Topic: Economics - CIAO Search Results

1. Recycling Regime, Environment, and Exclusion of Electronic Scrap Workers in Delhi

Author:: Gayatri Jai Singh Rathore
Publication Date:: 11-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:: In recent years, the Indian e-waste sector has undergone a process of formalisation through the implementation of E-waste Management Rules (2016), leading to the creation of what I call recycling regime. The upper and middle classes, along with NGOs and industry actors, are frontrunners in thinking about e-waste policies. They were prompted by a twofold motive: the desire for a “world-class”, clean, and pollution-free city; and seizing business opportunities by extracting value from e-waste. Rather than replacing the State, they co-opted the State so that it would legislate to safeguard the environment, and address toxicity and health problems associated with e-waste. Recycling regime relies on formalisation processes embedded in multiple technologies – technicity, capital-intensive facilities, certifications, authorisations, and licences – that work together to exclude the “informal” sector from the e-waste governance system. Recycling technologies act as “technologies of domination” that further contribute to sidelining the “informal” labour of scrap workers or e-kabadis, who as Muslims already find themselves on the margins of society. However, the recycling regime fails to safeguard the environment in the end as e-waste trickles down back to the informal sector via authorised actors.
Topic:: Civil Society, Economics, Environment, Globalization, Health, Markets, Poverty, Governance, Law, Urbanization, Emerging States, and Norms
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

2. What Happens If the United States Leaves the WTO?

Author:: James Bacchus
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Aresolution before Congress calls for US withdrawal from the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both international law and US law permit withdrawal. The case for withdrawal, however, is misguided and misinformed. Much of what is said and widely believed about the effects of WTO membership on the United States is simply untrue. In fact, American membership in the WTO has been for decades and remains today enormously beneficial economically to US businesses, workers, and consumers. Withdrawal by the United States from the WTO would result in the loss of many of these economic benefits, including those derived from decades of accumulated trade commitments made by the 165 other member countries on thousands of different US goods and services traded within the WTO legal framework; those resulting from the commercial shield of WTO rules forbidding trade discrimination against US exports; and those emanating from the availability to the United States of an impartial, binding, and enforceable system of WTO trade dispute settlement. Moreover, withdrawal by the United States would cede US leadership in the WTO to other leading trading countries, including the second-largest trading country in the world, China. Trade is a win-win economically for all WTO members. WTO membership maximizes the overall economic gains from engaging in trade. The United States should remain in the WTO and help lead it toward needed reforms that will make it more beneficial to all in the modern global economy of the 21st century.
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Trade, and WTO
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

3. The Asian 21st Century

Author:: Azhar Waqar
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: “The Asian 21st Century” is a compilation of essays and articles by Kishore Mahbubani that covers various topics related to the transition of power especially in the context of the geopolitical and economic rise of Asia. In this book, instead of giving an overarching definition of Asia, the author focuses on certain countries, particularly China, Japan, South Korea, India and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries. The book has been divided into four sections; the first section is titled “The End of Era of Western Domination”, the second “The Asian Renaissance”, the third is comprised of articles related to “The Peaceful Rise of China”, and the last one is titled “The Globalization, Multilateralism and Cooperation.”
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Book Review, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Asia, and South Korea

4. COVID-19 Relief Measures had Few Durable Post-Pandemic Effects on Renters

Author:: Benjamin Mark Reicher and Michael Kuehlwein
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:: Berkeley APEC Study Center
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic was responsible for an unprecedented crisis in the rental housing market, as families faced eviction as a consequence of pandemic lockdowns and resulting economic recession. In response, for the first time ever in US history, eviction moratoria were introduced to protect renters from being evicted for nonpayment; these were accompanied by several stimulus measures to support renters and the overall economy. This study asks whether these pandemic-era policies had any lingering effects after they had ceased to be implemented, by examining whether renters’ housing vulnerability at the state level saw any improvement in the post-pandemic years of 2022-23. For comparison, the study also evaluates the effects of variables reflecting economic fundamentals and renters’ housing burden. The findings suggest that the included policies had little effect on renters’ post-pandemic housing precarity.
Topic:: Economics, Public Policy, Eviction, COVID-19, Housing, Rent, and Housing Market
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

5. Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine: Massive Losses and Tiny Gains for a Declining Power

Author:: Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Despite claims of battlefield momentum in Ukraine, the data shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains and is in decline as a major power. Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II. At current rates, combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026. After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of between 15 and 70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy is under mounting strain, with manufacturing declining, slowing growth of 0.6 percent in 2025, and no globally competitive technology firms to help drive long-term productivity.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Intelligence, Science and Technology, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. Assessing US Government Efforts to Support Fossil Fuel–Reliant Communities

Author:: Noah Kaufman
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: The decline of domestic fossil fuel production in the United States poses serious economic risks for communities that rely on fossil fuel industries for jobs and public revenues. Many of these communities lack the resources and capacity to manage those risks on their own. The absence of viable economic strategies for affected regions is a barrier to building the broad, durable coalitions needed for an equitable national transition to cleaner energy sources. President Joe Biden touted investments into fossil fuel–reliant communities as part of his administration’s broader place-based economic and climate change strategies. This study assesses those federal efforts, examining the rationale, design, and implementation status of the major programs involved.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Government, Fossil Fuels, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

7. Predicting protest participation: Insights from the year before Kenya’s 2024 anti-tax demonstrations

Author:: Daniel Iberi and Kamal Yakubu
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Protests – often described as “unconventional” or “non-institutional” forms of political participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Hooghe & Marien, 2013) – have increased markedly across Africa since 2010, a trend sometimes referred to as the continent’s “third wave of protests” (Mueller, 2018; Najimdeen, 2024). Protests such as South Africa’s #RhodesMustFall (2015) and #FeesMustFall (2016), Zimbabwe’s #ThisFlag protests (2016), Nigeria’s #EndSARS demonstrations (2020), and Madagascar’s 2025 demonstrations that toppled President Andry Rajoelina illustrate both the breadth and political significance of this wave (Fihlani, 2019; Lawal, 2024; Princewill, 2025). In Kenya, patterns of protest participation have evolved considerably over the past two decades. While the country has experienced repeated episodes of mass protest – most notably around contested elections in 2007, 2013, and 2017 – the character of protest activity has shifted, with recent protests increasingly centred on economic grievances, cost-of-living pressures, and perceptions of fiscal injustice rather than electoral disputes.
Topic:: Economics, Protests, Tax Systems, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: Kenya and Africa

8. Trump’s Exit from the Paris Agreement: An Opportunity for the EU to Back South Africa’s Climate Leadership

Author:: Bongiwe Ngcobo-Mphahlele and Darlington Tshuma
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In his address to the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos in January 2025,[1] South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa – who currently chairs the G20, the first African leader to do so – outlined a bold and assertive agenda centred on global cooperation, inclusive growth and sustainable development. His address included a renewed call for transparency in the allocation of climate resources and the reform of the global financial architecture that has long been criticised as too rigid to support long-term sustainable development in the Global South.[2]
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Economics, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:: Europe, South Africa, North America, and United States of America

9. IMF, Structural Adjustment, and Poverty: A Cross-National Difference-in-Differences Analysis, 1980-2018

Author:: Shih-Yen Pan, Lawrence P. King, and Elias Nosrati
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been one of the world’s most powerful international organizations in setting the parameters for economic reforms in the developing world. In this study, using data from 1980-2018 from 57 countries, we test competing hypotheses surrounding the impact of the IMF’s lending programs on poverty incidence in participant countries. Departing from the prevailing practice of relying on instrumental variables, we employ a novel difference-in-differences approach that ensures clean comparisons between “treatment” and “control” units based on their program participation histories. Besides providing a quantitative estimate of the average program effect, we evaluate whether the IMF’s alleged anti-poverty focus in recent decades has made any difference. We find that IMF program participation leads to large increases (3.6-5.7 percentage points) in the proportion of a country’s population living under the $3.65/day and $6.85/day international poverty lines (2017 PPP) and the countryspecific Societal Poverty Line. We also find that the poverty reduction measures incorporated by the IMF into its programs have not been effective in mitigating the poverty-increasing program effects. Overall, our findings show that IMF programs have been detrimental to the welfare of vulnerable populations in participant countries.
Topic:: Development, Economics, International Organization, and IMF
Political Geography:: Global Focus

10. Macroprudential policies and private domestic investment in developing countries: an instrumental variables approach

Author:: Bao-We-Wal Bambe
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: This paper examines the effect of macroprudential policies on private domestic investment using a panel of 87 developing countries from 2000 to 2017. Our instrumental variables strategy exploits the geographic diffusion of macroprudential policies across countries, with the idea that reforms in neighbouring countries can affect the adoption or strengthening of domestic reforms through peer pressure or imitation effects. The findings indicate that the tightening of macro-prudential policies significantly reduces private domestic investment. This effect holds for both instruments targeting borrowers and those targeting financial institutions, and is subject to heterogeneity depending on several economic and institutional factors. The transmission channel analysis highlights that the negative impact of macroprudential policies on investment is primarily driven by a reduction in credit supply and financial inclusion.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Finance, Investment, and Macroprudential Policies
Political Geography:: Global Focus

11. Korea’s Strategy for Critical Minerals: Navigating New Trade Rules and Global Challenges

Author:: Cheon-Kee Lee
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Since the establishment of the GATT in 1947 and the WTO multilateral trading system in 1995, trade liberalization has led to an increase in global trade and the internationalization of production through global supply chains. In recent years, however, as non-trade values including national security, labor rights, and environmental protection have become important considerations, supply chains have become an end in themselves rather than a means of pursuing efficiency. Additionally, major trading partners such as the U.S, the EU, and China have sought to regulate global supply chain by leveraging market access to their domestic markets or critical minerals. The proliferation of such unilateral measures has posed significant challenges, as traditional WTO/FTA trade rules have failed to effectively address these new regulatory dynamics. The increasing compliance costs for companies, stemming from emerging supply chain regulations, are exacerbated by the legal constraints and loopholes in existing international trade frameworks, despite previously promised market access in multilateral and bilateral agreements. Against this backdrop, this Brief reviews the current state of disciplines in bilateral and multilateral trade rules and disciplines, with a particular focus on unilateral supply chain regulations. It will explore the critical minerals sector in light of recent sector-specific agreements and arrangements, including the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement, the U.S.-Japan Critical Minerals Agreement or “CMA”, and the EU's Strategic Partnership. While many supply chain issues are emerging in relation to various non-trade values, the critical minerals sector has been the first to see the emergence of more flexible and pragmatic sector-specific agreements and MoUs that depart from the traditional FTA model. This is likely due to the fact that the security of mineral resources is crucial to the competitiveness of domestic industries in many countries. Moreover, the recent trend of resource-owning countries requiring foreign and foreign-owned mining companies to uphold environmental and labor rights during the mineral extraction process has led to the emergence of new ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) obligations. The ability to address these elements in a stand-alone agreements or MoUs specific to critical minerals—rather than within the framework of a traditional FTA—marks a key strength of this approach. The evolution of these agreements, especially in the critical minerals sector, is of particular relevance to Korea. As the country faces increasing reliance on the global supply of critical minerals and is deeply impacted by evolving international regulations, it is crucial for Korea to explore its own strategy for securing access to these resources. This Brief will focus on the development of Korea's critical mineral strategy, while drawing the lessons from international agreements.
Topic:: Economics, World Trade Organization, Multilateralism, Trade, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

12. Recent Global Business Cycles: Characteristics and Implications

Author:: Sang-Ha Yoon
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: The analysis of economic patterns from late 1999 to 2023 reveals significant changes in how the world's economies connect with each other. Our research shows a clear trend toward more varied economic patterns, with regional and country-specific factors becoming more important than global influences. This shift became particularly noticeable after the COVID-19 pandemic, where we saw global factors having less influence on national economies than before. The study's findings have important implications for economic policy making. Countries need to develop flexible approaches that can adapt to both global and regional economic changes. At the same time, they must strengthen regional economic cooperation while maintaining domestic economic stability. The findings also highlight the importance of building better systems for responding to economic crises, while considering both regional and global factors in economic policy decisions. These changes suggest that the global economy is becoming more complex, with different regions and countries showing more independent movement than before. As this trend continues, the ability to balance global, regional, and domestic economic relationships will become increasingly important for maintaining economic stability and promoting growth.
Topic:: Economics, Business, Economic Growth, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Global Focus

13. State Enterprises as Enablers of Economic Cooperation in India

Author:: Kyunghoon Kim
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This Brief discusses the role of state enterprises in India's economy, emphasizing their pivotal contribution to the government's development strategy. It also highlights cases where Indian state enterprises have formed cooperative relationships with global companies, as well as foreign and international development agencies. The Brief concludes with implications for the Korean government and businesses.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Economic Cooperation, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, Asia, and South Korea

14. Digital Data and Advanced AI for Richer Global Intelligence

Author:: Danielle Goldfarb
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: From collecting millions of online price data to measure inflation, to assessing the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on low-income workers, digital data sets can be used to benefit the public interest. Using these and other examples, this special report explores how digital data sets and advances in artificial intelligence (AI) can provide timely, transparent and detailed insights into global challenges. These experiments illustrate how governments and civil society analysts can reuse digital data to spot emerging problems, analyze specific group impacts, complement traditional metrics or verify data that may be manipulated. AI and data governance should extend beyond addressing harms. International institutions and governments need to actively steward digital data and AI tools to support a step change in our understanding of society’s biggest challenges.
Topic:: Economics, Inflation, Artificial Intelligence, and Data
Political Geography:: Global Focus

15. Canada at Economic War: Setting the Scene

Author:: Raquel Garbers
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: The global threat environment is increasingly complex and unstable, with hostile states using all instruments of national power to launch attacks on foreign governments, industries, research labs, civic groups and more. They are especially active in the economic domain, where they are using illicit, unfair and illegal economic practices to corrupt the global order that underpins stable interstate relations; weaponize economic interdependencies; and aggressively target the foreign assets and technologies essential to modern military power. In our highly integrated world and 360-degree threat environment, economic attacks are the essential first phase of full-scale war, and Canada is a high-value target. This policy brief, the first in a series as part of CIGI’s Canada at Economic War project, says securing our future against growing pressures from allies and adversaries alike requires urgently changing our outdated foreign policy mindset and resetting how we engage in the world. Developing a Canadian Defence Industrial Strategy will be a key part of defending Canada in the current threat environment.
Topic:: Economics, National Security, Geopolitics, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:: Canada and North America

16. Precarious Geographies: Migrant Labor in China’s Network Production

Author:: Na Fu
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: As industrial production decentralizes, rural China has become a new hub for networked manufacturing, blurring the boundaries between factory and home. Migrant workers are returning to their hometowns to set up workshop-style facilities, driven by labor shortages, infrastructure improvements, and digital connectivity. Na Fu's study examines how mobility, once seen as a path to opportunity, now reinforces labor precarity, reshaping spatial and economic relations under China’s evolving network production system. Na Fu holds a Ph.D. in Politics from the New School for Social Research and is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at China Initiative at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University. Her research explores the intersections of digital labor, political economy, and smart production, focusing on how technological advancements reinforce social inequities and drive resource extraction in industrial transformations. This event is hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute.
Topic:: Economics, Manufacturing, Migrant Workers, and Production
Political Geography:: China and Asia

17. Neofascist March Calls for the Expulsion of Haitians in Punta Cana

Author:: Simón Rodríguez
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:: A recent violent and destructive march calling for the expulsion of Haitians in Punta Cana demonstrates the vehement anti-Haitianism and rising fascism prevalent in the Dominican Republic.
Topic:: Economics, Far Right, Migrant Workers, and Neofascism
Political Geography:: Latin America, Caribbean, Haiti, and Dominican Republic

18. Mackinder’s Heartland Thesis and the Belt and Road Initiative: Russia’s Growing Dependence on China in the Aftermath of the Ukraine War

Author:: Hanna Samir Kassab
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This paper focuses on Russia’s current economic isolation due to the war in Ukraine. The more western states punish Russia, the more likely it will become economically dependent on China. H. J. Mackinder argues that whoever controls, or organises, the heartland of the Eurasian continent, controls the world’s political system. The more dependent Russia is on China, the more China will exercise control over Russia. If China were to gain this political leverage over Russia, it would be in a good position to organise the heartland, and possible become global hegemon.
Topic:: Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia-Ukraine War, International Politics, and Dependence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

19. From Ideas to Policy: Q&A with Ibrahim Awad

Author:: Omar Auf
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Is it possible to imagine, let alone move toward a different global political-economic order? Ibrahim Awad believes conferences and the exchange of ideas have a role to play in moving such a reality forward
Topic:: Economics, Political Economy, Politics, Neoliberalism, Interview, and International Order
Political Geography:: Global Focus

20. ASEAN-ROK Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Haikal Amran
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Maritime Institute of Malaysia
Abstract:: Strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific has taken centre stage in today’s global geopolitical and economic landscape, with key players across the region now increasingly strengthening maritime cooperation with each other to uphold regional peace and economic stability. After all, the Indo-Pacific region hosts critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs) instrumental to international trade, with vital yet precarious maritime corridors, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea (SCS). In response to this importance, two key players of the region, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have both reaffirmed commitments to increase maritime cooperation through the ASEAN-ROK Plan of Action (POA) 2021–2025 and the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI). Both the POA and KASI outlined an ambitious and broad scope of maritime cooperation to be achieved. Within the grand scheme of things, Track Two discussion plays a pivotal role as one of the many instruments to foster this cooperation, hence serving as an informal yet influential platform to build trust, exchange knowledge, and explore practical solutions on issues ranging from maritime security to sustainable ocean governance between ASEAN and ROK maritime experts.
Topic:: Economics, Maritime, ASEAN, Cooperation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Indo-Pacific

21. The Impact of Increased Mass Litigation in the UK

Author:: Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has seen a marked rise in collective litigation, transforming what was once a niche legal, rarely employed, tool into a fast-growing business model with wide-ranging economic implications. At a time when the country seeks to boost investment, support innovation and attract global business, the proliferation of mass litigation risks undermining these ambitions. This study takes a closer look at how mass litigation is reshaping the UK’s legal, business and regulatory landscape – and asks whether the balance between justice and economic efficiency is tipping too far. The UK stands out among European countries for the ease with which mass claims can be launched. It has long provided a favourable environment for consumer representation and dispute resolution, with a strong culture of accountability. But recent years have seen the emergence of a new ecosystem: law firms specialising in group actions; litigation funders offering upfront capital in exchange for a share of awards; and Claims Management Companies (CMCs) that recruit claimants en masse and process high volumes of cases. The business model has proved highly successful, making group litigation an asset class in its own right and pushing collective actions far beyond traditional sectors such as banking and pharmaceuticals. Today, a growing portion of the UK economy is in the firing line – with potentially damaging consequences. This shift has been rapid and striking. From fewer than 10 mass litigation cases in the late 2010s, the UK saw 47 such actions in 2024 alone, more than any other European country. On a per capita basis, the UK ranks as one of the most litigious jurisdictions in Europe, well ahead of comparable economies such as France or Germany. The implications for the UK economy are far-reaching: many of the companies targeted by these actions operate in sectors that were included in the UK Government’s latest industrial strategy as critical to the country’s future economic growth. Whereas previously limited to financial and professional services, mass litigation cases are now rising in UK companies working in life sciences, advanced manufacturing and digital services. These are industries where risk-taking, long product development cycles and data-driven innovation are the norm. The threat of mass litigation introduces uncertainty and cost at exactly the moment when these businesses need regulatory clarity and investment stability. Moreover, claims against public sector entities involve a direct transfer of capital from the tax payer to hedge fund litigation funders. The financial burden is also considerable. Legal fees and returns to funders often consume a large share of total settlements, reducing the compensation that actually reaches affected individuals. In the Post Office Horizon scandal, for example, £46 million in legal fees and funders payments were deducted from a £57 million settlement, leaving a paltry sum of just over £20,000 per claimant. In the recent judgment of Merricks v. Mastercard, £100 million have been allocated to compensate consumers. Affected individuals could receive up to £70 each if only 5 percent claim, but as little as £2.5 if the full class of 44 million comes forward. These figures raise questions about who really benefits from mass litigation. The limited benefits for individual consumers stand in stark contrast to the substantial costs that mass litigation imposes on the UK economy as a whole. Our scenario modelling shows that, under a scenario where the costs of mass litigation are just 30 percent of the current costs in the US, litigation costs in the UK could reach more than half of the claim value; the cost of mass litigation for the UK economy could reach close to £18 billion, and the market capitalisation of the UK’s most innovative companies could fall by £11.2 billion, more than half the announced public investment into R&D in the 2025 Autumn Budget. These financial pressures affect the whole country. While many large companies are headquartered in Greater London, their operations, and the jobs they support, are often spread across the wider regions. This means that the impact of a legal challenge is not just a concern for a corporate boardroom in London, but it impacts local economies and communities across the UK. As the Civil Justice Council reviews the framework for litigation funding, this study provides evidence to inform the debate. It does not argue against collective actions per se but urges a careful weighing of their benefits against broader economic costs. If the UK wants to remain an attractive destination for business, investment, and innovation, it must ensure that its legal infrastructure supports rather than stifles those ambitions.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Finance, and Litigation
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

22. Strengthening the Supply-Side Innovation in EU Telecommunications

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The telecommunications sector is central to the EU’s competitiveness, not only providing the infrastructure that underpins digital connectivity but also serving as a key driver of innovation. Recent EU reports already highlight the persistent structural challenges faced by the EU telecommunication sector: market fragmentation, low investment levels, divergent spectrum policies, and an urgent need to bolster digital sovereignty. However, a critical dimension in this discussion often receives far less attention: the supply of the underlying technologies that power telecommunications infrastructure. In this domain, EU companies remain competitive. In 2023, 27 EU-headquartered firms were among the world’s top 2,000 R&D spenders in telecommunications, accounting for 16 percent of global sectoral investment. These figures underscore that, while Europe may lag in investment and infrastructure, it still holds strategic leadership in telecom innovation and technology development. Central to Europe’s success are standard development organisations (SDOs), technical standards, and Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). SDOs provide collaborative forums where companies jointly develop technical standards that ensure interoperability, reduce fragmentation and foster innovation. Complementing this, SEPs protect the innovations embedded within these standards, granting European companies vital licensing revenues that sustain their research efforts. This system is particularly important for EU firms, which tend to be smaller than their global competitors; it enables them to specialise in cutting-edge technology development and commercialise their innovations globally without needing to dominate manufacturing or end-user markets. As competitiveness in telecommunications increasingly depends on the pace and adoption of innovation, the EU faces both a challenge and an opportunity. European firms have the potential not only to supply critical technologies but to drive breakthroughs in connectivity which are linked to the development of other technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) or quantum technologies. However, to stay competitive, the EU must reinforce its position on the supply side, where its companies still operate at the technological frontier.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Digital Economy, Innovation, and Supply and Demand
Political Geography:: Europe

23. The impact on developing economies of WTO dissolution

Author:: Lloyd Barton
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: This report revisits the analysis presented in our April 2024 paper on the potential impact of WTO dissolution, drilling down to quantify national-level impacts for a sample of ten developing economies. Our previous report (The economic impact of abandoning the WTO) focused on presenting aggregated results for developing countries by region and income level. This report drills down to quantify impacts for a sample of ten individual countries: Brazil, Cameroon, China, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam. These countries provide a rich, varied sample that captures the complexity of trade policy in the developing world. Their diversity in geography, economic size, policy orientation, and development stage allows for a nuanced analysis of how WTO dissolution could potentially influence pathways to higher incomes, poverty reduction and economic resilience. Our analysis reinforces the importance of ensuring the WTO can adapt to new trade realities and continue to function as an effective global trade body.
Topic:: Economics, Poverty, Trade, Economic Development, and WTO
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, Turkey, India, South Africa, Brazil, Vietnam, Egypt, Guatemala, and Cameroon

24. The Economic Impact of the On-demand Service Industry in Indonesia

Author:: Bali Kaur Sodhi and Hwee Shi Yong
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: The on-demand service industry in Indonesia has become a vital component of the country’s digital economy, improving the everyday lives of millions of Indonesians through its multi-service platforms. Our analysis suggests that the industry, which covers ride-hailing and delivery services, facilitated a total economic contribution worth Rp91.7 trillion to Indonesia’s economy in 2023. In addition, the industry also supported an estimated 588,000 jobs and contributed Rp33.2 trillion in household income. This impact is generated through purchases on the on-demand service platforms and the economic activity it supports among the local supply chains in the wider Indonesian economy. For every employee hired by platform operators, an additional 112 workers are supported in other parts of the Indonesian economy. Every Rp100 of GDP generated by purchases made through on-demand service platforms leads to further economic activity worth Rp110 across the rest of the Indonesian economy. Beyond its economic contributions, the on-demand service industry promotes financial inclusion in Indonesia by offering unbanked individuals and small merchants access to financial services and microloans. On-demand service platforms also connect driver-, delivery-, and merchant-partners to Indonesia’s digital economy, enhancing digital literacy and creating new pathways for economic participation.
Topic:: Economics, Digital Economy, Digital Platforms, and Service Industry
Political Geography:: Indonesia and Southeast Asia

25. (Digital) cash transfers, privacy and women’s empowerment: Evidence from Uganda

Author:: Greco Giulia, Gulesci Selim, Prabhakar Pallavi, and Sulaiman Munshi
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD), Brac University
Abstract:: This study reports findings from a randomized controlled trial in Uganda that provided unconditional cash transfers to married women, varying the payment method (cash or mobile money) and whether spouses were informed. Results show that mobile money transfers significantly enhance women’s economic independence and decision-making power, as reflected in increased personal labor income and greater say in household decisions. In contrast, cash transfers are more effective in reducing intimate partner violence (IPV), especially when both spouses are informed about the transfer. These findings reveal a critical trade-off: while digital payments promote women’s financial control, they may be less effective in addressing IPV. The study underscores the importance of considering both economic empowerment and safety outcomes when designing transfer programs for women.
Topic:: Economics, Women, Privacy, Empowerment, and Cash Transfers
Political Geography:: Uganda and Africa

26. Adapting and Validating WEE Indicators in an Experimental Study of Savings

Author:: Anahit Tevosyan, Scott Graham, and Joeri Smiths
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD), Brac University
Abstract:: Traditional indicators of Women’s Economic Empowerment (WEE) are often too broad to effectively measure specific behavioral outcomes like women’s savings behavior (WSB). This study addresses that gap by identifying contextually relevant WEE indicators that closely align with savings behavior, using data from 1,498 FINCA Uganda women savers. It employs a two-step validation approach. First, qualitative methods such as focus groups and cognitive interviews establish a set of WEE indicators tailored to the local context. Then, machine learning models test how well these indicators predict actual savings behavior. The study links women’s self-perceived empowerment with real financial actions—setting savings goals, making deposits, and using funds purposefully. Further validation comes from a subsample exposed to a low-cost coaching intervention, which strengthens the WEE-WSB relationship and reveals which empowerment factors make coaching more or less effective. Notably, the research highlights often-overlooked domains such as external social influence and the complexity of decision-making burdens. This work offers a more targeted, behavior-linked approach to measuring WEE, with potential to improve the design and evaluation of development programs across varied contexts.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Women, Empowerment, and Savings
Political Geography:: Uganda and Africa

27. Prepare now: Europe must get ready for the coming long-term care surge

Author:: Svend E. Hougaard Jensen, David Pinkus, and Nina Ruer
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Demographic change and ageing populations in European Union countries will impact many aspects of the economy and have a direct effect on long-term care (LTC) systems. Demand for LTC already exceeds supply in many EU countries, leading to the ‘care gap’. This gap is expected to widen, threatening quality of life for the elderly, exacerbating gender disparities and imposing significant economic costs. The root causes of the gap include demographic shifts, inadequate public investment, workforce shortages and a heavy reliance on informal caregiving. Women stand to lose the most if no steps are taken to prepare LTC systems for the coming surge in demand because care, both formal and informal, is predominantly provided by women. The care gap can be reduced by either increasing the supply of care or by reducing the demand for care. We assess LTC reforms in five EU countries and explain how these can affect the care gap by influencing demand and supply. Governments should: Recognise LTC as a priority. Governments should increase public spending on LTC and make LTC a central policy priority linked to broader goals, including gender equality and economic growth. Expand funding mechanisms. Governments can introduce new means of financing, such as mandatory LTC insurance and pre-funding mechanisms. Most importantly, benefits should target those with the greatest needs, to promote equity and adequacy. Support the workforce more. The LTC sector should be made more attractive by raising wages, improving working conditions and expanding training programmes to attract and retain workers. Develop prevention strategies. EU funds could be directed to research into treatments targeting age-related diseases such as dementia. National governments could invest in public health campaigns and preventive care to reduce future demand. Use the newest technologies. EU countries should invest in robotics and assistive technologies to improve productivity and to reduce physical strain on caregivers.
Topic:: Economics, Health, Governance, European Union, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe

28. Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform

Author:: Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The economic strategy being defined by the 2024-2029 European Commission seems to follow the prescriptions on innovation and single market reform, and the expansive approach to industrial policy, set out by Mario Draghi in his September 2024 report on European Union competitiveness, with two important differences. First, the Commission stops short of calling for World Trade Organisation-prohibited subsidies – this is welcome. Second, the Commission proposes a new state aid framework for national industrial policy rather than expansion of EU-level public investment funding. This runs the risk of weakening the single market and harming competition, with the unintended consequence of protecting incumbents and inhibiting structural change. In terms of specific policies, on defence, the Commission is right to face up to the challenge of defining an EU procurement mechanism that offers sufficient speed and cost advantages to justify large-scale funding. On economic security and international partnerships, the Commission is right to take a broader approach than a foreign economic policy focused only on supply chains. What is lacking is a much greater commitment to providing support for climate mitigation in developing countries. The second Trump presidency creates risks for the Commission strategy. President Trump has gone further than expected in threatening territorial expansion and with the speed, aggression and disregard for the rule of law with which he has started to implement his policies. These factors will complicate the EU-United States relationship. The best defence against both Trump and the competitive and security threats posed by China is to accelerate policies that address the EU’s structural weaknesses: raising productivity growth, defence capacity and economic security. Economic security, in turn, requires more resilient trade relationships, less financial dependence on the US and an improved standing with emerging market and developing economies. The EU should also seize the opportunity offered by the shift in US policy from subsidies to deregulation. While the EU should not race Trump to the bottom on environmental or financial deregulation, it should rapidly improve its own regulatory framework while building on its core strengths: human capital and the rule of law. Unlike tariff wars or discriminatory subsidies, a competition to provide a good business environment is not a zero-sum game.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Industrial Policy, Budget, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, Sustainability, European Commission, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

29. Building coalitions for climate transition and nature restoration

Author:: Jean Pisani-Ferry, Beatrice di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Global climate and biodiversity outcomes will largely be determined in emerging and developing economies (EMDEs). We propose a four-pillar strategy to support climate and nature preservation in line with the economic interests of both developing and advanced countries. This would move beyond voluntary pledges to embed climate and nature objectives into the structures of trade, finance and industrial policy, creating a self-reinforcing system of cooperation and reducing the net costs of the green transition. Under Pillar 1, a coalition of advanced and developing countries would link tiered carbon pricing with a common carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). Pillar 2 would create a climate-finance coalition to decarbonise the power sectors of developing countries. Pillar 3 would involve partnerships to develop clean energy-intensive industrial production stages in developing economies with rich renewables endowments; these would feed into the supply chains of the European Union and other energy-importing advanced economies. Pillar 4 would redesign markets to create scalable and credible mechanisms to fund carbon removals. Technology-based removals can be incentivised through the introduction of clean-up certificates into the EU emissions trading system, while nature-based removals would require improved market design centred on a new asset class: nature shares. The four pillars reinforce each other. A multi-country CBAM and carbon pricing coalition (Pillar 1) would reduce the cost of financing power sector decarbonisation (Pillar 2). Linking EMDE membership of the CBAM and carbon-pricing coalition to financial support for the decarbonisation of power sectors would also make it more attractive for EMDEs to adopt carbon prices. Decarbonisation of power sectors (Pillar 2) would be a precondition for developing clean, highly energy-intensive industry in renewables-rich EMDEs (Pillar 3). The Pillar 1 coalition should include the EU, China and as many other countries as possible. Advanced countries and China could underpin the Pillar 2 financier coalition. Pillar 3 would involve the EU and potentially other energy-poor advanced countries, along with EMDEs that are richly endowed with renewables. Pillar 4 would include the main custodians of the planet’s natural capital. Enabling these coalitions will require EU leadership.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Industrial Policy, Trade, Sustainability, Decarbonization, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Europe

30. Childhood Welfare Exposure and Economic Outcomes for Adult Daughters and Sons

Author:: Robert Paul Hartley, Carlos Lamarche, and James P. Ziliak
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:: We investigate how length of time on welfare during childhood affects economic outcomes in early adulthood. Using intergenerationally linked mother-child pairs from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we adopt a nonlinear difference-in-differences framework using the 1990s welfare reform to estimate average and quantile treatment effects on intensity of welfare use and earnings in adulthood. The causal estimates indicate that additional childhood welfare exposure leads to more adulthood years on the broader safety net for both daughters and sons, yet this positive relationship only applies below moderate levels of adult welfare participation and reverses at greater levels of dependence. Increasing childhood welfare exposure implies lower earnings in adulthood for daughters, however we find no evidence that it depresses adult sons’ earnings. Both daughters and sons exhibit some wage penalty from childhood welfare exposure, yet only daughters are penalized through hours worked in the labor market.
Topic:: Economics, Income Inequality, Welfare, Labor Market, Gender, and Intergenerational
Political Geography:: Global Focus

31. Slowing Down, Heating Up: Economic Deceleration and Social Discontent in Latin America

Author:: Iván Albina, Jessica Bracco, Leonardo Gasparini, and Luis Laguinge
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:: There have been widespread public expressions of discontent throughout Latin America since the early 2010s. We exploit harmonized microdata from national household surveys covering nearly all Latin American countries to explore potential sources of discontent driven by income changes along the income distribution. We also estimate fixed-effects models that link discontent measures to changes in household incomes. Our results suggest that discontent may stem less from absolute economic performance during the 2010s than from the significant deceleration relative to the previous decade.
Topic:: Economics, Inequality, Income, Discontent, and Deceleration
Political Geography:: Latin America

32. Hard Times, Hard Attitudes? The Effect of Economic Downturns on Gender Norms

Author:: Inés Berniell, Leonardo Gasparini, Mariana Marchionni, and Mariana Viollaz
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:: This paper examines the impact of economic fluctuations on social norms, specifically exploring the link between changes in unemployment and shifts in attitudes toward gender roles in the labor market. The results are not immediately obvious, as the literature suggests several potential mechanisms with conflicting outcomes. Using microdata from the World Values Survey for a panel of 103 countries that cover close to 90% of the world population, we estimate individual-level probability models of agreement with traditional gender roles over the period 1995 to 2021, including country and year fixed effects. We find that an increase in unemployment is associated to more conservative views about gender roles in the labor market. This result is remarkably robust across different groups and specifications. We also find that some contextual factors matter. In particular, the link between higher unemployment and more conservative views on gender roles is stronger in countries with, on average, higher gender inequality and lower female labor force participation. Overall, this study contributes to a growing body of research on the complex relationship between economic conditions, gender norms, and social change.
Topic:: Economics, Unemployment, Attitudes, Gender, and Social Norms
Political Geography:: Global Focus

33. Minimum Wages and Skill Premiums: Evidence for Latin America

Author:: Lucía Ramírez Leira, Octavio Bertín, and Leonardo Gasparini
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes the effect of the minimum wage on skill premiums in Latin America over the period 1997–2019. The canonical labor market model is extended to include the role of the minimum wage, following the approach proposed by Vogel (2023). Skill premiums are estimated through Two-Way Fixed Effects (TWFE) regressions using harmonized household survey microdata from 14 Latin American countries. Results suggest that increases in the minimum wage are associated with reductions in the skill premium between workers with and without higher education, but do not appear to have a significant effect on the gap between workers with medium and low levels of education. The largest effect of the minimum wage is observed for workers with higher levels of labor market experience. These findings contribute to recent evidence highlighting the role of labor institutions as one of the main drivers of the reduction in inequality in Latin America since the early 2000s.
Topic:: Economics, Inequality, Skilled Labor, Minimum Wage, and Wages
Political Geography:: Latin America

34. Lessons from West Germany's Cold War experience

Author:: Paul Williams
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:: The Russian aggression against Ukraine is now more than three years old. A new US administration is implementing a radical approach to securing a ceasefire and appears poised to limit direct military assistance to Ukraine. Consequently, Europe now recognizes that it must approach this war in a decidedly different manner than might have been presumed only a few months ago. The past may offer hints to a path forward for Ukraine to survive and ultimately prevail against Russia. While the imminent threat of war hung over Europe during the Cold War, West Germany lived under the constant threat of Soviet aggression. Yet, through economic revival, strategic military growth and partnerships, and careful political maneuvering, West Germany not only outlasted its aggressor but laid the groundwork for long-term stability and prosperity. West Germany's experience during the Cold War offers valuable insights for Ukraine in its pursuit of enduring stability and prosperity amid external threats. This blog explores some of the lessons that may be drawn from West Germany across economic and military themes.
Topic:: Cold War, Economics, History, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and West Germany

35. A New Triangle: The Interplay Between China and EU-India Relations

Author:: Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship for decades.1 Today, another significant triangle is emerging: the China-EU-India relationship. Indian and European leaders are strengthening ties. Both view China as a formidable economic and security rival while regarding the United States as a key security partner (and, for Europe, a long-standing ally). What is the current state of EU-China and EU-India relations? As India’s influence and economic appeal grow, could it become a viable alternative to China for European business leaders and policymakers? How is Brussels incorporating India into its strategies to address a potential crisis in Asia or the broader Indo-Pacific? Twenty-five years ago, the European Union viewed China as a top priority for business, cultural exchanges, and diplomacy. Following the introduction of Beijing’s open-door policy in 1978 and with strong encouragement from Chinese authorities, European companies flocked to China. Initially, many Europeans used Hong Kong as an intermediary for business, but by the mid-1990s, Guangdong Province and Shanghai became key gateways to the Chinese market, particularly for Germany and France.2 Trade and investment surged, especially after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which was widely supported by European political and business elites. Today, China remains the EU’s largest trading partner, with substantial European investments across the mainland. In contrast, India was long viewed as a potential partner, but only a few EU member states took steps to forge a strategic partnership with New Delhi. European investments in India were — and still are — limited, with many corporations citing challenges such as inadequate infrastructure, market access barriers, and bureaucratic red tape, which make it difficult to operate in most Indian states. However, the mood has begun to shift. On the EU side, the European Commission’s 2019 China strategy characterized Beijing as “a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival.” The COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted direct links between Europe and China from 2020 to 2022, caused significant strain. This was followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, an event many on the continent perceive as having Beijing’s tacit support. Additional factors, including an increasingly authoritarian regime at home and a more assertive China abroad, have contributed to European perceptions,3 as explained at length by the Center for China Analysis’s latest Global Public Opinion on China project.4 This, in turn, has affected the EU-China relationship, which has been gradually downgraded from the “honeymoon” period of 1995–2015. On the other hand, the strengthening EU-India relationship is a relatively recent development, driven by several factors that have emerged in the wake of the pandemic. These include the rise of the ambitious Bharatiya Janata Party under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who first took office in 2014 and is now serving his third term, as well as a broader diversity of partnerships between the EU and India. Other factors influencing EU-India relations include the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China and the United States’ shift away from multilateralism during President Donald Trump’s first term (2017–2021). Since January 2025, the increasing probability of a break in the transatlantic alliance under the new Trump administration is leading the EU to look for new partners, including in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, India’s robust GDP growth — 6.6% in 2025 and a projected 6.7% in 2026 — has attracted European businesses.5 In a global environment defined by multipolarity, could the previously low-profile EU-India relationship evolve into a closer partnership? With EU-China relations facing significant challenges, might India emerge as a viable alternative Asian partner for Europe? The current EU-India relationship is described as “strategic.” In reality, it is partial and uneven, and there are major differences in the nature of relations between India and individual EU member states. Meanwhile, how does Beijing view its competitor in the Global South as it seeks to win over Europe’s support? This paper explores the dynamics of the interaction among these three powers in the rapidly changing geopolitical context. It examines India’s political and economic challenges in the context of the EU-China relationship, how the EU-India relationship is evolving, and whether an EU-India partnership could take center stage if tensions with China escalate. European countries have kept strong ties with the Global South, and some see a strong India as a potential bridge for fostering cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:: China, Europe, India, and Asia

36. The cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2025-2026

Author:: Marc Ablong
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Australia faces a perilous strategic environment with multiple threats overlapping and, in some cases, converging. We’re confronted simultaneously by the rise of aggressive authoritarian powers, multiple conflicts around the world, persistent and evolving terrorism, foreign interference and the normalisation of cyberwarfare. Our largest trading partner, China, is increasingly aggressive militarily and has growing control of critical technologies integral to our societies. In Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region, rearmament is underway, including increased prospects of nuclear proliferation. Australia is a part of that rearmament, though others are moving much faster. Great powers flout the international rules-based system, either seeking to expand their spheres of influence, as Russia and China are doing, or pursuing a transactional and user-pays form of vassalage in the case of the US under the Trump administration. To be clear: the actions of the US are not comparable to those of Russia and China, but the administration’s tendency to treat all countries the same, without separating friend from foe, is causing unhelpful disruption and adding to global uncertainty. Many countries’ politics are become more partisan and prone to populist movements, fuelled by social-media outrage and demagoguery. Hybrid attacks on critical national infrastructure, internet-connected systems and the political foundations and institutions of states are becoming more common. Trust in public institutions is eroding, and cynicism is rising and often turning into belief in conspiracies. We’re reminded in the ministerial forewords to almost all public national-security documents that there’s no greater responsibility for the government than defending Australia. Part of that most fundamental responsibility is the obligation of government to resource the national-security community appropriately to prepare the nation for the challenges it faces. That’s why, this year, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has broadened its budget brief, The cost of Defence, beyond its traditional focus on the budget of the Department of Defence. The security challenges that Australia faces cannot, and should not, be borne by Defence and our armed forces alone. For too long, Australian governments have partitioned Australia’s security and failed to deliver a comprehensive approach to national security. ASPI has been vocal in calling for comprehensive national-security planning, and now we reflect that by examining the government’s national-security spending as a whole. Moreover, The cost of Defence: ASPI defence budget brief 2025–26 thoroughly examines the government’s progress with, and spending on, the 2024 National Defence Strategy. The core of the strategy is the concept of national defence, defined as ‘a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of national power to defend Australia and advance our interests’. This year’s Cost of Defence therefore asks some more fundamental and strategic questions and evaluates whether the government is paying enough attention to the traditional strategy calculation of ends, ways and means. Has it identified and articulated the objectives that meet Australia’s strategic intents, as set out in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 National Defence Strategy? Has it chosen the best plans for meeting those objectives? And has it allocated enough resources for those plans? We also examine whether the government is giving enough attention to the nation’s preparedness and resilience. This is a major theme for ASPI in 2025. The 2025 ASPI Defence Conference: Preparedness and Resilience will focus on those challenges for Australia, including how they bear on our industry, civil society and relationships with international partners. This year’s Cost of Defence provides ASPI’s views as a lead-in to that conversation. Another issue is whether the government is too focused on future equipment acquisitions, rather than the preparedness and readiness of the current force. Given that most of the major acquisitions won’t arrive until well into the 2030s and 2040s, we must ask the unnerving question of whether the ADF is too hollow for military operations this decade. Can the ADF we have now deter adversaries from attempting military domination in our area of primary interest? The issue has been on the country’s mind since a Chinese flotilla this year sailed close to Australia, conducted live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea and rehearsed strikes on Australia’s cities, national infrastructure and joint military facilities. Finally, this year’s Cost of Defence asks the hard questions about whether the government’s rhetoric about a once-in-a-generation investment in defence and about the criticality of Australia’s defence industry base, national economic base and resilience is being matched by resources. This includes money in the latest Budget for 2025–26 and the forward estimates and, perhaps more importantly, human capital in the form of a larger skilled workforce. There are also the strategies, concepts and interagency, intergovernmental and international engagements that government must be delivering. We argue, as we did last year, that resourcing isn’t matching the rhetoric. We suggest that, in part, that’s because the implementation of strategy has been frustrated by bureaucratic, time-consuming and inefficient processes. In a first for the Cost of Defence series, we recommend ways for the government and the Defence Department to shift the dial towards agility, adaptability, effectiveness and efficiency. That includes increased and more effective messaging on why defence investment is needed. Whatever percentage of GDP the government spends on defence, it is a large number, and not enough has been done to foster public support for the defence spending required to deter the types of conflicts we see in Europe and elsewhere. Governments shouldn’t wait for public pressure to make security decisions, but a measure of social licence is needed for defence investment, and that in turn takes candour about the gravity of the threats we face. ASPI’s charter requires us to inform and nurture public debate on defence and security and to provide alternative advice for the government. The cost of Defence does so objectively, sharing the government’s and Defence’s aim of strengthening Australia’s long-term security, prosperity and sovereignty. It’s never been more important for experts inside and outside the Australian Public Service to speak truth to power frankly and fearlessly in order to give decision-makers the strongest possible suite of options. We don’t expect all readers to agree with our positions. Indeed, we welcome debate and disagreement in the hope that Australia will be stronger, more prepared and more resilient for the challenges we confront now and will face in the future.
Topic:: Economics, Armed Forces, Artificial Intelligence, Defense Industry, Research and Development, and AUKUS
Political Geography:: Russia, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

37. Brave New World – The Future of China-US relations

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The US’s diminished leverage and Beijing’s reticence to engage an erratic US president mean that a new trade deal will likely take longer than in Donald Trump’s first administration, if it materializes at all. Prolonged trade tensions are unlikely to spiral into a security crisis in the Pacific. Both sides have economic priorities, US allies and partners lose trust in Washington, and Beijing will be loath to upset a trend towards a more accommodating region. The US-China trade and technology war will challenge the EU and its member states more than before but also provide Europe with leverage as the US and China gradually lose their economic partnership.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

38. The European Union and Critical Raw Materials: Juggling Geopolitical and Economic Realities

Author:: Dan Ziebarth
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Over the past decade, critical raw materials (CRMs) have emerged as a crucial focus for governments and industries worldwide. These materials, which include rare earth elements, lithium, cobalt, and others, have gained strategic importance due to their essential role in modern technologies, particularly those related to clean energy, digitalization, and advanced manufacturing (CRM Alliance 2024). In particular, the essential role of CRMs in clean energy technologies and the global push for a green energy transition have led to a surge in demand for CRMs (World Economic Forum 24-05-2024). This surge has created substantial opportunities for green industrialization. According to the International Energy Agency, the market for these raw materials has more than doubled over the past five years, with expectations of "unprecedented growth" in the coming years (International Energy Agency 2023); current climate commitments could lead to a quadrupling of global demand for materials such as rare earths, cobalt, and nickel by 2040 (Findeisen & Wernert 30-06-2023). CRMs are of paramount importance for the European Union’s economy, industrial base, and strategic autonomy. These materials have a wide range of applications, contributing to the production of various goods across all supply-chain stages in Europe. The use of CRMs is also essential for the EU’s green transition goals, as these materials are necessary for technologies crucial to the EU’s green and digital transformations. This is particularly true for many technologies that support net-zero carbon emissions goals like wind turbines and electric vehicles. For example, the production of a typical electric car has been estimated to require six times the mineral inputs of a conventional car; an onshore wind plant requires nine times more mineral resources than a gas-fired plant (International Energy Agency 2022). This surge in demand has led to increased concerns about supply chain vulnerabilities in western countries as many CRMs are concentrated in a small number of countries or are produced as by-products of other mining operations (U.S. Department of Energy 2023). The European Union, recognizing the economic and strategic significance of CRMs, responded by publishing a list of critical raw materials in 2011, updating it every three years to reflect changing economic importance and supply risks (Gislev & Grohol 2018), while the European Commission produced a foresight study of CRMs in 2020 for strategic technologies and sectors in the EU (Bobba et al. 2020). In 2023, the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) was adopted, which aims to increase and diversify the EU’s critical raw materials supply, strengthen circularity and recycling efforts, and support research and innovation in resource efficiency and the development of substitutes (European Council 2024).
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Geopolitics, and Critical Raw Materials (CRM)
Political Geography:: Europe

39. Uncertainty in Caracas: What Awaits Venezuela's Maduro in his Third Term?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On January 10, 2025, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro was sworn in for a third six-year term. The opposition condemned this event as a "coup," accusing Maduro of election fraud in connection with the presidential elections held on July 28, 2024. In response, the government organized a rally in support of Maduro in the capital. Meanwhile, the opposition staged a protest led by Maria Corina Machado, who made her first public appearance since August 2024.
Topic:: Economics, Elections, Protests, Organized Crime, Social Unrest, and Nicolas Maduro
Political Geography:: South America, Latin America, and Venezuela

40. Institutional Structures of Latin American Countries for Accession and Participation in the OECD

Author:: Lucas da Silva Tasquetto, Magali Favaretto Prieto Fernandes, and Milena da Fonseca Azevedo
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: This article delineates the institutional structures established by Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica to facilitate their accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The analysis delves into the political and economic contexts surrounding each country’s accession process, identifying key institutions and stakeholders domestic reforms required, and particular initiatives from each country, including institutional innovations and adapted procedures. Notably, each country exhibits unique institutional frameworks and adjustments, with varying prominence given to individuals and governmental entities based on constitutional, legal, and political-administrative configurations. We argue that, despite the uniqueness of each process, from an institutional standpoint, decisions concerning accession and the management of the process predominantly revolve around the Presidency and entities corresponding to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with variations in the preponderance of these bodies, and their leadership and coordination roles. Framing entry into the OECD primarily as a technical matter tends to justify the central role of the Ministries of Finance and affiliated bodies within the Presidency, aligned with the OECD’s liberal approach. Moreover, accession to the OECD often complements and/or legitimizes processes of trade openness and structural reforms, spurring consolidation of factions within domestic institutions.
Topic:: OECD, Institutions, Politics, and Economics
Political Geography:: Latin America, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico

41. How China Collateralizes

Author:: Anna Gelpern, Omar Haddad, Sebastian Horn, Paulina Kintzinger, Bradley C. Parks, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper is the first comprehensive analysis of the secured lending practices of Chinese creditors in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). We present a new dataset and detailed case studies of collateralized public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) loans from Chinese state-owned institutions in EMDEs between 2000 and 2021. Almost half of China's total PPG loan portfolio to EMDEs is effectively collateralized - amounting to $420 billion in collateralized debt across 57 countries. We document that Chinese lenders use techniques adapted from export and project finance to build multi-layered legal safety nets, which help ensure that risky EMDE loans will be repaid. As security, they use liquid, easily accessible assets, such as cash in bank accounts located in China. They rarely take infrastructure project assets as collateral, but often rely for repayment on established commodity revenue streams unrelated to the project. Typically, EMDE governments and state-owned enterprises commit to route foreign currency proceeds from commodity sales through bank accounts controlled by the lender. The cash balances in these accounts can be very large; in low-income, commodity-exporting countries, they average more than 20% of annual PPG debt service to all external creditors. The same revenue source can secure multiple successive borrowings over many years. Our findings reveal a previously undocumented pattern of revenue ring-fencing, where a significant share of commodity export receipts never reaches the exporting countries. Revenues routed overseas secure priority repayment for the creditor; they remain out of public sight and largely beyond the borrower’s reach until the secured debts are repaid. These findings raise new concerns about debt transparency, fiscal management, fiscal autonomy, and the quality of macroeconomic surveillance, particularly in commodity-exporting EMDEs.
Topic:: Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Debt, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Americas

42. Who’s Telling the Story on Inequality?

Author:: Raquel Jesse
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:: A look at how rising inequality has been reframed by anti-rights movements—and why reclaiming the narrative is essential to building a just future The past four decades have witnessed an unprecedented surge in wealth inequality and left us buffeted by one financial crisis after another. As we stand on the brink of yet another recession, a historic realignment in the global order, unfolding in real time, has made the world more unpredictable and transactional than ever. One consequence of this larger trend of instability has been the emergence of a ‘new’ wave of anti-rights leaders and movements in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 global financial crash. These movements defy easy categorization—often labeled as ‘populist right-wing,’ ‘autocratic,’ ‘fascist,’ ‘illiberal democracy,’ or ‘far-right’— but what they share is a common playbook; a willingness to offer answers to the widespread fear, anxiety, and grievances people are experiencing. Yes, they wield significant economic, social, and cultural capital, and despite often inconsistent messaging, they’re often the loudest (and often the only) voices addressing these concerns, albeit through distorted narratives of inequality, class struggle, and identity politics. They frame society as a struggle against a corrupt elite that is more invested in “woke” agendas than ordinary families. As a result, division and polarization have become the dominant response to rising precarity and distrust, and indeed, inequality. This new CIC perspectives piece explores the following themes: When Policy Fails: The Strategic Rise of (Not So) Reactionary Economics; The Vicious Cycle of Inequality and Division; Pattern Recognition: People Know When They Are Being Left Behind; When the System Really Works—But Only for the Few; Inequality by Design: The Policies that Transferred Wealth to the Top; The Crisis in Multilateralism Didn’t Start Today; Reclaiming the Fight Against Inequality.
Topic:: Economics, Inequality, Multilateralism, and Exclusion
Political Geography:: Global Focus

43. Geopolitical Influence & Peace

Author:: Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:: This report, Geopolitical Influence & Peace, explores the shifting dynamics of global power, drawing comparisons to the Cold War while underscoring the unique challenges of today's interconnected and multipolar world. Geopolitical risks today exceed levels seen during the Cold War, driven by heightened military spending, stalled efforts at nuclear disarmament, and a diminished role for multilateral institutions like the United Nations. At the same time, global power is being redistributed, with emerging middle powers reshaping the landscape through strategic investments and influence-building initiatives. These shifts challenge the dominance of traditional Western powers, creating both opportunities and vulnerabilities in global governance. Economic stagnation further complicates the picture, as developing nations grapple with mounting debt burdens that divert critical resources away from health, education, and infrastructure. Unlike the bipolar structure that prevailed in most of the 20th-century Cold War, the current global landscape is shaped by technological dominance, economic interdependence, and influence competition across emerging regions such as Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. While China's rise is clear, emerging regional powers, such as Brazil, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, South Africa and Indonesia are also seeking to shape regional and global dynamics. The proliferation of advanced technologies like artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and 5G infrastructure has transformed power dynamics, with states vying to secure strategic dominance in these areas. Meanwhile, economic interdependence, once seen as a stabilising force, is increasingly weaponised, as seen in trade wars, sanctions, and the deliberate decoupling of supply chains in critical industries. These dynamics are exacerbated by the intensification of proxy conflicts, hybrid warfare tactics, and disinformation campaigns that further destabilise global alliances and erode trust among nations. In exploring the current dynamics of global power, the report addresses the challenges of a multipolar world and the implications for the developing world. Developing countries can face economic disruptions, diminished development funding, and governance challenges due to shifts in geopolitics of the major powers. During the Cold War, developing countries became arenas for proxy wars, economic exploitation, and political interference, exacerbating instability, poverty, and underdevelopment. Today, as global power struggles intensify, nations in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia risk becoming similarly entangled, facing increased economic pressures, disrupted trade partnerships, and reduced access to critical investments. Debt servicing costs now outweigh investments in essential services for many developing countries, undermining their capacity for sustainable growth. Moreover, the plateauing of global trade integration limits economic opportunities, further constraining development pathways for emerging economies. Competition for influence among powerful nations may undermine local governance and development priorities, diverting attention from urgent challenges such as climate change, food insecurity, and peacebuilding. A nuanced understanding of these dynamics is crucial to ensure that developing countries are supported in long-term stability and development.
Topic:: Cold War, Development, Economics, Geopolitics, Peace, Strategic Competition, Multipolarity, and Post-Cold War
Political Geography:: Global Focus

44. How the World Looks from Tricontinental

Author:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:: In July 2015, social and political movements gathered for the Second Dilemmas of Humanity Conference and set in motion what would become Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. A decade later, we take stock of our view of the world and what lies ahead.
Topic:: Economics, Imperialism, and Global South
Political Geography:: Global Focus

45. Financial Influence Operations in the Hybrid Threats Spectrum

Author:: Bernard Siman
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: This paper examines the Hybrid Threats posed by perfectly legal and legitimate financial markets operations to national security through a variety of legal routes including acquisitions of intellectual property (IPs), E.S.G. regulations, Activist Investors and others. Focus has hitherto been on macro-measures, such as Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) Screening, sanctions compliance, Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”), Counter-Terrorism financing (“C-TF”), supply chain security, raw materials and the like. However, very little attention has been paid to micro-level financial and economic security threats through legal and legitimate financial markets operations. In other words, Why spy when you can buy. To achieve economic and financial security in the interest of national security and maintaining military capability superiority, such micro-financial markets operations in the Hybrid Threats spectrum, i.e., in the financial markets, must be tackled to prevent, inter alia, critical technology leak; as well as to enable greater investments in military capabilities, which have become a key defence, security and Strategic Autonomy priority. The fovus on macro-measure, in other words, is insufficient to achieve the objectives of economic and national security and must be urgently augmented by microlevel financial markets measures and awareness beyond AML and C-TF.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, Hybrid Threats, and Influence
Political Geography:: Europe

46. The Arctic: A Strategic Shift for Europe. A Unique Opportunity for Belgium

Author:: Hanaa El Hajji
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: With this clear assertion, the European Union published its updated Arctic policy in October 2021, titled “A stronger EU commitment to a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic.” Since then, the geopolitical landscape in and around the Arctic has shifted rapidly, requiring greater focus and an adapted response from the European Union as a whole. Since the publication of the EU’s 2021 Joint Communication, the Arctic’s strategic landscape has shifted dramatically. The war in Ukraine has disrupted Arctic cooperation, halting dialogue with Russia within the Arctic Council, and Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO has altered the regional security architecture, leaving Russia increasingly isolated among the Arctic Eight. These shifts have challenged the concept of “Arctic exceptionalism,” revealing how the region is becoming more deeply entangled in global geopolitical rivalries. Meanwhile, the intensifying effects of climate change are amplifying the Arctic’s economic and strategic value.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, International Cooperation, European Union, Geopolitics, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Europe, Belgium, and Arctic

47. The Mediterranean Region and the New International Context. Current trends and future challenges

Author:: Andrea Noferini
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: This report addresses two main questions: What are the main current challenges in the Mediterranean region? And, which economic, political and social aspects of the Mediterranean region are unlikely to change in the short-to-medium term? To answer the questions, the report considers the framework of the 2030 Agenda and the implementation of the SDGs in the Mediterranean region. First, the Agenda remains the common and shared vision towards sustainability, officially endorsed by the United Nations (UN). Secondly, the monitoring process of the Agenda provides the most up-todate evidence, thanks to reliable figures and data produced by the main statistical offices and international organisations. Methodologically, instead of considering all the 17 SDGs, the report uses the 5P Principles framework that allows a more systemic analysis (People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace, and Partnership). Given the nature of the report, the goal is not to be exhaustive but to select some of the most salient challenges that will affect the Mediterranean region in the coming years.
Topic:: Economics, Politics, United Nations, and Sustainable Development Goals
Political Geography:: Mediterranean

48. Inflationary Inertia as a Result of Unfulfilled Aspirations

Author:: Nicolás M. Burotto
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: I develop a discrete-time Keynesian D/Z model in which inflationary inertia arises from distributional conflict between firms and workers. The mechanism centers on aspiration gaps— the divergence between actual real wages and income targets—which, when combined with strong bargaining power, generate persistent inflation even after conventional macroeconomic gaps close. The model shows that equilibrium in real wages does not guarantee distributional balance, and that market mechanisms alone cannot restore stability. This underscores the need for a “social consensus” that moderates aspiration dynamics and defuses conflict-driven inflationary pressures.
Topic:: Economics, Inflation, Labor Market, Price, Wages, and Inertia
Political Geography:: Global Focus

49. The New Geopolitics and South Asia’s Trade Architecture – What Next?

Author:: Ganeshan Wignaraja, Amit Bhandari, and Aliasger Bootwalla
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: Geopolitics is increasingly intertwined with the economic destiny of South Asia. Even before the U.S. tariffs were rolled out, growing polycrises had hit the global economy, which has been struggling since the pandemic. South Asia seems a relatively bright spark of regional trade and growth. This paper analyses South Asia’s trade architecture in the backdrop of a sluggish world economy in the 2020s, and makes recommendations for closer regional economic integration.
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Economic Growth, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:: South Asia and United States of America

50. India-Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement

Author:: Anil Wadhwa and Manjeet Kripalani
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: India and Australia signed an Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) in December 2022. The ECTA is the first of a unique, two-part trade agreement that will bring India into global trade regimes in a calibrated manner. For Australia, with its global trading knowledge and pragmatic approach, gaining first-mover advantage in India’s large market is a major win. This case study explains the elements of ECTA.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and Australia

51. An Analysis of Local Authority Debt and Arrears in Zambia

Author:: Mbewe Kalikeka, Sydney Sihubwa, Liana Chikwekwe, Jones Bowa, Muchimba Sarah Siamachoka, and Mwelwa Banda
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:: The research study examines the financial health of local authorities and identifies opportunities to foster revenue generation crucial for service delivery at local level. It explores the accumulation of debt and arears for all 116 local Authorities in Zambia, analysing key factors contributing to financial strain and evaluating policy interventions aimed at enhancing fiscal sustainability.
Topic:: Debt, Development, and Economics
Political Geography:: Africa and Zambia

52. Putting US-India Trade Negotiations Back on Track

Author:: Aparna Pande and Bill Drexel
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: On April 2, 2025, which the White House dubbed “Liberation Day,” President Donald Trump announced broad, sweeping tariffs on over 90 countries. While the president’s announcement caused anxiety in foreign capitals, officials in New Delhi remained relatively calm. United States–India relations had been improving for more than two and a half decades, and the US had become India’s largest trading partner. By most accounts, President Trump respected Prime Minister Narendra Modi—even going so far as to refer to his Indian counterpart as his “good friend.” Furthermore, during an official visit in February 2025, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi announced a series of trade targets suggesting that a wider trade deal was imminent. The two leaders pledged to pursue $500 billion in bilateral trade by 2030—more than double the current volume—and promised to deepen US arms sales to India, including by laying the groundwork for future acquisitions of F-35 fighter jets. Prime Minister Modi committed to increasing energy imports from the US and reducing tariffs on American goods. India, by most accounts, was eager to address the Trump administration’s concerns about trade imbalances, and the two sides set fall 2025 as a target for finalizing a bilateral trade agreement. Meanwhile, due to strong messaging from the Trump team against production based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Apple announced plans to shift all assembly of its US-bound iPhones to India. Prime Minister Modi also spoke with Elon Musk to discuss providing Tesla with access to Indian markets. Vice President JD Vance even visited India in late April 2025, and lauded the country’s “sense of infinite possibility.”
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, and Trade
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and United States of America

53. Ride the wave: A big, beautiful European strategy for Trumponomics

Author:: Agathe Demarais
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Eight months into the second term of Donald Trump, Europeans are still struggling to craft a coherent response to American geoeconomics policies in the trade, investment and financial spheres. The Trump administration poses massive challenges to Europe. It has imposed tariffs on nearly all US imports from the EU. It is also considering applying pressure on investors to pick sides between the US and China. Finally, it could soon try to engineer a forced depreciation of the dollar against other major currencies like the euro. For the EU, the best response to baffling Trumponomics is to keep calm and carry on. European policymakers should adopt a self-help mindset—resisting the urge to impose retaliatory measures that could damage European economies, avoiding futile fights over US policies that will not change, and above all, holding the bloc together. Europeans should also use this turbulent moment to push through controversial economic reforms. Such policies include deepening the single market to support those EU exporters that will lose market share in the US; leveraging access to the EU market for digital services; boosting innovation financing through regulatory changes; increasing the global role of the euro; and bracing for the coming currency wars. Europe’s ability to implement much-needed reforms will shape the bloc’s economic prospects, global standing and resilience long after Trump leaves the White House.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Investment, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

54. From Provider to Precarious: How young men’s economic decline fuels the anti-feminist backlash

Author:: Javier Carbonell
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: A new political divide is emerging in Europe: a growing gender gap among young voters, with young women trending progressive and young men increasingly turning to the far right. This paper argues that the rise of anti-feminist backlash among young men is not merely a cultural reaction to feminism but also the result of deepening economic precarity—particularly for working-class men without university degrees. Over the past two decades, young men have seen declining wealth, stagnating wages, lower employment rates, and worse mental health outcomes. In some EU countries, young women now earn more than men their age. This economic decline is not caused by women’s advancement but rather by structural economic changes, such as the rise in inequality and automation, which disproportionately affect men who occupy more manual jobs. As traditional pathways to masculine status—such as stable employment, homeownership, and provider roles—erode, far-right actors have capitalised on this dislocation by offering a regressive but emotionally resonant vision of masculinity. This gender divide threatens not only gender equality but also the foundations of democratic support itself, as radicalised young men often express weaker commitment to democratic norms. To reverse this trend, democratic forces must pursue a two-pronged approach: Address the material roots of frustration through ambitious economic policy: investing in housing, education, vocational training, employment security, and wealth redistribution for youth—particularly men without degrees. Redefine masculinity by promoting positive, inclusive male role models and creating new cultural narratives that empower young men without reinforcing patriarchal norms. Progressive visions of manhood must offer not only critique, but aspiration.
Topic:: Economics, Democracy, Feminism, Men, and Precarity
Political Geography:: Europe

55. Ten Years of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia: The Critical Assessment and Future Directions

Author:: Elżbieta Proń
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: This paper looks at how China’s use of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in its policy towards Central Asia (CA) has changed since 2013 and what this change signalizes regarding China’s use of the BRI at international forums. To answer these research questions, the paper focuses on Central Asia – once dubbed “the first strand of the BRI” (R. Pantucci); the region where China has “tested” many institutions of its international engagement; and where the BRI was introduced in 2013. To answer the research questions, this study draws from analyzing literature and sources in Russian, Chinese, English, and Polish. This study is primarily empirically oriented. This study finds that at its 10, the BRI will focus on connectivity, clean energy, and new technologies. It also finds that despite the high profile of the Green BRI and many relevant agreements, only a fraction of projects are branded “Green BRI.” It thus argues that the BRI has served as a legitimizing “umbrella” label for various Chinese policy initiatives, which are realized via other cooperation formats.
Topic:: Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Renewable Energy, and Silk Road
Political Geography:: China and Central Asia

56. The US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal

Author:: Penny Naas, Georgina Wright, Eamon Drumm, and Antonia Wunnerlich
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Eighty years to the day after Germany’s surrender in World War II, two of the victorious allies in that conflict unveiled a new economic partnership, the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal (EPD). It is the first bilateral agreement of its kind concluded by the Trump administration since its new tariff policy was introduced in early April. Leaders have described the EPD as a “trade deal”, but it functions more as a framework for future action. It includes tariff concessions on selected goods, grants greater access to the British market for certain American agricultural products, and outlines areas for future negotiation, including in digital regulation, export controls, and, potentially, investment screening. A separate technology-focused agreement is also planned for both countries to find ways to collaborate on biotech, life sciences, quantum computing, nuclear fusion, aerospace, and space technologies. In substance, the EPD freezes tariffs at 10% for most goods while buying time for technical-level discussions and laying the groundwork for deeper alignment. For the United Kingdom, 30% of whose exports go to its largest export market, the United States, the deal is an important diplomatic win. It is for the United States, too, whose ninth-largest trading partner is the United Kingdom. In 2024, the United States imported $68.1 billion in goods from Britain and exported $79.9 billion to the country. For countries eyeing negotiations with Washington, the EPD underscores that US trade talks are increasingly shaped by national and economic security considerations, not just trade balances. The agreement links future tariff relief to shared approaches on US strategic issues such as digital policy and alignment on export controls, including to China. As Peter Mandelson, British ambassador in Washington, put it, the EPD is the "end of the beginning". Much will now depend on the outcomes of technical-level discussions, which could have direct repercussions on London’s reset talks with the EU.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and United States of America

57. Enhancing the Efficiency and Sustainability of Investmentsin Cameroon

Author:: Stephane Atangana
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: Cameroon’s drive toward economic emergence by 2035 hinges on ensuring the maximum impactand long-term viability of its investments—public, private, or foreign. Current data, however,highlights ongoing challenges that include reductions in public investment budgets, insufficientinfrastructure, and fluctuating foreign direct investment levels ( 1 ) . These constraints highlight theurgency of a coordinated strategy for reinforcing investment management and governancestructures. This policy brief concentrates on identifying the most significant determinants ofinvestment in Cameroon, examining both the factors that undermine efficient capital allocation andthose that facilitate better outcomes. Such determinants range from macroeconomic conditions,like elevated inflation and external debt, to governance issues, such as weak institutionalframeworks and corruption. The primary objectives of this analysis are to assess how existing investment policies function,propose relevant modifications that align with the national development strategy (SND30), andaddress accountability gaps. Methodologically, it draws upon existing legislation, official economicand competitiveness assessments, as well as statistical data on investments. The approachintegrates insights from successful practices and contextualizes them within Cameroon’s uniqueeconomic structure. This document begins by clarifying the nature of the investment challenges and exploring avenues for improvement, then critically discusses suitable policy choices in light ofCameroon’s institutional and economic context, and concludes with policy recommendations andpotential lines of future investigation to foster an inclusive and transformative investmentframework.
Topic:: Economics, Investment, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Africa and Cameroon

58. Trump's pivot to the Middle East

Author:: Zeina AlShaib and Ibrahim Al-Assil
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: In a repeat of his 2017 visit to Saudi Arabia, President Donald Trump is once again headed to the Middle East for the first official foreign trip of his second term. The decision to travel to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates underscores the priority the president places on strengthening strategic, security, and economic ties with regional partners. What deals will Trump be able to seal during his trip to the Gulf? This on-the-record briefing featured Daniel Benaim, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Arabian Peninsula Affairs and Associate Fellow at the Middle East Institute and Ibrahim Al-Assil, Senior Fellow at MEI and a Professorial Lecturer at George Washington University. Our experts examined the potential for Trump to strengthen US ties with a region that has undergone significant geopolitical shifts since his last term in office and explored the administration's renewed focus on the Middle East. They assessed prospects for reshaping the US-Gulf relationship for the 21st century, navigating regional realignments, and expanding the Abraham Accords, among other major issues.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and UAE

59. The Economic Dimensions of a Better Iran Deal

Author:: Hadi Kahalzadeh
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: President Donald Trump can secure a new, better nuclear deal with Iran by removing the barriers that have prevented American companies from entering the Iranian market. This could be achieved through a phased approach that would not require immediately lifting primary sanctions. Doing so would help secure greater nuclear concessions from Iran, generate economic opportunities for American companies that would create an estimated 200,000 American jobs annually, and make a new agreement more durable by strengthening its political bases of support in both the United States and Iran. Decades of sanctions on Iran have failed to compel political capitulation. Instead, Iran has rationally developed a so-called “resistance economy” that evades sanctions, benefiting and empowering hard-liners with close connections to the government. In Washington, many misinterpret Tehran’s resistance and believe that sanctions have not worked because the pressure has not been great enough. But Tehran has held firm, not because sanctions have been too mild but because of a lack of clear and immediate benefits from disarmament. A U.S. policy that includes real economic incentives for compliance will change this equation, empowering more moderate elements of Iranian society and bringing economic benefits not only to the Iranian middle class but to the U.S. and the wider Persian Gulf region. President Trump should issue targeted Office of Foreign Assets Control general licenses, enabling the export of up to $25 billion in U.S. goods annually to Iran, primarily in aviation, agriculture, automotive production, and telecommunications. A deal should also license a five-year carve-out for American–owned foreign subsidiaries operating in Iran, enabling U.S. access to as much as $4 trillion in unrealized Iranian investment opportunities by 2040. Such a license would allow the United States to partner with Gulf regional allies to modernize Iran’s transport and logistics networks, thereby advancing broader regional development and cooperation. The prospect of losing such partnerships would be a powerful incentive for Iran to exercise military and political restraint. In parallel with the technical nuclear discussions, a dedicated economic dialogue could explore ways to keep Iran’s consumer market open to American companies in the near term and unlock investment opportunities for U.S. investors over time. One potential method in that vein would be the inclusion of a “snap-forward” mechanism, in which economic openings accelerate based on Iranian compliance and good behavior. Such a carrot offers the path toward a more robust and dynamic U.S.–Iran economic partnership built on trust. Incorporating economic incentives into a new U.S.–Iran nuclear agreement would benefit private sector constituencies in both countries, bolstering American jobs and industry while reintegrating Iran into the global economy. In the long term, such a multifaceted agreement could blaze a path toward peaceful coexistence with Iran.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Negotiation, Nuclear Energy, and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

60. The Temporal Demands of Parental Child Care: Evidence from the American Time Use Survey

Author:: Nancy Folbre and Jooyeoun Suh
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: Most research on parental time devoted to child care is based on survey questions regarding explicit care activities or co-presence of parents and children in the same room, factors clearly relevant to child development. Time spent keeping an eye and/or ear on young children while engaging in other activities deserves attention for a different reason—it represents an even larger constraint on maternal employment. Analysis of pooled time-diary data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) from 2004-2019 focuses on an underutilized question that asks respondents when own household children under the age of 13 were “in their care,” and shows that reported parental time likely devoted to supervision parental time likely devoted to supervision exceeds time devoted to active care by a factor of 2.9 and is more negatively related to maternal hours in paid employment. In-your-care time is an important indicator of the opportunity costs of motherhood, especially in low-income households unable to purchase or otherwise unable to obtain “babysitting” assistance.
Topic:: Economics, Women, Employment, Inequality, Time, Gender, and Child Care
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

61. Pan-African-Foreign Policy Theory: A Conceptual Significance of Foreign Policy Analysis Within Policy Agenda Setting for Africa

Author:: Chris Landsberg, Sandile Moloi, and Oscar Van Heerden
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: This article claims that Pan-Africanism Foreign Policy Theory is about Africa’s states’ foreign policy. This claim and theory have not been developed before. The closest argument to our Pan-Africanism Foreign Policy Theory is the writing in 2009 by McDougal (2009), which contends that, as the continental states and its premier integration bodies seek to craft a new-Pan-Africanism, African foreign policies should be based on three aspects: cultural and political unity; Afro-centric development, and the Afri-can conceptualisation of Ubuntu. We lay further claim that Pan-Africanism is rarely analysed by reviewing the goals pursued by states, specifically those of security, prosperity, and world reorganisation. This paper aims to make a constructive contribution to the overall literature by examining Pan-Africanism as African foreign policy, given that little has been written about it from this viewpoint.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Pan-Africanism, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Africa

62. Between Two Reefs: Indonesia’s Strategic Culture in the Twenty-First Century

Author:: Gregory B. Poling and Andreyka Natalegawa
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: In a landmark 1948 speech, Indonesia’s first vice president, Mohammad Hatta, proclaimed, “The best policy to adopt is one which does not make us the object of an international conflict. On the contrary, we must remain the subject who reserves the right to decide our own destiny and fight for our own goal, which is independence for the whole of Indonesia.”1 While Hatta spoke of the Cold War and the choice of aligning with either the Soviet Union or the United States, his conception of Indonesia as rowing between two reefs (mendayung antara dua karang) has remained a guiding principle of Indonesian foreign policy in the decades since the country’s independence. As the world’s third-largest democracy, the largest Muslim-majority nation, a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and a leading figure in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia has been characterized as a rising middle power and a central player in the emergent Global South. As a sovereign country, Indonesia has pursued what analysts and policymakers describe as a bebas aktif, or free and active, foreign policy—free because the country does not side with world powers, and active because it does not take passive or reactive stances on global issues but does seek to operate in a diplomatic role.2
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Indonesia and Southeast Asia

63. Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Vision

Author:: Leah Hickert
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: In March 2023, two men stood shaking hands in front of a blinding array of flashing cameras while the international community—and especially observers from across the Middle East—watched in disbelief at their unlikely meeting. Videos captured the previously unimaginable scene of Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, smiling alongside Musaad bin Mohammed al-Aiban, Saudi Arabia’s national security adviser. The adversaries had just agreed to restore diplomatic relations, de-escalating regional tensions that had been brewing since the two countries severed ties in 2016, when demonstrators stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran to protest Riyadh’s execution of a prominent Shia Muslim cleric. Notably, some onlookers did not think the rapprochement was the most surprising aspect of the press conference. For many, the deal was the natural culmination of years of negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Instead, these observers were stunned by the nationality of the man who Saudi Arabia asked to mediate the deal. He stood just behind the pair, in front of a flag with 5 stars—not 50. China’s top-ranking diplomatic official, Wang Yi, heralded in the new era of regional peace. U.S. officials were nowhere to be found.
Topic:: Economics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Middle East and Saudi Arabia

64. Friendshoring Copper: A New Pillar of the U.S.-Brazilian Economic Partnership

Author:: Gracelin Baskaran, Meredith Schwartz, and Bryan Harris
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Brazil holds some of the world’s largest reserves of critical minerals, including niobium, rare earths, graphite, manganese, bauxite, zinc, and lithium. However, the next frontier is copper, which now accounts for one-third of all mineral exploration investment in the country. Market enthusiasm for Brazil’s copper aligns with a global outlook in which copper demand is projected to nearly double by 2035. China has already secured a strong foothold in Brazil’s mining ecosystem through trade agreements, concessional financing, and infrastructure investments. By contrast, the United States remains in the early stages of building a minerals partnership with Brazil. Unlocking Brazil’s potential as a major copper producer—and securing U.S. access to this strategic metal—will require bilateral efforts. Brazil must strengthen geological mapping, expand infrastructure, and streamline its overly bureaucratic permitting system. On the U.S. side, deploying strategic financing, promoting vertical supply chain integration, and offering targeted tariff exemptions to advance national and economic security objectives will be critical to a successful partnership.
Topic:: Economics, Partnerships, Mining, Trade, Economic Security, Copper, and Friendshoring
Political Geography:: Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America

65. CRINK Economic Ties: Uneven Patterns of Collaboration

Author:: Maria Snegovaya, Nicholas Fenton, and Tina Dolbaia
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) face obstacles to economic collaboration such as geographic distance, sanctions, mutual mistrust, and self-sufficiency goals. Reliable data on CRINK’s economic and trade ties is limited due to lack of reported data from Iran and North Korea and the rise of informal and shadow trade since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Existing data reveals uneven patterns, although expanding bilateral agreements, strengthening energy ties, and increasing trade in dual-use technologies point to growing economic cooperation among the CRINK countries. CRINK also seeks to integrate their financial and payment systems to bypass Western sanctions by prioritizing national currencies over the U.S. dollar. The post-2022 China-Russia relationship drives most of the momentum, while Iran and North Korea exhibit expanding but considerably weaker integration with the rest of the group. China is nevertheless a cautious actor that hedges its bets in energy trade with Russia and Iran, avoids flagrant sanctions violations, and faces constraints from its own economic slowdown.
Topic:: Economics, Trade, Treaties and Agreements, Economic Security, Geopolitics, International Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Middle East, Russia, and Europe

66. Management practices, competition, and multi-product firms in developing countries

Author:: Victor Gimenez-Perales and Alina Mulyukova
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: We study how liberalization and competition affect firms’ output and product scope depending on management practices. In a model of multi-product firms, we show that firms with better management practices specialize in fewer products with lower marginal costs. The model predicts that, under increased competition, firms with better management practices are less adversely affected by competition, especially in heterogeneous sectors. Evidence from India’s de-reservation policy supports these predictions. Our simulations estimate a 0.29% welfare gain in India from the policy. The same policy could increase welfare by 0.39% in an environment with better management practices, such as the US, highlighting the management practices’ role in liberalization outcomes.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Business, Innovation, Management, and Liberalization
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and United States of America

67. Economic Insecurity: Trade Dependencies and Their Weaponization in History

Author:: Martin Bernstein, Josefin Meyer, Kevin H. O'Rourke, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Do trade dependencies leave countries vulnerable to geopolitical coercion? We study the economic costs of trade and financial sanctions, from 1920 to the present. We first develop a continuous measure of sanction intensity, using bilateral commodity-level data to calculate the importance of specific flows that fall under sanctions. We find that sanctions inflict relatively small costs on average: sanctioning 1% of GDP worth of imports or exports leads to approximately 0.3 percentage points of lost GDP over a 5-year period and a 0.1 percentage point increase in unemployment. However, we show that sanctions are far more costly for countries whose trade is highly concentrated, and for countries that rely heavily on exporting primary commodities. Low income and developing countries appear most vulnerable to trade sanctions, while high income financial centers and some EU countries are among the most exposed to financial sanctions.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Political Economy, Sanctions, Trade, Vulnerability, Coercion, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Global Focus

68. Trade Wars and Currency Wars – Lessons from History

Author:: Kris James Mitchener and Kirsten Wandschneider
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Explaining President Trump’s “Liberation-day” tariffs on April 2nd, 2025, Stephen Miran, President Trump’s chairman of the council of economic advisors suggested that countries accept the U.S. tariffs without retaliation to come to a fair “burden sharing”(Miran: 2025). History shows that this assumption is wrong: using a detailed data set of bilateral trade flows constructed for the interwar period, this column shows that in fact the US faced substantial and widespread retaliation from trade partners in response to the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 (i.e., the Smoot-Hawley Tariff). U.S. exports to retaliating countries fell by as much as 33%, with U.S. trade partners specifically targeting high-end, branded consumer products, such as U.S. autos. The drop in trade contributed to the Great Depression, which in turn triggered a large currency war: between 1929 and 1936, 70 countries devalued their currencies relative to gold. We show that trade was further reduced by more than 21% following devaluation. The currency war destroyed the trade-enhancing benefits of the global monetary standard, ending regime coordination and increasing trade costs. The 1930s are a potent reminder of what can happen when international policy coordination breaks down and countries go it alone when negotiating trade and exchange-rate policies.
Topic:: Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

69. Sovereign vs. Corporate Debt and Default: More Similar Than You Think

Author:: Gita Gopinath, Josefin Meyer, Carmen Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Theory suggests that corporate and sovereign bonds are fundamentally different, also because sovereign debt has no bankruptcy mechanism and is hard to enforce. We show empirically that the two assets are more similar than you think, at least when it comes to high-yield bonds over the past 20 years. We use rich new data to compare high-yield US corporate (“junk”) bonds to high-yield emerging market sovereign bonds 2002-2021. Investor experiences in these two asset classes were surprisingly aligned, with (i) similar average excess returns, (ii) similar average risk-return patterns (Sharpe ratios), (iii) similar default frequency, and (iv) comparable haircuts. A notable difference is that the average default duration is higher for sovereigns. Moreover, the two markets co-move differently with domestic and global factors. US “junk” bond yields are more closely linked to US market conditions such as US stock returns, US stock price volatility (VIX), or US monetary policy.
Topic:: Economics, Sovereign Debt, Sovereign Default, and Corporate Bonds
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

70. Spatial distribution of housing liquidity

Author:: Francisco Amaral, Mark Toth, and Jonas Zdrzalek
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper examines the relationship between location, liquidity, and prices in housing markets. We construct spatial datasets for German and U.S. cities and show that liquidity and prices decline with distance to the city center. To rationalize these results, we build a structural model with spatial search frictions. We argue that location preferences concentrate buyers in central areas, making markets tighter, more liquid, and driving up prices. Counterfactuals show that suppressing search frictions raises welfare and prices, especially in peripheral areas. Our findings highlight the importance of demand-side preferences and search frictions for understanding liquidity and asset prices.
Topic:: Economics, Financial Markets, Cities, Housing, Real Estate, Liquidity, and Assets
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

71. In Merz We Truss: Financial Market Reaction to Germany’s Fiscal Package

Author:: Filippos Petroulakis and Farzad Saidi
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: • This study analyzes capital market reactions to Germany’s recent announcement of loosening fiscal restrictions for defense and state-level spending, while establishing a €500 billion infrastructure investment fund. In particular, we examine whether surging Bund yields reflect growth expectations or fiscal risk concerns. • Clear evidence of growth expectations: The steepening German yield curve, rising stock prices, euro appreciation, and stable credit default swap prices collectively indicate that markets interpret Germany’s fiscal expansion as growth-enhancing rather than a reckless fiscal bet. • The contrast with the UK’s Truss-Kwarteng episode is stark: Unlike the 2022 UK “mini budget” aftermath, which triggered a selloff across all UK asset classes, Germany’s announcement has seen positive market reception across different asset classes, suggesting confidence in Germany’s fiscal credibility. • While the policy shift introduces some uncertainty, evidenced by modest increases in the European VSTOXX volatility index, this reaction appears calibrated and partially attributable to concurrent global market events, reinforcing the interpretation that markets view Germany’s fiscal expansion as responsible.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, Budget, Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Debt, Yield Curve, and Debt Brake
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

72. The Great Equalizer: Effects of Chinese Official Finance on Economic Complexity across Recipient Countries

Author:: Jan Denninger and Lennart Kaplan
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes whether Chinese aid and other forms of official finance affect structural transformation in low- and-middle income countries. Specifically, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach to causally analyze the effect on the Economic Complexity Index of 98 recipient countries over the 2002-2016 period. Economic complexity is defined as the diversity and sophistication of the goods an economy produces. The results reveal that Chinese official financing (OF) does not have statistically significant effects at the aggregate level; however, its effectiveness varies across sectors and recipients. A sectoral perspective shows that Chinese OF to recipients’ production sectors has a significantly negative effect on their economic complexity. These effects are most pronounced for high-complexity recipients, suggesting that China primarily targets industries below existing levels of complexity, thereby impeding potential structural transformation. In contrast, low-complexity recipients experience positive complexity effects from Chinese social sector projects, especially from those related to education. Given that China is known for its demand-driven approach of lending, recipients should push for an adjustment in the composition and allocation of Chinese OF to render structural transformation more likely.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Aid, and Complexity
Political Geography:: China and Asia

73. Who wins wars?

Author:: Jonathan Federle, Dominic Rohner, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Economic resources are often seen as decisive for the outcomes of military conflicts. This paper asks whether “deeper pockets” help win wars. We construct a fine-grained dataset covering more than 700 interstate disputes and rely on exogenous resource price shocks to estimate the causal effect of windfall gains on winning chances in interstate conflicts. We find a statistically significant and quantitatively large impact of windfall gains on winning odds and show that a key channel of transmission is a surge in military spending, after an exogenous increase in government revenues.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Military Spending, Fiscal Policy, Armed Conflict, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Global Focus

74. Official Development Assistance

Author:: Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:: Amidst rapidly shifting geopolitics, major donors such as the United States, the United Kingdom and European Union (EU) countries have announced significant reductions to their annual Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments. In 2023, contributions from these countries accounted for 63 per cent of all ODA flows. A key driver of the current situation has been the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has led to unprecedented aid allocations to Ukraine. In 2023, Ukraine received $37 billion in ODA, equating to 14 per cent of all ODA disbursed in that year. In addition to ODA, military aid allocations to date have totalled $128 billion. Given the current climate, this report presents economic projections under various scenarios, indicating that ODA could decline by 20 to 40 per cent in the coming years. This would result in reductions of between $50 and $115 billion less aid relative to 2023 levels. In such scenarios, sub-Saharan Africa, MENA and Latin America could see cuts of 30-40 per cent in their ODA inflows, exacerbating risks of economic downturns, political instability, and humanitarian crises. The economies that will be most affected by ODA cuts are also in the least peaceful countries in the world. Most at risk include Afghanistan, Yemen, Central African Republic, and Somalia. Existing and emerging donors are unlikely to be able to fill the gap. Countries such as China, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye contribute less than five per cent to the international aid system. With US support for Ukraine in question, EU countries may need to further increase their contributions to Ukraine and boost domestic military spending. Calls to raise EU military spending to five per cent of GDP could require an additional $560 billion annually, diverting funds from other sectors. In a climate of shrinking resources and rising demand, there is an urgent need for reforms that enhance the efficiency, transparency, and data-driven targeting of ODA. Investing in robust monitoring and evaluation systems is essential to ensure that limited aid funds yield maximum developmental and economic benefits.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Donors, Development Assistance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Global Focus

75. Global Peace Index 2025

Author:: Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:: This is the 19th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness, covering 99.7 per cent of the world’s population. Produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. It uses 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure the state of peace across three domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. The 2025 GPI finds that global peacefulness continues to decline and that many of the leading factors that precede major conflicts are higher than they have been since the end of WWII. More countries are increasing their levels of militarisation against the backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions, increasing conflict, the breakup of traditional alliances and rising economic uncertainty.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Geopolitics, Peace, Armed Conflict, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Global Focus

76. Global Peace Index Briefing 2025

Author:: Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:: The 2025 Global Peace Index reveals a fundamental reshaping of the global order not seen since the Cold War. It details a record decline in global peacefulness as rising conflict deaths, accelerating geopolitical tensions, and the erosion of social cohesion are driving ‘The Great Fragmentation’. The world is at an inflection point. While the number of conflicts is higher than at any time since World War II, they are also becoming unwinnable and increasingly expensive, yet global investment in conflict prevention have dramatically reduced. The last decade has seen major shifts in influence as middle level powers become more assertive within their respective regions. This has contributed to a record 78 countries being involved in conflicts beyond their borders. Combined with major power competition, the proliferation of asymmetric warfare technologies and mounting debt burdens in the most vulnerable states in the most fragile economies, the prospect for conflict has never been higher.
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Peace, Armed Conflict, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Global Focus

77. Semiconductors and Statecraft: Belgium’s Role in Europe’s Technological Sovereignty

Author:: Victor De Decker and Marcus Loiseau
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Belgium’s global role in semiconductors hinges not on scale but on control of a strategic chokepoint: upstream innovation. With imec at its centre, Belgium functions as Europe’s semiconductor R&D engine – but this asymmetric position leaves the country structurally exposed. Without manufacturing capacity, talent diversification, or broader ecosystem scaling, Belgium risks becoming a high-value subcontractor in a geopolitical and financial game it does not fully control. To remain indispensable – and not merely useful – Belgium must convert R&D dominance into strategic leverage, push for Chips Act reforms that close the EU’s coordination gaps, build scaling innovation ecosystems, and expand its influence within a fragmented European industrial policy landscape.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, Innovation, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: Europe

78. Engendering Pluralism in Economics: Gendered Perspectives from an International Survey of Economists*

Author:: Mohsen Javdani
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: This study contributes to growing calls for greater pluralism in economics by examining how gender shapes economists’ normative and epistemological orientations. Drawing on original survey data from 2,425 economists across 19 countries, we document systematic gender differences in views on a broad range of issues. Female economists are significantly more likely to support progressive equity-oriented positions, challenge mainstream assumptions, and endorse pluralistic approaches to inquiry. We also find stark gender differences in political ideology: women are far more likely than men to identify as left-leaning—particularly far-left—while men disproportionately align with centrist or right-leaning ideologies. These ideological divides account for some of the gender differences in views, underscoring the mediating role of political ideology. However, the influence of ideology itself varies by gender: moving rightward on the ideological spectrum reduces support for some progressive positions more sharply among men than women. This suggests that gendered experiences inform distinct interpretive frameworks that persist even within shared ideological categories. Taken together, our findings highlight that gender diversity in economics is not merely demographic but epistemic—and that realizing its transformative potential requires institutional environments that value and legitimize dissenting and underrepresented perspectives.
Topic:: Economics, Politics, Ideology, Pluralism, and Gender Diversity
Political Geography:: Global Focus

79. The Flawed Welfare Foundations of Pro-Free Trade Arguments

Author:: Mark Glick and Gabriel A. Lozada
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: Free trade has long been defended as an unquestioned good in economics, yet its welfare foundations are deeply flawed. The efficiency gains highlighted by comparative advantage rest on the Potential Pareto Principle, which assumes away distributional concerns and treats aggregate surplus as synonymous with social welfare. In practice, free trade produces both winners and losers, often with significant and lasting harms to labor. Classical and modern theorists—from Ricardo to Samuelson—have acknowledged these problems, but standard textbooks and policy rhetoric bury them beneath confident claims of net benefits. Revisiting the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, critiques of consumer and social surplus, and later retractions by Hicks and Samuelson, we show that the intellectual case for free trade rests on indefensible ethical and empirical premises. A more rigorous and honest approach requires economists to restrict themselves to identifying effects on different groups, while leaving judgments about welfare and distribution to broader political debate.
Topic:: Economics, Free Trade, Trade, and Welfare
Political Geography:: Global Focus

80. Refining the Strategy: The Economics of Lithium Value Addition in Ghana

Author:: Thomas Scurfield and David Sefa Adjei
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Abstract:: Ghana’s plan to refine its lithium domestically should be based on economic feasibility, market outlook and a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. A Ghanaian refinery would currently face limited access to feedstock and high costs compared to global competitors, particularly in China. Excess refining capacity in China and uncertainty about the growth of lithium chemical demand outside China further compound these challenges. A refinery built in the next few years is unlikely to generate much benefit for Ghanaians. NRGI modeling suggests it could cost the government at least USD 500 million in lost revenue, as the refinery would need to purchase Ghana’s concentrate at below-market prices just to break even. It is also unlikely to create more than 200 direct jobs once operational, and the stimulus for other sectors is uncertain. In contrast, the opportunity costs as well as environmental and social harms could be considerable. The government would benefit from a mine-and-monitor approach instead: ensuring that the Ewoyaa mine starts as soon as possible while supporting further lithium exploration, monitoring the evolution of global conditions for lithium refining, and taking domestic steps to improve future refining prospects—such as developing a strategy for byproduct use. Transparency and citizen engagement in the decision-making process are essential to building trust, managing expectations, and fostering a strong investment climate for future lithium refining.
Topic:: Economics, Natural Resources, Mining, and Lithium
Political Geography:: Africa and Ghana

81. Obscurity By Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Author:: Tanner Greer
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy. That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be. This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1] If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2] This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

82. Beyond Zambia's 2020 Sovereign Debt Default

Author:: Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis & Research (ZIPAR)
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:: This paper provides an analysis of Zambia’s 2020 debt default, its economic aftermath, and the policy and institutional responses that have shaped the country’s recovery. The study situates the default within a broader global and domestic context of rising debt vulnerabilities, fiscal indiscipline, and external shocks, highlighting how years of high borrowing, exchange rate volatility, and weak public financial management culminated in the crisis. Following the default, Zambia faced acute liquidity challenges, rising inflation, and restricted access to international capital markets. In response, the government pursued fiscal consolidation and institutional reforms under the IMF’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF), alongside a debt restructuring process guided by the G20 Common Framework. These measures sought to restore stability, rebuild confidence, and create space for inclusive growth while prioritising social spending and debt transparency. The study analyses the debt restructuring agreements with the Official Creditor Committee and Eurobond holders, noting the inclusion of state-contingent instruments, particularly the Value Recovery Instrument (VRI) embedded in the B-bond. This clause links Zambia’s future debt service obligations to improvements in its Composite Indicator (CI)—a metric combining the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), import coverage of reserves, and global growth trends. If Zambia’s CI exceeds a threshold of 2.69, the upside payment mechanism would be activated, triggering higher coupon rates and accelerated repayments. While this offers creditors a share in Zambia’s potential recovery, it also raises sustainability concerns, as it could increase the country’s debt service burden precisely when fiscal buffers remain fragile. It, however, does not provide any safeguards against adverse shocks or unexpected macroeconomic volatility, leaving the Government exposed to budgetary stress in the event of slower-than-expected growth or external disruptions. The paper, therefore, emphasises that durable debt sustainability depends on more than restructuring; it requires sustained reforms in domestic revenue mobilisation, prudent fiscal management, and institutional capacity building. It also calls for improvements to the Common Framework to enhance timeliness, predictability, and equitable burden-sharing among creditors, thereby reducing delays, improving fairness in repayment obligations, and providing more explicit guidance for future debt restructuring efforts.
Topic:: Debt, Economics, Sovereign Debt, Debt Restructuring, and Sovereign Default
Political Geography:: Africa and Zambia

83. Japan-US Trade Talks: Start by Expanding Beyond Trade

Author:: Mark Siegel
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Japan is facing a world suddenly beset by enormous uncertainties. Tokyo didn’t ask for this moment, but it should take the embedded opportunity seriously. This is not a time to patiently wait for a return to the old normal. The ancien régime is gone. Instead, Tokyo should put forward ideas that transcend previous institutional arrangements. While the coming period will be challenging, Japan may never have a better opportunity to press for systemic change. By most accounts, negotiations between Japan and the United States have started well. The US seems open to novel and tradition-breaking approaches, and wants to develop a framework agreement quickly. There is clearly goodwill between the two countries, and President Donald Trump’s participation in the opening dialogue was more than just symbolic. He appreciates the extraordinary importance of the bilateral relationship to both countries, and while the president takes issue with the merchandise trade imbalance, he and his team see value in creating win-win outcomes across a spectrum of subjects.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

84. Germany in Multi-Dimensional Change: Implications for Central Europe

Author:: EUROPEUM
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: On April 29th, the Brussels Office of EUROPEUM, representing the Think Visegrad Platform, hosted an expert roundtable discussion entitled ‘Germany in multi-dimensional change: implications for Central Europe.’ The event took place at The Library Ambiorix, Square Ambiorix 10, under the Chatham House Rule with a participation of 14 experts. The aim of the discussion was to explore Germany’s ongoing transformation amid overlapping economic, geopolitical, and structural challenges, and their implications for broader European politics.
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

85. Sustainable cost of quinoa production in Bolivia: A landscape approach integrating the recovery of agricultural heritage (COSPH)

Author:: Javier Aliaga Lordemann and Adriana Caballero Caballero
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD)
Abstract:: This study analyzes the sustainable production cost, integrating the recovery of agricultural heritage (COSPH), for quinoa cultivation in the Bolivian High Plateau (Altiplano), seeking to answer: How much does it cost to make quinoa production sustainable over time in Bolivia? And, How does this change when considering agricultural heritage conservation? Specifically, the study evaluates how good agricultural practices (GAP) can mitigate climate change impacts and whether they are cost-effective, integrating the costs of agricultural heritage, which are particularly important for the quinoa real (royal quinoa) crop in Bolivia. Methodologically, the research combines a microeconomic model of imperfect competition calibrated for quinoa — capturing price differentiation based on sustainability and heritage conservation — with the NL-CROP model (Non-Linear Crop Optimization Model), which simulates non-linear interactions between climate, soil, and farming practices. Key findings show that GAP significantly reduce yield losses: under moderate climate conditions, productivity declines decrease from 5-7% to 1.8-2%, while in extreme events, losses drop from 16-30% to 2.5-6.2%, attributed to sustainable soil management. GAP remain viable in scenarios with up to two to three standard deviations, where profit margins cover additional costs. However, in severe crises (50% yield losses), negative margins (-4.7%) make agricultural insurance necessary (premiums of 7-10%), as well as tailored policies to balance climate adaptation with smallholders’ economic viability. When heritage conservation costs are included (COSPH), results show improved resilience (yield loss reduced to 10.5% under a moderate climate scenario) at a moderate additional cost (5.75% compared to 5%), suggesting that preserving agroecological heritage contributes to long-term sustainability. These findings highlight the strategic role of combining sustainable agriculture with the protection of cultural landscapes in vulnerable highland farming in Bolivia.
Topic:: Agriculture, Climate Change, Economics, Environment, Heritage, Farming, Adaptation, Production, and Quinoa
Political Geography:: South America and Bolivia

86. Robotics and Artificial Intelligence: A New Economic Order

Author:: Lili Yan Ing and Gene Grossman
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Various technological advancements have revolutionised how businesses operate and how people live and work. In recent years, significant advancements have occurred regarding industrial robotics and artificial intelligence (AI). The adoption of robotics and AI positively impacts productivity at both firm and national levels through increased precision and cost efficiency. While these technologies have the potential to substantially enhance productivity and to facilitate trade in goods and services, this paper also looks at the research on their impact on workers, wages, and economic welfare. Indeed, the extensive and uneven effects of robotics and AI on different skill sets have become a focus of economic research, which has explored how these technologies may yield outcomes that differ markedly from previous technological advancements.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Robotics
Political Geography:: Asia and Global Focus

87. Grievance and Flawed Governance in Iran’s Baluchestan

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? As Iran struggles with geopolitical tensions and economic duress, its periphery regions are facing additional challenges. Baluchestan, the southern part of Sistan and Baluchestan province, has experienced recurrent unrest. Many residents feel the government discriminates against them as a religious and ethnic minority. Militancy persists. Environmental concerns compound the difficulties. Why does it matter? The central government’s repeated pledges to reduce poverty in Baluchestan through development and improved governance have been undermined by chronic mismanagement, lack of investment and suppression of dissent. Deepening socio-economic disparities, threats of militancy and growing environmental challenges are likely to bring greater strains. What should be done? Enhancing popular participation in local governance, making economic reforms and improving environmental stewardship are the best ways to address Baluchestan’s entrenched crisis. But meaningful progress will require considerable support from the central government, notwithstanding the other huge challenges it faces at home and abroad.
Topic:: Economics, Poverty, Governance, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Baluchestan

88. Game Over? How the United States Could Have Won the Trade Wars

Author:: Emily Kilcrease and Geoffrey Gertz
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The Center for a New American Security's Energy, Economics, and Security (EES) Program designed and conducted an economic wargame to explore possible pathways to resolve the trade wars sparked by historic levels of U.S. tariff escalation. This trade wargame was designed to examine foreign government responses to U.S. tariffs, including whether they would retaliate, negotiate, and/or make concessions. After being punished by U.S. tariffs, would foreign governments have the appetite to engage in dealmaking with the United States and, if so, under what conditions? The trade wargame was conducted on March 17, 2025, two weeks before President Donald Trump made his real-world announcement of shockingly high tariff rates on a day he deemed “Liberation Day.”
Topic:: Economics, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

89. China in Iraq

Author:: Ingrid D'Hooghe, Vera Kranenburg, and Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: China’s main objective in Iraq is to ensure a reliable supply of oil that diversifies Beijing’s imports without making it dependent on Baghdad. China has a large economic footprint in Iraq, moderately strong diplomatic ties and is marginally relevant from a security perspective. Specifically, 50-67% of Iraq’s oil production comes from fields where Chinese companies are involved as investors, producers or in field servicing roles. Iraq’s political elites welcome Chinese engagement as its foreign policy is less intrusive and more respectful than the United States, its presence creates alternatives and its economic deals are profitable on Iraqi terms.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Oil, Bilateral Relations, and Imports
Political Geography:: China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

90. Incomplete Exit: Central and Eastern Europe’s Corporate Decoupling From Russia

Author:: Michal Wyrebkowski
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, companies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) initially were trailblazers in voluntarily withdrawing from Russia, effectively self-sanctioning through voluntary overcompliance with sanctions by leaving, even though operating in the country is still legal. At the same time, CEE countries have enabled sanctions-evasion networks. The historical economic relationship between CEE countries and Russia created the conditions for this paradox. Decades of relying on Russian energy sources masked an asymmetric interdependence: Russia’s military-industrial complex relied heavily on CEE countries for the machine tools, industrial components, and dual-use technologies essential to weapons production. When EU sanctions targeted these critical supply chains, the geographic proximity and established trade relationships that motivated voluntary exit by some companies also enabled systematic sanctions circumvention by others. The EU’s Russia sanctions since 2014 have struggled to match the complexity of the economic networks involved. Early sanctions focused on financial restrictions and high-profile sectors but failed to address the technical vulnerabilities that enable large-scale evasion. Even as restrictions expanded to cover dual-use goods and Russia’s “shadow fleet”, fundamental gaps in classification systems and enforcement mechanisms persisted. The responses of CEE companies have varied across sectors and countries. While investor and consumer pressure drove rapid voluntary exits from Russia in consumer-facing industries, industrial manufacturers found numerous ways to keep supplying it through third-country intermediaries. The behavior of energy companies has reflected the strategic priorities of CEE governments, with some achieving complete diversification from Russia while others reinforced existing dependencies. The variety of corporate responses mirrored the uneven development of national sanctions-enforcement capabilities, ranging from understaffed sanctions departments to insufficiently robust regulatory frameworks; for example, regarding criminalization of violations. The persistence of sanctions evasion through CEE countries reflects systemic failures in the EU’s enforcement architecture. Technical classification systems designed for traditional trade cannot adequately distinguish between civilian and military applications of modern dual-use technologies. Customs officials lack access to the information systems necessary to verify complex ownership structures and end-use destinations. Legal frameworks optimized for territorial jurisdiction are inadequate for regulating globalized supply chains where goods, payments, and corporate structures span multiple jurisdictions. Banking institutions operating across Central and Eastern Europe have become critical actors, with a small number of financial institutions handling substantial portions of Russia’s foreign currency transactions. Their continued operations highlight the limits of EU territorial sanctions, which is confirmed by the extent to which US extraterritorial enforcement has become necessary to police sanctions violations in Europe. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive reforms across multiple dimensions. Technical improvements must include supplementary classification systems that incorporate detailed specifications for dual-use goods, while institutional capacity-building demands substantial increases in staffing and expertise at the national and EU levels. Financial-sector monitoring needs real-time automated screening capabilities and dedicated compliance structures, while industrial-sector oversight requires specialized task forces with technical expertise in dual-use technologies.
Topic:: Economics, Trade, Russia-Ukraine War, and Decoupling
Political Geography:: Russia and Eastern Europe

91. Navigating Global Value Chains and Economics in 2025: US–Vietnam Relations in a Changing IndoPacific

Author:: Thanh Nha Nguyen
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Vietnam has emerged as an indispensable link in Indo-Pacific manufacturing networks. The country’s strategic advantage lies in its ability to adapt to shifting policies while mitigating risks from trade frictions. To sustain these gains, Vietnam must invest strategically in long-term competitiveness by upgrading workforce skills, improving infrastructure, and climbing the value chain through enhanced design and innovation capabilities. Vietnam’s adaptability has made it a prime beneficiary of the ongoing realignment in global supply chains driven by US trade policy changes. Tariffs on Chinese goods and broader efforts to "de-risk" supply lines have prompted many manufacturers to expand operations in Vietnam, sharply boosting exports and investment. By 2023, Vietnam had vaulted from the 12th- to 7th-largest exporter to the United States, as US imports from Vietnam rose by nearly 35 percent year-on-year. High-profile firms, including Samsung, Apple contractors, and major textile producers, have accelerated investments in Vietnam, solidifying its role as a preferred “China+1” manufacturing base.
Topic:: Economics, Manufacturing, and Global Value Chains
Political Geography:: Vietnam, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

92. Tariff Wars: Strategies to Prevent Economic Marginalizationof Africa

Author:: Stephane Atangana
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: The global economy is showing signs of structural slowdown. Global inflation is declining (from6.8% in 2023 to an expected 4.5% in 2025), and medium-term growth has plateaued around3.1%, a historically low level . Concurrently, « geoeconomic fragmentation » is intensifying—definedby the IMF as a policy-driven reversal of global economic integration. Protectionist measures aremultiplying at an unprecedented rate: nearly 3,000 new trade barriers were imposed in 2023, triplethe number in 2019. This surge in restrictions jeopardizes the economic architecture thatpreviously lifted 1.5 billion people out of poverty over recent decades . For low- and middle-incomeAfrican countries, these trends pose a dual challenge: firstly, their economies remain heavilyreliant on commodity prices (accounting for approximately 76% of exports in 2023) and strugglewith diversification; secondly, they face growing pressures on public finances due to mountingdebt. Specifically, external refinancing needs have tripled in a decade, reaching nearly USD 60 billion annually , while debt servicing now consumes over 12% of public revenue on average in sub-Saharan Africa. These constrained fiscal resources severely limit capacities for productiveinvestment and social policies. Thus, the critical question is: How can these vulnerable economiesmaintain access to international markets while fostering sustainable development?
Topic:: Economics, Tariffs, Inflation, Marginalization, Geoeconomics, and Global Economy
Political Geography:: Africa

93. Addressing Policy Issues to Support Women’s EconomicEmpowerment in the Care Economy in Cameroon

Author:: Nkafu Policy Institute
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: Cameroon is a middle-income country with a population of more than 29.4 million [1] . It ranked117 out of 146 in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index in 2021 [2], indicating asignificant gender gap. With an increasing global focus on women’s empowerment, Cameroonhas made strong policy commitments and developed sound policy measures to support Women’sEconomic Empowerment (WEE), backed by changes in macroeconomic frameworks to enable aninclusive approach to economic growth [3]. Nevertheless, gender equality cannot be taken forgranted and needs sustained attention in policy formulation and implementation. More womenhave been moving into paid work and increasingly leadership positions, yet globally, societalexpectations, employer policies, the legal environment and the availability of care continue to playan important role in the choice of educational tracks and career paths for these women. Womenremain disadvantaged at all levels of economic empowerment, especially in access to decentlivelihoods, resource ownership, infrastructure, and services to meet their productive, reproductive, and household needs. This article seeks to address various policy issues required tosupport women’s economic empowerment within the care economy in Cameroon. Thesubsequent sections consist of the Care Economy and Women’s Economic Empowerment, somechallenges and barriers women encounter in terms of economic empowerment, and policychallenges affecting WEE and the care economy. This is followed by a variety of policyrecommendations and future directions.
Topic:: Economics, Women, Empowerment, and Care Economy
Political Geography:: Africa and Cameroon

94. Labor in the Green and Digital Jobs of the Future: What Kind of ‘Future’ Will Arrive and Under Which Conditions?

Author:: Aslı Aydın
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:: Sustainable development goals, increasing environmental threats and global competition are forcing countries to take steps towards green transition and digital transformation based on artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. In this so-called “twin transformation”, low-carbon and smart technology-oriented jobs are expected to increase rapidly and future jobs are expected to be shaped around these new trends. In this policy brief, the potential opportunities and risks in the twin transformation, including the gender equality dimension, are examined together, and discussion topics that are expected to benefit policymaking are put forward.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Digital Economy, Artificial Intelligence, Labor Market, Sustainable Development, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:: Global Focus

95. The Arctic as an Arena for Strategic Competition: Rivalry with Traditional and Irregular Levers of Power on NATO’s Northern Flank

Author:: Njord Wegge
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article investigates to what degree and through which fields and mechanisms strategic competition today plays out in the Arctic as well as how these questions align with international relations (IR) theory. Using rationalist approaches to the study of IR and the DIME model (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to structure the empirical investigation, this article finds that the strategic competition matches perspectives found in realism as well as liberalism. The article points out how states develop strategies to maximize security, wealth, power, and prosperity at the cost of others, while at the same time also identifies empirical evidence supporting liberal perspectives that stresses how unintended consequences of competition can be harnessed through institutions and international law. The competitive environment experienced in today’s Arctic increasingly reflects an international society characterized by zero-sum thinking and a dynamic where the constraining role of institutions has diminished.
Topic:: International Relations, NATO, Diplomacy, Economics, Strategic Competition, Military, and Information
Political Geography:: Arctic

96. Investing in Power: Unequal Exchange in Global Value Chains

Author:: James Heitz and William Milberg
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: The question of how value is distributed within global value chains (GVCs) is one of the central questions in contemporary research on trade and development and an analysis of power is central to understanding this issue. This paper extends existing research on distribution within global value chains by focusing on the issue of power in both product markets and supplier markets. We present a formal model in which lead firms capture a larger share of value-added, either through higher mark-ups – monopoly power – or lower unit costs goods purchased from suppliers – monopsony power. Maintaining or expanding this market power involves costly investments in intangible assets, with the nature of that investment depending on the characteristics of the GVC. This framework provides new insights into the distributive dynamics of value chains, including reputation effects tied to corporate social responsibility. In this way, the paper presents an innovative way of theorizing international trade, inspired by the unequal exchange tradition, that can be extended in future research.
Topic:: Economics, Human Rights, Finance, Macroeconomics, Global Value Chains, and Labor Market
Political Geography:: Global Focus

97. Anchored Inflation With Differential Inflation Benchmarks

Author:: Thomas R. Michl
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: This paper presents a model of inflation and distribution that features a structural difference between the wage Phillips curve and the price Phillips curve. The wage Phillips curve revolves around conditions in the labor market represented by the employment rate while the price Phillips curve revolves around conditions in the product market represented by capacity utilization. Differences in the relative bargaining power of workers and capitalist firms give rise to stabilizing real wage dynamics that lead to normal capacity utilization. Wage and price setting are each benchmarked to a different reference rate of price inflation, and both are anchored by the central bank’s inflation target. Price-setting by capitalist firms requires accurate projections (inflation expectations) of their competitors’ prices while the wage-setting reference rate reflects the delay in keeping up with past inflation that firms impose on workers, so that more anchoring represents the loss of working class bargaining power. Greater anchoring of the wage-setting reference rate relative to the price-setting rate makes real wages vulnerable to erosion from inflation. Capacity constraints also generate inflation that erodes wages. The model sheds some light on the recent post-Covid inflation through these channels.
Topic:: Economics, Employment, Inflation, and Labor Market
Political Geography:: Global Focus

98. Inequality of Opportunity and Stratification Economics: Different Paths, Shared Concerns

Author:: Luis Monroy-Gómez-Franco
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: This paper compares two approaches to the study of inequality that have recently consolidated as distinct fields: the economics of inequality of opportunity (IOp) and stratification economics (SE). IOp examines how circumstances beyond individual control shape inequalities, while SE emphasizes how institutions and group identities reproduce intergroup hierarchies. I argue that, despite distinct origins, the two frameworks can be viewed as complementary. To support this claim, I outline the main features of each theoretical framework and contrast them along several dimensions: their equalisandum, the role of social groups, primary unit of analysis, and their conception of how structural factors influence inequality. The analysis shows that the distance between the two approaches is less significant than often assumed. Their differences enhance their complementarity, positioning SE and IOp not as competitors but as mutually reinforcing frameworks for understanding inequality.
Topic:: Economics, Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Stratification Economics
Political Geography:: Global Focus

99. Mexico: A Pivotal State on the Global Stage

Author:: Ryan C. Berg, Rubi Biedsoe, and Michael Ferguson
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: In his 1867 Manifesto to the Nation, Benito Juárez famously stated: “Among individuals, as among nations, respect for the rights of others is peace.”1 Spoken by Mexico’s first indigenous president, Juárez’s quote demonstrates Mexico’s view of the global order—that countries should promote national sovereignty, security, and prosperity through collaboration and dialogue rather than through intervention. Mexico effectively operates with one foot in the door of the Global North, via its position in North America, and one foot in the door of the Global South, as one of the leading economies and cultural powerhouses of Latin America. This hybrid role, characterized by some as a “pivotal state,” has created both opportunities for leverage and areas of tension with other countries, particularly with regards to its close but complicated relationship with its northern neighbor.2 A key player and beneficiary of a global economy underpinned by a U.S.-led order, Mexico has found itself in a state of “autonomy within limits,” by which U.S. interests oftentimes circumscribe Mexico’s range of potential actions.3 Being the United States’ southern neighbor both grants Mexico unmatched economic benefits and presents it with a delicate balancing act: In pursuing autonomy within limits, Mexico must maximize its benefits from the Western-led order while asserting its sovereignty and reducing its dependence on the order’s biggest players, especially the United States. This tension influences Mexico’s policy positions as its presidents balance nationalistic rhetoric at home and trying to assuage U.S. concerns. Mexico’s balancing act also exacerbates divisions between the country’s pro–Global North elites and its disadvantaged populations who have not received the benefits of global economic integration, which has led to the success of the social welfare and populist-oriented Morena party. Mexico’s effort to maintain relations with its neighbor to the north consumes most of its foreign policy energy. But Mexico’s foreign policy DNA, often described as noninterventionism or the Estrada Doctrine (after Foreign Affairs Minister Genaro Estrada), can sometimes undercut its desire to play a leadership role on the global stage. Mexico firmly believes that nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries can earn it a seat at the tables that matter, allowing it to negotiate or mediate conflicts. In practice, however, Mexico has demonstrated little global leadership of late, preferring to stay on the sidelines (and under President Lopez Obrador, to focus on his project of domestic transformation). Mexico’s ultimate goal is to exert full sovereignty over its domestic affairs; it has also used its political capital on the global stage to openly criticize the role of U.S. sanctions and containment policies against Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela for contributing the region’s security and migration crises. Further, Mexico does not see the world through the West’s post–Cold War lens, but rather as a group of politically equal states. China and Russia are treated as normal states in the international system the same way Algeria, Ethiopia, or Thailand might be.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Latin America, North America, and Mexico

100. The United Arab Emirates: From Footnote to Sophisticated Global Partner

Author:: Jon B. Alterman
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Vladimir Putin bounded down two dozen steps from his presidential plane on the morning of December 6, 2023. It must have felt good to be on the road again. An International Criminal Court indictment following his invasion of Ukraine had limited his international travel to former Soviet states, China, and Iran—but now, he seemed free. While world leaders were focused on the COP28 conference in Dubai, Putin—escorted by four Su-35 fighter jets—arrived in Abu Dhabi to a hero’s welcome. Lampposts were draped with Russian and Emirati flags. His limousine rolled past Bedouin guards and their camels lining the right side of the road, while mounted cavalry bearing Russian flags lined the left. The seven jets of the UAE Air Force’s acrobatic team streaked overhead, their colored smoke painting the Russian tricolor across the skies of the Emirati capital. The onward trip to Saudi Arabia for a few hours that evening almost felt like an anticlimax. For nearly two decades, the leadership of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has spared no effort in portraying itself as an essential Middle East partner to the United States, a beacon of moderation, and a catalyst for regional transformation. The push had its origins in crisis: two of the 9/11 hijackers were Emirati, leaving behind distrust among some in Congress and the American security establishment. The Emirati leadership confronted those perceptions head-on, skillfully courting U.S. government officials, senior military officers, and opinion leaders over the years. They judged that success in Washington was impossible if Israel and the UAE were at loggerheads, so outreach extended to the American Jewish community and included many years of quiet conversations with Israeli officials, culminating in U.S.-brokered diplomatic recognition in 2020. The Emirati goal with each successive U.S. president, it seemed, was to be considered America’s favorite Arab state. That effort was largely a success. For many in Washington and across the United States, the UAE became a model for the Middle East. And yet, as the Biden administration sought to rally the world after February 2022 to defend Ukraine and isolate Russia, the UAE remained circumspect. Distrustful of ideology in all its forms, the Emirati leadership viewed their country as a global entrepôt that had earned the right to flourish outside of political blocs. They saw no contradiction between being a close friend of the United States and entering into a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China in 2018. When Russian capital (and capitalists) sought a place to land after Ukraine-related sanctions slammed Russia in 2022, Emiratis welcomed both. Emirati officials touted their success in negotiating the exchange of hundreds of Russian and Ukrainian prisoners of war. They simultaneously deepened economic ties with both Ukraine and Russia. The UAE, they argued, was a more valuable friend when it maintained relationships with all. They would not choose—in part, because they judged they did not have to.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Global South, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Middle East and United Arab Emirates

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS