Topic: Foreign Policy - CIAO Search Results

101. Foreign policy congruence in Africa: Evidence on free movement and free trade

Author:: Florian G. Kern, Martin C. Steinwand, and Samira Diebire
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: How does foreign policy of African governments reflect the preferences of their constituents? Scholars have studied public opinion in Africa and how constituents assess government performance. Yet social scientists neglect how and why foreign policy by African governments reflects public opinion, despite much anecdotal evidence of citizens expressing opinion on African foreign policy. In this paper, we investigate the congruence of governmental foreign policy positions and public opinion on issues of free movement and free trade across 34 African countries. We explore two drivers of foreign policy congruence: first democratic vs. autocratic government, and second external rents accruing from natural resources, aid, and remittances. Our descriptive evidence suggests that, on free trade, African publics tend to be more trade-sceptic than the liberalised policy positions of their governments, meaning low foreign policy congruence. On free movement, low foreign policy congruence stems from African constituents preferring more liberalisation than what governments provide. Surprisingly, multivariate analysis indicates that democracies show lower foreign policy congruence than autocracies on issues of free trade. We argue that this may be because democracies systemically oversupply market liberalisation. We cannot find an effect of external rents on foreign policy congruence.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Free Trade, Freedom of Movement, and Globalism
Political Geography:: Africa

102. ‘Brazil is a Christian and Conservative Country with Family as its Foundation’: The Role of Defender of the Faith in Bolsonaro’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Mónica Salomón and Luis Gustavo de Araújo Zimmer
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: : Foreign policy analysts have used role theory for decades. Several recent studies have resorted to it to describe and explain Brazilian foreign policy. By complementing current efforts that seek to account for the restructuring of Brazil’s international identity undertaken by the Bolsonaro government, this article focuses on a role relatively neglected by literature, i.e., the one Holsti called ‘defender of the faith.’ In the case of Bolsonaro’s foreign policy, the faith to be defended is that of ‘Judeo-Christian civilisation’ values in its most conservative interpretation. After identifying this role in statements by official representatives of Brazilian foreign policy, we examine both its primary internal sources (the political actors identified with religious-conservative agendas in the National Congress) and its external sources (the ‘conservative transnational’ of governments close to Bolsonaro’s), to then illustrate its performance through two sets of initiatives representing drastic changes in Brazilian diplomatic positions: the support to Israel in the voting of UN’s resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the shift from progressive to conservative positions in discussions on gender rights in multilateral venues.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, Gender, Role Theory, and Ultraconservatism
Political Geography:: Brazil and South America

103. Causal Explanation in Brazilian International Relations

Author:: Enzo Lenine
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: How do Brazilian IR scholars tailor causal explanations in their research? Searching for causes has become paramount to the scientific endeavour in the social sciences, and in recent years the lexicon of causality has come under scrutiny, with many scholars revising the standard Humean and covering law approaches to cause. Far from being consensual, current philosophical and meta-theoretical debates in IR reveal a rather kaleidoscopical picture of causation. However, Brazilian IR scholars seem to remain unfamiliar about what it means to advance causal claims. In this paper, I have a twofold goal: to advance the causal talk by rehearsing recent meta-theoretical debates on causality; and to examine the ways Brazilian IR scholars in the subfield of Brazilian foreign policy analysis (BFPA) tailor causal explanations. To achieve the latter, I perform a cartography of the articles published in five Brazilian top-tier journals in the discipline – Brazilian Political Science Review, Dados, Contexto Internacional, Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais and Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional – from 2018 through 2022. I conclude that BFPA research is founded primarily in non-Humean understandings of causality, but Brazilian scholars might benefit from further awareness on the various meanings of causal explanation.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, International Relations Theory, and Causality
Political Geography:: Brazil and South America

104. The Crises and Agony of International Development Cooperation: Consequences for Brazilian Foreign Policy

Author:: Pietro Carlos De Souza Rodrigues and Patricia Andrade de Oliveira Silva
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: At the beginning of this century, International Development Cooperation (IDC) began to occupy a central position in Brazil’s international status. Political and social transformations created conditions for Brazil to begin acting as a relevant protagonist in international projects, especially in developing nations, through South-South Cooperation (SSC). However, a succession of crises after 2011 and the emergence of ideas opposed to cooperation during the Bolsonaro administration (2019-2022) altered the conditions that sustained IDC as part of Brazilian foreign policy. In this article, we will identify the political and economic conditions that ensured (1) the structuring and (2) the growth of Brazilian cooperation up until 2011, and we will argue that the loss of these conditions resulted in IDC’s (3) decline, leading to (4) its agony beginning in 2019. Finally, we will evaluate several consequences of the cooperation crisis based on an evaluation of Brazilian foreign policy in the global health agenda, and its commercial relationship with African nations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, International Cooperation, Global South, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Brazil and South America

105. Hidden on the Stage: Racism and Brazilian Foreign Policy in the FESMAN ’66

Author:: João Montenegro Pires
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized the country’s contributions in the World Festival of Black Arts (FESMAN, Festival Mundial das Artes Negras) in Senegal in 1966 so as to demonstrate the exceptionality of racial relations in Brazil, expressed under the label of ‘racial democracy.’ The importance attributed to reaffirming Brazilian exceptionality was related to a strategic selectivity of the State aimed at privileging the continuous reconstitution of racism, intrinsically necessary to the reproduction of capital in general and, in particular, in the Brazilian social formation. The case illustrates how racial democracy represented a discursive reference that allowed the State to simultaneously organize the power block and disorganize the opposition from the dominated classes. The Brazilian racial fantasy taken to FESMAN covered up material inequality, made it challenging to identify Afro-Brazilians as a group, and hindered the formation of transnational ties with Pan-Africanism. The current article intends to enrich theoretical reflection on the reasons and ways racism affects the content of Brazilian foreign policy
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Pan-Africanism, Marxism, and State Theory
Political Geography:: Brazil and South America

106. Bolsonaro’s Foreign Policy in Laerte Coutinho’s Cartoons

Author:: Gelson Fonseca Júnior and Cristine Koehler Zanella
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: This article examines former President Jair Bolsonaro’s foreign policy through Laerte Coutinho’s cartoons, published in the Folha de São Paulo newspaper, contextualised within Brazilian opening speeches at the UN General Assembly’s Annual Debate from 2019 to 2021. The work is epistemologically tied to the aesthetic turn in International Relations, broadly in line with a post-structuralist approach and uses iconographic analysis (including the tools of particular meanings and each cartoon’s situational context) and iconological interpretation methods (applying area concepts to explain foreign policy elements revealed through the sensitivity of the chosen works). Consequently, we identified that the cartoons effectively convey former President Bolsonaro’s approach to Brazilian foreign policy (BFP). It is an alternative epistemological and methodological approach to understanding international affairs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Jair Bolsonaro, Iconography, Cartoons, and Laerte Coutinho
Political Geography:: Brazil and South America

107. Peeking Behind the Arches: An Examination of Diplomats’ Party Affiliations and Candidacies in Brazil

Author:: Vinicius Silva Santos
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: This article explores the intricate dynamics between Brazilian diplomats and political parties within the realm of foreign policy. Our central research problem is to uncover how the interplay of the party system’s structure, the attributes and ideologies of political parties, and the aspirations of bureaucrats collectively influence the extent of diplomats’ involvement in formal party-political activities. Despite the growing attention to partisanship in Brazilian foreign policy debate, empirical research and methodological approaches to measure the concept are limited. The construct validity of the term is often confused with ideologization and politicization. Moreover, the involvement of Brazilian bureaucrats in party politics lacks comprehensive investigation. To address these gaps, this study examines the relationship between diplomats and political parties, uncovering its multifaceted dimensions and implications. Using a novel data source, we explore diplomats’ affiliations and candidacies, shedding light on interaction patterns during the Nova República period. We present a set of hypotheses investigating the association between diplomats’ party affiliations and their interactions with a) party ideologies (H1) and b) professional ambitions, delineated into i) intra-bureaucratic advantages (H2.1) and ii) political career aspirations (H2.2). By employing a mixed methods approach, incorporating thematic content analysis, descriptive statistics, and hypothesis testing, we aggregated evidence that substantiates hypotheses H1 and H2.2. However, in the case of H2.1, the findings proved inconclusive, prompting the need for further exploration into the topic.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Affiliation, Political Parties, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:: Brazil and South America

108. 10 Years of Observing US-Russia Relations (09/18/2025)

Author:: Timothy Frye, Samuel Greene, Nina Khrushcheva, Maria Snegovaya, Joshua Tucker, and Alexander Cooley
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Please join the New York University Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia and Harriman Institute at Columbia University for the concluding event in the New York-Russia Public Policy series, held in person at NYU. This panel of four distinguished researchers and commentators on Russia will reflect on a decade of observing U.S.-Russia relations, how the two countries represent their relations and understand their interests, and the challenges inherent in communicating the many nuances of these relationships. Our panelists will also speculate on what we are likely to see in the next decade to come.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Democracy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

109. Relaciones de España con Marruecos y Argelia y consecuencias para Ceuta y Melilla

Author:: Carlos Echeverría Jesús
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: Morocco claims territories belonging to Spain and Algeria. Ceuta, Melilla, the Vélez de la Gomera and Alhucemas Rocks and the Chafarinas islands, from Spain, and the so-called Eastern Sahara from Algeria. Morocco considers that the Kingdom suffers a “territorial deficit”, and this perception remains today and will remain in the future as an obstacle for the consolidation of stable relations in the region.
Topic:: Regional Politics, Foreign Policy, Territory, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:: Morocco, Spain, Europe, and North Africa

110. Europe’s Strategic Imperative: Advancing Sustainability for Global Stability

Author:: Reinhold Brender
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Europe’s long-term security depends not only on military strength, but also on global stability shaped by sustainable development and effective multilateralism. From the outset, Donald Trump’s second presidency has placed additional strain on an international system already under pressure, further weakening key pillars of the rules-based international order. Geopolitical divisions continue to paralyse the UN Security Council on critical issues. In this increasingly fragmented landscape, the EU must advance a dual security imperative: strengthening its defence capabilities while tackling the root causes of instability beyond its borders. This policy note outlines six strategic priorities for the EU to advance security through sustainability: (i) implementing the UN Pact for the Future; (ii) helping finance global sustainability through more innovative and coordinated mechanisms; (iii) shaping a strategy for EU engagement with the Global South that reflects geopolitical realities and mutual interests; (iv) delivering on the promise of Global Gateway by addressing operational shortcomings and sharpening its strategic focus; (v) rethinking the SDG framework beyond 2030 to sustain global development momentum; and (vi) winning the battle of narratives through stronger, more strategic communication and credible engagement. These priorities are examined against the backdrop of growing geopolitical fragmentation and structural vulnerabilities that shape both global stability and Europe’s strategic outlook.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Political stability, Multilateralism, Economic Development, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Europe

111. Will the New Government Safely Navigate Belgium through Turbulent International Waters?

Author:: Wannes Verstraete
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: “Yes, our country is vulnerable”, said Belgian Major-General Phaleg Bernard during a hearing in the Defence Commission from the Chamber of Representatives in October 2024. The remarks by him and other senior officers stressed the urgent necessity of accelerating the modernisation of Belgium’s military forces at a moment when the government negotiations were ongoing. By the end of January 2025, these negotiations proved to be successful. The new De Wever Government released its coalition agreement and was sworn in on 3 February 2025. As is often the case in Belgium, the coalition is made up of different ideological parties, namely the N-VA (conservative Flemish nationalist); MR (Francophone liberals); cd&v (Flemish Christian democrats); Les Engagés (Francophone centrists); and Vooruit (Flemish social democrats). The national security sections of the new coalition agreement are spread throughout the document and can be found in the parts on foreign affairs, defence, and elsewhere. In comparison with former governments, the new coalition agreement showcases an increased ambition and formulates some of the minimum necessary adjustments. The previous 2020 coalition agreement was 97 pages long in total and contained 2 pages on defence, 5 pages on foreign affairs, and 2 on development. The new 2025 agreement is 199 pages long and contains 8 pages on defence and 11 pages on foreign affairs and development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Belgium

112. Understanding Uganda’s (ambiguous) actions in Eastern DRC: Military interventions to protect roads and trade?

Author:: Kristof Titeca and Giovanni Salvaggio
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Much attention has been given to the role of Rwanda in the conflict in Eastern DRC, and its support to M23. Much less attention has been given to the role of Uganda. In this briefing, we aim to fill this gap. We will show how that Uganda’s presence in Eastern DRC has strong economic under- and overtones: much of Uganda’s actions are centered around protecting trade and roads in Eastern DRC. This builds on historical relations between Uganda and Congolese traders – particularly the Nande and Hema business community – with whom it had been discussing these issues in the years prior to their military intervention. In doing so, Uganda primarily protects its own interests, and has ambiguous relations with all key-actors in the conflict – M23, Kigali and Kinshasa. We will show this by first explaining the broader history of economic relations between Uganda and Eastern DRC, and second, link this to its current actions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Intervention, Trade, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Uganda, Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Central Africa

113. Military policy toward China: The case against overreaction

Author:: John Mueller
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: It is often argued that the policies of containment and military deterrence worked against the Soviet threat during the Cold War, and many have urged applying these same policies to China today. However, it is not clear that containment was all that successful during the Cold War nor is it clear that it should now be applied to China. Should it pursue the “hegemonic” ambitions often attributed to it, China, like the USSR, may prove its own worst enemy by overstretching its resources and provoking its neighbors. In any case, China does not seem to harbor hegemonic ambitions. Its existing gestures at global influence, like the Belt and Road Initiative, are in disarray and unlikely to work. Rather than rushing to more forcefully contain or balance China, the United States should let China make its own mistakes. Doing nothing or next to nothing against a perceived threat isn’t always wise or politically popular but in this case it’s the most rational choice. The U.S. can wait for China to mellow while warily profiting from China’s economic size and problems to the degree possible and expanding mutually beneficial exchange. The U.S. can also help Taiwan prepare to defend itself while maintaining that the island is independent so long as it doesn’t say so.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Deterrence, and Containment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

114. From Stalemate to Solution: Rethinking EU Approaches to Bilateral Disputes in the Context of Enlargement

Author:: Steven Blockmans and Butrint Berisha
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In cataloguing the various disputes, this report distinguishes between disputes involving a member state and a candidate country, and those between candidate countries themselves, classifying them into categories such as statehood identity issues post-conflict issues, border demarcation and/or territorial disputes, minority rights protection, and economic issues. While many disputes exist among candidate countries, the more challenging ones for the EU to resolve are those which involve a member state. Member states can strategically misuse their veto power in the pre-accession process to gain political leverage over a candidate country, as currently seen with Bulgaria vis-à-vis North Macedonia and Hungary towards Ukraine. The authors argue that the ability to manage and resolve them is not merely a technical requirement for enlargement but increasingly a strategic necessity for the EU in a more conflicted geopolitical environment. In reviewing past practice, the report highlights the EU’s non-interventionist approach before the early 2000s, noting how the EU itself served as a framework for cooperation and dispute resolution, as demonstrated in the case of Northern Ireland. Around the time of the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004, the EU’s approach underwent a shift, with the prior resolution of disputes increasingly becoming a condition for accession. However, this long-standing expectation warrants a critical re-examination in light of inconsistencies in policy application, stagnation in existing dispute settlement mechanisms, mounting blockades, and the rise of nativist populism in Europe. The report assesses a wide range of EU instruments and third-party resolution mechanisms provided by the Council of Europe, United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Existing proposals to overcome the misuse of veto power are also analysed. The authors argue that a more strategic, consistent, and principle-based approach to dispute resolution—supported by legal tools, political incentives, and coordination with third-party actors—is essential to re-dynamise the enlargement process and sustain the EU’s credibility as a promoter of peace, stability, and integration. To that end, they emphasise that the Commission should abandon the habit of seeking unanimity at every interim step of the enlargement process, which is not prescribed by EU law, and that the EU should create an Enlargement Dispute Resolution Mechanism (EDRM) that separates between issues that fall under the aquis chapters for membership negotiations and those that should rely on external arbitration and mediation. Furthermore, they advocate that the EU should double down on its preventive efforts to manage latent bilateral disputes through early-warning diplomacy and structured dialogue.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Europe

115. Russia and the Red Sea since 2022: Militarised Foreign Policy or Strategy of Conflict?

Author:: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Accounting for over 10% of world trade, the Red Sea is an essential waterway and a chokepoint for international shipping. Piracy, instability, and inter-state conflict are long-term challenges that have kept regional and extra-regional powers engaged in contributing to the security of the area. Since 19 October 2023, the Red Sea attacks on commercial shipping by the Yemen-based Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) have only raised the stakes. In this context, Russian engagements with the region deserve scrutiny. Crucially, between January 2022 and August 2024, Russia’s share of the total oil transit through the Suez Canal jumped from just above 0% to almost 70%.[1] Moscow’s reported support for the Houthi movement, its search for a naval base on the Red Sea shores, and its broader military diplomacy raise questions about the Kremlin’s intentions in the area. What is Russia’s approach to the Red Sea? How does it fit into Moscow’s broader aggressive foreign policy?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Piracy, Conflict, Houthis, and Shipping
Political Geography:: Russia, Yemen, and Red Sea

116. Francophonie: A Subtle Response to Revisionist Powers

Author:: Arthur Leveque and Justin Leveque
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Organisation de la Francophonie (OIF) has long been a platform where France can reach out to its partners outside Europe. President Emmanuel Macron’s appearance at the latest 2024 Villers-Cotterêts OIF summit testifies to his willingness to defend a French concept of globalisation based on “a diplomacy that stands for sovereignty and territorial integrity” without “double standards.”[1] President Macron reiterated the outward vision of his government, extending his foreign policy to that of the entire Francophonie—seen as a French “area of influence.” The French president declaimed his resolute support for nations whose sovereignty and territorial integrity are in jeopardy, such as Ukraine, Armenia, Lebanon, and the Indo-Pacific countries. Undoubtedly, his speech was addressed to both his non-European partners tempted to apply double standards when Ukraine is mentioned and to revisionist powers like Russia and China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Globalization, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe and France

117. Seven Inaccuracies about US Support for Somaliland

Author:: Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Amid reports that President-elect Donald Trump’s administration may consider recognizing the self-governing coastal region of Somaliland as independent from Somalia, Somali Ambassador to the United States Dahir Hassan Abdi wrote an op-ed arguing that the US should support a unified Somali state. But the ambassador’s argument relies on numerous inaccuracies. Those are detailed below. 1. Somalia currently has territorial integrity, and recognizing Somaliland would break that integrity. The Somali government does not currently have territorial integrity. Islamist terror group al-Shabaab still controls parts of the country. Somaliland has not been functionally a part of Somalia for decades. And Puntland and Jubaland frequently defy Mogadishu. Arguments premised on fictions are irretrievably broken. 2. The US-Somalia partnership has “bolstered regional stability.” The region is as unstable as it has been for decades. 3. “Clan-based ambitions threaten to fracture Somalia’s national cohesion.” There is no national cohesion to fracture, in part because clans remain the fundamental ordering principle of Somalia’s society. Rather than denying that reality, Somalis should build a highly decentralized order that accounts for their preeminent loyalty to clan. The US and its partners should stop pretending that a strong centralized government can work in Somalia. 4. “The United States must remain committed to Somalia’s sovereignty within its recognized 1960 borders—an enduring policy that has helped stabilize one of the world’s most strategically vital regions.” This is one of Abdi’s strangest claims. Somalia has consistently been among the least stable countries in the world since 1969, and it has in turn caused massive regional unrest. US policy built on the fiction that Somalia is a unified nation with territorial integrity has demonstrably failed. 5. “A divided Somalia would distract the central government from counterterrorism operations and disrupt the successes already achieved.” Again, Somalia is already divided. Also, Mogadishu already allows all sorts of things, usually petty political squabbles, to distract it from fighting al-Shabaab. The Somali government’s easily distracted nature has proven time and again that it is not a competent counterterrorism partner for the US. 6. “A unified Somalia . . . can foster transparency, attract responsible investment, and ensure its people benefit from [the country’s] resources—all while reinforcing the stable environment in which US interests can flourish.” The Somali government cannot achieve these lofty goals because Somalia is not unified. Decades of experience demonstrate the country will continue to be divided for the foreseeable future. And it is not clear that unity in Somalia would lead to transparency or competent governance. Mogadishu currently demonstrates neither of those things. There is no reason to believe it will magically improve, even if Somalia somehow, for the first time in its people’s history, becomes unified. 7. “By helping Somalia strengthen its institutions, enhance security forces, and foster inclusive political dialogue, the United States ensures that clan affiliations enrich national identity rather than fracture it into competing states.” The US and others have formed policy based on this belief for over a decade. It has not worked. Why should it suddenly begin working now? What has changed? Fundamentally, the ambassador’s arguments—and Washington’s current policy toward Somalia—rest on fictions: (a) that Somalia is united, politically or societally, (b) that the government in its current form contributes to regional stability, and (c) that Mogadishu’s actions are a net positive for the US. Washington cannot achieve its goals in the Horn of Africa without first acknowledging reality and building policies that reflect that reality, rather than comforting fictions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Africa, Somaliland, and United States of America

118. A Better Understanding of Nigeria’s Problems

Author:: James Barnett
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In a recent post on Truth Social, President Donald Trump instructed the United States military to prepare to go into Nigeria “guns-a-blazing.” The development may be surprising for some, but those who closely follow US-Nigeria relations should not be surprised that the president, or Republicans more broadly, would express concern over violence against Christians in Nigeria. The president cited this violence as his basis for threatening military action on November 1, one day after announcing that he would redesignate Nigeria as a country of particular concern (CPC) for violations of religious freedom. But there are two fundamental problems with the approach the president has outlined: The nature of militant violence in Nigeria is more complicated. First, the premise that Christians in Nigeria face something akin to nationwide persecution is questionable, as Christians and Muslims alike suffer from Nigeria’s rampant insecurity. Nigeria is not, as some believe, the site of a concerted war against Christians. Rather, the country faces something more like a death by a thousand cuts, in which various militant groups in different corners of the country degrade state sovereignty, causing increased violence and extremism. Military intervention comes with serious risks. Depending on their scale, scope, and form, US military operations in Nigeria could recklessly destabilize Africa’s most populous country. On the other hand, operations could be limited in impact and largely symbolic. The latter scenario is more likely but not without its own risks. If the US insists on being a more highly visible military partner than it has traditionally been, its strategy may contradict Nigerian preferences and further polarize Nigerian society. The Nigerian government could have taken steps to reduce the chances of American intervention. But officials have at least made it clear over the past 48 hours that they do not seek to escalate the situation. It is entirely conceivable that President Trump will walk back his maximalist initial salvo and settle for some form of renewed bilateral security cooperation. While this is unlikely to affect the state of Nigeria’s conflicts in the near term, it would be politically agreeable to both governments. The Trump administration and Nigerian officials should both recognize certain truths. The US administration needs to understand that (a) Nigeria cannot immediately and effortlessly dismantle all militant networks within its borders, and (b) religiously divisive narratives will make it harder for the Nigerian government to achieve the necessary political consensus to tackle insecurity. Abuja, for its part, should understand that many in Congress are frustrated with Nigeria, in part because they believe the country has repeatedly failed to utilize American security assistance effectively against terrorists. With sufficient political will, President Bola Tinubu’s administration could use this crisis to (1) reform Nigerian security forces so that they can combat terrorism better, and (2) address some of the conflict’s underlying drivers. This would be the best potential outcome of the current situation, one that is by no means guaranteed. Before considering what this resolution might entail, American policymakers should understand some essential context about insecurity in Nigeria.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

119. Next Steps for Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: History was made at the White House on August 8, 2025, when President Donald Trump hosted Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for a landmark meeting. Against all odds, and after more than three decades of failed diplomacy by the international community, the two leaders from the Caucasus signed a joint declaration committing to a final peace treaty that will normalize relations between their countries. Their foreign ministers also initialed a draft version of that treaty, which the countries plan on fully ratifying within the next 12 months. Diplomats brokered this breakthrough not in Moscow, Paris, or Brussels—but in Washington. For decades, the South Caucasus has been a flashpoint for regional competition, unresolved wars, and missed diplomatic opportunities. Now, with US reengagement, real peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan may finally be within reach. It is reasonable to assume that President Trump’s instinctive urge to cut deals—along with his desire to go down in history as an international peacemaker and statesman—drove his determination to lead efforts to end the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The deal also gave him the chance to tie up a loose end from his first administration. Despite Trump’s frequent claims that no new wars started under his watch, the 2020 Second Karabakh War erupted in the final year of his presidency. His administration made no meaningful effort to bring it to a close, creating a vacuum that Moscow filled by brokering a ceasefire agreement—one it ultimately proved unable to enforce. But President Trump could also recognize an opportunity when presented with one. In many ways, he was pushing at an open door. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan understand the importance of normalization and peace. Both are also exhausted by Moscow’s failed mediation efforts and its waning regional clout. The White House would be mistaken in assuming that since the headlines have passed, the cameras have stopped recording, and the signing ceremony is complete, the job is finished. Three big challenges are still on the horizon: Questions remain about Prime Minister Pashinyan’s political stability, which could be undermined, especially in the lead-up to Armenia’s parliamentary elections next June, as hardline nationalists and Moscow-backed groups inside Armenia challenge his authority and the legitimacy of the peace process. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan should expect Russia and Iran to try to discredit the peace process by launching disinformation campaigns. Many questions remain unanswered about how the regional transport links envisioned in the peace agreement—including the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)—will be funded and financed. Without a resolution of these challenges, President Trump might lose interest in the peace initiative. Only his direct oversight can ensure its success.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, and Peace
Political Geography:: Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and United States of America

120. Security Guarantees for Ukraine: A Layered Approach

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: President Donald Trump met last week with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska, and then met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and several top European leaders at the White House this week. Yet for Ukraine to secure the just peace it deserves, Kyiv, Washington, and their partners need to resolve two outstanding issues. First, Ukraine is concerned with maintaining internationally recognized borders. Russia fully controls the Crimean Peninsula, which Moscow illegally seized from Ukraine in 2014. But Russian forces do not control the full administrative territory of any other Ukrainian oblast that it wants to annex (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia). And since November 2022, Russia has expanded its occupation by only about 2,240 square miles—less than 1 percent of Ukraine’s total land area. For comparison, Russia’s territorial gains after 1,000 days of war amount to roughly the same proportion as if a foreign power occupied only Central Park out of all five boroughs of New York City. These limited gains have cost Russia an estimated one million casualties and tens of thousands of pieces of equipment. Understandably, Kyiv remains unwilling to relinquish control over areas Russia has not even conquered. Ultimately, the Ukrainian people should determine the future status of these territories. Second, Ukraine wants stronger security guarantees. Unlike the territorial control question, security guarantees require the United States’ involvement. Ukraine remains understandably wary of assurances that sound strong but prove meaningless, as has happened previously. The West’s weak responses to Russia’s invasions of Crimea in 2014 and mainland Ukraine in 2022 demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2014–15 Minsk agreements, respectively. The most immediate and effective way to guarantee Ukraine’s long-term security is membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is technically possible even if some of Ukraine’s territory remains under Russian occupation. This should remain Kyiv’s final goal. But President Trump does not support Ukraine joining NATO, nor will he commit to sending combat troops to Ukraine. With this political reality in mind, policymakers should instead consider a five-layered approach to guaranteeing Ukrainian security. While no single layer is sufficient on its own, together they will provide the most robust protection currently possible.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

121. The Weaponization of Energy Resources: Fossil Fuels as Instruments of Geopolitical Leverage in the EU–Russia Context

Author:: Nataliia Khoma and Maiia Nikolaieva
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This paper examines how energy functions as a strategic instrument of geopolitical coercion, focusing on Russia’s prolonged weaponization of natural gas and the European Union’s evolving response. Building on Soviet-era infrastructure, Moscow has employed price increases, supply cuts, and control of pipelines to pressure states. At the same time, the EU has countered with sanctions, diversification of suppliers, and accelerated investment in renewable energy. For more than fifty years, energy has served as leverage that blurs the boundary between economics and security, imposing heavy economic and political costs on both producers and consumers. Interdependence amplifies these vulnerabilities, allowing energy to operate as a “weapon” on both supply and demand sides. Although the EU plans to end Russian gas imports by 2027, Moscow’s continuing circumvention efforts demonstrate that energy remains a critical tool of power and national security worldwide.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Fossil Fuels, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Weaponization
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

122. Accessing Foreign Policy Information in the Digital Age: Evidence from Greece

Author:: Péter Kacziba
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The digitalization of governance and media has increased the visibility and accessibility of foreign policy, reshaping how citizens engage with international affairs. However, limited research exists on how digital platforms influence the way foreign policy information is accessed and evaluated in specific national contexts. This study addresses this gap by examining the case of Greece. Drawing on a nationwide online survey conducted in February 2024 (N = 800), this analysis investigates citizens’ source preferences, perceptions of credibility, and engagement patterns across socio-demographic groups. The findings reveal that digital platforms have emerged as the dominant sources of foreign policy information. Nevertheless, traditional dynamics of political polarization, selective trust, and fragmented media consumption remain prevalent. These results underscore the constraints of digitalization in expanding democratic participation and highlight the need for foreign policy research and practice to pay greater attention to public opinion and societal dynamics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Democracy, Media, Polarization, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

123. Four lenses for observing the second Trump administration: Reflecting uncertainty

Author:: Charly Salonius-Pasternak and Ville Sinkkonen
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The global security landscape has evolved in the four years since President Donald Trump’s first term. The new administration aims to usher in a “Golden Age of America”, with impacts on domestic politics and society, as well as foreign policy. Unlike in 2017, the incoming administration appears better prepared, with outlined plans and key appointments. However, chaotic decision-making processes and an emphasis on loyalty to Trump are likely to introduce unpredictability into governance and policymaking. The administration’s unified domestic and foreign policy strategy can be viewed through four lenses: national sovereignty, economic nationalism, devolution, and the unmooring of power. The Trump administration is likely to embrace disruption and chaos to achieve revolutionary rather than evolutionary change. This thinking draws on tech-inspired startup culture and generational-revolutionary philosophies, which perceive the US as being in a moment of crisis that will usher in a new historical epoch. Key uncertainties remain regarding the administration’s long-term effects on democracy, alliances, and great power competition, particularly concerning trade-security linkages and alliance relations with Europe and Asia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, Democracy, Donald Trump, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

124. Critical Minerals, Rare Earth Elements, and the Challenges Ahead for the United States

Author:: Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA)
Abstract:: The race to secure critical minerals (CM) and rare earth elements (REE) has become an area of increasing geopolitical competition, with China and the United States the two key players. The United States is currently behind in that competition. It is being out-invested, out-innovated, and out-educated. Not only is Washington losing, but it is falling further behind by undermining the alliances and cooperative networks that should play a crucial role in overcoming the existing structural deficit. At the same time, current US policy is weakening the domestic green energy market that relies on CMREE inputs and drives technological innovation and investment as much of the world pushes ahead with the energy transition. Solely market-driven solutions are unlikely to materialize to address this challenge in the United States. After all, it was this approach over at least the last two decades that helped to create the current imbalance. The central challenge for the United States, then, is how to build a foundation from which market forces can once again play a leading role in driving financing, research, and labor in the sector. The interlocking web of policies to build this foundation is complex. To be done right, each policy requires others surrounding for support. Completing the puzzle will require broad-spectrum cooperation between government and business. This will include a renewed focus on industrial policy and require setting explicit goals for the United States and its partners to create secure supply chains. This process is not without challenges and will inevitably produce local, and potentially national, opposition. The refineries required to diversify where CMREE are processed will create environmental hazards as well as stress local water resources, among other vulnerabilities. This set of policies will also demand heavy investment in material sciences to develop new technologies that can reduce and replace CMREE inputs where possible. Pursuing these policies will necessitate much deeper investment in education and training to create a workforce capable of meeting the demands in the CMREE mining, processing, and materials science sector. Even with extensive government support, there is no guarantee that private investment will materialize to sustain the industry. China’s virtual cornering of a vast swath of the market means much of the sector does not operate along traditional axes of supply and demand, discouraging private investment in the process. This makes it more likely that long-term government support in the form of subsidies, tax incentives, and price controls will be required. That puts such funding and support at the mercy of shifting political winds. Under previous US administrations, a wide-ranging challenge like CMREE would produce the requisite policy papers calling for deeper coordination, cooperation, and integration between the United States and a consortium of like-minded countries. Some of that cooperation may yet be possible, but with a US administration that views the world through a zero-sum lens, it becomes less likely each day. Rather than coordination, it will be absolute dollar amounts that drive cooperation. That approach may be successful in the short term in establishing the building blocks of a secure CMREE supply chain. But its longer-term prospects are uncertain. This report and its policy recommendations are based on discussions from two seminars and multiple conversations across several countries and continents with policy analysts, industry professionals, and government officials. The first seminar was conducted in cooperation with the Perth USAsia Centre in Perth, Western Australia. This seminar brought together participants from around the Indo-Pacific to share their views on how allies and partners could coordinate their efforts. The second seminar was held in Chicago at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs with industry professionals, minerals practitioners, and academic experts from across the United States. A full list of participants can be found in the appendix.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Rare earth elements (REEs), Critical Minerals, and Global Economy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

125. Come and (Re)discover China: Staunchly Patriotic, Sincerely Religious, and Eager to Further Engage with the World

Author:: Bart Dessein
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: While elderly women and men are happily singing and dancing on the shores of Hangzhou’s famous West Lake, grandparents are taking their grandchildren out for a stroll and a boat trip on the lake. Buddhist monasteries in the vicinity of Ningbo, a coastal city south of Shanghai that has recently been elevated to a ‘new first-tier city,’ are teeming with monks who have retreated from every-day life and devote themselves to the word of the Buddha. On a daily basis, tens of thousands of ordinary citizens visit Putuoshan, an insular sanctuary just off the coast of Ningbo, devoted to Avalokitesvara, the Buddhist god(ess) of compassion. In a small place in the neighborhood of Ningbo, the local monastery has newly built the ‘Avalokitesvara’s Dharma-world,’ a temple complex in full marble, ornamented with precious stones and gold leaf, venerating the same Buddhist god(ess). Also in early morning Beijing, hundreds of people are queuing up, waiting for the gates of the Lama temple to open, so that they can enter to pay their respect to the Buddhist deities. Meanwhile, the number of European tourists – despite the extended visa free travel possibilities of up to one month for many European citizens – can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Even in cities such as Shanghai where, judging from the attendance in the breakfast room of an international hotel, the foreign guests are of Indian or Near-Eastern descent, and where shops that have closed down business and commercial spaces for rent in newly built high-rise buildings catch the eye. Also in Hangzhou (equally a new first-tier city), top-end restaurants and small street stalls alike are waiting for customers. This picture is repeated in Anyang, a provincial town in Henan Province, where waitresses and waiters brave the freezing cold to lure customers into their restaurants.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nationalism, Religion, and Tourism
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia-Pacific

126. NATO: The Damage Is Done – So Think Big

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: For seventy-six years, NATO tried to prove Lord Palmerston wrong. Now it turns out that he was right after all: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow”. The second Trump Administration behaves as Europe’s rival, not as its ally. It is too late for mere damage control. Placating Trump will not work either: unrestrained, he will just go further and further. Europeans must present the US with a clear idea of which NATO they want, and what they will invest to get it. That is the way to salvage the Alliance at the NATO Summit in The Hague in June. The damage is done. Because even if the US were to radically alter course and recommit fully to NATO as we knew it, everyone now knows that a next President may change it back again. The US cannot treat NATO the way it treats the agreements on climate change: it joins, it leaves, it rejoins, and leaves again. Deterrence demands constancy, or there is no deterrence. Unless it is actually tested in war, Article 5 will now never be as credible as before. This has already affected the global balance of power: adversaries who perceive that the US may not stand by Europe may be emboldened and become more aggressive. Against Europe, but also against the US, whose erratic economic and foreign policies Europe will not follow.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

127. Moldova’s EU Path: Between Moscow’s Shadow and Brussels’ Promises

Author:: Reinhold Brender
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: In the ongoing confrontation between the European Union and Russia, the Republic of Moldova occupies a critical—though often overlooked—position. While not as militarily pivotal as Ukraine, Moldova’s struggle is no less consequential: it is a contest over national orientation and the future of the European order. Moldova’s plural identity makes it especially vulnerable to Russian interference, complicating its EU accession process and straining internal cohesion. The country’s trajectory mirrors the broader dilemma facing post-Soviet states still defining themselves amid renewed geopolitical rivalry between East and West. Moldova’s future will depend on the decisions of its leaders and electorate, the course of the war in Ukraine, and the EU’s readiness to honour its commitment to membership. The 28 September 2025 parliamentary elections will reveal whether Moldova’s leadership retains a popular mandate to pursue the European path. This policy brief outlines key aspects of the current situation and sets out how the EU can help safeguard the integrity of Moldova’s upcoming elections and support its pro-European trajectory amid heightened geopolitical risk.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, Foreign Interference, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Moldova, and Eastern Europe

128. Fit for the Future? A Review of the Belgian Defence’s 2025 Strategic Vision

Author:: Wannes Verstraete
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Alexus G. Grynkewic, said in July 2025 that NATO should prepare for the threat of two simultaneous wars in Europe and the Pacific within two years (2027), instigated and potentially coordinated by Russia and the People’s Republic of China. This devastating and near-future scenario should drive Allied Defence policymaking with a single goal in mind, namely deterring such an outcome, and if deterrence fails, defending Allied interests. General Grynkewic also mentioned during his confirmation hearing at the United States Senate Armed Services Committee that he will “conduct a 90-day assessment to evaluate” the priorities for the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). This ongoing assessment will be a key element to determine the evolution of the USEUCOM force posture in the European theatre during the coming years.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe and Belgium

129. From Syria to the Black Sea: Containing Russia, Partnering with Turkey?

Author:: Bernard Siman
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The outcome of the Russo-Turkish power competition in Syria will impact the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This, in turn, will impact the outcome of any peace negotiations with Ukraine and its relative position in the Black Sea. The future of Syria very much matters for the EU, therefore. Because blunting Russia’s attempts at achieving dominance over the Black Sea will play an important role in Europe’s security. And because the Syrian coast is only 300KM from Cyprus, the EU’s southeastern most border. Syria is the EU’s neighbour for all intents and purposes. In Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, Turkey and the EU finally have a key strategic objective in common.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Syria, and Black Sea

130. BRICS+: an Odd Family of (un)Likely Frenemies

Author:: Bart Dessein and Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On June 13, 2025, the government of Brazil, in its capacity as pro tempore BRICS(+) Chair, announced the formal admission of Vietnam as a partner country of the group. With this, Vietnam became the tenth BRICS+ partner country, after Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan had obtained this status in 2024. This Policy Brief aims to assess the significance of the BRICS+ framework as a whole, with particular emphasis on the role and positioning of Vietnam’s partnership within the context of the increasingly dynamic and contested geopolitical landscape that the European Union (EU) is presently faced with.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and BRICS
Political Geography:: Brazil, Vietnam, and South America

131. The Fog: The Opacity That Warns

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Now in its fourth year, Russia’s war on Ukraine has become more than a battlefield confrontation. It is fire, ice, and fog at once: the hot war in Ukraine fought with mass, drones, and attrition; the cold confrontation with NATO, centred on escalation management; and the fog of Russia’s internal struggle, marked by fatigue, militarisation, repression, and a growing social isolation, as much of the population seeks to distance itself from the war both mentally and in daily life. Considered alone, each dimension distorts the picture. Taken together, they reveal a Russia both fragile and resilient, archaic and adaptive. This is Part III: The Fog, examining Russia’s internal front—the least legible dimension of the conflict. The system performs strength while pressure accumulates beneath the surface: raison d’état coexists with societal passivity, producing fragility that yields lurches rather than orderly decline. This Policy Brief maps that opacity through an economy of exhaustion, the “veteran variable” as battlefield costs migrate home, a society that holds still under pressure, elite cohesion sustained by fear and performance, and the indicators that often precede sudden shifts. The policy lesson is simple: do not mistake opacity for stability—prepare for discontinuity, monitor the silent front, and prioritise endurance over spectacle.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

132. DRC-Rwanda: Why the 27 June Agreement is not Enough and How CENCO-ECC might Improve the Odds of Peace

Author:: Erik Kennes
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On 27 June, a Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Rwanda was undersigned in Washington, witnessed by the US government. The agreement is based on the “Declaration of Principles” undersigned on 25 April by the Congolese and Rwandan Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This is the last in a series of agreements and arrangements concluded over the last 25 years which never resolved the basic problems underpinning the recurrent conflict, notably the foreign security and economic policy of Rwanda, and the structural weakness of the DRC state and security forces. In their conception or implementation, they did not address the fundamental “root causes” of the crisis in the East either. Will it be different this time? Two elements are new: it is the first direct bilateral peace agreement between DRCongo and Rwanda, to a certain extent guaranteed by the US state department. It is concluded between the real decision-makers but ignores most existing procedures and regulations set up after previous crises. Secondly, it considers economic aspects crucial for durable peace, while political issues are simply discarded.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Central Africa

133. The Ice: The Confrontation That Cannot Thaw

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Europe’s debate over Russia is sharply divided along ideological, epistemological, and geographical lines, crystallised by Fiona Hill’s June 2025 warning that “Russia is at war with Britain.” While sceptics downplay the threat and frame Western policy as the driver of Russian behaviour, others emphasise Russia’s capabilities and ambitions yet struggle to reconcile its simultaneous weakness and aggression. Van Bladel resolves this through the fragile-state paradigm, where capacity limits foster risk-taking coercion rather than restraint. This brief (Part II in a three-part series) systematically assesses Russia’s layered challenge: battle-hardened forces, grey-zone campaigns, conventional build-up in key regions, nuclear signalling, and adaptive but inconsistent execution. Democracies must prepare for rare but catastrophic “fat-tail” risks, emphasising endurance over spectacle—munitions stockpiles over prestige platforms, redundancy over efficiency, rehearsed decision-making over rhetorical unity—ensuring a measured response compatible with liberal deomcracy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Fragile States, Gray Zone, Coercion, and Aggression
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

134. Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The small island of Taiwan is often at the center of U.S. foreign policy discourse. This is thanks to the threat of a Chinese invasion and fears over a resulting loss of U.S. military and economic power in the region. A recent survey by Defense Priorities shows there is substantial disagreement among experts as to how the United States should and would respond to a Taiwan conflict. This suggests the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is working. The experts surveyed largely agreed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan, a departure from political and military leaders who have inflated the possibility. They also tended to agree that China is unlikely to strike U.S. military bases in East Asia ahead of a Taiwan invasion, which would grant U.S. leaders flexibility in how they respond to this scenario. These experts are divided, however, on what that response should look like. Some say the United States should use direct military force in Taiwan while others argue it should only send military aid. Very few think the U.S. should stay out completely. Even as they acknowledge that a successful seizure of Taiwan would not offer China significant military or economic benefits and recognize the enormous risks and costs to the United States of entering a Taiwan conflict, some experts continue to support a U.S. intervention. This tension is perhaps best explained by a lingering attachment to the pursuit of U.S. hegemony.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

135. Keep NATO focused on Europe, not China

Author:: Thomas P. Cavanna
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: During the Trump I and Biden presidencies, the United States applied growing pressure on NATO to turn against China. Although focused on protecting Europe, these efforts also attempted to expand the alliance’s prerogatives into the Indo-Pacific. Should this expansion continue, it could distract NATO from Russia, the only real threat that Europe faces. It could also delay the emergence of a more autonomous Europe able to defend itself, thereby perpetuating current U.S. overstretch and reducing Washington’s ability to concentrate on the China challenge in Asia. NATO’s turn against China might generate undue tensions with the PRC, deepen Sino-Russian cooperation, and cause controversy in the Global South, all of which would work against U.S. interests. Instead of trying to fold Europe and Asia together to counter the Sino-Russian axis along the Eurasian rimland, the U.S. should keep NATO focused on Russia and encourage European strategic autonomy. It should refocus its own efforts on the Indo-Pacific and reduce the risk of escalation with Beijing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Expansionism
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

136. China can’t dominate the Middle East

Author:: Rosemary Kelanic
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: A common argument for the United States to remain in the Middle East is that it needs to counter Chinese expansionism. The U.S. is embroiled in a new cold war, this line of thinking goes, and if it withdraws from the Middle East, Beijing will fill the power vacuum and expand its influence. This fundamentally misreads China’s modest aims in the region, which have more to do with hedging against U.S. threats to Chinese oil access. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was proximate to the Middle East, China lacks the military wherewithal to threaten the region. And whereas it was very plausible that the Soviet Union could have captured and weaponized Middle Eastern oil production, China almost certainly could not capture the oil, and even if it did, couldn’t withhold it from the global market. In the Middle East, the United States faces less of a military and economic threat from China than it did from the Soviet Union. It should respond by finally withdrawing from the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Oil, Strategic Competition, and Expansionism
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

137. Japan Looks Ahead to Trump 2.0

Author:: Bart Gaens
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Today, on the eve of the presidential inauguration in the US, Japan’s current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces a new Trump administration, and, in a more volatile regional and global environment, also more challenges in terms of foreign and security policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and United States of America

138. Deterrence and Hybrid Warfare: Lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine for Taiwan and the Nordic-Baltic Region

Author:: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Eric Chan, Tony Lawrence, and Jyun-yi Lee
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Deterrence is once more at the centre of discussions on national security. Faced with larger revisionist neighbours driven by aggressive foreign policies, Taiwan and states in the Nordic-Baltic region are drawing lessons from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine to understand how to enhance deterrence in their respective theatres. These lessons, properly executed, drastically raise the costs for any aggressor. By involving both the military and civil society in the defence of the nation, territorially small states can redesign defence in depth to deter an aggressor across the entire spectrum of conflict.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

139. Kenya’s Foreign Policy Towards Europe and Estonia

Author:: Stephen Kimoita
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Kenya’s foreign policy towards Europe is largely motivated by the need to promote its national interests through trade and investment, as reflected in its 2014 Foreign Policy document (revised 2024). This paper explores Kenya’s relations with Europe and Estonia in areas of security, multilateralism, education, culture, and the diaspora. Despite having already achieved a close partnership, there is room for growth in Europe-Kenya relations. To maximise foreign policy gains, Kenya should fully leverage existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks for cooperation. Meanwhile, Europe needs to customise its exports to Kenya’s needs and pursue well-targeted trade and investment opportunities in areas like manufacturing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Multilateralism, Investment, Manufacturing, and Trade
Political Geography:: Kenya, Africa, Europe, and Estonia

140. Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling

Author:: Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The second Trump administration has undertaken a peace deal with Russia. This policy may not simply reflect Donald Trump’s personal affinity for Moscow and deal-making style but is also likely informed by a certain strategic perception of the US-China-Russia triangle.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Decoupling
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

141. Russia’s Self-Serving Aid Policy: Influence, Opacity, and Propaganda

Author:: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Discussions on international development assistance tend to contemplate the role of colonial legacies and the power imbalances between donors and recipients. Russian humanitarian aid and development cooperation stands out in this debate, as Moscow uses aid as part of its aggressive foreign policy based on spheres of influence.
Topic:: Foreign Aid, Russia-Ukraine War, International Development, and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: Russia

142. EU Defence Series: The White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030

Author:: Marianne Paire
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Commission presented its White Paper on defence on 19 March at a press conference with the Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. [1] This document is part of a dynamic that has been at work since the outburst of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, namely the greater priority given to defence within the EU.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Readiness
Political Geography:: Europe

143. More Than a Systemic Rival: China as a Security Challenge for the EU

Author:: Tauno Tõhk
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The EU's ties with China rank just behind its transatlantic ones in significance. With China being a major trading partner, the focus has long been on economic opportunities. In recent years, there has been a shift in how the EU frames its relationship with China. Yet, despite increasing emphasis on systemic rivalry and economic security, security risks remain underrepresented in EU China policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

144. Obscurity By Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Author:: Tanner Greer
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy. That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be. This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1] If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2] This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

145. Partners or Rivals? Areas of Convergence and Divergence of Interests in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Alexander Korolev and Thomas J. Shattuck
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China announced that their friendship had “no limits” and “no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation” in 2022.[1] That summit between President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping occurred before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but the two leaders have since doubled down on their cooperation and partnerships. However, the limits of their “no limits” partnership have not necessarily been tested, particularly within the context of the Indo-Pacific region. How close are the two countries’ priorities and interests in the Indo-Pacific? Are the two partners or prospective rivals? Do their interests converge or diverge? The Foreign Policy Research Institute’s report series for the US European Command’s Russia Strategic Initiative has utilized the instruments of statecraft to analyze the interests, influence, and relationships of Moscow and Beijing across the vast Indo-Pacific region. The first report provided a general overview of the strengthening of the bilateral relationship and specific and joint interests in the region. The second report focused specifically on China’s diplomatic, military, and economic interests across the Indo-Pacific region and gave Moscow’s perspectives on these interests. The third report homed in on the two countries’ relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the prospect of the three forming a trilateral axis, concluding that such an arrangement is unlikely to occur. The fourth report analyzed Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examined how China perceived it. This report seeks to bring the elements of the series together and provide a forward-looking approach to Moscow and Beijing’s foreign policy trajectory in the Indo-Pacific region. It will first analyze how there is a systemic convergence of joint interests at the global level. Given the context of the Ukraine war and a general Western anti-China push, the two countries and their interests are quite close at the systemic level. However, at the regional level, some divergences emerge in the security and economic realms. Russia’s historic relationships with Vietnam and India, in particular, could put Moscow and Beijing at odds, and the negative historical memories and economic imbalances of their own relationship have the potential to create new cleavages among their populations and hinder alignment formation. The report will then attempt to investigate the future trajectories of the bilateral relationship and where convergences and divergences may emerge. While specific tensions may erupt at the regional level, such as those related to a greater Russian defense presence in Southeast Asia or a Taiwan conflict, the deep structural interests and convergences will likely prevail.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Rivalry, Strategic Interests, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Indo-Pacific

146. Russia’s Use of the Instruments of Statecraft in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Alexander Korolev
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: This report analyzes Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examines how China perceives it. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, it examines Russia’s activity in the subregions most significant for Russia’s strategic interests: China, the Southeast Asia and South China Sea (SCS) region, India, and the Korean Peninsula. Russia has utilized instruments of statecraft to maintain a two-level engagement pattern in the region—systemic balancing and regional hedging. At the level of systemic balancing, Russia unequivocally embraces China as an economic, military, and political ally to balance the United States or the West more broadly. However, at the level of regional hedging, Russia diversifies its economic, political, and security bets by engaging with China’s actual or potential adversaries and avoids explicitly taking one side at the obvious expense of another in regional disputes: Moscow hedges its bets between different states, including China, to maximize cooperation opportunities. This two-level engagement pattern does not undermine Russia’s systemic alignment with China, but it reduces Moscow’s dependence on Beijing and makes the regional aspects of China-Russia relations more complex. The intensification of US-China rivalry and the deterioration of China’s relations with India, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian states are conducive to Russia maintaining this two-level pattern. The worsening US-China relations incentivize Beijing to consolidate its alignment with Russia. Simultaneously, Beijing’s growing capabilities and aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims in the region make regional powers proactively seek closer ties with Moscow, recognizing that unequivocal alignment with the US will irreversibly antagonize China, which is not in their interests. China, while concerned about Russia’s strategic partnerships in the region, needs Moscow for its confrontation with the US and quietly accepts these developments, worrying that if Russia withdraws from its partnerships with countries like India and Vietnam, the US will fill the void, which is more detrimental to Beijing. These criss-crossing geopolitical pressures give Russia an extra hedge in its relations with China without undermining China-Russia strategic alignment. As a result, Russia can develop strategic alignment with China (balancing) while enhancing strategic cooperation with whomever is available (hedging). The new Trump administration’s foreign policy toward the US’s traditional allies has increased geopolitical uncertainty and undermined the Indo-Pacific states’ trust in the US as a regional security guarantor, forcing them to diversify their external relations, which provides Russia with more regional hedging possibilities.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Statecraft, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

147. Sino-Russian Interactions Regarding Kazakhstan

Author:: Richard Weitz
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Many Russian strategists see Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asia country and a border state of Russia, as a strategic buffer shielding the Russian Federation from external threats. Russia derives considerable leverage over Kazakhstan from the two countries’ shared history, geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and defense ties. The Chinese government has cultivated extensive diplomatic, economic, and energy ties with Kazakhstan; Beijing has approached security ties more cautiously, not wishing to antagonize Russia. Kazakhstan is a critical participant in Beijing’s trans-Eurasian transportation initiatives due to the country’s pivotal location between China and Europe. Trilateral security cooperation remains modest while Russian-Chinese-Kazakhstani trade is increasing due to expanding rail, pipeline, and dual-use transfer networks connecting all three countries.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

148. Xi Jinping’s Visit to France: Stumbling Blocks Pile Up on the Path of Bilateral Cooperation

Author:: Marc Julienne
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: On May 6 and 7, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay a state visit to France, his first to Europe since 2019 and the Covid-19 pandemic. Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping will celebrate Franco-Chinese friendship and the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between their two countries. It comes at a time when the bilateral relationship is officially perceived as positive on both sides, especially after the French President’s visit to China in April 2023. However, beneath the diplomatic varnish, obstacles are piling up, and the space for cooperation between the two countries is receding. Of the four major areas of cooperation on the visit’s agenda – Ukraine, economic relations, human and cultural exchanges, and global challenges – the first three are already facing significant limitations. Beyond the strictly bilateral relationship, the two heads of state have radically different visions of and for Europe. Finally, there is a number of issues that remain absent from the discussions, which are not likely to ease tensions: the Taiwan Strait, nuclear arms control and Chinese interference in Europe. They will need to be addressed sooner or later.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Emmanuel Macron, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and France

149. India-Russia Relations in Troubled Times: Steady but Stagnating

Author:: Aleksei Zakharov
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: This paper examines the trajectory of India-Russia relations post-February 2022. The war in Ukraine emerged as a significant challenge for bilateral ties, presenting new obstacles to political and diplomatic relations and intensifying the previous difficulties in developing economic cooperation. Moscow and New Delhi have demonstrated divergent approaches to the advancement of their strategic partnership. While Russia has rushed into reinventing the old friendship with India, the latter has acted with greater discretion. New Delhi has demonstrated a nuanced approach to navigating the Russia-Ukraine conflict, staying on good terms with Moscow and the West. India’s record imports of Russian crude and other commodities, at times in defiance of Western sanctions, have allowed for a considerable boost in bilateral trade. While this “oil connection” may benefit both the Indian and Russian economies, it should not be misperceived as a leap forward in partnership. The structural challenges appear to still prevent the two sides from reinvigorating the economic ties. Furthermore, their geopolitical understanding is waning, and their defense cooperation is currently in a state of limbo. As long as the war in Ukraine persists, India seems to be prioritizing maintaining the status quo in its relationship with Russia over pursuing new initiatives. This may help to prevent the two sides from drifting apart too far in the near term but is unlikely to lead to any substantive progress in their relationship.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi
Political Geography:: Russia, South Asia, and India

150. Guam in Washington, 1972-Present: The Overlooked Strategic Implications of Congressional Polarization

Author:: Mirabai Venkatesh
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Contrary to the long-held logic that giving Guam a stronger, more autonomous voice will undermine U.S. strategic interests, failing to provide Guam with a stable pathway of interest advancement beyond Congress hinders its development and with it the federal government’s ability to achieve soft-power advantages and basic military readiness in the Indo-Pacific theater. Since the United States assumed responsibility for administering the territory of Guam in 1898, it has treated the prospect of Guam’s status improvement as detrimental to U.S. strategic interests. This has informed its chosen method of territorial administration, which places U.S. territories under the authority of the Department of the Interior. Each territory is then given only one formal representative in Congress, specifically the U.S. House of Representatives, but without full-voting rights. This paper will explore how Guam has managed to advance its interests in Washington since 1972, highlighting how congressional representation has become Guam’s most successful pathway of interest advancement with the federal government to date. However, the agency and success of Guam’s congressional delegates must be framed within a broader discussion of the fragility of the U.S. approach to territorial administration, which has relegated Guam to a pathway of interest advancement incredibly vulnerable to political sea change. Ultimately, this paper will illustrate how Guam’s main pathway of interest advancement in Washington is quickly narrowing at the expense of U.S. strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, History, Soft Power, Autonomy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and Guam

151. Friends in Need: Russian Strategic Communications in Africa Before and After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Christopher Babcock
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Africa is becoming an important strategic hub for the Russian state as Putin’s regime faces rising ostracization elsewhere. In this paper, I analyze Russian influence in Africa by examining over 1,700 pieces of online content created or re-posted by 4 Russian embassies in Ghana, Ethiopia, the Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania between January 15 and December 31, 2022. I demonstrate that, despite new developments in Russian strategic communications, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has mostly fed pre-existing narratives rather than drastically shifting the focus or direction of state rhetoric. All four of the embassies used in the analysis promoted narratives that depicted Russia as a revisionist power going up against a “neocolonial” West, portrayed Ukraine as a neo-Nazi puppet of the West, and attempted to contrast this with Russia’s purportedly friendly relations with Africa. The scale and intensity of these narratives exploded in the leadup to and in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine—to the extent that some embassies began to focus almost exclusively on Ukraine in their communications. Meanwhile, many African nations were willing to pragmatically engage with Russia as an alternative (or complementary) ally to the West. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, I show that the war in Ukraine has revealed the fault lines of Russian and African thinking, loyalty, and strategy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Engagement, Russia-Ukraine War, and Strategic Communication
Political Geography:: Russia and Africa

152. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Turkey has an energy dependence problem. For the past two decades, Ankara’s energy needs have been on the rise, and they are projected to continue on an upward trajectory until at least 2035. Yet, the country is not endowed with the proven natural resources to support its energy needs, and so it imports almost all of the energy it consumes. This reliance on energy imports creates economic and security constraints for Ankara. On the economic front, strategic decisions to diversify Turkey’s energy market impact the direction and pace of the country’s economic development. On the security front, dependence on foreign energy exposes Turkey to external shocks and creates vulnerabilities that affect the country’s international posture. To Turkish policymakers, this is hardly breaking news. For many decades, successive governments have been considering ways to diversify the country’s energy portfolio with the objective of ensuring access to affordable, reliable energy supplies. Domestically, this goal has translated into continued investments in locally produced power, such as the development of natural gas fields under the Black Sea and the opening of nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the country. Externally, the aim of diversification has led Ankara to forge a wide range of international partnerships and preserve relations with both Western purchasers of Turkish exports and key energy providers, including Russia and countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. What is more, Ankara pursues its energy diplomacy against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical strategy of bolstering Turkey’s status as a regional power based on its geographic position and connections. At the heart of this strategy is a grand plan to establish Turkey as a major natural gas hub that will put the country at the center of regional energy trade. This policy has ramifications for Ankara’s relations with its close and more distant neighbors. Turkey is surrounded by energy-rich countries, and one of its primary objectives when reaching out to them is to secure the conditions for a steady inflow of energy resources—typically, natural gas and oil. This objective can lead to the development of durable economic partnerships, such as with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran; but it can also spark conflicts of different degrees of intensity, such as with Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors and Iraq. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Ankara’s gas diplomacy is consequential for relations with Russia—with which Turkey has been strengthening its energy relations beyond hydrocarbons—and with Europe. On the demand side of Ankara’s natural gas market equation, European countries are thirsty for non-Russian hydrocarbons in the short and medium term and for green energy in the longer term. Turkey has the potential to provide both, as long as it comes up with strong policies that support these energy transitions. To do so, the Turkish government will need to shift its approaches not only to energy but also to geopolitics. Ankara will have to present itself as a reliable energy partner for Europe and ramp up its investment in clean energy technologies. Delinking Turkey’s economic development from its dependence on hydrocarbons will benefit Ankara financially while bringing it closer to its European allies. Building a long-lasting energy partnership with Europe remains one of Turkey’s greatest challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Egypt

153. Getting Off the Back Foot: Guiding Principles for a Proactive Western Strategy on Belarus

Author:: Artyom Shraibman
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: For decades, the West has been unable to build an effective strategy on Belarus due to the country’s limited geopolitical importance, an inexorably deeper dependence on Moscow, and the glaring absence of leverage over Minsk’s strategic decisionmaking. This paper proposes a different paradigm for approaching the issue. Instead of passively reacting to Minsk’s actions, the West should broaden its planning horizon and create more specific incentives for Belarus to follow a different trajectory in the future. The overriding goal of a more proactive Western strategy should be the eventual emergence of a democratic Belarus that is no longer fully dominated by Moscow in the military and political realms. Such an ambitious goal would have tangible and lasting benefits for the new European security landscape amid the prospect of a long war in Ukraine. Skepticism in Western policy circles about the viability of such a scenario is entirely understandable. Yet it is not entirely clear whether Western policymakers have registered the significant differences between Russia and Belarus at the societal level and divergent strategic interests of the Russian and Belarusian regimes. At the same time, it is essential for Western policymakers to keep their expectations in check and to avoid an overestimation of their capabilities. The Belarusian crisis cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future by Western efforts alone. Moreover, there should be no illusions about the fact that Belarus, much like Ukraine, holds a special place in the worldview of the Russian ruling elite and President Vladimir Putin personally. The Kremlin’s long-standing obsession with keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) away from Russia’s borders plays into the same attachment to keeping the Belarusian regime in as tight an embrace as possible. Therefore, until Moscow either changes its foreign policy priorities under a new leadership or simply becomes unable to keep Minsk under its control, it would be naïve to expect that the Russian leadership will simply offer any Belarusian government greater leeway to shift its geopolitical orientation. At the same time, it is conceivable that a qualitative increase in military assistance to Ukraine and a more effective economic pressure campaign against Russia could disrupt Belarus’s trajectory and make Minsk more amenable to the incentives that the West can already offer. But an overnight breakthrough seems highly unlikely. This paper, therefore, focuses on more realistic recommendations with longer-term effects.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

154. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft

Author:: Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

155. Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy

Author:: Rosa Balfour and Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The political landscape in the European Union (EU) is changing rapidly. For decades, the traditional mainstream parties of the center right and center left have been losing ground, while antiestablishment parties have been gaining support. According to research by the University of Amsterdam, 32 percent of voters opted for antiestablishment parties in 2021, up from 12 percent in the early 1990s.1 Radical-right parties make up about half of this share, and their support has risen faster than that of any other group. Many of the fourteen parties examined in this study have achieved vote shares of 20 percent or more. The radical right is now in government, or supports the government, in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Sweden. In the Netherlands, it is likely that Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV) will be part of a governing coalition. In other countries, these parties have become the leading opposition groups. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) has been carefully preparing to win the 2027 presidential election. Setbacks for the radical right in Poland and Spain in the second half of 2023 have shown that the relentless rise of these parties is not a foregone conclusion. However, current polling for several national elections and the June 2024 European Parliament elections indicates a strong likelihood of their continuing electoral success.2 Chega (Enough), a recently established party that shot to 18 percent of the vote in Portugal’s March 2024 election, ended the country’s exceptionalism as one of the few European nations without a right-wing populist party.3 The June 2024 Belgian federal election may see the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), which so far has been strong in Flanders but kept out of national politics, break through at the federal level. Polling for Austria’s September 2024 parliamentary election suggests a surge in support for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).4 In contrast with populism, which has a thin ideology focused mainly on fomenting the anger of the so-called pure people against corrupt elites and which has risen on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, the radical-right parties of the 2020s have a more distinct ideological profile.5 All have national specificities, such as rural origins in Northern Europe or ethnonationalism in Central Europe. Several parties are rooted in postwar fascism, such as the FPÖ, RN, Brothers of Italy (FdI), the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), and the Sweden Democrats (SD). For some groups, strong connections with society and well-developed party structures compensated for their marginal impact in national politics. Before its landslide victory in Italy’s 2022 parliamentary election, support for FdI hovered at around 5 percent, as it did for the party’s predecessor throughout the period since World War II.6 Other parties, such as Hungary’s Fidesz, gained ground as classic populist or even mainstream parties and benefited from an aura of respectability even as they shifted toward ethnonationalist or nativist positions. Since the 1990s, liberal-democratic parties have started to adopt some of the ideas of the radical right while keeping the parties themselves out of government. In the 2000s, the radical right became normalized, in some countries becoming part of the political mainstream. During this process, as political scientists Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller have argued, liberal-democratic parties have shifted toward the radical right in the hope—mostly in vain—of keeping their traditional electorates. Yet, in practice, this approach has led voters to prefer the real radical right to its imitators. In other words, the tactic of chasing the radical right has not paid off electorally. Voters have moved toward the radical right as a consequence, not as a cause, of liberal-democratic parties’ attempts to contain it.7 Today, the far right is dominated by the radical right, which, unlike the extreme right, accepts the essence of democracy but rejects its liberal elements: minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers.8 The radical-right parties selected for this study all share deep antimigration sentiments, often determined by race or religion; a nationalism that makes these parties Euroskeptic and opposed to what they see as a Brussels-based dictatorship; and skepticism of climate change policies. Many of these parties also espouse deeply conservative family values that go against women’s and LGBTQ rights. Foreign policy is usually not the strong suit of these parties, apart from their keen interest in the external dimension of migration policy. These parties pay close attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but are sharply divided on this issue, with positions ranging from deep mistrust of Russia to close alignment with the Kremlin’s arguments. A future Donald Trump administration could lead to new divisions in the EU, as some member states are likely to align with the United States under any circumstances. This would mean that many of the EU’s current foreign policy positions, such as support for Ukraine, would come to an end. As radical-right parties rise to prominence at the national and the EU level, they are developing views on a range of foreign policy issues, building increasingly influential international networks and think tanks, and learning from each other’s successful tactics in solidifying their control of the state and propagating their values.9 For some radical-right parties that have been established in government, such as Fidesz and, until October 2023, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, the upgrading of foreign policy on their political agendas can be inferred by the fact that all diplomatic postings in the EU are political appointments. Hungary’s foreign policy machinery is under the direct control of the prime minister.10 Diplomatic colleagues of the Hungarian representatives in Brussels know that the country’s negotiating positions are micromanaged in Budapest.11 Other countries, such as Italy and Finland, have chosen to rely on the credibility of career diplomats to navigate the Brussels machinery, preferring compromise over confrontation and isolation. For a long time, European politicians and EU institutions have assumed the radical right could be contained. Now, the challenge of the radical right needs to be addressed more seriously. Just as this phenomenon has eroded democracy and the rule of law in some EU member states, so foreign policy may become affected at a time when collective action is most needed to address international issues. As the radical right challenges the EU’s attempts to navigate a dangerous world, European politics can no longer afford complacency.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
Political Geography:: Europe, France, and Germany

156. RBPI and the Study of IR: Fostering a Multifaceted Platform for Global Dialogue, Debate and Academic Cooperation

Author:: Haroldo Ramanzini Junior, Antônio Carlos Lessa, and Wilton Dias
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the evolving landscape of international politics, the challenges this scenario presents for the field of International Relations (IR) and the pivotal role played by Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI) in shaping both academic knowledge and policy frameworks. The study aims to achieve two primary objectives. First, to contextualize the significant shifts in international politics in the last few years, such as the rise of China and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, while advocating for interdisciplinary approaches and highlighting the contributions of Latin American, particularly Brazilian, scholars to global academic debates. Second, to trace the history, evolution, and international impact of RBPI since its inception in 1958, emphasizing its role in leveraging the standards of academic publishing in Brazil and Latin America, fostering international collaborations, and influencing policy decisions. The paper proposes that RBPI serves as an indispensable platform for advancing rigorous academic inquiry and offers a more inclusive perspective on international relations, thereby having a lasting impact on both the academic and policy landscapes globally
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Research, and Publishing
Political Geography:: Brazil, South America, and Global South

157. Domestic regimes and national preferences as factors of regionalism’s crisis. The case of Guatemala’s regional integration policy

Author:: Francisco Santos-Carillo and Luis Andrés Padilla Vassaux
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The article analyzes the influence of internal factors in the Central American integration crisis, based on Guatemalan politics and from a liberal intergovernmental approach. The results confirm the relationship between national preferences, some alignment with the preferences of partner states, and the results and effects of the process. For Guatemala, integration is an ideational commitment conditioned by the absence of negative externalities for the interests of governments and other key actors. National preferences limited the scope and determined the institutional design. The identity commitment and the creation of regional institutions seem to be insufficient for integration.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Government, Regional Integration, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Latin America, Central America, and Guatemala

158. South Africa as a Leading Regional Power in Africa? An Analysis of the Implementation of the African Union, Auda-Nepad and Agenda 2063

Author:: Murilo Gomes da Costa
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The article analyzes South Africa’s role in the African Union’s Agenda 2063. It examines South Africa’s position as a leading regional power post-apartheid. The study contends that Pretoria has developed a strategy towards its region. The argument is supported by a descriptive analysis of the implementation of Auda-Nepad and South Africa’s efforts to broaden the thematic scope of the AU. The results show that South Africa’s strategy as a leading regional power in Africa has been achieved through Pretoria’s role as a paymaster in both the AU and Auda-Nepad, alongside the development of its own Agenda 2063 projects.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, African Union, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Africa and South Africa

159. US Hegemony in Latin America: Think Tanks and the Formation of Consensus about the Chinese Presence

Author:: Luciana Wietchikoski and Livia Peres Milani
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: In recent years, U.S. government agencies have defined the Chinese presence in Latin America as a challenge, which has organized foreign policy towards the region. Departing from a neo-Gramscian approach, this paper investigates the bibliographical production of U.S. think tanks and seeks to understand the construction of consensus about the Chinese presence in Latin America. The methodology is based on content analysis and we identified two main narratives: in the first, the Chinese presence is presented as a threat to U.S. regional hegemony; in the second, the Chinese adaptation to liberal precepts is sought. There are therefore nuances in how the Chinese power is perceived, although the discourses remain restricted to the promotion of capitalism and neoliberalism under U.S. leadership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, and Think Tanks
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, North America, and United States of America

160. Transitional justice and women’s representation in peacebuilding: Myanmar and the case for Feminist Foreign Policy

Author:: Nang Moet Moet and Clara Bradley
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:: February 2024 marks three years since the start of the military coup which ignited Myanmar’s Spring Revolution. For the first time in the nation’s history, women have been at the forefront of the resistance, making up over 60 percent of the resistance movement.i The unprecedented number of women in the movement signals women’s refusal to live under patriarchal military rule. The modest yet critical gains made towards gender equality during the democratic period enabled a generation of women to see the value of their participation in broader functions of society. Reverting back to military rule would not just hinder progress on gender equality, it threatens the hardwon fundamental rights of women and girls. In a country shaped by decades of militarization, this war, like those before it, has compounded women’s experience of patriarchal violence. As Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO) and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) inch closer to defeating the Myanmar military (herein referred to as the ‘junta’), attention is turning to post-coup peace and nation building processes. At this important juncture in Myanmar’s political history, women are demanding adequate representation and genuine participation in peacebuilding processes, including transitional justice initiatives that adequately address violence against women in conflict. Over the decades of political instability, women have been repeatedly told that a democratic union must come before gender equality.ii The de-prioritisation of women’s participation in public life is embodied in the Constitution 2008, which clearly proscribes that ‘nothing in this section shall prevent appointment of men to positions that are naturally suitable for men only.’iii This subjugation of women’s rights to political stability is mirrored in traditional foreign policy approaches that prioritise the security of the nation state, rather than the security of the individuals within that state. A feminist foreign policy approach inverts the traditional hierarchy, understanding that security is not possible absent the conditions required for all people to flourish. Without addressing the structural roots of pervasive violence that has oppressed both women and ethnic minorities in Myanmar society for decades, there can be no durable peace. Countries that have adopted a feminist foreign policy – or those with a values-based foreign policy such as Australia – must invest in, and advocate for, the inclusion of women from all ethnic groups in future peace and transitional justice processes.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Women, Transitional Justice, Feminism, and Representation
Political Geography:: Southeast Asia and Myanmar

161. Palestine: Public Opinion Report 2023, Part 2

Author:: Khalil Shikaki
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Palestinians see the Israeli occupation as the most critical threat facing Palestine and their most preferred countries are Turkey, Qatar, and China. In a comparison between China's and U.S. foreign policies, the Palestinian public views China's policies more positively than those of the U.S. on all issues at hand. Wide-ranging opposition to Arab normalization with Israel remains as strong as it was two years ago, but most express optimism about the world's solidarity with the Palestinians, and the vast majority expresses opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side. The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize SaudiIsraeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement. This report is the second in a series of reports that cover the findings of the current wave of AB. It addresses one important issues covered by AB8: Palestinian perception of various international and regional actors and other international relations issues. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding these topics, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in AB7, conducted two years earlier, and one poll conducted after AB8.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Normalization, and October 7
Political Geography:: China, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Qatar

162. China’s Perspective on Economic Security

Author:: Audrye Wong
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper examines how Beijing views economic security as well as other countries’ actions in this realm. Economic security is not a new or foreign concept to Chinese thinkers and policymakers, but the emphases, concerns, and priorities have evolved, due in part to changes in the international environment as well as in China’s own economic and geopolitical situation. This paper examines how Chinese leaders and scholars have approached the definition and scope of economic security, as well as recent and proposed policy responses. It draws on a range of Chinese-language official documents and scholarly writings, as well as broader secondary source analyses. The paper explores that while Chinese discussions of economic security tend to be framed as ensuring economic development and stability, development is implicitly and explicitly linked to national security. Many writings emphasize that economics is the foundation for national strength (including military capabilities). As such, it is more than just economic survival and growth for the economy’s sake; it also has implications for China’s geopolitical position in the international order. In that respect, economic stability and national security may be hard to separate. Indeed, we see a resurgence in today’s rhetoric about the notions of development and security as inextricably linked, along with the need to coordinate the two—and in service of maintaining CCP rule and regime stability. Finally, the paper shows Beijing is taking concrete steps toward increased legalization and institutionalization of economic security measures. This represents a shift, at least in the domain of retaliatory countermeasures, from its usually more “informal” approach to economic coercion, which has afforded more flexibility and minimized political costs for the regime. At the same time, actual implementation has been relatively limited thus far.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, National Security, Trade Wars, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China and Asia

163. Economic Security and U.S.-China Competition: The View from North Korea

Author:: Rachel Minyoung Lee
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper argues that while North Korea does not discuss “economic security” in domestic contexts or have an established definition of the term, it thoroughly understands that the economy and national security are inseparable. North Korea is essentially unaffected by the typical economic issues that many major economies are grappling with in relation to economic security, but like other countries, it has closely tracked economic security developments and deepening U.S.-China strategic competition for potential political fallout and what opportunities and challenges that may generate. The paper shows that U.S.-China strategic competition has offered unique opportunities to North Korea, including China’s cover against fresh and existing sanctions against North Korea, and economic assistance. Moreover, deteriorating U.S.-China ties provide Pyongyang extra space to consider and put into motion alternative foreign and economic policy paths, namely, shifting away from its three-decade policy of nonalignment with China and normalization of relations with the United States. Also, China appears to be a factor in North Korea’s shift to a more conservative economic policy. Despite the opportunities presented by the U.S.-China divide, however, North Korea is wary of the risks of dependence on China and has tried to build economic resilience at home, for example by launching a national campaign on domestic production and recycling. North Korea’s somewhat cooler handling of China and its proportionately warm treatment of Russia since the Armistice Day celebrations in July is a clear example of North Korea’s China dilemma. This is where North Korea’s recent strengthening of ties with Russia comes into the picture. The paper contends that it is hard to conclude at this point whether North Korea’s moves are aimed at short-term, tactical gains or are part of a longer-term, strategic calculus, but we can be certain of this: it has just as much to gain or lose as any other country affected by economic security and U.S.-China strategic competition, though not in the same ways as other countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

164. False promises: The authoritarian development models of China and Russia

Author:: Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea, Patrick Quirk, and Lauren Van Metre
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Are authoritarian regimes more successful than free countries in offering prosperity to their people? The answer is decidedly no, yet China and Russia actively advertise the “benefits” and “promise” of their authoritarian development model. Beijing and Moscow contend that their governance model—rooted in central control of political, social, and economic life—delivers for their people. The facts prove exactly the opposite and show that countries characterized by repression and concentrated control are far less successful across all metrics of human development than are free societies. That free societies are better for the people residing in them is not an ideological position; it is a statement of fact backed by substantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes. This paper aims to showcase why and how the authoritarian development model is inferior to that of free societies. The first section documents democratic backsliding and the reversal of freedom’s fortunes. The second section presents data on how authoritarian regimes have failed to deliver prosperity for their people. The third section outlines how free societies have done the opposite—delivered sustained prosperity for their citizens. The final section offers the conclusion that authoritarian regimes, despite their claims, cannot deliver democratic progress or prosperity for society at large.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Diplomacy, Politics, Authoritarianism, Reform, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

165. Redefining US strategy with Latin America and the Caribbean for a new era

Author:: Jason Marczak, Maria Fernanda Bozmoski, and Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The strategic interest of the United States and the countries of Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) lies in strengthening their western hemisphere partnership. Shared borders, economic interests, and security alliances bind these nations, along with a common goal for prosperity. However, the perception of waning US interest and the rise of external influences necessitate the rejuvenation of and renewed focus on this partnership. In May 2023, the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security established the US-LAC Future Strategy Working Group to redefine the US-LAC partnership. This strategy promotes mutual and inclusive economic growth, renewed cooperation through enhanced commercial and investment ties, a renewed paradigm on bolstering security and reducing migration flows across the region, and a focus on preparedness in the face of natural disasters and the energy transition. Acting on this strategy could significantly benefit US economic and security interests. The United States should capitalize on immediate opportunities, like promoting nearshoring as a means to growth and prosperity across the Americas, while maintaining a medium-term strategy tailored to each country’s specific needs. This strategy paper highlights the importance of adaptability and practicality, particularly as the global economic landscape evolves and power shifts foresee new leading economies by mid-century. In addition, the strategy advocates for the significance of the US-LAC relationship amid the recalibration of US worldwide interests.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Migration, Politics, Economy, and Energy
Political Geography:: Latin America, Caribbean, and United States of America

166. Sanctions have become a tool of first resort. But enforcement needs upgraded and updated resources.

Author:: David Mortlock and Alex Zerden
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Enforcement remains a critical but underresourced element of economic sanctions. The US Congress and the Department of the Treasury should consider updates to its resources, public guidance, and policies to ensure the efficacy of sanctions enforcement as the use of the sanctions policy tool continues to expand. Economic sanctions are often described as the foreign policy tool of first resort. The Department of the Treasury acknowledged this reality in its “2021 Sanctions Review.” Through its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the Treasury Department administers thirty-eight different, albeit overlapping, economic sanctions programs. With only a few hundred employees, OFAC has a nearly unparalleled national security mandate with oversight of the US economy and many other facets of global economic activities. OFAC develops policies for the use of sanctions, designates sanctions targets like individuals, entities, and jurisdictions, engages with the private sector to promote compliance, and civilly enforces apparent violations by US persons and others. This latter enforcement role represents a critical but often overlooked capability. For instance, the same “2021 Sanctions Review” does not even mention the enforcement function in its assessment. (However, it did seek to ensure that sanctions are “enforceable” in the context of sanctions implementation.) Resource constraints, a lack of attention, and the prioritization of policy crises hamper this enforcement function. In 2023, OFAC only undertook seventeen public enforcement actions, including its largest settlement to date with Binance, a global cryptocurrency exchange. For perspective, the Department of Justice terminated 63,419 civil cases in fiscal year 2022, according to the most recent public data. As the wider interagency continues to rely on sanctions as a critical tool and the United States seeks to expand partner sanctions capacity, US policymakers must fully support the sanctions enforcement function. Strengthening the internal controls for OFAC enforcement improves the rule of law through improved due process and protects OFAC from legal challenges that could existentially undermine its national security mission. OFAC enforcement urgently requires increased budgetary resources and an upskilled workforce from Congress, stronger internal procedures to avoid litigation risks, improved public guidance, and revised enforcement guidelines to promote consistency and improve compliance by industry.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Sanctions, Transparency, and Enforcement
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

167. Inclusive Foreign Policy in Israel – Trends and Processes from a Gender Perspective

Author:: Orni Livny
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: Gender equality and women’s rights are consensual values across parties and political agendas in Western democracies, of which Israel has always been proud to be a part. However, Israel’s 37th government, which is the most religious and conservative in the country’s history, set Israel back on the gender issue. Yet, the new government’s weakening of the female voice can also be an opportunity for change: The struggle for adequate representation of women in decision-making processes, which previously only troubled the limited communities of women’s organizations, became a core issue in the public discourse and expanded the awareness that gender equality and women’s rights are fundamental values of democracy. It is not a struggle only of women nor of one political camp or another, but a central part of liberal democracy. This policy paper, written in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), examines the concepts of inclusive and feminist foreign policy and seeks to suggest elements of these concepts that Israeli policymakers may adopt, whether in the short term or the long run.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Women, Feminism, Decision-Making, Inclusion, and Gender
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

168. The Long Shadow of Structural Marxism in International Relations: Historicising Colonial Strategies in the Americas

Author:: Samuel Parris and Armando Van Rankin
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Over the past decades, Marxist-inspired approaches from the field of International Historical Sociology (IHS) have theorised the relationship between 16th and 17th Century European colonial expansion and the development of relations of production and economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic. In this article, we argue that such attempts – from Dependency Theory (DT), World-Systems Theory (WST), and Uneven and Combined Development (UCD) – are premised on a structuralist perspective which overextend the notion of capitalism and under examine the sphere of production, rendering divergent and distinct strategies of European colonialism a homogenous and under-historicised process. Embracing theoretical innovations from Geopolitical Marxism (GPM), we dispute this unitary logic of expansion, instead applying a radical historicist methodology to demonstrate that British and Spanish colonial strategies in the Americas (intra-imperial free trade vs. mercantilism) were shaped by nationally specific class relations (capitalism vs. feudalism/absolutism), generating unique patterns of settlement on the ground (mineral extraction vs. cash-crop production). Promoting historicism thus allows Marxist International Relations to better recognise "the 'making of' the international order" during the period of European colonial expansion from the 16th century onwards, and, in doing so, further understand its enduring legacies.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Political Economy, Socialism/Marxism, Colonialism, International Historical Sociology, and Radical Historicism
Political Geography:: South America, Central America, and North America

169. Advancing Feminist Foreign Policy in the Multilateral System: Key Debates and Challenges

Author:: Evyn Papworth
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:: Since the first feminist foreign policy (FFP) was adopted by Sweden in 2014, sixteen countries have either published an FFP or announced their intention to do so. Some proponents of FFPs have indicated that these policies can be a way to democratize and transform multilateralism, integrating feminist approaches and principles into multilateral institutions and leading to more inclusive and equitable outcomes. This requires seeing FFPs as not just a “women’s issue” but also as a way to reinvigorate an outdated and inequitable system through transformational change and the interrogation of entrenched power dynamics, including in areas such as trade, climate, migration, and disarmament. One obstacle to realizing the potential of FFPs is that there is no single definition of feminist foreign policy. Part of the challenge is that there are many interpretations of feminism, some of which reflect a more transformative, systemic approach than others. Ultimately, there is no single way to “do” feminism, and approaches to FFP should, and will, vary. If FFP is to survive and grow, it will encompass contradictions and compromises, as with all policymaking, and civil society and member states will have to collaborate to advance feminist principles in the multilateral arena. To explore the future of FFPs, the International Peace Institute, in partnership with the Open Society Foundations and in collaboration with the co-chairs of the Feminist Foreign Policy Plus (FFP+) Group, Chile and Germany, convened a retreat on Feminist Foreign Policy and Multilateralism in July 2023. Drawing on insights from the retreat, this paper discusses five ongoing debates that FFP-interested states should meaningfully engage with: Militarization, demilitarization, and the root causes of violence; Global perspectives and postcolonial critiques; The branding and substance of FFPs; The domestication of FFPs; and Accountability and sustainability.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Feminism, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: Global Focus

170. The Security Side of Gulf Visions. Adapting Defence to the Connectivity Age

Author:: Eleanora Ardemagni
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: The GCC states are adapting defence strategies to the challenges raised by their “Visions”, their post-hydrocarbon national plans. Far from being just economic programmes, the Visions are broad national transformation platforms displaying also a security dimension, and with many security implications. New cities and industrial poles, infrastructures, mega events and tourism raise unprecedented security risks, at which the GCC states are answering through a combination of economic-oriented foreign policy, multipolar international alliances, and ambitions towards “defense autonomisation”. What are the Visions’ security dimensions and implications, and how does the post-oil path affect and reshape foreign policies? This Report analyses how GCC states are adapting deterrence and defence tools to the connectivity age, navigating a troubled neighbourhood of both conventional and asymmetric threats. In a central but more vulnerable Gulf, how may the EU and NATO accommodate transformations in GCC states’ defense policies, postures, and means, to support their own security?
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

171. Moving Targets. Trends in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policies

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: In December 2022, Japan announced it would drastically increase its defence budget by 2027. The decision came as a wake-up call for the whole region: Japan was gearing up for a world of heightened tensions and rivalry in the Indo-Pacific Region. This Report analyses the present and future of Japan’s security and defence policies. Within the context of a rising China, Tokyo has broadened its defence ties with the US, India, Australia, and Taiwan. However, China remains its biggest trading partner, meaning Tokyo's policymakers are charged with the task and challenge of striking a balance between defence policies and business and trade relations with China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, ASEAN, Influence, Defense Spending, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, India, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

172. A Return to US Casualty Aversion: The 9/11 Wars as Aberrations

Author:: John Mueller
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Impelled by an overwhelming desire to hunt down those who were responsible for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States launched military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, where it toppled regimes that had little or nothing to do with 9/11. There has been a tendency to see these exercises as misguided elements of a coherent plan to establish a liberal world order or to apply liberal hegemony. However, the warring of the post–9/11 period has been a glaring, extended, and highly consequential aberration. During the quarter century before that, the United States pursued a foreign policy that was far more casualty averse. Over the past decade, the country has moved back to—and appears poised to expand on—that tradition after its exhausting 9/11–induced military ventures that ran such high costs for so few benefits. Moreover, public opinion in the United States is not messianic or in constant search of hegemony or of monsters abroad to destroy. As part of its move back to a more limited military approach, the United States developed—or further developed—a strategy called “by, with, and through” that was particularly evident in its successful military campaign from 2014 to 2019 against the Islamic State. In this, the United States worked with local forces by providing advice, supplies, and intelligence, and by carrying out air strikes while the locals were expected to take almost all of the casualties. Although this approach is hardly new, it seems to have a future and is currently being applied in the war in Ukraine. It might also be applied to deal with a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, 9/11, War on Terror, Casualties, and Military
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

173. Geopolitics in the Pacific Islands: Playing for advantage

Author:: Meg Keen and Alan Tidwell
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Pacific Islands Countries are leveraging geopolitical rivalries to maximise their development options. But unmanaged competition for influence among key development partners can compromise good governance and privilege geopolitical posturing over local priorities. Australia, the United States, and other traditional donors can capitalise on areas of strength, such as social inclusion and regional and multilateral initiatives. Joint efforts along these lines and the pooling of resources would scale up impact and set higher accountability standards. Despite the risk that higher standards will open gaps for non-traditional donors with less burdensome criteria, there is much long-term value in traditional development partners collaborating in a “race to the top” in meeting the region’s needs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Regional Cooperation, Foreign Aid, Geopolitics, and Donors
Political Geography:: China, Australia, Australia/Pacific, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

174. Outrage is not a policy: Coming to terms with Myanmar’s fragmented state

Author:: Morten B. Pedersen
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: This paper analyses the evolution of Myanmar’s civil war with a view to identifying optimal international policy responses. The sharp escalation of armed resistance since late 2023 holds out the tantalising prospect that the once seemingly invincible military regime could be defeated. Yet it remains an open question whether anti-junta forces will be able to carry the momentum from their recent victories in the forest-covered, mountainous borderlands across the open plains of central Myanmar to take the capital or other major cities. Even if resistance forces ultimately emerge victorious, the goal of building a genuine federal democracy will likely take years of highly complex and politically fraught negotiations. While the outcome of the civil war remains uncertain, new resistance groups have started building state-like structures and delivering public services in “liberated areas”, much like the older ethnic armed organisations have been doing since the 1960s. The longer Myanmar remains mired in warfare, the more crucial these plural governance systems will become to the welfare of millions of people, with lasting implications for the nature of state-building in the country. To more effectively support the Myanmar people, Western governments and likeminded actors will need to come to terms with the reality of an increasingly — and quite possibly, permanently — fragmented state. The paper thus calls for greater investments in “parallel state-building”, focused on strengthening the collective capabilities of a wide range of emerging political authorities and community-based organisations to carry out traditional state functions and serve vulnerable populations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Civil War, Development, and Governance
Political Geography:: Southeast Asia and Myanmar

175. Civilizational War: The Will to Win

Author:: Andrey Ilnitsky
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The US National Security Strategy defines the US as a global hegemon that sees no dividing lines between domestic and foreign policies and treats the world as its sphere of interests.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Globalization, National Security, War, Hegemony, Ideology, Civilization, Deep State, and Generative Models
Political Geography:: Russia and United States of America

176. Tailored Deterrence Strategy on the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Gary Samore
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Over the last decade, the most significant change in the international strategic environment has been the reemergence of a great power rivalry between the U.S. and its European and Asian allies on one hand and Russia and China on the other. This trend began in the second term of President Obama, with the Russian invasion of Crimea in early 2014 and the Chinese construction of a network of military bases in the South China Sea beginning around 2013. Since then, the trend has sharpened. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has locked the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies against Russia in a long-term struggle for the survival of Ukraine and future of European security. In Asia, tensions between Beijing and Washington have become worse, as both the Trump and Biden admіnistrations pursued economic measures against China, and as China appears to be building military options to unify Taiwan and the mainland by force. The reemergence of great power rivalry has important nuclear dimensions, increasing concerns about “strategic stability” – the nuclear balance among the great powers – and the risk of nuclear conflict. The Ukraine war has lowered the nuclear threshold. Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons to discourage NATO intervention or assistance to Ukraine. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) - the last remaining arms control treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals - expires in February 2026, and Russia has refused U.S. offers to negotiate a new treaty as long as the U.S. is assisting Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia continues to develop an array of exotic nuclear delivery systеms intended to overcome U.S. missile defenses, including hypersonic reentry vehicles, nuclear-armed submarine drones, and nuclear anti-satellite weapons. China is pursuing an unprecedented nuclear build-up, including new strategic bombers, more advanced nuclear-armed submarines, and three new missile bases with more than 300 silos for solid fuel ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles. According to U.S. Department of Defense estimates, China has more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023 and will “probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030” (U.S. Department of Defense 2023a). Like Russia, China is also pursuing hypersonic reentry vehicles, anti-satellite weapons, and strategic cyber operations. Some analysts fear that China’s nuclear build-up will make it more confident that it can deter U.S. intervention in the face of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or increase the risk that a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan will escalate to nuclear use. To address the reemergence of great power threats, the U.S. has introduced the concepts of “tailored deterrence” and “integrated deterrence” into its nuclear doctrine. According to the Trump admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review, released in February 2018, The United States will apply a tailored and flexible approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. Tailored deterrence strategies communicate to different potential adversaries that their aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs according to their particular calculations of risk and cost (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018). The tailored deterrence concept was also adopted by the Biden admіnistration in its October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, saying, Central to U.S. deterrence strategy is the credibility of our nuclear forces to hold at risk what adversary leadership values most. Effectively deterring – and restoring deterrence if necessary – requires tailored strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best understanding of their decision-making and perceptions (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022). Building on the concept of tailored deterrence, the Biden admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) also introduced the concept of “integrated deterrence,” which is based on the idea that traditional nuclear deterrence can be reinforced by non-nuclear capabilities. According to the NPR, The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans. Non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed. A pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence will seek to determine how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent (Ibid.).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

177. The trade routes vital to Australia’s economic security

Author:: David Uren
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Arecurrent theme in Australia’s defence strategy has been our reliance on and need to defend Australia’s trade routes in a globalised world. The vulnerability of Australia’s limited stockpiles of critical goods and its concentrated sources of supply have driven military capability and planning for decades and remain a justification for strategic investments. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review argued that the danger of any power threatening to invade the Australian continent was remote, but that an adversary could implement military coercion at a distance with threats against our trade and supply routes. With limited resources and finite defence capability, yet vast interests at sea, it’s important that Australian security and economic planning is trained on the most critical pain points in our sea lines of communication. Strategy and planning must derive from up-to-date and accurate data about what we trade, via which routes, and to and from which specific locations. We also need to understand the factors that contribute to our resilience. They include the depth of supply options, the availability of alternative routes and the sheer strength in numbers which our shipping enjoys when it enters the mighty flow of commerce through the waters of our Asian trading partners. This report explores our trading routes in peace-time. Any conflict would bring sharper focus on what shipping and what trade is truly necessary and on what can be done to secure it. However, the strengths and vulnerabilities of our linkages to the world are evident now and are the focus of this report. Concerns have been sharpened by the assaults by Houthi militias on commercial shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, disrupting the 12% of global trade that passes through those waters.2 In addition, drought has slashed the capacity of the Panama Canal, which in normal seasons handles a further 5% of world trade. Surprisingly, the course and operation (who is moving what) of Australia’s trade routes has received extraordinarily little analysis. The last significant public paper on the topic was conducted by the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (now the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics, BITRE) in 2007 and was based on data from 2001 to 2004. The profile of Australia’s trade has changed radically since then. This report makes five key policy recommendations and the first of these is that the government fund BITRE to update its 2007 study of trade routes so that Defence can make assessments of how best to secure Australia’s trade routes. A dangerous combination of complacency and tolerance could be born of a view that conflicts are in faraway locations. The reality is that few saw either of the current wars as imminent when they started, and we mustn’t make the same mistake in our region. A central finding in this report is that the greatest risk to the security of our trade routes lies relatively close to home, in the narrow channels through the Indonesian archipelago through which more than half Australia’s maritime trade must pass. Another strong conclusion is that trade has a surprising resilience in the face of conflict: it is important to understand the sources of that strength and develop plans to maximise it.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Australia

178. Australia’s 2024 Independent Intelligence Review: opportunities and challenges: Views from The Strategist

Author:: Chris Taylor
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Australia has a recent history of intelligence community reform via independent intelligence reviews (IIRs) commissioned by government on a regular basis since 2004. The latest IIR is being undertaken by Dr Heather Smith and Mr Richard Maude. In the lead-up to the announcement of the 2024 IIR, and afterwards, ASPI’s The Strategist has served as a valuable forum for canvassing publicly the most significant issues and challenges to be addressed by the reviewers. This report draws together a selection of articles featured in The Strategist over the past year, with direct relevance to the review and its terms of reference. The articles cover topics from the broad to the specific but include: the review itself, including its scope and purpose the key capability challenge facing Australian intelligence—its future workforce the ‘how’ of intelligence now and into the future; more particularly, new tools such as intelligence diplomacy and offensive cyber operations the purposes for intelligence – from addressing global, existential risks to informing effective net assessment of Australia’s strategic circumstances. In the lead-up to the expected public release of the IIR’s findings later this year, this compilation provides valuable background to the review and to the fundamental challenges and opportunities facing Australian intelligence in the decade ahead.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Intelligence, and National Security
Political Geography:: Australia and Australia/Pacific

179. A national strategic warning intelligence capability for Australia

Author:: Chris Taylor
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Australia’s strategic warning time has collapsed—in response to profound geopolitical shifts. As the ADF is adapting to the hard implications of this change, so must the national intelligence community (NIC). Australian Government decision-makers need time and insight to identify and prioritise threats (and opportunities) and devise effective responses. Strategic warning intelligence enables and empowers them to do so. But it must be done in a way that keeps up with the rapid pace of geopolitical and technological change, and a widening array of non-traditional strategic threats, and in a fashion best suited to Australia’s circumstances. To meet this need the NIC should develop a discrete, institutional strategic warning intelligence function—an Australian Centre for Strategic Warning (ACSW). This would recognise the distinct skills, analytical focus and interface with decision-making entailed—and the vital national interests at stake. In implementing an ACSW, much can be learned from our own and other intelligence communities’ ongoing efforts to adapt to threats other than invasion—notably terrorism and pandemics. This will be especially pertinent in its application to grey-zone threats such as economic coercion. Done right, an ACSW would be an important addition to the suite of Australia’s statecraft tools.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Intelligence, National Security, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:: Australia

180. Full tilt: The UK's defence role in the Pacific: Views from The Strategist

Author:: Alex Bristow
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Britain has a new prime minister, Keir Starmer, leading its first Labour government in 14 years. Key questions for us now are how Britain under Labour will approach the security partnership with Australia and whether London will remain committed to investing defence resources in the Indo-Pacific. This report provides vital context for addressing these questions. In this series of articles, originally published in ASPI’s The Strategist this year, ASPI authors review the historical underpinnings and future course of Britain’s strategic recoupling with Australia and this region, especially the Pacific Islands, from perspectives ranging from deterrence to climate resilience. The report makes some recommendations for how to strengthen the Australia-UK defence partnership and shape Britain's approach to our region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

181. Gender mainstreaming in United Nations peace operations: an unfulfilled promise?

Author:: Jen Wittwer
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The principle of gender equality is a cornerstone of the United Nations (UN). Centred on equal access to rights, opportunities, resources and decision-making powers irrespective of gender, it’s embedded within the UN Charter and championed in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Mechanisms such as the inaugural resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agreed to in 2000 by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and the adoption of an additional nine WPS resolutions, further represent the critical intent to achieve this goal. The purpose of such WPS mechanisms is to cultivate gender balance, foster diverse leadership and champion gender equality in a global effort to establish sustainable peace after conflict. Yet, as we stand on the threshold of the 25th anniversary of UNSC resolution 1325, the UN’s stride towards gender equality for uniformed women in peace operations has been ‘exceedingly slow’. The lofty aspiration of ‘equal opportunity peacekeeping’ through gender mainstreaming policies and practices remains elusive, entangled in a web of misconceptions and entrenched systemic barriers and institutional challenges. The purpose of this ASPI report is threefold. First, it examines the blocks to implementation and the effects of gender mainstreaming strategies. Second, it advances three strategic interventions for the UN system and its global peace and security community: redefining peacekeeping benchmarks for an efficient and effective uniformed component shifting the narrative on peacekeepers’ contributions regardless of gender incorporating feminist voices and practices in the development of policies and practices for the deployment of peacekeepers. These proposed interventions offer a unique prospect for the final section of this report: encouraging Australian Government departments and agencies that have responsibilities for and commitments to execute the Australian National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS. Those commitments extend to fostering gender equality in both domestic and international WPS endeavours, thereby strengthening Australia’s position as a proactive UN member state.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, United Nations, Peacekeeping, Women, Peace, and Gender
Political Geography:: Global Focus

182. The ‘official’ histories of Australian and British intelligence: lessons learned and next steps

Author:: Chris Taylor
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Unclassified, official histories of ‘secret’ intelligence organisations, for public readership, seem a contradiction in terms. These ‘official’ works are commissioned by the agencies in question and directly informed by those agencies’ own records, thus distinguishing them from other, outsider historical accounts. But while such official intelligence histories are relatively new, sometimes controversial, and often challenging for historians and agencies alike, the experiences of the Australian and British intelligence communities suggest they’re a promising development for scholarship, maintaining public trust and informed public discourse, and more effective functioning of national security agencies. Furthermore, these histories remain an ongoing project for Australia’s National Intelligence Community (NIC).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Intelligence, and National Security
Political Geography:: Britain, Australia, and Australia/Pacific

183. Ice panda: navigating China’s hybrid Antarctic agenda

Author:: Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Antarctica is often overlooked in strategic discussions, but its role in geopolitical competition deserves attention. This report assesses the continents importance to Australian security, China’s hybrid Antarctic activity, and the need for Australia to develop a balancing strategy capable of bolstering the Antarctic Treaty and ‘pushing back’ against growing Chinese power in Antarctica. Antarctica offers significant strategic advantages for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although Beijing's actions in Antarctica may not overtly violate the Antarctic Treaty (AT), they effectively undermine its principles and, by extension, Australia's strategic interests. Currently, the PRC is adeptly navigating the AT System to challenge the status quo without explicitly breaching the treaty. China's domestic policies, which merge civil and military sectors, appear to contravene the spirit of the AT's military prohibitions, even if they have not yet resulted in direct military activity on the continent. This evolving dynamic underscores the pressing need for Australia to safeguard the existing Antarctic status quo. With robust Australian foreign and security prioritization, the AT can counter Beijing's growing ambitions, which may directly impact Australian interests. We must protect and uphold the principles of the AT. With diverse domestic and international priorities, Australia must not neglect Antarctica, as Beijing continues to exploit the strategic gap left by our limited focus. Australia, with its rich history and commitment to Antarctica, must assert its role as an Antarctic claimant and clarify that China's presence is contingent on Australian and other claimants' cooperation. It's time for Australia to lead in Antarctica and protect our strategic interests.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Antarctica

184. Chinese foreign policy in 2024: crisis management and global governance

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: This Trend Report examines key aspects of Chinese foreign policy in 2024, emphasizing three critical questions: the Taiwan situation, China’s stance in the Ukraine conflict, and its global governance reform proposals. The analysis suggests that the likelihood of a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan remains low due to electoral outcomes and various deterrent factors. China is expected to intensify non-physical threats. Economic considerations, including reliance on exports and partnerships with Europe, deter China from escalating support for Russia. The "Global South" is likely to support China’s global governance reforms, driven by resentment against perceived US double standards. European decision-makers are advised to align strategies with China’s nuanced approach, emphasizing reassurances on Taiwan, clear red lines on Russia, and increased engagement with the "Global South" while upholding UN principles.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Governance, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China and Asia

185. From “as long as it takes” to “as long as we can”: will the West abandon Ukraine?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Ukraine starts 2024 on a military stalemate. Sustaining its war effort critically depends on increasing Ukraine allies’ – especially Europe – manufacturing capacity. Without continued Western aid, Ukraine cannot win this war. Both in the U.S. and in Europe, though, the momentum for supporting Ukraine “as long as it takes” seems to be waning, especially since the eruption of violence in the Middle East partly took Ukraine off the media screens. Continuing to steadily contain Russia is the only option for now. Ukraine’s future, but also the West’s credibility, are at stake.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

186. Happy Election Year!

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Billions of voters in 77 countries will go to the polls in 2024. Some of these elections will transform key nations’ foreign policies and might durably shape international relations. In many countries, though, elections are just a folding screen for authoritarian regimes. Even in advanced democracies, citizens’ disillusionment seems to give illiberalism a lifeline. The risk is also high that polls across the globe this year will be a ‘prime target’ for disinformation, ‘fake news’, conspiracy theory and cyber attacks.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Elections, and Disinformation
Political Geography:: Global Focus

187. Survival strategies in the Middle East: Foreign policy in the service of regime security. The cases of Egypt and UAE.

Author:: Johannes Späth, Carsten Minh Vo, and Cengiz Günay
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: This policy analysis examines foreign policy making in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It highlights how internal power dynamics and the interaction between formal institutions and informal networks shape foreign policy making in these two different types of Middle Eastern autocracies. The study identifies the politically relevant elite coalitions and their impact on decision-making. In both regimes, the circle at the top of the power pyramid is rather small and characterized by informal and family ties. A small and homogeneous elite promotes cohesion, but also limits the diversity of opinions. The royal elite in the UAE and the military and intelligence elite at the core of the al-Sisi regime in Egypt pursue their own economic interests in the service of regime security and stability. The paper identifies areas where the regional and foreign policies/interests of the two friendly countries and their elites diverge.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Autocracy, Regional Politics, and Regime Security
Political Geography:: Middle East, Egypt, and UAE

188. Freerider or Strategic Balancer? Austria vis-à-vis NATO and Russia. US – perspective on Austrian neutrality politics

Author:: Jason C. Moyer and Patrick Kornegay
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 highlighted the fragility of peace and security in Europe. The resurgence of war in Europe prompted a reassessment of the security postures of traditionally neutral countries. Norms on military spending and assistance have been shattered, leading to Finland and Sweden reversing decades of military non-alignment to join NATO. Even Switzerland is eyeing a strategic overhaul and is considering joint exercises with NATO (Revill, 2022). Despite Sweden and Finland’s decision to join NATO Austria remains committed to neutrality. The public debate on Austria’s strategic culture has remained largely the same and policymakers in Vienna have not changed their stance on NATO. Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored Austria’s need to reevaluate its policy of neutrality and strategic approach vis-a-vis NATO and Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Austria, and United States of America

189. Future Danish engagement with Africa: Insights and priorities for Denmark´s new Africa strategy from DIIS’ partners across the continent

Author:: Mary Boatemaa Setrana, Rahma Hassan, Faisal Garba, Mohamed Aden Hassan, Meron Zeleke Ersesso, Adam Moe Fejerskov, Nauja Kleist, and Mikkel Funder
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Remaking political relations with African countries has become a key priority for the Danish government, looking toward a future where Africa becomes of greater (geo)political importance to Denmark and Europe. To achieve this, Denmark is preparing a new plan for its future strategic engagement on the continent. Aiming to situate African countries closer to Denmark’s core foreign affairs, the plan is expected to address questions across the fields of foreign affairs, security, development, and trade, and focus on equal partnerships. The government has indicated a need to build on the mantra of ‘preaching less and listening more’ – as the Danish minister for foreign affairs framed it at a recent visit to Kenya – with political relations based on a ‘pragmatic idealism’ and more genuine forms of cooperation that reflect mutual interests. In this Policy Brief, some of DIIS’ African research partners consider key questions on what it takes to achieve equal partnerships, what a new Danish strategic engagement with Africa should look like, and what it should refrain from.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Engagement, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Denmark

190. Europe's role in the Sahel

Author:: Christine Nissen
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: A few years ago Africa’s Sahel region sat at the top of the EU’s foreign policy and security agenda. European member states were mobilising significant resources to address the security challenges of the region. This changed overnight on the 24th of February 2022 when Putin’s Russia invaded Ukraine and resurrected the spectre of conventional war on the European continent. From that day all Europe’s focus was directed to the Eastern threat, and European presence in the Sahel has since been scaled down. The Russian war in Ukraine is not the only reason why Europe is scaling down ambitions in the Sahel. Indeed, growing anti-Western sentiment amongst Sahelian governments and populations, and increasing resistance to European, and not least French, interference have made it challenging for European countries to stay engaged in the region. The Ukraine War and the European re-focus eastwards is symptomatic of the changing global order, which tells a broader story of European–African relations in crisis. The world is changing – and European governments are struggling to decide how to position themselves within it. In the short term Europe emerges as the primary loser due to its limited readiness to navigate this evolving landscape.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Geopolitics, and International Order
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Sahel

191. An analysis of the impact of Turkish attacks on Syria on future normalization efforts between the two nations

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: In a televised address after a Cabinet meeting on January 16, 2024, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirmed his country's commitment to eliminating what he referred to as "terrorist hideouts" in Syria. These areas extend from Tel Rifaat to Ain al-Arab, and from Hasakah to Manbij. Erdogan stressed, “Our military presence beyond our borders is critical to the national security of our country and for the peace of our citizens. There’s no turning back from this.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Syrian War, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Normalization, Rapprochement, Bashar al-Assad, and PKK
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

192. What Dilemma is Hampering Japan’s Rise to a Major World Power

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On January 1, 2024, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida vowed to propel Japan to the forefront of the international arena amongst nation-states that have a proactive role in key global affairs and issues. In his New Year's address, Kishida affirmed that he will “exert leadership unique to Japan" through summit diplomacy to "overcome challenges," citing issues such as Russia's war on Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict. The Prime Minister’s comments come on the back of official figures released on February 15, 2024, showing that Japan’s economy has slipped to fourth place after being replaced by Germany as the world’s third largest economy. India is projected to overtake both Japan and Germany and become the world's third-largest economy during the current decade. Between Japan's aspirations to become a major global player and its evident economic decline, there are lingering questions about the obstacles it faces in transforming into a significant influential force in a world moving towards multipolarism.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, Economy, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

193. Forecasting Chinese expansion into Central Asia

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: In early April 2024, China signed a two-year enhanced security cooperation agreement with Uzbekistan, which was reached during a meeting between Chinese Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Interior Minister Pulat Bobojonov in Tashkent. Some believe this pact was prompted by escalating international and regional competition for Central Asia, mainly because it came amid moves by international and regional powers in the five countries. Moreover, as China expands activities in this region to capitalize on cooperation potentials and opportunities, its influence in the five Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is steadily rising, mainly encouraged by Moscow's preoccupation with its war in Ukraine. The development is raising questions about the future of China's presence in Central Asia in the coming years.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Competition, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Central Asia, and Asia

194. China’s Role in the Middle East

Author:: John Calabrese and Yun Sun
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss China’s role in the Middle East amid rising regional tensions and growing threats to both international security and the global economy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Security, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Asia

195. Spotlight on US Syria policy

Author:: Charles Lister and Alistair Taylor
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: On this week's episode, Director of MEI's Syria and Countering Terrorism & Extremism Programs Charles Lister and MEI Editor-In-Chief Alistair Taylor talk about US policy toward Syria. The deadly Jan. 28 drone attack on a US military outpost in northeastern Jordan, near the borders with Syria and Iraq, has drawn renewed attention to the US military presence in the area. This comes against a backdrop of regional conflict and escalation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Syrian War, Escalation, and Military
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

196. Iranian Proxies in Iraq and Syria

Author:: Charles Lister and Douglas London
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss Iran’s proxy network throughout Syria and Iraq.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

197. Understanding EU-NATO Cooperation: How Member States Matter

Author:: Pınar Atakara
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: “Understanding EU-NATO Cooperation: How Member States Matter” by Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters conducts a distinctly member-state based theoretical examination of interorganizational cooperation between the EU and NATO. Ewers-Peters mainly intends to demonstrate member states’ foreign/security policy orientations, roles and positions affecting the functionality and dys-functionality of Euro-Atlantic security, between the period of the end of the Cold War and 2021. The book is composed of seven chapters including conclusion and implications. By providing 28 face-to-face semi-structured interviews carried out in Berlin and Brussels between February 2017 and February 2018, with different member states’ representatives (see Appendix A.), as well as document analysis of primary and secondary sources, the book relies on well-designed qualitative research.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, European Union, and Book Review
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

198. Goodbye to Russia, Russia and Russia!1: Finland’s New NATO Chapter Within the Framework of Shelter Theory

Author:: Yeliz Kulali Martin
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Behavior, Russia-Ukraine War, Shelter Theory, Small States, and Hard Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Finland

199. Assessing the Impact of Turkey’s Quest for Status Since the 2000s on Foreign Policy Change: Transformational or Transactional?

Author:: Samiratou Dipama and Emel Parlar Dal
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This paper delves into an assessment of the impact of Turkey’s quest for status since the 2000s on changes in its foreign policy. In other words, how has Turkey’s search for status influenced its foreign policy stances since the 2000s? And can we consider the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy change transformational or transactional in essence? In this vein, this paper will make essential contributions to the existing literature on Turkey’s status-seeking strategies by using specific cases to link them to changes in Turkey’s foreign policy and assessing the extent to which they are transactional or transformational. The examination of this topic is all the more important in light of internal developments in Turkey, such as democratic backsliding and economic crisis, as well external factors such as its tense relationships with the EU, its rapprochement with Russia and China, and its increasingly proactive profile in regional crises. This paper critically assesses the pattern of Turkey’s foreign policy change from transformational and transactional perspectives.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Status, and International Politics
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

200. The Mattei Plan for Africa: A Turning Point for Italy’s Development Cooperation Policy?

Author:: Daniele Fattibene
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: At the end of January 2024, Italy hosted an Africa summit during which Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni outlined the vision and first projects of the so-called “Mattei Plan”, an ambitious project announced officially at the end of 2023[1] that aims to shape Italy’s strategy for Africa in the years to come.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Italy

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS