Topic: Military Strategy - CIAO Search Results

1. Deep fires and the British strategic posture: does the war in Ukraine validate it?

Author:: Eduardo Munhoz Svartman, Augusto W.M. Teixeira Junior, and Tamiris Pereira dos santos
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The Russia-Ukraine war presented an unintended chance to assess the British strategic posture regarding deep fires. The deployment of guided rocket artillery systems by Ukrainian forces in 2022 altered the land battle dynamics significantly, especially with the modern Western deep fires by the US, UK, and France. This study analyses the evolution of the UK defence policy and land force structure and the impact of deep fires in the first phase of the war, and discusses challenges ahead of Britain due to the ongoing conflict. This perspective might apply to other cases, including Brazil, as we drew upon critiques mainly directed to the over-reliance on technology over combat mass due to the re-emergence of conventional warfare.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, United Kingdom, and Ukraine

2. Lecciones militares estratégicas de la Guerra de Ucrania

Author:: Yago Rodríguez
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: La mayor guerra europea desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial es una fuente natural de lecciones para cualquier ejército. En el siguiente estudio ofrecemos una tamización de las lecciones estratégicas estrictamente militares que nos ha dejado la guerra a partir de la disección de la historia militar de la misma.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Selecting San Carlos: The Falklands War, 1982

Author:: Michael T. Maus
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Abstract: During the Falklands War in 1982, the United Kingdom conducted an amphibious landing to repossess the Falkland Islands from the invading Argentinians. The Falkland Islands naturally possess thousands of miles of shoreline and more than two dozen suitable beaches for an amphibious landing with several in close proximity to the United Kingdom’s primary objective of Stanley. However, British forces landed in the San Carlos Water, a bay across East Falkland Island miles from their objective all the while short of tracked vehicles and helicopter transports and pressured by the approaching onset of the Southern Hemisphere’s winter. This article analyzes why British task force planners selected the San Carlos inlet for an amphibious assault and what parameters and events bound or persuaded planners to make their final decision. This article contributes to the operational analysis historiography of the Falklands War by examining the reasoning of selection and further supplements the historiography on the British way of war with regard to amphibious operations.
Topic:: History, Military Strategy, Falklands War, and Amphibious Operations
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Argentina, South America, and Falkland Islands

4. Fires From the Shore: Supporting the Fight for Sea Control

Author:: Shaun Callahan
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The struggle to obtain, maintain, and exploit sea control during a campaign is an inherently Joint endeavor requiring a multi-Service, cross-domain application of firepower and maneuver. Maritime strikes from the land domain provide a critical offset to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) growing strength at sea and enable Joint force maneuver in the Western Pacific. To have a meaningful impact on the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) surface action groups and contribute to a Joint force objective to gain sea control in the Western Pacific as part of a coordinated campaign, the U.S. Army’s maritime strike capability must be aggregated into effective salvos by the supported maritime component commander. If deterrence fails in a strategically near future, naval operations in the Western Pacific will need to incorporate the U.S. Army’s multidomain task forces and their maritime strike capability to defeat the PRC’s antiaccess, area-denial (A2/AD) strategy.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Army, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Sea Control, and Joint Force Maneuver
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Oceans Are Now Battlefields: How the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Can Counter North Korea’s Navy in an Evolving Age

Author:: Alan Cunningham
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The North Korean armed forces are one of the main threats in the Asian geographic region and consistently have been a thorn in the side of Western allied Asian nations and the United States. In such a conflict with the North Koreans, the United States would, alongside others, take a lead role in countering North Korean naval forces. Taking into account the Force Design 2030 and 2045 battleplans devised by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, it is imperative to explore how the United States could work to combat North Korean forces in the near future. With the Force Designs and stated modernizations and improvements being performed in sea-based warfare, there is much more to do to make a strong military force that can strike against the North Koreans.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Maritime, Marine Corps, Amphibious Operations, and Force Design
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

6. Land Power in the Littoral: An Australian Perspective

Author:: John Nash
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The Australian Army is coming to terms with a new strategic direction set by the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR), 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS), and the Integrated Investment Program (IIP). This article considers how the Australian Army fits into this new direction as a littoral maneuver-focused force providing long-range strike capability. It examines concepts and analyzes how the Australian Army might be used in future scenarios: what it might be required to do in the maritime environment, whether it is contributing to sea control operations, sea denial, and/or intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR). In addition, there is the maneuver component and how the Army might use the littorals of the Indo-Pacific as a maneuver space. This article seeks to generate discussion on how a modern land force might adapt to conflict and competition in the Indo-Pacific littoral.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Maneuver, Littoral, and Australian Defence Force
Political Geography:: Australia and Indo-Pacific

7. Rescuing the Unreachable: Personnel Recovery and Resupply in a Contested Environment

Author:: William Fensterer, Richard Jr. Marshall, Colleen Minihan, and Jason Philips
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: In a potential armed conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific, sustainment of the Joint force is not assured. China’s modernized antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities threaten sustainment lines of communication and challenge successful joint personnel recovery operations. This article examines the Joint operating environment through the lens of a historical case study, analysis of the current operating environment, and an assessment of the future operating environment—the next fight. The authors propose large quantity artificial intelligence (AI)-capable unmanned systems and a scalable force concept able to penetrate the A2/AD and recover and resupply the Joint force. Fielding new and existing technologies, continual doctrine refinement, and tailored wargaming is necessary to find and cover the gaps in our capabilities and be prepared to win the next fight.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, Logistics, Joint Force Maneuver, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, and Personnel Recovery
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

8. Maritime Militias: Disrupting Naval Operations in the Pacific Theater and the Case for Intermediate Force Capabilities in the Maritime Domain

Author:: Peter Dobias
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: China aims to pursue national goals through a combination of political, diplomatic, and information maneuvering. With China’s growing assertiveness against other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the risk of a military conflict in the region is increasing. Drawing on the ideological importance of militias, during the last 10 years China heavily invested in building its fleet of maritime militias masquerading as fishing vessels. This article argues that in case of a conflict in the Asia-Pacific, these militias could be employed to interfere with the U.S. and allied forces and supply flow within and into the theater and disrupt naval and amphibious operations in the Pacific theater. While there are limited ways of engaging these forces below a lethal threshold, the intermediate force capabilities could provide the allied forces with a broader range of options, while imposing some cost and dilemmas on the adversary, and potentially contribute to the deterring of their use.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Navy, Maritime, Deterrence, Militias, Military Operations, and Disruption
Political Geography:: China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

9. Breaking the Newtonian Fetish: Conceptualizing War Differently for a Changing World

Author:: Ben Zweibelson
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Explaining what a military’s social paradigm concerning conflict and war is requires a theoretical approach to both frame the core constructs and offer feasible alternatives. This article introduces social paradigm theory for military application and how most modern, technologically advanced militaries sustain a Newtonian-styled worldview concerning warfare and what constitutes war. The Newtonian-styled war paradigm gained prominence during the last five centuries, yet is now becoming increasingly insufficient and possibly irrelevant. The integration of ever-increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence into nearly all aspects of warfare will require new ways of thinking and how teams of humans and AI systems collaborate in complex security contexts immediately. The new combination of the space domain, cyberspace, those military forces associated with these new domains, and special operations activities are of increased focus for how and why conflict may change, particularly within an overarching traditional nuclear deterrence between state competitors. This requires a military paradigmatic shift, moving away from Newtonian constructs.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, Warfare, Complexity, Force Design, and Emergence
Political Geography:: Global Focus, United States of America, and Space

10. La invasión rusa de Ucrania bajo el prisma de las teorías de control reflexivo

Author:: Arturo Esteban Ceballos
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: El presente artículo analiza las causas del fracaso de la fase inicial de la invasión rusa de Ucrania de febrero de 2022 desde el prisma de la teoría del control reflexivo. Esta teoría fue formulada en los años sesenta por el matemático y psicólogo Vladimir Lefebvre, y constituye hoy día una de las fuentes de inspiración de la moderna doctrina político militar de Rusia. Para ello, se ha utilizado un método hipotético deductivo sobre la base de una hipótesis que relaciona este fracaso con el manejo inadecuado de los marcos de información por parte de Rusia. Dado que la moderna doctrina militar de Rusia descansa en gran parte en las teorías del control reflexivo, el fracaso de este último provocó que no se alcanzasen las condiciones decisivas del enfrentamiento en las fases iniciales del conflicto. Ucrania había resistido las medidas activas rusas, lo que ocasionó un error de cálculo en el diseño estratégico inicial del Kremlin.
Topic:: Intelligence, Military Strategy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Reflexive Control
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

11. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

12. Buying Time: Logistics for a New American Way of War

Author:: Chris Dougherty
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Discussions about defense strategy that focus on combat units and fail to account for logistics are irrelevant when it comes to understanding how well the United States can deter or defeat aggression by China or Russia. Planes, ships, and tanks are just weapons systems; making them combat capabilities requires getting them and their crews into the fight; supplying them with fuel, food, water, medical care, and munitions; and keeping them maintained. Logistics, more than the quantity of forces or the quality of technology, will determine the potential combat power available to the United States in future conflict scenarios with China or Russia. It will influence Chinese and Russian decisions about going to war, and when, where, and how to fight. It will bound the military courses of action available to U.S. commanders and delineate the strategic options available to presidents. Despite this critical role, the Department of Defense has systemically underinvested in logistics in terms of money, mental energy, physical assets, and personnel. Neglect of logistics arguably became most severe in the post–Cold War era. Pressure to save money through efficiency and misguided attempts to run the department like a “lean” business disproportionately impacted logistics. Maximizing the ratio of combat “tooth” to logistical “tail” saved money, but at the cost of leaving U.S. armed forces with a logistical system that is stretched thin supporting peacetime operations and wholly unsuited to the demands of warfare with China or Russia. Recognizing U.S. dependence on strained logistics networks, China and Russia have developed means to attack these networks, including long-range missiles and cyberattacks. Barring changes to U.S. logistics and sustainment concepts, such attacks present a grave threat to the department’s ability to uphold U.S. security commitments in East Asia or eastern Europe.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Logistics
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

13. The Putin Doctrine: What is it? The Russian Strategic Issue and the Enlarged National Security

Author:: Jose Alexandre Altahyde Hage
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: One can mention that this essay is only a contribution for an urgent issue in International Relations that is igniting debates in part of the academic community and the press in general, Russian expansionism and its conception of international security that, in our view, can be defined as enlarged national security. For Moscow, the dividing line between the international and the domestic whereas considering this issue is very thin4. This is why it is not a part of our objective to exhaust such a broad and complex topic, but to present some of its features.The period analysed in this article begins in 1991, with the demise of the Soviet Union, till January 2022, that marks the beginning of military exercises in some parts of Ukraine, namely the Donbass region, promoted by Putin ́s government. Our theoretical and methodological framework is based on classical and contemporary geopolitical literature, Halford Mackinder and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and International Relations realist thinkers such as Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer. Nevertheless, that does not mean that we will not be able to reference some liberal authors, such as Francis Fukuyama and Joseph Stiglitz.Apart from this Introduction, our essay is divided as such: a first part in which we propose a brief review of the concept of doctrine, as used by interstate politics and the State ́s national power principle. Following, we present an analysis of the Putin Doctrine, seen as both a result and as a drive for Moscow ́s revisionism in the face of the current geopolitical balance. In the third part, we examine some passages of the 1990s and of this emerging system, as an era of globalization, liberalization and “shock therapy” that disturbed the Russian quantum. Last, but not least, in our Final Thoughts some reflections will be brought.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

14. United States Foreign Policy Towards Jordan From the Political and Security Dimensions from 1990 to 2017

Author:: Ala Alkhawaldeh and Ayman Hayajneh
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: Foreign policy cannot be dissociated from what we call the theory of international relations (Holsti, 2015). Relations between Jordan and the United States go back to 1949 when diplomatic relations were first established. The United States contributed to providing economic and military assistance to Jordan for the first time since 1951 and 1957, respectively, and has continued until now. The United States and Jordan share the common goals of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East and to end violent extremism that threatens the security of Jordan, the region, and the world at large. The peace process and counterterrorism between the two countries aid American interests. The United States has helped Jordan maintain its stability and prosperity through military assistance and close political cooperation (Bush, 2009).This study examines the United States foreign policy towards Jordan from 1990 to 2017. This period witnessed important regional and international political events that significantly impacted American foreign policy in the Arab region and the United States - Jordan in particular. The political events covered in the study have the greatest impact on the development or decline of relations between the two countries in terms of politically and security aspects.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

15. The Foreign Policy of Post-Revolutionary Iran: Expediency at the Crossroad of Suprra-Nationalism and Soverignty

Author:: Hamoon Khelghat-Doost
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy has been a source of argument among scholars since the establishment of the revolutionary regime in 1979. Iran’s foreign policy just like its revolution is still a mystery to many researchers as it is difficult to find an appropriate theoretical framework for it. Revolution and how revolutionary states such as China and Cuba view the world and build their foreign relations with other nations have been long discussed in the works of prominent scholars including Leng (1972), Armstrong (1993), Walt (1996), Halliday (2002), and Doma-Nguez & Domínguez (2009). However, what makes the foreign policy of revolutionary Iran different from other revolutionary states (mostly Marxist revolutions) and, therefore, more confusing to study, is the Shi’a Islamic nature of it.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

16. Starr Forum: Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War

Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. IMperial or Colonial: The War is Fought Over The Soviet Past an A Broken Relationship

Author:: Li Bennich-Bjorkman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Russia is trying, through its bombs, attacks, and brutality, to erase what Ukraine was. Therefore, it is a war effort to keep remembering how Ukraine in peace looked like, how it smelled, tasted, and felt. And to never forget that this is a war against Ukraine, in its own right. Not as a representative of the West, and not as a representative of democracy. But because Ukraine is of such importance to Russia, that a break between the two is unthinkable for Putin. That was what Leonid Kravchuk, the Ukrainian president, realized already in 1991. He, and Ukrainian leaders after him, tried to protect their territory while at the same time reassuring Russia that relations could still be friendly. But Russia has never changed in a similar way
Topic:: Imperialism, Military Strategy, Colonialism, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. Small States and the War in Ukraine

Author:: Anders Wivel
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The War in Ukraine signals a return to the sphere of influence politics and great powers’ use of military instruments against their weaker neighbors. The consequences for small states are negative. Although some small states will find new opportunities for hedging and brinkmanship, most small states will see their chances of shaping international agendas reduced as they increasingly focus on defensive aims. To meet these challenges small states must work together to promote their shared interests: 1) A modus vivendi between the great power, which minimizes the risk of great power war as well as the annexation and invasion of smaller states, 2) a rule-based international order; 3) a relaunch the United Nations as the central arena for debates on international society among sovereign states.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Superpower
Political Geography:: Global Focus

19. U.S. Foreign Policy an the War in Ukraine

Author:: James A. Russell
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: This essay assesses the impact of the war in Ukraine on American foreign policy. The thesis provided here is that the war in Ukraine must be viewed as a painful but maybe necessary shock therapy that has helped to relieve the residual hangover from America’s two-decade-long, ill-advised war on terror and the lost wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In parallel, the war has served as a vehicle for the reinvigoration of national grand strategy and the foreign policy that provides the vital connective tissue between ends, ways, and means. In this trinity, the foreign policy represents an instrumental tool to connect the assumptions that undergird grand strategy to the practical, real-world of international politics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

20. Exploring the Russian Perspective on the War in Ukraine: Demography's Power and Ukraine's Uniqueness

Author:: Aybars Arda Kilicer
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Western officials and media have portrayed Russia as a rogue state that seeks to undermine the fundamental foundations of the Western lifestyle, which are based on democratic and liberal principles, especially more since the invasion of the remaining Ukrainian territories began on 24 February 2022. According to this perspective, Russia allegedly launched its strike to prevent Ukraine from joining the club of liberal nations. This move would have been a clear message to any other post-Soviet countries, further strengthening Russian control over them. It would be unfair to completely dismiss this argument, yet, justifying the simplification of the procedure and the continuation of conflict on these reasons goes much beyond presenting the facts. A thorough examination of the many issues involved is necessary to comprehend the Russian motivations for the ongoing war. This calls for an in-depth analysis of the Crimean Question, focusing on how Russia uses demographics in its foreign strategy. In addition, within the broader context of The Russian World (Russkiy Mir) Vision, it is crucial to understand the relevance of Russia’s unique perspective on Ukraine. The objective of this study is to provide an analytical framework concentrating on these apparently most visible factors for Russia’s willingness to raise tensions in Eastern Europe further and invade the remaining territory under the sovereignty of Ukraine.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

21. Why Romania is a NATO "Model Ally?"

Author:: Petre Roman
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: NATO’s eastward expansion was a fundamental geopolitical process that allowed countries to be prepared for the worst, the Russian revanche, by pursuing the best, the most successful path for democracy. Romania, which emerged from the tremendous communist Ceausescu regime, strongly wanted NATO membership and, after the first encouraging meetings in 1990, officially entered in 2004. However, Romania has been already back then contributed to many Western missions. Due to its geographical position, Romania is central to all NATO objectives. Now, Romania and Poland are the pivots of NATO’s defensive complex in the “postsoviet space”: Poland protects the Baltic Sea, Romania the Black Sea, where the Russian old-imperial appetites remain; Romania still defends the precious grain corridor. Furthermore, Romania is a “model ally”. There is a solid pro-Atlantic and pro-American sentiment in the country.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Europe and Romania

22. Towards a Fuzzy World Order: What Role for NATO

Author:: Richard Higgott and Simon Reich
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Bi-polarity, multi-polarity, the end of globalization, or Cold War v. 2.0. New explanations of world order abound. Often, they are asserted rather than reasoned by pundits looking for their 15 minutes of fame. This paper is much more modest. It eschews grand statements about world order. Rather we demonstrate that the future is far less clear cut and predetermined. Yes, a global binary is emerging around U.S.-China competition, but it is what we describe as fuzzy bifurcation. If our analysis is accurate, then it affects the behavior of other actors differently than a tight bi-polar system. In this paper we look at the implications of a fuzzy bifurcation of world order for that most important of alliances – NATO.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

23. Modelling Nuclear W Modelling Nuclear Weapon E eapon Effects in W ects in Wargaming Using Monte gaming Using Monte Carlo Simulations

Author:: Tyler Guetzke
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:: The United States Army’s interpretation of nuclear weapon effects needs change and modernization. Wargaming exercises are commonplace in today’s military, however, despite the growing threat of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), little has been done to inform battlefield commanders on their true effects. Our research seeks to develop a tool for commanders to easily interpret quantifiable effects of a NSNW. Utilizing Monte Carlo simulation, we are developing a new methodology to analyze NSNW effects. Our model allows a commander to calculate the expected unit strength following a NSNW strike which will aid in their operational decision making ability. The Monte Carlo simulation method for analyzing nuclear effects offers a novel approach to account for variation while giving the commander an analytically interpretable output as descriptive statistics that avoids probabilities.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Command and Control
Political Geography:: Global Focus

24. Pakistan Security Report 2022

Author:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: In 2022, the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan marked an increase of 27 percent from the previous year. The number of terrorist attacks in the country also continued to rise for the second consecutive year. A total of 262 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in the year – including 14 suicide bombings –claimed in all 419 lives and injured another 734 people. A 25 percent increase has been recorded in fatalities in the outgoing year as compared with 2021. Pak Institute for Peace Studies revealed these statistics in its annual “Pakistan Security Report 2022”. The report further noted that the proscribed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was becoming a major irritant in Islamabad’s relations with the Taliban government in Kabul as the militant group remained one of the major actors of violence in Pakistan in the year 2022. Other critical actors of violence in 2022 were Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Over 60 percent of total terrorist attacks recorded in Pakistan in the year were perpetrated by these three militant groups. Similarly, about 95 percent of the total recorded terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2022 concentrated in in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Governance, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and Asia

25. What Losing the Iran Deal Could Mean for the Region

Author:: Seyed Hossein Mousavian
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: If President Joe Biden is seeking to restore sustainable peace and security in the region, he has to start with reviving the JCPOA
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Peace, JCPOA, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

26. Fortune and Hazard for Algeria

Author:: Zine Labidine Ghebouli
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: War in Ukraine has brought new cash flow to Algiers, but the state must walk an ever-narrowing path to maintain its non-alignment
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa and Algeria

27. The Russian-Ukrainian War: An Opportunity to Strengthen the AfCFTA

Author:: Steve Tametong and Venessa Aboudi
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: The world had hardly covered from the horrors of the COVID-19 pandemic when it was once again tested on February 24, 2022, by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The consequences of this war are quite significant for humanity. On the economic level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the disadvantages of globalization, understood as a process marked by the interconnection and interdependence of world economies. The inflationary shock and the food crisis resulting from the inoperative nature of import channels for certain basic necessities from Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the fragility of the economies. With regard to African countries, in particular, the prices of several basic food products (wheat, flour, rice, maize, bread, vegetable oil, etc.) have risen sharply. Indeed, most African countries are almost dependent on the import of agricultural products and seeds from the two belligerent countries. These imports correspond to 35 billion US dollars of imports each year (1). This appears to be an incongruity given the extent of arable land on the African continent. The low production and especially processing capacity increases the dependence of African economies on the import of these basic products. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to question the economic resilience of African States, that is to say, their “capacity [ to] keep output close to [their] potential despite a shock ” (2). Above all, it offers the opportunity to analyze the economic and commercial potential of the AfCFTA in the process of building the resilience of African economies to external shocks. Indeed, the AfCFTA was officially launched in January 2021 with the main objective of “creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by the movement of people in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent…” (3). This policy note is structured around the idea that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in view of its socio-economic consequences on the African continent, offers an opportunity for African countries to work toward the strengthening of the AfCFTA. So that it appears as a real pole of competitiveness and inter-African trade likely to counter the shocks and uncertainties of the dynamics of world trade. Before analyzing the AfCFTA as a pole of production and export of African products (II), it is necessary to take stock of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on African economies (I).
Topic:: Security, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Free Trade, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

28. Reach for the Stars: Bridging Italy’s Potential in Space with Its Foreign and Security Policy

Author:: Karolina Muti
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Italian capabilities, expertise and potential in the space sector are not widely known. Among state actors, Rome has actually been a pioneer in the field, boasting a long tradition that started in 1964 when Italy became the third country, after the Soviet Union and the United States, to send a nationally manufactured satellite into orbit.[1] From an industrial standpoint, Italy is among the few countries whose companies cover the whole space value chain.[2] In Europe, Rome is ranked second for total number of assets in orbit and is currently the third contributor to the European Space Agency (ESA).[3] An Italian astronaut, Samantha Cristoforetti, has recently become the first European woman to take command of the International Space Station (ISS).[4]
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

29. The Default Policy Option: Chaos

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Chaos in the territories poses a security problem to Israel, but such a problem is less acute if the Palestinian militias vying for influence compete with each other.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

30. The Russian Bloodletting Strategy in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: From Success to Hubris

Author:: Spyridon N. Litsas
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The article focuses on the role of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in shaping the balance of power in the Lesser Caucasus as a prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It argues that Russia implemented a “bait and bleed” strategy to discipline Armenia for its pro-Western agenda. In addition, it focuses on Turkey’s role as a supportive apparatus for Azerbaijan’s military efforts against Armenia, evaluating the connection established between Moscow and Ankara. The Nagorno-Karabakh case marked a new manipulative Russian strategy to influence the balance of power in regions with geostrategic significance for the Kremlin.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Caucasus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

31. “Trying Not to Lose It” The Allied Disaster in France and the Low Countries, 1940

Author:: Richard J. Shuster
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article argues that the critical point of failure in the Allied catastrophe in France and the Low Countries in 1940 was a military plan that ignored key tenets of operational art and planning. In doing so, it points out that the Allies lacked a strategy oriented toward victory, failed to balance their operational factors of time, space, and force, and planned against a single potential enemy course of action. Together, these components set the conditions for a swift Allied defeat that shocked the world.
Topic:: History, Military Strategy, and World War II
Political Geography:: Europe and France

32. Assessing Israel's military strategy in Gaza

Author:: Michael K. Nagata, Mick Mulroy, and Rachel Dooley
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The Middle East Institute hosted an on-the-record press briefing to discuss Israel’s military strategy in Gaza, including the IDF’s successes and challenges in northern Gaza, the ramifications of a ceasefire versus a pause in fighting, and the growing humanitarian crisis. Recorded Tuesday, November 14, 2023.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Humanitarian Crisis, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

33. The Zangezur corridor as part of the global transport route (against the backdrop of power games in the South Caucasus region)

Author:: Piotr Gawliczek and Khayal Iskandarov
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The restoration of historical transport routes and the creation of new ones is a strategic objective of most states in modern times. Located at the intersection of the North–South and East–West transport routes, Azerbaijan is currently recognised as an important transport and logistics hub. Successful cooperation with European Union countries in this field is taking place. The East–West and North–South international transport routes passing through the territory of Azerbaijan are very convenient for cargo transportation in terms of distance and duration. This paper discusses the plausibility of the Zangezur corridor being used (which is mentioned in the tripartite agreement that dates back to 10 November 2020) and highlights its importance as an integral element of the global transit route. A comparative analysis of different transit routes was carried out, and the advantages of opening this corridor for all stakeholders was justified.
Topic:: International Security, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Eurasia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

34. Introduction to Special Issue on Navigating NATO dynamics: Addressing various challenges in the international security environment

Author:: Bert Chapman, Jarosław Gryz, and George Andrew Zombanakis
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: As the international security environment undergoes significant changes, North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) capacity to adapt shows how alliances can evolve from focusing on military defence to encompassing a wider spectrum of regional security challenges in an integrated manner. Russia’s violation of international law in 2014, followed by the war in Ukraine, has drawn the attention of NATO to the fact that apart from diplomatic measures, there might be a need to resort to more dynamic means in order to safeguard its members’ interests, especially when the security of the alliance’s eastern flank is threatened. NATO’s evolving role in the international security landscape reflects the alliance’s strategic adaptation to contemporary geopolitical challenges. The 2022 Strategic Concept embodies this change, emphasising NATO’s primary purpose of ensuring collective defence through a comprehensive approach focused on deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security (Calmels, 2020; North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2022). This change occurs within a complex geopolitical context, further complicated by evolving public opinion. For example, recent trends in the United States, particularly among younger Republican congressional representatives, reveal evolving attitudes towards the support for Ukraine. With growing disapproval of President Biden’s management of the Ukraine crisis, and varying opinions on the level and duration of support for Ukraine, it is evident that public sentiment is divided and evolving (Cerda, 2023; Langer, 2023). These findings reveal the complexity of the US involvement in the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the need for policymakers to consider these diverse viewpoints when shaping the future foreign policy decisions. The shifts in public opinion can also have significant implications for the ongoing conflict (Fisher, 2020), which is expected to continue for an extended period. This dynamic international security situation and shift in public opinion have set the stage for the ongoing challenges that NATO member states face in addressing the war in Ukraine. Consequently, there has been a significant surge in literature exploring these issues, examining them in terms of geopolitics, economics, and even psychology. Thoroughly investigating complex conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, requires an integrative research approach, drawing on multiple research sources, including scholarly journal articles, government information resources from multiple democratic countries and international organisations, datasets, public policy research institute materials, multiple social media platforms, and public opinion polls. Researchers must navigate the strengths and weaknesses inherent in these resources while adopting an interdisciplinary methodology to comprehensively analyse these events.
Topic:: NATO, International Security, Military Strategy, Hybrid Warfare, Adaptation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

35. The Wind Rose’s Directions: Russia’s Strategic Deterrence during the First Year of the War in Ukraine

Author:: Anya Fink
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, and even before February 2022, the Russian government has conducted intense nuclear rhetoric and actions. This behavior is a specific approach to strategic deterrence that seeks to incorporate nonmilitary and military (nuclear and nonnuclear) means into a continuous spectrum of actions for deterrence, escalation management, and warfighting. Nuclear weapons are the foundation of credible strategic deterrence and signaling with these and other strategic capabilities could in theory be instrumental for deterring the escalation of a local conflict to a regional war. Russian signaling varies from aggressive declarations from Putin himself but also Russian officials such as Medvedev or journalistic cronies, to medium to large scale strategic exercises like the infamous Grom. Likewise, on the international stage, Russia has shown restraint by reimplementing the Reagan-Gorbachev declaration, but also deliberate disrespect of arms control agreements, notably by suspending its participation to the New START treaty. In practice, however, Russia’s use of strategic deterrence signaling in this conflict has been met with mixed results insofar as it has not compelled the cessation of or constraints on Western lethal aid to Ukraine, even though it may have, at least in the eyes of Russian officials, deterred direct Western intervention. Consequently, there might be more to expect from Russia, depending on the evolution of the daily battlefield in Ukraine. If the use of a nuclear weapon is still very unlikely, some other strategic moves in the hybrid domain (cyberattacks, attacks on undersea cables, information manipulation) could also serve as signaling.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

36. NATO's Strategic Concept from theory to practice: NATO Mission Iraq

Author:: Robert Dresen
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO’s security environment is changing rapidly, and so is the Alliance. Until a decade ago, out-of-area operations dominated the NATO agenda. That shifted in 2014 when Allies renewed their focus on territorial deterrence and defence in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea. Two more recent events produced further shocks to NATO’s agenda. First, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 brought almost 20 years of NATO presence to an abrupt and traumatic end. Second, Russia launched an all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which signaled the return of large-scale conventional war to the European continent. On the heels of these pivotal events, NATO adopted its eighth Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit in June 2022.1 The document captures Allies’ shared assessment of the changing security environment and defines the key purpose and core tasks of the Alliance. It provides a renewed emphasis on deterrence and defence, yet it also reaffirms that effective deterrence and defence requires NATO to enhance its global awareness and reach. It also makes clear that the key purpose of NATO, the collective defence of Allied nations and populations, is supported by contributing to crisis prevention and management – its second core task. In light of the Afghanistan experience, the question arises how exactly NATO should seek to fulfil this role in practice. While assessing lessons learned from the Afghanistan experience, former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations John Manza suggested that the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) “provides a good proof of concept of how [the Alliance] might carry out these interventions with a lighter, more sustainable touch”.2 This Policy Brief aims to further explore this argument by analyzing the current practice of NMI set against the theoretical framework provided by the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept. It argues that the NMI is a litmus test for NATO’s evolving approach to crisis prevention. As such, the experience of NMI underscores the importance of a more holistic and flexible strategy, one that acknowledges the role of other external actors and plans for NATO’s contributions into a wider national and regional context.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, and Strategic Concept
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

37. Before Zero Day: Taiwan’s Evolving Defense Strategy and the Struggle for Peace

Author:: Eric Lee, Ian Easton, Grace Price, Colby Ferland, Cathy Fang, Mark Stokes, and Alice Cho
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: The invasion of Ukraine has upended long-held assumptions of the liberal international order, and as tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese leaders are watching Ukraine with their futures in mind. The objective of this report is to provide insights into how Taiwanese policymakers, military officers, diplomats, strategists, and everyday citizens are responding to the evolving threat picture in the Taiwan Strait and offer ideas for the policy debate in Washington. This report examines leadership speeches, strategy reports, military writings, and media articles, as well as recounts findings from interviews with Taiwanese and U.S. government officials, military officers, and civil society.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Peace, and International Order
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

38. Unknown Knowns How the Bush Administration Traded Failure for Success in Iraq

Author:: David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and Alistair Millar
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:: This is the story of a road not taken, how the United States discarded a proven system of United Nations weapons inspections and multilateral sanctions and opted for an unnecessary war in Iraq. The saga of what happened twenty years ago may seem like ancient history to some, but many negative consequences are still evident. From the imposition of sanctions on Iraq in 1990 until the calamitous invasion in 2003, our research team produced a steady stream of reports and publications documenting the most significant policy failure by the United States since the Vietnam War.1 With the twentieth anniversary of the invasion approaching, it is time for a fresh look at those events to assess the strategic and ethical implications of the decisions made then and their relevance for today. George W. Bush was gripped by a messianic zeal to overthrow Saddam Hussein by force.2 The president and his advisers were determined to implement a policy of armed regime change regardless of all evidence, logic, or reason.3 The White House concocted a false narrative of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a dictator with supposed links to al-Qaida.4 Bush ignored the unequivocal conclusion of the U.S. intelligence community that Iraq had nothing to do with either 9/11 or al-Qaida.5 The result of the administration’s campaign of deception was a costly war of choice that ended in “strategic defeat,” to cite the conclusion of the U.S. Army history of the war.6 Many studies have examined what went wrong in Iraq,7 but few have looked at the alternative security approaches that were available at the time. We examine those alternatives here to document that the war was unnecessary and to highlight the policy advantages of multilateral nonmilitary security strategies.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Multilateralism, Iraq War, and George W. Bush
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

39. Radioactive Consequences of a War in Ukraine

Author:: Rico Chandra
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:: A war in Ukraine could lead to thousands of radioactive sources getting lost, or worse, getting stolen and repurposed for political destabilization. So what is a radioactive “source”? It is a material that is specifically manufactured for the purpose of emitting radiation. For example, some forms of cancer are treated using radiotherapy whereby intense gamma radiation, emitted from a pencil-sized lump of radioactive metal, is directed at the tumor. This lump of highly radioactive metal is a radioactive “source”.
Topic:: Health, Military Strategy, Radiological Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

40. Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This article is the first to analyze these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

41. Blocking the Gateways to Nuclear Disorder in the Middle East

Author:: John Spacapan
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: This study will explain how the United States and like-minded states can still stop, or at least significantly slow down, the bomb’s spread in the Middle East. The historical record as well as the current intentions of potential proliferators in the region suggests this is possible, but Washington will need to start planning now. The three case countries of this monograph – Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia – are all taking aggressive steps toward nuclearization.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Middle East

42. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:: Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

43. Keeping Secrets

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: With Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Americans have had a ringside seat at one of the most unusual of presidential shows: President Joe Biden publicly divulging some of our nation’s most protected, secret insights on what Vladimir Putin and his military might be planning. Some have criticized this; most think it has prevented Putin from controlling the war’s narrative. If we are lucky, it could be part of a more important movement toward liberalizing the use and sharing of intelligence. America and its allies could finally be progressing from a vision of war first theorized a hundred years ago. That violent and indiscriminate vision was fully realized with the city-busting aerial attacks of World War II. Ever since, we have believed that being able to decimate a nation’s military, industrial, and demographic capital promises deterrence in peace and quick victories in war. Today, this vision is being slowly supplanted with weaponry and tactics that can target terror precisely, in order to disable nations without decimating them.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Classification, and Secrecy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

44. The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Russian authorities apply an “algorithm of lies”, the Russian armed forces have become a sealed organization, and tactical information about Russia’s war in Ukraine is fragmented and unreliable. Hence, definite conclusions concerning the Russian soldier cannot be drawn.
Topic:: Security, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

45. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

46. The War against Ukraine and European Defence: When will we square the circle?

Author:: Bruno Angelet
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: After the end of the Cold War, Europe’s harvesting of the peace dividend was fed by wrong assumptions and led to a persistent underinvestment in defence. Today, problems are three-fold: too small stocks, inadequate, insufficient capabilities, and very low industrial production capacity. In many cases, stocks went well below accepted NATO standards, putting many European military units in serious difficulty to achieve NATO and EU readiness-levels. Strategic enablers were in further decline over the last 20 years, and many European countries dismantled their stocks of heavy weaponry. Both in Libya (2011) and in Afghanistan (until the withdrawal of NATO troops, in August 2021), European armed forces were unable to sustain combat, or evacuate, without support of US military hardware. On the eve of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the intelligence gap left Europeans in disbelief when US intelligence proofed almost entirely correct. The European Defence industry is fragmented and overprotected by exemptions to the Single Market regulations for reasons of “national security”. Companies face shrinking export markets (due to stringent export-criteria) and reduced production capacity, often by more than half. They became easy prey for foreign take-overs. The war against Ukraine propels those problems to the critical edge: the rush to arm Ukraine has depleted national stocks. Heavy weaponry needed for Ukraine’s territorial defence (and for ours) is missing or already sold to private stores. The European industry cannot not ramp-up production without a long term prospect of sustained demand for Europe’s Armed Forces.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

47. Russian Spring 2022 Recruitment Cycle

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: In May 2022, we published our Egmont Paper 116 entitled The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited, in which we suggested, “The current spring recruitment cycle (1 April-15 July 2022) may be considered a more accurate indication of popular support for Putin’s war in Ukraine than the results of public opinion research as we know it. Therefore, the 2022 spring recruitment cycle may be regarded as a referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine with the voenkomati as its voting stations.” Near the end of this recruitment period, it is time to return to this statement. How did the spring recruitment cycle go, and which conclusion can we draw from it? A critical review.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Civil-Military Relations, Recruitment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

48. Tanks versus Banks: Russian Military versus EU Geoeconomic Power

Author:: Bernard Siman, Sven Biscop, and Tobias Gehrke
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: War is an instrument of policy. Those who lose sight of the policy objectives, or keep shifting them, rarely do well in war. The European Union and its Member States (and NATO) are not directly involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine, but they have unleashed a major geoeconomic offensive in response to Putin’s geopolitical gambit. They too, therefore, have to define precise objectives, and prepare for the new geoeconomic and geopolitical world that will inevitably result from this war. First, rerouted supply chains will create new challenges and dependencies for the EU. Second, instability in other states, as a consequence of the disruptions in the global economy, may indirectly also affect the EU. Finally, long-term relations with Russia obviously have to be reassessed, but relations with China and the alliance with the US are evolving too.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Civil-Military Relations, and Banking
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

49. Putin Is Creating the Multipolar World He (Thought He) Wanted

Author:: Sven Biscop, Bart Dessein, and Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Up until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s and China’s worsening relations with the European Union and the United States meant that the world order was at risk of falling apart into two rival blocs, as during the Cold War: Europeans and Americans against Russians and Chinese. Since 24 February 2022, that is not so clear anymore. The more Russia escalates the violence in Ukraine, but also the strategic anxiety (by putting its nuclear forces on alert), the more difficult it becomes for other powers to stay completely aloof, let alone to simply align with Russia. The more EU and US sanctions reverberate throughout the global economy, the more it becomes impossible for other powers to avoid going at least partially along. China in particular has in fact already made a defining choice.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Social Order, Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

50. Russia’s shifting foreign and security policy in Northern Europe: The new geopolitical meaning of ‘good neighbourliness’

Author:: Sinikukka Saari and Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Since the start of Putin’s third presidential term in 2012, geopolitical competition has also become rooted in the Nordic region, and small states’ room for manoeuvre in security policy has shrunk. In Russia’s view, maintaining ‘good neighbourly relations’ is primarily the responsibility of small states that always need to negotiate the limits of their sovereignty with great powers, such as Russia. From the Nordic point of view, the relations may require walking on eggshells. Prior to 2014, Norway was often mentioned among Russia’s ‘good neighbours’, but now Russia regularly calls off its policy of ‘reassurance and deterrence’. There are increasing signs that, in Russia’s view, a ‘good neighbour’ should refrain from extensive security collaboration and training with NATO and the US. Hence, Finland and Sweden cannot wholly avoid political tension with Russia merely by staying outside of the Alliance.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

51. A policy agenda for Finland’s entry into NATO: From ‘one for one’ to ‘one for all’

Author:: Edward Hunter Christie
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: At the NATO Madrid Summit in June 2022, Allies invited Finland and Sweden to join the NATO Alliance. In preparing for its membership, Finland will need to go through a reflection process on how it intends to contribute to NATO’s core tasks and make the most of its membership. Finland should consider making substantial contributions to the deterrence and defence posture in the Baltic Sea region, including in the Baltic states, and elsewhere on the Eastern Flank. In parallel, Finland should also ensure it contributes to the Southern Flank. Finland should aim to hit the ground running into the next cycle of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and fulfil all relevant capability targets. Finland should also aim to “start strong to stay strong” on all existing NATO Pledges, notably those on defence investment, cyber-defence, and resilience. It is typical for individual NATO Allies to seek a salient role when it comes to certain specific topics. For Finland, the Arctic (Northern Flank) and resilience seem most promising.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and Finland

52. US global security partnerships in the Biden era: Twilight or regeneration?

Author:: Eoin Micheál McNamara
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Guarantee-based alliances underpinned US grand strategy during the Cold War, but policies designed for the War on Drugs (WOD) after the 1990s, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in the 2000s, and counter-piracy operations in the 2010s have led US policymakers to increasingly rely on ad hoc security partnerships. Looser partnerships facilitate cooperation that is quick to reform and redistribute, benefiting the US when reacting to urgent risks. When the necessity for cooperation diminishes, partnerships allow for prompt “exit options”. Guided by a narrowing set of strategic priorities under President Biden, the US partnership network is undergoing some downsizing. As part of a wider effort to challenge the US-led international order, Russia and China seek to reduce US opportunities to renew security partnerships. Ever closer US and NATO partnerships with Finland and Sweden have bucked an otherwise weakening global trend in recent years. Russia’s escalated aggression in Ukraine has caused Finland and Sweden to seek policy change from partnership-based security policies to NATO membership and stronger deterrence.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

53. Global South Perspectives on a Global Ban on Nuclear Weapons: A Comparative Approach

Author:: Leonardo Bandarra, Miriam Prys-Hansen, Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Layla Dawood, Monica Herz, Nir Hassid, Harsh V. Pant, and Shounak Set
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:: Banning nuclear weapons is an aspiration at the core of most disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives. It gained new momentum with the "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons." The negotiation of that treaty, and its subsequent approval and entry into force, sheds light on the complexities and dissent surrounding diverse regional perspectives on the appropriate means and timing regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons and establishing a related global norm. Scholars from different academic backgrounds and epistemological standpoints jointly discuss these perspectives through lenses from Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia. We seek to discuss how regional issues may shape global non-proliferation and disarmament politics, with a focus on the nuclearweapon-ban norm. This debate also reveals the broad trends and patterns organising and driving the current shifts in the global nuclear order, such as interrelations between regional and global institutions as well as domestic politics and decision-making.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Global South

54. The Last Word: Zelensky Wags the Dog, But Slowly

Author:: Zachary Jonathan Jacobson
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:: Too often agency (and blame) for the war in Ukraine has been presumed to lie predominantly with the greater powers. Liberals like Anne Applebaum point to President Vladimir Putin’s autocratic and expansionist mission to restore a greater Russia as the precipitating reagent for the crisis, while realists like John Mearsheimer hold the Americans and Europeans responsible for encouraging Ukraine to challenge Russia by seeking membership in NATO.2 In both cases (and both have a case), what has been underplayed is the agency of Ukraine. Taken for granted have been President Volodymyr Zelensky’s artful strategic manipulations to pull a wide community of actors into the regional conflict. His calls for military assistance have resembled what the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. termed the “soft powers” of persuasion.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

55. They melted down our tanks, we are creating the strongest power in the region – militarist narratives serving the purpose of state capturing

Author:: Luka Steric
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: In this publication, BCSP researcher Luka Šterić analyzes how are the militarist narratives used for the legitimising in public the capturing of the state. Defence system capturing is done in various ways. The authorities are using the procurement of armament from different parties to achieve foreign policy goals in order to reduce the external pressure on the authoritarian regime. Insisting on military neutrality and foreign policy balancing, Serbia is trying to keep access to both the Eastern and Western armament markets. Also, through non-transparent contracts, individuals and companies close to the government opulently profit at the expense of the military industry, as well as through exporting weapons oftentimes conducted in contravention of both domestic and international law and norms. However, the focus of this analysis shall be on the militarist narratives constructed by the authorities to legitimise in public the capturing of the state and its defence system. In this publication, we shall present three major militarist narratives used by the authorities to capture the state: the narrative of the personal power of the “commander-in-chief“, the narrative of non-transparent armament in order to defend the country from the external enemy and the narrative of discrediting criticism and political opponents on topics of defence. The narrative of efficient personal power in the defence system has got a dual function. On the one hand, building the cult of a leader as the only guarantor of the state’s success, thus the Army’s success, justifies the non-constitutional concentration of power in the hands of the President. On the other hand, it normalises the military hierarchy as the most efficient model for civilian authorities’ structure, too, whereby the institutional and other mechanisms of government control are discredited. The narrative about the external enemy and the necessity of armament serves to justify the reduced transparency and scandals related to the defence system. The narrative about the inept and non-patriotic former government is used for settling the political accounts with political opponents, as well as for suppression of any criticism against the regime regarding the topics of defence.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Military
Political Geography:: Global Focus

56. Stop Fighting Blind: Better Use-of-Force Oversight in the U.S. Congress

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: The U.S. constitution divides war powers between the executive and legislative branches, so as to ensure that decisions about using force are collective and deliberative. Lawmakers’ role has receded, however, particularly in recent decades. Small steps would help them start reclaiming their prerogatives.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Legislation, Civil-Military Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

57. Avoiding a Return to War in Myanmar’s Rakhine State

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: An unofficial ceasefire has kept Rakhine State quiet compared to much of Myanmar following the 2021 coup. But friction is building between the military and ethnic Rakhine fighters. The parties should strike a formal deal to avert a return to war.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Asia and Myanmar

58. Syria: Ruling over Aleppo’s Ruins

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Aleppo was devastated by bombing and shelling during the Syrian war. It remains unsafe, with residents subject to shakedowns by the regime’s security forces and various militias. Damascus and its outside backers should curb this predation as a crucial first step toward the city’s recovery.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Recovery
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

59. The Iran Nuclear Deal at Six: Now or Never

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: After all is said and done, the Iran nuclear deal struck in 2015 remains the best way to achieve the West’s non-proliferation goals and the sanctions relief that Tehran seeks. The parties must not squander what is likely their last chance to save the accord.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

60. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:: Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

61. tarr Forum: An Update on Russia's War Against Ukraine

Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: What is the status of Russia's invasion of Ukraine?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

62. Starr Forum: Energy as a Weapon of War: Russia, Ukraine and Europe in Challenging Times

Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: How has Russia weaponized energy in this war? What have been the effects? How have Europeans responded to this weaponization of energy and what may be their responses this winter?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Military Strategy, European Union, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

63. Türkiye and the Russia-Ukraine War: Impact on the West, Central Asia, and the Caucasus

Author:: Matthew Bryza
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: During a recent webinar, I was asked to address the following question: what does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean for Türkiye’s approach to the Caucasus and Central Asia? At first, the question struck me as odd. Having worked on these issues since the late 1990s and now living in Istanbul, it seemed obvious to me that Türkiye’s goals in these regions have been enduring since the end of the Cold War and were not changing because of Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine. These goals, I said, were and remain to: secure westward exports of oil and natural gas produced in the Caspian Basin; promote stability in the South Caucasus; and strengthen Türkiye’s business and cultural ties with the Turkic populations of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Türkiye’s approach toward Russia in this context also remains what it has been since the Ottoman centuries: cooperate where possible but confront where necessary. Reflecting momentarily on this question, however, I realized how different Ankara’s goals appear from the perspectives of Washington, Paris, and Athens. In these and other NATO capitals, Turkish foreign policy seems to have shifted from its pursuit of “zero problems with neighbors” during the early years of the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to one of “zero neighbors without problems.” Türkiye is thus viewed within the Atlantic Alliance as a belligerent outlier, bent on violating international law to pursue the extraction of Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons, enabling Azerbaijan to use military force during the Second Karabakh War, and aligning in Syria more with Russia than with its own treaty allies.
Topic:: Security, War, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia

64. How the Conflict Over Ukraine Affects Security in the South Caucasus

Author:: Nargiz Gafarova
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Against the background of the present stage of the conflict over Ukraine, the South Caucasus is experiencing perturbation. Three examples rise immediately to mind: elements of the 10 November 2020 tripartite between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War statement (and the arrangements that have derived from it) are being suboptimally implemented; the leaders of Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia continue to hold out the possibility to conduct a referendum on “unification” with Russia; and the uncertain outcome of the talks in Vienna to revive the Iran nuclear deal. Such and similar examples have led all three South Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) to pursue variants of a policy some call “neutrality” and others “hedging” between the parties to the conflict over Ukraine. Located at the intersection of Europe, Russia, and the Greater Middle East—and thus constituting the western part of the Silk Road region, as defined by the Editorial Statement of Baku Dialogues—the South Caucasus is one of the most important and, at the same time, one of the most potentially explosive areas bordering the West. Over the past several decades, developments within all three South Caucasus states have contributed to a general sense of insecurity within the region. These include, most obviously, ethno‑political conflicts, civil wars, and color revolutions; the lackluster development of Western‑style governance institutions; and the widely‑held perception of ongoing high levels of corruption. Even the potentially positive strategic consequences of the outcome of the Second Karabakh War—namely, the prospect for the normalization of two sets of bilateral relationships (Armenia‑Azerbaijan and Armenia‑Türkiye) and the unblocking of all economic and transport connections in the region—have been overshadowed by the ongoing restructuring of world order, manifested by the increase of geopolitical volatility and ambiguity due to the major escalation of the conflict over Ukraine whose present phase began on 24 February 2022. The effects of the Western‑led sanctions and export restrictions regime against Russia have spilled over into the South Caucasus— notwithstanding the fact that none of the region’s states have formally aligned themselves with them. This essay provides an overview of the reverberations of the conflict over Ukraine towards the South Caucasus, with a focus on its impact on the region’s political, economic, and security environment.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Europe, Caucasus, and Asia

65. A Revitalized NATO and Its "New Strategic Concept" Amin Global and Regional Changes

Author:: E. Fuat Keyman
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: At the beginning of 2022, just as the globalizing world was entering the postCovid period and the United Nations Climate Change Conference declared a “code red” emergency for the climate crisis at COP 27, a strategically calculated move came from Russian President Vladimir Putin to unlawfully invade Ukraine. From the beginning, the invasion of Ukraine has generated impacts much larger and more transformative than any previous crisis, triggering serious crisis-ridden developments in the international system and globalization and forcing national governments and global actors to recalibrate and reposition. It is in this global and broader context NATO’s Madrid Summit and its “new Strategic Concept” should be analyzed and assessed. This paper argues that the summit is historic, necessary, but not sufficient. To substantiate this argument, it analyzes is NATO’s new strategic concept in detail, exploring its critical importance, its transformative effect and the six challenges that it faces.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

66. NATO's Changing Priorities

Author:: Ahmet O Evin
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems to have led, with very few exceptions, to greater cooperation among members of the Western alliance and brought the transatlantic partners closer to one another. As a result, NATO, which has undergone several changes since the end of the Cold War, has regained its key role as the cornerstone of the West’s collective security interests. In its enhanced position, NATO also appears to be emerging as the champion of the liberal order as well as the universal values embraced by transatlantic partners. Yet, it may also be facing new challenges both from within, particularly in the case of a prolonged conflict in Europe, and from China, which is demonstrating increasing rivalry to the West.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

67. Future Uncertain: NATO in a Post-Quantum Post-AI World

Author:: James Sperling
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The emerging and disruptive technologies of the 21st century—artificial intelligence and quantum technologies—confront NATO with a paradox: the integration of those technologies into national armed forces will significantly narrow and possibly invert the systemic technology dominance NATO has enjoyed since 1945 and widen the technology gap within the Alliance with potentially debilitating consequences for operational effectives and allied cohesion. The precise impact of these disruptive technologies must remain largely speculative, but it is certain that they will change the nature of war-fighting, exacerbate the security dilemma, and precipitate in a recalibration of the global balance of power.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

68. Russia's Assault on Ukraine: Fallout From the War

Author:: Dina R. Spechler and Martin C. Spechler
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The war between Russia and Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, has now gone on for more than four months. It has already taken a severe toll on much of the world and will cause much more harm the longer it continues. Moreover, it does not seem likely to end soon. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently declared that Russia has barely begun its military operation in Ukraine. He has clearly stated his goal of taking the entire Donbas. Success in that endeavor may motivate him to continue the fight for other objectives, including the major industrial center of Kharkiv, the key Black Sea port of Odesa, and perhaps even Kyiv and its environs. For his part, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly said his goal is to push Russia back to the line it occupied on 23 February. His Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba has spoken of winning back the entire Donbas and liberating “the rest of our territory.” The U.S. Director of National Intelligence has predicted that a “grinding struggle” may continue for a long time. This article will explore some of the consequences of the war already in evidence
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

69. The Historical Roots of NATO Engagement in the Mediterranean

Author:: Matteo Gerlini
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The new strategic concept of the alliance looks at the Mediterranean situation as a shift in the engagement with a history that is as old as the origins of the Western bloc. In this history, the Italian role has been an example for the other Mediterranean countries that later joined NATO. The steps in the construction of the Atlantic coalition started also in Mediterranean with U.S. military engagement grounded in Truman’s doctrine. Twenty years late, the North Atlantic Council’s report on the alliance’s future tasks examined crucial “exposed areas” for NATO, and first among them was the Mediterranean. After the collapse of the Soviet system, NATO worked on a relationship of coexistence and cooperation with Russia. The ongoing invasion in Ukraine has thwarted years of discussion and work, but the partnerships promoted by NATO with the countries of the so-called enlarged Mediterranean stand as a success story.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and Mediterranean

70. A Compass and a Concept: A Guide to the EU and NATO Strategic Outlooks

Author:: Ricardo Borges de Castro and Rita Barbosa Lobo
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022 upended Europe’s security order. The invasion was a wake-up call that peace in the continent should not be taken for granted and a catalyst for change at European and transatlantic level. The EU adopted a long-term Strategic Compass for security and defense. NATO, no longer “braindead,” issued a new Strategic Concept for the coming decade and is expanding. While there is convergence in strategic outlooks, questions remain on how both organizations will cooperate and coordinate their actions, implement the investment, troops and capabilities’ goals set in each document as well as deal with countries such as China.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

71. NATO: The Importance of Activism in the Mediterranean Scenario

Author:: Lorenzo Somigli
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The secure defense of NATO members does not depend on the Kyiv frontline; the southern flank is the most unguarded. This paper deals with the Mediterranean, a closed sea without borders which globalized before globalization, examining some strategic alternatives for Western allies. The Mediterranean is a point of contact, a diaphragm, and a battlefield. In addition, the central Mediterranean is a relevant area where Russia and China have their foot in the door because of the disengagement of France and Italy and the lack of attention of NATO. It is precisely on this weaker frontier that NATO must relaunch its commitment and presence. Defending marine spaces determines the continent’s safety. So, losing the Mediterranean can be disastrous. And finally, it examines Italian policy in the Mediterranean to date and the reasons why Italy can and must correct the strabismus of the USA, which is completely looking at the Indo-Pacific, and of imagines a peripheral Europe without politics.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Activism
Political Geography:: Europe and Mediterranean

72. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:: Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Mine action has the potential to incentivise confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), because it could contribute to development and reconciliation through the creation of communities of practice among individuals from civil society and at the grassroots level as part of post-conflict reconstruction. Although many Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) participating States are contaminated by mines, mine action as a CSBM has scarcely been included in peace negotiations, because it is thought that it might hinder the peace process. Yet mine action, if “depoliticised”, could be implemented independently of peace negotiations through the creation of spaces for cooperation in demining projects of common interest to rival communities. The OSCE is well placed to propose these strategies, especially in Eastern Ukraine, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, which are not only affected by protracted conflicts with limited engagement of the population in the peace process but are also highly contaminated by mines.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Violence, and Landmines
Political Geography:: Europe

73. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:: Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The global debate on weaponised artificial intelligence (AI) often focuses on futuristic “killer robots”, which risks overlooking the fact that these technologies are already part of the security landscape. Diminishing human control over the use of force and the differences in states’ discourse pose a considerable risk for European security and stability. The impact of AI is not inevitable, and states should address this issue through political means, such as a political declaration with a commitment to ensuring human control over the use of force. With its inclusive membership, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can and should become the platform through which its participating States can take a step forward in the global debate on weaponised AI.
Topic:: Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and OSCE
Political Geography:: Europe

74. Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century

Author:: C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete. This analysis emphasizes coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one’s own cause. To achieve this result, actors must carefully calibrate their demands to ensure their adversary’s cost of concession is as low as possible. To prevent challenges in the first place, actors should convince the adversary acting on a threat is one’s most rational response. If convincing the adversary is not possible, then one must find ways to decrease the value of the adversary’s challenge. When none of those options are possible, preparing for conflict is likely one’s rational option. This analysis then applies the rules of thumb to US relations with China, Russia, and Iran.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Game Theory, Coercion, and International Competition
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

75. The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq

Author:: Heather S. Gregg
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The remarkable life of early-twentieth-century British adventurer Gertrude Bell has been well documented through her biographies and numerous travel books. Bell’s role as a grand strategist for the British government in the Middle East during World War I and the postwar period, however, is surprisingly understudied. Investigating Gertrude Bell as both a military strategist and a grand strategist offers important insights into how Great Britain devised its military strategy in the Middle East during World War I—particularly, Britain’s efforts to work through saboteurs and secret societies to undermine the Ottoman Empire during the war and the country’s attempts to stabilize the region after the war through the creation of the modern state of Iraq. As importantly, studying the life and work of Bell offers a glimpse into how this unique woman was able to become one of the principal architects of British strategy at this time and the extraordinary set of skills and perspectives she brought to these efforts—particularly, her ability to make and maintain relationships with key individuals. Bell’s life and work offer insights into the roles women have played and continue to play as influencers of grand strategy.
Topic:: History, Military Strategy, Grand Strategy, World War I, and Gertrude Bell
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Mesopotamia

76. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:: Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

77. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

78. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

79. Cyber War and Ukraine

Author:: James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”—the term itself makes little sense—but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. It attempted to do so again in 2022. Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. The metric for Viasat and for other actions is not whether a cyberattack is effective in terms of network penetration or the disruption of services or data, but whether its effect helps achieve in this case, the occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its elected government. By this metric, the Viasat attack was not a success.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Ukraine

80. The Collapse of One China

Author:: Ivan Kanapathy
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: As the One China policy accommodation unravels and China’s military attains a credible capability to mount a cross-strait invasion, the United States and its allies should stop hedging and adopt enhanced measures to deter Beijing.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

81. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

82. Indispensable: NATO’s Framework Nations Concept beyond Madrid

Author:: Sean Monaghan and Ed Arnold
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: s NATO’s leaders gather in Madrid this month to unveil the alliance’s eighth strategic concept at a crucial time for European security, they should take inspiration from earlier concepts. In 2014, NATO launched its Framework Nations Concept at the Wales summit to enhance collective defense through multinational cooperation. The idea is built on the basic principles established in NATO’s first strategic concept in 1949. Beyond Madrid, allied leaders should agree to develop the Framework Nations Concept in three ways
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

83. Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux

Author:: Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: There is a saying: “If you want a new idea, read an old book.” For the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new strategic concept looking for a new approach to its core task of defense and deterrence, the best “old books” to consult might be the seven strategic concepts NATO has published since 1949. The first four of these were classified and made public in 1997.1 Since 1991, three concepts have been published openly, the latest in 2010. This paper examines NATO’s first seven strategic concepts to chart the progress of the alliance’s approach to defense and deterrence. The main purpose of doing so is to give today’s leaders and planners a better understanding of their forebearers’ efforts, to learn their lessons, and avoid their mistakes. The analysis also reveals three broad insights that can be applied today: plan against Russia’s maximum intentions; revitalize the sword and the shield; and modernize the sword and the shield.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

84. The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Grace Hwang
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: NATO countries have already provided massive amounts of military aid to Ukraine, deployed additional forces to support the NATO countries that share a border with Russia, improved the Alliance’s ability to rapidly deploy forces forward in a crisis, and worked with key powers like Poland to strengthen its capabilities. NATO has accepted Finland and Sweden as future members of the Alliance, and it has made numerous other short-term adjustments to its force posture that enhance its deterrence and defense capabilities. NATO faces a future, however, where it cannot predict how much territory Ukraine will lose and where it must now view Russia as an ongoing major threat at virtually every level from the limited conventional threats Russia poses to the NATO countries on its border to the major increases in its threat of strategic nuclear forces. NATO cannot continue to treat Russia as a potential partner, and that seems to be an unlikely path forward so long as Putin or anyone like him is in power. NATO also cannot ignore the rise in China’s military and economic power or the prospects of closer Russian and Chinese strategic cooperation. The challenge NATO faces goes far beyond Ukraine. The days in which NATO countries could keep taking peace dividends by cutting their forces, failing to modernize, and failing to adopt new forces of tactics and interoperability are over. NATO cannot deal with the Russian threat in terms of half-measures or by continuing to focus on empty and virtually meaningless force goals like spending 2% of national GDP on defense and 20% of defense expenditure on equipment. NATO needs to act now to look far beyond the short-term priorities of the Ukraine conflict. It needs to revitalize its entire force planning progress. It needs to create effective levels of deterrence and defense capability, while it modernizes its forces to deal with radically new requirements like joint all-domain operations (JADO), emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), new precision-strike capabilities, changes in air and missile warfare and defense, and the revival of Russian naval power and the growth of a Chinese blue-water navy. The Emeritus Chair in Strategy has prepared a report, entitled, The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise, that examines how NATO must approach an effective force planning exercise that can give its new strategy real meaning. This report documents the pointless character of NATO’s present emphasis on burdensharing, and it examines the real-world shifts in spending and forces in NATO since 2014, as well as how these changes have affected the national forces in given sectors of Europe.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

85. North America Is a Region, Too: An Integrated, Phased, and Affordable Approach to Air and Missile Defense for the Homeland

Author:: Tom Karako, Matthew Strohmeyer, Wes Rumbaugh, and Ken Harmon
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: U.S. air and missile defense efforts have long been characterized by a striking dichotomy. Defenses for the homeland have largely focused on long-range ballistic threats, while cruise missile defense and other air defense efforts have focused on regional and force protection applications to the exclusion of the homeland. This compartmentalization assumes that battles in one place will only consist of certain parts of the threat spectrum, and battles elsewhere will consist only of others. That lingering dichotomy creates a vulnerability that near-peer adversaries now seek to exploit. In a sense, the homeland-regional dichotomy ignores the fact that North America is a region, too. As with any other region, attacks on assets in North America could be designed to shape the political and military calculus of U.S. policymakers. This report explores the strategic significance of air and missile defense for the homeland, considers principles informing defense design, and develops and costs an architecture based on those principles.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Homeland Security, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

86. Software-Defined Warfare: Architecting the DOD's Transition to the Digital Age

Author:: Nand Mulchandani and John Shanahan
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) massive bureaucracy struggles with the kind of periodic “tech refresh” that has been instrumental to commercial industry success. While it is insulated from market competition within the U.S. economy, the DOD is not immune from the kind of revolutionary, secular, and wide-ranging technological changes happening outside the government. Nor is it immune from the threat of competition with other militaries around the world. In the future, warfighting will only become more complex, even more chaotic, and even faster. The only way for the DOD to stay competitive in a new warfighting environment is to ensure that it uses the most potent weapon available: technology, and more specifically, software. For the United States to retain its dominant position in the future— which is not a guaranteed outcome—the DOD needs a new design and architecture that will allow it to be far more flexible, scale on demand, and adapt dynamically to changing conditions. And it must do so at a dramatically lower cost as it delivers its critical services. This paper provides a blueprint for the way forward.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, Digitalization, and Software
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

87. The CNO’s Navigation Plan for 2022: A Critique

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: There should be a clear difference between efforts to provide unclassified documents that explain and justify U.S. military forces and issuing official reports that are little more than public relations exercises. The U.S. faces major security challenges and the annual cost of U.S. defense is over $760 billion, even if one ignores the cost of nuclear weapons, the Veterans Administration, related activities of the State Department and other agencies, and substantial additional intelligence activity. The effort to shape U.S. forces and strategy must deal with very real threats. They include a Russia that has invaded the Ukraine, a China that is actively seeking to challenge the U.S. in military and economic power, and regional threats like Iran and North Korea. The U.S. must cope with emerging and disruptive technologies that constantly alter the nature of military forces in unexpected ways, support America’s strategic partners on a global level, and deal with near collapse of many arms control efforts and major increases in Russian and Chinese nuclear and long-range strike programs. Far too often, however, the Department of Defense issues documents that are little more than sales pitches – filled with slogans, and that are an awkward cross between a shipping list that borders on being a child’s letter to Santa Claus and a used car commercial. The CNO’s Navigation Plan for 2022 is a case in point. In fairness, does highlight a long list of important points about the threat, and the need to reshape U.S. naval forces, but it comes far too close to burying them in overall and hype. It fails to meaningfully address and justify the cost of the U.S. Navy, to provide any clear picture of the threat, to address the need to cooperate with key U.S. allies, and to provide a clear program for shaping the Navy’s future. It is scarcely unique in failing to provide a clear and meaningful plan. The defense budget requests talk about being strategic documents, but almost all of their contents are shopping lists for individual military services. U.S. strategy documents have become little more than long lists of broad goals and wish lists with no actual plan, program, or budget.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Public Relations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

88. What If . . . Alternatives to a Chinese Military Invasion of Taiwan Image

Author:: Benjamin Jensen, Riley McCabe, and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: With the 20th Party Congress approaching and Xi Jinping seeking an unprecedented third term, it is important to explore the full range of actions Beijing could take to coerce Taiwan over the next 10 years. History provides a range of historical cases that suggest alternatives to a full-scale invasion. As part of its On Future War series, the CSIS International Security Program adapted six historical cases of coercion China could use to target Taiwan short of a costly amphibious invasion. The report looks back to look ahead, using the logic of historical cases ranging from the 1948 Berlin Airlift to the 1980s Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf to identify ways and means Beijing could use to compel Taiwan. The resulting range of scenarios point toward an urgent need to develop new escalation management frameworks supporting the new integrated deterrence strategy.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

89. Keeping the U.S. Military Engine Edge: Budget and Contract Trends

Author:: Gregory Sanders and Nicholas Velazquez
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Military aircraft engine technology is a qualitative edge for the United States, one enabled by a world-leading industrial base. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) faces critical decisions regarding the future of engine investments and the industrial base of the F-35. This platform dominates present U.S. tactical aircraft purchases and faces a growing engine modernization imperative. The following questions help inform key debates: How does the DOD prioritize investments in engines compared to other systems? Where is investment targeted? And how can competition best be fostered? Recent years have shown a spike in the purchase of products for military engines amid a decline in research and development (R&D) spending relative to the early 2000s. Military engine R&D is now largely dependent on the Air Force, as the Navy has taken a step back to focus funding on other service priorities. Finally, competition for military engine contract spending has been on the decline as the F-35, with its single-engine option, dominates the procurement landscape. The future of the military engine industrial base will be shaped by the DOD’s choice between spending more up front to introduce competition into the fifth-generation fighter fleet or waiting until the end of this decade as the first sixth-generation fighter is expected to enter production.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

90. Baltic Conflict: Russia’s Goal to Distract NATO?

Author:: Courtney Stiles Herdt and Matthew "BINCS" Zublic
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Baltics are a key strategic region where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian military and economic interests overlap. Sabotage of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, regardless of who executed the attack, has signaled that conflict in the region is no longer left of bang. Gray zone operations are underway, and the United States, NATO, and their partners need to be ready to act in unity against an increasingly hostile Russia that is now trying to distract attention from its military shortcomings in Ukraine. In this effort, Russia’s playbook will test the limits and try to exploit the seams of the alliance. An exacting response is needed to deny Russia control and ensure full conflict is avoided. The NATO summit in Vilnius will be critical to strengthening resolve and a path forward to a combined strategy to deter further Russian aggression.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and Baltic States

91. A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: t is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence that are emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends. These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the CSIS entitled A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023. This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers. It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare. It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war. Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

92. A Green Wave?

Author:: Jessica Drun
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Edited by Jude Blanchette of CSIS and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The Papers will be rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Jessica Drun examines how political and identity trends within Taiwan are likely to affect cross-strait relations. Primarily a reaction to assertive actions and policies from Beijing, Drun argues, these trends are moving away from Beijing’s preferences and in Drun’s view are likely to fuel rising PRC belligerence through 2027 and beyond. With this in mind, she suggests the United States should proceed with a long-overdue review of its Taiwan policy, built on a more nuanced understanding of domestic political realities within Taiwan, changes in the cross-strait military balance, growing PRC influence in international organizations, and the broader geopolitical environment.
Topic:: Security, Politics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

93. “Reunification” with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China

Author:: Jude Blanchette and Gerard Dipippo
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Many commentators and officials speculate about Beijing’s plans to compel “reunification” with Taiwan. Much of the existing commentary focuses on how or when a Chinese attack on Taiwan could occur, but there is little discussion of the nonmilitary consequences of such a scenario for China and the world. This brief explores the implications of a Chinese attack on Taiwan based on reasonable, albeit speculative, assumptions. When considered more holistically, the implications of an attack on Taiwan would be grim for Beijing, even if Chinese forces “successfully” capture the island. China would probably be diplomatically and economically isolated from key advanced economies, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping would have to tread a narrow path to avoid dire consequences for China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a whole. This analysis helps clarify what could be at stake for the world and reaffirms the importance of deterring Beijing from contemplating such an attack on Taiwan.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

94. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

Author:: Pavel Baev
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The blame for committing the blunder of starting the war with Ukraine is deservedly placed on President Vladimir Putin, but a single-explanation interpretation of the unfolding disaster is unsatisfactory. The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided. On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities. The sum total of these flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire. The strategy of protracted war of attrition can lead to victory only if the economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

95. Iranian Public Opinion on the War in Ukraine and Nuclear Options

Author:: Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: The current survey is an Update, rather than a comprehensive check on Iranian public attitudes. This interim report covers findings on two unfolding security challenges – Iran’s nuclear program and the war in Ukraine – and their potential interconnections.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

96. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:: Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Recent technological and political developments in OSCE participating States suggest a strong interest in pursuing, testing and using weaponised AI and weapons systems with increasingly autonomous features controlled by algorithms. In May 2021 Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia had begun producing combat robots “capable of fighting on their own”,1 while the French Army is planning to introduce robotic systems by 2040.2 The United Kingdom (UK) government has stated its objective of achieving “a leading role in critical and emerging technologies”3 and has established a Defence Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy Unit to better understand them.4 In the United States, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence has urged the government “not [to] be a witness to the AI revolution in military affairs”.5 The global discussion about autonomous weapons systems is often framed in a futuristic way and focuses on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) – colloquially called “killer robots” – or the “AI arms race”. But weaponised AI is already a reality of European security. Thus far participating States have been reluctant to utilise the OSCE platform to address the risks caused by the increasing autonomy of weapons systems. Building on this issue, this essay intends to address the following questions: (1) how does the lack of regulation of weaponised AI affect security and stability in Europe? and (2) what role can the OSCE play in mitigating the risks related to weaponised AI?
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:: Global Focus

97. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:: Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Landmines are designed to maim or kill indiscriminately and can lie inactive in the soil for years. As such, they represent a constant threat to local populations, restrict people’s freedom of movement, and pose an obstacle to the return of refugees and to development during post- conflict reconstruction.1 Currently tens of millions of landmines have been laid in more than 60 countries and many of them are still unmapped.2 Among the most contaminated countries worldwide, four are in the OSCE region: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Turkey. Armenia, Ukraine, and Georgia are also highly contaminated.3 In addition, several OSCE countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russia, the United States, and Uzbekistan) did not join the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (generally known as the Ottawa Convention), which bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines; encourages mutual assistance among states parties to destroy existing landmines and stockpiles as soon as possible; and provides assistance to mine victims.4 Some of the non-signatory states are engaged in protracted conflicts in which the OSCE has played a role for years as mediator or facilitator in negotiations. This paper investigates whether mine action could be implemented as a CSBM as part of conflict transformation in the OSCE region, taking three post-Soviet ethnic conflicts as case studies (Georgia, Eastern Ukraine, and Nagorno-Karabakh), where the problem of landmines and protracted conflicts are two interconnected dimensions of the same complex scenario, although with the possibility of generalising results to other areas. The study starts by illustrating the evolution of mine action and then moves on to address the multitrack approach to peacebuilding to explain how this can be combined with mine action. By reviewing the literature on conflict transformation and good practices worldwide, the study concludes that there is sufficient ground to consider mine action to be a promising CSBM in the OSCE area.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, Landmines, and OSCE
Political Geography:: Europe

98. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:: Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

99. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

100. A Path to Peace

Author:: Park Institute for Peace Studies
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: The last few decades have seen Pakistan grapple with serious and diverse security challenges. These have been accompanied not merely by deterioration of law and order, but also substantial socio-economic impact. In recent years, particularly after 2014, Pakistan managed to achieve considerable success in containing terrorism. Militant groups no longer had large areas under their effective control and attacks and casualties declined sharply,1 affording Pakistan a degree of relative peace. In early 2021, violence against civil society, security forces, public servants and other citizens was not as frequent or vicious as it had been a few years earlier. Much has been said and written about the prevalence of violent extremism and terrorism in Pakistan and on ways to tackle them in order to restore peace to the country. Terrorism in the country is recent decades has been largely believed to be religiously motivated.2 Groups responsible for the wave of terrorism from 2009 till 2017 were largely Sunni and Deobandi in nature, who targeted state institutions and civilians, both indiscriminately and along sectarian lines. Ethnonationalist organizations, predominantly from Balochistan, also conducted high profile attacks in Pakistan’s urban areas. The State’s counter-terrorism (CT) responses have almost exclusively fallen in the category of “hard approaches”, involving kinetic force and tactical operations to physically eliminate terrorists.3 To be fair, many of the security threats that confronted Pakistan warranted some form of immediate military action. However, while successful in the short term, such approaches fail to address the wider issues or causes and factors of violent extremism. For instance, even as hard approaches eliminate terrorists already on the ground, as long as the motivation driving them survives, more would continue to take their place. In that context, until the ‘mindset’ driving terrorism and violent extremism and the networks that connect them are confronted and eradicated, claims of victory over terrorism may be premature and unsustainable.4 Therefore, “soft” approaches must be an indispensable component in any counter-terrorism framework, particularly in the case of Pakistan, where not just terrorism but violent extremism is also rampant. At the outset, it must be said unequivocally that the state has the right, and indeed the obligation, to use all lawful and reasonable options to maintain law and order and protect the rights and lives of citizens. However, perceiving hard approaches as the only option, for all intents and purposes, misses out on the sustainability and advantage of the alternatives that may be used instead of or in conjunction with the use of force, as a measure of last resort. As the counter-terrorism approaches have relied on hard options over the past two decades, Pakistan’s growing extremism challenge—including the factors, dynamics, ideologies, and actors that feed into terrorism—have not received as much attention. This is not to say that no example of non-violent approaches for tackling terrorism and extremism exists in Pakistan. Several initiatives over the years have included components of counter-violent extremism (CVE) and the so-called soft approaches with the stated aim of preventing alienation, radicalization and promoting political means including dialogue and other forms of engagement, as well as rehabilitation and reintegration. Prominent instances of the use of soft approaches in Pakistan are enumerated in Chapter II. However, without exception, these so-called soft or non-violent approaches in the country have either had too miniscule a footprint, or little effort has been exerted on implementation, even for initiatives launched with much fanfare. The post-2014 trend of improving security indicators seemed to be faltering, or even reversing in the latter half of 2021, particularly after the fall of the Afghan government in August. Even before this recent development, as the physical footprint of terrorist outfits and their attacks had seemingly receded in the face of military operations, little had been done to tackle the religious-ideological, sociocultural, political, or governance-related and other factors and drivers of extremism, which feed into violent extremism and terrorism. This report has sprouted out of an initiative conceived in mid-2020, much before the unfolding of several recent events with significant implications for peace and security in Pakistan. That is to say that the need for considering soft approaches has only grown more urgent with the Taliban regaining power in Afghanistan and a clear uptick in security-related incidents in Pakistan in recent months.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Governance, Counter-terrorism, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Pakistan and Middle East

Search

Search Constraints

Search Results

Refine your search

Topic

Political Geography

Content Type

Journal

Publishing Institution

Author

Publication Year

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS