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41. From Bridge to Hinge: Rapprochement-Estrangement Pendulum of Turkish Foreign Policy

Author:
Mesut Özcan
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
The main motivation of this paper is to uncover the logic underlying the seemingly inconsistent and erratic foreign policy behavior of countries like Turkey, which are surrounded by different subsystems. The strategic cultures of the surrounding subsystems impose different modes of behavior on borderlands and create attract-repel elements for them. The responses to such elements appear as policies of rapprochement and estrangement, representing closer or cooling relations. Therefore, as part of the attract-repel dynamic, foreign policy behavior appears to oscillate between conflicting extremes. Consequently, the borderland position presents a combination of challenges and opportunities, depending on the comprehensive national power. It can be either reduced to a buffer zone caught between different and imposing entities, or transformed into a hinge state that can change regional or global balances. The underlying logic and ultimate goal of such policy swings, which may appear contradictory and erratic at times, is to become a hinge state in this process by capitalizing on advantages and opportunities, avoiding drawbacks and gaining more power at each step. In this process, Turkey appears as a borderland country that keeps moving between pivotal and linchpin positions, trying to confirm her linchpin status while aspiring to become a hinge state.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Borders, Rapprochement, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

42. Perception and Continuity: Active Non-Alignment in Turkish Foreign Policy

Author:
Burak Çakirca
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
This study analyses Turkish foreign policy between 2010 and 2025, asking whether this period marks a strategic rupture or reflects continuity with the long-standing Westernisation trajectory. Employing the emerging framework of Active Non-Alignment (ANA), the study examines how Turkey’s redefinition of strategic interests and alignments reflects shifting global and regional dynamics. The findings suggest that while institutional and ontological ties to the West persist, Turkish foreign policy demonstrates a perceptual shift characterised by strategic autonomy, diversified partnerships, and issue-based pragmatism. By applying ANA to this evolving policy orientation, the study offers both a reinterpretation of Turkish foreign policy continuity and a theoretical contribution to the emerging literature on alternative alignment strategies in global politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Diversification, Strategic Autonomy, Pragmatism, Continuity, and Westernization
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

43. A pivot or a saga? How Turkish foreign policy is torn between domestic pressures and economic needs

Author:
Başak Alpan
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The EU must take proactive steps to address longstanding issues and cultivate a more trust-based and cooperative relationship with Turkey. Bilateral relations could be rejuvenated by addressing key issues such as democratic reforms, visa liberalisation, civil society engagement and the ongoing dispute over Cyprus. This CEPS Explainer explores the recent orientation of the Turkish foreign policy, focusing on its historical Western orientation and recent efforts to achieve ‘strategic autonomy’ by scrutinising the results of the fieldwork undertaken through the CATS Network project. Interviews conducted in Ankara, Istanbul and Brussels show that while Turkish policymakers aim to diversify the country’s foreign policy by forging security and economic partnerships with non-Western actors, such as the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China and Russia, its institutional and ideological foundation remains Western-oriented. Integrating Turkey into European security alignments, such as the SAFE framework, and modernising the Turkey-EU customs union would help to strengthen bilateral ties. Additionally, the EU should substantiate the people-to-people contact approach to rebuild trust and encourage further cooperation.
Topic:
European Union, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Civil Society, Partnerships, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Europe

44. How the EU can pursue strategic cooperation on secondary raw materials with the Western Balkans

Author:
Edoardo Righetti, Deniz Tekin, and Vasileios Rizos
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Europe’s green and digital transitions are increasing demand for critical raw materials (CRMs), just as geopolitical risks and trade tensions are reshaping global supply chains. In recent years, the EU has taken steps to secure and diversify supplies through building strategic partnerships with resource-rich countries, which also includes recovering CRMs from mine waste and tailings. The Western Balkans region stands out as a natural partner, given their already close integration with EU markets and transport networks, and their legacy of old industrial sites and mine tailings. Such a partnership could lead to several mutual benefits – for the EU, more resilient and circular CRM value chains which correspond with its strategic autonomy and sustainability objectives, and for the Western Balkans, by rehabilitating legacy sites and advancing green and circular policies tied to the Green Agenda and the enlargement framework. This CEPS Policy Brief dives into three priority areas for EU-Western Balkans cooperation on secondary raw materials that policymakers should pay more attention to.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Supply Chains, Green Transition, Digital Transition, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Europe and Western Balkans

45. Economic implications for Europe of a potential reintegration of Iran into the world economy

Author:
Gabriel Felbermayr, Mahdi Ghodsi, Heider Kariem, Robert Stehrer, and Yoto V. Yotov
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
How would fundamental political change in Iran, leading to a democratic system with a free and rules-based economic order, affect Germany and the EU economically? In the event of change, sanctions could be scaled back, allowing Iran to rejoin the global economy. This study quantifies the economic effects of such a transformation. It neither advocates for nor legitimises the lifting or easing of sanctions under the current regime or without far-reaching and credible reforms that fully address the concerns underlying the sanctions currently in place. Using the newest available data and quantitative methods, the results indicate that lifting EU sanctions alone could raise Iran’s real GDP by more than 80% in the long run while generating moderate but economically meaningful gains for Germany and the EU of around 0.3-0.4% of GDP. These gains are driven by expanded trade, lower energy and input prices, and improved allocative efficiency. When sanctions removal is combined with plausible scenarios of productivity catch-up with Turkey or South Korea, Iran’s GDP would increase by 240-388% and the gains for Europe would increase further, underscoring the strong complementarity between trade integration and productivity growth. Moreover, Iran’s reintegration would reduce energy price volatility, improve the security of maritime trade routes, and lower migration pressures. Overall, the findings suggest that a negotiated transition and rules-based reintegration of Iran would generate substantial mutual economic benefits while contributing to regional and global stability.
Topic:
Markets, Political Economy, Foreign Direct Investment, Sanctions, European Union, Economy, Inflation, Energy, and Trade Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Germany

46. Structural dependencies and choke points in GVCs: An industry-level analysis

Author:
Robert Stehrer
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
Global value chains (GVCs) are intricate international networks in which the production and distribution of goods and services across multiple economies and industries is coordinated. Their complexity introduces strategic dependencies when economies or industries rely heavily on a limited number of foreign suppliers. Such dependencies can also create additional vulnerabilities, particularly at choke points (i.e. key links or nodes in the chain) whose disruption – whether due to political instability and geopolitical tensions, natural disasters, pandemics or policy shocks and trade restrictions – can halt production. This study builds on previous research by examining two factors: (i) size dependencies arising when an importing economy-industry pair relies largely on the inputs of a partner economies, and (ii) choke dependencies, where imports from one economy pass through another, creating potential choke points. Choke dependency is particularly concerning, as disruptions in the choke economy can impact not only its direct exports but also the flow of goods from other suppliers. Using the multi-country input-output tables (MC IOTs), this study introduces two indicators to assess dependencies: (i) ‘size dependency’, based on the share of an economy-industry’s foreign output sourced from a specific partner, and (2) ‘choke dependency’, based on the pass-through frequency (ptf) indicator, which reveals how often inputs from third economies are routed through a particular partner. An economy-industry pair is considered dependent if it meets thresholds for size dependency, choke dependency or both. This comprehensive approach aims to offer a deeper understanding of systemic vulnerabilities in global trade networks.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Global Value Chains, Vulnerability, Dependency, and Choke Points
Political Geography:
Global Focus

47. Restraint and Diplomacy in Arctic Policy: Cooperation Amid U.S.-Russia-China Tensions

Author:
Pavel Devyatkin
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
In recent years, the Arctic has become the site of both great-power cooperation and competition. While the 2025 Alaska summit between Presidents Putin and Trump reflected a thaw in U.S.–Russia relations, U.S. interest in acquiring Greenland has cast doubt on continued U.S. cooperation with both Russia and China in the region. This brief details how a combination of restraint and proactive diplomacy in the Arctic — built upon shared interests and a recognition of competitive coexistence — will best serve the United States. The second Trump administration has called for American Arctic dominance, viewing the region as an energy source and as an opportunity to monopolize resources and to establish its Western Hemisphere force posture. Russia views the Arctic through a similar lens of resources and sovereignty, as it ramps up its military presence while intensifying efforts to extract natural resources. China’s influence in the region has steadily increased, as it collaborates with Russia, while advancing scientific research, sustainable development, and multilateral climate cooperation. The United States has come to see increasing Russia–China collaboration in the Arctic as a threat to U.S. national interests. But rather than responding to this deepening relationship through unilateralism, the U.S. should recognize that competitive coexistence and trilateral cooperation are more beneficial. This approach avoids zero-sum confrontation and minimizes accidental escalation while maintaining U.S. force projection, maximizing resource extraction, and promoting scientific collaboration. Toward this end, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Establish trilateral maritime safety and search-and-rescue, SAR, operations, a system that exchanges real-time information, conducts joint training exercises, and invests in port and coast guard infrastructure. Such cooperation would lower shipping costs, improve safety, and encourage economic development — goals shared by the United States, Russia, and China. Institutionalize direct, reliable U.S.–Russia–China communication channels, including a dedicated Arctic hotline for incident reporting and a security digital platform for real-time vessel tracking. Such transparency minimizes the chances of miscalculation, particularly with nuclear assets in the region. Revitalize the Arctic Council to enable communication among the three major powers, the eight Arctic states, and Indigenous representatives. Initiate a trilateral arms control framework, using reductions in Arctic military exercises as a springboard for broader arms control and security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

48. Prospects and Problems for Reinvigorating Superpower Nuclear Cooperation

Author:
Ariel Petrovics
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A three-way nuclear arms race between the United States, China, and Russia looms — an escalation that would erode global nonproliferation and usher in an era of unchecked nuclear proliferation. This brief offers a path to preventing this destabilizing outcome through pragmatic nuclear cooperation — an approach that has strong historical precedent and accords with the strategic interests of all three nuclear superpowers. Superpower cooperation historically underpinned the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, but increasing great power competition erodes this entire system of international security. China and Russia have each modernized and expanded their nuclear programs and adopted more aggressive nuclear postures. The United States, in turn, has approved a nearly $2 trillion nuclear modernization program. This burgeoning arms race heightens risks of inadvertent escalation, as each of the superpowers become increasingly reliant on nuclear brinkmanship to hold off the growing capabilities of their adversaries. The deteriorating nuclear security environment places pressure on other states to similarly seek their own nuclear arsenals while weakening the nonproliferation tool kit that previously prevented these states from breaking out. As more armed states join the fray, they in turn multiply the number of potential nuclear flashpoints around the world. Reinvesting in superpower cooperation on nuclear security is not an idealistic bid for goodwill. Rather, halting unchecked competition is a pragmatic strategy that serves the interests of the United States, Russia, and China. It preserves a global nuclear system that has safeguarded the superpowers’ dominance for decades. Weakening it, on the other hand, undermines the international marketplace that has preserved U.S. dominance in private industry and innovation. Russia and China, in turn, risk a multifront nuclear competition, as proximate U.S. allies choose uncontrolled independent arsenals over existing security umbrellas. The superpowers can still step back from the abyss by reviving nuclear cooperation. Toward that objective, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Accept Russia’s offer to extend New START for a year, paired with verification pathways and transparency measures. Reinvigorate existing direct lines of communication (i.e., hotline systems) with both Russia and China. Initiate trilateral nuclear discussions with Russia and China toward the goal of capping arsenals at parity on specific warheads and delivery systems.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

49. Necessary Neighbors: Poland and Ukraine Must Stabilize Their Strained Partnership

Author:
Yuliia Korotia
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Polish-Ukrainian relations have moved from a phase of exceptional solidarity to one of mounting tension and deepening structural strain. What initially seemed to be a long-term strategic partnership grounded in shared security interests has evolved into a more fragmented and fragile, at times almost hostile, relationship. This shift, visible across political, economic, and social dimensions, risks undermining not only bilateral cooperation but also the broader foundations of regional stability at a moment of ongoing war, strategic uncertainty in Europe, and a potentially antagonistic transatlantic relationship. If Poland and Ukraine fail to adopt a more realistic, constructive, and mutually attentive approach to the partnership, their cooperation will weaken in ways that directly affect military logistics, EU cohesion, regional resilience, and resistance to hybrid threats. Understanding how the relationship has changed, and what deeper dynamics are driving this, is essential for assessing the risks ahead and identifying pathways to improve the relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Russia-Ukraine War, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Poland

50. If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Research on the possibility and likely outcome of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has expanded rapidly in recent years. Studies have focused on a broad range of questions related to deterrence, potential conflict dynamics, and possible conflict outcomes. Tabletop exercises have been used to identify gaps in the capabilities of the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan to assess potential escalation pathways and to better understand war termination strategies.1 Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the potential impact of cross-Strait conflict on the PRC itself and how that impact could shape President Xi Jinping’s risk calculus and decision-making about use of force against Taiwan. Xi’s risk calculus is crucial to understanding if and under what circumstances Beijing might take aggressive actions against Taiwan because any such decision would carry profound political, economic, and strategic consequences for the PRC and for him personally. Xi has tied his legitimacy to putting the PRC on an irreversible path toward the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation by 2049 and unifying Taiwan with the motherland is deemed essential to that goal. Yet a military conflict over Taiwan would risk massive economic disruption, catastrophic military losses, significant social unrest, and devastating sanctions, all of which could turn his dream into a nightmare and undermine his political authority. Xi’s calculus must therefore weigh the perceived benefits of using force to achieve unification against the potential costs. The centrality of Xi’s risk calculus to understanding future PRC decision-making about potential actions against Taiwan demands deeper investigation than has taken place so far. This report seeks to fill this research gap by examining how use of force against Taiwan would impact the PRC in four key areas: its economy, its military capabilities, its social stability, and international costs. Each issue set is evaluated in a separate paper, although all four are interrelated, a factor that the report’s conclusion addresses. Logan Wright and Charlie Vest assess potential implications for the PRC economy. Joel Wuthnow analyzes the possible impact on the Chinese military. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi consider the potential risks for social stability. Zack Cooper examines the likely international responses and costs. There is a broad range of possible scenarios for PRC use of force against Taiwan. Potential actions taken by Beijing may vary in terms of intensity and duration. To make comparisons possible across the four papers, the authors were given two baseline scenarios, a limited conflict and a major war. Both are described in detail below. In outlining these scenarios, specific triggers were not established. They would nevertheless be important in determining international responses and subsequently would have implications for the PRC economy and possibly for social stability. Although the absence of a detailed trigger is a limiting factor, in any crisis multiple actors will draw their own conclusions about what sparked the conflict, so perceptions of who was at fault would differ across countries. The authors were also permitted to assess cases situated between a minor conflict and a major war, given that the economic, military, political, and international costs may vary discontinuously across a range of scenarios. All scenarios were assumed to occur between 2026 and 2030. The first scenario that authors assess is a minor conflict lasting several weeks. In this case, PRC ships and aircraft surround Taiwan after a series of deadly air and maritime confrontations between their forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) then attempts to conduct a “quarantine” of major ports in Taiwan. The United States intervenes and its warships escort commercial vessels through the blockade zone without incident. For the purposes of this scenario, dozens of PRC and Taiwan armed forces members are assumed killed in incidents in the air and at sea. There are no losses of foreign personnel. The conflict terminates when both sides agree to de-escalate the situation. This results in a relatively low intensity and short duration conflict. The second scenario that authors were asked to review was a major conflict of several months that ends in a PLA defeat. This conflict starts with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in which initial PLA missile strikes target Taiwan’s military and US forces in Japan and Guam. PRC forces land on Taiwan but supplies and follow-on forces are hampered by sustained Taiwanese and US strikes on ships and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait. After several months of heavy fighting, PRC forces withdraw to the mainland after losing roughly 100,000 personnel. Taiwan suffers approximately 50,000 military casualties and 50,000 civilian casualties. The United States loses 5,000 military members and 1,000 civilians, while Japan loses 1,000 military members and 500 civilians. Beyond this, no substantial foreign losses occur. The conflict terminates when the PLA withdraws from the main island of Taiwan but retains control of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The purpose of these scenarios is not to assert that this is how a conflict over Taiwan would play out. The intention is instead to help describe in more detail what the costs would be to the PRC of a failed crossstrait operation. An important caveat is that the authors were asked to make their own assessments of the impact on the PRC in each of the four areas examined. They were not asked to put themselves in Xi’s (or his successor’s) shoes. Xi and his colleagues might underestimate (or overestimate) the costs that the PRC would incur in these scenarios. Even if Beijing anticipates that the costs of taking an action against Taiwan are high, they might proceed despite the perceived risks. National leaders often make choices that overlook high costs if the perceived benefits are high or overridden by political considerations. Xi might conclude that not acting is more costly for him personally than taking a risky action that he believes is necessary to demonstrate resolve. For example, if Xi views a step taken by Taipei as intended to permanently separate it from the PRC, and especially if he judges that Washington supports that goal, he is likely to move against Taiwan even if he expects that the PLA would suffer high casualties in attempting to seize it. Overall, the authors of these essays demonstrate that the costs to the PRC of a failed military operation against Taiwan would be substantial. As noted above, this is not to suggest that Beijing would necessarily be deterred from starting a conflict in the first place. But it would be a mistake to simply assume that the PRC would prevail in a conflict over Taiwan. The history of failed amphibious operations is long, and these essays demonstrate that an unsuccessful PRC-initiated conflict would have severe negative consequences for the country’s economy, military, social stability, and international standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

51. A Long Time Coming: Europe and India have discovered a strategic partnership

Author:
Garima Mohan
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The relationship between Europe and India is on the cusp of change. Later this month, in a historic first, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will serve as guest of honor, a position reserved for India’s top partners, at the country’s Republic Day ceremony. At the subsequent EU-India summit, the two sides are likely to sign a long-elusive free trade agreement (FTA) and an expansive security and defense partnership. They are also expected to announce initiatives designed to boost skilled migration, and to foster cooperation between European and Indian industry to enhance economic security. There are several other positive developments. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz just undertook his first official visit to India, also his first to a non-NATO ally. Accompanied by a substantial business delegation, he secured many agreements on defense industrial cooperation, semiconductors, and critical minerals. Recent German governments have made a point of sending top leadership to India before official visits to China, and Merz’s visit continues that convention. French President Emmanuel Macron is due to follow in February to cement his own country’s ties with New Delhi on emerging technologies, thereby broadening an already substantial and critical strategic partnership. India’s foreign minister, in a breakthrough for India’s small-group diplomacy in Europe, just joined a Weimar Format meeting for the first time. Lastly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to visit the continent in spring for the next India-Nordic summit. For some observers this momentum is the result of the rocky relationships that Europe and India have with the United States. In a world of fractured alliances and partnerships, Europe and India need each other like never before. But the groundwork for their current ties was laid over the last decade. Structural factors such as competition with China, and India’s policy of diversification that led it to focus on ties with the West, have brought them closer and raised bilateral ambitions. The relationship is, however, not without divergences, particularly on approaches to Russia. Based on interviews with policymakers in New Delhi, Paris, Berlin, The Hague, and Brussels, this piece will trace the evolution of the “India agenda” in European foreign policy and lay out Europe’s position among New Delhi’s foreign policy priorities.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, South Asia, and India

52. Leveraging Remittances for Economic Transformation inECCAS Countries

Author:
Salim Ahmed Vessah
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Remittances are increasingly becoming a strategic yet underutilized lever for economictransformation in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Across Sub-Saharan Africa, remittance inflows reached a record USD 54 billion in 2023. Within ECCAS, theDemocratic Republic of Congo (approximately USD 1.4 billion) and Cameroon (about USD 375million) were the main recipients, while other member states received comparatively modestamounts. Although these flows do not collectively reach USD 5 billion at the regional level, theyalready surpass foreign direct investment or official development assistance in specific countriesand play a stabilizing role in household welfare. However, their developmental potential remainslargely untapped due to limited financial inclusion, high transfer costs, and the absence ofeffective institutional mechanisms to channel remittances toward productive investment and economic structural transformation. At the same time, ECCAS economies continue to grapple with persistent challenges : low industrialproductivity, weak competitiveness, fragile regulatory systems, insufficient infrastructure, and poorgovernance quality. These weaknesses are compounded by high levels of financial exclusion,limited access to affordable credit, and rising unemployment especially among young people andvulnerable populations. Combined, these constraints hinder progress toward the SustainableDevelopment Goals (SDGs) and the aspirations of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 . In thiscontext, better mobilization and strategic use of remittances constitute a viable and largelyuntapped alternative to support economic transformation and resilience.
Topic:
Economic Transformation, Remittances, and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
Political Geography:
Africa

53. Improving access to electricity for greater energy justice inEconomic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

Author:
Salim Ahmed Vessah
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
ECCAS’s growth is constrained by a deep electrification deficit that undermines energy justice,human development, and inclusive structural transformation. Despite its immense energypotential, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) remains one of the leastelectrified sub-regions in Africa. , access to electricity was estimated at just 56.7%, far below thesub-Saharan African average of 72%. This persistent energy deficit fuels domestic energyinsecurity, as millions of poor and vulnerable households still rely on traditional and polluting fuelsfor cooking and heating. The consequences are profound: weakened social services, health risks,reduced productivity, and slowed economic diversification. The impacts span multiple sectors. Inrural areas, health centers lack reliable power for vaccine refrigeration, emergency care, oressential equipment. Households using biomass-based fuels face heightened risks of respiratorydiseases, disproportionately affecting women and children. In education, limited lighting andinadequate digital infrastructure reduce study hours and widen the learning gap. More broadly, unreliable electricity remains a major constraint on industrialization, agro-processing, and private-sector development, weakening the region’s competitiveness and slowing progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals .
Topic:
Development, Industrialization, Energy, Sustainable Development, and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
Political Geography:
Africa

54. From International Fragmentation to Industrial Cohesion:The Missing Link in AfCFTA Implementation

Author:
Salim Ahmed Vessah, Stephane Atangana, and Larissa Ntoubia
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
As global geo-economic fragmentation accelerates, African economies face rising external shocksfrom supply chain reconfiguration, protectionism, and volatile capital flows. The AfricanContinental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offers a strategic pathway to build regional resilience,expand industrial capacity, and strengthen economic sovereignty. Yet, despite early trade growth,intra-African trade remains limited, constrained by persistent non-tariff barriers, regulatoryfragmentation, weak logistics infrastructure, and insufficient productive capacity. Without deeperdomestic and regional reforms, AfCFTA risks delivering trade diversion rather than sustainedindustrial transformation. This brief argues that Africa’s central challenge is not market accessalone, but the absence of industrial cohesion that enables firms to scale, integrate into regionalvalue chains, and compete globally. It proposes a reform agenda focused on accelerated NTBremoval, targeted industrial value-chain development, regulatory convergence, digital tradeintegration, and coordinated continental trade diplomacy. Translating AfCFTA from legal ambitioninto economic performance is essential for inclusive growth, resilience, and long-termcompetitiveness in a fragmenting global economy.
Topic:
Resilience, Fragmentation, Geoeconomics, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and Global Economy
Political Geography:
Africa

55. Chinese Loans to Sub-Saharan African countries: BalancingDevelopment and Dependency

Author:
Ahmed Salim Vessah
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, China has become sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) foremost tradingpartner and the region’s main bilateral creditor, profoundly reshaping its financial and geopoliticallandscape. Between 2000 and 2022, Chinese lenders extended over USD 170 billion in loans toAfrican countries , with major recipients (such as Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia)each receiving between USD 5 and 40 billion. Today, China accounts for around 20% of SSA’sbilateral external debt , underscoring its strategic importance in the continent’s developmenttrajectory. This Policy Brief argues that while Chinese loans are instrumental in addressing Africa’smassive infrastructure deficit, they concurrently heighten debt vulnerabilities and geopoliticaldependence. The attractiveness of Chinese financing is best understood in relation to Africa’spersistent structural needs. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2024) , SSA facesan annual infrastructure financing gap of USD 100-150 billion, far exceeding the capacity ofdomestic revenues and traditional donors. Chinese loans therefore stand out due to their speed of approval focus on large-scale physical infrastructure, and limited policy conditionality’s comparedto Western lenders. For many African governments, this makes Chinese credit an appealing andpragmatic alternative for accelerating development.
Topic:
Debt, Development, Infrastructure, Trade, and Dependency
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

56. Glocalising Universal Health Coverage in Cameroon:Implications for good governance, equity and inclusiveness

Author:
Constantine Asahngwa
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Despite recent health financing reforms, quality healthcare services remain largely inaccessible tomany Cameroonians with financial barriers being one of the primary reasons. The UniversalHealth Coverage (UHC) program was introduced as a way of enhancing equitable access toquality services, without heavy financial spending for patients. However, rolling out the program inCameroon has raised some conceptual ambiguity as there is no clear understanding of what UHCis all about, including its implementation. Drawing from desk review of policy documents andresearch papers, we argue that UHC has been glocalized in Cameroon and the process hasimplication for good governance, equity and inclusiveness, which are the core values in measuring and assessing its performance. We begin with a presentation of the conceptualization of UHCfrom a global perspective, followed by the glocalization of UHC in Cameroon, its implication forgood governance, access and inclusiveness, and some recommendations for action.
Topic:
Governance, Public Policy, Public Health, Health Insurance, Inclusion, and Equity
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

57. Strengthening Democracy, Deepening Practice, and Shapingthe Future of Governance in Central Africa

Author:
Pippie Hugues
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Democracy in Central Africa is at a critical juncture. While citizen demand for accountability hasgrown, political instability, fragile institutions, and shrinking civic space continue to underminedemocratic progress. Elections, though increasingly frequent, remain high-stakes events that caneither strengthen legitimacy or expose systemic weaknesses. Ensuring transparency, credibility,and institutional resilience is therefore essential. This policy brief argues that the region’s democratic future depends on translating continentalnorms into national practice, strengthening institutions, and cultivating a civically literate publiccapable of sustaining democratic culture. Without these foundations, reforms risk remainingsymbolic rather than transformative.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Democracy, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Africa and Central Africa

58. Lessons from Community-Based Health Insurance forScaling Universal Health Coverage in Cameroon

Author:
Regina Sinsai and Constantine Asahngwa
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Cameroon’s Universal Health Coverage (UHC) program, launched in 2023, aims to reducefinancial barriers to healthcare. However, coverage remains low (6.4%). Community-Based HealthInsurance (CBHI) schemes, despite their limitations, offer valuable lessons for UHCimplementation—particularly in governance, community engagement, and risk pooling. This briefoutlines these lessons and provides actionable recommendations to strengthen UHC.
Topic:
Governance, Health Insurance, and Community Engagement
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

59. Closing the Health Insurance Gap for Cameroon’s HealthWorkforce

Author:
Regina Sinsai, Constantine Asahngwa, and Ronald Gobina
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Healthcare workers (HCWs) are essential to Cameroon’s health system, yet most lack adequatehealth insurance coverage. Current schemes—NSIF, employer-based plans, and UHC—fail toprotect HCWs from catastrophic health costs. This brief examines the coverage gap, itsimplications, and policy actions to safeguard the health workforce.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Employment, Public Policy, Workforce, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

60. Virtual Briefing Series | US Military Posture and Strike Options Against Iran

Author:
Kevin Donegan, Mick Mulroy, and Jason Campbell
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
On January 14, as the Iranian regime brutally cracked down on the largest street protests the country had seen in years, US President Donald Trump urged Iranians to persevere, posting on social media “help is on its way.” At the time, however, limited US military resources in the theater constrained the president’s military options. In the ensuing month since Trump’s post, the Pentagon has repositioned significant forces to the Middle East. This has led to wide speculation that the US is preparing for renewed strikes on Iran even as the Trump administration pursues diplomatic talks with the Iranian regime. To better understand the military planning and force posture dynamics shaping US policy choices, this briefing featured two Distinguished Military Fellows, former commander of the 5th Fleet VADM Kevin Donegan, USN (Ret.), and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Mick Mulroy. MEI Senior Fellow Jason Campbell moderated the discussion.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Protests, Military, and Airstrikes
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America