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101. Game Over? How the United States Could Have Won the Trade Wars

Author:
Emily Kilcrease and Geoffrey Gertz
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The Center for a New American Security's Energy, Economics, and Security (EES) Program designed and conducted an economic wargame to explore possible pathways to resolve the trade wars sparked by historic levels of U.S. tariff escalation. This trade wargame was designed to examine foreign government responses to U.S. tariffs, including whether they would retaliate, negotiate, and/or make concessions. After being punished by U.S. tariffs, would foreign governments have the appetite to engage in dealmaking with the United States and, if so, under what conditions? The trade wargame was conducted on March 17, 2025, two weeks before President Donald Trump made his real-world announcement of shockingly high tariff rates on a day he deemed “Liberation Day.”
Topic:
Economics, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

102. China in Iraq

Author:
Ingrid D'Hooghe, Vera Kranenburg, and Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
China’s main objective in Iraq is to ensure a reliable supply of oil that diversifies Beijing’s imports without making it dependent on Baghdad. China has a large economic footprint in Iraq, moderately strong diplomatic ties and is marginally relevant from a security perspective. Specifically, 50-67% of Iraq’s oil production comes from fields where Chinese companies are involved as investors, producers or in field servicing roles. Iraq’s political elites welcome Chinese engagement as its foreign policy is less intrusive and more respectful than the United States, its presence creates alternatives and its economic deals are profitable on Iraqi terms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Oil, Bilateral Relations, and Imports
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

103. Incomplete Exit: Central and Eastern Europe’s Corporate Decoupling From Russia

Author:
Michal Wyrebkowski
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, companies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) initially were trailblazers in voluntarily withdrawing from Russia, effectively self-sanctioning through voluntary overcompliance with sanctions by leaving, even though operating in the country is still legal. At the same time, CEE countries have enabled sanctions-evasion networks. The historical economic relationship between CEE countries and Russia created the conditions for this paradox. Decades of relying on Russian energy sources masked an asymmetric interdependence: Russia’s military-industrial complex relied heavily on CEE countries for the machine tools, industrial components, and dual-use technologies essential to weapons production. When EU sanctions targeted these critical supply chains, the geographic proximity and established trade relationships that motivated voluntary exit by some companies also enabled systematic sanctions circumvention by others. The EU’s Russia sanctions since 2014 have struggled to match the complexity of the economic networks involved. Early sanctions focused on financial restrictions and high-profile sectors but failed to address the technical vulnerabilities that enable large-scale evasion. Even as restrictions expanded to cover dual-use goods and Russia’s “shadow fleet”, fundamental gaps in classification systems and enforcement mechanisms persisted. The responses of CEE companies have varied across sectors and countries. While investor and consumer pressure drove rapid voluntary exits from Russia in consumer-facing industries, industrial manufacturers found numerous ways to keep supplying it through third-country intermediaries. The behavior of energy companies has reflected the strategic priorities of CEE governments, with some achieving complete diversification from Russia while others reinforced existing dependencies. The variety of corporate responses mirrored the uneven development of national sanctions-enforcement capabilities, ranging from understaffed sanctions departments to insufficiently robust regulatory frameworks; for example, regarding criminalization of violations. The persistence of sanctions evasion through CEE countries reflects systemic failures in the EU’s enforcement architecture. Technical classification systems designed for traditional trade cannot adequately distinguish between civilian and military applications of modern dual-use technologies. Customs officials lack access to the information systems necessary to verify complex ownership structures and end-use destinations. Legal frameworks optimized for territorial jurisdiction are inadequate for regulating globalized supply chains where goods, payments, and corporate structures span multiple jurisdictions. Banking institutions operating across Central and Eastern Europe have become critical actors, with a small number of financial institutions handling substantial portions of Russia’s foreign currency transactions. Their continued operations highlight the limits of EU territorial sanctions, which is confirmed by the extent to which US extraterritorial enforcement has become necessary to police sanctions violations in Europe. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive reforms across multiple dimensions. Technical improvements must include supplementary classification systems that incorporate detailed specifications for dual-use goods, while institutional capacity-building demands substantial increases in staffing and expertise at the national and EU levels. Financial-sector monitoring needs real-time automated screening capabilities and dedicated compliance structures, while industrial-sector oversight requires specialized task forces with technical expertise in dual-use technologies.
Topic:
Economics, Trade, Russia-Ukraine War, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
Russia and Eastern Europe

104. Navigating Global Value Chains and Economics in 2025: US–Vietnam Relations in a Changing IndoPacific

Author:
Thanh Nha Nguyen
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Vietnam has emerged as an indispensable link in Indo-Pacific manufacturing networks. The country’s strategic advantage lies in its ability to adapt to shifting policies while mitigating risks from trade frictions. To sustain these gains, Vietnam must invest strategically in long-term competitiveness by upgrading workforce skills, improving infrastructure, and climbing the value chain through enhanced design and innovation capabilities. Vietnam’s adaptability has made it a prime beneficiary of the ongoing realignment in global supply chains driven by US trade policy changes. Tariffs on Chinese goods and broader efforts to "de-risk" supply lines have prompted many manufacturers to expand operations in Vietnam, sharply boosting exports and investment. By 2023, Vietnam had vaulted from the 12th- to 7th-largest exporter to the United States, as US imports from Vietnam rose by nearly 35 percent year-on-year. High-profile firms, including Samsung, Apple contractors, and major textile producers, have accelerated investments in Vietnam, solidifying its role as a preferred “China+1” manufacturing base.
Topic:
Economics, Manufacturing, and Global Value Chains
Political Geography:
Vietnam, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

105. Tariff Wars: Strategies to Prevent Economic Marginalizationof Africa

Author:
Stephane Atangana
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The global economy is showing signs of structural slowdown. Global inflation is declining (from6.8% in 2023 to an expected 4.5% in 2025), and medium-term growth has plateaued around3.1%, a historically low level . Concurrently, « geoeconomic fragmentation » is intensifying—definedby the IMF as a policy-driven reversal of global economic integration. Protectionist measures aremultiplying at an unprecedented rate: nearly 3,000 new trade barriers were imposed in 2023, triplethe number in 2019. This surge in restrictions jeopardizes the economic architecture thatpreviously lifted 1.5 billion people out of poverty over recent decades . For low- and middle-incomeAfrican countries, these trends pose a dual challenge: firstly, their economies remain heavilyreliant on commodity prices (accounting for approximately 76% of exports in 2023) and strugglewith diversification; secondly, they face growing pressures on public finances due to mountingdebt. Specifically, external refinancing needs have tripled in a decade, reaching nearly USD 60 billion annually , while debt servicing now consumes over 12% of public revenue on average in sub-Saharan Africa. These constrained fiscal resources severely limit capacities for productiveinvestment and social policies. Thus, the critical question is: How can these vulnerable economiesmaintain access to international markets while fostering sustainable development?
Topic:
Economics, Tariffs, Inflation, Marginalization, Geoeconomics, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
Africa

106. Addressing Policy Issues to Support Women’s EconomicEmpowerment in the Care Economy in Cameroon

Author:
Nkafu Policy Institute
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Cameroon is a middle-income country with a population of more than 29.4 million [1] . It ranked117 out of 146 in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index in 2021 [2], indicating asignificant gender gap. With an increasing global focus on women’s empowerment, Cameroonhas made strong policy commitments and developed sound policy measures to support Women’sEconomic Empowerment (WEE), backed by changes in macroeconomic frameworks to enable aninclusive approach to economic growth [3]. Nevertheless, gender equality cannot be taken forgranted and needs sustained attention in policy formulation and implementation. More womenhave been moving into paid work and increasingly leadership positions, yet globally, societalexpectations, employer policies, the legal environment and the availability of care continue to playan important role in the choice of educational tracks and career paths for these women. Womenremain disadvantaged at all levels of economic empowerment, especially in access to decentlivelihoods, resource ownership, infrastructure, and services to meet their productive, reproductive, and household needs. This article seeks to address various policy issues required tosupport women’s economic empowerment within the care economy in Cameroon. Thesubsequent sections consist of the Care Economy and Women’s Economic Empowerment, somechallenges and barriers women encounter in terms of economic empowerment, and policychallenges affecting WEE and the care economy. This is followed by a variety of policyrecommendations and future directions.
Topic:
Economics, Women, Empowerment, and Care Economy
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

107. Labor in the Green and Digital Jobs of the Future: What Kind of ‘Future’ Will Arrive and Under Which Conditions?

Author:
Aslı Aydın
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
Sustainable development goals, increasing environmental threats and global competition are forcing countries to take steps towards green transition and digital transformation based on artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. In this so-called “twin transformation”, low-carbon and smart technology-oriented jobs are expected to increase rapidly and future jobs are expected to be shaped around these new trends. In this policy brief, the potential opportunities and risks in the twin transformation, including the gender equality dimension, are examined together, and discussion topics that are expected to benefit policymaking are put forward.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Digital Economy, Artificial Intelligence, Labor Market, Sustainable Development, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:
Global Focus

108. The Arctic as an Arena for Strategic Competition:​ Rivalry with Traditional and Irregular Levers of Power on NATO’s Northern Flank

Author:
Njord Wegge
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article investigates to what degree and through which fields and mechanisms strategic competition today plays out in the Arctic as well as how these questions align with international relations (IR) theory. Using rationalist approaches to the study of IR and the DIME model (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to structure the empirical investigation, this article finds that the strategic competition matches perspectives found in realism as well as liberalism. The article points out how states develop strategies to maximize security, wealth, power, and prosperity at the cost of others, while at the same time also identifies empirical evidence supporting liberal perspectives that stresses how unintended consequences of competition can be harnessed through institutions and international law. The competitive environment experienced in today’s Arctic increasingly reflects an international society characterized by zero-sum thinking and a dynamic where the constraining role of institutions has diminished.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, Diplomacy, Economics, Strategic Competition, Military, and Information
Political Geography:
Arctic

109. Investing in Power: Unequal Exchange in Global Value Chains

Author:
James Heitz and William Milberg
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
The question of how value is distributed within global value chains (GVCs) is one of the central questions in contemporary research on trade and development and an analysis of power is central to understanding this issue. This paper extends existing research on distribution within global value chains by focusing on the issue of power in both product markets and supplier markets. We present a formal model in which lead firms capture a larger share of value-added, either through higher mark-ups – monopoly power – or lower unit costs goods purchased from suppliers – monopsony power. Maintaining or expanding this market power involves costly investments in intangible assets, with the nature of that investment depending on the characteristics of the GVC. This framework provides new insights into the distributive dynamics of value chains, including reputation effects tied to corporate social responsibility. In this way, the paper presents an innovative way of theorizing international trade, inspired by the unequal exchange tradition, that can be extended in future research.
Topic:
Economics, Human Rights, Finance, Macroeconomics, Global Value Chains, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Global Focus

110. Anchored Inflation With Differential Inflation Benchmarks

Author:
Thomas R. Michl
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
This paper presents a model of inflation and distribution that features a structural difference between the wage Phillips curve and the price Phillips curve. The wage Phillips curve revolves around conditions in the labor market represented by the employment rate while the price Phillips curve revolves around conditions in the product market represented by capacity utilization. Differences in the relative bargaining power of workers and capitalist firms give rise to stabilizing real wage dynamics that lead to normal capacity utilization. Wage and price setting are each benchmarked to a different reference rate of price inflation, and both are anchored by the central bank’s inflation target. Price-setting by capitalist firms requires accurate projections (inflation expectations) of their competitors’ prices while the wage-setting reference rate reflects the delay in keeping up with past inflation that firms impose on workers, so that more anchoring represents the loss of working class bargaining power. Greater anchoring of the wage-setting reference rate relative to the price-setting rate makes real wages vulnerable to erosion from inflation. Capacity constraints also generate inflation that erodes wages. The model sheds some light on the recent post-Covid inflation through these channels.
Topic:
Economics, Employment, Inflation, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Global Focus

111. Inequality of Opportunity and Stratification Economics: Different Paths, Shared Concerns

Author:
Luis Monroy-Gómez-Franco
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
This paper compares two approaches to the study of inequality that have recently consolidated as distinct fields: the economics of inequality of opportunity (IOp) and stratification economics (SE). IOp examines how circumstances beyond individual control shape inequalities, while SE emphasizes how institutions and group identities reproduce intergroup hierarchies. I argue that, despite distinct origins, the two frameworks can be viewed as complementary. To support this claim, I outline the main features of each theoretical framework and contrast them along several dimensions: their equalisandum, the role of social groups, primary unit of analysis, and their conception of how structural factors influence inequality. The analysis shows that the distance between the two approaches is less significant than often assumed. Their differences enhance their complementarity, positioning SE and IOp not as competitors but as mutually reinforcing frameworks for understanding inequality.
Topic:
Economics, Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Stratification Economics
Political Geography:
Global Focus

112. Mexico: A Pivotal State on the Global Stage

Author:
Ryan C. Berg, Rubi Biedsoe, and Michael Ferguson
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
In his 1867 Manifesto to the Nation, Benito Juárez famously stated: “Among individuals, as among nations, respect for the rights of others is peace.”1 Spoken by Mexico’s first indigenous president, Juárez’s quote demonstrates Mexico’s view of the global order—that countries should promote national sovereignty, security, and prosperity through collaboration and dialogue rather than through intervention. Mexico effectively operates with one foot in the door of the Global North, via its position in North America, and one foot in the door of the Global South, as one of the leading economies and cultural powerhouses of Latin America. This hybrid role, characterized by some as a “pivotal state,” has created both opportunities for leverage and areas of tension with other countries, particularly with regards to its close but complicated relationship with its northern neighbor.2 A key player and beneficiary of a global economy underpinned by a U.S.-led order, Mexico has found itself in a state of “autonomy within limits,” by which U.S. interests oftentimes circumscribe Mexico’s range of potential actions.3 Being the United States’ southern neighbor both grants Mexico unmatched economic benefits and presents it with a delicate balancing act: In pursuing autonomy within limits, Mexico must maximize its benefits from the Western-led order while asserting its sovereignty and reducing its dependence on the order’s biggest players, especially the United States. This tension influences Mexico’s policy positions as its presidents balance nationalistic rhetoric at home and trying to assuage U.S. concerns. Mexico’s balancing act also exacerbates divisions between the country’s pro–Global North elites and its disadvantaged populations who have not received the benefits of global economic integration, which has led to the success of the social welfare and populist-oriented Morena party. Mexico’s effort to maintain relations with its neighbor to the north consumes most of its foreign policy energy. But Mexico’s foreign policy DNA, often described as noninterventionism or the Estrada Doctrine (after Foreign Affairs Minister Genaro Estrada), can sometimes undercut its desire to play a leadership role on the global stage. Mexico firmly believes that nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries can earn it a seat at the tables that matter, allowing it to negotiate or mediate conflicts. In practice, however, Mexico has demonstrated little global leadership of late, preferring to stay on the sidelines (and under President Lopez Obrador, to focus on his project of domestic transformation). Mexico’s ultimate goal is to exert full sovereignty over its domestic affairs; it has also used its political capital on the global stage to openly criticize the role of U.S. sanctions and containment policies against Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela for contributing the region’s security and migration crises. Further, Mexico does not see the world through the West’s post–Cold War lens, but rather as a group of politically equal states. China and Russia are treated as normal states in the international system the same way Algeria, Ethiopia, or Thailand might be.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and Mexico

113. The United Arab Emirates: From Footnote to Sophisticated Global Partner

Author:
Jon B. Alterman
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin bounded down two dozen steps from his presidential plane on the morning of December 6, 2023. It must have felt good to be on the road again. An International Criminal Court indictment following his invasion of Ukraine had limited his international travel to former Soviet states, China, and Iran—but now, he seemed free. While world leaders were focused on the COP28 conference in Dubai, Putin—escorted by four Su-35 fighter jets—arrived in Abu Dhabi to a hero’s welcome. Lampposts were draped with Russian and Emirati flags. His limousine rolled past Bedouin guards and their camels lining the right side of the road, while mounted cavalry bearing Russian flags lined the left. The seven jets of the UAE Air Force’s acrobatic team streaked overhead, their colored smoke painting the Russian tricolor across the skies of the Emirati capital. The onward trip to Saudi Arabia for a few hours that evening almost felt like an anticlimax. For nearly two decades, the leadership of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has spared no effort in portraying itself as an essential Middle East partner to the United States, a beacon of moderation, and a catalyst for regional transformation. The push had its origins in crisis: two of the 9/11 hijackers were Emirati, leaving behind distrust among some in Congress and the American security establishment. The Emirati leadership confronted those perceptions head-on, skillfully courting U.S. government officials, senior military officers, and opinion leaders over the years. They judged that success in Washington was impossible if Israel and the UAE were at loggerheads, so outreach extended to the American Jewish community and included many years of quiet conversations with Israeli officials, culminating in U.S.-brokered diplomatic recognition in 2020. The Emirati goal with each successive U.S. president, it seemed, was to be considered America’s favorite Arab state. That effort was largely a success. For many in Washington and across the United States, the UAE became a model for the Middle East. And yet, as the Biden administration sought to rally the world after February 2022 to defend Ukraine and isolate Russia, the UAE remained circumspect. Distrustful of ideology in all its forms, the Emirati leadership viewed their country as a global entrepôt that had earned the right to flourish outside of political blocs. They saw no contradiction between being a close friend of the United States and entering into a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China in 2018. When Russian capital (and capitalists) sought a place to land after Ukraine-related sanctions slammed Russia in 2022, Emiratis welcomed both. Emirati officials touted their success in negotiating the exchange of hundreds of Russian and Ukrainian prisoners of war. They simultaneously deepened economic ties with both Ukraine and Russia. The UAE, they argued, was a more valuable friend when it maintained relationships with all. They would not choose—in part, because they judged they did not have to.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Global South, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Middle East and United Arab Emirates

114. India’s Future Strategic Choices: Complications of Mass

Author:
Richard M. Rossow
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Leading up to the 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi, the Indian government put up billboards of Prime Minister Narendra Modi across the city. By one count, there were almost 1,000 signs and banners in the 12-kilometer stretch between the airport and U.S. President Joe Biden’s hotel highlighting India’s accomplishments, aspirations, and vision under Modi’s leadership.1 When asked about the billboards, India’s G20 coordinator responded, “We haven’t done advertising. We’re doing branding.”2 But this branding exercise was not merely intended to highlight India’s leadership role in a major international summit; it also sought to assert India’s leadership among the G20 countries that are less wealthy but large and fast growing. Quite purposively, India gathered more than 100 countries for the Voice of the Global South Summit the week before the G20 summit, where Modi declared the importance for India of “voicing the concerns of the Global South on the agenda of a significant platform like G-20.”3 As the concept of a coalition of Global South countries has emerged in recent years, India’s efforts to bolster its own brand as the vanguard of the Global South have accelerated. But India’s response to a new international order reflects an old strategy. In March 1947, on the eve of Indian independence, India hosted the first Asian Relations Conference, bringing together a diverse range of countries, including China, Indonesia, Egypt and the Arab League, Australia, and many of the Soviet republics. India hosted the conference during a period of geopolitical transformation, as countries around the world grappled with the aftermath of World War II and an emerging process of decolonization. Jawaharlal Nehru, then vice president of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, described the moment of the conference as an “age of transition.” He argued, “One of the notable consequences of the European domination of Asia has been the isolation of the countries of Asia from one another,” but “as that domination goes, the walls that surrounded us fall down and we look at each other again and meet as old friends long parted.”4
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, and India

115. Striving for Seriousness: Brazil’s Inclusion and Exclusion from the World Order

Author:
Ryan C. Berg, Henry Ziemer, and Luke Maloney
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Unlike other significant actors in the Global South, the genesis of Brazil’s grievances is not principally the country’s colonial past, but rather its presence at the founding of the rules-based international order. In other words, Brazil is motivated less by mistreatment than by a sense of not being given its due. In 1942, Brazil officially entered World War II on the side of the Allied powers, serving as the only independent country in South America to join the war effort. Perhaps most notably, Brazil deployed a significant expeditionary force to the Italian campaign: a force which numbered around 25,000 soldiers directly under U.S. command.1 However, Brazil’s expeditionary force deployed on the Italian front in September 1944 and left in May 1945—arriving too late and heading home too early. As a result, Brazil did not secure a significant role for itself in the formation of the postwar international order. This ran counter to Brazilian expectations—and, it should be noted, to American promises. At a meeting in February 1943 between Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Getúlio Vargas in Natal, the U.S. president told his Brazilian counterpart that he wanted him at his side during the postwar settlements to reorganize the world.2 Instead, Brazil did not play a large role in the postwar peace conference or in the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions. The spoils that were to accrue to Brazil from fighting on the right side failed to materialize.
Topic:
Economics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Brazil and South America

116. Strategic Ambiguity: Erdoğan’s Turkey in a Multipolar World

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff and Max Bergmann
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Finland and Sweden made the historic decision to seek membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While Washington greeted this decision as an opportunity to strengthen the alliance and reinforce Russia’s strategic miscalculation in starting the war, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan saw Finland’s and Sweden’s membership aspirations as an opportunity to seek concessions over arms sales, Turkey’s pursuit of membership in the European Union, and Stockholm’s perceived sympathy for Kurdish militants. After signing off on Finland’s membership in March 2023, Turkey only approved Swedish membership in January 2024 after Sweden approved new counterterrorism legislation—and after the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden agreed to sell Turkey modernized F-16 fighter jets. The saga over Finland and Sweden joining NATO demonstrates how Turkey straddles multiple worlds. It is at once part of the West—a NATO member and an EU candidate country—and part of the Middle East, an integral player across the region stretching from Libya to Afghanistan. It is also a member of the Global South that practices familiar hedging strategies toward the West, engages constructively with Russia and China, and does not hesitate to pursue foreign policy goals counter to the interests of its most important treaty ally, the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, Multipolarity, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

117. Who owns a bank account in Africa?

Author:
Suhaylah Peeraullee, Dominique Dryding, and Kamal Yakubu
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
During his inaugural speech as chairperson of the African Union (AU) for 2022–2023, President Macky Sall of Senegal called for the creation of a pan-African credit-rating agency, arguing that low sovereign ratings discourage investment, raise borrowing costs, and undermin Africa’s competitiveness in global markets (Wanjohi, 2022). Similarly, at the 35th AU Summit in February 2022, President Nana Akufo-Addo of Ghana criticised international credit-rating agencies for their “continuing consequential stranglehold” over African economies, which constrains governments’ access to development finance and increases the cost of capital (African Peer Review Mechanism, 2022, p. 4). These interventions reflect more than episodic political frustration. They point to a broader contest over how African economies are assessed and valued within the global financial system. Ideas about risk and creditworthiness are shaped by historical experience, structural constraints, and unequal power relations, and they in turn influence policy agendas and institutional reform (Jackson, 2021). From this perspective, African leaders’ critiques of the global credit-rating architecture can be read as an effort to assert greater agency over how African economic potential is defined and priced.
Topic:
Economics, Capital, and Banking
Political Geography:
Africa

118. From aspiration to action: Barriers to youth empowerment in Africa

Author:
Rorisang Lekalake, Sophie Sunderland, and Komi Amewunou
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Africa has the world’s youngest population, with more than 400 million people between the ages of 15 and 35 – a number projected to rise above 830 million by 2050. This sustained youth bulge will keep the continent demographically young for decades, bringing significant challenges as well as opportunities, especially in areas such as jobs, education, and entrepreneurship (African Union, 2025). In this context, Africa’s development trajectory increasingly depends on its ability to participate in the global knowledge economy, where human capital (education and skills) drives productivity, innovation, and competitive advantage (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa & Oxford Economics Africa, 2023). Access to quality education is therefore a critical pathway to employment that provides purpose, dignity, and personal fulfilment – in addition to material security – for the continent’s youth.
Topic:
Economics, Education, Employment, Youth, and Jobs
Political Geography:
Africa

119. Should we be concerned about European competitiveness?

Author:
Olivier Perquel
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
At the end of the year 2025, all economic players agree that Europe's economic and financial situation is worrying, and that there are many issues at stake. However, it is no doubt worth trying to list them, by presenting a few figures, and highlighting some avenues for recovery, or a new start.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Finance, and Productivity
Political Geography:
Europe

120. Intellectual Property Is Economic and National Security

Author:
David Durand and Kyle Briggs
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Canada’s economic and national security depends on how the country manages its intellectual assets and intellectual property (IP). Looking at the concepts of economic warfare and economic security through an IP lens, this paper examines how attacks against IP can exploit fragmented policy regimes, putting economic security and sovereignty at risk. The authors make five recommendations to address these concerns: create an open-source intelligence agency, protect the outputs of Canadian research, strengthen foreign investment controls, invest in sovereign cloud compute and storage, and coordinate federal legal frameworks.
Topic:
Economics, National Security, and Intellectual Property/Copyright
Political Geography:
Canada and North America