Search

Begin New Search Topic Russia-Ukraine War Publishing Institution Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)

21. Biden’s Bombs: The Dance of Ethics and Interests

Author:
Dominic Tierney
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
On the same day in July 2023, the Biden administration destroyed America’s last chemical weapon, and also, controversially, announced the supply of cluster bombs to Ukraine. The story of the two bombs shows how America’s view of ethics in war is shaped by an underlying strategic logic. The focus on humanizing war by banning certain weapons may do more to help America on the battlefield than to protect civilian lives.
Topic:
Ethics, Weapons, Civilians, Joe Biden, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

22. Wagner’s Head is Dead, Now Bury the Body

Author:
Marcel Plichta, Christopher Faulkner, and Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The core of Wagner leadership was effectively decapitated with the deaths of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitri Uktin, but the group’s fingerprints won’t disappear quickly. Although the Kremlin may attempt to appoint new leadership, semi-nationalize Wagner, or attempt a full takeover, a Wagner descendant organization will continue causing problems for the West. The Wagner model of weaponizing private military companies to use as a foreign policy tool, will continue as well. U.S. and European authorities should avoid complacency by intensifying efforts to counter Wagner and its employees, so that Wagner members cannot slip into anonymity amidst Russian gray zone warfare.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

23. The Eagle in the South Caucasus: Armenia Tests Alternative Geopolitical Waters

Author:
Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The US-Armenia “Eagle Partner” joint military exercise from September 11–20 may signal the beginning of a shift in the foreign policy direction of Armenia, historically a close ally to Russia. Armenia has been growing frustrated at the lackluster response of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to its appeals for assistance in the deepening conflict with Azerbaijan. However, it would be difficult to imagine a wholesale change in the geopolitical orientation in Yerevan, given the strong military, economic, energy, and cultural ties between Armenia and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, North America, South Caucasus, and United States of America

24. Russian Military Drones: Past, Present, and Future of the UAV Industry

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since 2009, Russia has invested significant effort into developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, for military purposes. They have used drones for reconnaissance, targeting, electronic warfare, and direct strikes. Some of these UAVs have been used in Ukraine and Syria since 2014, while combat UAVs (i.e., the Orion and Altius drones) still were on the research and development phase at the beginning of 2022. However, after a year of war in Ukraine, the Russian military has lost the biggest part of its tactical reconnaissance and targeting UAVs. At the same time, it was still unable to deploy advanced combat UAVs. As soon as fall 2022, or roughly six months into Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, Russia started the large-scale use of Iranian loitering munitions, and continues to be highly dependent on them as of fall 2023. Despite efforts towards increasing their production, Russia’s use of its own loitering munitions remains insignificant.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Russia-Ukraine War, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

25. Synchronized: The Impact of the War on Ukraine's Energy Landscape

Author:
Thomas Laffitte and Ihor Moshenets
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine was able to generate substantial revenues from the transit costs of Russian hydrocarbons destined for the European market. Despite the war, Russian oil (and some gas) continues to flow to Europe via Ukraine, and the latter continues to receive transit fees. In the field of hydrocarbons, although Ukraine is far from having hydrocarbon reserves equivalent to those of Russia, it has several assets to offer Europeans, including particularly large storage capacities. Fortunately, these storage facilities are located in the western part of the country, away from much of the fighting. Thanks to the successful synchronization of the Ukrainian and the EU power grids, the electricity trade continues. It has become a field of increased cooperation between Kyiv and Brussels, offering a potential blueprint for other sectors with a view to future integration. Despite the immense destruction caused by the Russian army, which specifically targeted the country’s energy infrastructure, Ukraine has shown extraordinary resilience. Ukraine can export electricity to its European partners, creating a profitable situation for both parties and good promises for the future. While the debate continues in Europe regarding the role of nuclear energy in the energy transition, it is already clear that in this domain, North American actors have the upper hand in Ukraine. Decisions made in Brussels on the exact contours of the energy transition will have a major influence on energy policy decisions made in Ukraine. The country has significant potential to produce decarbonized and renewable electricity.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Nuclear Energy, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

26. Seoul Searching: Lessons from South Korea's Experience with Sanctions against Russia

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia and the West have found themselves enmeshed in an expansive economic war as a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. While the conflict on the ground in Ukraine is undoubtedly—and tragically—the primary front of Russia’s aggression, and where its aggression reaps its most dramatic horrors, Western powers have joined with a wide swathe of the international community to support Ukraine’s resistance and hold the Kremlin to account. But as with the kinetic war in Ukraine, the conflict did not begin one evening last February. It was first launched by Russia in response to Ukraine’s pro-Western, anti-corruption Maidan Revolution that raged through the winter of 2013–2014, ultimately resulting in the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych after he sought to capitulate to the Kremlin and refuse protesters’ and the wider Ukrainian public’s demands for continuing the country’s pro-European and pro-Western agenda. Russia was the first power to use sanctions and trade restrictions in the conflict, namely against Ukraine in 2013.[1] Russia also first sought to use Ukraine’s future to bring the international economic order into the scope of its fight even before Yanukovych’s ouster.[2] However, economic and technology restrictions on Russia have been at the core of the wider West’s strategy of support for Ukraine throughout that period. The target of these tools has changed significantly, initially aimed at deterring Russia from further aggression after 2014 to seeking to restrict its state capacity and ability to wage the war since 2022. But their global impact and Putin’s attempts to undermine the international order through his own weaponization of Russia’s economy and its commodities base have left the world in a new era of international economic competition, and other powers, great and small, are being impacted in ways unforeseen. States are, in turn, also learning lessons from this new era of economic warfare for the future, and the risks they might face from such conflict. This paper examines the impact on one often overlooked but deeply affected country, the Republic of Korea (or South Korea). Seoul has a unique position in the economic war in that it was arguably the largest Western ally that did not join the sanctions regime against Russia after Putin’s annexation of Crimea and fomenting conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014. In fact, as we will see, a number of crucial economic ties between Russia and South Korea grew significantly thereafter; although this was also the case for a number of countries that induced sanctions—Germany’s gas linkages with Russia in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline are perhaps the best known example. This paper will examine Seoul’s strategic considerations in doing so, and the reasons that the West did not put substantial pressure on South Korea to join the sanctions regime at the time. Seoul did, however, join the sanctions regime fully in 2022. The domestic political considerations in South Korea played a key role in that shift and will also determine how the policy’s effectiveness is judged and, in turn, how South Korea may be positioned for future similar economic conflict between the West and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Economy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, and South Korea

27. Controlling the Narrative: A Roadmap to Russia's 2024 Presidential Election

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Almost ten years into Russia’s war against Ukraine and almost two years into the 2022 full-scale invasion, most domestic political and economic actors seem to have accepted the emergence of a new normal. Timelines and perceived limits of economic planning and political activities have shifted. However, the contours of this new normal are still unclear, which introduces an element of uncertainty into Russian politics on all levels. The two main reasons for this uncertainty are the Russian government’s unequivocal bet on the war effort, which is reflected in budgetary priorities, communication, and an increasingly short-term planning horizon; and the rapid, major adjustments that the continuation of the war and economic sanctions have forced on the political and business elite. While the war as a topic is rarely discussed in public politics due to the risks associated with criticizing the authorities’ line and the heightened attention paid by the security services to dissenters, issues related to the war—such as a tightening of funds available for other budgetary headings, the rapid and forced restructuring of the Russian economy, and fears of an armed rebellion inside the country—have shaped political debates and created frictions. While the Kremlin seems to still be firmly holding the reins of political institutions four months before the 2024 presidential election, it has sought to reduce its dependence on regional power brokers and officials. In parallel, regional elites, typically in peripheral regions, have been able to mount a certain degree of opposition to the Kremlin while bargaining for increasingly scarce resources. The stability of domestic politics is guaranteed, for the time being, by a critical mass of voters and elites beginning to believe that the war is an inevitable circumstance and that victory is close (i.e., a necessary, but short war), all while the Russian government needs to maintain the international perception that Russians are ready and prepared for a long war. Challenging this belief, all while being aware of the existing and new avenues of domestic politics in Russia, is an important purpose of international sanctions.
Topic:
Political stability, Domestic Politics, Vladimir Putin, Presidential Elections, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

28. Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
After six weeks of combat, where is the Russo-Ukrainian War going? Modern technology both facilitates and hampers the answer to that question. Every day, this war is evaluated from every angle and perspective, but modern technology provides only a soda-straw view of the war’s entire canvas. This article will try to discern that larger canvas of the war, including a focus on casualties, information operations and morale, and logistics to see how they and the tactical correlation of forces may influence several possible strategic outcomes.
Topic:
Conflict, Military Tactics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

29. Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The United States and its allies in the West have been unable to use the threat of military force to coerce Russia into stopping its war in Ukraine. In part, this is because the West is more concerned about escalation than Russia. Further analysis using Alexander L. George’s framework of coercive diplomacy, however, suggests the problem is more complex and deep-rooted: Few of the historical conditions or factors that favor coercive diplomacy are present in Ukraine. This analysis reveals three things the United States and its allies should do to revive the prospects of ending the war in Ukraine through coercive diplomacy. First, they should take smaller, more achievable steps which are less likely to inspire Russia to double-down. Second, they should exploit Russia’s deteriorating position through a mixture of carrots and sticks. Finally, the West should seek to minimize the intensity of its wider confrontation with Russia and focus on strategic stability as an end in itself. This will be challenging because of the gravity of Russian atrocities in Ukraine. But it may help end the war through coercive diplomacy, and avoid a serious miscalculation with Russia.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Coercion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

30. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine