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1. Prospects and Problems for Reinvigorating Superpower Nuclear Cooperation

Author:
Ariel Petrovics
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A three-way nuclear arms race between the United States, China, and Russia looms — an escalation that would erode global nonproliferation and usher in an era of unchecked nuclear proliferation. This brief offers a path to preventing this destabilizing outcome through pragmatic nuclear cooperation — an approach that has strong historical precedent and accords with the strategic interests of all three nuclear superpowers. Superpower cooperation historically underpinned the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, but increasing great power competition erodes this entire system of international security. China and Russia have each modernized and expanded their nuclear programs and adopted more aggressive nuclear postures. The United States, in turn, has approved a nearly $2 trillion nuclear modernization program. This burgeoning arms race heightens risks of inadvertent escalation, as each of the superpowers become increasingly reliant on nuclear brinkmanship to hold off the growing capabilities of their adversaries. The deteriorating nuclear security environment places pressure on other states to similarly seek their own nuclear arsenals while weakening the nonproliferation tool kit that previously prevented these states from breaking out. As more armed states join the fray, they in turn multiply the number of potential nuclear flashpoints around the world. Reinvesting in superpower cooperation on nuclear security is not an idealistic bid for goodwill. Rather, halting unchecked competition is a pragmatic strategy that serves the interests of the United States, Russia, and China. It preserves a global nuclear system that has safeguarded the superpowers’ dominance for decades. Weakening it, on the other hand, undermines the international marketplace that has preserved U.S. dominance in private industry and innovation. Russia and China, in turn, risk a multifront nuclear competition, as proximate U.S. allies choose uncontrolled independent arsenals over existing security umbrellas. The superpowers can still step back from the abyss by reviving nuclear cooperation. Toward that objective, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Accept Russia’s offer to extend New START for a year, paired with verification pathways and transparency measures. Reinvigorate existing direct lines of communication (i.e., hotline systems) with both Russia and China. Initiate trilateral nuclear discussions with Russia and China toward the goal of capping arsenals at parity on specific warheads and delivery systems.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

2. Shipment of a Controlled Vacuum Furnace to North Korea via Multiple States: An HS Code Case Study

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In tracking trade data and trade flows, Harmonized System (HS) codes are routinely used to aid searches for dual-use commodities and to help guide the identification of dual-use items that require a license or greater scrutiny. A recurring concern is shipper falsification of HS codes to evade detection or payment of duties. An illustration of such falsifications is a case we learned about via government sources from around 2022 that involved North Korea and a dual-use vacuum furnace suitable for uranium melting that wound its way from Spain to North Korea, via Mexico, South Africa, and China. Such a furnace is typically controlled under the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) Part 2 list and is banned for export to North Korea under United Security Council resolutions. This type of furnace is a mainstay of a nuclear weapons program, particularly one that uses weapon-grade uranium as the nuclear explosive material, as North Korea is known to do. With North Korea expanding its uranium enrichment program and producing greater quantities of weapon-grade uranium, this new furnace would be especially important.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Trade, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

3. Can France Provide European Allies with Nuclear Deterrence?

Author:
Roberto Zadra
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In his speech to fellow citizens on 5 March, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the opening of a “strategic debate on the protection of our allies on the European continent by our (nuclear) deterrent”.[1] It is not the first time: already in the 1990s then-president François Mitterrand alluded to a vocation européenne of French nuclear deterrence.[2] Macron himself proposed, already in February 2020, the opening of a dialogue on the matter.[3] The initiative was not very successful at the time, essentially because European allies considered the security guarantees provided by the United States to Europe through NATO sufficient, together with the repeated reassurances of NATO communiqués that the British and French nuclear forces “have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance”.[4] This time, however, the reactions by many European allied countries to the French initiative will probably be different. For a simple reason: excluding the deployment of its own forces to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire and denying security guarantees to Kyiv, the Trump administration fuels the fears of European allies that Washington’s commitment to collective defence is less solid than in the past. Indeed, the Ukraine crisis has shown the limitations of the traditional NATO distinction between Article 5 and non-Article 5 – that is, between those who are members of NATO and therefore protected by collective defence, and those who are not because collective defence is not valid for NATO partners – as it has laid bare how crisis management and cooperative security are having a direct impact on (the perceived lack of US commitment to) collective defence in Europe.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and France

4. Political and Legal Foundations of Russia’s Strategic Planning in the Field of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Tatyana Kashirina
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
RUSSIA’S official position on nuclear deterrence is outlined in several strategic planning documents concerning national security and defense. The deterioration of the international situation, worsening Russian- American and Russian-European relations, and the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2013-2014 prompted Moscow to revise its Military Doctrine in 2014. This document places significant emphasis on the increased activity of military forces unfriendly to Russia and foreign nations operating in territories adjacent to the Russian Federation and its allies. Among the key external military dangers are threats to global stability (which is primarily based on the possession of nuclear weapons) and regional stability through the development and deployment of strategic missile defense systems that disrupt the established balance of power in the nuclear missile domain. Other threats include the implementation of the “global strike” concept, intentions to deploy weapons in space, the proliferation of high-precision nonnuclear strategic systems, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and missile technologies.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Deterrence, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

5. Hermeneutics and Psychology of Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
Vasily Belozyorov
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
RECENT developments surrounding Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy have sparked widespread reactions in Russia and abroad, ranging from belligerent and aggressive to eschatological and apocalyptic. On November 19, 2024, official guidelines were unveiled in the updated document titled Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence1 (hereinafter referred to as the Fundamentals). Several factors compelled Russia to revise its approaches to nuclear deterrence policy: the erosion of strategic stability, provocations and nuclear blackmail by Ukraine, and Western encouragement of the latter’s irresponsible and reckless leadership. The increasingly adversarial nature of global relations has brought the international system to the brink of large-scale war. The release of this new doctrinal policy provides a critical opportunity to analyze various aspects of Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Communications, Deterrence, Hermeneutics, Russia-Ukraine War, Perception, and Intimidation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

6. Hypersonic Myths and Strategic Realities

Author:
Mihai Giboi
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
After decades of deterrence preventing nuclear war, hypersonic weapons appear poised to undermine strategic stability due to their speed, manoeuvrability, and potential ability to defeat missile defences. Because of their technological characteristics, Canadian and American discourse largely conclude that they will pose challenges to the international security environment, especially nuclear deterrence. However, the literature’s technical lens provides exaggerated threat assessments that assert hypersonics could disrupt the strategic nuclear balance, without acknowledging the risk of retaliation. Consequently, this paper counters these claims by drawing from Thomas Schelling’s emphasis on mutual vulnerability, and Kenneth Waltz’s insights about counterforce limitations, to demonstrate that hypersonic weapons cannot undermine strategic stability because they are subject to the same constraints that discourage a nuclear attack. It also argues that attacking command-and-control is more dangerous than attempting a counterforce strike, since it does not attempt to physically neutralize a second-strike capability.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Deterrence, and Hypersonic Weapons
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

7. Forecasting Nuclear Escalation Risks: Cloudy With a Chance of Fallout

Author:
Jamie Kwong, Anna Bartoux, and James M. Acton
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Forecasting—that is, estimating the probability of specified events’ occurring—can contribute to efforts to better understand and address the challenge of managing escalation.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Forecast, Escalation, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

8. Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition

Author:
George Perkovich, Fumihiko Yoshida, and Michiru Nishida
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Preventing nuclear war and other existential military threats requires nations today to focus more on politics than on the qualities or quantities of weapons. Yet, many participants in nuclear policy debates do the opposite.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

9. La Intersección entre Inteligencia Artificial y Armas Nucleares: Riesgos, Beneficios y Recomendaciones

Author:
Manuel Herrera
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Las innovaciones tecnológicas han sido clave en la evolución de la defensa militar, permitiendo a los Estados obtener ventajas estratégicas, como ocurrió en 1945 con la bomba atómica. Actualmente, la inteligencia artificial (IA) impulsa una revolución similar. Aunque su uso principal es civil y empresarial, varios países la están integrando en sus capacidades militares para ganar superioridad estratégica. La IA ya se emplea con éxito en drones y análisis de macrodatos, pero también comienza a aplicarse en sistemas de armamento nuclear, lo que podría tener consecuencias imprevisibles. Este artículo examina el impacto de la IA en las armas nucleares, centrándose en los sistemas de mando y control, y sus implicaciones para el equilibrio estratégico global. Se define la IA, se analiza su uso histórico en la Guerra Fría por Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética, y se evalúan sus aplicaciones actuales. Finalmente, se proponen recomendaciones para mitigar riesgos asociados a su integración en el ámbito nuclear.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and Machine Learning
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. Averting AI Armageddon: U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In recent years, the previous bipolar nuclear order led by the United States and Russia has given way to a more volatile tripolar one, as China has quantitatively and qualitatively built up its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, there have been significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. As a result of these two trends, understanding the AI-nuclear nexus in the context of U.S.-China-Russia geopolitical competition is increasingly urgent. There are various military use cases for AI, including classification models, analytic and predictive models, generative AI, and autonomy. Given that variety, it is necessary to examine the AI-nuclear nexus across three broad categories: nuclear command, control, and communications; structural elements of the nuclear balance; and entanglement of AI-enabled conventional systems with nuclear risks. While each of these categories has the potential to generate risk, this report argues that the degree of risk posed by a particular case depends on three major factors: the role of humans, the degree to which AI systems become a single point of failure, and the AI offense-defense balance. As Russia and China increasingly aim to modernize their nuclear arsenals and integrate AI into their militaries, it is essential for policymakers to be aware of the risks posed by the AI-nuclear nexus. Dealing with China and Russia on issues at this nexus is likely to be difficult in the current diplomatic and military context, characterized by increasingly strained bilateral relationships between the United States and both China and Russia, along with an uptick in coordination between Beijing and Moscow. Nonetheless, there are still various steps that U.S. policymakers could take to bolster deterrence and stability with respect to these issues. These include: building knowledge and competency around issues at the AI-nuclear nexus; integrating AI into diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear and other strategic risks, and vice versa; establishing and promoting norms for the safe use of AI in relation to nuclear arsenals and other strategic capabilities; developing policy and technical criteria for assessing exactly how and when to keep humans in the loop on all nuclear-related processes; including AI technologies as a factor in oversight and reviews of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; investing in AI-enabled cyber and space capabilities to enhance defense and resilience, reduce incentives to attack those areas, and mitigate entanglement risks; consulting closely with U.S. allies about how AI will shape extended deterrence calculations related to both nuclear and conventional capabilities; and pursuing a comprehensive set of risk reduction and crisis management mechanisms with China and Russia while recognizing the obstacles to progress. Failing to take these steps could leave the country and the world dangerously exposed to risks and ill-prepared to seize any opportunities arising from the increasingly salient AI-nuclear nexus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

11. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

12. 30 years of the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons: eppur si muove

Author:
Lucas Carlos Lima
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons remains a pivotal reference in international law and disarmament debates. While the Opinion did not categorically prohibit nuclear weapons, its reasoning has been widely cited in legal and diplomatic arenas. This study examines the Opinion’s long-term influence through three key elements: its incorporation into state practice, its role in international litigation, and its impact on the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Employing a methodology centered on primary sources, this research evaluates the Opinion’s relevance in shaping international legal norms and assesses whether it still accurately reflects the state of international law on nuclear disarmament.
Topic:
International Law, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. North Korea, Russia, and China: Past Cooperation & Future Prospects

Author:
Sydney Seiler
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Syd Seiler argues that recent developments in the relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia should be examined within the context of past interactions and North Korea’s geopolitical reality over the past several decades. North Korea’s pursuit of a distanced approach toward China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its post-Cold War management of the bilateral relationships while developing nuclear weapons, and contemporary developments within the North Korea-China-Russia triangle highlight limited shared interests and few signs of deliberate trilateralism. Despite skepticism regarding the durability of trilateralism, Seiler warns against neglecting the threat of collaboration and cooperation among the three countries. In particular, the evolving relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia holds the potential to harm the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and embolden North Korea to believe that the use of force might be justified within the New Cold War structure. Seiler outlines three scenarios in which the evolution of trilateralism could lead to North Korea employing military force on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the critical role of China and Russia in either restraining or encouraging North Korean revisionism. To properly respond to the dangerous transformation of the geopolitical environment, Seiler recommends the United States, South Korea, and like-minded states reinforce conventional and extended deterrence by convincing China and Russia that they will incur high costs for enabling North Korea’s coercive and revisionist behavior.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and North Korea

14. The imperative of augmenting US theater nuclear forces

Author:
Greg Weaver
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States and its allies and partners face an impending change in the threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries: a strategic environment marked by two nuclear peer major powers. Russia, long a nuclear peer of the United States, will likely emerge from the war in Ukraine—regardless of how it ends—even more reliant on its nuclear forces, which are already the largest in the world. Meanwhile, China is undertaking the largest nuclear force buildup since the Cold War. That buildup will increase the size of Beijing’s nuclear forces by roughly seven and a half times since 2018, positioning China as a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035.1 Meanwhile, North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal. Although the North Korean threat has been somewhat constrained by the quality of its ballistic missile systems—particularly its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—technical assistance from Russia, in exchange for Kim Jong Un’s material support for the war in Ukraine, could rapidly enhance North Korean capabilities. Finally, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East could prompt Iran to choose to acquire its own nuclear arsenal, presenting a wholly new challenge. A pair of recent analyses of the strategic impact of this two-nuclear-peer environment have sounded an alarm, making clear that this environment poses a qualitatively and quantitatively new threat of adversary aggression and the potential for nuclear war.2 Conducted by bipartisan teams of former senior US officials and other nuclear experts, both analyses concluded—in the words of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (hereafter referred to as the Strategic Posture Commission)—that the planned US nuclear force “is absolutely essential, although not sufficient [emphasis added] to meet the new threats posed by Russia and China.”3 Both reports emphasized the urgent need to enhance US theater nuclear forces to address the most likely path to large-scale nuclear war: the failure to deter or counter limited adversary nuclear use in an ongoing conventional conflict. Finally, both reports laid out a set of attributes that US theater nuclear force enhancements must possess to effectively address the threat of limited nuclear escalation. However, these reports did not examine in depth the deterrence and warfighting implications of alternative new US theater nuclear systems. This paper examines why the two-nuclear-peer threat makes the enhancement of US theater nuclear forces an urgent imperative. It explains why the planned US strategic and theater nuclear forces are insufficient to address this threat. The paper then presents a more detailed set of political-military and operational attributes that enhanced US theater nuclear forces must possess to effectively counter the threat. Using these attributes, it evaluates the relative deterrence and warfighting value of various potential alternative theater-range nuclear weapon systems. The paper concludes with a recommended future US theater nuclear force structure and posture, specifically, that the United States should field a theater nuclear force that combines an effectively dispersible dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) force in Europe with nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-Ns) deployed day-to-day on attack submarines (SSNs) in Europe and Asia and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM-Ns) and/or ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM-Ns) continuously deployed in Europe and/or Asia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

15. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?

Author:
Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

16. Nuclear NATO: How to make it credible and efficient

Author:
Karl-Heinz Kamp
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s nuclear deterrence is not suffi ciently prepared for the evolving strategic environment in Europe and beyond. The current Strategic Concept does not defi ne which steps are needed to maintain nuclear deterrence’s eff ectiveness and credibility. To adapt nuclear deterrence to today’s requirements, NATO must fi rst and foremost agree on a new nuclear strategy document.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe

17. Brazil and the TPNW: Brazilian Interests and the Promotion of the Norm of Nuclear Prohibition

Author:
Luiza Elena Januário and Raquel Gontijo
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contexto Internacional
Institution:
Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) formalises the norm of nuclear prohibition and is presented as a way to fill a gap regarding nuclear disarmament. Brazil played a leading role in the negotiation of this treaty, in line with its historical advocacy for disarmament. This article aims to analyse the foundations of the Brazilian position, guided by the following question: Can Brazil be considered a norm entrepreneur in favour of the prohibition of nuclear weapons? We hypothesise that Brazil has not truly solidified its role as a normative entrepreneur, exhibiting an ambiguous stance. We begin the article with a discussion of the contributions of norm constructivism. Next, we present some elements of the nuclear normative order. Finally, we analyse Brazil’s posture regarding TPNW and the norm of nuclear prohibition. We provide a historical reconstruction of Brazil’s position, situating it in the context of the norm cluster around nuclear weapons. Despite being vocal in advocating for disarmament, we conclude that Brazil has not fully established itself as a norm entrepreneur in promoting the norm of nuclear prohibition and presents an ambiguous stance due to its weak adherence to humanitarian motivation as the foundation of this norm.
Topic:
Disarmament, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), Nuclear Weapons, and Norms
Political Geography:
Brazil and South America

18. On Limited Nuclear Use in the Western Pacific

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Introduction Would China or the United States use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan? If so, what would that look like in practice? This paper examines that dark prospect. It unfolds as a series of queries designed to highlight the key factors that could influence limited nuclear use in a war in the Western Pacific. Firm answers to these questions are not always forthcoming. The exact decision-making calculations related to nuclear employment—from both the Chinese and U.S. side—are impossible to state definitively in advance of the actual moment when such weapons might be utilized. Rather, the paper’s intent is to provide the reader insight into the issues that come into play when debating nuclear use in a Taiwan contingency. The goal is less hard answers and more a basis for further conversation. Examining nuclear use in the Western Pacific obviously should not be conflated with endorsing it. But avoiding nuclear employment in practice might hinge, in part, on better understanding the circumstances where it could come into play in advance. At a minimum, realistic examinations of nuclear use in the Western Pacific can further raise awareness of the escalation risks in any conflict over Taiwan.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Armed Conflict, Escalation, and Firms
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

19. Nuclear Weapons In Space: Orbital Bombardment and Strategic Stability

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
In 2015, a new space race began. Blue Origin, a privately owned company, landed a booster on a launch pad back on earth, after lifting an object 100 kilometers into the atmosphere. SpaceX quickly followed suit, landing its own Falcon booster back on a pad for use again for later space flight. The dramatic drop in the cost of space launch has revolutionized how humans now use space. SpaceX now operates thousands of satellites in large constellations and a bevy of private companies have hundreds of privately owned satellites now circling the globe taking images of every surface of the planet. Ukrainian soldiers, fighting against the Russian army, use satellite internet to coordinate fires and fly small drones over the front lines. In response to this revolution in space, American adversaries have invested in the tools to hold these satellites at risk. Russia is reportedly experimenting with a nuclear-armed co-orbital satellite, a program that has links back to the early days of the Cold War. China has invested in anti-satellite weapons and, in yet another throwback to Soviet Cold War behavior, invested in an orbital bombardment system to overcome any future deployment of space-based missile defenses. The United States is in an advantageous position. Its space private sector has no true competitor. The dramatic decrease in the cost of space launch has made space-based missile defense more feasible than ever before. However, the moves by U.S. adversaries to hold at risk U.S. assets in space require new thinking about how to protect those same assets, deter the use of nuclear weapons to target large constellations, and to defend against the novel ways adversaries are now experimenting with to defeat space-based missile defense. The U.S. should consider how to repurpose current missile defense interceptors to hold any Russian co-orbital satellites at risk, make explicit that any nuclear attack on U.S. origin satellites would invite retaliation, continue to invest in sensors to detect missile launch from adversary nations (including those fired south to travel over the South Pole), and to be the insurer of last resort for private satellites that could be destroyed by a hostile act.
Topic:
National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
North America, United States of America, China, and Russia

20. Impact of Military Artificial Intelligence on Nuclear Escalation Risk

Author:
Vladislav Chernavskikh and Jules Palayer
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Increasing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into military systems has the potential to influence nuclear escalation even when that integration occurs outside nuclear weapon systems. Non-nuclear applications of military AI may compress decision-making timelines, potentially increasing miscalculation risks during a crisis. Opaque recommendations from an AI-powered decision-support system can bias a decision maker towards acting, while autonomy in a system with counterforce potential may undermine strategic stability by threatening the integrity of second-strike capabilities. Such uses of AI raise the fundamental question of whether they introduce new risks, exacerbate existing ones or fundamentally alter the nature of nuclear escalation. Contextual and socio-technical factors that might affect nuclear escalation pathways can help to answer this question. Understanding these dynamics is essential for using current risk-reduction measures or developing new strategies to address nuclear escalation risks posed by military AI.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Artificial Intelligence, Military, Armament, and Nuclear Security
Political Geography:
Global Focus