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41. Russia’s War on Ukraine: A New Phase

Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has entered a new phase. The Kremlin’s initial plan to seize Kyiv with a lightning strike failed due to spirited defense by the Ukrainian military. In response, Russia has concentrated forces in the Donbas, and to a lesser extent southern Ukraine. Fighting remains fierce in these areas and experts disagree about the trajectory of the conflict. Some argue that Ukraine’s superior morale and greater international support will be decisive, while others point to Russia’s sheer advantage in numbers. Our panel of experts will discuss the implications of this new phase of the war. Can Ukraine gain back territory lost in recent weeks? Have Russia’s war aims changed? Should the US and NATO change course? Is it time for all sides to seek a negotiated settlement?
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

42. Journalism During Wartime: A Conversation with The Kyiv Independent

Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
The Kyiv Independent is a leading English-language media source based in Ukraine. Olga Rudenko (Chief Editor, Kyiv Independent) and Daryna Shevchenko (CEO, Kyiv Independent) will talk about the Kyiv Independent’s work in Ukraine and about the challenges of reporting in a country that is at war. Lili Bivings (Contributing Editor, Kyiv Independent) will then lead a discussion with the two presenters which will be followed by a Q & A with the audience moderated by Mark Andryczyk (Harriman Institute). This event is cosponsored by Razom for Ukraine.
Topic:
War, Media, Journalism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

43. Navalny and Russia's Opposition During the War: A Conversation with Maria Pevchikh

Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Please join the Harriman Institute at Columbia University for a discussion with Maria Pevchikh, head of the investigation department at the Anti-Corruption Foundation. Moderated by Elise Giuliano, Senior Lecturer in Political Science.
Topic:
War, Authoritarianism, Civil-Military Relations, Opposition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

44. Saludos desde Mariúpol: Covering Ukraine for the Spanish audience

Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
In the Spanish media landscape, the shadow of Russia has always loomed large over the image of Ukraine: a confusion fueled by geographical distance and historical myth-making. The Russian-Ukrainian war that began in 2014 and the current large-scale invasion have created an opportunity for Spanish journalists to get to know Ukraine, challenge stereotypes and engage in a dialogue with the readers back home. An ongoing process that nevertheless has brought some change.
Topic:
War, Media, Language, Journalism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Spain

45. Narrating the War Everydayness

Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
In early March 2022, the Center for Urban History and colleagues from Poland, the UK, and Luxembourg started to discuss the possibility of ethically well-grounded and methodologically reasonable emergency collecting and archiving of oral testimonies of Ukrainian refugees, IDPs, and volunteers. During the presentation, Otrishchenko will describe multiple decisions we made in this project concerning interactions within the team, sensitivity of recruitment, trauma-informed interviewing, and ethical preservation of collected stories.
Topic:
War, Media, Interview, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

46. Israel’s Ukraine policy: ‘Right side of history’ vs national interest

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
History has no right side and it does not evolve according to moral imperatives.
Topic:
Diplomacy, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

47. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

48. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

49. Latin America and the New Non-Aligned Movement

Author:
Bryan Pitts
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
While the Global North has responded as a unified front to the war in Ukraine, in Latin America, countries are choosing their own paths.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Geopolitics, and Narrative
Political Geography:
Ukraine and Latin America

50. For Hemispheric Unity, a Change in U.S. Foreign Policy is Needed

Author:
Brett J. Kyle and Andrew G. Reiter
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
In the face of a new war in Europe, shoring up support in Latin America will not be as easy as the Biden administration thinks.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and War
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Latin America, and United States of America

51. HOW GERMANY’S COALITION CHANGE CONTRIBUTED TO PUTIN’S STRATEGIC MISCALCULATION IN UKRAINE

Author:
Debra Leiter and Rebecca Best
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin almost certainly failed to anticipate that Germany would be willing to sacrifice the benefits of cheaper Russian gas to punish Russian aggression in Ukraine. But Tuesday, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz indefinitely paused certification of the completed Nord Stream 2 pipeline to “reassess” the situation. While the move didn’t stop Putin from invading Ukraine—by that point Putin already had too much skin in the game to risk the loss of face from backing down—it has substantially raised the costs for Russia. Why did Germany do this, and why didn’t Putin see it coming?
Topic:
NATO, Oil, War, Gas, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

52. WILL NATO FIGHT RUSSIA OVER UKRAINE? THE STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX SAYS NO

Author:
Andrew Kydd
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Many observers of the current war between Russia and Ukraine have expressed concern that NATO support for Ukraine could escalate the conflict to a direct major conventional war between NATO and Russia, and that from there it could easily escalate to a nuclear war. A group of foreign policy experts have proposed that NATO impose a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine, while other analysts have decried the escalatory potential of such a move. In a recent poll of international relations scholars, 40 percent thought a no-fly zone would lead to large-scale conventional war between NATO and Russia and 13 percent thought it could lead to nuclear war.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, War, Escalation, and Instability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

53. WHY A SETTLEMENT IN UKRAINE REMAINS OUT OF REACH

Author:
Valerie Sticher
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The Russian invasion and unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine show the limits of diplomacy. Despite warning of an impending invasion, efforts to stop the war failed. And despite the high costs on all sides, efforts to stop this horrific war remain elusive. Why is this the case?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

54. HOW HISTORICAL ANALOGIES WOKE UP THE WEST

Author:
Eric Mosinger
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Policymakers, activists, and ordinary people often make analogies between past and present, for example, by labeling 9/11 “the Pearl Harbor of the 21st century.” In doing so, people hope to better understand surprising events and develop a plan of action for themselves and others. Vladimir Putin employed historical analogies to justify his invasion of Ukraine, while Western leaders drew on their own understanding of World War II history to mobilize a surprisingly muscular response to Russian aggression.
Topic:
War, History, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

55. WHY OFFSHORE FINANCE LIMITS U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA

Author:
Menevis Cilizoglu and Chelsea Estancona
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
More than 1,000 individuals and entities have now been targeted with sanctions since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including more than 50 oligarchs close to Putin and their families. These measures include the freezing of assets in international banks, seizure of yachts, private jets, and luxury real estate, and travel bans. Western policymakers hope that targeting a wide network of Russian political and economic elites, including oil executives, steel tycoons, media moguls and high-level intelligence officers will isolate Putin and pressure him to reverse course. The million-dollar question is, can these targeted measures actually hurt Russian oligarchs, let alone pressure Putin?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Sanctions, Offshore Finance, and Shell Companies
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

56. Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union

Author:
Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The economic shock from the war in Ukraine is forcing Europe to face difficult policy choices, according to Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry. Governments must decide how best to soften the blow of higher energy and food prices, and how much to rely on debt finance. The European Central Bank must decide how to balance the fight against inflation with the need to sustain aggregate demand, in the face of decreases in real income. The authors analyze the impact of the war on the European economy, discuss the pros and cons of policy options, and call for coherence in balancing sanctions, fiscal measures, and monetary policy. They argue for the use of transfers rather than across-the-board subsidies and point to the room for debt finance. They show the potential role of tripartite wage agreement and also argue that monetary policy can remain on its current trajectory but be ready to adjust.
Topic:
War, European Union, Economy, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

57. Wartime governance and state-building trajectories in post-conflict societies

Author:
Patricia Justino
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
To date, there is limited understanding about the consequences of wartime dynamics for post-war state-building processes. This paper explores one such dynamics—the forms of governance exercised by armed groups during wartime—and proposes a theoretical framework outlining how forms of wartime governance affect trajectories of state-building in the aftermath of civil wars. Six possible trajectories are mapped out: stable democracy, weak democracy, stable autocracy, fragmented rule, contested autocracy, and durable disorder. Each trajectory is shaped by the interaction between two dimensions of wartime governance: how armed groups build institutional capacity in wartime and the characteristics of wartime civilian rule by armed groups. The core argument is that civil wars generate within themselves bureaucratic and institutional capacity—through how armed groups govern territories and civilians within them—that under certain circumstances may be harnessed in the post-war period to build states capable of governing. The characteristics and durability of those forms of wartime governance shape the type of statebuilding and political regime trajectories that emerge in the post-war period.
Topic:
Political Violence, Development, War, Conflict, Peace, and State Building
Political Geography:
Global Focus

58. Starr Forum: The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: A prologue to WWIII or another frozen conflict?

Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Dmitry Gorenburg is a senior research scientist at CNA, where he has worked since 2000. Dr. Gorenburg is an associate at the Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. His research interests include security issues in the former Soviet Union, Russian military reform, Russian foreign policy, and ethnic politics and identity. Olga Oliker is the program director for Europe and Central Asia at the International Crisis Group. Her research interests include foreign and security policies of Russia, Ukraine, and the Central Asian and Caucasian successor states to the Soviet Union, domestic politics in these countries, US policy towards the region, and nuclear weapon strategy and arms control. She received her PhD from the MIT Department of Political Science. Serhii Plokhii is the Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyi Professor of Ukrainian History and director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University. His research interests include the intellectual, cultural, and international history of Eastern Europe, with an emphasis on Ukraine. Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program. She is a research associate at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Dr Saivetz is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues, including an assessment of the “reset,” Russian policies toward the other Soviet successor states, and current US-Russian relations. Elizabeth Wood is professor of history at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine (Woodrow Wilson Center and Columbia University Press, 2016). She is co-director of the MIT Russia Program, coordinator of Russian studies, and adviser to the Russian Language Program.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

59. Determinants of China's Policy Towards the War in Ukraine

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China’s position on the war in Ukraine depends mainly on the stabilisation of China’s internal situation before the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress planned for autumn this year. By holding NATO responsible for the conflict, the CCP reinforces its rhetoric about the legitimacy of the rivalry with the U.S. China’s signals on supporting peace negotiations and not helping Russia to circumvent sanctions are intended to protect China from possible Western secondary sanctions. The prospect of further Sino-Russian cooperation should induce the EU to reduce its economic interdependence with China.
Topic:
War, Sanctions, European Union, Rivalry, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

60. The Course of Cooperation between Russia and its Latin American Partners

Author:
Bartlomiej Znojek
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
For the past several years, Russia has been strengthening ties with the authoritarian regimes of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and has developed cooperation with other Latin American countries as an investor in the energy sector, a supplier of weapons and Sputnik-V COVID-19 vaccine, and in other areas. Most Latin American governments have condemned the Russian aggression against Ukraine, but they have not imposed sanctions on Russia. It is in the EU’s interest to persuade its Latin American partners of the validity of the restrictions and to work together to mitigate the negative economic effects of the war.
Topic:
International Cooperation, War, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Partnerships, and Vaccine
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Cuba, Latin America, Nicaragua, and Venezuela