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41. China’s influence at the United Nations: words and deeds

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Théo Storella, and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
We investigate China’s influence at the United Nations by focusing on the promotion of its narratives (words) and its voting behaviour (deeds). For the former, we assess the extent to which China’s global initiatives have become embedded in UN discourse compared to Western initiatives. For the latter, we assess the degree to which countries, regions and voting coalitions align their UN General Assembly votes with China compared to the US. When it comes to words, China’s global initiatives are sometimes louder than the West’s. More specifically, the Belt and Road Initiative has had a much greater impact on UN discourse than any Western initiative. Other Chinese global initiatives do not clearly stand out from those of the West, with the Global Compact for Migration mentioned more frequently at the UN than any Chinese initiative other than the BRI. We also find that Chinese initiatives are more self-referential. Thematically, both Chinese and Western initiatives are very focused on security as well as aid and human rights. Moving to voting patterns, countries’ income levels are a key determinant of alignment in voting. Poorer countries are much more aligned with China than with the US. North America and the European Union, in that order, are generally more aligned with the US than with China and these trends are much more stable than one could expect given China’s growing economic influence.
Topic:
United Nations, Bilateral Relations, Governance, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

42. Updating the EU strategy on China: co-existence while derisking through partnerships

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Abigaël Vasselier
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union-China relationship has deteriorated markedly since the EU introduced a three-part strategy in 2019 based on partnership, competition and systemic rivalry. Th e relationship has been undermined by China’s support for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and its increasingly anti-Western foreign policy that aims to alter the international rules-based system. Meanwhile, the economic relationship is changing because of China’s structural deceleration and increasing self-reliance, coupled with the EU’s growing critical dependence on China, especially for digitalisation and decarbonisation. Europe must accept that relations with China will not return to their pre-pandemic state. While there is no need to change the overall strategy, the EU should seek co-existence with China while preserving EU values and interests. Cooperation is still needed to address global problems, including climate change, in which China plays an important role in finding solutions, but on which the EU cannot accept Chinese cooperation at any price. In terms of co-existence, the EU must continue to pursue de-risking – or reducing its exposure to China – especially for its energy and digital transitions. De-risking has started but more needs to be done to understand how it can be continued while not creating conflict. The EU should pursue a three-part approach: increase coherence and coordination with all European stakeholders, refi ne the EU economic-security strategy while accepting trade-offs, and seek partnerships as the best offensive tool. The 2024-2029 European Commission should foster discussion of China and coordination of strategic issues within a larger constituency. EU countries, with Commission coordination, need to be more involved in building a comprehensive approach, including by conducting national risk assessments and by shaping and implementing de-risking measures. On economic security, full implementation of current defensive instruments is needed, along with new protections, such as better coordination of export controls and a new outbound-investment screening mechanism. The trade-offs stemming from pursuing more security will need to be made explicit in order to mitigate them. On partnerships, the EU must look beyond the United States, working within the G7 and with other like-minded countries, such as Australia and South Korea, which have valuable experience of de-risking. Mutually beneficial and strategic cooperation agreements need to be brokered with relevant emerging and developing economies.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Economy, Risk, Trade, and Coexistence
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

43. Partnership of convenience: Ream Naval Base and the Cambodia–China convergence

Author:
Rahman Yaacob
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
It is unlikely that Ream Naval Base in Cambodia will be a Chinese military base or outpost such as the facility in Djibouti fully operated by the People’s Liberation Army. However, China could gain preferential access to the base or use its facilities there to collect intelligence against other states. The Cambodia–China defence convergence is driven by differing motives. Cambodia seeks a partner to modernise its military so it can meet perceived security threats from Thailand and Vietnam, while China wants to expand its political influence and military reach in Southeast Asia. New political and military leadership in Cambodia offers Australia and other like-minded partners an opportunity to deepen defence relations with the kingdom to counter China’s influence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Navy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Cambodia

44. On U.S.-China Relations & Climate

Author:
Kate Logan and Li Shuo
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Climate change, and how to confront it, is one of the most politicized issues in the American political system. Regardless of how U.S. politicians talk about climate change, its effects are increasingly dire for Americans and the entire world — including many vulnerable populations in Asia. With the United States and China accounting for around 40% of annual greenhouse gas emissions globally, the speed and scale of their collective emissions reductions will largely determine the future magnitude of economic and human damages. Moreover, how the United States and China implement climate policy and interact will also shape geopolitics, especially for Asian economies that depend on fossil fuels or those rich in minerals and technologies needed for clean energy. The nature of climate change as a common global challenge previously enabled the United States and China to forge a uniquely cooperative relationship on the issue. U.S.-China joint action famously laid the groundwork for the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, while tempering bilateral tensions. Former President Donald Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, however, irrevocably damaged this cooperation, along with global trust in the United States as a climate leader. And the recent emergence of U.S. economic competitiveness with China as a rare area of bipartisan consensus has further complicated the issue, as U.S. policy responses aiming to limit China’s global dominance in essential clean technologies including solar panels and electric vehicles are seen as counterproductive to the global clean energy transition. Despite this, President Joe Biden and his vice president, Kamala Harris — now the Democratic presidential nominee — have supported climate cooperation as a critical area of U.S.-China convergence. This is the backdrop against which this year’s U.S. election is playing out: two parties that largely align in their view of China as the top U.S. competitor, but who hold starkly polarized views toward climate policy as an economic enabler, in Harris’s and the Democrats’ case, or as a barrier to growth that must be dismantled, as Trump and his supporters contend. The stakes are high — for U.S.-China relations, as well as for the health and safety of our planet.
Topic:
Climate Change, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Carbon Emissions, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. On U.S.-China Relations & Political Economy

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee and Neil Thomas
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Communist leaders may not like electoral democracy but there are few events they will pay more attention to this year than the U.S. presidential election on November 5. General Secretary Xi Jinping says U.S.-China ties are “the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” and Chinese officials, scholars, and netizens are anxious to glean insights about Republican Party candidate and former President Donald Trump and Democratic Party candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris. For Beijing, the stakes are high. The presidencies of first Trump and now Joe Biden saw the United States adopt a posture of “strategic competition” toward China that has significantly impacted the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s external environment and domestic priorities. Trump imposed tariffs on most Chinese imports to the United States, which Biden ramped up in key industries including electric vehicles. Biden introduced extensive export controls aimed at curbing China’s chip industry, which could be expanded to other sectors. Trump and Biden have both elevated U.S. support for Taiwan; strengthened restrictions on inbound and outbound investment with China; and sanctioned hundreds of Chinese government agencies, state-owned enterprises, private firms, and individuals. Biden has further prioritized working with U.S. allies and partners on economic, political, and security policies to blunt China’s influence. Both countries seek “guardrails” against crisis and conflict, but bilateral diplomacy is increasingly fraught and multilateral cooperation on global challenges is increasingly difficult. This essay analyzes the China policies of both candidates, focusing on the diplomatic and economic dimensions of U.S.-China relations, highlighting how a second Trump administration could deliver acute shocks but potential openings while Harris would likely bring continuity with Biden’s approach. It argues that Beijing has no clear preference between the two candidates. Therefore, neither election outcome would fundamentally change China’s international strategy, although the result would produce different tactical responses. It concludes with recommendations for how both Washington and Beijing can safeguard global stability while preserving national sovereignty regardless of who succeeds Biden.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

46. On U.S.-China Relations & Security

Author:
Lyle Morris and Wu Xinbo
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In the run-up to the November 2024 U.S. presidential election, national security issues are playing a key role in the campaigns of the two candidates — Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. In particular, since China has been identified as the United States biggest “strategic competitor” during both the Trump and Biden administrations, a key question is how will the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will be affected under a Harris or a Trump presidency? This article explores how both candidates will approach China if elected president. In particular, both authors will present U.S. and Chinese perspectives of how both candidates will influence bilateral relations, with a particular focus on national security. The central question to be considered is this: Will there be any discernible changes to U.S. policy towards China under a Harris or a Trump presidency? If so, what changes might be expected? Both authors agree that there will be few differences at the macro level in the China strategies of Harris and Trump: “strategic competition” has become deeply ingrained as the guiding principle within the U.S. national strategy towards China. Furthermore, national security has seeped into U.S. trade and investment policy toward China in recent years, to include greater U.S. export controls on high-technology commodities. Thus, it is likely that both candidates will continue policies that nest national security considerations within an overall economic approach toward China. However, we may expect tactical differences in both candidates’ policies regarding trade and U.S. approaches to alliances. Harris will likely continue policies under a Biden administration that prioritize the central role that U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe play in the world. While Trump will likely inject uncertainty into the role of alliances within strategic competition with China. He will also likely adopt a much more aggressive stance on trade, to possibly include heavy tariffs on China, that may destabilize an already unstable bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

47. Pragmatic Considerations: Analyzing Why is China Concerned About North Korea-Russia Growing Military Cooperation?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On November 11, 2024, North Korea’s Central News Agency reported that Pyongyang had ratified a mutual defense treaty with Russia. This agreement, signed by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in June, stipulates that both parties will provide support to each other in the event of an armed attack. In October 2024, reports suggested that North Korea dispatched several thousand troops to Russia to assist in its war effort in Ukraine. Although both Moscow and Pyongyang have neither confirmed nor denied this action outright, China’s silence and ambiguous stance on the matter have been equally enigmatic. The increasing military alignment between North Korea and Russia has raised significant concerns in China, a key strategic ally of both nations. These concerns stem from the potential repercussions on Beijing’s regional and global influence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

48. Voters Consider, Trump Comes, China Coercion Cools

Author:
Graeme Dobell
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Australia’s politicians prepare for the national election that must be held by May. In judging the first term of Anthony Albanese’s Labor government, the key concern for Australia voters is the cost of living, while international issues are bracketed by the United States and China—the return of President Donald Trump and the cooling of China’s trade coercion of Australia. The Albanese government tells Australians they face “fraught and fragile global conditions” in a “a time of great global uncertainty,” in “the most complex and challenging strategic environment since the Second World War.” Canberra’s approach to the Trump administration will emphasize traditional alliance ties while reinforcing new elements: AUKUS nuclear submarines, the Quad, the increase of US forces on Australian soil, and steps toward free trade in defense equipment and technology to achieve more integration between US and Australian industries.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, Strategic Interests, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

49. Moscow and Beijing at the Dawn of A Grave New World of Trump 2.0

Author:
Yu Bin
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The election of Donald Trump as the 47th US president changed the chemistry between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing so much and yet so little. It was so much because the war-ending rhetoric of the president-elect was in sharp contrast to his predecessor’s steadfast support of Ukraine. It was so little because the war in Ukraine not only continued but even escalated after Trump’s decisive electoral win in early November as the Biden administration rushed arms to Ukraine with much relaxed restrictions (on ATACMS, etc.). Meanwhile, Beijing-Moscow relations continued to broaden and deepen throughout 2024 despite Trump’s repeated vows to split the Russia-China entente. Xi and Putin met three times in six months (May, July, and October). Their joint enterprises (SCO, BRICS, etc.) also expanded steadily while experiencing growing pains. Meanwhile, the two large powers considerably stepped up their mil-mil interactions with more exercises, exchanges, and joint patrols. It remains to be seen how Trump would operationalize his campaign rhetorics not just to capture a pivotal position within the Moscow-Beijing-Washington triangle, but more importantly, to avert the Kissingerian dark prophecy of a grave new world of WMD and AI racing toward World War III.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

50. Movement but Minimal Progress

Author:
June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Signs of a possible improvement in Sino-Japanese relations followed a meeting between newly elected Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Peru on November, with the two exchanging vague promises of cooperation. Separately, China softened its position on various issues, saying that an unexpected obstruction had accidentally pushed its spy plane into Japanese airspace, allowing the resumption of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish that had been suspended since November 2023 and reinstating visa-free entry that had been suspended in the wake of CovidCOVID. The government also indicated that it will gradually resume imports of Japanese seafood and remove a buoy in what Japan considers its exclusive economic zone, though neither has happened yet. Japanese skeptics pointed out that with no resolution on these and a number of other issues such as the detention of Japanese nationals on vaguely worded charges and sporadic violent attacks against Japanese children, it is premature to speak of Xi’s long-postponed state visit to Tokyo.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia