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31. Broken Dream: The oligarch, Russia, and Georgia’s drift from Europe

Author:
Régis Genté
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Georgia’s relationship with the West has deteriorated over the last year and a half. The Georgian government’s actions have prevented the country from becoming a candidate for EU membership. Three-quarters of Georgians see themselves as pro-Western; only a tiny proportion of the population is pro-Russian. Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili appears to be largely responsible for this dissonance between Georgian foreign policy and public opinion. Through his control of the Georgian Dream party and the government, Ivanishvili may be attempting to manoeuvre Georgia into Russia’s sphere of influence. It is still possible for the EU to work with Georgia. But the bloc should condition the financial and political support it provides – starting with the 12 points that Brussels designated in June 2022.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, and Oligarchy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

32. Beyond Sputnik and RT: How Does Russian Soft Power in Serbia Really Work?

Author:
Vuk Vuksanović
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
Public opinion in Serbia and Russian soft power are some of the topics of the BCSP analysis written by BCSP Senior Researcher Vuk Vuksanović, President of the International Advisory Committee Srđan Cvijić and BCSP Visiting Fellow Maksim Samorukov. In 2022, as part of the public opinion survey, the Open Society Foundation (OSF) and Datapraxis collected data from 22 countries for the purpose of the report entitled “Fault Lines: Global Perspectives on a World in Crisis”. The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) had exclusive access to the said report and was able to analyse it. In autumn 2022, BCSP conducted its own public opinion survey on the Serbian citizens’ perception of the country’s major foreign and security policy issues. The “Fault Lines” survey established that Serbia is much different than any other country involved in the survey, including those that generally subscribe to the Russian narrative concerning the Russia-Ukraine war. The BCSP survey applied an even more granular approach to how Russian popularity in Serbia is manifested and how deeply it is entrenched. Based on the research findings, it can be concluded that soft power is a major element of the Russian presence in Serbia. However, the catch is that Russia’s soft power in Serbia is not operating based on the traditional definition of the term, derived from the attractiveness of a political and social model, but rather on the fact that the majority of the public in Serbia sees Russia as an alternative to the West, by which it feels betrayed, abandoned and never fully accepted. This has resulted in the enormous popularity of Russia, which is now a major impediment for Serbia joining the EU sanctions against Moscow or any overt anti-Russian policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Soft Power, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Serbia

33. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine

34. Russia and India: A New Chapter

Author:
Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America

35. Russian economic nationalism and the vectors of Russian foreign policy

Author:
Rafał Lisiakiewicz
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
In this article, the author wants to test the impact of economic nationalism on the change in Russia’s foreign policy. The author will refer to neoclassical realism, which shows how to combine the issues of power distribution in international relations with the influence of the domestic level of the state on the process of creation of the foreign policy. In terms of neoclassical realism, economic nationalism is a variable that shapes the perception of the economic challenges facing Russia. The author also points out that economic nationalism is also related to the protectionist policy of the Russian Federation. Thus, it influences the shaping of processes within and outside the country. The author recognizes that in the process of creating the Russian foreign policy decisions, economic nationalism should be linked to other factors, especially security issues and Russia’s general strategic culture, in order to obtain the final set of premises that will determine Russia’s shifts in foreign policy. The tensions related to the role of the EU and NATO in the countries of Eastern Europe clearly influenced the level of cooperation between Russia and the West. Nevertheless, economic issues in this regard were also extremely important. Russia’s power position was based on the economic potential.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Economics, Nationalism, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

36. The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
twitter The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine 174 08.11.2022 India has not condemned Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, which stems from historical ideological ties, as well as their strategic and military cooperation. However, the war has led to unfavourable changes from India’s point of view—the weakening of Russia, the collapse of its cooperation with the West, and a growing dependence on China. As a result, Russia is diminishing in importance as a key partner of India, including a supplier of weapons and technology. In the long run, closer cooperation between India and the U.S. and EU countries in the field of security and energy will help to move India away from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and India

37. What Next for Georgia's Foreign Policy

Author:
Arkadiusz Legieć
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
During the European Council summit on 23 June, Georgia was not granted EU candidate status, unlike Ukraine and Moldova, and received only the prospect of EU accession. Georgia is the most pro-European state in the South Caucasus. The effectiveness of its Euro-Atlantic foreign policy course is hampered by internal political polarisation and Russia’s policies towards the region. Georgia’s continued cooperation with the EU and NATO will depend primarily on its willingness to implement reforms and the development of an internal consensus between the government and opposition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Domestic Politics, Polarization, Russia-Ukraine War, and European Council
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Georgia

38. The Russia-Ukraine War and North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:
Seung-soo Hyun
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
What is the impact of the war in Ukraine on North Korea’s unprecedented military provocations? Seung-soo Hyun, a research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification, points out that Moscow’s defense of Pyongyang at the UN Security Council has emboldened North Korea. However, considering the low economic compatibility between the two countries and tight international sanctions against Russia after it invaded Ukraine, the bilateral economic cooperation would hardly help Pyongyang to develop its economy. Dr. Hyun claims that conflicts between Northeast Asian countries show signs of polarization and highlights the importance of monitoring how the war in Ukraine will reshape global strategic dynamics among Russia, China, and the U.S.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Denuclearization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and North Korea

39. The bear in the room: Russia's role in the UN Security Council - and what It means for the West

Author:
Elias Götz and Jonas Geji Kaas
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Kremlin attaches great importance to its role in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. This provides an opening for Western countries to use the Council as an arena for diplomatic competition with Russia. At the same time, the body serves as a much-needed venue for discussion and crisis management at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, UN Security Council, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

40. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia