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1. German Industrial Competitiveness and the Metaverse

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Robert Baker
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The metaverse is the next iteration of the internet as an immersive, 3D, virtual, shared world where activities can be carried out with the help of extended reality services. But it is much more than headsets and virtual games. The metaverse is increasingly conceptualised in tandem with other advanced technologies, including AI, IoT, automation, and blockchain. Combined, these Industrie 4.0 innovations will be at the centre of German productivity growth over the next decade. The IMF and the OECD both expect Germany to be the worst-performing leading economy in the world in 2023. Beyond recent shocks, German competitiveness is being “steadily eroded” by structural factors like “rising labour costs and a lack of digitisation” (Arnold, 2023). In this context of sclerotic growth, immersive technologies show much promise. The economic dimension of the new Digital Strategy should be guided by three simple “I’s” – immersive, industrial productivity, and internationalisation of German technologies. Specifically, the metaverse is driving productivity gains in manufacturing, engineering, financial services and retail – it could add €71 billion to German GDP by 2035. As well as enhancing the productivity of existing operations, immersive technologies and smart factories can enable the reshoring of profitable activities back to the German economy, particularly in technology and engineering. But these economic gains are not inevitable. Neglecting immersive technologies would have a significant effect on Germany’s remaining competitive advantages. For example, late adoption of the metaverse and digital twins by the German auto industry would lead to a 10% loss in exports, equating to more than €12 billion each year. The costs of late adoption are only underscored by the current salience of global competition. US firms have a strong track record of successfully integrating internet products into industry, while China and its own technology giants are developing strategic initiatives to capitalise on the metaverse. While much of the metaverse remains under development, companies are already showcasing a range of commercial partnerships and innovative use cases. German companies like Siemens are at the forefront of digital twins which allow automakers and other manufactures to replicate their physical facilities in virtual worlds, drawing on real-time data and simulations to optimise their operations. In insurance, the same digital twins are facilitating underwriting and expedited claims via remote monitoring. Meanwhile, in medical devices and healthcare, a metaverse of medical technology and AI (MeTAI) is facilitating the refinement of AI-based medical practices. This is the future of medical imaging technology, diagnosis, and therapy.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

2. How Huawei Weathered the Storm: Resilience, Market Conditions or Failed Sanctions?

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Robin Baker
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Huawei is exhibiting stoic resilience in the face of US sanctions, economic downturns, and the slow pace of 5G investments. There is a narrative that the company has been propped up by the Chinese government, but the key to Huawei’s resilience is multifaceted. Through pre-emptive stockpiling and ingenuity, the company has continued to fulfil its base station orders and defend its market shares abroad. Concurrently, Huawei has made an autonomous business decision to reinvest its earnings and intensify R&D to secure its supply chains against political risks and diversify into new business areas. Successful forays into semiconductors, cloud services and energy grids have also been facilitated by a capital structure that lends itself to long-term planning. Huawei’s survival is not necessarily a lesson in the futility of sanctions to stifle technological progress. However, it does show that muddled political objectives and inconsistent implementation will yield potentially contrary outcomes. At the same time, factors that contribute to Huawei’s resilience also highlight the infighting and vulnerabilities of listed firms like Mavenir, Ericsson and Nokia.
Topic:
Markets, Sanctions, Digital Economy, Resilience, and Huawei
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

3. Empires of Exceptionalism: Lessons from the EU AI Act and Attempts at AI Legislation in California

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Claudia Lozano
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU AI Act, which passed after three years of negotiations and much ambivalence, sets a comprehensive regulatory framework that reflects the European Union’s unique needs that are not translatable to other jurisdictions. The proposed bill in California (SB 1047) illustrates this case in point. The bill could potentially mislead the public into thinking that AI is already under effective regulatory control. Lawmakers must recognize that the EU differs from other systems. The EU AI Act is not only shaped by the desire to slow down global AI development, allowing Europe to catch up with rivals like the US and China: The EU lacks an enforceable constitution, and the Act prohibits its governments to impose social scoring and discriminatory measures. SB 1047 only addressed humanity-ending disasters and had unclear practical value. Meanwhile, the EU AI Act was passed into law to prevent internal competition and Europe’s history of authoritarianism. Existing laws in California and the EU already regulate most AI use cases. In addition, the EU AI Act reviews existing regulations to ensure they are still fit for purpose, something California failed to do in SB 1047. A critical takeaway is to examine existing obligations or executive powers (including enforcement agencies and public funding) to achieve the desired policy objectives. The diverging outcomes of the two laws show the importance of avoiding mismatches between policy objectives and legislative scope. AI regulation cannot substitute for other policy objectives, like privacy and antitrust. Also, lawmakers must weigh the cost of failed regulation against the risks of non-regulation. California did not see any immediate costs of inaction, whereas delayed action by the EU might have led to the fragmentation of its internal market. Also, given its collective decision-making, the EU can escape accountability for policy failures due to premature laws in a way the leaders in other political systems cannot.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Legislation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe, California, North America, and United States of America

4. AI and India’s National Interest

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Badri Narayanan Gopalakrishnan, Claudia Lozano, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
AI offers a policy dilemma for India. On the one hand, export competitiveness hinges on the nationwide deployment of productivity-enhancing technologies. Indian services and consultancies must incorporate AI technologies to keep their leading position in the global market. On the other hand, there are also concerns over automation’s impact on social cohesion, discriminatory algorithmic decision-making, and the risks of “deepfakes”. However, the current transitional guidelines have shown a feasible pathway to avoiding overlapping liability or regulatory blindspots by re-interpreting existing legislation. India has a comprehensive framework for antitrust, corporate liability, free speech, and public order that covers AI development and use cases. India may not need AI-specific rules. Currently, only the EU has chosen to legislate through binding laws due to its unique structural deficiencies. The EU lacks a supranational constitution that safeguards human rights and protects citizens against AI-based surveillance or policing by its Member States. The EU must enact binding rules to pre-empt AI laws by national governments that will otherwise fragment its Single Market. Whereas India has previously taken inspiration from the EU or the US laws, India must follow its own paths and pursue its national interests based on its services-driven industrial profile and the two-way competition against China and the US, who have chosen not to impose any regulatory impediments on AI use or development. India’s challenge lies not in whether businesses prefer a local or foreign AI platform but in encouraging rapid adoption and supporting open-source and other alternatives accessible for fine-tuning and transfer learning for its IT industry.
Topic:
Regulation, Digital Economy, Exports, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

5. Subsidising Balkanisation: What China’s 3G Subsidies Teach us about 5G Open RAN

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Open RAN is increasingly becoming the answer to how to diversify 5G networks and beyond, especially in the light of a potential exclusion of China’s participation in western networks. In recent times, the US and Japan have jointly pledged $4.5 billion to support its development. Much – or perhaps entirety – of this support is predesignated for the O-RAN Alliance, a closed-door and private industry consortium. State interventionism is back – in a sector hereto characterised by open western markets and free competition. The public support currently pledged to the O-RAN consortium bear many resemblances to the Chinese government’s attempt to support TD-SCDMA, a unique standard for the Chinese market that was designed to support local vendors. Its use was a pre-condition for public subsidies for R&D or public procurement. As recent as 2020, the US Trade Representative reported on China’s standard-setting practices and subsidies as one of the world’s worst trade barriers. Those who advocate similar support in the West are either indifferent or nescient about how EU and US trade negotiators worked to address subsidies and opaque standard-setting. It is an open question whether the US and Japan will offer a level-playing field to European vendors – or non-O-RAN members who may develop their own Open RAN variants. Nowadays, Chinese scholars and senior officials openly talk of “TD-style innovation” as a disaster for the nation that delayed China’s rollout of 4G and plunged the economy into a performance and innovation lag. A key lesson for policymakers today is how vendors that cannot survive without subsidies will not optimise the organisation for innovation but public grant-seeking. This is an eerie warning for the 5G debate in some western capitals.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Digital Economy, 5G, and Subsidies
Political Geography:
China and Asia

6. Open RAN: The Technology, its Politics and Europe’s Response

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Florian Forsthuber
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This policy brief explores the implications of Open RAN concept and its technical and political developments in the mobile network industry. Open RAN is not necessarily a new technology in itself, but represents a combination of existing technologies, e.g. virtualisation, AI, commercial off-the-shelf parts and open interfaces. Its proponents promise more secure networks without ‘high-risk vendors’ but Open RAN could introduce new systemic risks that must be addressed due to its reliance on open source software. While the proponents also promise significantly reduced costs, it is still inconclusive whether Open RAN in itself reduces the total costs of deploying a 5G network. Economic evidence shows that the equipment market is a buyers’ market due to a higher concentration amongst operators. The number of vendors is less critical for prices than the relative power between buyers and sellers. The network equipment market is the only ICT segment where the EU manufacturers are still global leaders. If various industry consortiums call for subsidies, the EU has the commercial policy instruments to countervail against them. Some industry voices suggest that a certain Open RAN specification could replace existing global specifications under 3GPP. However, as today’s market condition is not caused by the 3GPP standardisation, a solution is not to be found through developing alternative technical specifications. 3GPP is also more comprehensive than RAN. Thus, the question is whether Europe should try to sustain one common global umbrella of standards – or see the world balkanise into national or regional standards from 6G and onward. For better or worse, there will be regional fragmentation. The EU industrial policy could be facing a reality where network standards are politicised for commercial reasons – to pave way for an indigenous industry – which is unrelated to national security objectives. Also, EU operators may not react well if Open RAN open the door for cloud services to encroach into the telecom market. In conclusion, Open RAN has a raison d’etre as a promising new concept, even if it does not solve any geopolitical gambits. However, the EU have little to gain from government interventions in the RAN segment, which is just one element of the mobile network market.
Topic:
International Political Economy, Science and Technology, Global Markets, Digital Economy, Industry, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Europe

7. The Economic Losses from Ending the WTO Moratorium on Electronic Transmissions

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Badri Narayanan Gopalakrishnan
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This paper is co-authored with Badri Narayanan, PhD, Associate Professor at University of Washington, Consultant at McKinsey Global Institute, UN ESCWA, FAO, Commonwealth Secretariat and GTAP Research Centre. Since 1998, the WTO Members have applied a moratorium against tariffs on international electronic transmissions (commonly referred to as the WTO ‘E-Commerce’ Moratorium). However, some WTO Members have recently debated whether the moratorium remains in their economic interest, given the potential revenues that might be generated by imposing tariffs on electronic transmissions. The study examines the impact on India, Indonesia, South Africa and China (and the general case for developing countries) and concludes that imposing such tariffs would be fiscally counter-productive. Putting aside any legal questions, a country that opted out of the moratorium may apply tariffs affecting a wide range of cross-border business activities. Our research shows that if countries ceased to uphold the moratorium and levied import duties on digital goods and services, they would suffer negative economic consequences in the form of higher prices and reduced consumption, which would in turn slow GDP growth and shrink tax revenues. Yet our research indicates that the payoff in tariff revenues would ultimately be minimal relative to the scale of economic damage that would result from import duties on electronic transmissions.
Topic:
Globalization, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Digital Economy, Tariffs, Trade, and WTO
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus