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42. Ukrainian Organisations' Response to Russia's Full-Scale Invasion
- Author:
- Maryna Slobodyanuk, Lyudmila Cherkez, and Emma Mateo
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- The Harriman Institute
- Abstract:
- Join the Harriman Institute for an event with Ukrainian activists discussing how their organisations have responded to the 2022 escalation of Russia’s war on Ukraine. We will be joined virtually by activists representing two organisations: Truth Hounds, and TAPS Ukraine. Both organisations were in operation prior to 2022, but their work was significantly impacted by the challenges associated with the full-scale invasion. Maryna Slobodyanuk will discuss the work of Truth Hounds, where she is the Head of the Analytical Department. Truth Hounds has been documenting war crimes and other serious human rights violations in Ukraine since 2014. Lyudmila Cherkez will share the work of TAPS Ukraine, where she is head of communication. TAPS Ukraine is based in Dnipro, 100km from the front lines, and has been supporting those affected by military loss since 2018. TAPS Ukraine was also involved in the creation of the Coordinating Headquarters of Dnipro Volunteers, one of the largest volunteer hubs established in Eastern Ukraine following 24 February 2022. This hybrid event is open to the public and you are welcome to join us online or in person. The event will be moderated by Emma Mateo.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Activism, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
43. Economic Challenges to Ukrainian Refugee Integration in Central and Eastern Europe
- Author:
- Atanas Dimitrov and Vasil Pavlov
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
- Institution:
- Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
- Abstract:
- The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has resulted in the displacement of millions of Ukrainians, leading to socio-economic and political challenges for the host countries. The Refugee Response Plan, encompassing heavily affected EU Member States, has been the focus of this study, examining how the issue of refugee integration was addressed, with a specific emphasis on flaws and omissions in the approach. Various demographic and socioeconomic data and strategic national documents related to refugee integration were compared for this analysis. Employment was identified as a key tool for the integration of Ukrainian refugees. The findings revealed a lack of a common refugee integration policy among the surveyed countries despite similar past and current socioeconomic circumstances and security environments, including mixed migration. Ambiguities across these countries, including local population perceptions hindering Ukrainian refugee integration, were observed. Consequently, we assert the necessity for EU harmonized measures, emphasizing their long-term implementation to alleviate the economic burden of the war in Ukraine and provide predictability in the actions of individual governments.
- Topic:
- Economics, Refugees, Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
44. Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition
- Author:
- Seth G. Jones, Riley McCabe, and Alexander Palmer
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- Russia suffered more combat deaths in Ukraine in the first year of the war than in all of its wars since World War II combined, according to a new CSIS analysis of the force disposition and military operations of Russian and Ukrainian units. The average rate of Russian soldiers killed per month is at least 25 times the number killed per month in Chechnya and 35 times the number killed in Afghanistan, which highlight the stark realities of a war of attrition. The Ukrainian military has also performed remarkably well against a much larger and initially better-equipped Russian military, in part due to the innovation of its forces.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, Innovation, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
45. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Western Military Assistance
- Author:
- Tony Lawrence
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The tenth Brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the Western military assistance to Ukraine. Tony Lawrence, the Head of the Defence Policy and Strategy Programme at the ICDS, examines donor dilemmas, and how the Western military assistance has changed the course of the war. He highlights the steps made by Western Allies even before the 24th of February, and their considerations regarding “offensive” and long-range weapons, as well as Russia’s efforts to discourage donors. He concludes that most weapons can be used for both offence and defence, and therefore the Allies earlier argued about self-imposed restrictions. He states that the offensive-defensive dilemma was largely resolved when the war shifted to the east. Donor dilemmas include fear of escalation, the apparently limited capacity of manufacturers to produce replacements, and ensuring that Ukraine is provided with what it needs. Lawrence concludes that the West’s military assistance, far from being historically unprecedented, has been uneven and broadly cautious. Ukraine’s victories are Ukraine’s alone, but they could not have been achieved without Western assistance. The outcome of the war will depend to a large extent on Western supply of weapons and equipment to Ukraine, as Russia’s military strength degrades.
- Topic:
- Conflict, Foreign Assistance, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
46. Questions Concerning Finnish Membership in NATO
- Author:
- Mike Sweeney
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. Consideration of the defensibility of Finland must take into account a revitalized, long-term Russian threat, not just the force currently mired in a grinding war in Ukraine. More thorough discussion is needed about Finland’s capacity to defend itself and the level of outside support it would require from NATO and, specifically, the U.S. military. Regardless of whether it admits Finland, NATO should support it in any future crises with Russia. But the nature of that support changes depending on whether Finland is an alliance member or not, with attendant implications for the level of risk NATO incurs. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe need to be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, Finland, and Eastern Europe
47. Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine
- Author:
- Sascha Glaeser
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- The Russo-Ukraine war is analogous in several ways to a hypothetical war between China and Taiwan. Like Ukraine, Taiwan is a relatively weak state, threatened by a neighboring great power with a sizable nuclear arsenal who makes historical claims to its territory, and has some backing from the United States. Ukraine’s experience provides several lessons for Taiwan. War remains an instrument of statecraft that great powers use in pursuit of their perceived national interests; smaller, weaker states should plan accordingly. In Taiwan’s case, that means continuation of the status quo which has helped provide peace for decades. Taiwan should assume the United States will not engage in direct conflict with China on its behalf. This assumption should encourage Taiwan to focus its military strategy on securing an advantage by acquiring more anti-access, area-denial capability and reforming its reserve force to help it deter or resist an invasion. While Ukraine shows Taiwan could expect an outpouring of global humanitarian and military aid if attacked, its island geography and the likely course of the war means it might not manage to receive or access those supplies, and should therefore maintain strategic stockpiles of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, and other supplies. The United States and others will likely impose economic sanctions on China. However, sanctions are unlikely to alter China’s behavior in any meaningful way if it has already committed to war.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, and Asia
48. American Interests in the Ukraine War
- Author:
- Joshua Shifrinson
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America
49. Prepare Ukraine for Victory in a Long War
- Author:
- Luke Coffey
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years. While many assumed that the war would be short, a stiff Ukrainian defense halted and then successfully counter-attacked against the Russian advances on Kyiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. After capturing Kherson, Russia’s main advance from occupied Crimea in the south toward Mykolaiv also stalled. At the time of writing, Ukrainian forces are beginning a counterattack in that region and are located approximately 12 miles outside Kherson city center. Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov coastline, fell to the Russians on May 22 after Ukrainian forces made a heroic last stand in the Azovstal iron and steel works. This capture allowed Russia to create a land bridge from the Russian Federation to occupied Crimea. Mariupol’s capture also turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake.”1 In the Donbas, which is arguably Russia’s main effort at this stage of the war, Russian troops have made limited advances at a very high cost in equipment and manpower. In late June, Russian forces captured Sievierodonetsk after weeks of heavy fighting, leaving Russia in control of Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainians are currently defending a front line that is approximately 1,250 miles long—this is equal to the straight- line distance from Washington, DC, to Houston, Texas. Russian public opinion still supports the war.”2 While Russia’s advancements in the Donbas have been slow and costly, there is no indication that Moscow will stop its offensive anytime soon. President Vladimir Putin knows that his legacy rides on Russia’s victory or defeat in Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
50. Russia Can Still Be Defeated, But Time Is Short
- Author:
- Can Kasapoglu
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- At Davos last May, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sparked a controversy when he argued that Kyiv must cede territory to Moscow to achieve peace. Kissinger may well be correct to assert that a stable balance between Russia and Ukraine will require some trade-offs based on the principles of Realpolitik. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that Putin—a former KGB officer who considers the collapse of the Soviet Union to have been the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century—launched this war simply to secure a border readjustment. Putin’s essay, published in April 2021, expresses his view with admirable clarity: Ukraine, in the eyes of the Kremlin, is Russia. In sum, he launched this invasion to subordinate Ukraine to Moscow—totally and permanently. We should also not conclude that Russia’s battlefield setbacks have been so severe as to deflect Putin from his original goal. After he failed to subordinate Ukraine swiftly with a quick knockout blow directed at the capital, Kyiv, he moved to Plan B: a strategy of exhaustion. He is now determined to grind Ukraine down slowly and deliberately with the expectation that eventually it will have no choice but to bow to his iron fist. For its part, the West should thwart Putin’s strategy by safeguarding Ukraine’s political and economic independence. Kissinger’s comments did not bring us closer to achieving that goal. If members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) follow his lead and attempt to cajole Kyiv into ceding territory now, while Russia still believes it has the upper hand on the battlefield, their efforts will only whet Putin’s appetite for expansion. Putin will begin to entertain compromises acceptable to the West only when he comes to believe that failure to do so will lead inevitably to catastrophic losses for Russia. The bad news is that the military balance on the ground right now will not lead him to such a conclusion. If NATO members act quickly, however, there is still time to shift the dynamic in Ukraine’s favor—but it will not be easy.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe