Topic: Foreign Policy - CIAO Search Results

251. The Evolution and Ethics of Accountability Sanctions

Author:: Mark Ferullo
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: When Yahya Jammeh seized power in The Gambia in 1994 in a bloodless coup d’état, the young army colonel’s promise to eliminate corruption seemed disin- genuous. At the time, few Gambians could have anticipated how corrupt and cruel his rule would be. His Excellency Sheikh Professor Al-haji Dr. Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh Babili Mansa, as he titled himself, brutalized his country for over two decades. In 2022, The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Com- mission exposed the extent of his violence, revealing that he commanded a hit squad that crushed dissent through murder, torture, and rape. His claim that he could cure AIDS with herbs might have been dismissed as the delusions of an out-of-touch autocrat were it not for the loss of life this lie caused during the medical trials.1 When the United States placed economic sanctions on Jammeh in 2017, most Gambians had little sympathy for their former leader, and few denied he deserved punishment.2 By then, Jammeh had fled the country, but the United States sanctioned him anyway. Jammeh joined 12 other individuals—including an organ-trafficking surgeon from Pakistan, a Guatemalan Congressman who ordered the killing of a journalist, and a Ukrainian police commander who oversaw the shooting of peaceful protestors in Kyiv during the Revolution of Dignity three years prior—as the first designations under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. “There is a steep price to pay for their mis- deeds,” said Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin at the time.3
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Economy, and Accountability
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

252. The Future of Japan-Africa Cooperation: TICAD

Author:: Habib Badawi
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: Africa will remain relevant to Japan as a necessary means to achieve some of its long-term political, economic, and strategic goals. Additionally, Japan seeks to expand its relations with the continent. However, it is diffi-cult to view Japan’s participation in Africa as part of an integrated policy or a well-thought-out long-term strategy, but only as a set of goals and some of the tools and mechanisms used to achieve those goals. This is largely reflected in Japan’s failure to prioritize its economic and political interests in its relationship with Africa. While Japan views Africa primarily through an economic lens, it has other major political interests. As Japan strives to bolster the dynamism of its ongoing development, production, and trade through a manufacturing and trade strategy designed to adapt to circumstances and mitigate crises, the nation has concurrently hei-ghtened its ambition for strategic hotspots, including resources and wealth. This is evident in its keen interest in the African continent and the ongoing competition between European and American powers for control over it.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, International Cooperation, Economy, Trade, Strategic Interests, and Resources
Political Geography:: Africa and Japan

253. Atlantism Under Maintenance: A Review of the Brazil-Cape Verde Partnership During the Dilma Rousseff Administrations (2011–2016)

Author:: Tatiana Raquel Reis Silva and Leandro Chaves Batista
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: From a holistic perspective, Brazil’s foreign policy towards the African continent has historically been marked by moments of greater proximity and others of relative distance. Authors such as Barriviera (2016) and Costa (2015) claim that there’s been a downturn in Brazil-Africa relations since Dilma Rousseff became president. It is essential to situate the relations established between Brazil and the various African nations as a phenomenon integrated into the logic of South-South Cooperation (SSC), a segment of Internatio-nal Development Cooperation (IDC) that encompasses political, diplomatic and commercial ties between developing countries, guided by the principle of horizontality, with an emphasis on mutual benefits. With regard to the cooperation established with the archipelago of Cape Verde, it is important to note that it is supported by a basal document: the Basic Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, signed in 1977.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Dilma Rousseff, and Atlantism
Political Geography:: Africa, Brazil, and Cabo Verde

254. Washington's and Taiwan's Diverging Interests Doesn't Make War Imminent

Author:: Hargisl Shirley Martey
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: We are a month from the Taiwan 2024 election that sent shockwaves around the world. President-elect, Lai Ching-te (賴清德), dared to utter the world ‘independence” in a strike against the longstanding One China Policy (一个中国政策) in his successful campaign to lead the nation. The election was important enough for an increasingly assertive President Xi Jinping (习近平出席) to try (and fail) to influence the election’s outcome. Xi has been rattling cages for the last several years and has made no secret of his desire to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s thumb without explicitly ruling out the use of force. Meanwhile, a busy President Biden has had his hands full keeping allies committed to Ukraine, battling Putin-sympathetic members of Congress, while also dealing with cascading crises in Israel and the Middle East. With that as our backdrop, does Lai’s election, Xi’s frustration, and Biden’s preoccupation mean we are closer to conflict in the Taiwan Strait? In this brief analysis we argue that at present the answer is “no.” And we make this call by looking at the vantage points and early actions of each country. For America, the Taiwan election has put the country on alert. For Taiwan, domestic concerns are mainly driving voters – not cross-Strait policy. For the People’s Republic of China (PRC; 中华人民共和国), ignore the rhetoric because they’ve followed their Taiwan election disappointment by returning to their standard playbook.1 But stay tuned…. perhaps they’re saving the fireworks for Lai’s May 20 inauguration.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Politics, Elections, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, North America, and United States of America

255. How Has the Ukraine War Changed the China-Russia Relationship?

Author:: Yun Sun, Segey Radchenko, Andrew Nathan, and Alexander Cooley
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Just prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “no-limits” partnership between their countries. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the Sino-Russian relationship. While Putin has sought Beijing’s support for his territorial grab, China’s position, has been famously characterized as “pro-Russia neutrality”. Geopolitics remains the single most important factor in China’s decision regarding the Ukraine war, as Beijing has been torn between the competing agendas of managing its relations with Russia and relations with Europe. And while the Russians have grown increasingly frustrated with what many in Moscow perceive as Beijing’s double-dealing and unwillingness to commit, Putin’s leverage with Xi Jinping remains limited. As the war in Ukraine grinds into its third year, China and Russia continue unsteadily towards an ever closer alignment even while pragmatically looking out for their own interests in an evolving world.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

256. At Home or Abroad, U.S. Firearms Should Not Fuel Violence, Instability, and Abuse

Author:: Allison McManus and Laura Kilbury
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: Congress and the Biden administration should strengthen the U.S. Department of Commerce’s efforts to prevent American firearms from reaching adversaries and fueling global violence and rights abuses.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Weapons, and Gun Violence
Political Geography:: Israel, Latin America, and United States of America

257. The EU’s accidental geopolitics: Europe’s geopolitical adaptation and its limits

Author:: Niklas Helwig
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: This Working Paper develops the idea that the EU is engaged in accidental geopolitics. There is a lack of consensus among EU institutions and members on the extent of the EU’s geopolitical role. The Union’s structures and strategic culture do not reflect a focus on geostrategy and power. Instead, the environment of strategic competition has pushed the EU to act in geopolitical ways, for example through the financing of military aid or the imposition of sanctions. The paper argues that these actions have been accidental rather than intentional. To substantiate this argument, the paper draws on an analysis of several key foreign and security policy developments during the EU’s outgoing institutional cycle (2019–2024). The analysis reveals the EU’s shortcomings in becoming an intentional geopolitical actor, and highlights the role of foreign policy agents within the Union in driving decisions. Accidental geopolitics and the reactive deployment of the EU’s international leverage underline the impact of the Union’s top jobs on its role in international politics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Adaptation
Political Geography:: Europe

258. Helsinki Security Forum 2024 report

Author:: Mikael Mattlin, Harri Mikkola, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Tyyne Karjalainen, and Minna Ålander
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Helsinki Security Forum 2024: Towards a Total Defence of Europe – From Apathy to Action? In its search for unity, Europe requires a comprehensive approach to security to build resilient societies. The third annual Helsinki Security Forum (HSF) will explore how comprehensive national security strategies and preparedness could benefit Europe on a broader scale. HSF is an annual event that gathers decision-makers and foreign policy experts to discuss pressing international security issues from a Northern European perspective.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Northern Europe

259. Erdoğan and Asad’s Slow Rapprochement: Too Weak to Make a Deal

Author:: Joel Parker
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In our latest edition of Turkeyscope, Joel Parker discusses the chances of a rapprochement between Turkey and Syria. He argues that the Syrian regime will not accept full normalization without an end to Turkish military presence in northeastern Syria, which is unlikely to happen.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Syrian War, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Normalization, Rapprochement, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

260. Comparing Israeli-Turkish Relations: The 1990s versus post-October 7

Author:: Jonathan Ghariani
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In our latest issue of Turkeyscope Dr. Jonathan Ghariani analyzes the changes in Turkey's approach to Israel since October 7, 2023 in contrast to the pre-Erdogan era led by Necmettin Erbakan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

261. Retrospectiva, incógnitas y conjeturas: imaginando la OTAN tras la guerra de Ucrania

Author:: Carlos López Gómez
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: Tras el final de la Guerra Fría, la OTAN experimentó una profunda transformación en cuanto a su composición, objetivos, acciones y alcance geográfico. La invasión rusa de Ucrania ha hecho que en los últimos dos años se haya concentrado de nuevo en las funciones tradicionales de la disuasión y la defensa de sus miembros. El artículo explora las variables y condicionantes de las que dependerá el papel de la OTAN en el futuro.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

262. Between Tradition and Transformation: The Impact of Illiberal Populism on Georgia’s Democratic Aspirations

Author:: Giorgi Iakobishvili
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The article examines the role of Georgian far-right illiberal populist groups in Georgian politics and their influence on Georgia’s foreign policy and the ongoing democratization process, emphasizing Euroscepticism, liberal institutional development, and the pro-Russian narrative. Using qualitative research methodology, we analyzed the programs, manifestos, and public speeches of well-known groups active in Georgian politics, such as People's Power, Georgian March, Georgian Idea, Unity, Essence, Hope (ERI), and Alliance of Patriots of Georgia. Analysis of the mentioned material, as well as various scientific studies, shows that the discourse of these groups is dominated by xenophobic, nationalist, populist, and racist rhetoric, which represents a significant challenge to Georgia’s European integration path and in the direction of democratization of its governance system. In the long term, we concluded that the existence and development of these illiberal populist actors threaten Georgia’s aspirations for European integration and democratic development. This study contributes to a broader discourse about populism and illiberal views in the Georgian reality, focusing on the influence of these ideologies on the formation of the country’s foreign policy and orientation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Democracy, Populism, Domestic Politics, Illiberalism, and Euroskepticism
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

263. Two years of war in Ukraine: Will the West need another shock to act decisively?

Author:: Arkady Moshes
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The West is failing to provide Ukraine with sufficient resources to resist Russia’s invasion, and lacks a vision for the future of West-Russia relations. This may push Ukraine to the brink of defeat as early as 2024. Western capitals should realize the risks and stop procrastinating.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

264. Back to the Future: Applying Cold War Wisdom to Modern Belgian Defence

Author:: Bernard Siman
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Dust off the Cold War files that are lying under mounds of dust in the archives of our European Defence chancelleries. Bring back willing retired officers to share their knowledge of how things were done over 45 years of a solid and ultimately successful defence posture. There is bound to be a wealth of instructive and useful structures, tools, experiences and models, tested to their limit and refined to near perfection over the period of the Cold War between 1945 to the early 1990s. They can be adapted to suit the need for a rapid build-up of both defence capabilities as well as resilience. Belgium’s obligations in NATO: Cold War lessons in brigades’ formations As the new Belgian government undergoes the trials and tribulation of horse-trading to form a new cabinet, following the recent general election, it behoves all politicians to make the defence of the realm a priority, using the wealth of information contained in the experiences of the Cold War. Do the negotiating politicians need more of a prompt than the NATO summit currently held in Washington (2024), celebrating the 75th anniversary of the most successful defence alliance in history, that coincided with the start of the negotiation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Cold War, Diplomacy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Belgium

265. Re-Empowering Belgian Foreign Policy

Author:: Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Belgium’s existing foreign policy framework was never designed to cope with the return of war and the decay of the rules-based international order. As a result, the country’s international position is rapidly deteriorating. The incoming Belgian government will face the daunting task of articulating a new foreign policy that is tailored to the demands of a new era. This Egmont Policy Brief makes the case for putting security back at the centre of Belgium’s international outlook, complementing the strong focus on the EU with strong bilateral diplomacy, and reversing the budgetary erosion of the Belgian foreign policy apparatus. By strengthening its diplomatic corps and its network abroad, the new government can help ensure the collective security and prosperity of all Belgian citizens, that is to say: the national interest.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Belgium

266. Modi III and the EU, after the Elections

Author:: Jan Luykx
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The May elections in India and the June elections for the European Parliament have resulted in leadership-continuity in Delhi and in EU-Brussels. Does this mean that Europe can expect ‘more of the same’ from the new Indian government and vice versa? Will the EU and India take the opportunity of this new start to re-engage in a more significant way than they have done during the last couple of years? Will they be able to identify common interests, and more importantly, act upon them?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, Narendra Modi, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe, South Asia, and India

267. No End in Sight? The West, China, and the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The West supports Ukraine as a non-belligerent. China purports to be neutral, but the West increasingly sees it as a non-belligerent on the side of Russia. In a way, the West’s and China’s approaches are not dissimilar: doing enough for “their” side to stop it from losing the war, but otherwise sitting it out in the hope that the other side will somehow give up. That can hardly be called a strategy. Both the West and China will have to review their strategies if they want to preserve their interests. Will this inevitably increase tensions between them?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia-Pacific

268. Russia’s Potential Alliance with Hizbollah: A Strategic Challenge for the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:: Bernard Siman
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: One year on, the debate has been dominated by Israel, Hizbollah and the potential for regional war in the Middle East. An additional credible scenario has been worryingly absent: that in which Hizbollah and Russia cooperate, not necessarily to the exclusion of Iran as a third leg in a tripartite alliance. This scenario combines geography, history and geopolitics to bring Hizbollah and Russia closer together as a force to recon with. This is a possible development in the Southern Neighbourhood and the Levant that the EU needs to take seriously. Missing Russia’s potential move on Hizbollah could be an historic omission. The decapitation of Hizbollah’s chain of command that preceded the ground incursion, and Iran’s feeble reaction to the devastating assault on its Lebanese proxy, have created a new geopolitical vacuum and reality in the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia may spot an opportunity in the misfortunes of Hizbollah and move on a weakened prey. Will Russia’s direct influence return to Beirut for the first time since the 1770s when it occupied the city for a few months following the naval defeat of the Ottoman fleet at the battle of Cheshme? It is a distinct possibility, especially given Iran’s lukewarm military response, and one that the EU, and member states, must be prepared to deal with, if not pre-empt and prevent.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Geopolitics, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Lebanon, and Eastern Mediterranean

269. What’s Brewing in Benin? Security Collaboration in the Gulf of Guinea

Author:: Nina Wilén
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Gulf of Guinea has drawn attention from Western states in recent years due both to increasing spillover of violent extremism from the Sahel and because of Sahelian military juntas’ shift of security partners from Western countries to Russian actors. Indeed, as three Sahelian states experienced five coups during the past years and gradually ousted their former security partners, starting with France, followed by the UN (in Mali) and the EU and the US (in Niger), the Gulf of Guinea countries’ relative stability and geopolitical positions have attracted new attention from external actors. Benin, neighboring both Burkina Faso and Niger, saw attacks by jihadist groups crossing the borders in the North of the country already in 2019. Although expanding relatively slowly, between 2021 and 2024, the number of attacks grew, forcing the government to invest more resources in counter terrorism efforts and reflect on more immediate ways to counter the expansion. Out of the Gulf of Guinea countries, Benin has so far been the hardest hit, and recorded a doubling in the number of recorded fatalities (to 173 deaths) over the past year. A figure which remains small in comparison to neighboring Sahel states, but which still indicates an increase. In spite of these attacks and the adoption in 2019 of a new electoral code limiting political opposition parties, Benin has remained relatively democratic and stable. Such stability has attracted old and new security partners to increase collaboration, both to counter terrorism and because of the expulsion from the Sahel countries. The US, France and Belgium have all intensified security collaboration with Benin over the past few years, while the EU has launched a new, regional CSDP initiative in the Gulf of Guinea. African states have also showed interest for Benin, with Rwanda offering to send troops bilaterally for counter terrorism purposes, similar to its operations in Mozambique. This policy brief aims to explore Benin’s security situation and international partnerships in the security domain, while identifying current and future challenges to such collaborations. The conclusion argues that Western and multilateral actors should maintain discrete collaboration but be cautious not to overburden Benin with their presence as absorption of new capabilities and capacities take time, and as a too heavy presence of Western security actors can become a burden rather than an advantage for the government. External actors should also continue to support recent efforts by the authorities to open up the political landscape to maintain its long-standing democratic tradition.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Partnerships, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:: Africa, North Africa, Sahel, Benin, and Central Africa

270. Geopolitics and Geography: A Realigned EU Strategy for Stability in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean

Author:: Bernard Siman
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The new EU Commission should commence its geopolitical thinking by acknowledging that geography is not kind to those who ignore her. The new European Parliament has the unique opportunity to become perhaps the first geopolitical parliament through a similar process. States, political leaders and societies ignore their geographic realities at their peril. Perceptions of location, distance and neighbourhoods can be dangerously distorted when they drift too far off from actual geographic realities. Digital technology, ease of air travel (bypassing the unpleasant geographic realities on the ground), combined with over three decades of peace in Europe, and 50 years in the Middle East, have created the distorted perceptions that somehow Israel’s and Ukraine’s neighbourhood was liberal Europe. These collective perceptions, untethered from their geographic realities, eclipsed perhaps the fact that both have neighbours with whom they have been at differing degrees of long-simmering conflicts. In reality, however, Israel and its neighbours have not succeeded at resolving the conflicts on its very borders, betraying the perception of peace. It is as if those neighbours with whom Israel has been in conflict had disappeared.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Geography
Political Geography:: Europe and Middle East

271. The Politics behind the EU-Rwanda Deal(s) and its Consequences

Author:: Kristof Titeca
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On the 14th of October, the news emerged that the EU is in the final stages of a discussion to award €20 million to the Rwandan army for its operations in Mozambique – where it is fighting insurgents in the oil-rich Gabo Delgado province. It would be the second time in two years that the EU awards this amount under the European Peace Facility (EPF): it also did so in December 2022. At that time, the decision was met with anger in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as it was already documented by the UN how the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) were supporting the M23 rebellion in Eastern DRC. In the meantime, this support has become clearer, with the last report from the UN Group of Experts from June 2024 extensively documenting the RDF operations with M23 in Eastern DRC. The news of potentially another €20 million is therefore met with anger in Congolese politics and society, primarily directed at the EU. It is a question which puzzles many: why does the EU want to award €20 million to the Rwandan army, in the midst of its violations of international law in Eastern DRC? This piece will unpack this question and reflect on the consequences for the regional dynamics and the EU.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Law, Politics, and European Union
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Rwanda

272. Why the BRICS Summit in Kazan should be a Wake-up Call for the EU

Author:: Reinhold Brender
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: This policy brief examines the growing influence of the BRICS in a multipolar world, as highlighted by their recent summit in Kazan, Russia, and the challenges to effective global multilateralism. Originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa, the BRICS have recently expanded to include Ethiopia, Egypt, the UAE, and Iran. All BRICS members seek to reshape global governance to provide a greater voice for the Global South and strengthen South-South cooperation. However, internal divisions persist: China, Russia, and Iran view the BRICS as a platform to counter Western influence, while India, Brazil, and South Africa pursue ‘multi-alignment’ to diversify their global partnerships. This brief argues that, given the urgency of pressing global challenges, the EU should take the Kazan Summit as a wake-up call to develop and implement a strategy for engaging the Global South in the much-needed reform of global multilateralism. This effort is essential despite the reelection of Donald Trump as US President.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, European Union, Multilateralism, BRICS, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe, Latin America, North Africa, and Asia-Pacific

273. China, the West, and the Rest: Who is Enjoying the Shadow of Whom?

Author:: Jasper Roctus and Bart Dessein
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On Tuesday, July 25, 2023, Beijing announced that seasoned diplomat Wang Yi would return to his function as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a post he had held for ten years (2013–2022). With this, he replaced his predecessor Qin Gang, a so-called ‘wolf warrior’ diplomat who was in office for only a few months. When former premier Li Keqiang (2013–2023) died of a heart attack on October 27, 2023, crowds of ordinary citizens laid chrysanthemum bouquets across the country, mourning for the more open and optimistic times that had characterized the era under Li’s patron, State President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Hu Jintao (r. 2002–2012). Minister of Defense Li Shangfu was, after an equally short stint in office, replaced by former People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) admiral Dong Jun on December 29, 2023. In the case of Li Shangfu, who was sanctioned by the United States (US) over arms sales to Russia, his resignation was combined with a purge and crackdown on corruption within the rocket force of the PLA. Given the focus on the PLAN in Xi Jinping’s military reforms of the mid-2010s, this could be interpreted as an advantage point for the faction of China’s leader. This signal stands in contrast to the promotion of Hu Haifeng, the son of Hu Jintao, to vice minister of Civil Affairs on January 16, 2024. Keeping the much-speculated removal of Hu’s father during the 20th National Congress of the CCP of October 22, 2022 into mind, one might ask: Who enjoys whose sunlight to step out of the shadows?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

274. A Safe and Sovereign Europe in a Changing Global Context

Author:: Lila Djait
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, with support of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in collaboration with the Representation of the European Commission in Belgium, has organised a series of three foresight workshops and three working dinners. Each session was dedicated to a key strategic challenge, providing a vital platform for dialogue and expert insight sharing among decision-makers from European Union (EU) institutions, the Belgian administration, and civil society. Far from being just a theoretical exchange, the discussions were a targeted effort to further develop strategic long-term thinking, with a vision extending over the next 5 to 10 years. The second round of the foresight workshops and working dinners reflected on ‘A Safe and Sovereign Europe in a Changing Global Context’. In the rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, the EU is undergoing a transformation in its global positioning within the multipolar world order. The perception of the EU as a strongly integrated regional entity in an era of heightened power politics necessitates a more assertive, unified stance in global affairs, as well as a reinforced coordination of the internal and external dimension of EU policies. Yet, translating this perception into a cohesive, integrated approach to global affairs has proven challenging for its Member States. Strengthening EU sovereignty becomes crucial in this altered geopolitical reality posing a paradox: Member States need to transfer some sovereignty to the EU to effectively safeguard their national sovereignty. This is particularly relevant in areas like defence and migration, where national approaches fall short.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Europe and Belgium

275. Procurement by Proxy: How Sahelian Juntas Acquire Equipment from Ousted Security Partners

Author:: Nina Wilén
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: During the past two years military juntas in Mali and Niger have ousted three multilateral security missions in addition to French, and more recently American, forces deployed to fight jihadists in the two countries. Although being preceded by deteriorating relations, the decisions to kick out the international partners have been announced abruptly and the departures have been rushed as juntas have increased pressure for the missions to leave. After making the decision to oust the missions, the juntas have also mounted new obstacles for the missions and their departures, either taking, or forcing the missions to leave a large amount of equipment and material behind. This article argues that this is a deliberate strategy by the military juntas in Mali and Niger to acquire new equipment and material for their security forces, in some cases to be used with new security partners, such as Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, Mali, Sahel, and Niger

276. China, Sovereign Internationalism, and Silent Pragmatism

Author:: Bart Dessein
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Until the early 1990s, transnational institutions of which the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (SU) were the respective epicenters were formed. Sovereign nation states transferred increasing amounts of decision-making power to these institutions. Post-Second World War internationalization, globalization, and interdependence thus created the bipolar world order of the Cold War era. An important effect of the demise of the SU and the disappearance of the Soviet-led institutions has been that the currently existing institutes of global governance are part and parcel of the liberal democratic world order. The growing economic and geopolitical clout of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has given this country the possibility to reposition itself vis-à-vis this liberal world order. This repositioning has, in its turn, also impacted the foreign policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states. All this makes it worthwhile to reassess the observation of Henry Kissinger who, looking back at the 1950s, stated that “from the outset, Mao [Zedong] had no intention to accept an international system in the design of which China had no voice” worthwhile.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, Sovereignty, European Union, and Pragmatism
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia-Pacific

277. India and The EU in 2024: Where to Next?

Author:: Jan Luykx
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: In this multi-election-year both the Indian Government and the European Parliament will soon face their respective voters. Relations between the EU and India, two powerful actors on the world stage, will hardly be a theme of much importance in these elections. With the present geopolitical turmoil in the world as background, the question arises whether India and the EU should enhance their strategic cooperation to a more significant level. Russia’s war on Ukraine is posing a real threat to peace and security for the rest of Europe and for the Eurasian continent. With China, Russia’s partner against ‘the West’, extending its influence in many parts of the world, while the rest of the world is waiting, often with apprehension, the outcome of the US elections, insecurity and uncertainty have become dominant feelings in many capitals. In this context, should the EU-political level not take note of the potential benefits of closer relations with a more ambitious India?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe, India, and Asia-Pacific

278. PESCO: The Last Chance

Author:: Sven Biscop and Beatriz Cózar Murillo
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: To the outside observer, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) equals the long list of projects rather than the 20 binding commitments that were hailed as a game-changer when PESCO was launched in 2017. At first sight, these 68 projects do not seem to work towards a single objective. Is the end of PESCO clear even to the initiated? It is not, in fact, and that remains the greatest obstacle to success. A (second) strategic review of PESCO is underway, but putting PESCO on the right track requires a fundamental overhaul.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
Political Geography:: Europe

279. Uganda’s Chess Game in Eastern DRC: With or Without M23?

Author:: Kristof Titeca
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Uganda has various economic, political and security interests in Eastern DRC. The latter is for example a vital export market for Ugandan products, and an important source of gold, Uganda’s most important export product. In this situation, a careful tactical game is played, in which Kampala seeks to protect these interests in Eastern DRC – for example from Kigali. This does not only involve a clear engagement with Kinshasa, but to a lesser extent also with M23. This is particularly the case because M23 is expanding (and keeping) its territory; creating an incentive for regional actors to engage with them.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:: Uganda, Africa, and Democratic Republic of the Congo

280. China and Geopolitics as Ontology

Author:: Bart Dessein
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Human beings are storytellers; stories form the cultural framework that gives sense to their behavior and existence. Nations, likewise, “are guided to act in certain ways, and not others, on the basis of the projections, expectations, and memories derived from […] available social, public, and cultural narratives”. Denying a political culture the right to own its story is tantamount to denying that political culture, and the human beings who belong to it, their very right to existence. Territorial integrity and unity After its defeat against European powers in the Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860), the Manchu government of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) was forced into signing the ‘unequal treaties’ (bu pingdeng tiaoyue). This put both the political leadership of the Manchus and the value and effectiveness of the traditional Confucian political ideology to the question. From this, the aspiration developed to create a Han Chinese nation state that would be built on Western political, social, and economic concepts. When the Republic of China (Zhonghua minguo) decided to join World War I in 1917 (in practice, the Chinese participation to World War I consisted of a contingent of some 140,000 laborers – the so-called ‘Chinese Labor Corps’ – who were active in the logistics of the war in Belgium and France), this was partly because of the conviction that this would enable China to position itself as a modern nation state among equals. However, after the war, the 1919 Versailles Treaty stipulated that the territorial possessions Germany had acquired through the ‘unequal treaties’ would not be returned to China, but had to be transferred to Japan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, History, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia-Pacific

281. Mask Off: Implications of the EU’s “Geopolitical Awakening” for its Relations with the MENA Region

Author:: Johannes Späth
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced European foreign policy-makers to reassess their view of international relations and reconceptualise the European Union (EU)’s approach to it. A broad consensus has emerged that the foreign policy of the EU needs to become more geopolitical. A sentiment echoed and championed by Ursula von der Leyen, who, since assuming the role of President of the European Commission in December 2019, has actively advocated for a more assertive and strategic EU presence on the global stage (Bayer, 2019). The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, has labelled these developments as “the awakening of geopolitical Europe” (Borrell, 2022). He further insisted that a more geopolitical European outlook on the world should not be temporary but should become the “new normal” (Borrell, 2022). This suggests a fundamental and lasting shift in the EU’s approach to external relations. Given the ambiguity of the term ‘geopolitics’, which has at least five different meanings (Kundani, 2023), many questions about the EU’s new normal remain to be answered: What does a more geopolitical foreign policy entail? What would be the implications of such a new approach regarding the European Neighbourhood, in particular the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region? And how can such an approach be reconciled with the EU’s liberal principles? This paper aims to assess these questions from a realist perspective. The article proceeds as follows. The first part examines the different conceptualisations of geopolitics and assesses which of them EU policy-makers refer to. The second part examines whether a more geopolitical EU foreign policy towards the MENA region can be seen as a paradigm shift or rather a continuation of existing policies. The third part considers how the “geopolitical awakening” can be reconciled with the EU’s liberal principles. The paper concludes by drawing on the findings to develop concrete recommendations.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Middle East and North Africa

282. Türkiye-EU Relations and the European Political Community in the Aftermath of Russian Invasion: Is the Transactional Turn Here to Stay?

Author:: Başak Alpan
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: Bilateral relations between Türkiye and the European Union (EU) acquired an EU conditionality dimension with the 1999 Helsinki decision, granting the country the EU candidacy status. Nevertheless, especially since the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, also known as Türkiye-EU Refugee Deal, what we see is a thorough shift in Türkiye-EU relations from a conditionality perspective to transactionalism, coupled with several domestic and international developments. In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the significance of geopolitics and the heightened relevance of realpolitik also contributed to a renewed focus on strategic and pragmatic issues, relegating normative concerns to the background within Türkiye-EU relations. All in all, the shift from a conditionality perspective to a security-based logic within the framework of Türkiye-EU relations was mainly determined and characterised by the so-called “transactional turn”. Within this very transactionalist paradigm, both the EU and Türkiye want to pursue their short-term interests at the expense of a long-term principled engagement for some time. The launch of the European Political Community (EPC) on 6 October 2022 with 44 European heads of state and government (including all 27 EU member states as well as Türkiye) also contributed to this transactional tide, which aimed to “emphasise European geopolitical cooperation in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; to remedy enlargement fatigue by providing an additional forum for exchange between EU candidates and member states; as well as create a forum for exchange with non-EU security actors” (Tcherneva, 2023). The EPC’s rather flexible structure and focus on mini-lateralism, which could provide greater freedom for leaders to focus on their immediate concerns, also raises eyebrows about whether the EPC would be attentive enough (and even have the mandate) to safeguard human rights, democracy, and the rule of law (Jurkovic, 2023). In light of these debates, the aims of this paper are twofold. First, it aims to explore how recent transactional initiatives between Türkiye and the EU in general and the EPC initiative in particular have unfolded and have been perceived by the Turkish diplomats and foreign policy experts. This endeavour to understand the Turkish perceptions of Türkiye-EU relations mainly focusing on recent transactionalism between the parties will be explored with a particular focus on three thematic layers, namely the foreign policy, migration and energy through semi-structured interviews with Turkish diplomats and foreign policy experts. The main rationale behind picking up these thematic layers is to identify, analyse and describe better the complex nature of Türkiye-EU relations with a particular focus on these policy fields (namely foreign policy, migration and energy), which recently witnessed the highest intensity of interactions between two parties. Second, the paper discusses the significance of the EPC within this very transactional turn and aims to understand whether the EPC is another repercussion of the increasing transactionalism. The final aim of the paper will be to understand whether the EU foreign policy, on the one hand, and the bilateral Türkiye-EU relations, on the other, would evolve in a completely transactional and security-based manner leaving no room for normativity amidst the current global uncertainties and challenges, as well as bringing together policy recommendations for the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Migration, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Middle East

283. Grand strategy: Alliances

Author:: Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Alliances are usually temporary arrangements among states to counter—or “balance” against—a specific common threat. The United States’ Cold War alliances, by contrast, have become seemingly permanent. States tend to balance power when they face a major threat. Bandwagoning, by contrast, is a particularly poor option for states with the capability to put up a fight. When threatened, states tend to join forces in alliances rather than surrender their national survival to the whims of a more powerful aggressor. Alliances, however, entail costs and risks. These include the dangers of being drawn into war through entanglement and entrapment, the deleterious effect on deterrence by allies that neglect their defense by “free-riding,” and the moral hazard produced by enabling allies to act like “reckless drivers.” Over time, the United States has shifted from a deep skepticism of “entangling alliances” to a global network of security dependents that are treated as an end in themselves, rather than a means to an end. This posture has left the United States overextended, while encouraging allies to neglect their own capabilities and preparedness. The United States can and should significantly reduce its alliance commitments, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, where threats to the U.S. are remote and local powers can balance adversaries. In Asia, the United States should act as a backstop to the regional balance of power rather than a vanguard.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Grand Strategy, Alliance, Balance of Power, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

284. Rethinking Africa Command

Author:: Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: As debate grows over U.S. policy towards Africa, consideration should be given to altering the continent’s status under the Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan (UCP). Eliminating Africa Command (AFRICOM) under the UCP would both signify a policy shift away from a counterterrorism focus and ease the process of implementing that change within the policymaking bureaucracy. Establishing a three-star subcommand, nested under European Command (EUCOM), would still allow the United States to use force in Africa, when necessary, but would reduce the prominence of military power in U.S. policy toward the continent. AFRICOM and EUCOM essentially share much of their force structure; this unique relationship would facilitate the transition to the proposed three-star subcommand. Altering the U.S. military footprint in Africa should also be considered in the context of any changes to policy and command arrangements. Making specific recommendations at this time is complicated by the opaqueness of the current footprint.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Counter-terrorism, Africa Command (AFRICOM), and European Command (EUCOM)
Political Geography:: Africa, North America, and United States of America

285. China’s and Russia’s Aggressive Foreign Policies: Historical Legacy or Geopolitical Ambitions?

Author:: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Che-chuan Lee, and James Sherr
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Beijing and Moscow are among the states across the world pursuing aggressive foreign policies, including towards their neighbours. Beyond mere threats, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that deterrence could fail, with catastrophic consequences. How is Russia’s war against Ukraine perceived in Taiwan and in the wider Indo-Pacific region? What are the long-standing strategic goals of the Kremlin and the CCP, and what role do Ukraine and Taiwan play in them? International security must guard against new challenges such as hybrid warfare but also prevent the foremost international crime: wars of aggression. Aggressive foreign policies are not the same as wars of aggression, but they are closely linked, as they share a hostile outlook to the status quo. Deciphering the drivers of aggressive state behaviour—between historical legacies and geopolitical ambitions—will help us better prepare against new threats from rival states. China’s aggressive foreign policy seeks to alter the cross-Strait status quo and achieve “national reunification”. While these ambitions are persistent, they also reflect an evolving understanding of Taiwan’s circumstances. Indeed, Beijing has demonstrated both continuity and change in its approach to cross-strait relations, simultaneously upholding the ‘One China Principle’ and pursuing a hybrid warfare strategy to undermine Taipei’s authority. The recent juncture was the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP). From early on, Beijing accused the DPP of pursuing Taiwan’s formal independence from China, followed by a cold peace to a more aggressive policy from Beijing. Many of these techniques draw from Beijing’s decades of confrontation with Taipei, and cover a range of political positions, public relations efforts, and ‘grey zone’ tactics. Given the centrality of cross-strait relations for international security, understanding these shifts is critical for adapting to broader shifts in the Indo-Pacific region. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy draws from entrenched adversarial perspectives about the West, as well as recent political developments inside the Kremlin. Despite the Soviet collapse and the transition to Capitalism, Moscow’s security elites still conceive international security through the idea of the ‘correlation of forces’, a Soviet-era concept to describe international relations as a sum-total of society. This wide understanding goes beyond the idea of the ‘balance of power’ by incorporating other dimensions of international power, such as the economy, the state of societies and even psychological factors. Moreover, Moscow never abandoned a sense of entitlement towards the countries that fall within what the Kremlin calls its “near abroad” and has only evolved in how it pursues and articulates this entitlement. Russia’s enduring interests also point to Europe, Ukraine, and China, as well as the broader international order. Putting the aggressive foreign policy of China and Russia side-by-side will enrich the analytical outlook of those engaged in studying these two countries’ foreign policies and the broader regions they are in. These are large topics, and the two chapters of this report offer a concise though comprehensive look that will be of interest to policymakers, analysts, and anybody concerned with the security challenges of today.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific

286. Russia and China in Central Asia: Potential For Direct Competition

Author:: Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: China is now undisputedly the leading economic partner for the Central Asia region, with trade and investment continuing to increase despite Beijing’s economic slowdown. Russia is still the dominant political partner for the region, but its influence and ability to strong-arm Central Asian states has been significantly dented by the impact of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are now able in tacitly criticize Putin’s actions without significant cost and some have taken advantage of the negative impacts of Russia’s international isolation and sanctions to strike beneficial deals, in particular Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moscow remains content in its position, knowing that the lack of democracy in the region and dominance of elite networks in business and politics mean that regional states are still willing to turn to Moscow for political support, as witnessed in the Kyrgyz Republic in particular since President Japarov came to power in 2020. Tensions between Beijing and Russia have failed to emerge, at least publicly, although if the current trends continue the potential for direct competition may increase.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

287. Advise, Assist, Enable: A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

Author:: John A. Nagl and Marshall Cooperman
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved. Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization. Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

288. A "Frozen Conflict" Boils Over: Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Future Implications

Author:: Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: This report has two objectives: first, to present an account of the conflict with an emphasis on analytically useful categories and context up to the present, and second, to discuss local, regional, and global consequences of the latest developments of the dispute, including policy implications and recommendations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Territorial Disputes, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

289. The Realignment of the Middle East

Author:: Lior Sternfeld
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: In the Middle East, reality can change in the blink of an eye. Misconceptions and misrepresentations that dominate the public discourse have it that the region has been embroiled in war since time immemorial. Still, even its most recognizable conflict—the Israel-Palestine dispute—has been going on for only a century. This report will not focus on the history of that conflict but instead will try to analyze the realignment of the key players in the region and beyond and point out several pathways to build on in securing peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the sole global superpower. The change in world politics and the demise of the Soviet Union did not end the perception of alliances as zero-sum games. The War on Terror, the debacle of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of movements such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Arab Spring, and the collapse of old state structures, somehow fortified this approach over a more nuanced and pragmatic approach. Since the early 1990s, China entered as a secondary force and slowly gained a different status. This report examines the changes the Chinese doctrine might bring to the geopolitics in the region. Furthermore, it will examine the role China has played in the reshaping of the Middle East as a multipolar region, the transformation in the American role, and identify areas where the United States can take advantage of the new multipolarity in the region in light of Chinese activity.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, and Realignment
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and United States of America

290. Russia and China in Central Asia

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The two countries that have the greatest influence in Central Asia are Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have common interests in Central Asia, foremost are security interests connected to sharing long borders with a mainly Muslim region that itself borders Afghanistan. However, both these giant neighbors view Central Asia differently. Russia and China each have their own purposes in Central Asia, some of which do not affect the other, but some that at the least make the other country uncomfortable. Since Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine, these Sino-Russian rifts are becoming more pronounced. Russia and China want the current status quo in Central Asia, and that is the reason both countries have been concerned by the three revolutions in Kyrgyzstan since 2005. Moscow and Beijing know the top people in the Central Asian governments and have established security and business ties in all five countries. Neither China nor Russia want their relationships with individual Central Asian states to change, and neither wants to see the arrival of strong outside competitors for influence in Central Asia as was the case when the United States and its allies suddenly increased their presence in Central Asia for the campaign in Afghanistan in the years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

291. Getting Ukraine to a Position of Strength: A Strategy for the Trump Administration

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Below are five reasons why Ukraine is important to US interests. 1. Protecting the US economy. North America and Europe account for nearly half of the world’s GDP. Two-thirds of foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, and 48 states export more to Europe than to China. This supports millions of American jobs. European stability, which Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine undermines, benefits the US economy and, by extension, the American worker. Aiding Ukraine helps preserve that stability. 2. Detering Chinese aggression. Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is watching how the West supports Ukraine. A strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan appear stronger and deters Chinese aggression. 3. Succeeding in great power competition. Russia’s war against Ukraine is central to America’s great power competition against the Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis. North Korea has provided 10,000 soldiers, millions of artillery shells, and hundreds of missiles to Russia in exchange for military technology. Meanwhile, Iran provides Russia with drones and ballistic missiles in exchange for fighter jets and other advanced capabilities. China’s technical, economic, and diplomatic support for Russia enables all this as part of Beijing’s strategy to undermine the US. 4. Preparing the US military enterprise for twenty-first-century warfare. Support for Ukraine has exposed major shortcomings in the US defense industrial base that can now be fixed. The war has also tested American-made military hardware in a way not possible in peacetime—with no American casualties. The US is learning what works, what does not work, and how systems evolve in combat. And as Ukraine receives US weapons, America replaces its own weapons stocks with newer, more effective systems. 5. Demonstrating strength. A successful Ukraine demonstrates American strength. However, acquiescing to Putin and abandoning partners shows the world American weakness. Even forcing Ukraine into a deal that lopsidedly benefits Russia would embolden US adversaries and cause America’s allies to hedge toward other security arrangements.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

292. Understanding and Countering China’s Global South Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: While the United States and advanced economies and democracies in Europe and Asia are hardening their views of and position against China, the latter is gaining much ground with respect to the developing economies of the Global South. Indeed, China increasingly demands that developing nations base their discourse and policies on approaches that Beijing supports, and many Global South nations are increasingly complying. In other words, a growing number of these nations have started to alter and adopt discourse and policies that better align with Chinese demands and preferences. In the Indo-Pacific, a region that will largely determine the future shape of the global strategic landscape, evidence shows that developing nations are absorbing Chinese norms and preferences and gradually adjusting their thinking and behaviors accordingly. China’s progress vis-à-vis the Global South—especially in the Indo-Pacific—relies on what material inducements and opportunities Beijing can offer. These are most successful when they prioritize rapid development and regime security over liberal economic rules and individual rights. Meanwhile, regardless of where the fault lies, many developing nations do not believe they have benefited as much materially or institutionally from the US-led order as they would like or expect. Members of the Global South often believe the Chinese narrative about the alleged failure of US-led globalization in the post-colonial and post–Cold War periods. For this reason, many in developing economies believe that the interests and values of these nations (or at least those of the regimes in power) better align with what China is promising than with what Washington is delivering. The US and allies such as Japan and Australia have to accept and respond to this reality. This report analyzes and assesses why and how China is making worrying progress when it comes to shaping and influencing the policies and actions of developing economies in the Indo-Pacific. It explains why this is a significant problem for the US and its allies. It then offers some recommendations to counter the Chinese Global South strategy in the region. In offering six recommendations, this report argues that the US can complicate China’s bid for leadership within the Global South, increase the cost and risk for Beijing, challenge and change narratives and discourse favoring China in the Global South, and compete more effectively in the normative and institutional context.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Global South, and Indo-Pacific

293. The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: More than three years ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan after a two-decade insurgency against the internationally backed Afghan government. Since then, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. The country faces an acute humanitarian crisis affecting millions and has once again become a haven for transnational terrorism. This tragic outcome was not inevitable, and it is worth reviewing recent history. Starting in 2014, United States troops in Afghanistan were no longer leading daily combat operations but were instead primarily training the Afghan military. When President Donald Trump entered office in January 2017, there were only 11,000 US troops in Afghanistan conducting the counterterrorism and training mission. This was down from a peak of 100,000 troops in 2010–11. In February 2020, Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement was the starting point of the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. In January 2021, when President Joe Biden entered office, there were only 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan. Crucially, the US still provided close air support for Afghan forces. While this was not enough troops to ensure that the Afghan government could control the whole country, it was enough for the US to meet its counterterrorism objectives and prevent the Taliban from taking power. Instead of canceling the flawed withdrawal agreement with the Taliban—something that was in Biden’s power to do—the president merely delayed the date from May to September. On July 2 the US departed the strategically located and geopolitically important Bagram Airfield in the middle of the night without warning its Afghan partners. Around the same time, the US stopped providing Afghan troops with close air support. By the end of July, almost all US and international forces had left the country. On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz Province. This was the first time in almost 20 years that the terror group had successfully captured and held one of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals. Soon after, government-controlled capitals started falling like dominos. The Taliban finally captured Kabul on August 15. By September 11—the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks—the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on that day in 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, only one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in more than a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued to fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. Though there is no longer an American presence in Afghanistan, the country remains geopolitically important. Afghanistan’s location in the heart of the Eurasian landmass has made it strategically significant in great power competition throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. There is no reason to assume this will change anytime soon. The Biden administration’s actions have left the US without many good policy options in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many Afghans remain distrustful of the White House. But a new US administration will have an opportunity to reset American policy toward the country.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Terrorism, Taliban, Democracy, and National Resistance Front
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

294. The Rise of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Challenge of Deterrence

Author:: Kenneth R. Weinstein and William Chou
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first introduced the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in July 2016. Over the past eight years, FOIP has redefined the geopolitics of Asia, becoming central to the strategic visions of Japan, the United States, Australia, India, South Korea, key European nations, and the European Union. Every nation that has adopted FOIP has developed its own version of the concept. But FOIP still repositions the strategic geography of Asia, broadening the region from the Asia-Pacific, which placed a dominant China at the center, to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This shift highlights the critical role of the four large democracies that comprise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—Japan, India, the US, and Australia—a partnership the states revived with the ascent of FOIP. FOIP, moreover, offers a conceptual counter to the strategy of China’s One Belt, One Road (also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI) by engaging Australia and Europe on the importance of economic development assistance for, and investment in, Southeast Asia. The Trump administration’s rapid adoption of FOIP—the first time an ally’s strategic concept became central to US grand strategy—deepened America and Japan’s strategic alignment, which encouraged Tokyo to become more engaged in security and encouraged the US to become more engaged in economic development. The concept has made immense contributions to Indo-Pacific connectivity, prosperity, peace, and security. It has also been central to the Biden administration’s efforts to move away from the traditional hub-and-spoke alliance in which US partners worked directly with Washington as the hub but not with not each other, toward a lattice architecture in which like-minded allies (such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines) are linked to each other in a mutually reinforcing effort to meet the region’s security challenges. However, a Hudson Institute tabletop exercise conducted for this study showed the limitations of FOIP as a strategic doctrine. Specifically, it cannot induce either friendly or less-friendly ASEAN countries to openly aid Taiwan if the People’s Republic of China seeks either to invade or impose a blockade. FOIP, nonetheless, remains central to promoting prosperity and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan refashioned FOIP and focused on promoting agreement around minimal international norms that Russia violated. To enhance regional trust, Kishida highlighted an “Indo-Pacific way,” which would enhance regional resilience by mitigating natural disasters through cooperation under Japanese leadership and enhancing maritime security. Herein lies the security paradox behind FOIP: The concept can extend the network of partners and allies dedicated to Indo-Pacific security. This, in turn, may reduce the burden America bears by shifting it to other nations. But for the time being, FOIP rests upon the foundation of US deterrence.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Japan, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

295. How the US Can Beat the Kremlin in Moldova

Author:: Peter Rough and Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine was a seismic event for the Republic of Moldova. The war upended Chișinău’s long-held belief that constitutional neutrality would protect the country. Additionally, the invasion focused Brussels’s attention on Moldova, which the European Union has often regarded as an afterthought. Moscow’s war catalyzed Moldova’s politics and forced Chișinău and Brussels to make fundamental choices about their future relationship on an accelerated timetable. If Russia hadn’t launched its full-scale invasion, the EU would have probably not invited Moldova to open accession talks so quickly. Important elections in Moldova and a perilous situation in Ukraine ensure that 2024 will be a pivotal year on Chișinău’s path toward Western integration. United States and European policymakers should proactively shape an outcome that benefits both Moldovans and the Euro-Atlantic community.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Organization, Democracy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Moldova

296. Deterring China: Imposing Nonmilitary Costs to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The United States, Australia, and other allies have spent decades downplaying the prospect of conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), offering Beijing incentives and concessions to assuage its ambitions, and managing their differences with China by seeking to deescalate tensions when they arose. In more recent times, when there is an emerging consensus that the decades-long approach to China has failed, policymakers have elevated deterrence as the urgent priority. This report makes the following key points. First, the case for urgency in the context of deterring Chinese force against Taiwan is clear.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

297. U.S. foreign policy, Cold War history, and history of capitalism: An interview with Fritz Bartel.

Author:: Fritz Bartel and Asensio Robles
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:: It is an exciting time for Cold War historiography. Long gone are debates that were once central to the field, such as those about the origins of the Cold War and the responsibilities for its emergence. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Cold War for our present, some historians now argue, was not its outbreak but its end. Why did the Eastern bloc collapse in the late 1980s? How was it possible for this collapse to occur without triggering major international and domestic turmoil (Romania’s case notwithstanding)? And why did neoliberalism prevail over other economic paradigms in the new post-socialist democracies? Answering all these questions has become an urgent task in light of today's war in Ukraine, the continuing rise of populism, the growing delegitimization of liberal democracies, and the exhaustion of neoliberalism and globalization as reliable agents of growth in post-industrial societies. These are precisely the three big questions that Fritz Bartel sets out to answer in The Triumph of Broken Promises: The end of the Cold War and the Rise of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2022). Bartel’s book offers a picture of the end of the Cold War that has at its core a particular interpretation of the nature of the East-West conflict. Eastern communism and Western capitalism shared the same base: the Cold War was a politico-economic contest between two industrial ideologies over how best to ensure the continued social and economic well-being of their own populations. As such, both systems were largely successful during the golden years of post-war economic growth. However, if Western capitalism ultimately won the Cold War, Bartel argues, it was because Western liberal democracies proved to be much more flexible and capable of breaking their socio-economic promises in an increasingly globalized world than the Eastern Bloc after the 1973 oil shock. It was not geopolitics that ultimately decided the end of the Cold War, but rather the different strategies that East and West chose in a world increasingly shaped by oil, international finance, the exhaustion of extensive economic growth, and globalization. I had the pleasure of interviewing Bartel on December 5, 2023. What follows is a summary of our discussion about the origins of The Triumph of Broken Promises, its place in today's literature on U.S. foreign policy and Cold War history, and the lessons this book might have for our turbulent times.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Capitalism, Neoliberalism, Interview, and Historiography
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

298. The Yemen Annual Review 2023

Author:: Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) dominated Yemeni politics over the last year. The negotiations began as backchannel discussions in October 2022 after the Houthis resisted UN pressure to renew a truce first agreed in April 2022 by making a series of eleventh-hour demands. The talks continued despite Houthi attacks on oil terminals in southern Yemen in late 2022 that effectively put the internationally recognized government under a form of economic blockade. As the months progressed, the government’s increasingly dire economic situation pressured it to accept the Saudi policy of seeking a settlement with Houthi authorities, seemingly at almost any price. The broad terms of a Saudi-Houthi agreement first became public in January, when international media reported that Saudi Arabia had agreed in principle to pay outstanding civil servant salaries in Houthi-run areas, including those of military and security personnel, and to remove restrictions on entry points, including the ports of Hudaydah and Sana’a airport. In return, Saudi Arabia wanted guarantees that there would be no more attacks on its territory and the creation of a buffer zone along the border, an end to the Houthi blockade of southern ports and the siege of Taiz, and for direct Yemeni-Yemeni talks to follow any deal. Within a few months, these proposals had morphed into a comprehensive roadmap for peace involving a six-month ceasefire, to be followed by three months of government-Houthi discussions on managing a transitional phase of two years, during which a final resolution of the conflict would be negotiated. A prisoner swap in April arranged by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Switzerland saw around 973 people released, including high-profile figures, and seemed to augur rapid progress. But Saudi Arabia appeared to overplay its hand when Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al-Jaber led a delegation on a much-feted trip to Sana’a in April. The Houthis again raised their demands, arguing that an agreement must be signed first with Riyadh alone as a party to the conflict, and that Saudi Arabia should agree to pay compensation for war damage and finance postwar reconstruction. Al-Jaber left Sana’a without an agreement, but the basic terms of a formal de-escalation and path toward a resolution of the conflict were nevertheless laid down. Saudi Arabia’s problem now was how to manage resistance from the government’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Ultimately, it was kept in the dark about the details of the proposed arrangement for most of the year, even its chairman Rashad al-Alimi, who was expected to sign off at the end of the process. A Houthi delegation met Saudi officials during a hajj pilgrimage trip in June – posing for photos with Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman – sending the signal that a formal agreement normalizing Saudi-Houthi ties and initiating a Yemeni-Yemeni peace process had become a question not of if, but when. A complication that emerged early on was US reservations about a peace deal following the Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered by China in March. This seemed to mark China’s arrival as a diplomatic player in the region, putting the Americans on notice that another global superpower was interested in challenging its role in the Middle East, including, perhaps, in Yemen. There was an irony here, in that rising criticism of Saudi Arabia’s conduct during the war in the US Congress, and threats to halt arms sales, played a role in bringing the Saudi leadership around the idea of getting out of Yemen and ending a foreign military adventure that had damaged its global standing.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Investment, Houthis, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

299. Beyond proxies: Iran’s deeper strategy in Syria and Lebanon

Author:: Hamidreza Azizi and Julien Barnes-Dacey
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The war in Gaza is pushing the shadow conflict between Iran and Israel out into the open. There is a grave risk that this escalates further in Lebanon and Syria – where Iran wields powerful influence – and spirals into a full-blown regional war. The intensifying conflict in Syria and Lebanon is the result of Israel’s escalating response since Hamas’s attacks on 7 October and Iran’s “forward-defence” strategy, which aims to confront potential threats before they come close to Iranian borders. Iran’s strategy is underpinned by a decades-long effort to embed its influence in Lebanon and Syria. Western governments will not find this easy to dislodge, and an intensified coercive strategy to push Iran out of the Levant would likely be counterproductive. But Iran’s focus on preserving its influence and deterrence capability – which trumps its ideological commitment to supporting Palestinians and fighting Israel – offers opportunities to prevent a wider war. Europeans should now focus on de-escalating tensions in Lebanon and Syria; increasing conditional support for actors in both countries to advance local stabilisation goals; and intensifying their backing for structural reform that can slowly dilute Iran’s dominance.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transnational Actors, Regional Power, and October 7
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria

300. Value for money: Why and how Europeans should support the failing economies of Egypt and Tunisia

Author:: Anthony Dworkin, Camille Lons, and Tarek Megerisi
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The economies of Egypt and Tunisia are characterised by weak private sectors, insiderism, and the dominance of key constituencies that maintain regime leaders in power. The severe weaknesses of these economies have provoked recurrent crises and cause hardship for their populations, which threatens social and political instability as well as greater migration towards Europe. The EU wants to ensure that the financial assistance it provides contributes to promoting fundamental reform. But Egyptian and Tunisian leaders have resisted policy change for political and ideological reasons, relying in part on support from Gulf countries. Europeans need to ground their economic assistance in a better understanding of political dynamics and regional trends to ensure that they gain the greatest possible influence for the funding they provide. Europeans should adopt more achievable, more targeted policy requests for economic and financial reforms in each country, and work as closely as possible with Gulf partners, which are already making greater demands of Cairo and Tunis in return for the support they give.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Migration, Foreign Aid, and Economy
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, North Africa, Egypt, and Tunisia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS