Search

Begin New Search Topic Military Strategy

1. A new face of war: Russian military strategy post-Ukraine

Author:
Oscar Jonsson
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Among Russian strategists, there is a strong renewed appreciation for positional warfare and a strategy of attrition. This is a pivot from Russia’s pre-war strategy of “active defence,” which sought to move away from positional defence towards manoeuvre. The strength of a positional and defensive strategy comes from technological innovation, with an exponential growth in unmanned systems and space-based sensors, which are believed to make the battlefield transparent. The transparent battlefield concept challenges key principles of manoeuvre warfare, such as concentrating forces and surprise. A key priority for Russian strategists is to break the positional deadlock and re-establish the conditions for manoeuvre. This can be done through technological development in AI and drones and a more networked military that can mass fires across the entire depth of the adversary. In a potential war with Russia, NATO will face a military that is experienced on a drone- and sensorrich battlefield and that is increasing its ability to look beyond the frontline and strike further into the operational depth. The Russian military is putting effort into re-establishing the conditions for manoeuvre while denying their adversary the ability to do the same.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States

Author:
Lyle Morris
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China lacks experience dealing with military crises and has attempted to compensate by investing considerable intellectual capital to develop theories and strategies for managing escalation with potential adversaries. China’s military strategists believe that if a crisis breaks out, it can be “controlled,” and escalation can be “managed” by applying scientific principles and advanced military technology. People’s Liberation Army strategists have developed a conceptual framework for managing crises called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) — a flexible, graduated tool designed to guide political and military action during times of tension. Due to an overreliance on theoretical underpinnings, China believes it can control all facets of military escalation. This could make China’s leaders overconfident in their ability to prevail in a conflict and increase the risk of escalation in a military confrontation between China and the United States. The writings of Chinese military strategists omit how China’s behavior may be perceived — or misperceived — by an adversary. Absent is an acknowledgment that China’s actions, such as in space or cyberspace, may be viewed as provocative and grounds for the tit-for-tat escalation that Beijing seeks to avoid. Further research is necessary to explore the actions that China’s military may employ to manage escalation and how adversaries may interpret them.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Escalation, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. China Maritime Report #50: Foggy With a Chance of Surprise Attack: PLA Amphibious Deception in a Taiwan Scenario

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views deception as a force multiplier and war-winning weapon. The PLA leadership reserves a special place of veneration for wartime commanders who can employ deception to obtain surprise, something Xi Jinping refers to as “excelling at stratagem.” In January 1955, the PLA launched a surprise attack on the Yijiangshan islands, then controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei. This campaign remains a case study in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for how to conduct amphibious operations and catch defenders off guard. Empirical historical research shows that amphibious operations, while complex and difficult to conduct, almost always achieve their objectives. The critical factor is the shock they cause, and that is often enhanced by deception. PLA textbooks and field manuals explicitly link the difficulty of a future Taiwan invasion with the need to embrace unconventional approaches. They exhort officers at all levels of command to use deception. Advanced intelligence and surveillance technologies do not make a surprise attack on Taiwan unachievable. A zero-warning invasion remains virtually impossible, but it is also unnecessary from the PLA’s perspective. Chinese military researchers envision employing robots, containerized missiles, and unmanned amphibious vehicles to confuse and unbalance Taiwan’s defenders in a future war. American and Taiwanese strategists should account for unique ways the PLA may attempt to achieve the element of surprise and plan against those courses of action. War games, simulations, and field exercises that account for a surprise attack on Taiwan could generate insights and help senior leaders rethink the levels of risk associated with current and possible future defense postures. Immediate steps should be taken to cope with deception and minimize reaction times so that any sudden amphibious landings on Taiwan, while dramatic, will not be decisive.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Amphibious Operations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

4. Admiral Castex and the Israeli Navy: A Holistic View of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East

Author:
Meysune Yaşar
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:
Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:
The post-regime change order debates in Syria have strengthened the place of the Eastern Mediterranean on the agenda. In this context, Israel’s maritime strategy has been considered noteworthy for both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The study examines this strategy through French Admiral Raoul Castex's approach to naval strategy for non-hegemonic states and seeks an answer to the question of how Israel shapes its contacts with the Middle East through the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean. Admiral Castex focuses on the maritime behaviour of regional powers and emphasizes two important approaches: improving the ability of manoeuvre and the primacy of the offensive. Within the framework of these two approaches, the study examines the Israeli navy in the Eastern Mediterranean between 2011 and 2024. Thus, on the one hand, it draws the hegemonic state-oriented approach of classical naval studies to the regional level, and on the other hand, it aims to portray the naval behaviour of Israel, which is an important party to regional competition, through its contacts with the Middle East.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Navy, and Admiral Raoul Castex
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Eastern Mediterranean

5. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ukraine’s Strategy And Western Military Assistance

Author:
Hennadiy Maksak
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
International partners have provided significant military assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. The temporary suspension of critical US military assistance in early 2025 raised concerns about Ukraine’s strategy to fend off Russia. While it is difficult to predict how the battlefield will unfold in 2025, strong ties with Western partners will be crucial to continue a war of attrition against an overwhelming enemy.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

6. Enhancing NATO’s Naval Power in the High North

Author:
Gonzalo III Vázquez
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
With the return of great power competition, the Arctic is set to become increasingly relevant for global geopolitics and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) security. The potential for higher tensions in the region demands that the alliance’s member states strengthen their deterrence vis-à-vis Moscow, a task for which naval forces and the maritime domain as a whole will be pivotal. This article argues that the alliance should consider the establishment of an additional standing NATO maritime group (SNMG) for the Arctic region to undertake missions and operations similar to those that the SNMG 1 has performed during the last few years. Its establishment would enhance maritime domain awareness, naval power, and deterrence in the northern flank, albeit facing significant challenges in terms of force generation and adaptation to cold weather conditions. These challenges, however, should not automatically disqualify the proposal as entirely unattainable, but rather be seen as a longer-term goal.
Topic:
NATO, Military Strategy, Navy, Maritime, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:
Arctic

7. The Role of Artificial Intelligence in the U.S. Military Strategy in Proxy Wars, 2020–2024

Author:
Ehsan Ejazi and Mahsa Ahmadyan
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Proxy war has been a dynamic U.S. military strategy since the Cold War. In recent decades, however, artificial intelligence (AI) as a new manifestation of technology has played a significant role in these wars. The United States has been a pioneer in this field, making substantial investments, annually allocates multibillion-dollar budgets to advance robotic and automated weapons to win future wars. Artificial intelligence proxy wars can manage the competition between international actors as a mediating factor without wasting human resources. The main question of this article is as follows: What is the role of artificial intelligence in U.S. military strategy, and how much can this new technology help win proxy wars? The findings indicate that the United States, by applying artificial intelligence technology to its military equipment with remote control capabilities, robots, and automated guided weapons, has reduced human and financial costs while increasing the probability of triumph on the battlefield. However, the obtained data, according to moral and humanitarian criteria, suggest a high rate of civilian casualties in such military conflicts.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

8. Technological maturity for Jeune École: The case of Ukraine’s naval strategy

Author:
Guntis Skunstiņš
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This paper conducts an in-depth study on how Ukraine changed the balance of military power in the Black Sea. It conceptualises the idea that the development of modern military technology has reached a level of maturity, providing a new perspective for the Jeune École concept. The paper uses the process tracing method to establish a timeline from Russian full blockade to Ukrainian sea denial. The battlefield application of anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) in the early stages of the war created the necessary conditions for establishing sea denial, followed by the continued use of ASCM, aerial drones, and maritime drones to consolidate the initial successes. The international community observed Ukraine’s deployment of unmanned systems with great interest, heralding it as the dawn of a new era in naval warfare. However, when analysed in depth, it becomes clear that traditional weaponry played the decisive role in achieving sea denial initially. Only after the Russian Federation’s fleet had been forced from the coastal waters did naval drones begin to extend and solidify the denied area. The research further indicates that even a smaller state can produce significant strategic effects using anti-ship cruise missiles and swarming maritime drones—principles rooted in the historic Jeune École doctrine. Findings reveal that technological advances have significantly mitigated the traditional limitations of small platforms, especially in adverse conditions. As such, the combination of Jeune École’s asymmetric maritime strategy and modern unmanned systems offers a viable blueprint for smaller nations to challenge superior naval forces, dispute blockades, and achieve effective sea denial.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Navy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Warfare
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

9. Deep fires and the British strategic posture: does the war in Ukraine validate it?

Author:
Eduardo Munhoz Svartman, Augusto W.M. Teixeira Junior, and Tamiris Pereira dos santos
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine war presented an unintended chance to assess the British strategic posture regarding deep fires. The deployment of guided rocket artillery systems by Ukrainian forces in 2022 altered the land battle dynamics significantly, especially with the modern Western deep fires by the US, UK, and France. This study analyses the evolution of the UK defence policy and land force structure and the impact of deep fires in the first phase of the war, and discusses challenges ahead of Britain due to the ongoing conflict. This perspective might apply to other cases, including Brazil, as we drew upon critiques mainly directed to the over-reliance on technology over combat mass due to the re-emergence of conventional warfare.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, and Ukraine

10. Lecciones militares estratégicas de la Guerra de Ucrania

Author:
Yago Rodríguez
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
La mayor guerra europea desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial es una fuente natural de lecciones para cualquier ejército. En el siguiente estudio ofrecemos una tamización de las lecciones estratégicas estrictamente militares que nos ha dejado la guerra a partir de la disección de la historia militar de la misma.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

11. Selecting San Carlos: The Falklands War, 1982

Author:
Michael T. Maus
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Abstract: During the Falklands War in 1982, the United Kingdom conducted an amphibious landing to repossess the Falkland Islands from the invading Argentinians. The Falkland Islands naturally possess thousands of miles of shoreline and more than two dozen suitable beaches for an amphibious landing with several in close proximity to the United Kingdom’s primary objective of Stanley. However, British forces landed in the San Carlos Water, a bay across East Falkland Island miles from their objective all the while short of tracked vehicles and helicopter transports and pressured by the approaching onset of the Southern Hemisphere’s winter. This article analyzes why British task force planners selected the San Carlos inlet for an amphibious assault and what parameters and events bound or persuaded planners to make their final decision. This article contributes to the operational analysis historiography of the Falklands War by examining the reasoning of selection and further supplements the historiography on the British way of war with regard to amphibious operations.
Topic:
History, Military Strategy, Falklands War, and Amphibious Operations
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Argentina, South America, and Falkland Islands

12. Fires From the Shore: Supporting the Fight for Sea Control

Author:
Shaun Callahan
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The struggle to obtain, maintain, and exploit sea control during a campaign is an inherently Joint endeavor requiring a multi-Service, ­cross-domain application of firepower and maneuver. Maritime strikes from the land domain provide a critical offset to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) growing strength at sea and enable Joint force maneuver in the Western Pacific. To have a meaningful impact on the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) surface action groups and contribute to a Joint force objective to gain sea control in the Western Pacific as part of a coordinated campaign, the U.S. Army’s maritime strike capability must be aggregated into effective salvos by the supported maritime component commander. If deterrence fails in a strategically near future, naval operations in the Western Pacific will need to incorporate the U.S. Army’s multidomain task forces and their maritime strike capability to defeat the PRC’s antiaccess, area-denial (A2/AD) strategy.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Army, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Sea Control, and Joint Force Maneuver
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. Oceans Are Now Battlefields: How the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Can Counter North Korea’s Navy in an Evolving Age

Author:
Alan Cunningham
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The North Korean armed forces are one of the main threats in the Asian geographic region and consistently have been a thorn in the side of Western allied Asian nations and the United States. In such a conflict with the North Koreans, the United States would, alongside others, take a lead role in countering North Korean naval forces. Taking into account the Force Design 2030 and 2045 battleplans devised by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, it is imperative to explore how the United States could work to combat North Korean forces in the near future. With the Force Designs and stated modernizations and improvements being performed in sea-based warfare, there is much more to do to make a strong military force that can strike against the North Koreans.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Maritime, Marine Corps, Amphibious Operations, and Force Design
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

14. Land Power in the Littoral: An Australian Perspective

Author:
John Nash
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The Australian Army is coming to terms with a new strategic direction set by the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR), 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS), and the Integrated Investment Program (IIP). This article considers how the Australian Army fits into this new direction as a littoral maneuver-focused force providing long-range strike capability. It examines concepts and analyzes how the Australian Army might be used in future scenarios: what it might be required to do in the maritime environment, whether it is contributing to sea control operations, sea denial, and/or intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR). In addition, there is the maneuver component and how the Army might use the littorals of the Indo-Pacific as a maneuver space. This article seeks to generate discussion on how a modern land force might adapt to conflict and competition in the Indo-Pacific littoral.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Maneuver, Littoral, and Australian Defence Force
Political Geography:
Australia and Indo-Pacific

15. Rescuing the Unreachable: Personnel Recovery and Resupply in a Contested Environment

Author:
William Fensterer, Richard Jr. Marshall, Colleen Minihan, and Jason Philips
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
In a potential armed conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific, sustainment of the Joint force is not assured. China’s modernized antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities threaten sustainment lines of communication and challenge successful joint personnel recovery operations. This article examines the Joint operating environment through the lens of a historical case study, analysis of the current operating environment, and an assessment of the future operating environment—the next fight. The authors propose large quantity artificial intelligence (AI)-capable unmanned systems and a scalable force concept able to penetrate the A2/AD and recover and resupply the Joint force. Fielding new and existing technologies, continual doctrine refinement, and tailored wargaming is necessary to find and cover the gaps in our capabilities and be prepared to win the next fight.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, Logistics, Joint Force Maneuver, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, and Personnel Recovery
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

16. Maritime Militias: Disrupting Naval Operations in the Pacific Theater and the Case for Intermediate Force Capabilities in the Maritime Domain

Author:
Peter Dobias
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
China aims to pursue national goals through a combination of political, diplomatic, and information maneuvering. With China’s growing assertiveness against other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the risk of a military conflict in the region is increasing. Drawing on the ideological importance of militias, during the last 10 years China heavily invested in building its fleet of maritime militias masquerading as fishing vessels. This article argues that in case of a conflict in the Asia-Pacific, these militias could be employed to interfere with the U.S. and allied forces and supply flow within and into the theater and disrupt naval and amphibious operations in the Pacific theater. While there are limited ways of engaging these forces below a lethal threshold, the intermediate force capabilities could provide the allied forces with a broader range of options, while imposing some cost and dilemmas on the adversary, and potentially contribute to the deterring of their use.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Navy, Maritime, Deterrence, Militias, Military Operations, and Disruption
Political Geography:
China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

17. Breaking the Newtonian Fetish: Conceptualizing War Differently for a Changing World

Author:
Ben Zweibelson
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Explaining what a military’s social paradigm concerning conflict and war is requires a theoretical approach to both frame the core constructs and offer feasible alternatives. This article introduces social paradigm theory for military application and how most modern, technologically advanced militaries sustain a Newtonian-styled worldview concerning warfare and what constitutes war. The Newtonian-styled war paradigm gained prominence during the last five centuries, yet is now becoming increasingly insufficient and possibly irrelevant. The integration of ever-increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence into nearly all aspects of warfare will require new ways of thinking and how teams of humans and AI systems collaborate in complex security contexts immediately. The new combination of the space domain, cyberspace, those military forces associated with these new domains, and special operations activities are of increased focus for how and why conflict may change, particularly within an overarching traditional nuclear deterrence between state competitors. This requires a military paradigmatic shift, moving away from Newtonian constructs.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, Warfare, Complexity, Force Design, and Emergence
Political Geography:
Global Focus, United States of America, and Space

18. How to do strategic foresight

Author:
Samantha Cristoforetti and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
F oresight” is on the rise. What was a discipline restricted to a few people decades ago has become very popular. That’s good news – a wider use of foresight can have a number of benefits, as this guide explains. However, along with that popularity, the expectations about the scope of foresight have also grown. We can even find an aura of mystery surrounding the discipline. This is less helpful, as there is a risk of creating misperceptions about the nature of foresight. That is why it is necessary to limit the scope of foresight from the outset by clearly stating what it is and is not. Foresight is not about predicting or knowing the future. Despite the fantastic cover of this work, the aim of foresight is not envisioning what the future holds for us, i.e. predicting what is going to happen. Instead, foresight aims to make us more aware of what may happen, through a broad study of phenomena that are already present, so as to inform potential decisions. It may seem paradoxical, but a thorough analysis of the present reality is the basis of good foresight. Foresight is not a body of expert knowledge. It is not the realm of “experts” who pretend to hold special insights on the future. Rather, foresight is a methodical approach to thinking about possible futures that, at the same time, allows us to reveal and refine the assumptions and understandings we have about those futures. That does not mean that expertise does not matter. To the contrary, good foresight must integrate thematic, regional, scientific, military, political, economic, environmental, and other expertise to provide valuable insights. Foresight is not an end in itself. Instead, foresight is the first step to building better strategies and policies and improve the decision-making process in general. In this regard, foresight helps us to understand how potential, plausible futures could look like. Foresight helps us challenge our understandings and assumptions about the future, preventing bias that could hinder our plans and policies. Furthermore, foresight can help us shape our idea of a preferred future and set the basis of our effort to achieve it. Strategic foresight goes beyond pure foresight practices and is about integrating foresight into the policy-making process. This is a statement closely related to the previous idea and justifies the title of this guide. Chapter 4, “Setting the Policy,” is precisely dedicated to linking foresight to the policy/strategy-making process. As highlighted there, developing strategies and plans can be enhanced and supported by considering multiple alternative futures and their implications. This guide will use both terms, strategic foresight and foresight, the latter more specifically referring to the discipline of exploring, anticipating, and shaping the future in a systemic way.1 This guide aims to provide a simple tool for policy practitioners to start navigating the foresight discipline and help foster foresight thinking in policy teams and organizations. It does not intend to present a set of last-generation methodologies. Instead, this guide offers some simple tools and techniques of proven effectiveness that can be used by non-expert personnel. Nevertheless, simplicity is not equivalent to a lack of rigour, so the guide proposes a complete foresight process, starting with driver identification and scenario-building and ending with preparing and monitoring subsequent policies.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Foresight
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

19. Inequality kills: on Russian combat ineff ectiveness in Ukraine and beyond

Author:
Pilster Ulrich and Olesya Vinhas de Souza
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
What would Russia’s military strategy be in a war with NATO? Before 2022, many analysts worried about the scenario in which Russia, leveraging a tactically profi cient and well-coordinated combined arms force, could swiftly overrun the Baltics in a matter of days. Drawing on a statistical analysis of historical battles and an examination of Russian force structure and equipment losses in Ukraine, we challenge this view. Endemic inequality within the Russian Armed Forces will continue to impede their adoption of the sophisticated tactics necessary for manoeuvre warfare. Therefore, we anticipate that a future potential Russian attack would resemble a war of attrition. Unable to quickly out-manoeuvre NATO forces, Moscow would aim to deploy overwhelming fi repower and manpower against Allied troops and civilian populations, with an aim to infl ict widespread and sustained destruction.
Topic:
NATO, Military Strategy, Inequality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

20. The United Front, Comprehensive Integration, and China’s Nonmilitary Strategy Toward Taiwan

Author:
Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Global opinions have increasingly considered the potential danger of war in the Taiwan Strait should China take military action to invade the island in pursuit of its plan for “full unification of the motherland.” These are legitimate concerns, as such danger increases with the growth of both China’s national power and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s global ambitions. Military action should not, however, devalue Beijing’s military-backed, nonmilitary strategy to reclaim Taiwan. What, in practice, is the specific purpose of Beijing’s nonmilitary strategy? How do nonmilitary and military means mutually support each other in China’s overall reunification strategy? As the Taiwan populace seemingly drifts further away in terms of a shared Chinese identity and rejects future unification, why does China still deem nonmilitary means optimal for dealing with Taiwan? This paper addresses these questions by first discussing how China’s Taiwan strategy consists of both military and nonmilitary elements, highlighting how Xi has upgraded the latter by “putting the people at the center” of “peaceful reunification” while simultaneously preparing military action and how the nonmilitary strategy follows the spirit of the united front political strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It then investigates one of China’s latest nonmilitary initiatives to deal with Taiwan, namely, the “cross-strait integrated development demonstration zone” in Fujian, and analyzes the strategic implications of those various measures for promoting “comprehensive integration.”1 The third section explores how the CCP defines the situation in the Taiwan Strait as a continuation of civil war and, accordingly, employs both military and nonmilitary strategies for winning said war. By considering how the two strategies complement one another, it also explains why CCP leadership has strengthened nonmilitary means, such as integration, despite prior ineffectiveness. The paper concludes that nonmilitary measures will not ultimately lead to “peaceful reunification” but are instead intended to mask Beijing’s overall capabilities to deal with Taiwan.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Regional Integration, Economic Development, and Identity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia