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41. Friends and Foes in the Indo-Pacific: Multilateralism Out, Minilateralism In?

Author:
Axel Berkofsky and Guido Alberto Casanova
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Minilateralism is already among us, and it is here to stay. The well-known shortcomings of the multilateral system of governance are pushing individual states in the Indo-Pacific to come up with new and different solutions to deal with the security and prosperity issues that current institutions are unable to tackle. Amid growing geopolitical rivalries and the uncertainty provoked by the re-election of Donald Trump, this report aims to shed some clarity on an emerging trend that is already affecting the foreign policy of great powers in a region that is central to global affairs.
Topic:
Security, Alliance, Multilateralism, Institutions, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, India, Asia, North Korea, Philippines, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

42. Dilemmas for the EU in deficit-financing of defence expenditure and maintenance of fiscal discipline

Author:
Lucio Pench
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union is grappling with the challenge of increasing defence expenditure while maintaining fiscal discipline under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The European Commission has proposed activating the national escape clause available under the SGP to accommodate defence spending without triggering the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). However, the scope and enforcement of this measure remain uncertain. A proposed 1.5 percent of GDP cap on extra fiscal flexibility is legally questionable and unlikely to be enforced. While low-debt countries do not require the clause due to existing flexibility, highly indebted nations may find it insufficient in the face of rising debt costs. The escape clause may also serve as a backdoor for European Central Bank interventions under the Transmission Protection Instrument, which requires compliance with EU fiscal rules. The Commission has also proposed the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) funding mechanism, a €150 billion loan programme to finance national defence investments. SAFE relies on national borrowing and follows the model of the SURE (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) facility, put in place during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, SAFE’s limited scale and dependence on national fiscal capacities mean it falls short of the collective security funding approach advocated by economists. Meanwhile, Germany’s decision to reform its constitutional debt brake marks a major departure from its traditional fiscal policies. The reform establishes a permanent ‘defence golden rule’, exempting military spending from borrowing limits, alongside a €10 trillion infrastructure fund. Although this move does not endanger Germany’s fiscal sustainability, it undermines EU-wide fiscal coordination and conflicts with the SGP. This could weaken the European Central Bank’s position in future market interventions. Given these challenges, discussions on a new EU fiscal framework are necessary to ensure fiscal flexibility while maintaining debt sustainability.
Topic:
Security, Budget, European Union, Fiscal Policy, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe

43. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?

Author:
Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

44. Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform

Author:
Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The economic strategy being defined by the 2024-2029 European Commission seems to follow the prescriptions on innovation and single market reform, and the expansive approach to industrial policy, set out by Mario Draghi in his September 2024 report on European Union competitiveness, with two important differences. First, the Commission stops short of calling for World Trade Organisation-prohibited subsidies – this is welcome. Second, the Commission proposes a new state aid framework for national industrial policy rather than expansion of EU-level public investment funding. This runs the risk of weakening the single market and harming competition, with the unintended consequence of protecting incumbents and inhibiting structural change. In terms of specific policies, on defence, the Commission is right to face up to the challenge of defining an EU procurement mechanism that offers sufficient speed and cost advantages to justify large-scale funding. On economic security and international partnerships, the Commission is right to take a broader approach than a foreign economic policy focused only on supply chains. What is lacking is a much greater commitment to providing support for climate mitigation in developing countries. The second Trump presidency creates risks for the Commission strategy. President Trump has gone further than expected in threatening territorial expansion and with the speed, aggression and disregard for the rule of law with which he has started to implement his policies. These factors will complicate the EU-United States relationship. The best defence against both Trump and the competitive and security threats posed by China is to accelerate policies that address the EU’s structural weaknesses: raising productivity growth, defence capacity and economic security. Economic security, in turn, requires more resilient trade relationships, less financial dependence on the US and an improved standing with emerging market and developing economies. The EU should also seize the opportunity offered by the shift in US policy from subsidies to deregulation. While the EU should not race Trump to the bottom on environmental or financial deregulation, it should rapidly improve its own regulatory framework while building on its core strengths: human capital and the rule of law. Unlike tariff wars or discriminatory subsidies, a competition to provide a good business environment is not a zero-sum game.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Industrial Policy, Budget, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, Sustainability, European Commission, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

45. Ukraine: European democracy’s affordable arsenal

Author:
Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
European NATO members must raise defence spending by enough to deter through strength an irredentist Russia. This must be done possibly without the United States and when ageing populations demand higher social spending. Raising defence spending to sufficient levels could result in a doubling of current primary deficits to just over 3 percent of GDP on average. This seems likely to be a fiscally unattainable goal for this group of countries. European NATO members, in addition to their quantitative defence spending challenge, face the qualitative challenge of significantly increasing their outlays on new modern military equipment, especially drones, to credibly deter Russia. This will require all European NATO members to significantly increase investments in their domestic and regional military-industrial capacities. While its armed forces are physically defending their country against Russia’s onslaught, Ukraine is transforming gradually into a very large, advanced and cost-competitive military equipment and weapons producer. Through the so-called ‘Danish Model’, individual European Union and NATO members are already actively funding Ukrainian defence production, helping it to help itself against Russia. Much more focus should be put on Ukraine’s ability, if fully integrated with the military-industrial sector in the rest of Europe, to produce much of the modern military equipment wanted by itself and the rest of Europe. This Policy Brief shows how Ukraine already produces drones and modern howitzers, arguably the two most important weapons in defensive warfare today, at prices well below those achieved by other Western military suppliers. The EU, with a fully integrated and funded Ukrainian military-industrial sector, will have the capacity to produce much of the cost-competitive military equipment it will need in future, while continuing to fund its welfare systems. To facilitate this development, the EU must in all defence and military-related matters begin treating Ukraine immediately as a full EU member.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Industrial Policy, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

46. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:
Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

47. Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Author:
Grace Price
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Pacific Island countries (PICs) have long attracted development and security assistance from the region’s traditional partner states—the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. However, the Pacific has received renewed attention from them as China actively vies for influence. Despite increased engagement, the PICs are still turning to China in pursuit of their development and security needs. This report will map out efforts the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are taking to increase influence, obstacles that are hindering effective cooperation in the Pacific, and recommendations for improving their collective engagement with the PICs.
Topic:
Security, Development, Partnerships, and Alliance
Political Geography:
North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

48. Terrorism and Immigration: 50 Years of Foreign-Born Terrorism on US Soil, 1975–2024

Author:
Alex Nowrasteh
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Terrorism is a hazard to human life and material prosperity that should be addressed in a sensible manner whereby the benefits of government actions taken to contain it outweigh the costs. Whether policies are sensible depends on the risks that terrorism poses, the harms that terrorism inflicts, and the costs of anti-terrorism policies. This risk analysis of foreign-born terrorism is a crucial step in evaluating anti-terrorism policies related to immigration.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, and Immigration
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

49. Net assessments for Australia

Author:
Andrew Carr
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Established in 2023 in the Australian Department of Defence, net assessments will play an increasingly important role in shaping the future of the Australian Defence Force, disciplining long-term capability decisions to a series of key scenarios of concern. With Australia’s security requirements ranging across many more domains — and dependent on careful analysis of trends and networks beyond its shores — four additional Directorates of Net Assessment should be established, in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Home Affairs, Treasury, and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Net assessments will help Ministers better understand key strategic problems as well as potential conflict scenarios and outcomes, assisting them to make effective decisions to improve Australia’s competitive position and prepare the nation for any conflict in its region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Training, and Assessment
Political Geography:
Australia

50. Terminating Insurgency in Mozambique: Reflections on the SADC Mission In Mozambique

Author:
Oita Etyang, Lweendo Kambela, and Stephen Muleya
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
The continued threat of insurgency in Mozambique has triggered academic and policy interest in the recent past. Indeed, the ramifications caused by acts of insurgency globally and in Africa remain endemic. This calls for the need to establish sustainable and context-specific interventions at regional and national levels. The Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regions have not been spared from the lethality of insurgency, with Mozambique morphing into the epicentre of interest. Insurgency has caused untold suffering to communities in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, prompting the deployment of a SADC mission. As a regional peace operation, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed on 15 July 2021 following approval by the Extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Maputo, Mozambique on 23 June 2021. The main objective of SAMIM was to support the Republic of Mozambique to combat armed groups and acts of insurgency, particularly in the Cabo Delgado province. This article seeks to understand the impact of the SAMIM intervention. It mainly interrogates SAMIM’s mandate, structure, success, challenges and lessons learned using both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies and various open data sources, including programmatic documents.
Topic:
Security, Insurgency, Peacekeeping, COMESA, and South Africa Development Community (SADC)
Political Geography:
Africa, Mozambique, and Cabo Delgado