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21. Advancing Governance at the Nexus of Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Fei Su, Vladislav Chernavskikh, and Wilfred Wan
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The rapid advancement of military artificial intelligence (AI), especially its potential integration into nuclear systems, presents significant risks to strategic stability and established deterrence practices. Despite these concerns, no dedicated governance framework currently exists to address the specific challenges of the AI–nuclear nexus. Existing initiatives have primarily focused on ensuring human control over nuclear decision-making. There are a number of state-led initiatives on the governance of military AI more broadly. They can be adapted to address the use of AI in nuclear weapons, but applying them will not be straightforward. There is thus a need to extend the conversation beyond the ‘human in the loop’ concept and develop targeted governance measures. Future discussions could investigate the precise level and degree of required human control and set clear red lines for both the extent and the type of AI integration in nuclear and related systems.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Governance, Disarmament, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. Beyond the Nuclear Balance: A Strategic Forces Net Assessment

Author:
Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Senior American policymakers and military leaders want and need to know how the United States stands in key military competitions relative to its rivals. This net assessment examines the balance of strategic forces (the strategic balance) between the United States and its two principal rivals, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or “China”) and the Russian Federation (“Russia”). The assessment examines the current balance as well as trends that may alter the balance significantly over the planning horizon, defined as the 2025–40 time frame. During the Cold War, the term strategic forces referred to nuclear weapons deployed on strategic delivery systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers (LRBs). This taxonomy was codified in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and in the SALT I and II agreements negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union. Strategic defenses were those forces capable of defending effectively against attacks by these forces. This assessment retains this taxonomy with two important additions. First, following the Cold War, new capabilities emerged that could, under certain circumstances, perform some strategic strike operations1 that were once the exclusive domain of strategic nuclear forces. This is the case with respect to long-range delivery systems armed with precision-guided munitions, or non-nuclear strategic strike (NNSS) forces. Second, cyber weapons were introduced. Many believe they have the potential to threaten a state’s critical infrastructure (CI), its strategic force command, control communications, and computer (C4) systems, and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Combined with strategic nuclear systems, NNSS and cyber forces constitute an expanded strategic triad, supplementing the nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based, and airborne delivery systems. That said, given their proven ability to inflict prompt catastrophic destruction against the full range of strategic counterforce and countervalue targets, nuclear weapons remain far and away the most important strategic force. Consequently, they are this assessment’s principal focus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

23. Implications of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Modernization for the United States and Regional Allies

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Based on current trends, China will become a quantitative and qualitative nuclear weapons peer of the United States by the early to mid-2030s with a diversified, accurate, and survivable force that will rival America’s. Rather than having only high-yield nuclear missiles as a strategic deterrent against nuclear attack, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a range of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the latter being lower-yield weapons usable in a conflict theater. Why is China seemingly going beyond its long-standing nuclear weapons approach of maintaining only a minimal deterrent or assured retaliation? Why has it chosen to rapidly develop its nuclear arsenal and related delivery system in a deliberately opaque manner? This report argues that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to embark on such a rapid nuclear modernization not primarily because China wants to “win” a nuclear exchange against the US. Rather, Beijing wants to create political and psychological effects that lead to enormously important strategic and military effects. As the report explains, the CCP and PLA are using the rapid development of nuclear capability and related delivery systems to subdue the adversary and win without fighting. The following are components of achieving this: Degrade the adversary’s decision-making. Weaken the adversary’s will to fight. Undermine the adversary’s public support for war. Undermine the resolve of the adversary’s government from within. Support and enhance deterrence. The report assesses that there are three ways in which China uses nuclear modernization to change the material and psychological environment with important strategic effects that work to its advantage.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Modernization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. Nuclear Deterrence Explained: Strategic Implications for Europe in the Absence of U.S. Extended Deterrence

Author:
Iakob Dadvani
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Recent developments in U.S. foreign policy discourse indicate two potential future directions: prioritization or retrenchment.1 Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric clearly reflects a tendency toward retrenchment, particularly with respect to Europe. The most prominent indicators of this shift include the potential U.S. withdrawal from NATO European command, or a significant downsizing of its role2 , which would reduce the alliance’s overall combat effectiveness. This change would necessitate increased defense spending from European countries to maintain credible conventional deterrence, as the aggregate military power must remain constant despite reduced American involvement. Further to this are the moves to solve the Russia-Ukraine war by pressuring Ukrainians into negotiations that result in an unjust peace without security guarantees.3 Such an outcome would likely lead to long-term instability across the European continent.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

25. Grand strategy: Deterrence

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Deterrence is the mobilization of coercive means to convince an adversary not to take an aggressive action. This can mean mobilizing an effective defense—convincing an adversary they will not be able to achieve their goal—or threatening to punish an adversary so even successful aggression doesn’t seem worthwhile. The ability to deter an adversary requires that they perceive both the capability and the will to carry out a deterrent threat—in other words, that they find the deterrent threat “credible.” It also requires an implicit assurance that the adversary will not suffer should they refrain from taking action. The massive and mutually destructive power of nuclear weapons makes leaders especially cautious about taking actions that could escalate to nuclear war, thereby suppressing the incentives for conventional war between nuclear-armed states. Extended nuclear deterrence, such as the “nuclear umbrella” the United States has extended to many of its allies since World War II, puts strain on the credibility underlying nuclear deterrence since it risks annihilation on behalf of allies. Extended deterrence becomes less credible and therefore more likely to fail when the fate of the third party is not vital to the state defending it. Now that its core allies have the latent capability to defend themselves—including with nuclear weapons—the United States should exit unnecessary commitments to extended deterrence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Grand Strategy, Deterrence, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Global Focus

26. Target Taiwan: Challenges for a U.S. intervention

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China could attack Taiwan, attempting a fait accompli before the United States could mobilize sufficient forces in theater to defend it. Chinese advantages of proximity and will suggest that the U.S. would pay a heavy price in this scenario. U.S. ground forces would struggle to enter the combat theater in the relevant time because of uncertainties related to the air and sea campaigns. Attempts to insert U.S. ground forces in peacetime could ignite the very conflict they would intend to deter. Chinese missile, air, and drone assaults could damage U.S. airfields in the region and slow U.S. air support, acutely degrading U.S. maritime operations and Taiwan’s ground defenses. Because U.S. Navy surface forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD systems, combat in a Taiwan scenario would likely be disproportionately borne by the U.S. Navy submarine force. While these submarines could do damage to the Chinese Navy, they probably lack sufficient firepower to affect the overall outcome of a war. Surging forward U.S. air and naval power in a Taiwan scenario would entail incredible risks, including nuclear escalation. Any war or even intensive militarized rivalry between the U.S. and China would entail enormous risks in exchange for little gain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

27. How Russian Coercion Diminished Deterrence and Shifted the Nuclear Balance

Author:
WIlliam Schneider
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For a recent example of the rapidity of change in the international security environment, one should look to the United States’ most recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Though it was released in 2022, nearly all its policy aims and expectations are already out of date. With Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Dan Caine warning last week that he does not believe Russia will stop at Ukraine, and with Russian President Vladimir Putin boasting that his country is the “highest of all nuclear powers,” Washington needs to update its understanding of the new nuclear balance. In its NPR, the Biden administration sought to place “renewed emphasis on arms control [and] nuclear non-proliferation.” Doing so, it believed, would enable the president to “pursue opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons globally, enhance strategic stability with the [People’s Republic of China] and Russia, and reduce the risks of war or escalation during war.” But nuclear weapons are now central to the diplomatic aspirations of four nuclear-armed (or near-nuclear-armed) US adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These increasingly aligned states have signed a series of diplomatic, intelligence, defense-industrial, logistics, and military agreements. Additionally, arms control and nuclear nonproliferation frameworks constructed during the Cold War have ceased to meaningfully constrain Russian nuclear weapons programs. Russia has withdrawn from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which suggests that it will resume nuclear testing and will not extend New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Moreover, emerging doubts about the US commitment to global nuclear deterrence are emboldening Moscow’s nuclear weapons development and deployment aspirations. And Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine signaled a definitive end to the accords concerning Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity: the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements. Most fundamentally, US policy choices since Russia’s invasion have given US allies and adversaries alike reason to believe that nuclear threats are an effective means of deterring the US. The widespread recognition that the US could be deterred from taking actions otherwise in its interest set in motion a sequence of Russian initiatives that have adversely affected the credibility of US nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation aims more broadly.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

28. From umbrella to arsenal: boosting Europe's nuclear deterrence

Author:
Juraj Majcin
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Europe is entering its most dangerous decade since the Cold War. The post-Cold War peace has been shattered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and an escalating campaign of hybrid aggression aimed at destabilising the continent. Military and intelligence leaders are sounding the alarm with growing urgency: within the next three to five years, Russia could be in shape to launch a direct attack on a NATO member, plunging the Alliance into open war. To prevent such a catastrophe, deterrence must remain the bedrock of Europe’s defence strategy. In response to these threats, frontline states along NATO’s eastern and northern flanks have begun unprecedented rearmament efforts. However, deterrence without a nuclear dimension is incomplete—and, in the face of a nuclear-armed adversary, potentially ineffective. Nuclear deterrence has long been central to European security. During the Cold War, it was the US nuclear umbrella, combined with forward-deployed conventional forces, that held the Soviet threat in check. Today, however, cracks are emerging in the transatlantic bond, as the current US administration’s mixed signals on NATO commitments have deepened European anxieties about the reliability of American security guarantees. Even more concerning, Russia has developed and deployed new intermediate-range nuclear missiles on NATO’s doorstep, while intensifying its nuclear sabre-rattling through explicit threats and provocative rhetoric aimed at undermining allied resolve. Against this backdrop, Europe must confront a pressing question: how can it strengthen its own nuclear arsenal to ensure a credible deterrent against Russia—with or without the backing of the US umbrella?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and France

29. Attacking Iran's Nuclear Program: The Complex Calculus of Preventive Action

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Should a negotiated deal prove elusive, policymakers will need to consider how to define a successful strike, Iran’s potential responses, and whether a strategy of prevention can be sustained. ran’s nuclear program is one of the most pressing foreign policy challenges facing the Trump administration. While the president has expressed his preference for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, many Israeli officials believe that Iran’s current weakness provides a unique opportunity to destroy or at least set back its nuclear program through a military strike. Should a negotiated deal prove elusive, policymakers will need to weigh the pros and cons of military action and answer several questions, including: How does one define a successful strike? What challenges need to be addressed in planning a campaign to destroy or degrade Iran’s nuclear weapons program? How sustainable is a strategy of prevention? And how might Iran respond to such a campaign? In this Policy Note, military expert Michael Eisenstadt explains that a preventive attack likely won’t be a one-off but rather the opening round of a lengthy campaign employing military strikes, covert action, and other elements of national power. Such a campaign, he writes, could presage either a more stable order for the region or a new, danger­ous phase in one of its most volatile conflicts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Energy, Regional Security, and Preventive Measures
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

30. Russia Transitions to Nuclear Intimidation

Author:
Arseny Sivitsky and Alexander Taranov
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Since the launch of Moscow’s large-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, Russia has consistently escalated its nuclear posture from a predominantly defensive deterrence model toward offensive nuclear deterrence and intimidation. Russian offensive nuclear deterrence goes beyond signaling and prescribes demonstrative, selective, or limited nuclear strikes against selected critical facilities to instill fear among Western countries of large-scale and potentially uncontrolled nuclear escalation. Predeployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and strategic offensive systems in Belarus, updates to the 2024 Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence, and preparations to resume nuclear testing manifest and support a practical transition to this concept. The Kremlin’s preparations to resume nuclear testing were intended to reinforce the credibility of Russian nuclear threats and technically prepare for the potential nuclear weapons use in combat conditions.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Intimidation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

31. The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine

Author:
Nicholas L. Miller
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In the context of deep changes to the international security environment, especially the war in Ukraine, the risks of nuclear proliferation seem quite high, especially in the Middle East and East Asia. Four categories of factors have been identified that might trigger an escalation. Firstly, changes in the international security environment, including heightened competition among major powers, could increase pressure for proliferation in regions like Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Secondly, the declining ability of the United States to enforce non-proliferation regimes may lead allies to seek nuclear capabilities due to concerns over U.S. reliability. Thirdly, failures by nuclear powers to uphold disarmament commitments and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could undermine non-proliferation norms. Lastly, the war in Ukraine highlights the potential use of nuclear threats in conflicts, reinforcing the perception of nuclear weapons as crucial for national security. While there are reasons to anticipate growing proliferation risks, historical precedent suggests that these risks can be managed. Concerns over U.S. reliability and disarmament failures have been addressed through coercion and reassurance in the past. Additionally, the impact of conventional wars supported by nuclear deterrence has been contained. While some risk factors are novel, such as the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, their decisive impact remains uncertain. The implications for the Middle East and East Asia vary. Allies like Japan and South Korea may be convinced to remain non-nuclear due to U.S. security assurances, while adversaries like Iran could be incentivized to pursue nuclear capabilities amid declining effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it may pressure Saudi Arabia to follow suit, potentially leading to regional proliferation dynamics. Thus, great powers and the international community need to step in to manage proliferation triggers by maintaining a focus on nonproliferation in their statecraft.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

32. Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment

Author:
Gregory Weaver and Amy Woolf
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
After decades of seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the United States is now grappling with a global landscape marked by intense strategic competition and the growing salience of nuclear weapons—problems that will likely persist for years to come. Over the past year, Russia compounded its aggression in Ukraine with nuclear saber-rattling, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces over the past decade. Furthermore, Russia’s possession of a substantial inventory of theater nuclear weapons continues to threaten regional deterrence. Meanwhile, in Asia, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented surge in its nuclear capabilities. If current trends persist, China is projected to possess about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.1 While China was once viewed as a secondary nuclear power, its substantial investment in its nuclear arsenal—including the launch of a third ballistic missile early-warning satellite in 2022 and advancements in land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, submarines, and hypersonic missiles—positions China to become a near-equal nuclear power in the coming decade. These trends mark a historic shift. For the first time in its history, the United States must face two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously. At the same time, Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the New START agreement in 2023 has significantly weakened the last strategic arms control framework established in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This move leaves scant provisions governing the future of nuclear capabilities among the United States and its adversaries. For over half a century, Washington and Moscow negotiated to establish treaties that imposed limits on their nuclear arsenals, aiming to manage their nuclear rivalry and mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict. This process served the national security interests of both sides by curbing weapons and activities that could jeopardize deterrence, safeguarding strategic stability, offering insights into nuclear capacities, and potentially steering military competition toward less perilous avenues. However, shifts in the global security landscape have altered this calculus. The Russian Federation, much like the Soviet Union before it, has insisted that future agreements factor in the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France. On the other hand, the United States now confronts a security environment featuring two nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia and China—whose forces will potentially pose significant threats to the United States and its allies. This evolving security landscape may prompt the United States to reevaluate its assessments of its deterrence and arms control requirements. But how should the United States approach this problem?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

33. Tailored Deterrence Strategy on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Gary Samore
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, the most significant change in the international strategic environment has been the reemergence of a great power rivalry between the U.S. and its European and Asian allies on one hand and Russia and China on the other. This trend began in the second term of President Obama, with the Russian invasion of Crimea in early 2014 and the Chinese construction of a network of military bases in the South China Sea beginning around 2013. Since then, the trend has sharpened. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has locked the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies against Russia in a long-term struggle for the survival of Ukraine and future of European security. In Asia, tensions between Beijing and Washington have become worse, as both the Trump and Biden admіnistrations pursued economic measures against China, and as China appears to be building military options to unify Taiwan and the mainland by force. The reemergence of great power rivalry has important nuclear dimensions, increasing concerns about “strategic stability” – the nuclear balance among the great powers – and the risk of nuclear conflict. The Ukraine war has lowered the nuclear threshold. Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons to discourage NATO intervention or assistance to Ukraine. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) - the last remaining arms control treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals - expires in February 2026, and Russia has refused U.S. offers to negotiate a new treaty as long as the U.S. is assisting Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia continues to develop an array of exotic nuclear delivery systеms intended to overcome U.S. missile defenses, including hypersonic reentry vehicles, nuclear-armed submarine drones, and nuclear anti-satellite weapons. China is pursuing an unprecedented nuclear build-up, including new strategic bombers, more advanced nuclear-armed submarines, and three new missile bases with more than 300 silos for solid fuel ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles. According to U.S. Department of Defense estimates, China has more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023 and will “probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030” (U.S. Department of Defense 2023a). Like Russia, China is also pursuing hypersonic reentry vehicles, anti-satellite weapons, and strategic cyber operations. Some analysts fear that China’s nuclear build-up will make it more confident that it can deter U.S. intervention in the face of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or increase the risk that a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan will escalate to nuclear use. To address the reemergence of great power threats, the U.S. has introduced the concepts of “tailored deterrence” and “integrated deterrence” into its nuclear doctrine. According to the Trump admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review, released in February 2018, The United States will apply a tailored and flexible approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. Tailored deterrence strategies communicate to different potential adversaries that their aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs according to their particular calculations of risk and cost (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018). The tailored deterrence concept was also adopted by the Biden admіnistration in its October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, saying, Central to U.S. deterrence strategy is the credibility of our nuclear forces to hold at risk what adversary leadership values most. Effectively deterring – and restoring deterrence if necessary – requires tailored strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best understanding of their decision-making and perceptions (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022). Building on the concept of tailored deterrence, the Biden admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) also introduced the concept of “integrated deterrence,” which is based on the idea that traditional nuclear deterrence can be reinforced by non-nuclear capabilities. According to the NPR, The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans. Non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed. A pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence will seek to determine how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent (Ibid.).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

34. Constraining Iran’s Nuclear Potential in the Absence of the JCPOA

Author:
Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Since 2019, Iran has significantly expanded its sensitive nuclear activities, which has irreversibly altered the pathways available to Iran if the decision were made to develop nuclear weapons. The proliferation risk posed by Iran’s nuclear advances is amplified by the monitoring gaps that Tehran created by reducing IAEA access and monitoring. Iranian officials have long denied any interest in nuclear weapons but there are new signs that Iran may rethink the prohibition on nuclear weapons if security conditions change. Iran’s technical expertise cannot be reversed, and its nuclear infrastructure is less vulnerable to attack. As a result, military strikes against Iran would set back the program, but only temporarily, and risk driving Tehran to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran has signaled its willingness to de-escalate tensions, including on its nuclear program. Leaders in Washington should seize this opportunity to incentivize Tehran to take steps that increase monitoring of its nuclear program and reduce proliferation risk. The experience of the 2015 nuclear deal demonstrated the limitations of transactional bargaining. The regional nuclear environment also has shifted since 2015 and there is an increased risk that additional states will seek to match Iran’s capabilities. The United States should be thinking now about alternative frameworks for negotiating a longer-term nuclear deal, or series of deals, that take into account Iran’s nuclear advances and mitigate regional proliferation risks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, JCPOA, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

35. Inside the ICBM Lobby: Special Interests or the Public Interest?

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The nuclear weapons lobby is one of the most powerful forces in the military industrial complex. 1 The lobby’s current priority is advocating for the $315 billion Sentinel program to build a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The program has faced controversy over both its utility and its cost, including a cost increase of a whopping 81 percent since 2020. The key champions of the Sentinel program are the Senators from Montana, North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming — states that are home to major ICBM bases or host major work on the Sentinel program. The group — known as the Senate ICBM Coalition — stresses the Sentinel’s purported role in strengthening nuclear deterrence as well as its creation of jobs in the states they represent. However, other members of Congress and ex–defense officials have raised urgent concerns about the Sentinel program, questioning the deterrence rationale that undergirds it and raising the alarm over the risk of accidental nuclear usage. Despite claims about Sentinel’s economic benefits, it remains unclear how many jobs the program will actually create. Weapons contractors — led by the Sentinel’s prime contractor, Northrop Grumman — play a central role in the ICBM lobby. Since 2018, members of the strategic forces subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have received $3.8 million from the 11 major Sentinel contractors. In total, ICBM contractors have donated $87 million to members of Congress in the last four election cycles alone. Contractors’ influence efforts are aided by the fact that senior government officials and members of Congress often secure jobs in the arms industry when they leave government; this provides them the opportunity to lobby former colleagues. In all, the 11 ICBM contractors have spent $226 million on lobbying in the past four election cycles. They currently employ 275 lobbyists, the vast majority of whom have passed through the revolving door from influential positions in government. The Sentinel program should be scrutinized as part of a larger reassessment of U.S. nuclear policy. The 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States endorses the program and calls for a comprehensive nuclear weapons build-up, including the possible placement of multiple nuclear warheads on ICBMs — a highly aggressive strategic posture that has not been in place since the Cold War. A high number of Commission members have ties to the nuclear weapons industry, including its co–chair Jon Kyl, who was once a lobbyist for Sentinel prime contractor Northrop Grumman. Congress must weigh the dubious benefits of the Commission’s proposals against the significant risks and costs its recommendations would entail if carried out.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Grand Strategy, Military-Industrial Complex, Militarism, and Sentinel Program
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

36. NATO as a nuclear alliance : NATO’s nuclear capability and its evolution in the international nuclear order

Author:
Tapio Juntunen, Jyri Lavikainen, Matti Pesu, and Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Finland’s entry into NATO marked admission to a nuclear alliance. The aim of this report is to provide an overview of the structure and trends of the international nuclear order, the basics of NATO’s nuclear deterrence and its implementation, and decision-making related to the alliance’s nuclear weapons policy. The study will also assess how Finland can participate in NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy if it so wishes and what effects NATO membership will have on Finland’s arms control policy. Nuclear deterrence constitutes one part of NATO’s deterrence mix, and the alliance views nuclear weapons as the supreme guarantee of its security. U.S. nuclear weapons form the backbone of NATO’s nuclear deterrence, and a small proportion of its nuclear weapons are stationed in allied countries. According to NATO’s statements, the purpose of its nuclear deterrence is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter military aggression. NATO has not made any major changes in its nuclear weapons policy in recent years. The key outlines of NATO’s nuclear weapons policy are decided at NATO summits. The alliance has its own senior body for discussion on nuclear weapons: the Nuclear Planning Group. Non-nuclear allies such as Finland have several opportunities to influence and participate in the alliance’s nuclear weapons policy. Importantly, as a member of NATO, Finland can continue its active arms control efforts.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, Deterrence, and International Order
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

37. China as the second nuclear peer of the United States: Implications for deterrence in Europe

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
China’s nuclear build-up will make it a nuclear peer adversary of the United States in the 2030s. The US will have to deter both Russia and China, as well as other regional adversaries, with forces geared to engage in one major war at a time. If two major wars occur either simultaneously or sequentially, US military capability will be put under great stress. In the event of a second war, the US may find itself in a situation of conventional military inferiority, which it might have to compensate for with greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Since the US remains the ultimate guarantor of European security, its deterrence challenges elsewhere affect European security as well. Thus, even the possibility of war in the Indo-Pacific is a European security issue. European NATO allies can help mitigate the two-peer problem by permanently taking on a greater share of the burden of Europe’s conventional defence. At the same time, the effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear capability must be enhanced. A strategic defeat for Russia in the war in Ukraine would postpone Russia’s ability to pose a military threat to Europe. Ukraine’s NATO membership would further serve to reduce the threat of another major war in Europe.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

38. Strengthening the Political Credibility of NATO Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
Wannes Verstraete
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Due to Russian nuclear signaling during its war against Ukraine, there is renewed interest in strengthening nuclear deterrence in a Euro-Atlantic context. The changes in the agreed language in the new North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Strategic Concept, adopted on 29 June 2022 at the summit in Madrid, and the Vilnius Summit Communiqué from 11 June 2023, are examples of this interest. Subsequently, this policy brief focuses on one aspect of strengthening NATO’s extended nuclear deterrence (END), namely how can NATO adapt its nuclear policy and posture to mitigate the uncertainties related to the political credibility challenge of extended nuclear deterrence? Questions regarding the political will to use nuclear weapons by the guarantor to protect and reassure allies in an END relationship is a well-known evergreen that reappears from time to time. Therefore, the author argues that NATO should address this political credibility challenge by strengthening the role of European allies in the nuclear strategy of the Alliance.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

39. Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons in Military Alliances

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the role of nuclear weapons in military alliances, focusing on the perspectives of the so-called umbrella states—that is, allied states that do not have their own nuclear weapons but are part of the ‘extended nuclear deterrence arrangements’ of a nuclear-armed patron. After analysing allied security thinking and highlighting the underlying assumptions about nuclear deterrence, the paper subjects some of those assumptions to critical scrutiny. Taking into account regional military balances and escalation risks related to nuclear deterrence, it challenges the perceived security benefits of forward-deployed non-strategic weapons, continued support for allied nuclear doctrines based on readiness for the first use of nuclear weapons, and the assumed inevitability of nuclear second strike that underlies the practices of nuclear assurance. The goal is to open discussion on the development of a more measured approach to deterrence that would allow for minimizing the role of nuclear weapons in military alliances.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

40. The Nuclear Iran “Concept” Is Already Here: Time Is Short to Prevent Israel’s—and America’s—Next Calamitous Intelligence Failure

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Groupthink and unchallenged false assumptions about enemy capabilities and decision-making led to the disasters of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 2023 Hamas-led terrorist invasion of Israel. The lessons of these failures demand that Israel’s political and military leadership and their American counterparts immediately reconsider their assumptions about the Iranian nuclear threat to avoid an even costlier miscalculation.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, October 7, and 1973 War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine