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1. Averting AI Armageddon: U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In recent years, the previous bipolar nuclear order led by the United States and Russia has given way to a more volatile tripolar one, as China has quantitatively and qualitatively built up its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, there have been significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. As a result of these two trends, understanding the AI-nuclear nexus in the context of U.S.-China-Russia geopolitical competition is increasingly urgent. There are various military use cases for AI, including classification models, analytic and predictive models, generative AI, and autonomy. Given that variety, it is necessary to examine the AI-nuclear nexus across three broad categories: nuclear command, control, and communications; structural elements of the nuclear balance; and entanglement of AI-enabled conventional systems with nuclear risks. While each of these categories has the potential to generate risk, this report argues that the degree of risk posed by a particular case depends on three major factors: the role of humans, the degree to which AI systems become a single point of failure, and the AI offense-defense balance. As Russia and China increasingly aim to modernize their nuclear arsenals and integrate AI into their militaries, it is essential for policymakers to be aware of the risks posed by the AI-nuclear nexus. Dealing with China and Russia on issues at this nexus is likely to be difficult in the current diplomatic and military context, characterized by increasingly strained bilateral relationships between the United States and both China and Russia, along with an uptick in coordination between Beijing and Moscow. Nonetheless, there are still various steps that U.S. policymakers could take to bolster deterrence and stability with respect to these issues. These include: building knowledge and competency around issues at the AI-nuclear nexus; integrating AI into diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear and other strategic risks, and vice versa; establishing and promoting norms for the safe use of AI in relation to nuclear arsenals and other strategic capabilities; developing policy and technical criteria for assessing exactly how and when to keep humans in the loop on all nuclear-related processes; including AI technologies as a factor in oversight and reviews of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; investing in AI-enabled cyber and space capabilities to enhance defense and resilience, reduce incentives to attack those areas, and mitigate entanglement risks; consulting closely with U.S. allies about how AI will shape extended deterrence calculations related to both nuclear and conventional capabilities; and pursuing a comprehensive set of risk reduction and crisis management mechanisms with China and Russia while recognizing the obstacles to progress. Failing to take these steps could leave the country and the world dangerously exposed to risks and ill-prepared to seize any opportunities arising from the increasingly salient AI-nuclear nexus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

3. Back to the Future: The Rise of Militarization in China in the 2020s

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In this policy brief, IGCC director Tai Ming Cheung analyzes Chinese militarization efforts as the country seeks tighter integration of the civilian and defense economies and a strong sense of national security, and whether such efforts lead to China being more prone to going to war in the near future.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Economy, and Militarization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

4. Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment

Author:
Gregory Weaver and Amy Woolf
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
After decades of seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the United States is now grappling with a global landscape marked by intense strategic competition and the growing salience of nuclear weapons—problems that will likely persist for years to come. Over the past year, Russia compounded its aggression in Ukraine with nuclear saber-rattling, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces over the past decade. Furthermore, Russia’s possession of a substantial inventory of theater nuclear weapons continues to threaten regional deterrence. Meanwhile, in Asia, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented surge in its nuclear capabilities. If current trends persist, China is projected to possess about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.1 While China was once viewed as a secondary nuclear power, its substantial investment in its nuclear arsenal—including the launch of a third ballistic missile early-warning satellite in 2022 and advancements in land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, submarines, and hypersonic missiles—positions China to become a near-equal nuclear power in the coming decade. These trends mark a historic shift. For the first time in its history, the United States must face two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously. At the same time, Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the New START agreement in 2023 has significantly weakened the last strategic arms control framework established in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This move leaves scant provisions governing the future of nuclear capabilities among the United States and its adversaries. For over half a century, Washington and Moscow negotiated to establish treaties that imposed limits on their nuclear arsenals, aiming to manage their nuclear rivalry and mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict. This process served the national security interests of both sides by curbing weapons and activities that could jeopardize deterrence, safeguarding strategic stability, offering insights into nuclear capacities, and potentially steering military competition toward less perilous avenues. However, shifts in the global security landscape have altered this calculus. The Russian Federation, much like the Soviet Union before it, has insisted that future agreements factor in the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France. On the other hand, the United States now confronts a security environment featuring two nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia and China—whose forces will potentially pose significant threats to the United States and its allies. This evolving security landscape may prompt the United States to reevaluate its assessments of its deterrence and arms control requirements. But how should the United States approach this problem?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

5. Deterring an attack on Taiwan: policy options for India and other non-belligerent states

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
India has a vital role to play in deterring China from unifying Taiwan by military force, a new Australian Strategic Policy Institute report finds, highlighting New Delhi’s significant economic, diplomatic, legal and strategic narrative levers. The report looks beyond traditional thinking on military preparations to dissuade Beijing from taking the island by force and offers six ways for India, with its great strategic and economic weight, to “help shape Beijing’s calculus away from the use of force”. The author writes that the use of such long-term measures is vital to New Delhi’s own interests, as the economic and regional security impacts of a major war would be devastating for India itself.  India and other “non-belligerent states” could apply a range of measures to persuade Beijing that the time is not right for a military attack. The aim would be to convince Beijing that "its ducks aren’t quite in a row... so that it defers military action to some uncertain point in the future". The report states that China remains deterrable. While it is determined to assume control of the island as a paramount strategic priority, it knows a military invasion would be enormously costly and uncertain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Deterrence, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
India, Taiwan, and Asia

6. Taiwan Strait’s Echo in Korean Peninsula Security and the US-ROK Alliance

Author:
Yerin Yoon
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In recent years, the geopolitical landscape of East Asia has undergone significant shifts, with the Taiwan Strait emerging as a pivotal point of great power competition and regional instability. This paper delves into the intricate dynamics in this evolving scenario, examining the multifaceted implications of Taiwan contingencies and their ripple effects on the security of the Korean Peninsula and the longstanding US-ROK alliance. This study highlights the need for Korea to build strategic plans for a Taiwan contingency by examining the correlation between plausible scenarios and the security challenges of the Korean Peninsula. This paper explores the broader implications of a Taiwan contingency within the context of great power rivalry and international relations. Moreover, it analyzes specific scenarios related to the Korean Peninsula that could unfold around Taiwan, such as maritime blockades and potential Chinese armed attacks on Taiwanese territory. It then emphasizes the influence of these scenarios on the Korean Peninsula, revealing a complex web of economic security, diplomatic, and military challenges. The article thereafter turns its attention to the US-ROK alliance essential to regional security in East Asia. This analysis examines the strategic ramifications of the relocation of US Forces Korea (USFK) and the possible engagement of the ROK military to assess the potential responses by the US-ROK alliance to the Taiwan crisis. It also highlights how crucial it is to comprehend each of the points of view held by the US and the ROK, underscoring the complex intricacies of the alliance. Finally, the paper proposes strategic policy recommendations to enhance Korea’s role in regional security. This includes strategies for maritime security, military readiness against conventional threats, and the strengthening of trilateral relationships with the US and Japan, providing a proactive roadmap for Korea’s foreign and defense policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

7. Taiwan Voters Choose Independence

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Taiwan’s election campaign has concluded. Voters went to the polls on Jan. 13. As has been the case in almost every election, cross-Strait relations with China were the central issue, a secondary issue being President Tsai Ing-wen’s management of the economy. The outcome of the election will largely dictate the course of Taiwan-China relations over at least the next four years. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and President Tsai Ing-wen’s chosen successor, William Lai Ching-te, the eventual winner, proclaims that Taiwan is already independent as the Republic of China. It should continue to diversify economic linkages away from China, strengthen military deterrence, and hope that China will eventually offer talks without one-China preconditions. The opposition Kuomintang candidate, Hou Yu-ih, called for expanded cross-Strait economic ties and dialogue with China under the one-China banner to reduce tensions while Taiwan also builds its military deterrence. China has deployed economic sticks, gray-zone military intimidation, and fake news to influence the election. Washington has expanded its support for Taiwan’s self-defense, though less vigorously than Republican critics in Congress would like. Taiwan and the US have continued to expand trade ties in ways that will benefit Taiwan businesses though without tariff concessions that Taiwan eagerly wants. Now that Taiwan voters have elected William Lai, as the polls predicted, China will likely respond with increasing coercion. Had Hou Yu-ih been victorious, his challenge would have been to navigate between Beijing’s pressure for cross-Strait concessions and Washington’s suspicions of any such steps by Taiwan.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Sovereignty, Voting, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

8. Japan’s multi-layered security strategy: Deterrence, coalition-building and economic security

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
At the end of 2022, Japan announced substantial changes to its defence posture with the publication of a new National Security Strategy, a National Defence Strategy, and a Defence Buildup Programme. These included a boosted defence budget and the addition of deterrence through counterstrike capabilities. The policy shift is partly driven by the war in Ukraine, even if it can also be seen in the light of a much longer process of incremental changes. Furthermore, the new defence policy should be viewed in a broader context as part of Japan’s evolving multi-layered security strategy. In addition to deterrence, other central pillars of this multi-layered strategy include coalition-building through alignment, Official Security Assistance for developing countries, a normatively pragmatic engagement with the Global South, and economic security. Japan’s enhanced capabilities and increasingly proactive stance on coalition-building and alignment policy offer opportunities for cooperation, including with the EU and NATO. However, a more robust defence posture is offset by domestic challenges, including institutionalized self-imposed restrictions, political opposition, public opinion, economic and fiscal factors, and a greying population.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Aging, Deterrence, Economic Security, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

9. China Maritime Report No. 36: China's T-AGOS: The Dongjian Class Ocean Surveillance Ship

Author:
Devin Thorne
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Since 2017, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has commissioned a new class of ocean surveillance vessel into its order of battle: the Type 927. Similar in design and function to the U.S. Navy’s Victorious and Impeccable class T-AGOS ships, the Type 927 was introduced to help remedy the PLAN’s longstanding weakness in anti-submarine warfare. The PLAN has likely built six Type 927 ships to date, most based for easy access to the South China Sea. In peacetime, these ships use their towed array sonar to collect acoustic data on foreign submarines and track their movements within and beyond the first island chain. In wartime, Type 927 vessels could contribute to PLAN anti-submarine warfare operations in support of a range of different maritime campaigns. However, their lack of self-defense capabilities would make them extremely vulnerable to attack.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Navy, Maritime, Surveillance, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

10. The Taiwan election result: A strategic opportunity for a calmer Taiwan Strait

Author:
Mikael Mattlin and Jyrki Kallio
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Taiwan held combined presidential and legislative elections last weekend. The international media generally expected that a win by Lai Ching-te (DPP), who in the past has favoured independence, would lead to tensions and even conflict in the Taiwan Strait. However, there are several reasons why the opposite could be the case.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Elections, and Lai Ching-te
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America