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41. The Fiftieth Anniversary of India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion: An Interview with Jayita Sarkar

Author:
Marc Reyes and Jayita Sarkar
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
Today, May 18, 2024, marks the fiftieth anniversary of India’s peaceful nuclear explosion or PNE. To mark the occasion, the Toynbee Prize Foundation facilitated a conversation between historian Jayita Sarkar and myself. Dr. Sarkar explained what the PNE was and how it shaped Indian and nuclear history. In addition to the PNE, Dr. Sarkar and I also spoke about her acclaimed 2022 book, Ploughshares and Swords: India’s Nuclear Program in the Global Cold War which received the Bernard S. Cohn Book Prize from the Association for Asian Studies and Honorable Mention for Global Development Studies Book Award from the International Studies Association. The book can be freely read through its publisher, Cornell University Press, and here is a link to read my January 2023 Toynbee review of Ploughshares and Swords. Below is an edited version of our conversation.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, History, Global South, and Interview
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

42. Nuclear Danger and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Next month, the second Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) preparatory review conference will meet in Geneva. In anticipation of this international conference, NPEC is releasing Nuclear Danger and the NPT, an edited volume of research on what nuclear dangers await and how proper enforcement of the NPT can help. The hope is that the volume’s analysis will prompt constructive debate. It certainly is needed. Within ten years, there is a distinct possibility South Korea, Japan, the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran may decide to acquire nuclear weapons. After that, Algeria, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, and Australia may be sorely tempted to do the same. More could follow. What is fueling these grim prospects? Several things: Growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capabilities and threats; Russian forward basing of nuclear weapons in Belarus; waning allied confidence in U.S. nuclear security guarantees; and an increasing acceptance of dangerous civilian nuclear activities that bring states to the brink of bomb-making. Legally, the NPT is supposed to prevent these troubles. The question is will it? Much depends on what major nuclear powers choose to do regarding their NPT commitments and how smaller, nonnuclear nations view the treaty. Nuclear Danger and the NPT is designed to help clarify what that requires. Earlier this year, NPEC released an occasional paper on the challenges of creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Such challenges will surely be considered at the upcoming NPT review conference, but there will be more issues up for discussion. Attendees will likely debate the future of U.S. and Russian nuclear sharing arrangements, as well as the limits of what should be considered “peaceful” under the NPT. Iran’s threatened withdrawal from the treaty will also be a concern, as will China’s worries over the potential for Washington to redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea or for Seoul to acquire its own nuclear weapons. The U.S. delegation is likely to raise complaints about China’s nuclear weapons build up and Beijing’s unwillingness to enter into good faith negotiations on effective nuclear controls. Finally, Russia’s assaults on Ukraine’s civilian nuclear systems and the legitimacy of such assaults are likely to be discussed. Nuclear Danger and the NPT covers all of these topics in depth. For hawks and doves, Washington insiders, and simply concerned citizens, it’s worth reading.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, South Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

43. China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
As the dust settles on the election, one thing is certain: there is going to be increased interest in expanding America’s nuclear arsenal. Whatever the merits of what that move might be, it’s hardly a complete strategy to cope with a long term strategic contest, Russia, China, and their proxies. That will require far more than any adjustment of our nuclear arsenal. What’s required? At the request of several national security officials and outside experts, NPEC is sharing its answer with today’s release of China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War available as an Amazon book. It consists of four chapters. The first sketches out what a long-term contest with China, Russia, and its proxies will demand. Although building up military might and using threats of massive destruction against our enemies were critical to winning the Cold War, in the coming cool contest, they will no longer serve as our top ace in the hole. Instead, the key levers will be keeping our key military, political, and commercial functions immune to attacks and communicating, protecting, sharing, and analyzing essential information on an unprecedented scale. Wars may be waged against nations but the aim increasingly will be to disable them without physically obliterating them. What, though, should we do about the growing nuclear threat? That’s the focus of the book’s next chapter, “Xi and Putin Are Building More Nukes: How to Compete.” It, in turn, is followed by “What Missile-driven Competition with China Will Look Like,” which was first released three years ago. The Pentagon recently confirmed this chapter’s predictions about China’s development of intercontinental conventional missiles by 2030. The chapter’s other forecasts and military and diplomatic proposals are still timely. This brings us to the book’s last chapter, “Can Self-Government Survive the Next Convulsion?” It examines the domestic political, economic, and social implications of pursuing this volume’s recommendations. What’s needed most is a geographic distribution of America’s critical military and financial infrastructure and demographic capital. Fortunately, this has already begun, driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, and aligns with America’s bent to spread and increase political power and wealth domestically. The book’s final section is an appendix consisting of an introduction Thomas Cochran and I co-authored for “China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?” — a three-year NPEC study of China’s nuclear weapons production potential. The Pentagon has cited this research in each of its annual Chinese military power assessments for the last three years running. The Pentagon has used the study to help explain why China is likely to acquire as many nuclear weapons in a decade as the United States currently has deployed. It was this projection, perhaps more than any other, that caused national security analysts to focus on what is likely to be a long-term strategic contest with China and its new ally, Russia. Paul Bracken, author of The Second Nuclear Age, reviewed the book: “China and Russia’s military buildups have far-reaching political and strategic consequences. Yet the US is not remotely prepared to cope either intellectually or with appropriate hardware. Henry Sokolski takes a major step forward here by analyzing these challenges and what we need to do about them.”
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Strategic Competition, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

44. Lessons from China: How Soon Could Iran Get the Bomb? (Occasional Paper 2404)

Author:
Hui Zhang
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
It’s unclear when Iran might get the bomb. In July, Secretary of State Blinken revealed that Iran was only one to two weeks away from producing enough weapons grade uranium for several bombs. The New York Times quoted experts who estimated it would take Iran up to another year to make a missile-deliverable weapon. A conservative estimate would be no more than five months but could be much less. In the attached historical analysis of China’s nuclear weapons program, Hui Zhang pegs the number at three to five weeks, and possibly less. It makes for interesting reading, not only on what China was able to accomplish so quickly sixty years ago, but on what Iran may do.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
China and Iran

45. War Game Reveals Chinese Attacks on Communications Could Paralyze Taiwan’s Efforts to Resist

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Top security analysts have long noted that if China disables Taiwan’s underseas cable and disrupts its microwave, cell and space-based communications systems, Beijing could secure a smokeless victory over the island. Over the last five to 10 years, however, private commercial space-based communications and internet services have grown dramatically in importance. The critical role of Starlink in supporting Ukrainian military operations amply demonstrates this point. This prompts several policy questions: What national security roles should governments require commercial space service providers to play during a security crisis or war? Should governments set minimum standards for cyber and physical hardening for commercial satcom providers to meet in order to be eligible to compete for government contracts? What is the proper response to repeated “accidental” or deniable assaults on commercial and military space systems? To find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center conducted a space war game that focused on a near-term Taiwan-China scenario. It utilized the talents of current and retired officials, congressional staff, and outside experts to play the game. In the game, China cut communications cables, disrupted microwave and cellular services, attacked Taiwan’s electrical supply system locally and jammed its satellite communications. The United States and its space-faring allies acted slowly. Private space service providers were no quicker. Finally, the President of the United States authorized covert cyberattacks against China’s Beidou satellite ground stations. China responded by launching similar cyberattacks on U.S. GPS systems and the U.S., redoubling its attacks against the Beidou system. With U.S. naval forces closing in to disrupt a Chinese naval quarantine of Taiwan, Beijing called for a mutual ceasefire in exchange for bilateral talks to lock Taiwan’s future as a province of China. The U.S., allies and Taiwan rejected this offer, opening the door for further military escalation. In the hot wash, the players discussed three key findings: Washington, its space-faring allies and industry players must clarify how they might backfill Taiwanese communication systems well before China might try to disable them. The US and its allies must address Taiwan’s lack of legal recognition, which leaves it uniquely vulnerable to offensive Chinese space and terrestrial military actions against Taiwan’s communications systems. Washington and its space-faring allies must develop additional military space options with plausible deniability to deter and counter similar Chinese capabilities. The recommendations paired with each of these findings. Taiwan needs to be more vocal about its communications systems’ vulnerabilities and consider developing mechanisms to disable China’s satellites temporarily, in a deniable manner. The United States should lower the classifications associated with its non-kinetic anti-satellite systems and create an operational working group on space security that includes Taiwan.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Communications, Nonproliferation, and War Games
Political Geography:
China and Taiwan

46. Gaming Israeli Nuclear Use: Pandora Unleashed

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
With the continued fighting in Gaza, a nuclear rubicon of sorts has been crossed: Elected Israeli officials — a deputy minister and a ruling party member of Parliament—not only have publicly referenced Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, but suggested how such weapons might be used to target Gaza. This is unprecedented. More recently, Iran directly attacked an Israeli-manned intelligence outpost in Iraq and publicized a staged missile strike against a mock Israeli air base. Iran also has inched within weeks of making several nuclear weapons and made its military ever more immune to first strikes against its key missile and nuclear facilities. Iran and its proxies also now have long-range, high-precision missiles that can easily reach key Israeli targets. None of these developments is positive. For decades, most security analysts assumed Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons were only deployed to deter attacks and that Iran would not dare to attack Israel directly. The attached war game report, “Gaming Israeli Nuclear Use: Pandora Unleashed,” directly challenges these assumptions. The game starts in 2027 with Israeli intelligence reporting that Iran is mating nuclear warheads to its long-range missiles. This prompts Israel to ask Washington to collaborate in a conventional military strike against key Iranian nuclear facilities and missile bases. Not wanting to be drawn into a major war with Iran, the United States, however, demurs and instead offers Israel U.S. standoff hypersonic missiles. Several moves later, Israel, isolated and desperate, launches two nuclear strikes against Iran to which Iran replies with a nuclear strike of its own. The game raised several basic questions. Would Israel or Iran conduct further military nuclear operations? Might Israel target Tehran with nuclear weapons? Might Iran target Tel Aviv with nuclear arms? Would Russia or the United States be drawn into the war? These and other unknowns informed the game’s key findings. These included: 1. The strategic uncertainties generated after an Israeli-Iranian nuclear exchange are likely to be at least as fraught as any that might arise before such a clash. 2. Although Israel and Iran might initially avoid the nuclear targeting of innocents, such self-restraint is tenuous. 3. Multilateral support for Israeli security may be essential to deter Israeli nuclear use but will likely hinge on Israeli willingness to discuss regional denuclearization. 4. Little progress is likely in reducing Middle Eastern nuclear threats if the United States continues its public policy of denying knowledge of Israeli nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Nonproliferation, and War Games
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

47. Nuclear Verification’s Holy Grail: Verifying Nuclear Warheads — a new approach

Author:
Miles Pomper, William Moon, Marshall Brown, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, Dan Zhukov, Dick Gullickson, and Yanliang Pan
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This study is the culmination of four years of work to think through what would be required to track and monitor nuclear warheads in a verification process. It first began in 2021, shortly after President Joe Biden of the United States and President Vladimir Putin of Russia extended the New START Treaty until February 2026; the two presidents also announced the launch of bilateral strategic stability talks. This positive moment in the U.S.-Russian relationship, which became almost unimaginable after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, was the original impetus for the project. It also launched in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly known as the INF Treaty. The Russians had been violating the Treaty with the production and deployment of the 9M729 missile, also known in NATO parlance as the SSC-8. All NATO allies concurred with the withdrawal, which the United States completed in August 2019. The effort began with two strands of activity. The study team knew that when the United States and Russia decided to return to the negotiating table, the United States would place a high priority on seeking direct limits on warheads. Prior treaties had focused on controlling and eliminating missiles but had not focused directly on the warheads that armed them. It had long been a goal of the United States to seek direct limits on warheads, in order to more accurately constrain a Russian preponderance in warheads designated for theaterand shorter-range systems.1 However, if such an agreement were negotiated, the European allies would be ill-equipped to participate. On-site inspections under the INF Treaty had ended on May 31, 2001, so it had been twenty years since the allies had had to participate in verification activities. Most had lost expertise and institutional memory; some had never participated at all. “Raising the IQ” of the NATO allies about participating in arms control implementation was thus the first strand of activity. The second strand grew up around a conviction in the study team that the well-practiced verification techniques that had been exercised in INF and strategic arms control treaties since the 1980s could be augmented with new technology and innovative techniques. Thus emerged the emphasis on using cryptography to underpin a unique warhead tracking system. This work took advantage of some of the finest experts in the field of cryptography at Stanford University, and also the extensive experience gained during the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s many years of work to strengthen warhead protection, control and accounting in Russian Ministry of Defense nuclear warhead storage facilities. This work, which spanned a period of over fifteen years from 1995- 2013, provided the study team with a great depth of knowledge about the normal operating procedures in Russian military warhead facilities. This deep knowledge was vital to developing a concept for the tracking system, providing it with a realism and accuracy that otherwise would not have been possible. These two strands of work culminated in 2022 in a significant study, “Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Non-Strategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe.”2 However, the team realized that only one element of warhead verification had been touched—the broad outlines of a system for maintaining and exchanging information over the life of an agreement. Other verification elements such as on-site inspections and particular verification technologies had not been considered. They therefore resolved to expand the scope of work to imagine an entire closed system for nuclear warhead verification. With the cryptographic element as its foundation, the team reviewed the extensive experience of treaties, agreements and other activities such as exhibitions and joint experiments that had been built up over the many years of U.S.-Soviet and Russian cooperation on nuclear weapons control. From this, they created a comprehensive menu of measures that could be considered for a future warhead control regime, calibrating the measures according to the level of their intrusiveness.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

48. Nuclear China in the Twenty-First Century: Status and Implications for the World and Europe

Author:
David Santoro
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
In August 2021, shortly after new evidence surfaced that China might be expanding its nuclear arsenal much more extensively and rapidly than previously assumed, Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, described Beijing’s military investments as a “strategic breakout.” He underscored that the “explosive growth and modernization of [China’s] nuclear and conventional forces can only be what I describe as breathtaking,” adding that “that word, breathtaking, may not be enough.” Since then, several senior officials in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere have echoed that message and the final report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States published in October 2023 concluded that at its current pace, China “will reach rough quantitative parity with the United States in deployed nuclear warheads by the mid-2030s.” The result has been the emergence of work, including by this author, to understand this unprecedented development. This work is in its infancy, however, and more is needed to grasp the scale and scope of Chinese nuclear modernization (especially given that much of it is shrouded in secrecy) as well as its implications for strategic stability, deterrence, and arms control and risk reduction. Existing work has focused primarily on the implications for the United States and, to some extent, the United States and Russia. Yet it is also important to grapple with the implications for Europe, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and reflect on actions that Europeans, individually or with others, should take in response.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Modernization
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

49. Russia, The Global South and Multilateral Nuclear Diplomacy after the Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Hanna Notte
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had a detrimental impact on multilateral nuclear diplomacy. The war caused an earthquake in procedure, paralyzing processes at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations First Committee, and meetings dealing with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This was the case even as Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling and occupation of Ukrainian nuclear power plants, and Europe’s recommitment to nuclear weapons, demonstrated the ongoing need for nuclear dialogue. States from the Global South tended to navigate cautiously vis-à-vis Russia across the multilateral nuclear negotiating forums. Amid greater difficulties in forging common positions on nuclear issues related to the Ukraine war, these states were also frustrated with what they perceived as a deprioritization of their interests in multilateral nuclear diplomacy. Western states, especially during the first year of the war, were seen as exercising unwelcome pressure on the Global South to take sides against Russia. Russia, meanwhile, pursued a dual strategy, undermining nonproliferation efforts and chipping away at trust in legacy institutions, while also leveraging these forums in pursuit of greater alignment with states in the Global South. The implications of these different dynamics for the health of the nuclear order may take some time to fully play out, but will likely be profound.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Multilateralism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Global Focus, and Global South

50. A Significant Change in Russian Doctrine on Nuclear Weapon Use

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Speaking to the Russian Presidential Security Council on Sept 25, 2024, Vladimir Putin asserted that “Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state… supported by a nuclear power should be treated as their joint attack.” But what does this imply for the Ukraine war and more generally? Although the announcement reaffirms several long-standing provisions of Russian nuclear weapon doctrine, it does add something new and portentous. It asserts that Russia may reply to a massive aerial attack on the homeland while it is underway even if the attack is purely conventional. The perceived “massiveness” of the attack is held practically speaking to be equivalent to an existential attack. The new view may also imply that such an attack by Ukraine would be considered a joint UA-NATO attack and possibly warrant a similar response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

51. Unsealed Indictment Shows Iranian Agents Acquired Controlled Camera with Nuclear Weapons Application from United States

Author:
Sarah Burkhard, Chloe DeVere, and Kendall Roach
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In the spring of 2023, the U.S. Justice Department unsealed an indictment from 2012, which shows that in addition to the previously known high-speed cameras Iran purchased from Russia, brokered by Mohsen Vanaki, 2 Iran also acquired another camera with applications in nuclear and ballistic missile testing at the same time from the United States. 3 From 2006 to 2009, five agents residing in Iran, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Canada worked together to purchase the camera, which required an export license, from a U.S. company. They then shipped the camera via Canada and the UAE to an Iranian customer with known ties to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program. While a first attempt to purchase the camera failed, a second attempt succeeded, requiring an elaborate scheme with multiple transshipment points, front companies, and falsified end-user information. Ironically, the Iranian end user experienced multiple technical issues with the camera post-shipment, requiring prolonged back-and-forth communication among the network and with the manufacturer. Despite efforts taken by the multiple agents to ship the camera and conceal its end use, this case reveals red flags and missed opportunities to stop the initial shipment or the repair and technical consultations post-shipment. While it is difficult to determine in what way the camera could have contributed to Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts, there are several indications that Iran was continuing nuclear weapons related activities previously conducted under the Amad plan during that time frame, and multiple governments agreed at the time that Iran’s nuclear weapons program was likely ongoing. The case highlights that Iran seeks controlled high-speed cameras for nuclear and military applications. It also serves as an important reminder that Iran does have the type of sophisticated equipment needed to conduct various aspects of nuclear weapons development, then and today. Additionally, this case again shows the value of dual-national and other Iranian procurement agents located outside of Iran, especially in Western countries. Moreover, if they are arrested and prosecuted, Iran has effectively developed a strategy of trading them for innocent Western hostages it has arbitrarily seized inside Iran.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Weapons, and Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

52. Effectiveness of United Nations Security Council Sanctions: A Case Study of North Korea

Author:
Saira Iqbal
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
In the absence of a governmental structure, associations, organizations, or groups oversee managing global affairs and preserving stability and peace. The United Nations was founded in the wake of World War II and the start of the Cold War to guard against the possibility of nuclear weapons and a third world war, because of the then-current nuclear race. Nonetheless, the organizational structure has rules and regulations, occasionally with penalties attached, to maintain that harmony. This paper examines the effectiveness of the UN Security Council sanctions by using the case study of North Korea. This research evaluates how sanctions affect North Korea's political and economic behavior by applying the coercive diplomacy theory and this study is analytical and descriptive in nature. Many books, articles, newspapers, books, journal articles, governmental publications and United Nations resolutions documents are used to read, explore and analyze the resolutions passed by United Nations Security Council regarding North Korea. The results imply that sanctions have not had much of an impact on North Korea's nuclear program, while having some success in reducing the country's trade and access to foreign capital. The report indicates that denuclearization is unlikely to be achieved by sanctions alone and suggests a comprehensive strategy that combines ongoing pressure, diplomatic engagement, and economic incentives. The paper offers insights for policymakers attempting to solve the North Korean nuclear development threat and adds to the continuing discussion over the efficacy of sanctions as a coercive diplomatic tool.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Sanctions, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

53. Cold War Case Studies and Chinese Perspectives

Author:
Raven Witherspoon, Jenna Wichterman, and Shivam Shankar Singh
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
Rising Sino-American tensions have prompted widespread discussion of a “New Cold War,” and analysts increasingly worry that flashpoints in the bilateral relationship could trigger conventional war that could escalate to the nuclear domain. This research utilizes the Cold War analogy as a starting point for analyzing how nuclear war between the U.S. and China can be averted.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

54. Has the Iranian challenge been forgotten?

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel must take seriously Iran’s stated intention to destroy the Jewish state. Iran’s desire to attain nuclear weapons serves its goal of eliminating Israel and its strategy of using its proxies to threaten Israel’s civilian population. All measures taken so far to stop Tehran’s nuclear project have failed, and Israel has no choice but to urgently eliminate this threat by military means.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

55. Russian Nuclear Calibration in the War in Ukraine

Author:
Heather Williams, Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Reja Younis
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Russian nuclear threats have cast a long shadow over the war in Ukraine. As the conflict enters its third year, it is crucial to understand the objectives of Russia’s nuclear signaling at various stages and the effectiveness of U.S. and allied responses thus far. To explore these issues, the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues recently compiled a database and released a digital report Russian nuclear narratives and their evolution during the first 18 months of the war.[1] This brief builds on that work and finds that Russian officials noticeably calibrated their nuclear signaling at key points in the war. It also concludes that the risks of nuclear use will likely rise if Russia faces significant battlefield setbacks in the future or the conflict expands in new or unexpected ways. Accordingly, Washington should work to maintain international pressure against nuclear use in Ukraine while combatting narratives that downplay or rationalize Russia’s nuclear threats.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

56. Russia Changes Its Nuclear Doctrine

Author:
Artur Kacprzyk
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The publication of Russia’s new nuclear doctrine is another in its attempts to intimidate NATO states, especially in order to discourage them from supporting Ukraine. Russia is lowering the declared threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and specifying additional situations in which it is to be possible. This does not mean, however, an increased danger of nuclear weapons use in the ongoing conflict. Russia is nonetheless likely to take further steps to heighten the fears of such a scenario among NATO governments and societies. At the same time, the document reflects the weakening of Russia’s conventional forces.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

57. Political Drivers of China’s Changing Nuclear Policy: Implications for U.S.-China Nuclear Relations and International Security

Author:
Tong Zhao
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The message from Chinese officials has become increasingly clear: the United States and China should first stabilize their political relationship before taking on nuclear issues.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Bilateral Relations, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

58. Assessing the Efficacy of the India-Pakistan Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations/Facilities

Author:
Nasir Mehmood
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the 1988 India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear installations and facilities, examining its origins, implementation, and implications through declassified documents, primary sources, news reports, and interviews. While some view this agreement as a model for protecting nuclear facilities during conflicts and others question its effectiveness, this research reveals that the agreement successfully maintains a crucial balance between reassurance and deterrence. The study demonstrates that both nations have consistently complied with the agreement during peace and conflict, as it aligns with their strategic interests without compromising deterrence stability. The agreement has yielded significant benefits, including reduced fears of nuclear attacks, improved bilateral relations, international diplomatic gains, and cost-effective security measures for nuclear installations. The paper proposes two supplementary measures to enhance the agreement's effectiveness: establishing a Bilateral Consultative Commission for addressing implementation issues and creating a bilateral instrument specifically prohibiting cyber-attacks on nuclear facilities. This analysis contributes to the broader understanding of arms control theory by validating the complementary yet opposing relationship between arms control arrangements and nuclear deterrence operations, while offering valuable lessons for securing nuclear sites globally.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, and Nuclear Safety
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, and India

59. Adapting US strategy to account for China’s transformation into a peer nuclear power

Author:
David Shullman, John K. Culver, Kitsch Liao, and Samantha Wong
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China’s rapidly improving nuclear capabilities and expanding nuclear arsenal underpin its recent rise as a nuclear peer power. For the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, the uncertainty of China’s intentions behind this nuclear expansion poses a major challenge. It necessitates a revisit of the fundamental assumptions underpinning US and allied planning and preparation for a potential conflict with China. The 2022 White House National Security Strategy1 and National Defense Strategy2 identified China as the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological wherewithal to reshape the international order. The 2022 United States Nuclear Posture Review noted how China has embarked on an ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces and established a nascent nuclear triad.3 The report further assessed that Beijing will likely possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade.4 China also sustains extensive and ambitious space operations. According to the Department of Defense’s 2022 China Military Power Report5, as of 2021, China’s 260 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites were the largest collection of such constellations globally other than the United States’. The transformation of China’s military capabilities no longer represents the linear, stepwise modernization of an outmoded military that characterized the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for the past two decades. Since the PLA launched its major internal command and service restructuring in 2015, previous doctrinal and teaching publications acquired and exploited by Western analysts are out of date and likely declining in relevance. By extension, much of the Western analysis of PLA plans, operations, and concepts of deterrence and escalation control are also likely to be out of date. China’s rapid expansion of strategic warfighting capabilities (i.e., nuclear forces, space/counterspace systems, and cyber/information operations) represents tremendous discontinuity in the pace, scope, and scale of the PLA’s transformation, necessitating a major US reassessment of Chinese strategy, doctrine, and warfighting operations. The commonly accepted notion that deliberate Chinese nuclear force modernization is characterized as “running faster to stay in the same place” to sustain a minimal retaliatory posture is assessed to have evolved. China now has a higher likelihood of using its newfound nuclear power to more actively deter or compel6 its opponents and safeguard its core interests. This includes perceived external threats that could negatively impact domestic political interests. As a step in this reassessment, this project reevaluated China’s strategy, doctrine, and warfighting concepts in light of its ongoing rapid transformation into a peer nuclear power, examined implications of this assessment for future US contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, and produced several actionable findings and recommendations for US government decision-makers that can be addressed in the next five- to ten-year horizon.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

60. A bipartisan Iran strategy for the next US administration—and the next two decades

Author:
Atlantic Council
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States needs a bipartisan strategy toward Iran that can be maintained across several administrations, one that works patiently and resolutely to counter Iran’s efforts to dominate the Middle East, drive the United States out, destroy Israel, and threaten Arab allies. Pressure to keep Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and to halt its malign regional influence is crucial—but won’t work absent a strategic goal of new negotiations to address both challenges simultaneously. The United States must also counter Iran’s hostage taking, assassinations, and cyber and election meddling by triggering automatic penalties and responses in lockstep with allies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East