Topic: Nuclear Power - CIAO Search Results

1. Constraining Iran’s Nuclear Potential in the Absence of the JCPOA

Author:: Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arms Control Association
Abstract:: Since 2019, Iran has significantly expanded its sensitive nuclear activities, which has irreversibly altered the pathways available to Iran if the decision were made to develop nuclear weapons. The proliferation risk posed by Iran’s nuclear advances is amplified by the monitoring gaps that Tehran created by reducing IAEA access and monitoring. Iranian officials have long denied any interest in nuclear weapons but there are new signs that Iran may rethink the prohibition on nuclear weapons if security conditions change. Iran’s technical expertise cannot be reversed, and its nuclear infrastructure is less vulnerable to attack. As a result, military strikes against Iran would set back the program, but only temporarily, and risk driving Tehran to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran has signaled its willingness to de-escalate tensions, including on its nuclear program. Leaders in Washington should seize this opportunity to incentivize Tehran to take steps that increase monitoring of its nuclear program and reduce proliferation risk. The experience of the 2015 nuclear deal demonstrated the limitations of transactional bargaining. The regional nuclear environment also has shifted since 2015 and there is an increased risk that additional states will seek to match Iran’s capabilities. The United States should be thinking now about alternative frameworks for negotiating a longer-term nuclear deal, or series of deals, that take into account Iran’s nuclear advances and mitigate regional proliferation risks.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, JCPOA, and Monitoring
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

2. Nuclear power plants in war zones: Lessons learned from the war in Ukraine

Author:: Joanna Przybylak
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The aim of this paper is to examine the lessons learned till mid-2023 from the war in Ukraine to find out how attacking or seizing nuclear power plants (NPPs) can be utilised to advance military and political objectives during an armed conflict. The qualitative research approach has been applied to the study, focusing on an analysis of academic research and relevant acts of international law. In order to examine Russia’s approach to the attacks against the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia NPPs, numerous reports, official statements by the authorities, press releases, and Internet sources have been analysed. For evaluation of nuclear security and safety standards in Ukraine, the “seven pillars” model proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency has been adopted. The study indicates that strategically located NPPs can be used as “nuclear shields” for the occupying forces deployed at the plant or nearby. They may also become useful tools of “lawfare” waged with the use of flawed interpretations of international humanitarian law. Finally, nuclear security-related narrations analysed in the paper clearly prove that seized NPPs can be effectively used in information warfare. The research leads to the conclusion that civil NPPs in war zones can be weaponised and exploited by the hostile forces not only for impeding energy supplies (and thus shattering the public morale of the adversary) but also for blackmailing and coercing the decisionmakers of the attacked state and their international allies with a vision of man-made nuclear disaster.
Topic:: Nuclear Power, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Russia-Ukraine War, and Nuclear Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives

Author:: Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Six years ago, NPEC ran a mock execution of a law Congress passed in 1978 but that the Executive refused to implement —Title V of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Title V called on the State and Energy Departments to conduct country-specific analyses of how developing states might best meet their energy needs without nuclear power. It also called for the creation of an energy Peace Corps and an assessment of what our government was spending on energy development aid-related projects. When NPEC started its efforts, the staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked to see what NPEC produced to use it to pressure the Executive finally to implement the law. NPEC commissioned a number of studies on how Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and Taiwan might best meet their energy requirements without nuclear power. The center also contracted studies on the history and intent of Title V and on what government programs were already in play that aligned with Title V‘s stated objectives. As soon as NPEC’s project was completed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff prepared a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking the Secretary finally to implement Title V and file the reports required by law. Then, something unexpected occurred. The committee’s legal counsel discovered that the Secretary was under no obligation to comply: Congress had eliminated Title V’s reporting requirements along with several hundred other Congressionally mandated reports back in 1995. Flummoxed, I quietly set the book manuscript aside. Why, then, release it today? Because it is again timely. In October, the Biden Administration announced it is still considering extending civilian nuclear cooperation with Riyadh that would allow the Kingdom to enrich uranium — a process that can bring states within weeks of acquiring the bomb. Administration officials no longer question if Saudi Arabia really needs nuclear energy to meet its energy requirements. Shouldn’t they? Meanwhile, Taiwan’s presidential election this coming Saturday will, among other things, decide if Taiwan will build more nuclear reactors or not. Again, is new nuclear Taiwan’s best energy bet? As for China, the Pentagon has become increasingly concerned that the two “peaceful” fast breeder reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants Beijing is building will be used to make hundreds of bombs worth of weapons plutonium. One of the two fast breeder reactors is already operating. The question these dangerous nuclear activities raise is just how necessary they are to meet China’s energy requirements. Then, there’s Iran, which is intent on building reactors of Iranian design. It plans on expanding its nuclear power program from roughly one gigawatt electrical capacity to 11. Given Iran’s renewables potential and oil and gas reserves, how much sense does this make? Finally, in its efforts to achieve net zero, the Biden Administration has joined 20 other nations in pledging to triple global nuclear generation by 2050. Again, how practical is this? This volume’s aim is to help provide answers. Of course, in light of how long our government has ignored Title V, demanding it be implemented now would be odd. Creating a clean energy Peace Corps, comparing the costs of different types of energy, and trying to determine what investments would reduce emissions quickest and cheapest, however, all should be discussed. It’s my hope that the release of Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives today might prompt such discussion.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Legislation, Energy, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

4. Starr Forum: Chornobyl to Zaporizhzhia: The Atom and its Impact on Ukraine’s Politics and Security

Author:: Kate Brown and Mariana Budjeryn
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Speakers: Kate Brown is the Thomas M Siebel Distinguished Professor in History of Science at MIT. She is on leave from MIT AY2022-23 and at the Netherland Institute for Advanced Studies. Brown’s research interests illuminate the point where history, science, technology and bio-politics converge to create large-scale disasters and modernist wastelands. She has written four books about topics ranging from population politics, linguistic mapping, the production of nuclear weapons and concomitant utopian communities, the health and environmental consequences of nuclear fallout from the Chernobyl disaster to narrative innovations of history writing in the 21st century.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Nuclear Power, and Chernobyl Disaster
Political Geography:: Ukraine and Eastern Europe

5. The Representation of the Iranian Nuclear Program in the American Media

Author:: Mikail Ugus and Fatma Dogrusozlu
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: This article aims to unfold what sort of ideological representation the Iranian nuclear program has had in two of America's predominant newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post (through their headlines). The study, which sets out for this objective, concentrates on Edward Said's work titled "Orientalism", an exclusive theorist of post-colonial theory. In other words, this article will examine the "Islamic Threat" generally described in the West in conjunction with the theoretical framework of Orientalism and the reflection of the Iranian nuclear program in these two newspapers in terms of controlling it. Consequently, in this media news, the Iranian nuclear program is described as an object that might cause harm at any moment through the discourse of the Islamic enemy. Therefore, it is represented that the subject must control this dangerous object.
Topic:: Nuclear Power, Media, Representation, Orientalism, Edward Said, New York Times, and Washington Post
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

6. Southeast Asia’s Clean Energy Transition: A Role for Nuclear Power?

Author:: David Santoro, Elrika Hamdi, Sabar Md. Hashim, Shwe Yee Oo, and Julius Caesar Trajano
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: To bring clarity on these developments and their implications in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Forum commissioned several Southeast Asian scholars to write analytical papers on the energy transition that is underway in the region, which are compiled in this volume. Each chapter looks at the current and possible future energy landscape of a specific Southeast Asian country and focuses especially on the place and role of nuclear power in it. This “nuclear focus” is important because, for decades, most Southeast Asian countries have expressed on-and-off interest in nuclear power but never brought it online. Interest is now picking up again, especially for SMRs, so if this time one or several Southeast Asian countries successfully went nuclear, it would be a first. It is good timing, therefore, to devote attention to how Southeast Asian countries are thinking about nuclear power in today’s context, for multiple reasons, including those related to safety, security, and safeguards.
Topic:: Climate Change, Nuclear Power, Energy Transition, and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
Political Geography:: Southeast Asia

7. A return to grace for nuclear power in European public opinion? Some elements of a rapid paradigm shift

Author:: Mathieu Brugidou and Jérémy Bouillet
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The health crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic, and perhaps above all the war in Ukraine, together with increasingly outspoken Chinese and/or American interventionism, have largely contributed to "breaking European energy taboos"[1] towards more collective and coordinated approaches. This is undeniable in the field of energy: if certain mechanisms such as the general cap on gas prices have not been adopted, some measures, which were hard to imagine at European level until recently, have now been ratified, such as joint gas purchases, shared objectives for reducing energy demand, the obligation to store energy, etc.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Nuclear Power, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

8. EU-Pacific Talks: Be small and beautiful - future of nuclear energy?

Author:: Petra Pospíšilová
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: This year's third debate in a series of expert discussions on the EU's relations with the Pacific occurred online on Tuesday, 28 March 2023. The guests offered their views on nuclear energy trends, outlook, and small modular reactors' role in energy and industry sectors. Read more about this debate in the report by Petra Pospíšilová.
Topic:: Nuclear Power, European Union, Industry, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia-Pacific

9. Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This article is the first to analyze these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. The Iran Nuclear Deal at Six: Now or Never

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: After all is said and done, the Iran nuclear deal struck in 2015 remains the best way to achieve the West’s non-proliferation goals and the sanctions relief that Tehran seeks. The parties must not squander what is likely their last chance to save the accord.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

11. Small Modular Reactors: The Next Phase for Nuclear Power in the Indo-Pacific?

Author:: Carl Baker, Jor-Shan Choi, Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, Sanjana Gogna, and Victor Nian
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In an effort to understand the rising interest worldwide in so-called “small modular reactors” (SMRs) and their companion “floating nuclear power plants” (FNPPs), the Pacific Forum commissioned three papers on this topic. Written by Victor Nian, the first paper unpacks SMR/FNPP technologies and discusses their applicability in the Indo-Pacific. The second paper, authored by Jor-Shan Choi, examines the safety, security, and safeguards (i.e., the “3S”) considerations associated with SMRs/FNPPs. Finally, penned by Miles Pomper, Ferenc Dalnoki Veress, Dan Zhukov, and Sanjana Gogna, the third paper addresses the potential geopolitical implications of SMR/FNPP deployments in the Indo-Pacific. By looking at these three areas – the technology, the 3S considerations, and geopolitics – the papers seek to provide a comprehensive, albeit preliminary, analysis of the SMR/FNPP question in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
Political Geography:: Indo-Pacific

12. Reviving Nuclear Power: Is the Philippines Ready?

Author:: Julius Caesar Trajano
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: Philippine President Duterte has signed an executive order to include nuclear power in the country’s energy mix. However, there are critical preparatory issues that need to be resolved to enhance the country’s nuclear energy development.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Asia and Philippines

13. Expanding the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology and Climate Change Adaptation: Opportunities and Challenges

Author:: Julius Caesar Trajano
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: While ongoing debates on the critical role of nuclear power plants in achieving the goals established in the 2015 Paris Agreement remain unsettled, the peaceful applications of nuclear technology in climate change adaptation have been expanding in recent years. The peaceful uses of nuclear technology cannot be excluded from innovative approaches to addressing the world’s most pressing and complex challenge─ climate change. This NTS Insight examines how nuclear technology can be deployed to strengthen climate adaptation measures and presents case studies from several Southeast Asian countries that have nuclear research and scientific programmes. Nuclear technology is being utilised in adopting climate-smart agriculture, modernising water management, enhancing greenhouse gas emissions analysis, and combatting plastic pollution. This Insight offers agendas for action by Southeast Asian countries to address key challenges to expanding the role of nuclear technology in addressing climate change.
Topic:: Climate Change, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Asia

14. Small Modular Reactors in the Philippines’ Journey Toward Nuclear Energy

Author:: Julius Caesar Trajano
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The Philippines is seeking nuclear energy partnerships with various countries and allies as it aims to address the twin challenges of achieving energy security and reducing carbon emissions. How can advanced small modular nuclear reactors help the Philippines in its transition to clean energy?
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, Nuclear Power, Nuclear Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Asia and Philippines

15. Nuclear energy in a low-carbon future: Implications for the United States and Japan

Author:: Stephen S. Greene
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Nuclear power has received renewed global interest as a secure source of carbon-free energy. In the context of worsening climate change and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and resultant energy market constrictions, many countries are actively pursuing conventional and advanced nuclear development, while others are canceling or postponing scheduled shutdowns. As climate change continues to impact both energy supply and demand, nuclear energy is poised to play a major role in the reliability of the future clean energy mix. Challenges to nuclear rollout will require solutions. Construction timelines remain extended, as do licensing processes. Social constraints also hinder development prospects. These potential stumbling blocks require steadfast coordination between allies like the United States and Japan, especially as other nuclear energy heavyweights like Russia and China avoid many of those same bottlenecks in their pursuit of domestic buildout and export. Despite those issues, though, nuclear energy is forecasted to play a major role in the later stages of the energy transition, in which countries look to decarbonize the more difficult parts of their economies. The advent of advanced technologies and the completion of large-scale projects portends the arrival of nuclear energy’s reliability and versatility just as the global energy sector needs it.
Topic:: Climate Change, Nuclear Power, Carbon Emissions, and Energy
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. Beijing Makes a Big Long-term Bet on Nuclear Power

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Last fall, China suffered extensive power outages due to a combination of surging electricity demand and tight supply. A confluence of factors contributed to the energy supply shortage, but nearly all traced back to China’s struggle to manage its overdependence on coal for power generation: rising global coal prices; shuttering of old power plants as part of a push to enhance energy efficiency; emission-reduction efforts; an “unofficial” embargo on Australian coal imports due to geopolitical strife between Beijing and Canberra; and disparities in government price controls (power plants must purchase coal at market rates, but consumer prices are set in a narrow band) that incentivized plants to cease or slow operations rather than produce electricity at a financial loss (Caixin, October 12, 2021; Zaobao, July 14). In 2022, China has avoided a replay of last year’s energy crunch despite the supply shocks in the energy markets induced by the Ukraine conflict by increasing domestic coal production, exploiting the opportunity to import Russian oil and coal at discounted rates and continuing to steadily increase its renewable energy capacity. Boosting domestic coal production has been particularly essential to meet demand. This month, the National Energy Administration (NEA) reported that during the second quarter, China’s raw coal output rose 10 percent year-on-year, which the NEA highlighted as particularly noteworthy given it came on the basis of 16 percent growth in coal output in the same quarter last year (NEA, August 2). Another mitigating factor for China on the energy front has been heavy spring rainfall in many areas of the country that has increased hydropower output over 20 percent in the first half of this year—a substantial boost as hydroelectricity already accounts for about 15 percent of China’s overall energy mix (NEA, August 2; Global Times, May 5).
Topic:: Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

17. Are Small Modular Reactors Europe’s Energy Salvation?

Author:: Manuel Herrera
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Nuclear power has never lived up to expectations due to its enormous development, construction and maintenance costs, as well as safety concerns. However, governments committed to ambitious climate change targets have taken a second look at it. In Europe, for instance, in January this year, the European Commission added nuclear power to the list of projects eligible for green financing and, in July, included it in its taxonomy.[1] Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, meanwhile, has sent fossil fuel prices soaring and put energy security at the top of the political agenda in Europe.
Topic:: Climate Change, Nuclear Power, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Eastern Europe

18. The Iranian Nuclear Program Advances, with only a Slim Chance of Restoring Nuclear Agreement

Author:: Sima Shine and Ephraim Asculai
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Although the nuclear talks in Vienna were renewed over a year ago, a return to the deal is not on the horizon, and the regime of the ayatollahs has increased the pace of its violations of the deal, which will make it even harder for the parties to reach understandings. The coming weeks will be critical, and at this point the world powers, as well as Israel, must prepare for a reality where there is no agreement, accompanied by troubling Iranian progress on its nuclear program
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

19. Acceleration of Climate Policy and the Energy Transformation in Slovakia

Author:: Łukasz Ogrodnik
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Eduard Heger government wants to increase the production of energy from renewable sources and nuclear energy. This is evidenced among others by the preparations for the commissioning of two new units of the Mochovce nuclear power plant. Although Visegrad Group states include pronouncements they plan to use nuclear power in their national energy mixes, the difference in those mixes limits the possibilities of formulating regional climate policy and results in a lack of coherence on the EU forum. Hydrogen fuel, the use of which is growing in Slovakia, also remains an untapped potential for regional cooperation.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, Government, Nuclear Power, and European Union
Political Geography:: Central Europe and Slovakia

20. U.S. Security Ties With Korea and Japan: Getting Beyond Deterrence

Author:: Stephen Haggard
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: Japan and Korea—the United States’ two key allies in Northeast Asia—are both advanced industrial democracies facing similar constraints from a rising China and a nuclear North Korea. One would think that trilateral cooperation would be a cinch. Yet Japan and Korea have been at each other’s throats over simmering historical issues and differing approaches to China. Forging a trilateral alliance is highly unlikely. But strengthening cooperation is possible by focusing less on the military components of the alliance—i.e., providing extended deterrence—and more on new issues such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), and infrastructure, which can strengthen collective capabilities and make cooperation more appealing.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Nuclear Power, Innovation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Japan, China, North Korea, and Indo-Pacific

21. Israel Escalates Actions Towards Iran

Author:: Michał Wojnarowicz
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Since last year, Israel has increased its operations against Iran’s nuclear programme. The actions corresponded to the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy on Iran. Currently, the Israeli actions are an attempt to put pressure on the negotiations launched by the U.S. and Iran to restore the nuclear agreement. Israel opposes those talks, but further escalation will be limited by the stance of the Biden administration.
Topic:: Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, Joe Biden, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

22. Turkey's Nuclear Future

Author:: Assa Ophir
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In our latest issue of Turkeyscope Dr. Assa Ophir discusses the implications of Turkish efforts to potentially become a state with an independent nuclear program.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

23. Strategic Report

Author:: Zaid Eyadat and Moh'd Khair Eiedat
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:: This is not a historical nor chronological report. It is rather “a working paper”. The purpose of this rather brief report is to reflect on three major issues: first, what are the characteristics of the world we live in? How stable and predictable is it? Are those in power know what are they doing? Or is it the blind leading the blind? Is our sense of uncertainty and thus unpredictability a product of mental crisis related to one in a lifetime pandemic experience? or is it more structural with long historical span? The second question is how dangerous and out of control is the Middle east region? Or is it? The Abraham Accords promise a new dawn for the region? Paradise is just around the corner or the calm preceding the storm? The third question, where does Jordan fit in these wider circles of activities both global and regional? Deliberately we left out of the report any serious considerations of the economic aspect challenge facing Jordan which is both self-evident and widely recognized. Moreover, the emphasis is on the geostrategic aspects of security related to the global level, the regional level and that of Jordan. Let us first look at the world.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan

24. Belarus Goes Nuclear: Context and Prospects of the Astravyets NPP

Author:: Yuri Tsarik
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: On 7 November 2020, the president of Belarus, Aleksander Lukashenko, visited the Astravyets Nuclear Power Plant (Astravyets NPP) and dubbed its pending commissioning a “historic moment” for Belarus. Despite several incidents during the tests in late 2020 and early 2021 that prompted shutdowns of the reactor, the first unit was reconnected to Belarus’s power grid at full nominal capacity on 21 January 2021. The Astravyets NPP launch took place amid the worst political crisis in the country’s history. Following a rigged presidential election in August 2020 and violent suppression of the ensuing protests, the Belarusian authorities found themselves lacking legitimacy domestically and facing mounting political and economic pressure internationally. These events, and the choices made in response to them, are reshaping the geopolitical and geoeconomic context in which the plant will operate and thus are affecting the prospects of the entire project.
Topic:: Economics, Nuclear Power, Elections, Geopolitics, Legitimacy, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:: Eurasia and Belarus

25. Russia’s Nuclear Activity in 2020: A Show of Strength Despite COVID-19

Author:: Maxim Starchak
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation’s powerful nuclear arsenal has stood as a cornerstone of its political and military influence. In 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces maintained a high degree of activity. The number of nuclear exercises and air and sea deterrence patrols was stable and not much different from 2019. The Russian strategic nuclear arsenal remains an integral tool of the Kremlin’s pressure on rivals in Europe and North America.
Topic:: Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and North America

26. Enhancing South Asian Nuclear Dialogues: The Implications of Covid-19

Author:: Petr Topychkanov
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Before the global spread of Covid-19, nuclear-armed China, India and Pakistan lacked official diplomatic exchanges to address nuclear weapon-related issues. The pandemic then halted even unofficial dialogues between these countries, which had existed in various bilateral and multilateral formats. As a result, China, India and Pakistan are faced with the challenge of keeping a desirable level of predictability concerning each other’s nuclear postures and capabilities. This SIPRI Policy Brief explores ways of dealing with this challenge and enhancing nuclear dialogues in South Asia. It considers both longer-term developments in the region and the recent implications of Covid-19. The paper finds that bilateral dialogue remains more feasible than trilateral dialogue between China, India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, it argues that these countries may need to address specific issues in broader formats. Emphasized by the Covid-19 crisis, such issues notably include emerging technologies and autonomy. On the one hand, these technologies support diplomacy digitalization, allowing nuclear-armed states to use online and mixed formats to develop nuclear dialogues between them. On the other hand, if applied in the military area, these technologies may affect nuclear postures and capabilities, and contribute to military escalation.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, COVID-19, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and India

27. South Asia’s Nuclear Challenges: Interlocking Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States

Author:: Petr Topychkanov and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: This report provides an overview of views on nuclear postures and escalation affecting South Asia, based on 119 research interviews conducted in 2020 with military, nuclear, political and regional experts from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States. The publication also builds on the findings from a virtual workshop that SIPRI hosted on 8 and 9 December 2020 on ‘Nuclear challenges in South Asia: Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia, Australia, New Zealand and the USA’. These discussions revealed a variety of interlocking insights on such issues as no first use, lowered nuclear thresholds, conventional and nuclear entanglement and emerging technologies that are shaping strategic stability. The publication consists of five country-focused sections that explore nuclear postures, strategic technologies and escalatory risks, as well as conclusions that offer building blocks for the next steps on engagement. This report was prepared in the framework of the SIPRI project Assessing Nuclear Deterrence Risks and Challenges in South Asia, generously supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

28. Modernizing the Nuclear Triad: Decline or Renewal?

Author:: Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The United States is planning to modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent for the first time since the Cold War ended over thirty years ago. The deterrent comprises three main components, or “legs”: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), distributed in hardened silos throughout the northern Midwest; fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating from two bases, one on each coast; and long-range bombers positioned at three air bases in the continental United States. These three legs are known collectively as the triad. This study analyzes the United States’ plans for modernizing the land, sea and airborne legs comprising its strategic nuclear force triad. This force has been charged primarily with deterring a nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and security partners (“extended deterrence”), and mitigating the consequences should deterrence fail.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

29. Emerging Technologies and Nuclear Deterrence Relationship

Author:: Hirofumi Tosaki
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:: The implications of emerging technologies have been an important issue in the debate on nuclear posture and deterrence relationship. Although the concrete objectives, concepts, plans and states of development of the nuclear-armed states regarding the introduction of emerging technologies into their nuclear weapons systems are not necessarily clear, a particular focus of discussion has been the potential impacts of introducing artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technology and other emerging technologies into intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and nuclear command, control and communications (NC3). With regard to ISR for early warning, threat detection, situational awareness and attack/damage assessment, the development of remote sensing technology through quantum sensing, for instance, could improve the ability to detect an adversary's offensive capabilities, and increase the possibility of addressing them before they are used. The use of cloud computing, ultrahigh-speed high-capacity data communications and AI is expected to enable the efficient collection and prompt analysis of vast amounts of information.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, Deterrence, Artificial Intelligence, and Destabilization
Political Geography:: Global Focus

30. The Concurrent Approach: Is Iran changing its policy regarding the nuclear deal?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, has proposed the possibility of settling disputes over the nuclear deal by adopting the ‘simultaneous’ approach, meaning that Iran will once again comply to the deal in return for US lifting sanctions imposed on it. On February 2, during his interview with CNN network, Zarif responded to the question by Christian Amanpour, about whether Iran is still demanding that the US act first, saying that the necessary steps can be synchronized. He also suggested the EU mediate to settle the disputes and remove any obstacles against Washington's return to the agreement. This may imply that Iran made early concessions in its position, regarding the adherence to strict conditions, similar to: the US returning to the agreement first, lifting sanctions and providing compensation for the losses incurred. However, these may not be major concessions impacting the general attitudes of the Iranian leadership, nor may they necessarily indicate Iran's intention to make significant changes in its policy regarding the nuclear deal. To be precise, this new approach announced by Zarif may simply be a tactical change in the Iranian policy aiming to enhance the access to understandings and to avoid early problems with the US administration, at a time when Iran appears to be in dire need of lifting US sanctions.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Elections, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

31. Forging a Path Forward on US Nuclear Waste Management: Options for Policy Makers

Author:: Matt Bowen
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: Nuclear power is considered in many countries a critical facet to maintaining reliable access to electricity during a global transition to low-carbon energy sources. One challenge to its potential in the United States, however, is the current standstill regarding a disposal pathway for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from commercial reactors. This impasse has a negative bearing on nuclear energy’s ability to supply more zero-carbon electricity and may cost US taxpayers tens of billions of dollars in government liability for failing to meet contractual obligations to take possession of the waste from utilities. Despite the scientific community assessing that commercial SNF and other high-level radioactive waste (HLW), such as from defense activities, can be safely isolated in deep underground repositories, US efforts to license and operate one have flatlined. The original plan for siting at least two repositories for such waste was abandoned first by DOE and then by Congress. Yucca Mountain in Nevada was designated in law as the nation’s sole potential disposal site by Congress in 1987, fomenting the state’s opposition to the project. As a result of that opposition, Congress has not funded the project since 2010. Still, progress has been made over the last few decades in nuclear waste disposal programs in countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Canada. And the United States has seen the successful opening and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico to dispose of generally less radioactive but long-lived transuranic nuclear waste from defense activities. Such programs offer insights for how the United States can try to resolve the challenges with commercial nuclear waste disposal and potentially alleviate one obstacle to wider adoption of nuclear energy to decarbonize the US economy. This report, part of wider work on nuclear energy at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, explains how the United States reached its current stalemate over nuclear waste disposal. It then examines productive approaches in other countries and a few domestic ones that could guide US policy makers through options for improving the prospects of SNF and HLW disposal going forward
Topic:: Energy Policy, Nuclear Power, and Nuclear Waste
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

32. Can Negotiations and Diplomacy Break the US–Iran Impasse?

Author:: Anahita Motazed Rad
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: As the Biden and Rouhani administrations’ position to renew diplomatic efforts on the Iranian nuclear file with European support, they face more challenges than their predecessors did in 2015, when the Iranian nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was originally signed. Today, domestic, regional and international confrontations have increased; hardliners and conservatives in Tehran and Washington, on the one hand, and in Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the other, are now more aligned and coordinated against a diplomatic success than they were in 2015.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

33. Fourth Industrial Revolution in Japan: Technology to Address Social Challenges

Author:: Gyupan Kim, Hyongkun Lee, Boram Lee, Jongeun Lee, and Wonju Son
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: In Japan, the challenges posed by its low birthrate and aging population expanded rapidly with the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, and in March 2011, energy and environmental problems such as power supply shortages and nuclear radiation issues occurred in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima nuclear accident. Also, with the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic in January 2020, digital transformation has emerged as a social challenge. In particular, Japan's aging population combined with a decrease in the working age population, has caused the government to face fiscal crisis due to the burden of social insurance, and a sense of crisis of labor shortage in the medical, manufacturing and logistics sectors. This is also leading to a sense of crisis at local governments as well, seen with the collapse of the medical service supply system under “Tokyo centralization,” the rapid increase of the vulnerable in transportation due to the super-aging of rural areas, and the risk of extinction of local communities. The analysis on the healthcare and medical care sectors was conducted in chapter 2, and the manufacturing, mobility, and logistics sectors in Chapter 3, and the local revitalization in Chapter 4 respectively. And chapter 5 of conclusion remarks presents policy implications for the Korean government.
Topic:: Demographics, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, and Economy
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

34. The Coming Iran Nuclear Talks: Openings and Obstacles

Author:: Dennis Ross
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: A reimagined approach to Iran nuclear talks could extend the country’s breakout time, preserve U.S. negotiating leverage, and strengthen American alliances in Europe and across the Middle East. In the first in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining policy challenges across the Middle East, esteemed diplomat and policymaker Dennis Ross provides an innovative approach to reengaging Iran in nuclear diplomacy. His ideas have the potential to extend Iran’s breakout time, preserve U.S. negotiating leverage, and strengthen U.S. alliances in Europe and across the Middle East. Ross explains: “If regime change is not a realistic or advisable goal, the objective must be one of changing the Islamic Republic’s behavior. While this would be difficult, history shows that the regime will make tactical adjustments with strategic consequences when it considers the price of its policies to be too high.” In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

35. Europe Is Creating an Opportunity for Iran Talks, and Washington Should Take It

Author:: Charles Thépaut and Elena DeLozier
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: By triggering the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, Britain, France, and Germany are opening diplomatic space that could help the United States and Iran return to the negotiating table. In a press conference following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, President Trump reaffirmed his administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and asked, once again, for European countries to leave the nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Tehran announced what it called a “fifth and final remedial step” away from its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In response, the British, French, and German foreign ministers stated on January 14 that they would trigger the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM). At the same time, however, the E3 clarified that they are not joining the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign, which has steadily intensified ever since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed unilateral sanctions in 2018. Contrary to U.S. claims, the European decision will not immediately provoke “snapback” UN sanctions on Iran (though that scenario could unfold later if the E3 plan fails and Iran’s violations go before the UN Security Council). Instead, Europe is maintaining its evenhanded position somewhere between Washington and Tehran in order to preserve the possibility of new negotiations, on both the nuclear program and other regional issues.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

36. The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, Volume III, South Asian Perspectives

Author:: Peter Topychkanov, Sanatan Kulshrestha, Yanitra Kumaraguru, Malinda Meegoda, Kritika Roy, Saima Aman Sial, Dmitry Stefanovich, and Maaike Verbruggen
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: This edited volume is the third in a series of three. The series forms part of a SIPRI project that explores regional perspectives and trends related to the impact that recent advances in artificial intelligence could have on nuclear weapons and doctrines, as well as on strategic stability and nuclear risk. This volume assembles the perspectives of eight experts on South Asia on why and how machine learning and autonomy may become the focus of an arms race among nuclear-armed states. It further explores how the adoption of these technologies may have an impact on their calculation of strategic stability and nuclear risk at the regional and transregional levels.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disarmament, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, South Asia, India, East Asia, and Global Focus

37. Trump’s JCPOA withdrawal two years on: Maximum pressure, minimum outcomes

Author:: David Mortlock
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Two years ago, US President Donald J. Trump walked into the White House Diplomatic Reception Room and announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Trump administration reimposed sanctions on Iran and has adopted a policy of “maximum pressure” to compel Iran to change its behavior and to deny the Iranian regime the resources to engage in its destabilizing activities. However, he also promised he was ready, willing, and able to make a new and lasting deal with Iran. In “Trump’s JCPOA Withdrawal Two Years On – Maximum Pressure, Minimum Outcomes” author David Mortlock, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, evaluates the policy outcomes of President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. The author walks readers through the timeline of President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, the subsequent implementation of the maximum pressure campaign on Iran, and the policy outcomes relative to stated objectives. In sum, Mortlock concludes that although the maximum pressure campaign has been effective in inflicting economic harm on Iran, it has had minimum effect in other areas. Therefore, Mortlock believes the Trump administration should seize the opportunity to pivot from maximum pressure to an approach focused more on policy outcomes.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Economy, Donald Trump, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

38. European energy security and the critical role of transatlantic energy cooperation

Author:: Richard L. Morningstar, András Simonyi, Olga Khakova, and Jennifer T. Gordon
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Transatlantic cooperation is essential to European energy security, which is and should remain a key national security priority for the United States. European energy security is crucial for the maintenance of a strong European economy and for European political stability, both of which are in the best interests of the United States. The new report from the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, European Energy Security and the Critical Role of Transatlantic Energy Cooperation: Final Report and Recommendations, by Richard L. Morningstar, András Simonyi, Olga Khakova, and Jennifer T. Gordon, provides insights into how the United States and European Union (EU) can work together to strengthen European energy security. The Global Energy Center’s new report recommends that the United States and the EU focus their energy cooperation in several areas that will benefit the EU’s efforts to meet climate targets and that, at the same time, will also bolster energy security. These areas include: the development of competitive and transparent energy markets; the identification of alternative energy sources and routes; collaboration on new energy technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; and coordination of a transatlantic financing strategy. Additionally, new energy infrastructure, interconnected grids, the European Green Deal, and broader geopolitical challenges also represent areas of opportunity for cooperation between the United States and the EU.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Environment, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

39. A new energy strategy for the Western Hemisphere

Author:: David L. Goldwyn
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: In 2019, the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center began an effort in partnership with the United States Department of Energy to consider a fresh approach to energy in the Americas that is comprehensive in nature and targeted in its approach. Following a year-long period of engagements alongside six representative stakeholder countries participating, the resulting report: “A New US Energy Strategy for the Western Hemisphere,” was launched in March 2020 and will serve as the launch point for additional work by the Atlantic Council on energy and sustainability issues across the hemisphere.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, Governance, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, Renewable Energy, and Fossil Fuels
Political Geography:: South America, Latin America, and North America

40. Russia’s exotic nuclear weapons and implications for the United States and NATO

Author:: Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, and Christian Trotti
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: In 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced five new nuclear-capable, strategic weapons systems. These systems include a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarine drone. What does Russia have to gain from developing these novel and exotic nuclear weapons? And what should the United States and NATO do about it? This new Atlantic Council issue brief, Russia’s Exotic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for the United States and NATO, answers these questions. Informed by a workshop convened by the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and Los Alamos National Laboratory, authors Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, and Christian Trotti evaluate the potential utility, motivations, and consequences of these new systems. Among other conclusions, the most significant may be that great-power competition has returned, and with it, the importance of nuclear weapons in international politics.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Power, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

41. International Co-financing of Nuclear Reactors Between the United States and its Allies

Author:: Jennifer T. Gordon
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: It is critically important for global safety standards, nonproliferation agreements, and geopolitics that the United States play a leading role in the export of nuclear energy technologies. However, the domestic reactor fleet has struggled due to the deregulated US electricity market, inexpensive gas, and subsidies for renewables, which—in turn—has hampered US nuclear exports, since it is challenging to export a product that lacks a domestic market. However, building new reactors and bringing first-of-a-kind reactors to demonstration involve high capital costs and financial risk, for the purchasing party as well as the vendor. If the United States is to play a role at all in building new nuclear plants, it must address the challenges inherent in financing new nuclear builds; one mechanism to do this is through partnering with close US allies to co-finance new nuclear projects. If the United States and its allies fail to make their nuclear exports competitive, they will likely cede the mantle of global leadership in that area to Russia and China, where nuclear companies are state owned, easily able to finance nuclear exports, and already exploring emerging markets for nuclear exports.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

42. Reconsidering US Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

Author:: Richard Nephew
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: Despite having played a central role in the creation of the international nuclear commercial sector, today the United States is increasingly on the outside looking in when it comes to civil nuclear projects. The United States now accounts for a relatively small number of new reactor builds, both at home and abroad. There are a few rays of sunshine for the US nuclear industry, especially when it comes to new technology. In fact, many of the new reactor builds that are underway do involve US technology and intellectual property, even if others are performing the construction. To take advantage of a similar dynamic, US innovators are looking to both new and forgotten designs as a way of managing the challenges of nuclear fuel manufacture, safety, waste management, security cost, and proliferation. But these new technologies face an uncertain future (and so consequently does the US role), even notwithstanding the advantages nuclear energy would bring to managing climate change and the edge the United States may have in their development. Various factors account for the challenges facing the US nuclear industry, including the complex political, economic, scientific, and popular environment around nuclear technology and civil nuclear energy. Of the various problems potentially plaguing US nuclear energy policy, one remains both difficult to address and controversial: US requirements for nuclear cooperation, and in particular, the demand from many in Congress and the nonproliferation community that the United States insist on binding commitments from its cooperating partners to forswear developing enrichment and reprocessing technology. While this policy is not responsible for the decline of the US nuclear industry, it adds additional hindrance to US nuclear commerce abroad and may even be to the long-term detriment of US nonproliferation policy interests. If so, then the questions that arise are whether this is in the US interest and, if not, how the US ought to respond. If the government believes that having a role in international nuclear commerce is advisable on both economic and strategic grounds, then it needs to decide whether to commit resources to incentivize foreign partners to overlook the problems its nonproliferation policies may cause these partners or seek modifications to those policies. From a pure nonproliferation perspective, it would be preferable for the United States to invest in its nuclear industry to ensure it is competitive globally. But, this does not seem to be a likely course of action for the United States given the myriad political, legal, and budgetary complexities that would be involved. Consequently, this paper recommends several changes to how US nuclear cooperation agreements are negotiated as well as enhancements to overall US nuclear nonproliferation policies. In aggregate, they seek to rebalance and reformulate some aspects of US nuclear nonproliferation policy to make it more effective and efficient, particularly regarding engagement in civil nuclear commerce, but without compromising the core nonproliferation interests the current US diplomatic approach seeks to advance. With respect to nuclear cooperation agreements, the paper recommends the following: Relaxing the current US preference for a legally binding commitment to forswear all enrichment and reprocessing capabilities indefinitely for these agreements, while continuing traditional US policy to discourage these technologies development through various means. Relying on enhanced inspector access and improved verification tools, technology, and practices to provide confidence on the nondiversion of civil nuclear cooperation rather than assurances regarding enrichment and reprocessing that, in any event, are potentially revocable. Adopting a favorable view of “black box” transfers of nuclear power reactors and building this into policy as new, advanced reactor concepts are being explored, developed, and marketed. Creating a new sanctions regime to cover countries that pursue enrichment and reprocessing capabilities after concluding a 123 agreement. With respect to nuclear nonproliferation policy more generally, the paper recommends the following: Developing an annual nonproliferation indicators publication to identify trends in proliferation, including the kinds of goods that proliferators are potentially seeking. This document would also include a list of countries where there are presently enhanced concerns regarding national nuclear programs or concerns about transshipment and export control risk. Its objective would not be to serve as a proxy for future sanctions designations decisions but rather to give a broad perspective of the challenges that exist with particular jurisdictions even—and perhaps especially—if there is no need or justification for sanctions at present. Developing a warning system for sought-after goods. The United States should work with industry to develop a restricted database that identifies sensitive goods that are being sought. This database would be accessible to corporate compliance officers, who would be vetted for access to the information. Within it, the database could also include additional information about the sorts of tactics being employed by proliferators. Making greater use of end use verification as a means of facilitating monitoring of the nonproliferation commitments of countries, particularly regarding dual use technology. This could also be built out to include greater collaboration with partner countries and companies. Amending Executive Order 13382, which provides for sanctions against proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, to add a prong of “willful negligence.”
Topic:: Energy Policy, International Cooperation, United Nations, Infrastructure, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: United States

43. Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?

Author:: George Perkovich
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: For decades, policy debates in nuclear-armed states and alliances have centered on the question, “How much is enough?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are enough to credibly deter given adversaries? This paper argues that the more urgent question today is, “How much is too much?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are too likely to produce humanitarian and environmental catastrophe that would be strategically and legally indefensible? Two international initiatives could help answer this question. One would involve nuclear-armed states, perhaps with others, commissioning suitable scientific experts to conduct new studies on the probable climatic and environmental consequences of nuclear war. Such studies would benefit from recent advances in modeling, data, and computing power. They should explore what changes in numbers, yields, and targets of nuclear weapons would significantly reduce the probability of nuclear winter. If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, nuclear-armed states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states would benefit from actions to physically reduce such risks. The paper suggests possible modalities for international debate on these issues. The second initiative would query all nuclear-armed states whether they plan to adhere to international humanitarian law in deciding if and when to detonate nuclear weapons, and if so, how their arsenals and operational plans affirm their intentions (or not). The United Kingdom and the United States have committed, in the words of the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, to “adhere to the law of armed conflict” in any “initiation and conduct of nuclear operations.” But other nuclear-armed states have been more reticent, and the practical meaning of such declarations needs to be clarified through international discussion. The two proposed initiatives would help states and civil society experts to better reconcile the (perceived) need for nuclear deterrence with the strategic, legal, and physical imperatives of reducing the probability that a war escalates to catastrophic proportions. The concern is not only for the well-being of belligerent populations, but also for those in nations not involved in the posited conflict. Traditional security studies and the policies of some nuclear-armed states have ignored these imperatives. Accountable deterrents—in terms of international law and human survival—would be those that met the security and moral needs of all nations, not just one or two. These purposes may be too modest for states and activists that prefer the immediate prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons. Conversely, advocates of escalation dominance in the United States and Russia—and perhaps in Pakistan and India—will find the force reductions and doctrinal changes implied by them too demanding. Yet, the positions of both of these polarized groups are unrealistic and/or unacceptable to a plurality of attentive states and experts. To blunt efforts to stifle further analysis and debate of these issues, the appendix of this paper heuristically rebuts leading arguments against accountable deterrents. Middle powers and civil society have successfully put new issues on the global agenda and created political pressure on major powers to change policies. Yet, cooperation from at least one major nuclear power is necessary to achieve the changes in nuclear deterrent postures and policies explored here. In today’s circumstances, China may be the pivotal player. The conclusion suggests ways in which China could extend the traditional restraint in its nuclear force posture and doctrine into a new approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament with the United States and Russia that could win the support of middle powers and international civil society. If the looming breakdown in the global nuclear order is to be averted, and the dangers of nuclear war to be lessened, new ideas and political coalitions need to gain ascendance. The initiatives proposed here intended to stimulate the sort of analysis and debate from which such ideas and coalitions can emerge.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Environment, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, China, India, Global Focus, and United States of America

44. The NPT turns 50: Will it get to 60?

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: In the next decade, it is all too likely that the past success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons among the world’s nations will be reversed. Three trends make more proliferation likely. First is the decay of nuclear taboos. Second, and arguably worse, is renewed vertical proliferation—the increase in size and sophistication of nuclear arsenals by states that already have them. Third, the technical information to fuel nuclear breakouts and ramp-ups is more available now than in the past. These trends toward increased proliferation are not yet facts. The author describes three steps the international community could take to save the NPT: making further withdrawals from the NPT unattractive; clamping down on the uneconomical stockpiling and civilian use of nuclear weapons materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium); and giving real meaning to efforts to limit the threats that existing nuclear weapons pose.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

45. Understanding and Reducing Military Vulnerabilities of Civilian Nuclear Plants: The Case for the Northeast Asia

Author:: Jungmin Kang
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: A Fukushima-like nuclear accident does not have to be caused by nature. Similar results could be wrought by military attack that disabled its safety systems, including cooling and power systems of nuclear power plants (NPPs). This study shows hypothetical releases from a core meltdown or spent fuel pool fire of NPPs occurred by military attack such as missile attacks in some of Northeast Asia countries, with atmospheric dispersion and deposition calculations using the HYSPLIT code with historical meteorological data for the region.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Korea

46. Why the United States Should Remain Engaged on Nuclear Power: Climate Change and Air Pollution

Author:: Matt Bowen
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: Nuclear energy has shown much promise and faced considerable challenges since its origins in the mid-20th century. While the United States drove the early charge for safe nuclear power around the globe, its leadership has waned in recent decades. US reactors now under construction—following no orders for such plants in the United States for several decades—have gone well over planned budgets and schedules. And while the United States was once the leading international supplier of reactors, other countries have since stepped forward to fill that role. Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, as part of its wider work on nuclear energy, is examining the impact of potential American disengagement from nuclear power’s development and where opportunities exist to step back in and shape its future. The program also will assess the US nuclear waste management program and efforts to collaborate with other countries on advanced reactor development, as well as options for improvement on both fronts. This effort will begin with a two-part commentary on some of the benefits the United States might derive from increasing its engagement on nuclear power. The first in the series, this piece, explores the important role nuclear energy can play in lowering greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst potential outcomes of climate change. The second piece will examine the geopolitical and national security implications of the United States and its traditional allies effectively ceding the international nuclear energy marketplace to the Chinese and Russians. The nuclear program’s ultimate goal is to inform readers—policy makers, industry leaders, academics, and others—with objective, research-based analysis. It will strive in the months and years ahead to contribute constructively to a necessary dialogue on the future of nuclear power.
Topic:: Environment, Nuclear Power, Pollution, Air Pollution, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

47. Why the United States Should Remain Engaged on Nuclear Power: Geopolitical and National Security Considerations

Author:: Matt Bowen
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: Nuclear energy has shown much promise and faced considerable challenges since its origins in the mid-20th century. While the United States drove the early charge for safe nuclear power around the globe, its leadership has waned in recent decades. US reactors now under construction—following no orders for such plants in the United States for several decades—have gone well over planned budgets and schedules. And while the United States was once the leading international supplier of reactors, other countries have since stepped forward to fill that role. Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, as part of its wider work on nuclear energy, is examining the impact of potential American disengagement from nuclear power’s development and where opportunities exist to step back in and shape its future. The program also will assess the US nuclear waste management program and efforts to collaborate with other countries on advanced reactor development as well as options for improvement on both fronts. This effort includes a two-part commentary on some of the benefits the United States might derive from increasing its engagement on nuclear power. The first in the series explored the important role nuclear energy can play in lowering air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst potential outcomes of climate change. The second part of the series, this piece, examines the geopolitical and national security implications of the United States and its traditional allies effectively ceding the international nuclear energy marketplace to the Chinese and Russians. The nuclear program’s ultimate goal is to inform readers—policy makers, industry leaders, academics, and others—with objective, research-based analysis. It will strive in the months and years ahead to contribute constructively to a necessary dialogue on the future of nuclear power.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, National Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

48. An Effect-Centric Approach to Assessing the Risks of Cyber Attacks Against the Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Power Plants

Author:: Nancy Gallagher, Charles Harry, and Jor-Shan Choi
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: Cyberattacks against the digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are of grave security concern. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires all NPPs to protect critical digital assets that support safety, security, and emergency preparedness functions against cyberattacks.1 Other standards bodies like the International Society of Automation (ISA) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) have also developed standards that address cybersecurity for industrial control systems (ICS) including DI&C.2 Due to concerns for security, relevant stakeholders such as regulators, plant operators, information technology (IT) and operation technology (OT) staff, and equipment suppliers are sometimes reluctant to reveal in technical detail about vulnerabilities posed by DI&C systems. Yet, because some types of cyberattacks against an NPP may cause core damage or significant release of radioactivity, harming the plant, the public and the industry, the safety implications of potential cyberattacks should be evaluated. This divide between security and safety is a challenge for stakeholders focused in cyber security for NPPs. To bridge this security and safety divide, this study proposes and demonstrates a methodology for assessing and addressing the safety consequences of cyber events that disrupt one or more parts of the DI&C systems at NPPs. The methodology builds on the “effect-centric” cyber risk assessment framework developed by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). It is used to analyze two historical cyberattacks and one hypothetical attack scenario. As the focus is on plant safety, these assessment, evaluation, and analysis can be candidly and openly discussed with the goal of finding the best defense to thwart the specific cyberattack.
Topic:: Security, Governance, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, and Regulation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

49. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense

Author:: Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

50. Forgotten Ground Zeros: Local populations exposed to radiation from former nuclear test sites

Author:: Magdalena Stawkowski
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Around the world, hundreds of thousands of people live in and around former nuclear test sites. Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site in Kazakhstan provides both a home and a livelihood for an estimated 50,000 people, but security measures are not yet sufficient to protect them from radioactive waste from the past. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ Establish local education programs to prevent unintentional exposure to residual radioactivity ■ Encourage local authorities to promote radiation-safety programs ■ Cordon off and secure unmarked radioactive areas on nuclear test sites ■ Carry out regular radiation monitoring in villages close to nuclear test sites, as well as of livestock
Topic:: Health, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Central Asia and Kazakhstan

51. Iran Sanctions: The View From Iran

Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: World Politics Review
Abstract:: The ballistic missiles that Iran fired at two military bases in Iraq housing American troops could only be the start of Tehran’s retaliation. Many observers worry that more blowback could come in the form of Iran’s favored tactic of asymmetric warfare waged through its proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. This escalation did not begin with the killing of Soleimani, but in May 2018, when Trump unilaterally took the United States out of the international agreement curbing Iran’s nuclear program, known as the JCPOA, and reimposed crippling sanctions on Iran’s economy. What impact has the U.S. exit from the nuclear deal had in Iran? How has it changed the Iranian regime’s foreign policy calculations? And how have Iranian citizens reacted to Trump’s campaign of “maximum pressure” and more sanctions? This WPR report provides an essential view of events from Iran.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, and Iran

52. Germany’s Role in NATO’s Nuclear Sharing The Purchasing Decision for the Tornado’s Successor Aircraft

Author:: Heinrich Brauß and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Germany will need to replace its aging “Tornado” combat aircraft from 2025. To date, the federal government is considering purchasing F-18 aircraft from the United States or refitting Eurofighter planes. Buying state-of-the-art F-35 planes has been ruled out. Given Russia’s deployment of new intermediate-range missiles on its Western territory, this decision should be reconsidered.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Nuclear Power, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

53. Coming out and breaking out: The US, Iran and Europe go nuclear

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: On the eve of the US elections, the nuclear deal (JCPOA) stands on the edge of the precipice. The US strategy of ‘maximum pressure’ has not (yet) achieved its implicit objective of 'regime change' but tanked Iran’s economy, caused its government to dig in and increased regional instability. The geopolitical consequences of US sanctions, EU prevarication and Iran’s deep presence throughout the Middle East have been equally profound. At the global level, they include nudging Iran towards China/Russia, the US alienating its European ‘partners’ and encouraging them to develop greater strategic autonomy. At the regional level, US sanctions risk creating an alternative economic regional order, ensuring Yemen remains a protracted war and making a regional security initiative more necessary, but less likely. It is not yet too late to turn the tide. The focus should now be on reducing regional tensions and especially the stress that sanctions have put on Iran’s population and government. Radical action looks more inviting when one stands against the wall, but the Middle East does not need more conflict than it already has. To do so, the EU should first support Iran with a large-scale Covid-19 humanitarian economy recovery package. As such measures are already sanctions-exempt, they will create few new tensions. An economic initiative should follow that grants preferential access to the EU’s internal market for industrial and agricultural goods from the entire Middle East (for Iran via an upgraded INSTEX). Such interventions will not resolve existing security dilemmas but can show there is an alternative to confrontation.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Elections, and European Union
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Yemen, and United States of America

54. Nuclear Terrorism: Hype, Risks and Reality-A Case of Pakistan

Author:: Rizwan Naseer and Musarat Amin
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The danger of nuclear terrorism has heightened significantly in the recent years largely because of the transnational terrorist networks and their unrelenting efforts to acquire nuclear technology. The menace of nuclear terrorism is alarming and should be calculated as credible source of emerging trends in terrorism. No incident of nuclear terrorism happened yet but terrorist groups are struggling to steal fissile materials, nuclear technology or insiders‟ support to either procure a crude weapon or steal one. International community is concerned with such foreseeable scenario. This research attempts to make a realistic calculation of the hazards of nuclear terrorism. First part of the paper underlines hype of nuclear terrorism and the risks it poses. It also signifies magnitude of reality involving nuclear terrorism. Second part of the paper underscores the response to international media that is frenzy about risk of nuclear terrorism in Pakistan. It also highlights the safety and security measures that Pakistan has adopted under the guidelines of IAEA and Nuclear Security Summits. This paper concludes with the argument that over the years Pakistan has remained relatively open about sharing information regarding how it is making advancements in its command and control system to ward off any risks of nuclear terrorism and has been successful in achieving better levels of security.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

55. Strategic Stability in South Asia: Pakistan and the Challenges of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:: Muhammad Tehsin, Asif Ali, and Ghulam Qumber
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The protracted conflict between the US and the former USSR demonstrated that deterrence stability is improved by détente. South Asia‟s environment is characterized by mutual hostility; conventional military balance tilting in favor of India; and lack of a transparent and nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. The aforementioned factors are the missing components of détente. Both the provocative Indian expansion in its nuclear weapons programme, and Pakistani retaliatory notion of the short-range weapons option, is problematic not only in the South Asian context, but also contradictory to the decades-long experience acquired during the Cold War. Pakistan and India must move towards nuclear CBMs, doctrinal clarity, and risk-reduction measures in the light of new technological advancements, and changing US role in the region.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Territorial Disputes, Nuclear Power, Political stability, Grand Strategy, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Pakistan, South Asia, India, Punjab, and United States of America

56. The politics of hope: a nation’s patience tested

Author:: Ali Tehrani and Azadeh Pourzand
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:: The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:: Winter 2019 marked the 40th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The anniversary celebrations occurred in the midst of a difficult era of socio-economic turmoil, the return ofَ U.S. sanctions, and deepening political infighting in the Islamic Republic. Tensions between the government and the people are especially high. The tectonic plates of social change have been shifting below the surface in Iran over the past two decades, with major discontent erupting in the past year. While the country’s political facade appears largely unchanged, tensions and fragmentations among the ruling elite have deepened. Economic conditions are fast deteriorating for the average citizen, while political repression remains a harsh reality. Iran’s citizens, who have clung to hope and the possibility for change through decades of domestic repression and isolation from the global economy, struggle to remain hopeful. Collective fatigue stemming from years of isolation from the global economy, as well as domestic economic hardship, compounds the disappointment Iranians feel from unfulfilled political promises. The Iranian government has repeatedly failed to carry out promised reforms; in recent years alone, President Hassan Rouhani has proven unable to carry out his promises to “open up Iran politically, ease rigid social restrictions and address human rights abuses.” As this situation continues, Iran risks despair and chaos.
Topic:: Government, Politics, Social Movement, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Reform, Economy, and Memory
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

57. Preventing an Israeli-Iran War

Author:: Alon Ben-Meir
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: The EU is in a unique position to prevent the outbreak of a war between Israel and Iran that could engulf the Middle East in a war that no one can win.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Civil War, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

58. China’s evolving nuclear  export control regime

Author:: Xu Chunyang
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: The Chinese nuclear industry is actively pursuing international trade under China’s new “Go Global” policy. This development could strain Chinese nuclear export control systems in the coming decades. This paper investigates the evolution of the Chinese nuclear export control regime from the late 1970s to the present, describes the current state of the Chinese export control system, and investigates recent Chinese efforts to build a more robust system. It finds that although the Chinese strategic export control systems have grown tremendously since they first took shape and the capacity of the government to implement these controls has grown as well, significant improvements in both the legal basis for the controls and the capacity of institutions involved are still needed, including in how current laws define exports, in how government bodies are equipped to investigate violations, and in how violations are prosecuted. The Ministry of the Commerce is preparing a new “Export Control Law” that is expected to come into effect soon and to provide the basis for more robust controls that address many of the deficiencies identified above. The Chinese government’s growing commitment to undertaking its international obligations and safeguarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy provides reason for optimism, but in the near term, the effectiveness of these corrective efforts will depend on the completion, implementation, and enforcement of the new law.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: China, Beijing, and Asia

59. Do as I Say, and as I Do:  Chinese Leadership in Nuclear Security

Author:: Sara Z. Kutchesfahani
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes China’s words and actions regarding the Nuclear Security Summits to better understand what Chinese leadership on nuclear security could look like in the future. It finds that China accomplished the many things it said it would do during the summit process. The paper also explores how China’s policy and actions in other nuclear arenas could be paired with Chinese nuclear security policy to form a coherent agenda for nuclear risk reduction writ large. Consequently, the paper addresses how China doing as it says and does – per nuclear security – may be used as a way in which to inform its future nuclear security roles and responsibilities. In particular, it assesses China’s opportunities to assume a leadership role within this crucial international security issue area, especially at a time where U.S. leadership has waned.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: United States, China, Beijing, and Asia

60. Renewed Arms Race, the NPT, and the New Start Treaty After the End of the INF Treaty

Author:: Elif Beyza Karaalioğlu
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:: The U.S. decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty left world observing about what might happen next. Indeed, the demise of the INF Treaty points out to an uncertainty on arms control and it brings new questions regarding international security. In the light of recent developments on the INF Treaty, this study attempts to make an analysis on the possible impacts of the end of the INF Treaty on international security. This study argues that the collapse of the INF Treaty raise concerns for renewed arms race and the withdrawal from the INF Treaty inevitably brings other treaties such as the NPT and the New START into close consideration.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Russia, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

61. Does the New Saudi Reactor Justify Proliferation Fears?

Author:: Basel Ammane
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:: In early April 2019, Saudi Arabia’s progress in constructing its first nuclear reactor with the assistance of Argentine firm INVAP was the subject of considerable media attention that speculated on the dangers of this development. This was made all the more alarming given the reported nuclear technological assistance to the kingdom that the American administration approved. In fact, a cursory review of events surrounding this development reveals that there are at least two indicators that can be seen as cause for concern. First, Saudi leadership rhetoric pertaining to proliferation has not been reassuring, as crown prince Mohammed bin Salman signaled his country’s resolve to pursue the path of nuclear armament in the event that Iran, its regional rival, moves in that direction too. Second, the construction of this reactor is seen as the first step toward acquiring the knowledge and experience necessary for developing a sizeable nuclear power infrastructure that will supply the kingdom’s needs in the future. The kingdom has plans to build two large nuclear reactors to diversify its energy sources and meet its electricity needs, as well as a number of small reactors for desalination purposes. As these plans begin to materialize, the importance of Saudi compliance under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) will become indispensable and equivocation on the matter unacceptable. Having said this, speculation that is largely focused on a handful of events reported by the media is not good at providing a clear picture. Grounding analysis in an understanding of regional politics and global nonproliferation dynamics is likely to capture a clearer picture of the situation. There are at least two factors should be grounds for concern about potential Saudi nuclear proliferation.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Middle East and Saudi Arabia

62. Russia and China in the Middle East: Playing their best cards

Author:: Marco Siddi and Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Russia and China share a number of interests in the Middle East: limiting US power and maintaining good relations with all players in the region while remaining aloof from the key conflicts, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Iran and Israel. Russia’s position has been based on political support for particular states, arms sales and the provision of civilian nuclear energy technology. Moscow has boosted its role by intervening militarily in the Syrian civil war. China has been strengthening its political position in the region for the last decade and its presence is more substantial from a financial-economic perspective. The current Chinese and Russian regional posture further marginalises the influence of the EU in MENA. In the Middle East, the EU is already a weaker economic actor than China and a weaker military player than Russia. However, the EU can cooperate with Russia and China on upholding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme.
Topic:: Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Military Intervention, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and Asia

63. The Role of Nuclear and Gas in Romania-U.S. Relations

Author:: Jakub Pieńkowski
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The close alliance between Romania and the U.S. is focused on defence. Their cooperation also extends to energy issues, particularly nuclear energy, gas transit to the Balkans, and extraction from Black Sea deposits. However, Romania’s interests in energy security are only partially convergent with the U.S. goals of eliminating China’s and Russia’s influence in the region and becoming a key gas supplier to Central Europe.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power, and Gas
Political Geography:: Europe, Romania, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

64. North Korea’s Nuclear Program through the Lens of Strategıc Culture

Author:: Emine Akçadağ Alagöz
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This paper presents an application of the concept of strategic culture as a possible way to analyze North Korea’s nuclear program. The goal is to illustrate that the strategic culture approach is a useful method to understand North Korea’s determination to develop nuclear capability, demonstrating the link between culture and behavior through Alastair Johnston’s methodology. The question of the formation of a North Korean strategic culture will be scrutinized through scoring the speeches and written messages of three North Korean leaders in terms of the presence of key cultural assumptions. Then, it will accordingly suggest that North Korea’s strategic culture, affecting the practices of its security policy, leads this country toward an active defense strategy, which implies a credible nuclear deterrence.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Kim Jong-un, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

65. Future Scenarios: What To Expect From a Nuclear North Korea

Author:: Daniel R. Russel
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: After decades of broken promises and failed diplomatic efforts, North Korea has become a nuclear power. Kim Jong Un’s charm offensive over the past year, as seen in summit meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump and other leaders, has enabled him to shed his pariah status without shedding his nuclear weapons. While Kim has frozen testing, he continues to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal, defy and evade Security Council resolutions, and is now getting support from China in his call for sanctions relief. In the wake of the failed February 2019 Hanoi Summit, North Korea is warning of a return to testing by year’s end. But even if Kim were to reverse course and agree to freeze his entire nuclear and missile program, North Korea’s capacity to threaten the U.S. and its allies with a formidable arsenal would be undiminished. What’s worse, Kim seems to be turning to a powerful new weapon of mass destruction to gain leverage. Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) Vice President for International Security and Diplomacy Daniel Russel asserts in this ASPI issue paper that North Korea’s next weapon of choice is likely to be cyber: a high-impact, low-cost, and low-risk digital-age weapon that North Korea already can and does use to steal money, hack secrets, and terrorize nations. In the 5G era, developed nations such as the United States are particularly vulnerable. North Korean cyber-attacks have already succeeded in crippling critical overseas infrastructure and stealing hundreds of millions of dollars, reducing the efficacy of international sanctions. Future Scenarios: What to Expect from a Nuclear North Korea details the consequences of North Korea’s slow but steady trajectory toward acceptance as a nuclear power. The report highlights the urgency of focusing U.S. national security efforts against the threat from North Korea’s rapidly growing cyber warfare capability. Russel writes that the combined threat from North Korea’s nuclear and cyber programs can only be reduced through “coercive containment” — a multi-pronged strategy of diplomacy, defense, deterrence, and denial that will require substantial cooperation among key international players.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, Donald Trump, and Kim Jong-un
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

66. The value of the US nuclear power complex to US national security

Author:: Robert F. Ichford and Bart Oosterveld
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: In this analysis, the Atlantic Council has set out to estimate the value that the civilian nuclear power sector contributes to the United States’ national security apparatus. Based on a series of inputs, this analysis and conservative estimation found that the nuclear power complex contributes an equivalent of more than $42.4 billion to US national security, as broadly defined. In other words, the lack of a civilian nuclear sector would present an immediate and significant economic shock (and impact on the labor force)—which, in turn, would have immediate and longer-term budgetary implications for the US government. The definition of national security can be viewed narrowly or more broadly, in terms of both the scope of the institutional assets and providers of national security services and the types of functions or services they undertake. This analysis includes both nuclear utilities and nuclear generators, as well as US military and defense facilities, as providing critical national security functions. The utilities and generators provide secure and reliable electricity, accounting for 19.3 percent of total US electricity generation in 2018, and they contribute significantly to the diversified energy-generation mix that the United States enjoys. There are three main reasons for public support of the civilian nuclear industry for national security purposes, which are identified in the analysis that follows. The reasons are 1. the civilian nuclear industry generates a vast investment in human capital, which is a necessary condition for all applications of nuclear energy in the national security apparatus; 2. the civilian nuclear industry and its associated supply chain provide critical risk mitigation and procurement safety to the national security apparatus; and 3. the civilian nuclear industry’s value to national security priorities related to climate change.
Topic:: Energy Policy, National Security, Nuclear Power, Economy, and Business
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

67. Comparative Nuclear Policy: A Case Study of U.S. Impact on India and Brazil Programs (1946-2018)

Author:: Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo and Artur Cruz Bertolucci
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The knowledge regarding nuclear technology represented a new reality for the generation of energy and international security. The nuclear attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 represented the beginning of the so-called nuclear era and of the “balance of terror” as presented by many analysts such as Raymond Aron, deepened by the arms race in the US-Soviet bipolarity after 1947. Besides the superpowers, different countries had begun to develop their nuclear programs. The cases of Brazil and India stand out, since they develop their research agendas n the 1950s and 1960s, in the Cold War context, as a path to enhance their autonomy and bargaining power. The spread of the nuclear knowledge represented a challenge for the superpowers, and the talks for mechanisms of nuclear proliferation control such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) started. This is the context in which Brazil and India develop their nuclear programs under the impact of its bilateral relations with the US. Although, these programs were convergent at first, in the search for nuclear autonomy, adjustments are going to be observed on both policies after the end of the Cold War. The article aims to understand the importance and history of Brazil and India nuclear programs and US weight on these agendas.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: India, Asia, Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America

68. An Application of Expected Utility Modeling and Game Theory in IR: Assessment of International Bargaining on Iran’s Nuclear Program

Author:: Mesut Özcan
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: This article provides an introduction to the theoretical underpinnings of expected utility and game theory approaches in IR studies. It goes on to explore their application to a specific research subject, international bargaining on Iran’s nuclear program. In this application, the article presents forecasts about Iran’s nuclear program using a game theoretic, bounded rationality model called the expected utility model (Bueno de Mesquita 2002). Three analyses were made in December 2005, September 2006 and March 2007. All three forecasts appear to be in line with real-life developments regarding the issue. The results show that Iran has been losing international support since the analyses started, and the last forecast suggests a pro-US position supported by all major international actors. Also, all three analyses suggest that Russian and Chinese support is vital to curb the Iranian nuclear program.
Topic:: International Relations, Nuclear Power, and Game Theory
Political Geography:: Iran and Global Focus

69. Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation

Author:: Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China's nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons). The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China's strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation. China's confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Asia

70. Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market

Author:: Eliza Gheorghe
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The evolution of the nuclear market explains why there are only nine members of the nuclear club, not twenty-five or more, as some analysts predicted. In the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate nuclear transfers, the more suppliers there are, the more intense their competition will be, as they vie for market share. This commercial rivalry makes it easier for nuclear technology to spread, because buyers can play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear weapons or become hedgers. The great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) seek to thwart proliferation by limiting transfers and putting safeguards on potentially dangerous nuclear technologies. Their success depends on two structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of the security rivalry among them. Thwarters are most likely to stem proliferation when the system is unipolar and least likely when it is multipolar. In bipolarity, their prospects fall somewhere in between. In addition, the more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective they will be at curbing proliferation. Given the potential for intense security rivalry among today's great powers, the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity does not portend well for checking proliferation.
Topic:: International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, and China

71. Nuclear Security, Arms Control and the U.S.-Russia Relationship

Author:: Steven Pifer
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: For nearly five decades, Washington and Moscow have engaged in negotiations to manage their nuclear competition. Those negotiations produced a string of acronyms—SALT, INF, START—for arms control agreements that strengthened strategic stability, reduced bloated nuclear arsenals and had a positive impact on the broader bilateral relationship. That is changing. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is headed for demise. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) has less than two years to run, and the administration of Donald Trump has yet to engage on Russian suggestions to extend it. Bilateral strategic stability talks have not been held in 18 months. On its current path, the U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control regime likely will come to an end in 2021. That will make for a strategic relationship that is less stable, less secure and less predictable and will further complicate an already troubled bilateral relationship.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

72. What Happens to Israel If the US and Iran Go to War?

Author:: Louis René Beres
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:: On core matters of peace and security, two closely interrelated questions must be asked: 1. What precisely does Donald Trump have in mind regarding any potential armed conflict with Iran? 2. What might such a possibility portend for Israel, a US ally? Answers to these questions must extend beyond narrowly partisan simplifications. They should be nuanced and subtly overlapping. At a minimum, once a shooting war were underway, the Israeli armed forces (IDF) could become involved, possibly to a substantial degree. In a worst case scenario, clashes would involve unconventional weapons and directly affect Israel’s civilian population. The worst of the worst could involve nuclear ordnance.
Topic:: Security, War, Nuclear Power, Peace, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, United States of America, and Israel

73. Improving the Role of Intelligence in Counterproliferation Policymaking: Report of the "Speaking Truth to Nonproliferation Project," 2018

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: This report is the culmination of a two-year project sponsored by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, which engaged more than 50 senior, retired and serving policymakers, intelligence officers, and top academic national security analysts. Its findings are based on hours of group discussions and private conversations that helped develop new primary histories of eight nuclear proliferation cases: India, Pakistan, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, Libya, and an Argentine and a separate South African nuclear rocket case. Each history was prepared by an academic historian and was based on open sources. Former officials who had direct roles in these cases then critiqued these accounts. Additional private interviews were conducted with participants to fill in historical gaps. The purpose of the case studies was to identify when and how intelligence shaped or prompted nonproliferation policy actions and, if it did not, why. This set of historical conclusions prompted a more general discussion of how policy and intelligence officials might improve their collaboration to prevent and curb further nuclear proliferation and how academics might contribute by enhancing their treatment of such issues. The project addressed three broad, related questions: How can the role of intelligencein the making of nonproliferation policy be improved? How can the nonproliferation agenda get the priority it deserves? How can the nonproliferation community be sustained and strengthened?
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, History, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Africa, South Asia, Middle East, India, Israel, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Libya, South Africa, Argentina, South America, and North Africa

74. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015) on Restricting Iran’s Nuclear Program and Russia-Iran Relations Century | İran’ın Nükleer Enerji Programı’nın Sınırlandırılmasına İlişkin Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı (2015) ve İran-Rusya İlişkileri

Author:: Nurhan Hacıoğlu
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
Institution:: Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
Abstract:: After 11 September, Iran's nuclear energy program turned into an international crisis. However, Iran did not give up its nuclear energy program despite the pressure on it in the world public opinion. This crisis, which occurred in the early 2000s, did not cause a negative impact on relations between Iran and Russia. Russia continued to help Iran to develop its nuclear program. One of the main points of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed between P5+ 1 countries and Iran in 2015 is that Iran limited its nuclear energy development for ten years. However, Iran could be a regional rival for Russia, especially in terms of energy and gas exports, after a decade. In this context, the focus of the study is to analyse whether there was any change in the good relations between the two countries after JCPOA. The study seeks answers to specific questions: How does Russia look at JCPOA? Why does Russia stand for a rival Iran? Are there any changes in the relations between Russia and Iran in the post-2015 period? According to the results, JCPOA did not have any negative effect on Russia-Iran relations. | 11 Eylül sonrası İran’ın nükleer enerji programı uluslararası bir krize dönüşmüştür. Ancak İran, uluslararası kamuoyunda kendisine yönelik baskılara rağmen nükleer enerji programından vazgeçmemiştir. 2000’li yılların başlarından itibaren ortaya çıkan bu kriz Rusya İran ilişkilerinde olumsuz bir etkiye neden olmamıştır. Rusya İran’a nükleer programını geliştirmesi için yaptığı yardımlara devam etmiştir. 2015 yılında P5+1 ülkeleri ve İran arasında imzalanan Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı’nın (KOEP) temel noktalarından biri İran’ın nükleer enerji gelişimini on yıllık bir süre için sınırlandırmış olmasıdır. Ancak İran on yılın sonunda kendisine yönelik yaptırım ve ambargolardan kurtulmuş bir ülke olarak Rusya’ya özellikle enerji ve gaz ihracı noktasında bölgesel bir rakip olabilecektir. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın odak noktası, bütün bunlar göz önünde bulundurularak iki ülkenin KOEP sonrası iyi ilişkilerinde değişme olup olmayacağını analiz etmektir. Çalışma belli sorulara cevap aramaktadır: Rusya KOEP’e nasıl bakmaktadır? Rusya neden kendisine rakip olabilecek bir İran’ı göze almaktadır? 2015 sonrası dönemde Rusya-İran ilişkilerinde değişiklik olmuş mudur? Ortaya çıkan sonuçlara göre KOEP'in Rusya-İran ilişkilerine herhangi bir olumsuz etkisi olmamıştır.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

75. Nuclear Power Pays: Assessing the Trends in Electric Power Generation Employment and Wages

Author:: Oxford Economics
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: This report seeks to illustrate and articulate the US nuclear power industry as a driver of highly educated, high-skilled workers who earn premium wages. The nuclear power sector provides 20 percent of the electricity needs in the US, and it supports tens of thousands of well-paying jobs throughout the country. In 2017, the nuclear power generation industry employed nearly 48,400 workers in the US paying an average salary of $136,600. This exceeded average regional wages across the country and placed nuclear power as the highest paying industry in the electric power generation sector. With such high wages, it’s not surprising that skilled occupations account for nearly 86 percent of total jobs in the industry.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Labor Issues, Nuclear Power, and Employment
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

76. A Vision for Nuclear Security

Author:: Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The goal of global nuclear security efforts should be a world in which all countries with nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU), separated plutonium, and nuclear facilities whose sabotage could cause a major radiation release have reduced the risk of nuclear theft and sabotage to the lowest possible level. This will require policymakers, regulators, and operators to commit to a continuous process of striving for excellence in nuclear security performance.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Science and Technology, International Security, Natural Resources, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Global Focus

77. Combating Complacency about Nuclear Terrorism

Author:: Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Complacency about the threat of nuclear terrorism—the belief that nuclear and radiological terrorism threats are minimal and existing security measures are sufficient to address them—is the fundamental barrier to strengthening nuclear security. Many factors can lead to complacency, but the most significant contributors are lack of knowledge about: events related to nuclear terrorism; weaknesses of nuclear security systems; and the capabilities demonstrated by thieves around the world. People will be more likely to take action to strengthen nuclear security if they believe that nuclear terrorism poses a real threat to their own country’s interests and their actions can significantly reduce the threat. There have been many incidents in recent years that demonstrate the need for strong and sustainable security at both military and civilian nuclear facilities.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Science and Technology, International Security, Natural Resources, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Global Focus

78. India's New Nuclear Thinking: Counterforce, Crises, and Consequences

Author:: Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Bottom Lines Counterforce incentives. Pakistan’s threats of nuclear first use have given India incentives to develop disarming capabilities that might neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities in a future conflict. The goal of such a shift would be to allow New Delhi to recapture the space it believed it had lost for conventional retaliation, without fear of nuclear use from Pakistan and without having to engage in tit-for-tat nuclear warfighting. Expanding options without doctrinal change. This risk of first-strike instability may force India to consider circumstances under which it could use nuclear weapons preemptively, posing a challenge to its long-standing “no first use” (NFU) declaration. Senior former officials have argued that preemption may be consistent with India’s NFU policy, meaning that Indian nuclear strategy may be changing even without any public revisions to its declaratory doctrine. Growing but still insufficient capabilities. India has dramatically expanded the number of precise nuclear-armed and conventional weapons that it possesses that can strike deep into Pakistan, along with the necessary systems and infrastructure to find and destroy Pakistani nuclear systems and intercept any forces it may miss with missile defenses. Nevertheless, it is far from achieving the ability to execute counterforce strikes against Pakistani nuclear targets, but even the mere pursuit of such options creates both an arms race on the Indian subcontinent as well as dangerous incentives to strike first in a crisis.
Topic:: International Security, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

79. Can North Korean Nuclear Missile Crisis Be Resolved?

Author:: G. Ivashentsov
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: TENSION around the Korean Peninsula is one of the main threats to international security. North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear and missile weapon systems has become a new serious factor in global strategic sta- bility. Previously, during the cold war era, the only tool of control over strategic weapons was the relationship between Moscow and Washington. At present, the international situation has radically changed. New nuclear powers – India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea – regard- less of whether or not the original five members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) acknowledge them as such, are not under the control of either Washington or Moscow or Beijing: they act at their own discretion, as they see fit. The current polycentrism of nuclear proliferation is based on region- al rivalry. India has created its nuclear arsenal as a counterweight to China; Pakistan, as a counterweight to India; and Israel, as a shield against Arab states. None of these states, however, are seeking global supremacy and so their nuclear status is taken by the world community more or less in stride.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

80. The Rising Crisis between the United States and Iran

Author:: Amos Yadlin
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: After a year in which Iran opted for "strategic patience," in the hope that European nations would compensate for the United States sanctions, it now seeks to present a price tag for the US measures against it, and has thus embarked on a response comprising action in three realms: nuclear, military, and oil exports from the Gulf. In the current circumstances, Iran and the United States are demanding conditions that would make a resumption of negotiations difficult, although both sides apparently understand that dialogue may ultimately be the less dangerous option for them. The latest developments embody the potential for escalation and miscalculation that is liable to affect Israel's security, and therefore the security cabinet should convene to craft an appropriate policy for the near, medium, and long terms.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Oil, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: United States, Iran, Middle East, and North America

81. Exclusive Interview with the Ex-Minister of Defence of the UK

Author:: IWEP
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Institute of World Economics and Politics
Abstract:: The Kazakhstan-based Institute of World Economy and Politics (IWEP) interviews former British Secretary of Defense, Desmond Henry Brown, about nuclear weapons and international relations.
Topic:: International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Disarmament
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan

82. Cyber-Threats to Strategic Networks: Challenges for Pakistan’s Security

Author:: Rizwan Naseer and Musarat Amin
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Nuclear weapons revolutionized security affairs after Hiroshima and Nagasaki annihilation. States went nuclear eventually after the United States, Russia, UK, France and China but India and Pakistan joined that exclusive club too in 1974 and 1998 respectively. Nuclear weapons a source of security motivated Israel, Iran and North Korea too. Another development that started undermining nuclear security itself was cyber warfare. Pakistan being developing country in the list of Global Innovation Index finds it hard to catch up with other leading nations in science and technology. Leading countries including US, Russia, China, UK, Germany, France etc are not safe from cyber-threats they face then how Pakistan can be considered safe against cybersabotaging to its strategic weapons. Pakistan‟s nuclear security though has gained better levels but cyber security is the field that requires comprehensive strategy to establish cyber nuclear doctrine. China being reliable strategic partner can be a resourceful partner unlike other great powers. This strategy would add much security to Pakistan‟s already existing nuclear security and would open new avenues of cooperation with international organizations to gain next milestone of Nuclear Suppliers‟ Group membership.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:: Pakistan, South Asia, India, and Punjab

83. Security Dilemma in South Asian Context

Author:: Ghulam Qumber, Waseem Ishaque, and Saqib Riaz
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The paper through the lens of Security Dilemma, implores the international institutions in general and USA in concert with China in particular, to take the driving seat to forestall any eventuality of a nuclear catastrophe to take place in South Asian security architecture. The world is reminded that the Indian ploy of resorting to „Bilateralism‟, has neither borne any dividends in the past 70 years in thwarting the Security Dilemma, nor is likely to resolve any thing at their own any time soon, before it is too late.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Power Politics, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Punjab

84. Prospects of Internationalizing Nuclear Security: An Appraisal

Author:: Ahmed Minhas, Farhat Konain Shujahi, and Ghulam Qumber
Publication Date:: 07-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Nuclear security has always been a sensitive area for international cooperation and even for sharing the best practices. States have been guarding the information about their nuclear security measures. With the introduction of terrorism phenomenon after 9/11 incident, the international community has been conscious about possibility of an act of nuclear or radiological terrorism. The US President Barack Obama undertook the task of securing the world from this new kind of terrorism and initiated process of Nuclear Security Summits (NSS)from 2010-2016 in which 53 heads of states were invited. It was the highest forum at which nuclear security was discussed; although, cautiously. NSS entrusted IAEA with the lead role in nuclear security at parallel with the nuclear safety. How the IAEA stands up to its added responsibilities in the post NSS process has to be seen in times to come. Pakistan has also come a long way in perfecting its nuclear security measures especially under the challenging scenario of Global War on Terror (GWOT) being contested within and around Pakistan’s geographical borders. Despite the challenging security environments, Pakistan’s nuclear security measures remained steadfast and not a single terrorist act happened. An appraisal of Pakistani nuclear security approach would be useful for nuclear technology aspirant states as a model of nuclear security best practices.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Pakistan, South Asia, and Punjab

85. Going nowhere alone: US sanctions on Iran and the afterlife of the JCPOA

Author:: Fridtjof Falk
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:: The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:: On November 5th, 2018, the Trump administration re-imposed severe sanctions on Iran. These sanctions, which President Obama called the “toughest sanctions ever faced by the Iranian government,” were lifted by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Deal. The JCPOA was signed with a view to blocking Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons, allowing international inspectors into Iran in return for sanctions relief. Withdrawing the United States (US) from the deal was a prominent promise of Donald Trump leading up to the presidential elections of 2016. In a May 2018 speech that described the deal as rooted in “fiction,” President Trump made good on his promise to leave the JCPOA and to move to unilaterally re-impose sanctions on Iran.
Topic:: International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Economy
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

86. Avoiding a Nuclear Wild, Wild West in the Middle East

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 03-2018
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: With the recent visit of Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, there is keen interest in finalizing a civil nuclear cooperative agreement. Trump officials have also said they intend to renew or strike additional civil nuclear deals with Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey. How necessary and economically competitive is nuclear power in the Middle East for desalination and producing electricity compared to non-nuclear alternatives? In the Saudi case, is a Russian, Chinese, or French reactor sale likely? What are the nonproliferation implications of allowing Riyadh to enrich and reprocess, either now or in the future? Speaker: Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, and Former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Cheney Pentagon.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: United States and Global Focus

87. Alternative East Asian Nuclear Futures, Volume I: Military Scenarios

Author:: Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: The 13 chapters contained in this book’s two volumes were prompt-ed by a single inquiry in 2012 from the MacArthur Foundation. Was there any way, I was asked, to further clarify the economic and nonproliferation downsides if further production of civilian pluto-nium proceeded in East Asia? My initial reply was no. So much already had been done.But the more I thought about it, two things that had yet to be at-tempted emerged. The first was any serious analysis of just how bad things could get militarily if Japan and South Korea acquired nuclear weapons and North Korea and Mainland China ramped up their own production of such arms. Such nuclear proliferation had long been assumed to be undesirable but nobody had specified how such proliferation might play out militarily. Second, no serious consideration had yet been given to how East Asia might be able to prosper economically without a massive buildup of civilian nucle-ar power. Since each of the key nations in East Asia—China, the Koreas, and Japan—all would likely exploit their civilian nuclear energy infrastructure to acquire their first bombs or to make more, such inattention seemed odd.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, North Korea, and Global Focus

88. Alternative East Asian Nuclear Futures, Volume II: Energy Scenarios

Author:: Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: The 13 chapters contained in this book’s two volumes were prompt- ed by a single inquiry in 2012 from the MacArthur Foundation. Was there any way, I was asked, to further clarify the economic and nonproliferation downsides if further production of civilian pluto- nium proceeded in East Asia? My initial reply was no. So much already had been done.But the more I thought about it, two things that had yet to be at- tempted emerged. The first was any serious analysis of just how bad things could get militarily if Japan and South Korea acquired nuclear weapons and North Korea and Mainland China ramped up their own production of such arms. Such nuclear proliferation had long been assumed to be undesirable but nobody had specified how such proliferation might play out militarily. Second, no serious consideration had yet been given to how East Asia might be able to prosper economically without a massive buildup of civilian nucle- ar power. Since each of the key nations in East Asia—China, the Koreas, and Japan—all would likely exploit their civilian nuclear energy infrastructure to acquire their first bombs or to make more, such inattention seemed odd.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, North Korea, and Global Focus

89. National Security Update 5: The Trump 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

Author:: Jack Kelly
Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:: This IFPA National Security Update examines the Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).i This NPR addresses requirements for a U.S nuclear-force structure more attuned to 21st-century requirements in a world of additional nuclear states as well as other actors in possession of such weapons. The NPR focuses on the crucially important nuclear component of U.S national security strategy and capabilities and should be read in the broader context of the recently released National Security Strategyii and National Defense Strategyiii documents. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:: National Security, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

90. Is the World on the Road to Peace or War?

Author:: Hans Blix
Publication Date:: 10-2018
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: The SIPRI Lecture is an annual event focusing on major themes in peace and security. The event provides a platform for prominent global thought leaders sharing the values underpinning SIPRI, its research and other activities. The inaugural SIPRI Lecture was held in May 2018 on the theme ‘Is the world on the road to peace or war?’ in the presence of His Majesty Carl XVI Gustaf and Her Majesty Queen Silvia of Sweden. The lecture honoured HE Dr Hans Blix and his lifelong career of distinguished public service dedicated to peace, disarmament, non-proliferation and conflict resolution and was followed by a distinguished panel discussion.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, War, Nuclear Power, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe and Sweden

91. Bulgaria and Black Sea Security

Author:: Siemon T. Wezeman and Alexandra Kuimova
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: The Black Sea region is experiencing a changing military balance. The six littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) intensified their efforts to build up their military potential after Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the start of the internationalized civil war in eastern Ukraine in 2014. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Bulgaria aims to support NATO’s security objectives of increasing military spending, enhancing defence capacities and developing interoperability. Bulgaria contributes to NATO’s military activities in the Black Sea region and regularly hosts and participates in exercises with NATO partners. However, Bulgaria also tries to remain on good terms with Russia by way of bilateral economic and political cooperation.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, Arms Trade, Disarmament, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Bulgaria, and Black Sea

92. Juche Doctrine as the Official Ideology of North Korea and Effects on the North Korean Foreign Policy

Author:: Can Kakişim
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Juche, the official ideology of North Korea, is an original doctrine which influences every aspect of life and politics within the country. This ideology leads to one-man rule in the political area and highly statist and isolationist structure in the economic realm in North Korea. Effects of such an internal structure on the foreign relations of the country appear as the dominance of an uncompromising foreign policy philosophy. North Korea has a skeptical approach towards the external world and it pursues a military-first policy including nuclear armament in order to achieve its foreign policy goals and secure the continuation of Juche regime at home.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, Ideology, Socialism, and Juche
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

93. U.S.-Russian Arms Control At Risk: An Assessment and Path Forward

Author:: Maggie Tennis
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Arms Control Association
Abstract:: In March 2017, Gen. Paul Selva, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) that Russia had deployed a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) violating the “spirit and intent” of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Selva warned the committee that Russia is “modernizing its strategic nuclear triad and developing new nonstrategic nuclear weapons.” His testimony illustrates the new normal of U.S.-Russian relations, wherein historic nuclear cooperation is profoundly at risk. Russia’s alleged INF Treaty violation has soured already strained relations between the world’s largest nuclear powers. Yet, the United States and Russia continue to share a common interest in ensuring nuclear stability worldwide. Together, the countries possess over 90 percent of the planet’s roughly 15,000 nuclear weapons. This power carries a responsibility to rejuvenate cooperative initiatives that reduce nuclear risks dating back to the depths of the Cold War. To effectively evaluate the opportunities and challenges involved in that objective, U.S. policymakers must understand Russia’s current nuclear force policy and strategy. This policy paper examines Moscow’s nuclear doctrine, capabilities and modernization efforts, the status of U.S.-Russian arms control treaties, and the primary obstacles to cooperation. It concludes by offering a set of recommendations for both mitigating threats to strategic stability and resuming a productive U.S.-Russian arms control dialogue.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Cold War, International Law, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:: Russia and United States

94. Setting the Stage for Progress Towards Nuclear Disarmament

Author:: Tytti Erasto, Sibylle Bauer, Shannon N. Kile, and Peter Topychkanov
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Recognizing that the current international context is hardly conducive to arms control and disarmament, SIPRI working paper ‘Setting the stage for progress towards nuclear disarmament’ identifies 10 practical steps to revitalize the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the principal normative and legal foundation of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it recognizes the NPT’s inherent compatibility with other disarmament initiatives, most notably the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In addition to restoring a sense of common purpose and addressing ‘old’ nuclear weapon-related risks, the paper highlights ‘new’ risks arising from developments in conventional capabilities and emerging technologies. The overarching objective is to set the stage for future concrete steps and initiatives to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and to eventually eliminate them.
Topic:: Peace Studies and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Global Focus

95. Intelligence and Policy Community Cooperation in the Libya WMD Disarmament Case

Author:: William H. Tobey
Publication Date:: 10-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: As the Trump Administration prepares to negotiate with North Korea, a question has arisen as to what model Washington should follow. National Security Advisor John Bolton has suggested that the Libyan nuclear case represents the best example to emulate. Given the violence Libya suffered after it disarmed, this recommendation provoked criticism, not only from the North Korean government, but a number of American analysts. Anticipating the importance of this case, NPEC commissioned William Tobey, former Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, to write a primary history. Mr. Tobey served on the National Security Council in the Bush (43) Administration when the Libyan nuclear case was being worked.
Topic:: Intelligence, International Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Libya

96. Avoiding a Nuclear Wild, Wild West in the Middle East

Author:: Henry Sokolski (ed)
Publication Date:: 05-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: With the Trump Administration’s announcement last fall that it intended to negotiate a civil nuclear cooperative agreement with Saudi Arabia, a debate has ensued over how restrictive any such agreement should be over the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of plutonium. These nuclear activities can bring a country within weeks of making its first batch of bombs. This announcement immediately raised the question, how much economic sense it made for Saudi Arabia to invest in nuclear power. It also raised a number of security questions. Should the United States allow Riyadh to reprocess and enrich even though these activities could bring Saudi Arabia within weeks of acquiring nuclear weapons? If Washington acceded to this demand by Riyadh, what would be the implications for the terms of nuclear cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Morocco? How would such an agreement impact efforts to tighten the terms of our nuclear understanding with Iran? Would such a permissive deal with Riyadh make it more difficult to say no to Seoul’s demand that we allow them to enrich uranium? All of these questions and more are discussed in this volume’s four sections
Topic:: International Affairs and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Middle East

97. 8 Key findings regarding the Korea nuclear arms crisis from recent discussions with experts in China, Russia and Korea

Author:: Charles Knight
Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: Most interlocutors thought that there is almost no chance that the presently stringent sanctions can force the DPRK to agree to disarm. The Chinese and the Russians generally believe that the maximal concession that sanctions can win from the DPRK is an agreement to freeze their warhead and missile development — particularly inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development — in return for some combination of confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and progress toward political normalization. The North Koreans will not give up the nuclear weapons they already have… at least not until there is a permanent peace on the peninsula and the US is no longer understood to be an enemy.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

98. The Inter-Korean Summit Declaration of April 27, 2018: a review in detail

Author:: Charles Knight
Publication Date:: 05-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: The April 27, 2018 Inter-Korean Summit was a visibly cordial, even happy, event. At its conclusion, North and South Korea released a “Declaration of Peace, Prosperity and Unification.” This paper reviews a selection of key sections and phrases in “The Declaration” with attention to understanding their implications for the goal declared by both parties of ending “division and confrontation” on the peninsula and for addressing the overhanging issue of denuclearization. Notably, both parties strongly assert their rights as Koreans to take leadership in this task before them. Among the issues this review examines are the implications of various provisions in The Declaration for two great powers with long-standing interests in and influence on the Korean peninsula: China and the United States.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
Political Geography:: Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

99. Project on Nuclear Issues A Collection of Papers from the 2017 Conference Series and Nuclear Scholars Initiative

Author:: Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: The role that nuclear weapons play in international security has changed since the end of the Cold War, but the need to maintain and replenish the human infrastructure for supporting nuclear capabilities and dealing with the multitude of nuclear challenges remains essential. Recognizing this challenge, CSIS launched the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) in 2003 to develop the next generation of policy, technical, and operational nuclear professionals through outreach, mentorship, research, and debate. PONI runs two signature programs—the Nuclear Scholars Initiative and the Annual Conference Series—to engage emerging nuclear experts in debate and research over how to best address the nuclear community’s most pressing problems. The papers in this volume include research from participants in the 2017 Nuclear Scholars Initiative and PONI Conference Series. PONI sponsors this research to provide a forum for facilitating new and innovative thinking and a platform for emerging thought leaders across the nuclear enterprise. Spanning a wide range of technical and policy issues, these selected papers further discussion in their respective areas.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Global Focus

100. Russia's New Nuclear Weapons: Whoever Dies with the Most Toys Wins?

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 03-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Whatever his other limitations, Vladimir Putin has shown he is a master in exploiting Russian nationalism and American and European sensitivities. His latest gambit—publicizing new Russian nuclear systems—several of which are still developmental, may have key components that are untested, or do not yet exist—give him political credibility in asserting Russian national strength in a Russian election year, and emphasize the one key area where Russia remains a leading global super power: its possession of nuclear weapons. The key question is whether they represent any real change in the nuclear balance, Russian and U.S. ability to pose an existential threat to the other state, and mutual assured destruction. If they do not, they are more technological status symbols or “toys” than real threats, although the proliferation of such weapons might allow smaller nuclear powers like Iran and North Korea to defeat today’s missile and air defense systems and technologies. An analysis of the actual content of his speech, the changing nuclear and conventional balance between the superpowers—the U.S., Russia, and China, the global balance of deployed nuclear weapons, the shifts taking in US and Russian balance since the Cold War, and as a result of START, the full range of new U.S. and Russian nuclear programs, and of what Putin did and did not say about Russia's new programs, provides a very different picture from the one Putin portrayed in his speech. It shows that Putin focused on the "toy factor" in emphasize technology over any real world aspects of the balance, arms control, and war fighting.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nationalism, Military Strategy, Authoritarianism, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS