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51. China and the Two Koreas’ Triangular Games

Author:
See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
A rebound in China-ROK diplomacy raised optimism after a slow start to 2024, paving the way for the summit between Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol on Nov. 15. They met on the sidelines of APEC Peru before attending the G20 summit in Brazil. Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Cho Tae-yul met in Beijing on May 13, facilitating the China-ROK-Japan trilateral summit and Yoon’s meeting with Premier Li Qiang in Seoul. As China-DPRK exchanges dwindled compared to the first third of this year, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un’s summits with Putin in May and June raised questions about the direction of China’s Korea policy. Donald Trump’s reelection in November intensified debate on the regional security and economic implications of US-China competition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

52. Increasing Perils Ahead

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Lai Ching-te insisted at his May inauguration that Taiwan is sovereign and not subordinate to China. Beijing reacted by increasing cross-Strait tensions. China’s latest rounds of military exercises make clear that it is preparing to use force or at least gray-zone intimidation to effect reunification. Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang continued unofficial contacts with the Chinese Communist Party, seeking reconciliation but risking aiding China’s efforts to fragment Taiwan. Taiwan’s TSMC continues to expand in Taiwan and overseas in ways that keep it at the center of the global high-tech economy. Taiwan has increased its purchases of military equipment from the US and opened negotiations on a bilateral tax agreement. Beijing views US support for Taiwan as collaboration in Lai’s separatism. US President-elect Donald Trump has said that Taiwan stole the production of semiconductors from the US and should pay for US military support. However, this animus may be balanced by the outspoken Taiwan supporters he has chosen for his national security team. Can Taiwan overcome its internal divisions and Trump’s Taiwan skepticism? Can China, Taiwan, and the US step back from a confrontational spiral? None of this will be easy, but failure may put Taiwan’s future at risk.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Economy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

53. Trump’s Return Scrambles Outlook

Author:
Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
US-China relations through 2024 remained marked by a paradox. On the one hand, ties displayed a distinct stabilization. The two sides translated their leaders’ modest “San Francisco Vision” into reality. Cabinet officials and the numerous working groups met in earnest and produced outcomes, functional cooperation was deepened though differences emerged, sensitive issues were carefully managed, and effort was devoted to improving the relationship’s political optics. US electoral politics, or threat of Chinese interference in the elections, did not materially impinge on ties. On the other hand, the negative tendencies in US-China relations deepened. With its time in office winding down, the Biden administration went into regulatory overdrive to deepen the “selective decoupling” of the two countries’ advanced technology ecosystems. China methodically responded in kind using its now-robust economic lawfare toolkit. The chasm in strategic perceptions remained just as wide. Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office portends a period of disruptive unpredictability in ties, although “Tariff Man” Trump can reliably be expected to enact additional impositions on Chinese imports. Two years to the day that they met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia to place a floor under their troubled relationship and initiate a process of emplacing guardrails, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met for their third in-person meeting as presidents in Lima, Peru, on the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting. In Lima, the two presidents took stock of the gradual rehabilitation of ties over the past two years, despite its early interruption by the balloon incident, and pledged to consolidate the fragile stability and make the relationship more predictable. They also patted themselves for harvesting some of the low-hanging fruit since their summit in Woodside, California, 12 months ago. US-China relations have made important incremental progress over the past 18 months, starting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing in June 2023 (Blinken returned to Beijing again this April). In Spring 2023, aside from meetings of their senior-most officials, there was practically no active communication channel between the two sides. Fast forward to today and there are more than 20 dialogue frameworks that span the range from diplomacy, security, economy, trade, fiscal affairs, finance and military to counternarcotics, law enforcement, agriculture, climate change, and people-to-people exchanges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

54. The Clash at Tawang: Tensions Rise on the China-India Border

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 9, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian army clashed at Yangtse along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Tawang Sector in Arunachal Pradesh resulting in injuries on both sides. Following the incident, the local Indian commander held a flag meeting with his Chinese counterpart on December 11 in order to restore peace. The clash at Tawang marked the first major skirmish between the two armies in the eastern sector since the Galwan Valley clash in the western sector in Eastern Ladakh on June 15, 2020 (China Brief, July 15, 2020).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

55. The Sino-Russian Partnership Assumptions, Myths and Realities

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
When Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced a “no limits friendship” at their February 2022 summit, the message was that Beijing and Moscow had reached a new peak in relations. Yet Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed the limits of Sino-Russian partnership and highlighted their sometimes diverging interests. Far from being an authoritarian alliance, this is a classic great power relationship centered in realpolitik. China and Russia are strategically autonomous actors, with fundamentally different attitudes toward international order. The Sino-Russian partnership remains resilient. Both sides recognize that it is too important to fail, especially given there are no viable alternatives to continuing cooperation. Nevertheless, the balance of power within the relationship is changing rapidly. Russia’s geopolitical and economic dependence on China is greater than ever. Although predictions of a clientelist relationship are premature, this widening inequality represents a major long-term source of weakness. The challenges Beijing and Moscow pose to Western interests are largely separate and should be addressed individually on their merits. Equally, it is naive to imagine that reaching out to either side could help loosen their strategic partnership. Western governments should focus instead on upping their own game—from revitalizing democracy and the rule of law at home to addressing universal threats such as climate change and food insecurity. Bobo Lo is an Associate Research Fellow with the Russia/NIS Center at Ifri. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow with the Lowy Institute, Sydney, Australia; and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, and Deputy Head of Mission at the Australian Embassy in Moscow. Dr. Lo has written several books, including A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World (Penguin Australia, 2017); Russia and the New World Disorder (Brookings and Chatham House, 2015); and Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics (Brookings and Chatham House, 2008).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

56. Global trends in countries‘ perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Drawing on global media reports, we conduct a sentiment analysis of the image of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the evolution of its image over time. Our main finding is that perceptions of the initiative deteriorated significantly in many geographies from 2017 to 2022. The notable exception is in sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI’s image remains positive, even if slightly less so than in the past. This is notwithstanding increases in debt levels with China, much of which now face potential restructuring. Furthermore, we find significant inter- and intra-regional differences in the average sentiment towards China’s landmark project, as well as a much worse image of the initiative in countries which, until today, are not part of the BRI. Finally, we focus on the European Union, Africa and China’s immediate neighbourhood to better understand the complexities behind the perceived benefits and challenges associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

57. Course Correction: Charting a More Effective Approach to U.S.-China Trade

Author:
Clark Packard and Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Over the past several years the U.S.-China economic relationship has soured and become subordinated to broader concerns about national security and geopolitics. After a decades‐​long reform agenda in China that lifted hundreds of millions out of grinding poverty, Chinese president Xi Jinping has increasingly turned inward—reembracing Maoist socialism and heavy‐​handed central planning. Washington’s response to these worrisome developments has been reflexively hawkish economically, scattershot, and woefully inadequate for the economic challenge that China presents.
Topic:
National Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

58. Pyongyang in Search of a New Cold War Strategy

Author:
Jihwan Hwang
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Jihwan Hwang, a professor at the University of Seoul, predicts that the strengthening alliance between North Korea, China, and Russia could enable North Korea to overcome its international isolation, weakening the influence of the US-South Korea alliance and increasing China’s leverage over the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Hwang points out that even without the establishment of a new Cold War order, the strengthened cooperation among the authoritarian regimes will pose a significant strategic challenge to South Korea. As Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang has been based on a unipolar system led by Washington, Dr. Hwang highlights the need for South Korea to explore new approaches to address the changing security environment.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

59. Deepening Suspicions and Limited Diplomacy

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
China and South Korea began 2023 with the temporary imposition of tit-for-tat restrictions by both governments on travel to the other country after China lifted its zero-COVID policy. Although the restrictions proved temporary, they pointed to the reality of a sustained downward spiral in China-South Korea relations accompanied by increasingly strident public objections in Chinese media to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s steps to redouble South Korean alignment with the United States regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, supply chain resiliency, and shared values. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin’s congratulatory call to newly appointed Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang on Jan. 9 was one of the few positive senior-level interaction between the two countries in early 2023; by the end of April, the main diplomatic interactions between China and South Korea had devolved into a dueling exchange of private demarches and public assertions that the other side had committed a “diplomatic gaffe.” As Yoon took steps to strengthen South Korean ties with NATO, stabilize relations with Japan, and upgrade efforts with the US to deter North Korea from continued nuclear development, Chinese criticisms of South Korea became increasingly ominous. They culminated in a stern Chinese diplomatic response to Yoon’s interview with Reuters on April 19 in which he characterized a possible cross-strait conflict between mainland China and Taiwan as a global security issue. Meanwhile, the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) in February and China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) confirming Xi Jinping’s third term as president in March drove symbolic exchanges of support between Chinese party-state and military leaders and their North Korean counterparts. The continued lack of a unified UN response to North Korean missile provocations renewed calls for Chinese “responsibility” and “influence” and Beijing’s reassertions of Pyongyang’s own “insecurity.” The arrival of Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun in Pyongyang, delayed for two years following his appointment due to pandemic-related quarantines, may presage a broader opening for China-North Korea humanitarian exchanges alongside concerns about North Korea’s ongoing military development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

60. Confrontation Muted, Tensions Growing

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
As 2023 began, cross-Strait confrontation was muted. Travel began returning to pre-COVID levels across the Strait and between the mainland and Taiwan’s offshore islands. At China’s annual National People’s Congress, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang and reanointed President Xi Jinping eschewed inflammatory rhetoric about reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan and the US kept Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the US low-key. Tsai met House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, deflecting the speaker’s expressed interest in visiting Taiwan and avoiding the destabilizing Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that followed Speaker Pelosi’s visit last August. Despite this calm, seeds of confrontation proliferated. China cut a communications cable to Taiwan’s offshore islands and announced a coast guard drill to inspect commercial shipping in the Taiwan Strait, both interpreted as practice for gray-zone coercion. China persuaded Honduras to sever its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Taiwan increased its military budget and expanded training with US forces. Former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou visited China and met Chinese officials, endorsing the 1992 Consensus and signaling that the upcoming election campaign for Taiwan’s president will again offer two very different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with mainland China.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Coercion, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia