European and American Approaches to Antitrust Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Telecommunications

Author
J. Gregory Sidak, Damien Geradin
Content Type
Working Paper
Institution
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract
In the United States and the European Union, the topic of remedies in network industries cuts across antitrust law and sector-specific regulation, including telecommunications. The legal and economic understandings of a “remedy” are not always synonymous. In both legal systems, a remedy is the corrective measure that a court or an administrative agency orders following a finding that one or several companies had either engaged in an illegal abuse of market power (monopolization in the US and abuse of dominance in the EC) or are about to create market power (in the case of mergers). With the exception of merger control where remedies seek to prevent a situation from occurring, legal remedies are retrospective in their orientation. They seek to right some past wrong. They may do so through the payment of money (whether that is characterized as the payment of damages, fines, or something else). Or they may seek to do so through a mandated change in market structure (“structural” remedies), as in the case of divestiture, or in the imposition of affirmative or negative duties (“behavioral” remedies). United States v. Microsoft Corp (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 2001). presented the tradeoff between these various remedial alternatives.
Topic
Government, International Trade and Finance
Political Geography
United States, Europe