Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Eurasia

11. Training Diplomats in Azerbaijan: Past Successes and Future Plans

Author:
Fariz Ismailzade
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Azerbaijan as one of 15 newly independent republics in 1991, the development of a sovereign and professional diplomatic service became of utmost importance and urgency. Doing so, it was understood, was a necessary attribute and instrument for pursuing a country’s foreign policy agenda, which at minimum should aim to strengthen sovereignty, minimize external risks, develop bilateral and multilateral relations, and properly position a given country on the global map of nations. Yet apart from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, Azerbaijan and the remaining 11 former Soviet republics had limited experience with a truly professional and competent diplomatic service. The Soviet Union granted little authority to the ‘ethnic republics’ and provided them with no autonomy in foreign relations. Consequently, the offices of the republic-level Ministries of Foreign Affairs remained quite small and primarily handled protocol responsibilities for foreign dignitaries and guests traveling from Moscow to those parts of the country. The one in Baku, for instance, was established in 1944 as the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sovereignty, Training, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Azerbaijan

12. Breaking Free from Parochial Geopolitical Complexity: Azerbaijan’s Quest for a Third Path

Author:
Vasif Huseynov
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Though geographically small at 186,043 square kilometers—and dwarfed by neighboring Iran, Türkiye, and especially Russia—the South Caucasus is home to over 50 distinct ethnic groups, encompassing a diverse tapestry of languages, religions, and cultures. Another unique characteristic for a region of this size is its consistent role as a microcosm of global geopolitics. This has been the case since the region’s three countries regained their respective independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, with each aligning with different geopolitical centers. While Georgia pursued Euro-Atlantic integration, Armenia aligned with Russia within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Azerbaijan, adopting a balanced foreign policy, opted for neutrality, maintaining equidistance and cultivating friendly, mutually-beneficial relations with both Russia and the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Diversity, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

13. A Transforming Eurasian Order

Author:
Feng Yujun
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
I n recent years, driven by multiple factors, the international order has been undergoing rapid adjustment, evolution, and reshaping. In Eurasia, the Russia-Ukraine war has triggered persisting upheaval, acting as a pivotal catalyst for shifts in the regional order. Its impact has prompted historic changes in power dynamics, mutual perceptions, national identities, and strategic orientations among Eurasian states—shifts unmatched since the Soviet Union’s dissolution over three decades ago. These transformations are set to profoundly influence the regional order, becoming a central element in current and future global developments.
Topic:
Post-Soviet Space, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

14. China-Russia Relations Since the Start of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Asia Sociey
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In the 19th century, like Western powers and Japan, Russia participated in the “Scramble for China”; however, unlike the others, it never returned the vast territories it annexed. After a long and turbulent history of Sino-Russian relations, Mikhail Gorbachev launched the Soviet “turn to Asia” policy in July 1986 with his Vladivostok speech. Addressing the Chinese directly, he declared: “I would like to dwell on the most important issue in our relations. These relations are extremely important for several reasons, starting from the fact that we are neighbors, that we share the world’s longest land border, and that we, our children, and grandchildren are destined to live near each other ‘forever and ever.’”1 This policy was reaffirmed by President Vladimir Putin after he came to power in 2000, reinforced during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and further intensified following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That year, China and Russia signed lengthy and grandiloquent declarations celebrating their “no-limits friendship,” prominently showcased during commemorations in Moscow marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Yet this no-limits friendship, while rhetorically expansive, has never been formalized and contains several clear limitations — limitations the current U.S. administration has unsuccessfully attempted to exploit. This paper examines the China-Russia relationship and its often-contradictory evolution. The strategic dynamic between these two Eurasian powers has produced a partnership further solidified by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, despite Beijing’s attempts to mediate the conflict. While the strength of this partnership may make it appear unbreakable, it should not preclude continued dialogue between China and the West — particularly the European Union and its member states. The EU–China summit held in Beijing on July 24, however, did not yield the expected results in this regard.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

15. Russian military thinking about the Baltic Sea and the Arctic

Author:
Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Russia is likely to continue its military build-up in both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic in the long-term perspective. Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, Russian military thinkers and planners are increasingly seeing the two theatres as contiguous areas.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Finland, Sweden, Arctic, and Baltic Sea

16. The rise and fall of the Wagner Group

Author:
Karen Philippa Larsen
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Wagner Group’s rise, conflict and fall show a process firstly of endorsing private military companies in Russia, only to later seek to regain control by including the groups in the official security structures. The plane crash that killed the leader of the Wagner Group, oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and six other high-ranking Wagner Group members in August 2023 marked the literal and figurative fall of the Wagner Group’s considerable influence on Russian foreign policy. The Wagner Group is what Russia calls a private military company (PMC), which tends to have a much closer relationship to the state than we would normally expect from a private company in the West.
Topic:
Security, Wagner Group, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

17. Russia 2024: Making or Breaking the System

Author:
Laetitia Spetschinsky
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
In 2024, Russia is poised for Putin’s fifth term amid a lackluster presidential election. The political landscape leans towards conservatism, emphasizing protection against internal dissent. Putin’s focus on family values and the crackdown on LGBTQ rights underscores a nationalist agenda. Internationally, Russia aims to defend Russian-speaking communities and expand alliances, particularly in BRICS. The pivotal year presents challenges in territorial acquisition, maintaining the war economy, and preserving national unity. Putin’s legacy hinges on navigating these challenges and proclaiming a strategic victory in the face of Western pressures.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, BRICS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

18. Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe

Author:
George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions. An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest. This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different. Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance. While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance. However, NATO’s powerful military deterrent alone cannot create stability in Europe. Paradoxically, an excessive reliance on military deterrence is likely to increase instability by inducing Russia to rely increasingly on its nuclear force as its primary basis for deterrence. Unlike conventional forces, Russia and NATO possess roughly the same amount of nuclear weapons. Washington must work to defuse this increasingly unstable dynamic by restoring diplomatic lines of communication between Russia and the West.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

19. Russia’s presidential election: Signalling repression and demobilizing opposition

Author:
Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Autocrats such as Vladimir Putin use elections strategically to demonstrate their capability to secure the necessary votes. This primarily benefits the regime’s inner circle and rent-seeking elites who rely on Putin’s presidency for their wealth. Although a notable proportion of the Russian population regards the election and Putin’s leadership as legitimate, their support for Russia’s military actions in Ukraine is waning. Only a slim majority backs the continuation of the conflict. Despite the oppressive political environment, opposition initiatives such as “Noon against Putin” manifest ongoing resistance. These actions were reflected in vote tallies abroad, where support for Putin was dramatically lower than in Russia. The post-election period is likely to see the persistence of Russia’s current domestic and foreign policies, with the potential for increased societal and economic tensions. The declining support for the war could further complicate the regime’s efforts to maintain a unified front. This could potentially impact Russia’s global standing and internal stability.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

20. Between Tradition and Transformation: The Impact of Illiberal Populism on Georgia’s Democratic Aspirations

Author:
Giorgi Iakobishvili
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The article examines the role of Georgian far-right illiberal populist groups in Georgian politics and their influence on Georgia’s foreign policy and the ongoing democratization process, emphasizing Euroscepticism, liberal institutional development, and the pro-Russian narrative. Using qualitative research methodology, we analyzed the programs, manifestos, and public speeches of well-known groups active in Georgian politics, such as People's Power, Georgian March, Georgian Idea, Unity, Essence, Hope (ERI), and Alliance of Patriots of Georgia. Analysis of the mentioned material, as well as various scientific studies, shows that the discourse of these groups is dominated by xenophobic, nationalist, populist, and racist rhetoric, which represents a significant challenge to Georgia’s European integration path and in the direction of democratization of its governance system. In the long term, we concluded that the existence and development of these illiberal populist actors threaten Georgia’s aspirations for European integration and democratic development. This study contributes to a broader discourse about populism and illiberal views in the Georgian reality, focusing on the influence of these ideologies on the formation of the country’s foreign policy and orientation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democracy, Populism, Domestic Politics, Illiberalism, and Euroskepticism
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia