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41. The Long Shadow of Structural Marxism in International Relations: Historicising Colonial Strategies in the Americas

Author:
Samuel Parris and Armando Van Rankin
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
Over the past decades, Marxist-inspired approaches from the field of International Historical Sociology (IHS) have theorised the relationship between 16th and 17th Century European colonial expansion and the development of relations of production and economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic. In this article, we argue that such attempts – from Dependency Theory (DT), World-Systems Theory (WST), and Uneven and Combined Development (UCD) – are premised on a structuralist perspective which overextend the notion of capitalism and under examine the sphere of production, rendering divergent and distinct strategies of European colonialism a homogenous and under-historicised process. Embracing theoretical innovations from Geopolitical Marxism (GPM), we dispute this unitary logic of expansion, instead applying a radical historicist methodology to demonstrate that British and Spanish colonial strategies in the Americas (intra-imperial free trade vs. mercantilism) were shaped by nationally specific class relations (capitalism vs. feudalism/absolutism), generating unique patterns of settlement on the ground (mineral extraction vs. cash-crop production). Promoting historicism thus allows Marxist International Relations to better recognise "the 'making of' the international order" during the period of European colonial expansion from the 16th century onwards, and, in doing so, further understand its enduring legacies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Political Economy, Socialism/Marxism, Colonialism, International Historical Sociology, and Radical Historicism
Political Geography:
South America, Central America, and North America

42. Advancing Feminist Foreign Policy in the Multilateral System: Key Debates and Challenges

Author:
Evyn Papworth
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
Since the first feminist foreign policy (FFP) was adopted by Sweden in 2014, sixteen countries have either published an FFP or announced their intention to do so. Some proponents of FFPs have indicated that these policies can be a way to democratize and transform multilateralism, integrating feminist approaches and principles into multilateral institutions and leading to more inclusive and equitable outcomes. This requires seeing FFPs as not just a “women’s issue” but also as a way to reinvigorate an outdated and inequitable system through transformational change and the interrogation of entrenched power dynamics, including in areas such as trade, climate, migration, and disarmament. One obstacle to realizing the potential of FFPs is that there is no single definition of feminist foreign policy. Part of the challenge is that there are many interpretations of feminism, some of which reflect a more transformative, systemic approach than others. Ultimately, there is no single way to “do” feminism, and approaches to FFP should, and will, vary. If FFP is to survive and grow, it will encompass contradictions and compromises, as with all policymaking, and civil society and member states will have to collaborate to advance feminist principles in the multilateral arena. To explore the future of FFPs, the International Peace Institute, in partnership with the Open Society Foundations and in collaboration with the co-chairs of the Feminist Foreign Policy Plus (FFP+) Group, Chile and Germany, convened a retreat on Feminist Foreign Policy and Multilateralism in July 2023. Drawing on insights from the retreat, this paper discusses five ongoing debates that FFP-interested states should meaningfully engage with: Militarization, demilitarization, and the root causes of violence; Global perspectives and postcolonial critiques; The branding and substance of FFPs; The domestication of FFPs; and Accountability and sustainability.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Feminism, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

43. The Security Side of Gulf Visions. Adapting Defence to the Connectivity Age

Author:
Eleanora Ardemagni
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The GCC states are adapting defence strategies to the challenges raised by their “Visions”, their post-hydrocarbon national plans. Far from being just economic programmes, the Visions are broad national transformation platforms displaying also a security dimension, and with many security implications. New cities and industrial poles, infrastructures, mega events and tourism raise unprecedented security risks, at which the GCC states are answering through a combination of economic-oriented foreign policy, multipolar international alliances, and ambitions towards “defense autonomisation”. What are the Visions’ security dimensions and implications, and how does the post-oil path affect and reshape foreign policies? This Report analyses how GCC states are adapting deterrence and defence tools to the connectivity age, navigating a troubled neighbourhood of both conventional and asymmetric threats. In a central but more vulnerable Gulf, how may the EU and NATO accommodate transformations in GCC states’ defense policies, postures, and means, to support their own security?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

44. Moving Targets. Trends in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies

Author:
Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
In December 2022, Japan announced it would drastically increase its defence budget by 2027. The decision came as a wake-up call for the whole region: Japan was gearing up for a world of heightened tensions and rivalry in the Indo-Pacific Region. This Report analyses the present and future of Japan’s security and defence policies. Within the context of a rising China, Tokyo has broadened its defence ties with the US, India, Australia, and Taiwan. However, China remains its biggest trading partner, meaning Tokyo's policymakers are charged with the task and challenge of striking a balance between defence policies and business and trade relations with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, ASEAN, Influence, Defense Spending, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

45. A Return to US Casualty Aversion: The 9/11 Wars as Aberrations

Author:
John Mueller
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Impelled by an overwhelming desire to hunt down those who were responsible for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States launched military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, where it toppled regimes that had little or nothing to do with 9/11. There has been a tendency to see these exercises as misguided elements of a coherent plan to establish a liberal world order or to apply liberal hegemony. However, the warring of the post–9/11 period has been a glaring, extended, and highly consequential aberration. During the quarter century before that, the United States pursued a foreign policy that was far more casualty averse. Over the past decade, the country has moved back to—and appears poised to expand on—that tradition after its exhausting 9/11–induced military ventures that ran such high costs for so few benefits. Moreover, public opinion in the United States is not messianic or in constant search of hegemony or of monsters abroad to destroy. As part of its move back to a more limited military approach, the United States developed—or further developed—a strategy called “by, with, and through” that was particularly evident in its successful military campaign from 2014 to 2019 against the Islamic State. In this, the United States worked with local forces by providing advice, supplies, and intelligence, and by carrying out air strikes while the locals were expected to take almost all of the casualties. Although this approach is hardly new, it seems to have a future and is currently being applied in the war in Ukraine. It might also be applied to deal with a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, 9/11, War on Terror, Casualties, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

46. Geopolitics in the Pacific Islands: Playing for advantage

Author:
Meg Keen and Alan Tidwell
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Pacific Islands Countries are leveraging geopolitical rivalries to maximise their development options. But unmanaged competition for influence among key development partners can compromise good governance and privilege geopolitical posturing over local priorities. Australia, the United States, and other traditional donors can capitalise on areas of strength, such as social inclusion and regional and multilateral initiatives. Joint efforts along these lines and the pooling of resources would scale up impact and set higher accountability standards. Despite the risk that higher standards will open gaps for non-traditional donors with less burdensome criteria, there is much long-term value in traditional development partners collaborating in a “race to the top” in meeting the region’s needs.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Regional Cooperation, Foreign Aid, Geopolitics, and Donors
Political Geography:
China, Australia, Australia/Pacific, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

47. Outrage is not a policy: Coming to terms with Myanmar’s fragmented state

Author:
Morten B. Pedersen
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
This paper analyses the evolution of Myanmar’s civil war with a view to identifying optimal international policy responses. The sharp escalation of armed resistance since late 2023 holds out the tantalising prospect that the once seemingly invincible military regime could be defeated. Yet it remains an open question whether anti-junta forces will be able to carry the momentum from their recent victories in the forest-covered, mountainous borderlands across the open plains of central Myanmar to take the capital or other major cities. Even if resistance forces ultimately emerge victorious, the goal of building a genuine federal democracy will likely take years of highly complex and politically fraught negotiations. While the outcome of the civil war remains uncertain, new resistance groups have started building state-like structures and delivering public services in “liberated areas”, much like the older ethnic armed organisations have been doing since the 1960s. The longer Myanmar remains mired in warfare, the more crucial these plural governance systems will become to the welfare of millions of people, with lasting implications for the nature of state-building in the country. To more effectively support the Myanmar people, Western governments and likeminded actors will need to come to terms with the reality of an increasingly — and quite possibly, permanently — fragmented state. The paper thus calls for greater investments in “parallel state-building”, focused on strengthening the collective capabilities of a wide range of emerging political authorities and community-based organisations to carry out traditional state functions and serve vulnerable populations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil War, Development, and Governance
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia and Myanmar

48. Civilizational War: The Will to Win

Author:
Andrey Ilnitsky
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
The US National Security Strategy defines the US as a global hegemon that sees no dividing lines between domestic and foreign policies and treats the world as its sphere of interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, National Security, War, Hegemony, Ideology, Civilization, Deep State, and Generative Models
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

49. Tailored Deterrence Strategy on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Gary Samore
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, the most significant change in the international strategic environment has been the reemergence of a great power rivalry between the U.S. and its European and Asian allies on one hand and Russia and China on the other. This trend began in the second term of President Obama, with the Russian invasion of Crimea in early 2014 and the Chinese construction of a network of military bases in the South China Sea beginning around 2013. Since then, the trend has sharpened. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has locked the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies against Russia in a long-term struggle for the survival of Ukraine and future of European security. In Asia, tensions between Beijing and Washington have become worse, as both the Trump and Biden admіnistrations pursued economic measures against China, and as China appears to be building military options to unify Taiwan and the mainland by force. The reemergence of great power rivalry has important nuclear dimensions, increasing concerns about “strategic stability” – the nuclear balance among the great powers – and the risk of nuclear conflict. The Ukraine war has lowered the nuclear threshold. Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons to discourage NATO intervention or assistance to Ukraine. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) - the last remaining arms control treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals - expires in February 2026, and Russia has refused U.S. offers to negotiate a new treaty as long as the U.S. is assisting Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia continues to develop an array of exotic nuclear delivery systеms intended to overcome U.S. missile defenses, including hypersonic reentry vehicles, nuclear-armed submarine drones, and nuclear anti-satellite weapons. China is pursuing an unprecedented nuclear build-up, including new strategic bombers, more advanced nuclear-armed submarines, and three new missile bases with more than 300 silos for solid fuel ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles. According to U.S. Department of Defense estimates, China has more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023 and will “probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030” (U.S. Department of Defense 2023a). Like Russia, China is also pursuing hypersonic reentry vehicles, anti-satellite weapons, and strategic cyber operations. Some analysts fear that China’s nuclear build-up will make it more confident that it can deter U.S. intervention in the face of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or increase the risk that a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan will escalate to nuclear use. To address the reemergence of great power threats, the U.S. has introduced the concepts of “tailored deterrence” and “integrated deterrence” into its nuclear doctrine. According to the Trump admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review, released in February 2018, The United States will apply a tailored and flexible approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. Tailored deterrence strategies communicate to different potential adversaries that their aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs according to their particular calculations of risk and cost (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018). The tailored deterrence concept was also adopted by the Biden admіnistration in its October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, saying, Central to U.S. deterrence strategy is the credibility of our nuclear forces to hold at risk what adversary leadership values most. Effectively deterring – and restoring deterrence if necessary – requires tailored strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best understanding of their decision-making and perceptions (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022). Building on the concept of tailored deterrence, the Biden admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) also introduced the concept of “integrated deterrence,” which is based on the idea that traditional nuclear deterrence can be reinforced by non-nuclear capabilities. According to the NPR, The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans. Non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed. A pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence will seek to determine how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent (Ibid.).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

50. The trade routes vital to Australia’s economic security

Author:
David Uren
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Arecurrent theme in Australia’s defence strategy has been our reliance on and need to defend Australia’s trade routes in a globalised world. The vulnerability of Australia’s limited stockpiles of critical goods and its concentrated sources of supply have driven military capability and planning for decades and remain a justification for strategic investments. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review argued that the danger of any power threatening to invade the Australian continent was remote, but that an adversary could implement military coercion at a distance with threats against our trade and supply routes. With limited resources and finite defence capability, yet vast interests at sea, it’s important that Australian security and economic planning is trained on the most critical pain points in our sea lines of communication. Strategy and planning must derive from up-to-date and accurate data about what we trade, via which routes, and to and from which specific locations. We also need to understand the factors that contribute to our resilience. They include the depth of supply options, the availability of alternative routes and the sheer strength in numbers which our shipping enjoys when it enters the mighty flow of commerce through the waters of our Asian trading partners. This report explores our trading routes in peace-time. Any conflict would bring sharper focus on what shipping and what trade is truly necessary and on what can be done to secure it. However, the strengths and vulnerabilities of our linkages to the world are evident now and are the focus of this report. Concerns have been sharpened by the assaults by Houthi militias on commercial shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, disrupting the 12% of global trade that passes through those waters.2 In addition, drought has slashed the capacity of the Panama Canal, which in normal seasons handles a further 5% of world trade. Surprisingly, the course and operation (who is moving what) of Australia’s trade routes has received extraordinarily little analysis. The last significant public paper on the topic was conducted by the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (now the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics, BITRE) in 2007 and was based on data from 2001 to 2004. The profile of Australia’s trade has changed radically since then. This report makes five key policy recommendations and the first of these is that the government fund BITRE to update its 2007 study of trade routes so that Defence can make assessments of how best to secure Australia’s trade routes. A dangerous combination of complacency and tolerance could be born of a view that conflicts are in faraway locations. The reality is that few saw either of the current wars as imminent when they started, and we mustn’t make the same mistake in our region. A central finding in this report is that the greatest risk to the security of our trade routes lies relatively close to home, in the narrow channels through the Indonesian archipelago through which more than half Australia’s maritime trade must pass. Another strong conclusion is that trade has a surprising resilience in the face of conflict: it is important to understand the sources of that strength and develop plans to maximise it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Australia