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22. Sino-Russia Arctic Relations: The View from Singapore
- Author:
- Hema Nadarajah
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Dr. Hema Nadarajah, Program Manager for Southeast Asia at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, explains that states seeking to deepen their engagement in the Arctic, such as Singapore, may find themselves trying to balance tensions, especially in the wake of Sino-Russian cooperation in the region and US-China strategic competition.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and Arctic
23. South Korean Perspectives on China-Russia Collaboration in the Arctic
- Author:
- Young Kil Park
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Dr. Young Kil Park, Research Fellow at Korea Maritime Institute, explains that "While the immediate impact of China-Russia collaboration in the Arctic on South Korea is limited, it remains wary of the long-term implications for its economic and security interests."
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Collaboration
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Arctic
24. The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation
- Author:
- James Park and Mike M. Mochizuki
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China. Efforts to discourage North Korean and Chinese aggression are necessary, particularly considering Japan and South Korea’s physical proximity to the two countries. But the emerging trilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea could backfire and increase the risk of conflict if it focuses exclusively on military deterrence. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should instead pursue a more balanced arrangement — one that promotes stability on the Korean peninsula, credibly reaffirms long standing policy over the Taiwan issue, and disincentivizes China from pursuing its own trilateral military partnership with North Korea and Russia. To deter North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are relying on strike capabilities and military coordination to retaliate against North Korean aggression. This approach, however, will likely induce North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons and upgrade its missile capabilities. With this in mind, the three countries should roll back policy rhetoric and joint military exercises that might further provoke rather than deter North Korea, especially anything geared towards regime destruction. At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial. Another concerning aspect associated with this trilateral is the possibility of a corresponding alliance formation of Russia, China, and North Korea. To disincentivize this development, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should leverage their blossoming relationship to assuage Chinese fears of strategic containment, particularly through economic and diplomatic engagement that rejects the creation of a broadly exclusionary bloc in the region.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Escalation, Regional Security, Great Powers, and Regional Stability
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America
25. Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and Understandings are Urgently Needed
- Author:
- Michael D. Swaine
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The U.S.–China relationship appears to have stabilized since the November 2023 meeting between U.S. president Joe Biden and China’s president Xi Jinping in San Francisco. The reality, however, is that the features and trends pushing both countries toward a confrontation over Taiwan persist, fueling a dangerous, interactive dynamic that could quickly overcome any diplomatic thaw between the world’s foremost powers. These underlying forces — increased levels of domestic threat inflation in both the United States and China, the worst–casing of the other side’s motives and intentions, and the resulting erosion in the confidence of the original understanding over Taiwan reached in the 1970s — threaten to push Beijing and Washington into a crisis over Taiwan that both sides say they want to avoid. To defuse this worrying dynamic, both the United States and China must reaffirm long standing policy on Taiwan, while also undertaking a set of specific actions to further stabilize the relationship between the two countries. The Biden administration should explicitly reject extreme rhetoric towards China and deviations from longstanding policy on Taiwan, such as the framing of Sino–American competition as a titanic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, and the contention that an independent Taiwan is strategically crucial to overall Asian security. The administration can further inject stability into U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan by re–affirming and clarifying the One China policy through a series of statements, including: The United States opposes any Chinese effort to coerce Taiwan or compel unification through force. However, the United States would accept any resolution of the cross–Strait issue that is reached without coercion and that is endorsed by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The United States recognizes that the defense of Taiwan is primarily the responsibility of the people of Taiwan. Relatedly, and in accordance with the U.S.–China normalization agreement, Washington is committed to maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan and has no desire to alter this commitment. The United States Government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan. These statements should be made in combination with actions that bolster cooperative engagement with China, such as the initiation of a combined civilian and military Track 1.5 dialogue with Beijing. We believe that this type of reassurance would lead to corresponding commitments from China that would improve stability in the Taiwan Strait, such as reductions in provocative military exercises and potentially high level Chinese declarations that reject coercive measures towards Taiwan and a specific timeline for reunification. The recent improvements to the Sino–American relationship shouldn’t go to waste. The United States and China should go beyond the mere appearance of stabilization and revitalize the original understanding over Taiwan. Otherwise, they risk a continuous spiral towards full–scale conflict.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Realism, Regional Stability, and Restraint
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
26. Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan
- Author:
- Michael D. Swaine and James Park
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint for a U.S.–China conflict, unmatched in its combustible mix of conflicting interests, high stakes, and eroding trust and assurances. A full–blown war over Taiwan has become a startling possibility. Suspicion, threat inflation, zero–sum framing, and worst–casing are increasingly dominant factors in U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan, driven by preconceived ideas of the other’s intentions based on history and ideology, and domestic pressures in each country to prioritize military deterrence and even aggression. Amidst this emerging threat of direct conflict, numerous scholars, experts, and military strategists have focused on how to discourage China from invading Taiwan through military force alone — warfighting perspectives that typically share glaring and mutually reinforcing faults that, if overlooked, may only help to pave the path toward conflict. Analysts’ emphasis on military deterrence tends to obscure the utmost importance of political reassurances to avert conflict, particularly the United States reaffirming and recommitting to its original understanding of the One China Policy; this fixation on the military dimension feeds into the destabilization of the Taiwan issue, brought about by heightened suspicions of the other side’s intentions. Policymakers and pundits, in turn, tend to underestimate the possibility of inadvertent escalation, driven by an environment of distrust, pressure in Washington and Beijing to appear tough on the other, and a lack of comprehensive crisis management mechanisms. By examining the common analytical blindspots regarding a conflict over Taiwan, this report sheds new light on how the political and social dynamics fueling mutual hostility between Beijing and Washington could play a much more decisive role in a future crisis over Taiwan, rather than factors that earn far more attention, such as calculations about military capability and resolve. Averting a destructive crisis will require the United States and China to build off recent diplomatic progress to restore a deeper mutual understanding concerning Taiwan through policies and actions including: Mutual recognition of the interactive nature of the growing crisis over Taiwan, to which Beijing, Washington, and Taipei contribute. A clearer, more credible U.S. commitment to its successful, long–standing stance on Taiwan: the One China Policy and strategic ambiguity. Continued U.S. rejection of both unilateral Taiwan independence and any unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s defense. A credible Chinese affirmation of its continued commitment to peaceful unification without any specific deadline. The development of a broad–based crisis communication mechanism that includes both military and civilian dialogue.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Crisis Management, Joe Biden, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
27. How Has the Ukraine War Changed the China-Russia Relationship?
- Author:
- Yun Sun, Segey Radchenko, Andrew Nathan, and Alexander Cooley
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- The Harriman Institute
- Abstract:
- Just prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “no-limits” partnership between their countries. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the Sino-Russian relationship. While Putin has sought Beijing’s support for his territorial grab, China’s position, has been famously characterized as “pro-Russia neutrality”. Geopolitics remains the single most important factor in China’s decision regarding the Ukraine war, as Beijing has been torn between the competing agendas of managing its relations with Russia and relations with Europe. And while the Russians have grown increasingly frustrated with what many in Moscow perceive as Beijing’s double-dealing and unwillingness to commit, Putin’s leverage with Xi Jinping remains limited. As the war in Ukraine grinds into its third year, China and Russia continue unsteadily towards an ever closer alignment even while pragmatically looking out for their own interests in an evolving world.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
28. Figures on the Billiard Table: EU-China Dynamics in the Wake of the 2024 European Elections
- Author:
- Bart Dessein and Jasper Roctus
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- While still a powerhouse in its own right, Europe’s relative influence on the world stage has been diminishing over the last few decades. Data, for example, highlight a significant shift in global trade patterns away from the old continent. According to a recent Brookings’ calculation, South-South trade had by 2009, i.e., around the time of the global financial crisis, increased from 10.9 per cent to 25.0 per cent worldwide. South-South trade thus surpassed North-North trade for the first time in world history. Today, 35.0 per cent of global trade is accounted for by South-South merchandise trade, and just 25.0 per cent of global trade is North-North trade. One important factor in this is a surging China-Africa trade. With China’s bilateral trade with Africa rising from 2.7 billion dollar in 1990 to 209 billion dollar in 2022, China has now become Africa’s single largest trading partner.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Elections, European Union, Trade, and Strategic Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
29. China, Russia, and Power Transition in Central Asia
- Author:
- Robert E. Hamilton
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- Since the days of Thucydides, scholars have written about—and policymakers have wrestled with—the dangers of power transition, which occurs when a rising power challenges the previously dominant power in a system. In the 5th Century BCE, this dynamic led to decades of war between alliance systems led by Sparta and Athens. Though Sparta eventually defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the real winner was the Persian Empire, which snatched up territory from the exhausted states of the Hellenic system after the war ended. Much scholarship on the so-called Thucydides Trap focuses on the United States and China, asking if the powers two can negotiate the latter’s rise without conflict. But there is another, more acute power transition underway: that between Russia and China in Central Asia. In the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia’s power and legitimacy in Central Asia has declined in absolute terms. The erosion of Russian power relative to that of China, however, is more important than the decline in Moscow’s absolute power. Power transitions are notoriously hard to navigate and can strain even amicable relationships, turning erstwhile partners into competitors, or worse. The China-Russia partnership is a relatively recent phenomenon after centuries of mostly competitive relations. This means that Beijing and Moscow do not have a reservoir of goodwill built over decades to draw on as they navigate the erosion of Russian power in a region critically important to both. While this power transition is unlikely to lead to outright war between China and Russia over Central Asia, it is already leading to competition between the two, especially in the economic realm. Competition between Beijing and Moscow is made both more likely and more consequential by several unique features of the region. First, it is geographically contiguous to both. Next, both have high-order political, economic, and security interests at stake there. Finally, the US footprint in the region is light, removing a strong incentive for Chinese-Russian cooperation there. The United States is in many ways the binding agent between China and Russia: Where it is present, their shared resistance to Washington’s influence gives them a focal point for cooperation. Where the United States is absent—as it is in Central Asia, at least with respect to China and Russia—that focal point is removed. This report first analyzes Chinese and Russian influence and interests in Central Asia. It then examines how each pursues its political, military, and economic goals in the region. It concludes with an analysis of how and where their interests are most convergent and divergent and the implications for their overall relationship. If Beijing and Moscow can negotiate their power transition in Central Asia and maintain their overall partnership, this implies that the partnership is deep and durable. But it is Central Asia, more than anywhere else in the world, that will test Chinese-Russian ties.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Central Asia
30. Understanding the PRC’s Selective Use of Military Hotlines
- Author:
- Augusto Leal Rinaldi
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- The PRC’s strategic use of and reluctance to establish military hotlines reflect a calculated approach to escalation risk, which can be seen in crises ranging from the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade in 1999 to the present day. There is a recognition that hotlines offer tactical benefits, but they are not viewed as a solution to the broader challenges in US-PRC relations. The PRC is largely skeptical of military hotlines, believing that they lack utility and could potentially undermine its national security. Defense scholars fear that the existence of a mechanism to de-escalate crises could embolden adversaries to take more risks, and doubt that hotlines can help mitigate long-term mistrust in bilateral relations. Beijing also perceived some benefits of military hotlines. These include enhancing safety and crisis management, enabling the political signaling of intentions, and improving the PRC’s reputation as a responsible power, as well as allowing it to control narratives and influence other states’ actions.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, and Deescalation
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia