Topic: Security - CIAO Search Results

1. Emerging Challenges and Opportu-Nities in Humanitarian Assistance in Mozambique: A Case Study from Cabo Delgados

Author:: Fátima Chimarizeni Papelo
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: This paper aims to analyze the emerging challenges and opportuni-ties derived from the humanitarian assistance actions applied in Cabo Del-gado in the context of violent extremism that has been ravaging the province since 2017. This topic is relevant because the traditional concept of huma-nitarian assistance presupposes support for victims of a disaster caused by nature or man-made, and the province of Cabo Delgado presents a growing demand for humanitarian assistance due to the ongoing prolonged violent conflict. In Cabo Delgado, there are victims of a violent, unconventional, low-intensity conflict. More than 1 million people are in need of humanita-rian assistance, of which more than 50% are women and children (OCHA 2021). Along with terrorism, climate disasters, such as Cyclone Keneth in 2019, and the COVID-19 Pandemic, which began affecting Mozambique in 2020, are exacerbating the state of vulnerability of humanitarian victims. Combined, these events force non-state humanitarian actors to operate in an environment characterized by uncertainty, insecurity, and unpredictability. Nevertheless, these humanitarian actors may operate beyond what is defined by traditional humanitarian principles, which concern saving lives and allevia-ting the suffering of humanitarian victims, including developmental actions that may result in the reduction of state power in the humanitarian space and that lead to the implementation of political action by external forces. If prolonged, this scenario may accentuate the weakening of state power. Given this context, one wonders what challenges and opportunities are derived from the humanitarian support process in Cabo Delgado. This paper seeks to reflect on the emerging challenges and oppor-tunities arising from the humanitarian assistance process in Cabo Delgado. Specifically, it sought to a) define what humanitarian assistance is; b) analyze the emerging challenges for humanitarian actors in Cabo Delgado; and c) analyze the emerging opportunities for humanitarian actors within the pro-cess of humanitarian assistance in the region. We started from the hypothesis that the problem of the humanitarian assistance process in the context of violent extremism creates emerging challenges and opportunities for non--state humanitarian actors that are linked to human security, management, and coordination of humanitarian actions.
Topic:: Security, Violent Extremism, Armed Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Political Geography:: Africa, Mozambique, and Cabo Delgados

2. Strengthening Peace and Security in West Africa: A Conversation with Anthony Antem

Author:: Denis Foretia
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: As regional and global challenges related to peace and security continue to evolve, collaboration and knowledge-sharing remain critical to fostering sustainable solutions. The ReCAP Final Regional Conference, taking place in Dakar, Senegal, from February 10-11 2025, brings together experts, practitioners, and researchers from across West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin to reflect on lessons learned in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and the fight against violent extremism. In this insightful conversation, Anthony Antem (AA), Head of the Conflict Prevention Unit at the Nkafu Policy Institute, discusses the peace and security landscape in West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin. He highlights Nkafu’s contributions to the ReCAP project, shares expectations for the conference, and reflects on the importance of regional collaboration in fostering sustainable peace. The discussion is led by Ayukmba Nkonghonyor (AN), Senior Communications Manager at the Denis and Lenora Foretia Foundation.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Security, Peace, Interview, Countering Violent Extremism, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

3. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a changing security order with a mix of diplomacy and deterrence.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Criminal gangs have tightened their grip on much of Port-au-Prince, with the multinational security mission making little headway and transitional authorities mired in internal disputes. The UN Security Council should quickly decide how to respond to Haiti’s request for further assistance in restoring public safety.
Topic:: Security, UN Security Council, Organized Crime, Gangs, and Public Safety
Political Geography:: Caribbean and Haiti

5. Practical Guidance for Integrating Climate into WPS National Action Plans

Author:: Christina Vetter and Jessica Smith
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:: In this practical guidance note, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security explores the capacity for National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security (WPS NAPs) to be effective tools for national-level implementation of the WPS Agenda that is responsive to climate-related security risks. WPS NAPs have become the primary tool for national-level efforts to implement the WPS Agenda. To remain relevant and effective, NAPs must be responsive to the ever-changing security landscape and emerging threats to peace and security, like climate change. While the share of NAPs that mention climate change has slowly increased, many include just one cursory reference to climate change in the background section that does not comprehensively address the impacts of climate-related security risks across all four pillars of WPS or include specific actions or commitments related to climate in the NAP’s implementation framework. This report presents actionable policy recommendations for WPS NAPs to more meaningfully address climate change and related security risks throughout their design, drafting, and implementation. The report, authored by Christina Vetter and Dr. Jessica Smith, was made possible with support from the Embassy of Denmark in Washington, D.C.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:: Global Focus

6. Exploring options for advancing Kosovo-NATO relations

Author:: Ramadan Iazi and Jeta Loshaj
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: NATO’s role in Kosovo has been vital since the 1999 intervention and KFOR remains integral for guaranteeing security and stability not only in Republic of Kosovo but also the wider Western Balkans. Public sentiment for full NATO membership is extremely high in Kosovo—over 90% support—reflecting Kosovars’ enduring trust in the NATP alliance. However this overwhelming public support can be affected if Kosovo’s aspirations for closer ties with NATO are not addressed. While, Kosovo’s formal progress toward full membership is politically constrained by the fact that four NATO member states have yet to recognize its independence, there are other options that NATO can pursue to advance relations with Kosovo. In this context, this paper explores options how can Kosovo and NATO advance relations and cooperation. The 1995 study provides core principles for options that are examined in this paper. These principles remain highly relevant for Kosovo. While formal membership is stalled by non-recognizing NATO member states, the paper argues that an inclusive, step-by-step approach can be adapted for a flexible, deeper engagement with Kosovo. A central recommendation is the creation of a “Kosovo Enhanced Cooperation Initiative,” a tailored version of NATO’s partnership mechanisms (e.g., Partnership for Peace, Planning and Review Process, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre). KECI would aim to strengthen Kosovo’s defense institutions, enhance interoperability, support civil emergency preparedness, and develop broader crisis-management capabilities. Crucially, it would not force any change in the political stance on recognition among NATO member states. The EU-facilitated normalization dialogue between Republic of Kosovo and Serbia is one of the essential elements especially for Kosovo to build the confidence of both skeptical NATO member states and international partners when it comes to Euro-Atlantic integration process of the country. Regular coordination with NATO and the EU, particularly concerning sensitive actions in the north, would affirm that Kosovo’s leaders prioritize strategic partnerships and diplomacy over moves that risks and undermine support for Kosovo. Nevertheless, without any concrete carrots such as anything close to a guarantee that Kosovo gains an open perspective for NATO’s PfP, it is rather difficult for Kosovo to be encouraged to deliver on either an agreement with Serbia or any other agreement.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Partnerships, Normalization, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

7. Fueling the Future: Recommendations for Strengthening U.S. Uranium Security

Author:: Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Uranium is a crucial mineral for energy and national security—it fuels the nuclear energy that underpins today’s economy and is key to propelling future growth to meet the surge in energy demand from artificial intelligence. However, supply chain vulnerabilities and dependencies on foreign adversaries challenge U.S. leadership in the sector and create national and energy security risks. Russia and China are rapidly expanding their offtake of mined uranium from international partners, uranium enrichment capabilities, and nuclear infrastructure. To strengthen uranium and nuclear fuel supply chains, the United States must work with allies, implement conducive trade and tariff policies, and invest in both domestic enrichment capacity and uranium ore production abroad.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Economic Security, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. Russia’s Shadow War Against the West

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Russia is conducting an escalating and violent campaign of sabotage and subversion against European and U.S. targets in Europe led by Russian military intelligence (the GRU), according to a new CSIS database of Russian activity. The number of Russian attacks nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024. Russia’s primary targets have included transportation, government, critical infrastructure, and industry, and its main weapons and tactics have included explosives, blunt or edged instruments (such as anchors), and electronic attack. Despite the increase in Russian attacks, Western countries have not developed an effective strategy to counter these attacks.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Transnational Threats
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

9. The Impact of Stereotyping on International Cyber Norm‑making: Navigating Misperceptions and Building Trust

Author:: Fan Yang
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Over the past three decades, cyberspace – a digital realm shaped by both technological and social dynamics – has evolved into a domain where a wide range of human activities now take place. These activities are marked by their anonymity, which complicates attribution, and their instantaneity, which challenges timely regulation. To address these challenges, states focus on two approaches: applying existing laws and creating new ones. While there is a general consensus that cyberspace should be governed by the rule of law, including international law, the application of existing legal frameworks to cyberspace remains an evolving challenge both in terms of state practice and academic discourse. At the same time, the international community has consistently sought to develop new norms to promote good governance in cyberspace. Against this backdrop, states – especially those with advanced cyber capabilities – are engaging in a competitive game of norm-making, striving to exert influence in shaping international rules to govern cyberspace. As part of this process, states often categorise each other by trying to highlight their counterparts’ most distinct characteristics. While such labelling is common in diplomatic interactions, it is particularly problematic in the context of international cyber norm-making. Labels reflect and reinforce stereotypes, which often oversimplify the complexities of states’ behavioural patterns in cyberspace and their underlying logic. States are thus roughly grouped by opposing indicators, such as those viewing cyberspace as a global commons versus sovereign territory, those advocating for an interconnected free Internet versus a fragmented “splinternet”, or those favouring multistakeholderism versus multilateralism as the dominant approach to the governance of cyberspace. Once established, these stereotypes are difficult to dismantle and can lead to distorted perceptions that obstruct constructive dialogue. This GCSP Policy Brief aims to identify the potential security challenges posed by stereotyping in international cyber norm-making processes. It then illustrates the policy implications of this problem and offers policy recommendations.
Topic:: Security, Cybersecurity, Norms, Cyberspace, and Trust
Political Geography:: Global Focus

10. Managing Global Biological Risks: Towards a Security-Health Coordination Framework

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros, Jeselyn, and Mely Caballero-Anthony
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The task of securing the world against biological risks is complicated by enforcement and information challenges. A security-health coordination framework is crucial for securing cooperation among a diverse set of actors with different but converging mandates.
Topic:: Security, Biosecurity, Crisis Management, Risk, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Global Focus

11. Biosecurity Awareness and Education in Southeast Asia

Author:: Julius Caesar Trajano and Jeselyn
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: ASEAN leaders recognise the critical importance of biosecurity. But there is a need to enhance the security culture and biosecurity awareness among life science, medical, and biotechnology professionals to mitigate the misuse of biological materials.
Topic:: Security, Education, Biosecurity, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

12. The U.S. Pursues Increasingly Aggressive Policy towards Latin America

Author:: Bartłomiej Znojek
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s administration is seeking to rebuild U.S. influence in Latin America. It is trying to convince the countries of the region that cooperation with the United States will bring development and increased security to the Americas. For the time being, however, this approach mainly serves U.S. security interests, in particular combating irregular migration, organised crime and drug trafficking, and reducing China’s influence. The current administration’s threats, inconsistent positions, and expansionist drive will deepen the distrust of the U.S. and antagonise important Latin American partners.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Drug Trafficking
Political Geography:: Latin America and United States of America

13. Hybrid threats: the new horizons for a "Europe of internal security"?

Author:: Jean Mafart
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Even today, most of our fellow citizens are unaware that the European Union is actively involved in the fight against terrorism, money laundering and drug trafficking, in border protection and in the harmonisation of criminal legislation[1]. This is why a European internal security strategy, ProtectEU published by the Commission on April 1st is important : it defines the European Union's work programme for the coming years, within the framework of the guidelines laid down by the European Council. The assessment of the previous internal security strategy (for the period 2020-2025) shows that this kind of programme has real scope: the Commission announced numerous initiatives that were actually completed, even if, as time goes by, the action inevitably deviates from the initial intentions in response to circumstances. Since the successive strategies are work programmes for a given period, none of them really resembles the previous one. On the other hand, the major underlying themes vary relatively little: terrorism, organised crime and external border control were, as it is the case today, key concerns of the ‘founding fathers’ of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ). The doubling of the staff of Europol, the agency responsible which supports Member States in the fight against crime, and the tripling of the staff of the European Border Guard, which are part of the Frontex agency, are also the most spectacular proposals of the new strategy, even if they had already been voiced by the President of the Commission at the beginning of her second term. The arrival of a new theme is therefore bound to attract attention: in this case, it is striking to see the space given over to hybrid threats (a whole chapter, eight pages out of the thirty in the document published on 1 April). A sad sign of the times: it is no longer conceivable to develop an internal security policy without addressing, alongside the more ‘traditional’ themes, the growing threat of destabilisation operations of all kinds coming from Russia or elsewhere. The link between the internal and external dimensions of security is obviously nothing new: in France, the White Paper on defence and national security published in 2008 already considered that ‘the distinction between internal and external security is no longer relevant’. Current geopolitical tensions and the development of hybrid threats are blatantly reinforcing this. How can the ‘internal security of Europe’, initially conceived to respond to internal issues - compensating for the effects of free movement between Member States - adapt to take better account of threats from the outside?
Topic:: Security, European Union, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:: Europe

14. When sleepwalkers awake: German plea for a new European security architecture - a German point of view

Author:: Stéphane Beemelmans
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: For three years, a war has been raging on Europe's borders between two geographically connected states – a conflict that originated in Russia's occupation of Crimea and Donbass almost 11 years ago. Since then, every political and military decision-maker in our part of Europe should have realized that there is a (great) power on our continent that is ready at any time to put ‘war as a continuation of politics by other means’ (Clausewitz) into practice. The deterrent mechanism between the former blocs, which had been effective for almost 50 years and thus prevented war, has evidently given way to a ‘laissez-faire’ on the part of the European states, which has allowed Russia to attack and partially occupy Ukraine with complete impunity, using a crude mix of historical and political justifications that violate international law. What should not have happened could not be seen and therefore could not be addressed appropriately. Our and NATO's ‘laissez-faire’ was based on the for malistic argument that no NATO member country had been attacked and on the lack of strategic foresight disguised as ‘hope’, the expression of which under international law was the ‘Minsk Peace Agreement’ of 2015. The hope, namely, that this attack could be localized and thus geographically restricted or ‘frozen’.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

15. Connecting Opportunities: Greece’s Strategic Role in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)

Author:: Dimitris Gavalas and George Dikaios
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This policy brief discusses the role of Greece in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), focusing mainly on those aspects related to infrastructure and ports and the global supply chain. It suggests a series of different actions and highlights different angles that Greece should take into account if it wants to be a major player in the establishment of the Corridor and its gateway to Europe/European Union. – IMEC will be a game changer in international trade relationships, regional tensions, and political challenges. – The main obstacles to IMEC’s establishment are the conflicts in the Middle East and other major national interests of key actors (such as the Chinese monopoly in the region). – Focus is given to port infrastructure, as ports are pivotal to the global supply chain. India pays significant attention to its ports, while the Port of Piraeus is the largest port in Eastern Europe. – The critical role and position of Greece are highlighted, underlying its role as a hub that connects India and the Middle East to Europe. – Greece needs to invest in infrastructure development, build a skilled workforce, and attract foreign investments. – Suggestions for establishing a successful commercial corridor between India and Greece are given, focusing on mutual interests and growth opportunities.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Trade, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, India, and Greece

16. The Yemeni Civil War: Territorial Partition as the Path to Peace

Author:: Riddhi Likhe
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: The Yemeni Civil War is a conflict that bears crucial regional significance due to its destabilising effect on the Middle East, with the country also being home to one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters. The conflict is characterised by a complex web of regional rivalries, sectarian tensions, and international interventions. This research paper offers a comprehensive assessment of the conflict by outlining its background, key actors and main conflict drivers, and hence proposes a theoretically, historically and contextually informed strategy for resolution- the peaceful territorial partition of Yemen into the historical entities of North Yemen and South Yemen. The paper outlines short-term, medium-term and long-term priorities that the ideal territorial partition plan would focus on, including and accounting for relevant primary, secondary and tertiary actors. The paper aims to showcase that through a nuanced understanding of Yemen’s demographic dynamics and history, a roadmap to ending the conflict focused on territorial partition can be charted out in collaboration with regional actors and the international community, hence leading to stable Yemens that can heal from the humanitarian catastrophe caused by the conflict.
Topic:: Security, Civil War, Peace, Humanitarian Crisis, and Partition
Political Geography:: Middle East and Yemen

17. Pakistan Security Report 2024: An Abridged Version

Author:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: Marking a 70% increase from the previous year, Pakistan experienced a total of 521 terrorist attacks in 2024. This intensified wave of terrorism claimed 852 lives, reflecting a 23% rise compared to the terrorism-related fatalities recorded the year before. Another 1,092 people were injured in these attacks recorded during the year. Although terrorist attacks were recorded in all four provinces and the federal capital in 2024, over 95% of them were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In 2024, a significant increase in militant fatalities was observed during operational strikes conducted by security forces in Pakistan. Compared to 373 militants killed in such operations in 2023, the number rose to 621 in 2024, marking a rise of over 66%. Overall, security forces and law enforcement agencies carried out 158 anti-militant operations in 2024, which was a 22% increase from the previous year. These are some of the key findings from Pakistan Security Report 2024, prepared and released by Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

18. Hate Crimes, Terrorism and the Framing of White Supremacist Violence with Shirin Sinnar (Episode 26)

Author:: Shirin Sinnar and Sahar Aziz
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: In the face of pervasive racial violence in American society, the effort to address and subdue white supremacist extremism has been underserved by the framing of “hate crimes,” and the movement to re-frame these events as domestic terrorism, as these terms do not meet the heavy task of eliminating the perpetuation of institutional oppression.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, White Supremacy, Racism, Hate Crimes, and Domestic Terrorism
Political Geography:: United States of America and North America

19. Public Expectations of Government Responses to Security Contingencies Around Japan

Author:: Satoshi Machidori, Harukata Takenaka, Amy Catalinac, and Kenneth McElwain
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: In this workshop, scholars Satoshi Machidori and Harukata Takenaka speak on Japanese public attitudes toward possible geopolitical contingencies in the light of changing international environment in East Asia. Their new, large-scale survey experiment examines voter assessments of possible government responses to security crises, including a possible Taiwan contingency. The report also analyzes how perceptions of shared ethnicity may affect public reactions to a hypothetical threat from a democratic regime, expanding the research on the relationship between ethnicity and democratic peace. This research is part of a multi-year study project by ROLES (Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies, University of Tokyo). Speakers: Satoshi Machidori, Professor of Political Science, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University, Japan Harukata Takenaka, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies = GRIPS, Japan Discussant: Amy Catalinac, Associate Professor of Politics, NYU Moderator: Kenneth Mori McElwain, Visiting Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Columbia University Hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and co-sponsored by China and the World Program and APEC Study Center.
Topic:: Security, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, and Ethnicity
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

20. Double Dealers: Lebanon and the Risks of Captagon Trafficking

Author:: Mohanad Hage Ali
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Lebanon’s financial collapse and the Syrian conflict have allowed for the growth of an illicit economy, giving rise to a new breed of drug traffickers with ties to Lebanese parties and influence in the security forces. To address this, the country must adopt a comprehensive approach.
Topic:: Security, Syrian War, Drug Trafficking, and Captagon
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

21. Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition

Author:: George Perkovich, Fumihiko Yoshida, and Michiru Nishida
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Preventing nuclear war and other existential military threats requires nations today to focus more on politics than on the qualities or quantities of weapons. Yet, many participants in nuclear policy debates do the opposite.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:: Global Focus

22. Reconsidering Sovereignty Amid the Climate Crisis

Author:: Nitya Labh
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The current international order is based on the presumption that our physical geography is fixed and unchanging. However, climate change—in the form of sea level rise and inundation—is shifting international boundaries. The world’s changing geography will force policymakers and legal experts to adapt the concepts of sovereignty, statehood, and citizenship to address the new global environment. This paper focuses its discussion of climate impacts and response policies on the Pacific islands. The changes befalling low-lying islands, like those in the Pacific, are a harbinger of the future that awaits the residents of coastal cities and shorelines on larger land bodies.1 Islands’ experiences of climate change offer insights into the shortcomings of the existing international system and demonstrate the fundamental tension between sovereignty and climate change. Ultimately, the Pacific region serves as an important case study and a critical blueprint for the future of global adaptation and stability. In view of this challenge, policymakers should consider new legal options to address climate-induced boundary changes. These may include the creation of fictitious boundaries, collective sovereignty, hybrid citizenship, and corridors for climate displacement. This paper does not seek to suggest that these new ideas for sovereignty are the only path to resolving the nexus of legal-climate challenges that exist today. Instead, this paper attempts to raise new questions and ideas about how policymakers should think about the international system at a time when anthropogenic climate and environmental change is rearranging its geophysical foundations.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Sovereignty, and International Order
Political Geography:: Indo-Pacific

23. Ending the New Wars of Attrition: Opportunities for Collective Regional Security in the Middle East

Author:: Amr Hamzawy
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The Middle East’s only viable path toward stability and security lies in fostering dialogue, coordinated initiatives, and joint diplomacy among its influential states.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Dialogue, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: Middle East

24. Q&A: What happened in the coastal region of Syria last week?

Author:: Muaz Al Abdullah
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: On 6 March, a group of armed supporters of former President Bashar al-Assad ambushed a group of security forces in Beit Ana village in the Lattakia countryside, killing and injuring several service members. Following the attack, the gunmen targeted an ambulance that tried to evacuate those who were killed and injured. This triggered a large-scale response by the security forces inside Beit Ana that included artillery shelling and helicopter strikes. Later that same day, Assad loyalists launched coordinated attacks across Lattakia and Tartus governorates to restore control over the main junctions that link the two provinces. This sparked a cycle of violence that included extrajudicial killings of people in the Alawite community by regime forces. At least 57 distinct locations in Lattakia, Hama, Homs, and Tartus governorates were the site of violence over four days (see map below).
Topic:: Security, Extrajudicial Killings, Armed Conflict, and Alawites
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

25. The Global Terrorist Threat Forecast in 2025

Author:: Liu Chunlin and Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The global terrorist threat remains persistent and pervasive as the world moves into 2025. Armed conflicts from Ukraine to Gaza and destabilisation by both State and non-State actors are redefining international stability. The influence of groups such as Islamic State, al-Qaeda and Iranian-backed militias underscores the enduring risks. Key challenges include geopolitical rivalries, radicalisation and increasingly sophisticated cyber and physical attacks. With the Middle East at the epicentre of escalating tensions and Africa emerging as a new hotspot, coordinated international efforts are essential to prevent and counter threats. States must strengthen cooperation in intelligence, security and strategic foresight to deal with a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous global landscape.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Collaboration, Threat Assessment, 2023 Gaza War, Transnational Threats, and Salafi-Jihadism
Political Geography:: Middle East and Global Focus

26. Europe’s next watershed – how liberal Europe should react to Trump 2.0

Author:: Fabian Zuleeg
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The return of Donald Trump to the White House and his “America first” doctrine inevitably poses a fundamental challenge for the EU. Trump’s second presidency represents a new watershed moment: the policies of the next US administration are not just likely to put Europe at a global disadvantage, they will threaten its core objectives of prosperity, sustainability, security, and democracy. This is why European countries will have to act decisively to safeguard the bloc’s unity and strengthen its autonomy in a changed world. Assuming that a second Trump administration will resemble the first would be a serious error. Trump has become more extreme in his policy positions, while facing fewer constraints and operating in a more favourable international environment. As a result, preparing for a worst-case scenario may be a wise approach. Trump’s adversarial, zero-sum approach to international trade is likely to undermine the structures and processes of multilateral economic governance. Measures such as tariffs also threaten the EU’s growth and competitiveness and risk deepening divisions within the bloc. Global progress towards greater sustainability is certain to suffer. A disengagement on behalf of the US from its leadership role in environmental and climate governance will be a significant setback in these efforts. Should the US turn away from its climate goals, this would send a strong signal to other countries that these objectives are no longer a priority. On security, any potential benefit that a Trump presidency might produce in terms of strengthening EU unity is strongly undermined by his stance on Ukraine, which is set to increase the threat facing Europe from Russia. A US-imposed ceasefire would be no guarantee of lasting peace or security for Ukraine or for Europe. In response, the EU and its members will have to take a much bolder and more proactive role, sharply increasing Europe’s own military capabilities and spending. Policies that signal a tolerance for the use of open and covert force, in violation of international law, will also have profound consequences for global security. Far-right and anti-democratic forces within Europe are likely to be emboldened by an incoming Trump government. His actions to exploit Europe’s political divides are set to put significant pressure on European integration – a project Trump will have no qualms in undermining. The entrenchment and normalisation of Trump’s style of populistic, divisive politics and ‘us against them’ rhetoric risks eroding democratic debate more broadly. His amplification of falsehoods and disinformation will undermine public trust in the US and beyond, and could also boost political figures adopting similar strategies in Europe. There is strong potential for Trump’s anti-establishment narrative to gain further ground in Europe, and Europe’s illiberal, regressive and new-nativist forces will no doubt seek to harness this to increase their power. Should they be successful, there is a very real risk of the EU becoming hollowed-out and ineffectual. In this context, achieving consensus and acting with unity will be a greater challenge than ever for the EU27. Those within the EU who are prepared to take the necessary steps to rise to the challenge posed by Trump may have to explore unconventional forms of cooperation to act effectively. Moving forward in this way poses its own legal and political risks. But with European democracy at stake, it may be the only path to achieving the necessary level of ambition and unity to mount a strong response to Trump 2.0.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Donald Trump, Sustainability, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Europe

27. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

28. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency: Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Acontingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options. Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid. Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do. U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so: Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency. Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities. Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible. Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States. Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub. Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Coalition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

29. Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding: Analyzing Yemeni Civil Conflict Deadlocks

Author:: Felipe Duran and Marcial A. G. Suarez
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The roots of the ongoing civil conflict in Yemen lie in the inability of Yemeni society to address and resolve the frustration arising from political marginalization, economic deprivation and the effects of an extractive, corrupt and rent-seeking state. By definition, such systems are characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of a restricted elite and impose few restrictions on their exercise of power. This systemic failure has produced a cycle of violence, political upheaval, and institutional collapse since the creation of the modern Yemeni state in the 1960s, of which the current conflict appears to be only the latest eruption. We propose, as a way of accessing potential possible results for resolving the contradiction, a proposal based on the combination of policies based on Peace Studies, understanding that the mechanisms of the Security Sector Reform processes and transitional justice are crucial for the construction and peacebuilding in the Republic of Yemen. This work analyzes how structural violence has perpetuated in recent years in Yemen and how we can direct the conflict towards positive peace.
Topic:: Security, Civil War, Reform, Peacebuilding, and Structural Violence
Political Geography:: Middle East and Yemen

30. Kangaroo Concerns About Swiming Dragon Ambitions

Author:: Saira Aquil and Waheed Ur Rehman
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: China has accelerated its naval modernization in recent years. There are multiple factors behind this modernization drive. The rise of China in many ways is impacting political, economic, and security dynamics around the world but particularly in Asia-Pacific (Indo-Pacific). Australia is one of the country in this region which is not an exception in this regard. This study looks for implications of China’s naval modernization on Australia. The study makes an important contribution to the literature because this part of the world has not been looked into while analyzing Chinese naval modernization. Data is collected through primary and secondary sources. Besides reviewing the existing literature data is collected through key informant interviews and policy documents of China and Australia. Australian threat perception is evaluated by analyzing Australian Defense White Papers, speeches of Australian leaders and analysis of the country’s security analysts. The study finds that challenges posed by other nations in the region is prompting China to modernize its navy. This in turn enhances security concerns in Australia which is always wary of securing its territorial integrity, economic interests, and global liberal world order which has contributed to its development and security. Australia, in response to these developments, has embarked on the path of modernizing its own forces. It has bolstered its alliances with the US and other partners.
Topic:: Security, Navy, Modernization, Strategic Interests, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

31. Starr Forum: The US and the World Under Trump: The First 100 Days

Author:: Juliette N. Kayyem and Kori Schake
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Starr Forum: The US and the World Under Trump: The First 100 Days: Wednesday, April 16th, 2025. Juliette Kayyem and Kori Schake analyzed President Trump’s first 100 days in office and what this means for our nation and the world. Speakers: Juliette Kayyem is the faculty chair of the Homeland Security and Security and Global Health Projects at Harvard University and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. She also serves as a senior national security analyst for CNN where she has been described as CNN’s “go to” for disasters. A contributing writer to The Atlantic, Professor Kayyem has a weekly security segment on NPR’s Boston station WGBH. Her most recent book, "The Devil Never Sleeps: Learning to Live in an Age of Disasters," was described in a New Yorker profile as an “engagingly urgent blueprint for rethinking our approach to disaster preparedness and response.” She served as President Obama’s assistant secretary for intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. Kori Schake leads the foreign and defense policy team at the American Enterprise Institute. She is the author of "Safe Passage: the Transition from British to American Hegemony," and a contributing writer at the Atlantic, War on the Rocks, and Bloomberg. Before joining AEI, Dr. Schake was the deputy director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. She has had a distinguished career in government, working at the US State Department, the US Department of Defense, and the National Security Council at the White House. She has also taught at Stanford, West Point, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, National Defense University, and the University of Maryland. She has written additional books, including "America vs the West: Can the Liberal World Order Be Preserved?" and is coeditor, along with former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, of “Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military.” Moderator: Evan Lieberman is the Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa and the director of the MIT Center for International Studies. He conducts research on the political-economy of development, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. He studies the democratic politics of governing ethnically and racially diverse societies, including the challenges of public health, climate adaptation, and ensuring respect for human dignity. Lieberman is the author, most recently, of "Until We Have Won Our Liberty: South Africa after Apartheid."
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Public Health, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

32. What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba

Author:: Dmytro Kuleba, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, former foreign minister of Ukraine: Tuesday, April 8th, 2025. Speaker: Dmytro Kuleba is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and served as the foreign minister of Ukraine from March 2020-September 2024. Prior to that, he was deputy prime minister on matters of European relations from August 2019 to March 2020. He is internationally recognized as one of the most influential diplomats of his generation and a global champion for democracy, freedom, and resilience. Discussants: Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and US-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is director of the MIT-Ukraine Program at CIS.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

33. Starr Forum: Sudan Under Fire

Author:: Mai Hassan, Cameron Hudson, Kholood Khair, and Ahmed Kodouda
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Starr Forum: Sudan Under Fire: Monday, April 7th, 2025. As we enter year three of civil war, experts discussed the global crisis that has been too often ignored. Moderator: Mai Hassan is an associate professor of political science at MIT and the faculty director of the MIT-Africa Program at the Center for International Studies. Her work examines topics that span across authoritarian regimes, bureaucracy and public administration, and contentious politics. Speakers: Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to multiple other academic posts, Cameron served in the US government, including as an intelligence analyst in the Africa Directorate at the Central Intelligence Agency. Kholood Khair is the founder and director of Confluence Advisory, a 'think and do tank' formerly based in Khartoum that works on three priority policy areas: peace and security, economy, and governance. She is currently at Yale University as a visiting fellow. Ahmed Kodouda is a policy, advocacy, and communication specialist. He has an extensive background in conflict and post conflict settings and experience working with and consulting for governmental and NGOs around the world, including in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kenya.
Topic:: Security, Civil War, International Security, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Africa and Sudan

34. North Korea, Russia, and China: Past Cooperation & Future Prospects

Author:: Sydney Seiler
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Syd Seiler argues that recent developments in the relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia should be examined within the context of past interactions and North Korea’s geopolitical reality over the past several decades. North Korea’s pursuit of a distanced approach toward China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its post-Cold War management of the bilateral relationships while developing nuclear weapons, and contemporary developments within the North Korea-China-Russia triangle highlight limited shared interests and few signs of deliberate trilateralism. Despite skepticism regarding the durability of trilateralism, Seiler warns against neglecting the threat of collaboration and cooperation among the three countries. In particular, the evolving relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia holds the potential to harm the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and embolden North Korea to believe that the use of force might be justified within the New Cold War structure. Seiler outlines three scenarios in which the evolution of trilateralism could lead to North Korea employing military force on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the critical role of China and Russia in either restraining or encouraging North Korean revisionism. To properly respond to the dangerous transformation of the geopolitical environment, Seiler recommends the United States, South Korea, and like-minded states reinforce conventional and extended deterrence by convincing China and Russia that they will incur high costs for enabling North Korea’s coercive and revisionist behavior.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and North Korea

35. Siloed No More: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict

Author:: Clint Work
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This project was motivated by and builds upon earlier research tracing the evolution and apparent alignment of U.S. and South Korean signaling on Taiwan, wherein the South Korean government adopted a more outspoken position regarding “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and framed it in increasingly expansive terms—as a regional and global issue yet also directly linked to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. The previous research indicated the U.S.-ROK alliance faced a gap between its topline diplomatic rhetoric on Taiwan and its preparedness to navigate an actual conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan and the attendant risk of a simultaneous conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This project aimed to go beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Forty-two interviews were conducted from June 2024 to February 2025 in both Washington and Seoul. Most were in-person interviews with some conducted virtually or by written response via email. Through these interviews with U.S. and ROK current and former government officials, think tank experts, and academics—as well as open-source research—this project offers insight on the evolution and state of U.S.-ROK alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict, key challenges obstructing such discussions, and critical variables or dynamics the alliance would have to navigate in the event of a conflict.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

36. US interests can benefit from stronger congressional ties with the Caribbean

Author:: Wazim Mowla and Maite Gonzalez Latorre
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The Caribbean’s geographic proximity to the United States—as well as its use as a transit point for US citizens, goods, and financial services—makes it a crucial hub for US national interests. However, the relationship has suffered from inconsistent and infrequent assistance. Changes in US policy priorities bring ever-changing adjustments to US engagement, leaving the Caribbean, its leadership, and its institutions with insufficient time to benefit from US policy action. For Caribbean countries, policy continuity is critical for implementation and to see tangible and meaningful development. The region’s small populations and markets, vulnerability to natural disasters and changing global commodity prices, and limited institutional capacity slow the pace of receiving and utilizing development assistance and support. Underpinning US-Caribbean ties with stronger US congressional engagement can provide needed longevity to the relationship. Congressional actions—like newly appropriated resources and committee hearings—can bring tangible benefits to US-Caribbean relations.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Politics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Caribbean, North America, and United States of America

37. The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete

Author:: Clementine G. Starling-Daniels and Theresa Luetkefend
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Strategic competition is likely to intensify over the next decade, increasing the demands on the United States to deter and defend against wide-ranging and simultaneous security challenges across multiple domains and regions worldwide. In that time frame, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Force should more effectively leverage the competencies of US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to compete with US strategic adversaries. Three realities facing the DOD over the next decade lend themselves toward leveraging USSOF more in strategic competition. First, the growing need to counter globally active and increasingly cooperative aggressors, while the broader Joint Force remains focused on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, underscores the value of leveraging USSOF to manage competition in other regions. Second, the desire to avoid war and manage competition below the threshold of conflict aligns with USSOF’s expertise in the irregular aspects of competition. Third, unless defense spending and recruitment dramatically increase over the next decade, the Joint Force will likely have to manage more security challenges without a commensurate increase in force size and capabilities, which underscores the need for the DOD to maximize every tool at its disposal, including the use of USSOF to help manage strategic competition. The US government must harness all instruments of national power, alongside its network of allies and partners, to uphold international security, deter attacks, and counter efforts to undermine US security interests. Achieving this requires effectively integrating and leveraging the distinct roles of the DOD, interagency partners, the intelligence community (IC), and the Joint Force, including components like USSOF that have not been traditionally prioritized in strategic competition. For the past two decades, USSOF achieved critical operational successes during the Global War on Terror, primarily through counterterrorism and direct-action missions. However, peer and near-peer competition now demands a broader application of USSOF’s twelve core activities, with emphasis on seven: special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, unconventional warfare, and direct action. Over the next decade, the DOD should emphasize USSOF’s return to its roots—the core competencies USSOF conducted and refined during the Cold War. USSOF’s unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. During that era, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, and that is how USSOF should be applied in the next decade to help manage strategic competition. This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to: Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally. Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation. Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial. Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder. This report seeks to clarify USSOF’s role in strategic competition over the next decade, address gaps in understanding within the DOD and the broader national security community about USSOF’s competencies, and guide future resource and force development decisions. By prioritizing the above five functions, USSOF can bolster the US competitive edge and support the DOD’s management of challenges across diverse theaters and domains.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, National Security, Terrorism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Middle East, Latin America, and United States of America

38. Friends with benefits: Assessing Russian-Chinese military exercises

Author:: Narantsatsral Enkhbat
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: China-Russia joint strategic air patrols and naval manoeuvres near U.S. territory in the Pacifi c have become a growing trend, serving as geopolitical messaging. China is likely to become more involved in maritime security and power projection in the Arctic, as evidenced by its Coast Guard’s manoeuvres with Russia in the Northern Pacifi c. Russia conducts military drills and manoeuvres with China in the South China Sea (and potentially in the Taiwan Strait) to show support to China on territorial issues.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Geopolitics, Navy, Maritime, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

39. Uncharted Rebellion: The Shifting Frontiers of Left-Wing Extremism

Author:: José Pedro Zúquete
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: For readers of Baku Dialogues, a journal dedicated to fostering intellectual exchange across the Silk Road region, the study of left‑wing extremism (LWE) offers a lens into global ideological currents that resonate even in this historically rich and geopolitically and geoeconomically significant area. The Silk Road region, stretching from the South Caucasus to Central Asia, has long been a crossroads of cultures, ideas, and political movements. Today, it faces many of the same challenges of radicalization and extremism that afflict other parts of the world, though often in unique local forms.
Topic:: Security, Geopolitics, Leftist Politics, and Political Extremism
Political Geography:: Central Asia and South Caucasus

40. Infrastructure Grids and Networks. The Challenges Ahead, amid Security and Efficiency

Author:: Carlo Secchi and Alessandro Gili
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: In recent years, accelerating geopolitical tensions, economic disruptions, and climate-related disasters have elevated resilience and economic security to the forefront of both global and European policy agendas. In response, strategies such as de-risking have driven substantial investments in redundancy, new trade corridors, and expanded infrastructure – including railway lines, highways, ports, electricity grids, pipelines, and undersea digital cables. This infrastructure forms the backbone of the global economy. It is not only crucial for maintaining competitiveness and supporting growth but also plays a central role in enabling the energy and digital transitions. As such, protecting these systems from hostile actions or third-party interference has become an urgent priority. At the same time, the long-standing trade-off between efficiency and security has grown more pronounced amid increasingly strained international relations. Both governments and private sector actors are now more willing to absorb higher costs in order to enhance the resilience of supply chains and connectivity networks. Against this backdrop, a new paradigm is emerging - one that raises two critical questions: Where will the balance ultimately settle between economic efficiency and security/resilience? And what investment priorities will shape the future of transport, energy, and digital connectivity infrastructure?
Topic:: Security, Infrastructure, Economy, Energy, and Digital Transition
Political Geography:: Global Focus

41. Friends and Foes in the Indo-Pacific: Multilateralism Out, Minilateralism In?

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Guido Alberto Casanova
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Minilateralism is already among us, and it is here to stay. The well-known shortcomings of the multilateral system of governance are pushing individual states in the Indo-Pacific to come up with new and different solutions to deal with the security and prosperity issues that current institutions are unable to tackle. Amid growing geopolitical rivalries and the uncertainty provoked by the re-election of Donald Trump, this report aims to shed some clarity on an emerging trend that is already affecting the foreign policy of great powers in a region that is central to global affairs.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Multilateralism, Institutions, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, India, Asia, North Korea, Philippines, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

42. Dilemmas for the EU in deficit-financing of defence expenditure and maintenance of fiscal discipline

Author:: Lucio Pench
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union is grappling with the challenge of increasing defence expenditure while maintaining fiscal discipline under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The European Commission has proposed activating the national escape clause available under the SGP to accommodate defence spending without triggering the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). However, the scope and enforcement of this measure remain uncertain. A proposed 1.5 percent of GDP cap on extra fiscal flexibility is legally questionable and unlikely to be enforced. While low-debt countries do not require the clause due to existing flexibility, highly indebted nations may find it insufficient in the face of rising debt costs. The escape clause may also serve as a backdoor for European Central Bank interventions under the Transmission Protection Instrument, which requires compliance with EU fiscal rules. The Commission has also proposed the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) funding mechanism, a €150 billion loan programme to finance national defence investments. SAFE relies on national borrowing and follows the model of the SURE (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) facility, put in place during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, SAFE’s limited scale and dependence on national fiscal capacities mean it falls short of the collective security funding approach advocated by economists. Meanwhile, Germany’s decision to reform its constitutional debt brake marks a major departure from its traditional fiscal policies. The reform establishes a permanent ‘defence golden rule’, exempting military spending from borrowing limits, alongside a €10 trillion infrastructure fund. Although this move does not endanger Germany’s fiscal sustainability, it undermines EU-wide fiscal coordination and conflicts with the SGP. This could weaken the European Central Bank’s position in future market interventions. Given these challenges, discussions on a new EU fiscal framework are necessary to ensure fiscal flexibility while maintaining debt sustainability.
Topic:: Security, Budget, European Union, Fiscal Policy, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe

43. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?

Author:: Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

44. Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform

Author:: Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The economic strategy being defined by the 2024-2029 European Commission seems to follow the prescriptions on innovation and single market reform, and the expansive approach to industrial policy, set out by Mario Draghi in his September 2024 report on European Union competitiveness, with two important differences. First, the Commission stops short of calling for World Trade Organisation-prohibited subsidies – this is welcome. Second, the Commission proposes a new state aid framework for national industrial policy rather than expansion of EU-level public investment funding. This runs the risk of weakening the single market and harming competition, with the unintended consequence of protecting incumbents and inhibiting structural change. In terms of specific policies, on defence, the Commission is right to face up to the challenge of defining an EU procurement mechanism that offers sufficient speed and cost advantages to justify large-scale funding. On economic security and international partnerships, the Commission is right to take a broader approach than a foreign economic policy focused only on supply chains. What is lacking is a much greater commitment to providing support for climate mitigation in developing countries. The second Trump presidency creates risks for the Commission strategy. President Trump has gone further than expected in threatening territorial expansion and with the speed, aggression and disregard for the rule of law with which he has started to implement his policies. These factors will complicate the EU-United States relationship. The best defence against both Trump and the competitive and security threats posed by China is to accelerate policies that address the EU’s structural weaknesses: raising productivity growth, defence capacity and economic security. Economic security, in turn, requires more resilient trade relationships, less financial dependence on the US and an improved standing with emerging market and developing economies. The EU should also seize the opportunity offered by the shift in US policy from subsidies to deregulation. While the EU should not race Trump to the bottom on environmental or financial deregulation, it should rapidly improve its own regulatory framework while building on its core strengths: human capital and the rule of law. Unlike tariff wars or discriminatory subsidies, a competition to provide a good business environment is not a zero-sum game.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Industrial Policy, Budget, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, Sustainability, European Commission, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

45. Ukraine: European democracy’s affordable arsenal

Author:: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: European NATO members must raise defence spending by enough to deter through strength an irredentist Russia. This must be done possibly without the United States and when ageing populations demand higher social spending. Raising defence spending to sufficient levels could result in a doubling of current primary deficits to just over 3 percent of GDP on average. This seems likely to be a fiscally unattainable goal for this group of countries. European NATO members, in addition to their quantitative defence spending challenge, face the qualitative challenge of significantly increasing their outlays on new modern military equipment, especially drones, to credibly deter Russia. This will require all European NATO members to significantly increase investments in their domestic and regional military-industrial capacities. While its armed forces are physically defending their country against Russia’s onslaught, Ukraine is transforming gradually into a very large, advanced and cost-competitive military equipment and weapons producer. Through the so-called ‘Danish Model’, individual European Union and NATO members are already actively funding Ukrainian defence production, helping it to help itself against Russia. Much more focus should be put on Ukraine’s ability, if fully integrated with the military-industrial sector in the rest of Europe, to produce much of the modern military equipment wanted by itself and the rest of Europe. This Policy Brief shows how Ukraine already produces drones and modern howitzers, arguably the two most important weapons in defensive warfare today, at prices well below those achieved by other Western military suppliers. The EU, with a fully integrated and funded Ukrainian military-industrial sector, will have the capacity to produce much of the cost-competitive military equipment it will need in future, while continuing to fund its welfare systems. To facilitate this development, the EU must in all defence and military-related matters begin treating Ukraine immediately as a full EU member.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Industrial Policy, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

46. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:: Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

47. Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Author:: Grace Price
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: Pacific Island countries (PICs) have long attracted development and security assistance from the region’s traditional partner states—the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. However, the Pacific has received renewed attention from them as China actively vies for influence. Despite increased engagement, the PICs are still turning to China in pursuit of their development and security needs. This report will map out efforts the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are taking to increase influence, obstacles that are hindering effective cooperation in the Pacific, and recommendations for improving their collective engagement with the PICs.
Topic:: Security, Development, Partnerships, and Alliance
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

48. Terrorism and Immigration: 50 Years of Foreign-Born Terrorism on US Soil, 1975–2024

Author:: Alex Nowrasteh
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Terrorism is a hazard to human life and material prosperity that should be addressed in a sensible manner whereby the benefits of government actions taken to contain it outweigh the costs. Whether policies are sensible depends on the risks that terrorism poses, the harms that terrorism inflicts, and the costs of anti-terrorism policies. This risk analysis of foreign-born terrorism is a crucial step in evaluating anti-terrorism policies related to immigration.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, and Immigration
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

49. Net assessments for Australia

Author:: Andrew Carr
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Established in 2023 in the Australian Department of Defence, net assessments will play an increasingly important role in shaping the future of the Australian Defence Force, disciplining long-term capability decisions to a series of key scenarios of concern. With Australia’s security requirements ranging across many more domains — and dependent on careful analysis of trends and networks beyond its shores — four additional Directorates of Net Assessment should be established, in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Home Affairs, Treasury, and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Net assessments will help Ministers better understand key strategic problems as well as potential conflict scenarios and outcomes, assisting them to make effective decisions to improve Australia’s competitive position and prepare the nation for any conflict in its region.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Training, and Assessment
Political Geography:: Australia

50. Terminating Insurgency in Mozambique: Reflections on the SADC Mission In Mozambique

Author:: Oita Etyang, Lweendo Kambela, and Stephen Muleya
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The continued threat of insurgency in Mozambique has triggered academic and policy interest in the recent past. Indeed, the ramifications caused by acts of insurgency globally and in Africa remain endemic. This calls for the need to establish sustainable and context-specific interventions at regional and national levels. The Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regions have not been spared from the lethality of insurgency, with Mozambique morphing into the epicentre of interest. Insurgency has caused untold suffering to communities in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, prompting the deployment of a SADC mission. As a regional peace operation, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed on 15 July 2021 following approval by the Extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Maputo, Mozambique on 23 June 2021. The main objective of SAMIM was to support the Republic of Mozambique to combat armed groups and acts of insurgency, particularly in the Cabo Delgado province. This article seeks to understand the impact of the SAMIM intervention. It mainly interrogates SAMIM’s mandate, structure, success, challenges and lessons learned using both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies and various open data sources, including programmatic documents.
Topic:: Security, Insurgency, Peacekeeping, COMESA, and South Africa Development Community (SADC)
Political Geography:: Africa, Mozambique, and Cabo Delgado

51. Analysing the Root Causes of Armed Conflicts in Northern Ethiopia

Author:: Alemu Mullaw
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Armed conflicts that need constructive measurement are rampant in various corners of the world. Currently, there are wars occurring in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Armed conflict can be understood as a battle between two parties, at least one of which is a state government, over a government or territory, using armed forces.1 The notion of conflict is evolving along with understandings of states, borders, relationships, actors, issues, and globalisation. Mary Kaldor described this expanded understanding as ‘New Wars,’ which applies to the 2020 Ethiopian armed conflict.2 Ethiopia maintained its independence during the colonial period and emerged with its present borders and ethnic make-up at the end of the 19th century due to the territorial expansion undertaken by Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913). However, the history of the country is riddled with intra- and inter-state conflicts and it has experienced acute political and economic contradictions.3 The country has been a federal republic since 1994, with the official name of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, subdivided into nine ethnically based regional states (Killil), each with a large degree of autonomy, and two autonomous cities with regional state status, namely Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.4
Topic:: Security, Peace, Armed Conflict, and Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)
Political Geography:: Africa and Ethiopia

52. ‘Something for Something’: The Face of Peace and Security in Africa under Trump 2.0

Author:: Joel Odota
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The second Trump Administration is reverberating across global systems – politically, economically, socially, and culturally. The world is observing an increasingly transactional and disruptive foreign policy approach, from dramatic aid cuts to multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), to militaristic threats in West Asia and elsewhere and a regressive stance on gender rights. One of the defining characteristics of this Administration is the emergent doctrine of ‘something for something,’ whereby the United States (US) engagement in global affairs, particularly in peace and security, is conditional upon tangible benefits – primarily economic or strategic resources. A pertinent example of this approach is the Trump Administration’s reported demand for 50% of Ukraine’s critical minerals – including graphite, uranium, titanium, and lithium – in exchange for continued security assistance.[1] Lithium, essential in battery production for electric vehicles, is of particular strategic interest. A similar arrangement appears to be unfolding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the African government is seeking a security deal with Washington in exchange for access to the country’s abundant natural resources. In fact, Trump appointed his in-law Massad Boulos as the Senior Advisor for Africa, and Massad’s first overseas trip was to the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. The visit was to do two things: to ‘get more momentum on the peace agreement and the peace process in eastern DRC, and also, how to bring US investment to the region in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region.’[2] A review of Senior Advisor Boulos’s professional background reveals a strategic alignment with President Trump’s objectives in the DRC. Boulos brings decades of experience in sectors closely tied to the Administration’s emerging interest in resource-for-security exchanges. Notably, he previously held senior executive roles, including Director of Peugeot Nigeria Ltd., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Nissan Nigeria Ltd., and Managing Director/CEO of SCOA Nigeria Group. The SCOA Group is a prominent conglomerate engaged in the assembly, distribution, sales, and servicing of a wide range of global brands in sectors such as automotive, construction and mining equipment, agriculture, power generation, oil and gas, and industrial machinery. Additionally, the company has substantial interests in contracting and real estate development. Boulos’s extensive background in extractive industries and infrastructure development, especially within the African context, positions him as a key figure in shaping and advancing Trump’s transactional approach to US-Africa relations, particularly in countries like the DRC where strategic natural resource access is a central concern.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Natural Resources, Leadership, Peace, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

53. The African Union’s Pace of Integration: The Sahelian Crisis as a Challenge to Supranational Expectations

Author:: Matteo Peccini
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: This article contributes to the ongoing and dynamic debate surrounding the process of continental integration promoted by the African Union (AU). The article investigates how the African integration process has evolved, particularly from the perspective of peace and security, with a specific focus on the case study of the central Sahel. How can the continental approach to the Sahelian crisis be assessed in light of the AU’s longstanding integrative ambitions in the fields of peace and security? Can the instability in the Sahel be considered a missed opportunity for strengthening the continental response to such a significant crisis? This article reflects on these central questions and proposes the Sahel as a potential lens through which to interpret broader continental dynamics.
Topic:: Security, Peacekeeping, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Burkina Faso

54. National Dialogues in Africa’s Fragile States: Power Struggles, Diversity Management, and the Precarious Fight Against State Collapse

Author:: Distinct Obuzor Imaka and Tonye Marclint Ebiede
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: National dialogues have become an increasingly important conflict management tool in countries facing political instability, conflict, or transitions of power. In many African contexts, it is often seen as a last resort by national stakeholders, an attempt to prevent complete collapse or to guide a nation through a significant political shift. Unlike traditional negotiations that usually involve only political elites or those in power, national dialogues are designed to be more inclusive. They bring together a wide range of voices from across society, including opposition groups, civil society, religious leaders, and community representatives. In recent years, this approach has gained prominence in Africa as a response to ongoing crises. While the outcomes of national dialogues have been mixed, they are generally seen as opportunities to reset national priorities, address long-standing grievances, and open pathways toward reform and reconciliation. This article examines the role of national dialogues in Africa’s fragile states, where contested power, deep divisions, and the risk of state collapse shape the political landscape. In such situations, national dialogue has emerged as a way to manage diversity, resolve conflict, and create space for inclusive reform. The article explores how these dialogues navigate power struggles and whether they offer a meaningful path toward long-term stability.
Topic:: Security, Peace, Mediation, Fragility, and National Dialogue
Political Geography:: Africa

55. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 10

Author:: John Coyne and Henry Campbell
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 10, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months. Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include: Northern Australia and Defence, Developing Northern Australia, Northern Australia new policy opportunities, Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities, Articles are authored by a range of experts across these varied topics. Volume 10 also features a foreword by The Hon Lia Finocchiaro MLA, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Finocchiaro calls readers attention to the Northern Territory’s unique place in Australia’s defence history, its enduring strategic importance, and the Territory’s defence capabilities. The 34 articles in this Compendium provide practical policy options which government could implement in the short term. Facilitating both the security and economic prosperity of northern Australia.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Development, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Australia and Northern Australia

56. Northern Australia: securing a developing economy to secure a developed nation

Author:: John Coyne and Ian Satchwell
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Northern Australia is central to the nation’s future. Economically, it serves as the gateway to Indo-Pacific trade, is home to world-class resources and represents a frontier of opportunity. Strategically, it’s the keystone of Australia’s national defence posture. Yet, despite its immense importance, the region continues to face persistent structural challenges, including limited private-sector investment; low local economic capture from major projects; workforce and service deficits; and deteriorating public safety indicators. The Northern Australia Action Plan 2024–2029 describes a refreshed agenda for the north, encompassing economic development and delivering on a broad range of government priorities to support the region’s success. Its policy priorities cover many of the north’s needs. The action plan remains framed largely within nationwide policy approaches, however. This report reframes northern Australia not as a peripheral problem but as a developing economy within a developed nation. It calls for a renewed, coordinated investment agenda, treating spending in the north as a nation-building imperative. Inaction will incur higher costs in the future, but it will also expose Australia to intolerable risks. This investment—needed now—needs to be premised on the strategic advantage offered by the North’s space—literally and figuratively—for ideas, initiatives and infrastructure that strengthen the nation’s security and sovereignty through fields such as energy development, trusted and resilient minerals supply chains and military endeavours including with allies, all of which blends government responsibilities, traditional ownership and commercial development. Drawing on a detailed analysis of the Northern Territory (NT) and extending to northern Queensland and northern Western Australia (WA), this report presents a comprehensive, evidence-based argument for nation-building through targeted investment. It highlights not only the economic, security and strategic benefits but also the moral imperative to close the gap in service access, infrastructure quality, and life outcomes. Much of the analysis focuses on the NT, as the economic data for northern Queensland and northern WA is often distorted by the prosperity of those states’ southern regions. That makes it more difficult to isolate the structural challenges unique to the north in those states. However, the NT shares key demographic, geographic and economic characteristics with northern Queensland and WA—including low population density, high infrastructure costs, limited private-sector depth, and service delivery challenges in remote communities—making it a strong proxy for the broader region. The north shouldn’t be treated as a region apart but as the leading edge of Australia’s future prosperity and security. Ten years on from the Australian Government’s 2015 Our north, our future: White Paper on developing northern Australia, and four years since the 2021 Australian Infrastructure Plan, where progress has been mixed, this report outlines actionable recommendations across the federal, state, territory and private-sector domains. Australia is operating within an unstable international environment, involving an uncertain global outlook that doesn’t just include wars in Europe and the Middle East but growing tensions and security threats in the Indo-Pacific. Australia needs to view investment in the North as not just a local prosperity matter but vital for Australia’s long term security, deterrence of adversaries and preparation and resilience should deterrence ever fail and when inevitable natural disasters occur. In this way, this report provides a practical road map to secure a resilient, sovereign and prosperous future for the north and the nation.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Borders, and Research and Development
Political Geography:: Australia and Northern Australia

57. Australia-Indonesia defence and security partnership: Overcoming asymmetric aspirations to tackle common threats

Author:: Euan Graham and Gatra Priyandita
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Australian officials accustomed to dealing with Indonesia are cognisant of the limitations to strategic cooperation, but Canberra needs to be more realistic and creative in how it approaches the critical relationship with Jakarta. Australia places greater strategic value on the relationship with Indonesia than vice versa. That dynamic is unlikely to change fundamentally. Optimism and ambition will still be needed to achieve a more balanced partnership, but it’s also crucial that Australian policymakers ground their expectations in this reality. Politicians, in particular, should guard against optimism bias. There are still plenty of opportunities for both countries to engage more deeply across a range of shared security challenges. This report analyses the defence and wider security partnership and identifies several areas where Indonesia and Australia should productively concentrate their efforts in the coming years, particularly to counter the rise of hybrid threats. The 2024 Australia–Indonesia Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) is best understood as a continuation of, rather than an acceleration in, the strategic relationship. But it provides Australia with useful avenues to expand its defence relationship with Jakarta, at a time when Indonesia finds itself courted by other countries that don’t share Australia’s security interests. Ultimately, the DCA reflects Canberra’s long-term investment in a defence partnership that can address evolving regional security challenges. From disaster response and maritime patrols to multilateral peacekeeping, the agreement lays the groundwork for a future in which the two countries’ armed forces can operate together effectively. Continued engagement should centre on expanding military training programs, enhancing operational coordination, and exploring new areas of cooperation, especially to counter hybrid threats. The DCA’s future success will depend on the ability of both sides to manage their differing aspirations, motivations and strategic outlooks in a rapidly deteriorating global security environment. Proper management of those differences, rather than avoidance of them, would better position the two countries for practical cooperation on clear common interests but which, too often, is limited to positive prose instead of action. Revitalising the Australia–Indonesia security relationship requires a shift in focus, away from treating defence cooperation as simply an expression of goodwill or strategic alignment and towards framing it as a joint response mechanism to shared vulnerabilities. Australia and Indonesia face a convergence of challenges, such as maritime insecurity, cyberattacks, disinformation, illegal fishing and transnational crime, that affect both nations and undermine the broader stability of the Indo-Pacific. Responses to those shared concerns can still guide the two countries’ defence partnership in the absence of strategic alignment. By investing in functional collaboration—through interoperable training, coordinated hybrid threat responses and trilateral maritime frameworks involving states such as the Philippines—both countries can build a more flexible and purpose-driven security partnership. This approach acknowledges the limitations to cooperation without being paralysed by them, allowing the relationship to evolve around problem-solving rather than the chimera of strategic convergence.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, ASEAN, and Strategic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

58. A critical juncture: Sustaining and strengthening the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security

Author:: Chris Taylor
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: As Australia navigates an increasingly complex security landscape, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) stands at a crossroads. With cyber threats, foreign interference, grey-zone competition, and the prospect of Indo-Pacific conflict reshaping our national security, the need for robust, adaptive oversight of intelligence agencies has never been more pressing. This report from ASPI’s Statecraft and Intelligence Policy Centre underscores the need to reform and reinforce the PJCIS to ensure it remains an effective pillar of democratic accountability for Australian intelligence. Key to that reform will be refocusing the future work of the committee back towards intelligence oversight. Strengthening the PJCIS’s structure, clarifying its remit, and enhancing its resources are essential to maintaining public trust and ensuring effective oversight of the national intelligence community. The reforms outlined in this report offer a roadmap for renewal – one that the next chair of the PJCIS can seize with urgency and resolve.
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, National Security, Cybersecurity, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Australia and Asia-Pacific

59. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 11

Author:: John Coyne and Susan Thomson
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 11, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months. Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include; 1. Defence, 2. Critical minerals, 3. Supply chain resilience, 4.Environmental disaster preparedness, Articles are authored by a range of experts across these varied topics. Volume 11 also features a foreword by Senator the Hon Nita Green, Assistant Minister for Northern Australia. Senator Green calls readers attention to the Federal Government’s commitment to the North, while pointing to the rich opportunities available to northern Australia with the right continued investment. The 34 articles in this Compendium provide practical policy options which government could implement in the short term and the articles work together to create an overarching narrative that centres northern excellence. Thus, facilitating both the security and economic prosperity of northern Australia.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Defense Industry, Supply Chains, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Northern Australia

60. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world

Author:: Raelene Lockhorst, Charles Lewis Taylor, Justin Bassi, Danielle Cave, and Marc Ablong
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: For more than a decade, which has included the 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2022 federal elections, ASPI has helped to generate ideas and foster debate about Australian strategic policymaking through Agenda for change, a wide-ranging collection of analyses and recommendations to assist the next Australian Government in its deliberations and planning. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world continues in its tradition by providing focused and anticipatory policy advice for the 48th Parliament of Australia. The agenda strives to highlight, and present solutions to, the most pressing questions that our next government must consider in order to advance and protect Australia’s national interests in a more disordered and challenging world. This edition reflects five interrelated aspects of Australia’s position in 2025, focused on the need to: defend Australia navigate our place in a new world (dis)order reform our security architecture and policies secure our critical infrastructure protect and use our natural resources. In 2025, that means equipping the next government for the reality of the contest in which our country is engaged. Since the previous edition of Agenda for change in 2022 we’ve seen: Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and public confirmation of the China–Russia ‘no limits’ partnership change in Australia’s policy towards China, with a focus on ‘stabilisation’, accompanied by reduced economic coercion against Australia but a ratcheting up of military intimidation, including an unprecedented PLA Navy circumnavigation of Australia heightened aggression by China against the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Taiwan a lowering of the national terrorism threat level to ‘possible’ in 2022, before it was raised back to ‘probable’ not quite two years later the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the resulting war in Gaza and an increase in politically motivated violence in Australia the rise of artificial intelligence, including the landmark release of ChatGPT in late 2022 and then DeepSeek in 2025 the return of Donald Trump to the White House, bringing tension among allies and question marks over the future of the US-led international order. Each chapter in Agenda for change includes a limited number of prioritised policy recommendations, which are intended to be discrete, do-able and impactful. Although, when dealing with some of the more existential challenges facing Australia, the recommendations are necessarily and similarly expansive. In addressing that extraordinary range of developments, ASPI has drawn on a wide range of expertise for the 2025 edition of Agenda for change. The views expressed are the personal views of the authors and don’t represent a formal position of ASPI on any issue, other than a shared focus on Australia’s national interests.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, United Nations, European Union, Counter-terrorism, Defense Industry, and Defense Economics
Political Geography:: Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

61. Indonesia in 2035: Climate risks to security in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Michael Copage, Robert Glasser, and Isabelle Bond
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The Indo-Pacific region is particularly exposed to climate impacts, and Indonesia, like many countries, will be severely affected by climate impacts in the decade to come. The effects of climate-amplified disasters, combined with the political, social and economic consequences of climate impacts originating from within and across the region, will strain Indonesia’s economic and national-security interests. This report presents the findings of a narrative-driven scenario to stress-test Indonesia’s climate risks emerging by 2035. Its objective is to identify opportunities for Indonesia and its economic and strategic partners to prepare for and mitigate the risks. While Australian policymakers have devoted significant attention to the existential risks that Pacific island countries face, Southeast Asian countries are also highly exposed and often face similar risks. Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s climate risks have received very limited attention despite its high exposure to climate hazards, its very large population (over 10 times larger than all Pacific island countries combined) which is densely concentrated in vulnerable coastal areas and small islands, and its history of political unrest associated with disruptions to food and energy security. It’s also one of the closest neighbouring countries to Australia. Figure 1 on page 5 provides a visual summary of the interacting hazards, risks and consequences highlighted in this report. The population size of Southeast Asian countries and their often-close proximity to one another means that climate impacts in one country will often have consequences beyond their borders and for their neighbours across the region. Gaining a better understanding of how Indonesia, as the largest country in Southeast Asia, will be affected by climate developments is vital, given both the domestic and regional consequences. Even below the ‘safe’ threshold of a 1.5°C rise in global average temperature—the aspirational target set in 2015 by the signatories to the Paris Agreement—countries around the world are already experiencing serious, record-setting, climate-driven disruptions on a large scale. The era of climate-induced disruption is clearly already upon us—and it will intensify rapidly. Building resilience while preparing for future disruption requires an enhanced appreciation of climate risk that goes beyond adapting to more frequent and severe natural hazards, such as floods and fires. Development-assistance and defence communities have embraced the importance of treating climate change as a threat to human, economic and traditional military security. The challenge is to build the capacity and tools to assess the broad suite of security-related risks of climate change—and to translate that information into measures to mitigate the risks. Understanding the complexity and uncertainty associated with climate trends is a daunting task, greatly complicated by the need to incorporate the many ways climate change affects social, political and economic systems. The scenario developed in this report isn’t a prediction of the future, but rather a description of a possible future. It identifies many climate impacts, but suggests three primary pathways through which Indonesia may face compounding and destabilising climate disruptions: Significant food insecurity from losses to domestic production due to shifting precipitation timing and extremes across the wet and dry seasons, heightened sensitivity to shocks in global food prices, and reduced government ability to absorb economic shocks, such as food-price hikes. Large-scale coastal population displacement driven by Indonesia’s high coastal population density and the significant exposure of that population to sea-level rise and climate-induced coastal flooding. Slowed economic growth from lost agricultural output, declining revenues from stranded fossil-fuel assets, rising disaster costs at home and abroad affecting economic infrastructure and supply chains, and rising challenges in responding to domestic crises driven by food insecurity and population displacements. A major finding of this research is that, in little more than a decade, Indonesia is likely to experience major climate disruptions that also amplify climate and security risks in the region, resulting in a range of additional and cascading risks for Australia. A second overarching finding in the report is that Indonesia may be underestimating the likely scale of the climate risks and should devote greater attention to analysing them. It’s in Australia’s interests to do the same and, as a good neighbour, to coordinate an Australian whole-of-government effort to support Indonesia to mitigate the risks, including cross-border risks.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Climate Change
Political Geography:: Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

62. British public opinion on foreign policy: President Trump, Ukraine, China, Defence spending and AUKUS

Author:: Sophia Gaston
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Results snapshot President Trump Britons support an open and engaged foreign policy role for the United Kingdom. In light of the re-election of President Donald Trump, 40% believe Britain should continue to maintain its current active level of engagement in world affairs, and 23% believe it should play a larger role. Just 16% of Britons support a less active United Kingdom on the world stage. When asked what Britain’s response should be if the United States withdraws its financial and military support from Ukraine, 57% of Britons would endorse the UK either maintaining (35%) or increasing (22%) its contributions to Ukraine. One-fifth would prefer that the UK reduces its contributions to Ukraine. UK–China relations Just a quarter (26%) of Britons support the UK Government’s efforts to increase engagement with China in the pursuit of economic growth and stabilised diplomatic relations. In comparison, 45% of Britons would either prefer to return to the more restricted level of engagement under the previous government (25%) or for the government to reduce its relations with Beijing even further (20%). A large majority of Britons (69%) are concerned about the increasing degree of cooperation between Russia and China. Conservative and Labour voters share similarly high levels of concern, and Britons over 50 years of age are especially troubled about the trend of adversary alignment. Defence and security When asked whether the UK will need to spend more on defence to keep up with current and future global security challenges, a clear two-thirds (64%) of the British people agree. Twenty-nine per cent of Britons strongly agree that defence spending should increase. Just 12% disagree that the UK will need to spend more. The majority of Britons believe that collaboration with allies on defence and security projects like AUKUS will help to make the UK safer (55%) and that partnerships like AUKUS focusing on developing cutting-edge technologies with Britain’s allies will help to make the UK more competitive towards countries like China (59%). Britons are somewhat less persuaded that AUKUS will succeed as a deterrent against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, although the largest group of respondents (44%) agree that it will.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Alliance, AUKUS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Australia, and United States of America

63. The future of US Indo-Pacific policy

Author:: Greg Brown, Nerida King, and Eric Lies
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: How might US policy in the Indo-Pacific change over the next four years? In anticipation of a new US administration and Congress in 2025, ASPI USA held an “alternative futures analysis” exercise in mid-October 2024 to explore the drivers of US policy and how they might evolve through to November 2028. The workshop involved seven Indo-Pacific experts, who discussed a range of factors that could determine US policy and assessed how key factors could drive different outcomes. The participants determined that the two key drivers affecting the US role in the Indo-Pacific over the next four years that are simultaneously most uncertain and most determinative for US policy are: Washington’s perception of China’s strength in the Indo-Pacific the level of US attention to the region. The former is a key determinant of Washington’s threat perception, and the latter is a key determinant of Washington’s capacity to sustainably engage in the region. The nexus of those drivers produced a skeleton of four potential scenarios: Failing to walk and chew gum: Perceived high China power and a low level of US attention. In this scenario, Beijing continues to advance its interests across the region while Washington fails to prioritise imperatives in the Indo-Pacific amid ongoing conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Follow US: Perceived high China power and a high level of US attention. In this scenario, the possibility of Chinese regional hegemony is growing, but the US adopts a focused, harder-edged security strategy and leads like-minded states to confront the challenge. The Peaceful Pivot: Perceived low China power and a high level of US attention. In this “stars align” scenario, the perception of diminishing competition and conflict with China couples with the US implementing the decade-old promise of a pivot to Asia. Leading from behind: Perceived low China power and a low level of US attention. China’s capacity to project power falters in this scenario, but the US—pulled into global events elsewhere and distracted by its own domestic politics—does not provide forceful leadership in the region and leans on allies and partners to carry the load.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

64. The many contending futures of UN peacekeeping

Author:: Corine van Emmerik and Peter Albrecht
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: This DIIS Working Paper examines how UN peacekeeping operations are being reimagined in an era of global uncertainty. Through analysis of key UN documents and interviews with officials and diplomats, the research reveals multiple competing visions for peacekeeping's future — from a return to core principles to modular approaches and even a dramatic downscaling of peacekeeping as we have known it since the turn of the millennium. As peacekeeping operations face diminished legitimacy, host state resistance, and a deadlocked Security Council, the study argues that peacekeeping's chronic challenges are inherently unsolvable and must be continuously navigated. The paper comes at a critical moment following the closure of the Mali mission, considerable challenges in the DRC, and ahead of the 2025 Peacekeeping Ministerial, with implications for the future of global conflict management in an increasingly multipolar world.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, United Nations, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:: Global Focus

65. Russian military thinking about the Baltic Sea and the Arctic

Author:: Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Russia is likely to continue its military build-up in both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic in the long-term perspective. Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, Russian military thinkers and planners are increasingly seeing the two theatres as contiguous areas.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Finland, Sweden, Arctic, and Baltic Sea

66. The rise and fall of the Wagner Group

Author:: Karen Philippa Larsen
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The Wagner Group’s rise, conflict and fall show a process firstly of endorsing private military companies in Russia, only to later seek to regain control by including the groups in the official security structures. The plane crash that killed the leader of the Wagner Group, oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and six other high-ranking Wagner Group members in August 2023 marked the literal and figurative fall of the Wagner Group’s considerable influence on Russian foreign policy. The Wagner Group is what Russia calls a private military company (PMC), which tends to have a much closer relationship to the state than we would normally expect from a private company in the West.
Topic:: Security, Wagner Group, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

67. China and Russia challenge the Arctic order

Author:: Patrik Andersson
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation is real but limited – and should not distract from the broader strategic challenges each country poses individually. While the partnership merits attention, some aspects are more symbolic than substantive, with Russia ultimately controlling the pace and direction. Media narratives often highlight the growing alignment between China and Russia in the Arctic and the potential threat this poses to other states. Yet the partnership remains constrained by diverging priorities, Russia’s wariness of Chinese influence, and China’s reluctance to expose itself to sanctions or engage in risky ventures. At the same time Russia’s increasing dependence on China since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has given Beijing opportunities to pursue deeper access to the Russian Arctic on its own terms and in areas that align with its long-term objectives. Rather than engaging broadly, China is selective in how and where it invests or participates – a dynamic that could intensify underlying frictions between the two even as global geopolitical shifts continue to draw them closer in the region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Arctic

68. Denmark needs to rethink its multilateral engagement

Author:: Rens van Munster and Corine van Emmerik
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Uncertainty about NATO’s future and American commitment to European security is challenging the foundations of Danish foreign and security policy. Denmark must face this new reality and strengthen its commitment to multilateralism as central to its long-term security and influence. Denmark’s 2023 foreign policy strategy acknowledges that ‘the rule-based world order and multilateralism are under pressure’ – a stark reality for a small state whose security and prosperity fundamentally depend on international rules. Intensified geopolitical competition, rival visions of global governance, and the erosion of consensus on international security norms have plunged multilateralism into a full-blown crisis, placing Denmark – like many countries – in an increasingly difficult position.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, and Engagement
Political Geography:: Europe and Denmark

69. A Turning Point, or Not? Principles for a New European Order

Author:: Richard Youngs
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Despite repeated declarations of historic turning points, deep structural reforms to the European project remain elusive. While defense spending rises are welcome, EU governments must also pursue systemic changes to Europe’s political and security architecture.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Reform, European Union, Democracy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe

70. The Montreux Convention and its Importance for International Peace and Security

Author:: Ioannis Antonopoulos
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL)
Institution:: The Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL)
Abstract:: Since its conclusion, the Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the Straits (1936) constitutes an important pillar of the international order. This may be proven by many historical events from the 20th century until today: From the application of the Convention in WWII to its recent invocation in the ongoing Ukrainian conflict. The Convention’s significance derives from its subject-matter, the freedom of transit through the Dardanelles/Turkish Straits in regard to the warships and aircraft in time of peace and in time of war. This is a legal analysis of the Montreux Convention under the scope of International Law providing a brief look at the historical background of events that have led to the signature of the Convention, an extensive presentation of the legal framework of its provisions regarding passage of warships and overflight of aircraft, as well as, some thoughts on its importance for the international peace and security.
Topic:: Security, International Law, History, Peace, International Order, and Montreux Convention
Political Geography:: Europe

71. The geoeconomic turn in the Americas: The Dominican Republic at the centre of Washington’s return

Author:: Lauri Tähtinen
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The tide is turning rapidly as the United States shifts its response to China’s industrial rise, with Washington returning to the Western Hemisphere in search of not only new trade relationships but also industrial, foreign, and security policies. This shift reflects a geoeconomic turn in the Americas, where economic actors – from drug cartels to critical supply-chain partners – are increasingly treated as security concerns, blurring the line between commerce and security. The Dominican Republic is positioning itself as a partner in both the joint development of the Americas and US security. Its growing alignment with the United States reflects global shifts elsewhere, such as in Finland’s relationship with Washington. The Dominican Republic’s sustained economic growth and its location between the US territory of Puerto Rico and the region’s security challenges place it at the centre of Washington’s attempt to re-engineer hemispheric value chains and security partnerships.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Economic Growth, Trade, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Latin America, North America, and United States of America

72. Drivers of Extremist Sympathies: Security, Ideology, and Firearms in Lebanon and Tunisia

Author:: Doaa' Elnakhala, Gergely Hideg, and Darine Atwa
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Small Arms Survey
Abstract:: Lebanon and Tunisia share a common struggle against extremism, but the social, political, religious, and ideological make-up of each country is quite different. The Small Arms Survey conducted a general population survey in the two countries between September and November 2023, in which 3,339 adults were interviewed about their views on key elements of their lives, violent extremism, and firearms. Drivers of Extremist Sympathies: Security, Ideology, and Firearms in Lebanon and Tunisia—the latest Briefing Paper from the Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project—demonstrates a clear linkage between firearms and violent extremism, though manifested differently in the two countries. The paper also demonstrates that chronic insecurity and the absence of effective state-provided security play a significant role in fostering affinity for violent extremist groups. The findings have implications for other countries struggling with similar issues, both in the Middle East and North Africa region and beyond.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Violent Extremism, Weapons, and Ideology
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Lebanon, and Tunisia

73. The Sahel Seeks Sovereignty

Author:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:: On the heels of popular military coups, how are Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger returning to a path of sovereignty while navigating a legacy of dependency and internal-external security challenges?
Topic:: Security, Development, Sovereignty, Coup, and Economic Dependence
Political Geography:: Africa, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Burkina Faso

74. Climate Crisis and Gender Equality: Emerging Security Risks in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

Author:: Manale Abou Dagher, Noura Abdelwahab, Sarine Karajerjian, Suzanne Baaklini, and Zeina Moneer
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: This policy study focuses on a critical and timely intersection – gender equality and climate change – and highlights the disproportionate impact of climate change on women, especially those living in climate-vulnerable rural areas. This publication is the result of discussions held during the session “Climate Crisis and Gender Equality in the Euro-Mediterranean Region: Emerging Security Risks” at the High-Level Conference on Women for the Mediterranean, co-organised by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the Commissioner for Gender Equality of the Republic of Cyprus on 30-31 May. The event brought together experts from the region to share insights, challenges and policy recommendations, highlighting the importance of empowering women in climate decision-making processes to effectively address these emerging risks. Research shows that women’s leadership in climate action increases the effectiveness of policies, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, water management and renewable energy, where they are disproportionately affected by climate change. However, barriers such as limited access to finance and technology and under-representation in green sectors continue to hamper their potential to drive climate solutions.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Women, Leadership, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:: Europe

75. Safeguarding U.S. interests in a Ukraine war settlement

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States should pursue a peace deal in Ukraine that serves America’s best interests, even when these diverge from its European partners. The primary U.S. objective should be to achieve a “lasting peace” that endures over the long term. A final settlement of the Ukraine war should address five key issues: territory; ceasefire terms; arrangements for Ukraine’s future security; stabilizing relationships between Russia and NATO and Russia and the United States; and mutual assurances between Russia and Ukraine. Full resolution of all five dimensions would not be required to end a “hot war,” however. Issues of territory will be determined on the battlefield, and any ceasefire should be maintained with a demilitarized zone and some combination of a neutral, international monitoring force and remote and autonomous technologies, lke drones and sensors. Offering Ukraine a binding security commitment is not in U.S. interests, whether through NATO or otherwise. Instead, the best option is “armed neutrality,” which would leave Ukraine without external guarantees but help it build a credible, self-sufficient deterrent—with Europe leading the provision of military aid. Mutual security assurances between Ukraine and Russia, including restrictions on locations of forces and weapons, can reduce the risk of renewed conflict. The Trump administration should use willingness to talk about the future U.S. role in Europe’s security as a bargaining chip to get Russia to make necessary concessions. The United States gives up little by discussing these issues of high political value to Russia. Some changes in U.S. posture in Europe may also advance U.S. efforts to shift defense burdens to allies and partners.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

76. Grand strategy: The limits of military force

Author:: Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Since the Cold War, the United States has engaged in a number of military conflicts abroad, yet despite its preponderant military power, it has been unable to translate force into political success, especially when it comes to nation-building. In the absence of another great power to constrain it, the United States initiated regime change wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but by the same token it lacked an external imperative to devote the resources needed to achieve its ambitious nation-building goals. As costs and casualties mounted, public opinion soured. Policymakers thought U.S. technological superiority would keep casualties in these conflicts low and the attractiveness of liberal values would make nation-building easier. They underestimated how much coercive power would be needed on the ground to maintain order and the popular consent necessary for legitimate governments to emerge. Later attempts to intervene abroad with limited or no boots on the ground, as in Libya and Syria, were similarly unsuccessful, leaving vacuums of power, failed states, and long-term civil wars. Policymakers need to become more sober about the limits of military power. The United States’ abundant security means that it would benefit from more diplomacy and deal-making with adversaries, rather than threatening to overthrow or sanction their regimes.
Topic:: Security, Cold War, Regime Change, Grand Strategy, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

77. From Stalemate to Solution: Rethinking EU Approaches to Bilateral Disputes in the Context of Enlargement

Author:: Steven Blockmans and Butrint Berisha
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In cataloguing the various disputes, this report distinguishes between disputes involving a member state and a candidate country, and those between candidate countries themselves, classifying them into categories such as statehood identity issues post-conflict issues, border demarcation and/or territorial disputes, minority rights protection, and economic issues. While many disputes exist among candidate countries, the more challenging ones for the EU to resolve are those which involve a member state. Member states can strategically misuse their veto power in the pre-accession process to gain political leverage over a candidate country, as currently seen with Bulgaria vis-à-vis North Macedonia and Hungary towards Ukraine. The authors argue that the ability to manage and resolve them is not merely a technical requirement for enlargement but increasingly a strategic necessity for the EU in a more conflicted geopolitical environment. In reviewing past practice, the report highlights the EU’s non-interventionist approach before the early 2000s, noting how the EU itself served as a framework for cooperation and dispute resolution, as demonstrated in the case of Northern Ireland. Around the time of the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004, the EU’s approach underwent a shift, with the prior resolution of disputes increasingly becoming a condition for accession. However, this long-standing expectation warrants a critical re-examination in light of inconsistencies in policy application, stagnation in existing dispute settlement mechanisms, mounting blockades, and the rise of nativist populism in Europe. The report assesses a wide range of EU instruments and third-party resolution mechanisms provided by the Council of Europe, United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Existing proposals to overcome the misuse of veto power are also analysed. The authors argue that a more strategic, consistent, and principle-based approach to dispute resolution—supported by legal tools, political incentives, and coordination with third-party actors—is essential to re-dynamise the enlargement process and sustain the EU’s credibility as a promoter of peace, stability, and integration. To that end, they emphasise that the Commission should abandon the habit of seeking unanimity at every interim step of the enlargement process, which is not prescribed by EU law, and that the EU should create an Enlargement Dispute Resolution Mechanism (EDRM) that separates between issues that fall under the aquis chapters for membership negotiations and those that should rely on external arbitration and mediation. Furthermore, they advocate that the EU should double down on its preventive efforts to manage latent bilateral disputes through early-warning diplomacy and structured dialogue.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Europe

78. Hague Summit Series: The Central Issue. Defence Spending

Author:: Felix Gasper
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In 2014, the NATO Allies agreed that within a decade, they would spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Allies have focused more on strengthening their military posture. Donald Trump's insistence that Europe should take larger responsibility for its own security and the doubts he has sown regarding America’s commitment to its NATO obligations have strengthened European resolve and emphasised the need for the continent to foster greater military independence, including from the US. Trump’s vigorous return to these ideas at the start of his second term will make defence spending, in particular the Secretary General’s proposal for a new NATO target, the key agenda item for The Hague Summit.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

79. The Security Dividend of Climate Policy

Author:: Timothé Beaufíls, Michael Jakob, and Matthias Kalkuhl
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: By reducing reliance on fossil fuels, EU climate policy substantially lowers Russia’s financial strength, thereby limiting its military capabilities to sustain its aggression on Ukraine and beyond. We provide estimates for the security dividend of EU climate policy. A one-euro reduction in oil consumption in the EU results in a security dividend of 37 cents (central estimate). Based on the security dividend alone, a significant carbon price (central estimate of 60 euros per ton of CO2) on oil consumption is justified – in addition to its climate, terms-of-trade, and local health benefits. Ambitious EU climate policy that reduces demand for oil and natural gas should be seen as an important pillar of the European security architecture, complementing military spending, diplomatic efforts, and continued support to Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

80. NATO and the Middle East: Turkey’s threat conceptions and attempts at stability in post-Assad Syria

Author:: Olli Ruohomäki, Toni Alaranta, and Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: With the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and potential growing instability in Syria, NATO has struggled to formulate a coherent position on the Middle East and to build a cohesive network of partners in the region. As the stakes rise and Europe becomes more invested, both economically and militarily, in Euro-Atlantic defence, the Alliance should not neglect the chance to further develop its cooperative security agenda in the Middle East. In this context, Turkey – NATO’s only member state in the region – can act as a link between the Alliance and the Middle East. Turkey and other NATO members have long held different threat conceptions, resulting in differing priorities in counterterrorism. However, ongoing negotiations between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), aimed at ending their long-standing conflict, could ease this divergence. While deeper cooperation between Turkey and European countries in the new European security arrangements depends on Turkey’s willingness to choose a side in the Europe-Russia confrontation, European NATO allies could still work with Turkey in areas where there is clear common ground with other Middle Eastern states, such as safeguarding an orderly political transition in Syria.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Terrorism, Governance, European Union, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

81. Addressing environment-related risks in the EU’s crisis management: From greening to foresight and preparedness

Author:: Emma Hakala
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The EU and its crisis management efforts are increasingly challenged by environment-related risks, such as extreme weather events and their implications for stability, migration and food security. Greater recognition of environmental risks could bolster resilience and preparedness not only within specific crisis management missions, but also across the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. The integration of environmental issues into crisis management has been hindered by unclear mandates, lack of knowledge and expertise, and a failure to recognize the potential benefits for preparedness. For better mainstreaming, the environment needs to be seen as a key part of comprehensive preparedness, for example by producing foresight data, identifying linkages between the environment and security, and contributing to early-warning systems.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Environment, European Union, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Europe

82. National Action Plans as Tools for Effective Small Arms Control: Lessons from West Africa

Author:: Luc Chounet-Cambas, Alizée Henry, and Julien Joly
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Small Arms Survey
Abstract:: Guidance provided at the Fourth Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in June 2024 underscored the importance of aligning national action plans (NAPs) with sustainable development, security, and gender-responsive policies, in addition to the need for inter-agency collaboration and the inclusion of non-governmental stakeholders in small arms control efforts. While this shift signals a transformative paradigm in small arms control—moving beyond a compliance-driven model rooted in international norms and standards toward a more integrated approach that positions arms control as a tool to advance national objectives in human security, development, and governance—it raises a critical question: how can NAPs be effectively leveraged to ensure this alignment? National Action Plans as Tools for Effective Small Arms Control: Lessons from West Africa, commissioned by the Mines Advisory Group, is a Briefing Paper that examines the current state of practice of NAPs on small arms and light weapons in West Africa, their impact, and existing opportunities to enhance their effectiveness and potential in integrating small arms control into broader public policy frameworks that address development and security concerns.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Development, Weapons, and National Action Plan
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

83. The Republic of Kadamol: A Portrait of the Rapid Support Forces at War

Author:: Joshua Craze and Raga Makawi
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Small Arms Survey
Abstract:: After almost two years of war, Sudan is in the grip of a humanitarian and political catastrophe. A conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues to devastate the country. In recent months, the RSF has lost ground, and its efforts to create a government seem likely to come to naught. But what is the RSF, and what can learning about the paramilitary organization tell us about the future of Sudan? The Republic of Kadamol: A Portrait of the Rapid Support Forces at War is a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project. Based on interviews on the ground and with RSF personnel, the paper offers an insight into RSF recruitment strategies, war aims, and command and control problems. To understand Sudan's future, it is indispensable to understand the RSF, and this paper is the first to give a synthetic analysis of the RSF since the war began.
Topic:: Security, Humanitarian Crisis, Armed Conflict, and Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
Political Geography:: Africa and Sudan

84. Autopsiadel asalto a la frontera de Ceuta en2021: entre lazona grisyla gestión de crisis

Author:: Luis de la Corte Ibáñez
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: This paper analyses a significant incident that took place on the border of Ceuta between 17 and 19 May 2021, when more than 10,000 people entered the Spanish city from Morocco without authorisation, causing the most serious border crisis experienced in the city during the democratic era. The article begins with a diplomatic contextualisation of the crisis, linked to the deterioration of relations between Spain and Morocco, and sets out its immediate background. It then describes the development of the assault on the Ceuta border in all its relevant aspects. The incident is then analysed from three perspectives. The first offers a strategic reading of the border crisis, based on the hypothesis that the crisis should be interpreted as the result of an operation promoted by the Kingdom of Morocco, within the framework of an escalation in the grey zone, with the aim of influencing Spanish foreign policy. The second perspective offers a detailed analysis of the different phases and dimensions of the border crisis management process. This analysis is based on the hypothesis that, at the time of the crisis, the Spanish state did not have specific mechanisms and protocols in place to deal with incidents that could jeopardise the integrity of either of the two Spanish cities in North Africa, Ceuta or Melilla. The third perspective applies two approaches from the social sciences: the black swan and the gray rhino. The article concludes with an assessment of the diplomatic consequences of the border crisis and a reflection on its strategic implications for Spanish security policy.
Topic:: Security, Crisis Management, Borders, Gray Zone, and Irregular Migration
Political Geography:: Spain and Morocco

85. Global Terrorism Index 2025

Author:: Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:: Terrorism remains a persistent global threat, with 2024 marking another year of shifting patterns and evolving challenges with the geographic reach of terrorism spreading. The number of countries experiencing at least one terrorist incident increased from 58 to 66, the most countries affected since 2018. In 2024, more countries deteriorated than improved for the first time in seven years, with 45 countries reporting a higher impact from terrorism, while only 34 showed improvement. Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates remained the deadliest terrorist organisation in 2024, responsible for 1,805 deaths across 22 countries. The four major terrorist organisations, IS, Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Shabaab continued to increase their activity, with deaths attributed to these groups increasing by 11 per cent to 4,204. In 2023, these groups were active in 29 countries which increased to 30 countries in 2024. In 2024, 36 per cent of terrorist attacks were not claimed by an organisation. IEP has developed a machine learning model to assign these incidents to likely groups. The analysis found that deaths attributed to IS would have been 58 per cent higher, while those linked to JNIM would have been 176 per cent higher. This underscores the challenges in accurately assessing the impact of different terrorist organisations. In 2024, deaths from terrorism fell to 7,555, representing a 13 per cent decline from the previous year. This reduction was entirely due to the large spike in the prior year from the Hamas October 7th attack, otherwise deaths would have been approximately the same. The number of terrorist attacks also declined, falling by three per cent to 3,492. The drop in incidents was primarily driven by an 85 per cent decrease in terrorist activity in Myanmar. Excluding Myanmar, global terrorist attacks would have increased by eight per cent. In the West, lone actor terrorism is on the rise with terrorist attacks increasing from 32 to 52 in 2024. These attacks are typically carried out by youths, often in their teens, who have no formal ties to terrorist organisations. Instead, they become radicalised through online content, constructing personal ideologies that often blend conflicting viewpoints influenced via access to fringe forums, gaming environments, encrypted messaging apps and the dark web. Because there are no affiliations, it means these types of attacks are difficult for intelligence agencies to track. Social media algorithms also accentuate biases, pushing disaffected youth towards more radicalised content. In Europe, one in five persons arrested for terrorism is legally classified as a child. In Europe, terrorist incidents doubled to 67, including attacks by IS and Hamas. The resurgence of attacks was particularly notable in seven Western countries - Sweden, Australia, Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland, with Germany being the worst ranked nation at 27th on the Index. There are now seven Western countries ranked amongst the 50 most impacted countries on the GTI. Meanwhile, in the US, antisemitic and Islamophobic hate crimes escalated sharply following the start of the Gaza war, with FBI-recorded incidents targeting the Jewish community rising by 270 per cent in just two months. Similar patterns emerged in Europe and Australia, where attacks on synagogues were reported throughout the year. Terrorism in the Sahel has increased significantly, with deaths rising nearly tenfold since 2019. In 2024, the Sahel accounted for 51 per cent of all terrorism deaths, while overall conflict deaths in the region exceeded 25,000 for the first time since the inception of the Index. Of these, 3,885 were attributed to terrorism. Terrorism deaths here are now ten times higher than in 2019. The Sahel remains the global epicentre of terrorism, accounting for over half of all terrorism-related deaths in 2024 with the number of countries affected increasing. Five of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism are in this region. Although Burkina Faso remains the most affected country, both deaths and attacks declined, falling by 21 and 57 per cent respectively, however the country is still responsible for a fifth of all terrorism deaths globally. Niger highlights how fragile progress in reducing terrorism deaths can be. In 2024, the country recorded the largest increase in terrorism deaths globally, rising by 94 per cent to a total of 930, reversing previous improvements from 2022 when it had the second largest improvement. Niger’s example may mean that the improvements in Burkina Faso are transitory. Geopolitical changes continue to shape security dynamics across the Sahel. The Alliance of Sahelian States, comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has moved away from the West, instead strengthening ties with Russia and China. This shift, along with the bloc’s withdrawal from ECOWAS, has created opportunities for groups such as JNIM to expand their activities into coastal West Africa. Togo recorded its worst year for terrorism since the inception of the Index, reflecting the broader spread of terrorist activity beyond the Sahel’s traditional hotspots.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Youth, Threat Assessment, and Lone Wolf Attacks
Political Geography:: Global Focus

86. From Syria to the Black Sea: Containing Russia, Partnering with Turkey?

Author:: Bernard Siman
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The outcome of the Russo-Turkish power competition in Syria will impact the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This, in turn, will impact the outcome of any peace negotiations with Ukraine and its relative position in the Black Sea. The future of Syria very much matters for the EU, therefore. Because blunting Russia’s attempts at achieving dominance over the Black Sea will play an important role in Europe’s security. And because the Syrian coast is only 300KM from Cyprus, the EU’s southeastern most border. Syria is the EU’s neighbour for all intents and purposes. In Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, Turkey and the EU finally have a key strategic objective in common.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Syria, and Black Sea

87. Silence in the Sahel does not Equal Stability

Author:: Nina Wilén
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Sahel is no longer on the frontpages. In the past few years – even in the past few months – the geopolitical context has changed radically. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine understandably turned European attention to the East in 2022. The Israel – Palestine armed conflict which restarted in 2023 and has taken unprecedented proportions has also called for attention, while the last three years of Rwanda- supported rebel invasion in the East of the DRC recently caught the news. In more recent weeks, the new US administration’s deeply disturbing dismantling of national institutions and international order has predictably stolen the headlines. Yet, in the meantime the different crises which have plagued the Sahel over more than a decade are continuing and the situation is worsening. The military regimes which came to power in the latest coup wave in the Sahel region on the promise of quelling jihadist violence have not been able to deliver on this promise. Instead, jihadist groups are expanding across the region, with deadlier attacks against civilians in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, the three states which created the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) in 2023. The Sahel is today the region in the world which is the most affected by jihadist violence. The AES countries are also experiencing a deepening authoritarian turn, as the transitions to democratic elections and return to constitutional order have been stalled with continuous extensions of transitional period and repression against opposition voices. These developments are unfolding within a heavily restricted media landscape, where local independent and foreign journalists and news agencies are either silenced through repression or driven into exile, while civil society faces continued intimidation and oppression, including forced military recruitment, arbitrary arrests and in some cases summary executions. This article analyses the latest developments in the security and political sphere in the Sahel with a focus on the AES states. It examines the expansion of jihadist violence and assesses the political situation. It argues that despite the current geopolitical context and Europe’s decreasing influence, there is still a need for the EU and its member states to stay engaged. It is crucial to closely monitor developments in the region to better grasp the political and security landscape, and potential implications both within and beyond the African continent. This article is the first of a series of two analyzing the shifting political and security landscape in the Sahel. The next article will examine the AES countries’ shifting regional and international partnerships.
Topic:: Security, Authoritarianism, Political stability, Violence, Coup, and Salafi-Jihadism
Political Geography:: Africa and Sahel

88. DRC-Rwanda: Why the 27 June Agreement is not Enough and How CENCO-ECC might Improve the Odds of Peace

Author:: Erik Kennes
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On 27 June, a Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Rwanda was undersigned in Washington, witnessed by the US government. The agreement is based on the “Declaration of Principles” undersigned on 25 April by the Congolese and Rwandan Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This is the last in a series of agreements and arrangements concluded over the last 25 years which never resolved the basic problems underpinning the recurrent conflict, notably the foreign security and economic policy of Rwanda, and the structural weakness of the DRC state and security forces. In their conception or implementation, they did not address the fundamental “root causes” of the crisis in the East either. Will it be different this time? Two elements are new: it is the first direct bilateral peace agreement between DRCongo and Rwanda, to a certain extent guaranteed by the US state department. It is concluded between the real decision-makers but ignores most existing procedures and regulations set up after previous crises. Secondly, it considers economic aspects crucial for durable peace, while political issues are simply discarded.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Central Africa

89. Japan Looks Ahead to Trump 2.0

Author:: Bart Gaens
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Today, on the eve of the presidential inauguration in the US, Japan’s current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces a new Trump administration, and, in a more volatile regional and global environment, also more challenges in terms of foreign and security policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and United States of America

90. The EU’s Dilemmas in the Black Sea Region: Security and Enlargement

Author:: Koen Claessen
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Black Sea region has gained renewed strategic importance for the European Union following Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As an area of considerable economic and geopolitical significance, as well as a focal point for potential future EU enlargement, its stability is now an urgent concern for European policymakers. Russia’s sustained efforts to undermine security in the Black Sea necessitate a coherent EU vision, moving beyond the fragmented scope of earlier initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy and aspects of the Eastern Partnership.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Enlargement
Political Geography:: Europe and Black Sea

91. More Than a Systemic Rival: China as a Security Challenge for the EU

Author:: Tauno Tõhk
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The EU's ties with China rank just behind its transatlantic ones in significance. With China being a major trading partner, the focus has long been on economic opportunities. In recent years, there has been a shift in how the EU frames its relationship with China. Yet, despite increasing emphasis on systemic rivalry and economic security, security risks remain underrepresented in EU China policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

92. The Red-Hot Blue Line

Author:: Assaf Orion
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The first weekend of 2024 saw one of the fiercest exchanges of fire between Hezbollah and Israel since the 2006 war. On January 6, the group launched antitank guided missiles, attack drones, and no less than sixty-two rockets against Israel’s northern air control unit in Mount Meron, causing some damage. Hezbollah described the salvo as an “initial response” to the targeted killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut days earlier. In response, the Israel Defense Forces struck Hezbollah military compounds, a surface-to-air missile unit, and other targets at seven sites in south Lebanon. On January 8, an IDF strike killed Wissam al-Tawil, a senior commander in the group’s Radwan special forces. The next day, Hezbollah drones attacked the IDF’s northern command headquarters, while Israel killed the head of the group’s southern aerial unit and three of his team. In all, Hezbollah has claimed ten new “martyrs” since Saturday. Amid the fighting, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has restated Israel’s “resolve to return the northern communities home, diplomatically if possible; otherwise, by other means.” Similarly, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein, “We prefer the path of an agreed-upon diplomatic settlement, but we are getting close to the point where the hourglass will turn over.” Senior U.S. and European officials are now shuttling between Beirut and Jerusalem in a bid to stop the escalation. What exactly will it take to prevent a war in Lebanon and possibly beyond?
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Security, Diplomacy, and Military
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

93. German Ports and China: How to Reconcile Openness, Resilience and Security?

Author:: Marie Krpata
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Germany is dependent on its ports for the smooth running of its open economic model and has benefited from globalization in recent decades when the internationalization of its value chains strengthened its competitiveness. Yet, with today’s hardening geopolitics, the vulnerabilities of Europe’s leading economic power are becoming apparent. Germany’s ports are an indispensable interface between its production base and its export markets, as well as for its sources of supply. Crucial to its competitiveness, Germany’s ports are becoming increasingly indispensable for energy supplies given the country’s decoupling from Russian hydrocarbons, and they are essential for the deployment of military equipment to Europe’s eastern flank. This is why particular vigilance is required in ports such as Hamburg, where the Chinese shipping company COSCO has acquired a stake in the company operating the Tollerort terminal. This transaction would scarcely have worried anyone in the past. But now it is the subject of bitter discussions, with the Zeitenwende (“change of era”) announced by Olaf Scholz in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Increased caution seemed to gain a foothold in order not to repeat past mistakes –until the German Chancellor decided in favor of the acquisition. Given closer ties between China and Russia, China’s assertive stance on the international stage, and increased pressure on Germany from its American ally to clarify its position with regard to its main trading partner, Germany is seeing its room for maneuver shrink. Today, we need a more European approach that goes beyond short-term, profit-driven concerns. But to achieve this, we need to put in place a range of resources to be deployed in a resolutely cooperative approach.
Topic:: Security, International Trade and Finance, Sports, Trade, Industry, and Resilience
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

94. Understanding the Role of Women in Nigeria’s Non-State Armed Groups and Security Architecture

Author:: Michael Nwankpa
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Since 1999, when Nigeria returned to civilian government after successive military regimes, it has continued to face enormous challenges to its legitimacy and monopoly of the use of force. Protest groups, social movements, and non-state armed groups have emerged over the years to demand good governance in some cases and, in other extreme cases, secession, self-determination, and subversion of Nigeria’s secular political system. Many groups have been willing to take up arms against the state to pursue their objectives. Men are usually the significant actors in these armed groups, while most women are considered victims. However, since 2014, when Boko Haram started deploying female suicide bombers and mobilizing more and more girls and women in its terrorist strategies, women’s role in Nigeria’s armed conflicts and their capacity to use violence have gained visibility. Despite this, ascertaining the role of women (mainly whether they occupy positions of power and can perpetrate violence) in non-state armed groups’ activities against the Nigerian state remains difficult, judging by the overwhelmingly male-dominated recipients of the government’s amnesty and deradicalization programs. Relying on interviews with key respondents, this paper fills this gap by interrogating the role of women as victims or perpetrators in Boko Haram and Niger Delta insurgencies, Nigeria’s two foremost insurgencies since the return to democracy in 1999, as well as engaging with the prospect of an effective legislative and policy response that is negotiated by increasing the number of women in security and political leadership positions.
Topic:: Security, Non State Actors, Women, Disarmament, Boko Haram, Armed Conflict, Amnesty, and Reintegration
Political Geography:: Africa, Nigeria, and Niger Delta

95. South Korea’s Emergence as a Defense Industrial Powerhouse

Author:: Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: In recent years, South Korea’s ascent in the global arms market has been remarkable. This surge, particularly amid a shifting geopolitical landscape and the ongoing Ukraine-Russia War, has captured the attention of security watchers worldwide. This paper delves into the intricacies of the South Korean defense industry’s rapid emergence, wherein arms sales skyrocketed to 17.3 billion USD in 2022, and provides an in-depth analysis of its portfolio, capacity, and the rationales guiding its development over the last five decades. It explores how South Korea has capitalized on critical opportunities, including overcoming steep barriers to entry to major contracts with Central and Eastern European countries, especially Poland. It sheds light on South Korea’s competitive technologies, mass production capacity, and cost-effectiveness, and addresses the crucial role played by the government’s diplomatic support and coordination with key allies and partners. Against that backdrop, it concludes with some implications for the global defense industry and security architecture.
Topic:: Security, Defense Industry, Armament, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, South Korea, and Poland

96. Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy

Author:: Rosa Balfour and Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The political landscape in the European Union (EU) is changing rapidly. For decades, the traditional mainstream parties of the center right and center left have been losing ground, while antiestablishment parties have been gaining support. According to research by the University of Amsterdam, 32 percent of voters opted for antiestablishment parties in 2021, up from 12 percent in the early 1990s.1 Radical-right parties make up about half of this share, and their support has risen faster than that of any other group. Many of the fourteen parties examined in this study have achieved vote shares of 20 percent or more. The radical right is now in government, or supports the government, in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Sweden. In the Netherlands, it is likely that Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV) will be part of a governing coalition. In other countries, these parties have become the leading opposition groups. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) has been carefully preparing to win the 2027 presidential election. Setbacks for the radical right in Poland and Spain in the second half of 2023 have shown that the relentless rise of these parties is not a foregone conclusion. However, current polling for several national elections and the June 2024 European Parliament elections indicates a strong likelihood of their continuing electoral success.2 Chega (Enough), a recently established party that shot to 18 percent of the vote in Portugal’s March 2024 election, ended the country’s exceptionalism as one of the few European nations without a right-wing populist party.3 The June 2024 Belgian federal election may see the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), which so far has been strong in Flanders but kept out of national politics, break through at the federal level. Polling for Austria’s September 2024 parliamentary election suggests a surge in support for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).4 In contrast with populism, which has a thin ideology focused mainly on fomenting the anger of the so-called pure people against corrupt elites and which has risen on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, the radical-right parties of the 2020s have a more distinct ideological profile.5 All have national specificities, such as rural origins in Northern Europe or ethnonationalism in Central Europe. Several parties are rooted in postwar fascism, such as the FPÖ, RN, Brothers of Italy (FdI), the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), and the Sweden Democrats (SD). For some groups, strong connections with society and well-developed party structures compensated for their marginal impact in national politics. Before its landslide victory in Italy’s 2022 parliamentary election, support for FdI hovered at around 5 percent, as it did for the party’s predecessor throughout the period since World War II.6 Other parties, such as Hungary’s Fidesz, gained ground as classic populist or even mainstream parties and benefited from an aura of respectability even as they shifted toward ethnonationalist or nativist positions. Since the 1990s, liberal-democratic parties have started to adopt some of the ideas of the radical right while keeping the parties themselves out of government. In the 2000s, the radical right became normalized, in some countries becoming part of the political mainstream. During this process, as political scientists Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller have argued, liberal-democratic parties have shifted toward the radical right in the hope—mostly in vain—of keeping their traditional electorates. Yet, in practice, this approach has led voters to prefer the real radical right to its imitators. In other words, the tactic of chasing the radical right has not paid off electorally. Voters have moved toward the radical right as a consequence, not as a cause, of liberal-democratic parties’ attempts to contain it.7 Today, the far right is dominated by the radical right, which, unlike the extreme right, accepts the essence of democracy but rejects its liberal elements: minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers.8 The radical-right parties selected for this study all share deep antimigration sentiments, often determined by race or religion; a nationalism that makes these parties Euroskeptic and opposed to what they see as a Brussels-based dictatorship; and skepticism of climate change policies. Many of these parties also espouse deeply conservative family values that go against women’s and LGBTQ rights. Foreign policy is usually not the strong suit of these parties, apart from their keen interest in the external dimension of migration policy. These parties pay close attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but are sharply divided on this issue, with positions ranging from deep mistrust of Russia to close alignment with the Kremlin’s arguments. A future Donald Trump administration could lead to new divisions in the EU, as some member states are likely to align with the United States under any circumstances. This would mean that many of the EU’s current foreign policy positions, such as support for Ukraine, would come to an end. As radical-right parties rise to prominence at the national and the EU level, they are developing views on a range of foreign policy issues, building increasingly influential international networks and think tanks, and learning from each other’s successful tactics in solidifying their control of the state and propagating their values.9 For some radical-right parties that have been established in government, such as Fidesz and, until October 2023, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, the upgrading of foreign policy on their political agendas can be inferred by the fact that all diplomatic postings in the EU are political appointments. Hungary’s foreign policy machinery is under the direct control of the prime minister.10 Diplomatic colleagues of the Hungarian representatives in Brussels know that the country’s negotiating positions are micromanaged in Budapest.11 Other countries, such as Italy and Finland, have chosen to rely on the credibility of career diplomats to navigate the Brussels machinery, preferring compromise over confrontation and isolation. For a long time, European politicians and EU institutions have assumed the radical right could be contained. Now, the challenge of the radical right needs to be addressed more seriously. Just as this phenomenon has eroded democracy and the rule of law in some EU member states, so foreign policy may become affected at a time when collective action is most needed to address international issues. As the radical right challenges the EU’s attempts to navigate a dangerous world, European politics can no longer afford complacency.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
Political Geography:: Europe, France, and Germany

97. How does IR study children? A Brazilian perspective from the field

Author:: Patricia Nabuco Martuscelli, Giovanna Ayres Arantes de Paiva, Camilla de Azevedo Pereira, and Bruna Karoline Pinto da Silva
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: Children, or people under 18 years-old, represent 30% of the world population. While Childhood Studies gained attention in the last decades, in Brazil this topic remains incipient. In 2022 the Group of Studies on Childhoods and International Relations (GEIRI) mapped the open depositories for dissertations of Brazilian universities with IR programmes to understand how children appear as an IR issue. Using the framework of Global IR, this article presents two main contributions by analysing this novel data: a) ontological contribution by understanding Childhood Studies as a Global IR topic and Brazilian practices and interactions to see IR outside of a Western perspective and b) methodological contribution by analysing how students contribute to the IR knowledge production on Children and IR in Brazil mostly as international security and human rights issues.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Human Rights, Children, and Research
Political Geography:: Brazil and South America

98. Security and Peace After the War in Gaza

Author:: Ibrahim Awad
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Is the two-state solution feasible? In order to pursue such a policy, the international community must be able to overcome three main points of contention: Israeli occupation, the creation of a Palestinian state, and the role of Hamas
Topic:: Security, Self Determination, Refugees, Hamas, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 2023 Gaza War, and Two-State Solution
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

99. Trade policy, industrial policy, and the economic security of the European Union

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Out of fear about its economic security, the European Union is transitioning to a new form of international economic and policy engagement. This paper explores some of the major trade issues surrounding the bloc’s economic security, the role of trade and industrial policies in achieving its objectives, and some of the economic costs of doing so. It begins by explaining why economic security is suddenly playing such a prominent role and providing early evidence to motivate these government interventions. It then turns to a case study—new policies associated with China’s exports of electric vehicles and graphite—that highlights the difficult choices and practical challenges the European Union faces in tailoring policy to address concerns over economic security. The paper then introduces the domestic policy instruments that the European Union, its member states, and other governments are pursuing to address economic security, including stockpiling and inventory management, investment or production subsidies, tariffs, export controls, and regulations on foreign investment, as well as the scope for selective international cooperation over such policy instruments. The paper concludes with some caveats about abandoning interdependence and lessons from history.
Topic:: Security, Industrial Policy, European Union, Trade Policy, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Europe

100. The effect of lawful crossing on unlawful crossing at the US southwest border

Author:: Michael A. Clemens
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: An increasing number of migrants attempt to cross the US Southwest border without obtaining a visa or any other prior authorization. 2.5 million migrants did so in 2023. In recent years, responding to this influx, US officials have expanded lawful channels for a limited number of these migrants to cross the border, but only at official ports of entry. These expanded lawful channels were intended to divert migrants away from crossing between ports of entry, by foot or across rivers, thereby reducing unlawful crossings. On the other hand, some have argued that expanding lawful entry would encourage more migrants to cross unlawfully. This study seeks to shed light on that debate by assessing the net effect of lawful channels on unlawful crossings. It considers almost 11 million migrants (men, women, and children) encountered at the border crossing the border without prior permission or authorization. Using statistical methods designed to distinguish causation from simple correlation, it finds that a policy of expanding lawful channels to cross the border by 10 percent in a given month causes a net reduction of about 3 percent in unlawful crossings several months later. Fluctuations in the constraints on lawful crossings can explain roughly 9 percent of the month-to-month variation in unlawful crossings. The data thus suggest that policies expanding access to lawful crossing can serve as a partial but substantial deterrent to unlawful crossing and that expanding access can serve as an important tool for more secure and regulated borders.
Topic:: Security, Migration, and Borders
Political Geography:: North America, Mexico, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS