Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills

Eliana Carranza, Robert Garlick, Kate Orkin, Neil Rankin
Content Type
Working Paper
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers’ skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers’ skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers’ employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.
Labor Issues, Employment, Business , Job Creation
Political Geography
Global Focus