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2. How to do strategic foresight
- Author:
- Samantha Cristoforetti and Alessandro Marrone
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- F oresight” is on the rise. What was a discipline restricted to a few people decades ago has become very popular. That’s good news – a wider use of foresight can have a number of benefits, as this guide explains. However, along with that popularity, the expectations about the scope of foresight have also grown. We can even find an aura of mystery surrounding the discipline. This is less helpful, as there is a risk of creating misperceptions about the nature of foresight. That is why it is necessary to limit the scope of foresight from the outset by clearly stating what it is and is not. Foresight is not about predicting or knowing the future. Despite the fantastic cover of this work, the aim of foresight is not envisioning what the future holds for us, i.e. predicting what is going to happen. Instead, foresight aims to make us more aware of what may happen, through a broad study of phenomena that are already present, so as to inform potential decisions. It may seem paradoxical, but a thorough analysis of the present reality is the basis of good foresight. Foresight is not a body of expert knowledge. It is not the realm of “experts” who pretend to hold special insights on the future. Rather, foresight is a methodical approach to thinking about possible futures that, at the same time, allows us to reveal and refine the assumptions and understandings we have about those futures. That does not mean that expertise does not matter. To the contrary, good foresight must integrate thematic, regional, scientific, military, political, economic, environmental, and other expertise to provide valuable insights. Foresight is not an end in itself. Instead, foresight is the first step to building better strategies and policies and improve the decision-making process in general. In this regard, foresight helps us to understand how potential, plausible futures could look like. Foresight helps us challenge our understandings and assumptions about the future, preventing bias that could hinder our plans and policies. Furthermore, foresight can help us shape our idea of a preferred future and set the basis of our effort to achieve it. Strategic foresight goes beyond pure foresight practices and is about integrating foresight into the policy-making process. This is a statement closely related to the previous idea and justifies the title of this guide. Chapter 4, “Setting the Policy,” is precisely dedicated to linking foresight to the policy/strategy-making process. As highlighted there, developing strategies and plans can be enhanced and supported by considering multiple alternative futures and their implications. This guide will use both terms, strategic foresight and foresight, the latter more specifically referring to the discipline of exploring, anticipating, and shaping the future in a systemic way.1 This guide aims to provide a simple tool for policy practitioners to start navigating the foresight discipline and help foster foresight thinking in policy teams and organizations. It does not intend to present a set of last-generation methodologies. Instead, this guide offers some simple tools and techniques of proven effectiveness that can be used by non-expert personnel. Nevertheless, simplicity is not equivalent to a lack of rigour, so the guide proposes a complete foresight process, starting with driver identification and scenario-building and ending with preparing and monitoring subsequent policies.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Foresight
- Political Geography:
- Europe and North America
3. Inequality kills: on Russian combat ineff ectiveness in Ukraine and beyond
- Author:
- Pilster Ulrich and Olesya Vinhas de Souza
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- What would Russia’s military strategy be in a war with NATO? Before 2022, many analysts worried about the scenario in which Russia, leveraging a tactically profi cient and well-coordinated combined arms force, could swiftly overrun the Baltics in a matter of days. Drawing on a statistical analysis of historical battles and an examination of Russian force structure and equipment losses in Ukraine, we challenge this view. Endemic inequality within the Russian Armed Forces will continue to impede their adoption of the sophisticated tactics necessary for manoeuvre warfare. Therefore, we anticipate that a future potential Russian attack would resemble a war of attrition. Unable to quickly out-manoeuvre NATO forces, Moscow would aim to deploy overwhelming fi repower and manpower against Allied troops and civilian populations, with an aim to infl ict widespread and sustained destruction.
- Topic:
- NATO, Military Strategy, Inequality, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
4. The Russian-Ukrainian War: An Opportunity to Strengthen the AfCFTA
- Author:
- Steve Tametong and Venessa Aboudi
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Nkafu Policy Institute
- Abstract:
- The world had hardly covered from the horrors of the COVID-19 pandemic when it was once again tested on February 24, 2022, by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The consequences of this war are quite significant for humanity. On the economic level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the disadvantages of globalization, understood as a process marked by the interconnection and interdependence of world economies. The inflationary shock and the food crisis resulting from the inoperative nature of import channels for certain basic necessities from Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the fragility of the economies. With regard to African countries, in particular, the prices of several basic food products (wheat, flour, rice, maize, bread, vegetable oil, etc.) have risen sharply. Indeed, most African countries are almost dependent on the import of agricultural products and seeds from the two belligerent countries. These imports correspond to 35 billion US dollars of imports each year (1). This appears to be an incongruity given the extent of arable land on the African continent. The low production and especially processing capacity increases the dependence of African economies on the import of these basic products. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to question the economic resilience of African States, that is to say, their “capacity [ to] keep output close to [their] potential despite a shock ” (2). Above all, it offers the opportunity to analyze the economic and commercial potential of the AfCFTA in the process of building the resilience of African economies to external shocks. Indeed, the AfCFTA was officially launched in January 2021 with the main objective of “creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by the movement of people in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent…” (3). This policy note is structured around the idea that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in view of its socio-economic consequences on the African continent, offers an opportunity for African countries to work toward the strengthening of the AfCFTA. So that it appears as a real pole of competitiveness and inter-African trade likely to counter the shocks and uncertainties of the dynamics of world trade. Before analyzing the AfCFTA as a pole of production and export of African products (II), it is necessary to take stock of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on African economies (I).
- Topic:
- Security, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Free Trade, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
5. Reach for the Stars: Bridging Italy’s Potential in Space with Its Foreign and Security Policy
- Author:
- Karolina Muti
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Italian capabilities, expertise and potential in the space sector are not widely known. Among state actors, Rome has actually been a pioneer in the field, boasting a long tradition that started in 1964 when Italy became the third country, after the Soviet Union and the United States, to send a nationally manufactured satellite into orbit.[1] From an industrial standpoint, Italy is among the few countries whose companies cover the whole space value chain.[2] In Europe, Rome is ranked second for total number of assets in orbit and is currently the third contributor to the European Space Agency (ESA).[3] An Italian astronaut, Samantha Cristoforetti, has recently become the first European woman to take command of the International Space Station (ISS).[4]
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Space
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Italy
6. The Putin Doctrine: What is it? The Russian Strategic Issue and the Enlarged National Security
- Author:
- Jose Alexandre Altahyde Hage
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
- Institution:
- Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
- Abstract:
- One can mention that this essay is only a contribution for an urgent issue in International Relations that is igniting debates in part of the academic community and the press in general, Russian expansionism and its conception of international security that, in our view, can be defined as enlarged national security. For Moscow, the dividing line between the international and the domestic whereas considering this issue is very thin4. This is why it is not a part of our objective to exhaust such a broad and complex topic, but to present some of its features.The period analysed in this article begins in 1991, with the demise of the Soviet Union, till January 2022, that marks the beginning of military exercises in some parts of Ukraine, namely the Donbass region, promoted by Putin ́s government. Our theoretical and methodological framework is based on classical and contemporary geopolitical literature, Halford Mackinder and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and International Relations realist thinkers such as Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer. Nevertheless, that does not mean that we will not be able to reference some liberal authors, such as Francis Fukuyama and Joseph Stiglitz.Apart from this Introduction, our essay is divided as such: a first part in which we propose a brief review of the concept of doctrine, as used by interstate politics and the State ́s national power principle. Following, we present an analysis of the Putin Doctrine, seen as both a result and as a drive for Moscow ́s revisionism in the face of the current geopolitical balance. In the third part, we examine some passages of the 1990s and of this emerging system, as an era of globalization, liberalization and “shock therapy” that disturbed the Russian quantum. Last, but not least, in our Final Thoughts some reflections will be brought.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
7. Starr Forum: Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
8. IMperial or Colonial: The War is Fought Over The Soviet Past an A Broken Relationship
- Author:
- Li Bennich-Bjorkman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- Russia is trying, through its bombs, attacks, and brutality, to erase what Ukraine was. Therefore, it is a war effort to keep remembering how Ukraine in peace looked like, how it smelled, tasted, and felt. And to never forget that this is a war against Ukraine, in its own right. Not as a representative of the West, and not as a representative of democracy. But because Ukraine is of such importance to Russia, that a break between the two is unthinkable for Putin. That was what Leonid Kravchuk, the Ukrainian president, realized already in 1991. He, and Ukrainian leaders after him, tried to protect their territory while at the same time reassuring Russia that relations could still be friendly. But Russia has never changed in a similar way
- Topic:
- Imperialism, Military Strategy, Colonialism, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
9. Exploring the Russian Perspective on the War in Ukraine: Demography's Power and Ukraine's Uniqueness
- Author:
- Aybars Arda Kilicer
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- Western officials and media have portrayed Russia as a rogue state that seeks to undermine the fundamental foundations of the Western lifestyle, which are based on democratic and liberal principles, especially more since the invasion of the remaining Ukrainian territories began on 24 February 2022. According to this perspective, Russia allegedly launched its strike to prevent Ukraine from joining the club of liberal nations. This move would have been a clear message to any other post-Soviet countries, further strengthening Russian control over them. It would be unfair to completely dismiss this argument, yet, justifying the simplification of the procedure and the continuation of conflict on these reasons goes much beyond presenting the facts. A thorough examination of the many issues involved is necessary to comprehend the Russian motivations for the ongoing war. This calls for an in-depth analysis of the Crimean Question, focusing on how Russia uses demographics in its foreign strategy. In addition, within the broader context of The Russian World (Russkiy Mir) Vision, it is crucial to understand the relevance of Russia’s unique perspective on Ukraine. The objective of this study is to provide an analytical framework concentrating on these apparently most visible factors for Russia’s willingness to raise tensions in Eastern Europe further and invade the remaining territory under the sovereignty of Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
10. Why Romania is a NATO "Model Ally?"
- Author:
- Petre Roman
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- NATO’s eastward expansion was a fundamental geopolitical process that allowed countries to be prepared for the worst, the Russian revanche, by pursuing the best, the most successful path for democracy. Romania, which emerged from the tremendous communist Ceausescu regime, strongly wanted NATO membership and, after the first encouraging meetings in 1990, officially entered in 2004. However, Romania has been already back then contributed to many Western missions. Due to its geographical position, Romania is central to all NATO objectives. Now, Romania and Poland are the pivots of NATO’s defensive complex in the “postsoviet space”: Poland protects the Baltic Sea, Romania the Black Sea, where the Russian old-imperial appetites remain; Romania still defends the precious grain corridor. Furthermore, Romania is a “model ally”. There is a solid pro-Atlantic and pro-American sentiment in the country.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Romania