Topic: Diplomacy - CIAO Search Results

1. The Ukraine War Prospect: How Peace Plans Might Work and Why They Will Fail

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: During 2025 multiple contending Ukraine peace and cease-fire proposals were put forward by the Trump administration and America’s European partners. This article examines how the leading official proposals fell short. And it presents two, simpler proposals better aligned with battlefield realities. The article also explores the evolution of US, Ukrainian, Russian, and West European public opinion on the war. The Russia-Ukraine war has been a disaster – not only for the two principal combatants, who together have suffered 300,000 deaths, but for the entire world. This fact drives the imperative to end this conflict forthwith via negotiated compromise. Yet, as the article shows, none of the official proposals embrace this imperative. Instead, all exhibit efforts to win advantage for one side or the other. They are instances of diplo-fare – war by means of diplomacy. As such, their aim may be rejection not agreement, with an eye toward painting one’s opponent as intransigent and, in this way, build support for continuing the fight – or, in the case of President Trump’s preference, establish a pretext for US withdrawal. The simplest proposals may be the most practicable but these must reflect current battlefield realities rather than attempting to “correct” or “re-balance” them. This principle guides the independent cease-fire options suggested in this article. Otherwise, the article explores the possibility that Europe’s so-called Coalition of the Willing will respond to any serious fracture of Kyiv’s effort – a distinct possibility – by establishing a new nuclearized Europe-vs-Russia “central front” inside Ukraine. (With an Appendix summarizing the official November and December peace proposal texts.)
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, European Union, Negotiation, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and NATO
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

2. Pakistan Steps In: Sudan and the Transformation of Regional Security

Author:: Areig Elhag
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: A $1.5 billion Pakistani arms deal with Sudan signals a regional shift from diplomacy toward military escalation, which may prolong the war in Sudan. At a moment that should have seen renewed momentum toward a political settlement in Sudan, reports suggest that Pakistan, with Saudi mediation, is nearing completion of a $1.5 billion arms deal with the war-torn country. Far from being a routine arms transaction, the deal encompasses Karakoram-8 aircraft, more than 200 drones, and air defense systems. It also potentially includes JF-17 multirole fighter jets, produced jointly by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. This development points to a deeper regional shift away from sponsoring dialogue and toward a military resolution to the Sudanese conflict.
Topic:: Civil War, Diplomacy, Regional Security, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Africa, and Sudan

3. Prospects for Syria-Israel Relations

Author:: David Schenker
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Israel may believe the tense status quo is sustainable, but Washington is frustrated about the potential implications for Arab normalization, Turkish military friction, and near-term economic plans.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Syria

4. The Recognition of The Palestinian Statehood and itsImplication to International Diplomacy

Author:: Pippie Hugues
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: The recognition of Palestinian statehood has re‑emerged as a pivotal issue in internationaldiplomacy, reshaping alliances and testing the limits of symbolic acts in global politics. While 147UN member states now recognize Palestine, this acknowledgment remains contested, particularlyby Israel and its closest allies. The debate underscores the tension between symbolism andsubstance: recognition strengthens legitimacy but does not automatically deliver stability or peace. For Africa, the Palestinian case resonates with unresolved sovereignty disputes such as WesternSahara and Somaliland. It highlights the importance of collective positions, effective mediation,and reforms in global governance systems. The African Union and subregional blocs havehistorically intervened in contested sovereignties, but their capacity remains constrained by limitedresources and weak enforcement mechanisms. This brief argues that recognition must be paired with tangible reforms, inclusive dialogue, andinstitutional strengthening. For African states, the lesson is clear: declarations alone areinsufficient. By leveraging recognition diplomatically, advocating for UN Security Council reform, and enhancing AU mediation frameworks, Africa can transform symbolic acts into meaningfulsteps toward peace, stability, and equitable global governance.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Sovereignty, Geopolitics, Equity, and Recognition
Political Geography:: Middle East and Palestine

5. Restraint and Diplomacy in Arctic Policy: Cooperation Amid U.S.-Russia-China Tensions

Author:: Pavel Devyatkin
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: In recent years, the Arctic has become the site of both great-power cooperation and competition. While the 2025 Alaska summit between Presidents Putin and Trump reflected a thaw in U.S.–Russia relations, U.S. interest in acquiring Greenland has cast doubt on continued U.S. cooperation with both Russia and China in the region. This brief details how a combination of restraint and proactive diplomacy in the Arctic — built upon shared interests and a recognition of competitive coexistence — will best serve the United States. The second Trump administration has called for American Arctic dominance, viewing the region as an energy source and as an opportunity to monopolize resources and to establish its Western Hemisphere force posture. Russia views the Arctic through a similar lens of resources and sovereignty, as it ramps up its military presence while intensifying efforts to extract natural resources. China’s influence in the region has steadily increased, as it collaborates with Russia, while advancing scientific research, sustainable development, and multilateral climate cooperation. The United States has come to see increasing Russia–China collaboration in the Arctic as a threat to U.S. national interests. But rather than responding to this deepening relationship through unilateralism, the U.S. should recognize that competitive coexistence and trilateral cooperation are more beneficial. This approach avoids zero-sum confrontation and minimizes accidental escalation while maintaining U.S. force projection, maximizing resource extraction, and promoting scientific collaboration. Toward this end, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Establish trilateral maritime safety and search-and-rescue, SAR, operations, a system that exchanges real-time information, conducts joint training exercises, and invests in port and coast guard infrastructure. Such cooperation would lower shipping costs, improve safety, and encourage economic development — goals shared by the United States, Russia, and China. Institutionalize direct, reliable U.S.–Russia–China communication channels, including a dedicated Arctic hotline for incident reporting and a security digital platform for real-time vessel tracking. Such transparency minimizes the chances of miscalculation, particularly with nuclear assets in the region. Revitalize the Arctic Council to enable communication among the three major powers, the eight Arctic states, and Indigenous representatives. Initiate a trilateral arms control framework, using reductions in Arctic military exercises as a springboard for broader arms control and security arrangements.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

6. Turkey–Israel Relations: Strategic Context and Policy Considerations

Author:: Gabi Siboni and Erez Winner
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Between Ankara’s regional ambition, ideological and religious zeal, and economic vulnerability—implications for Israel’s security and diplomacy
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

7. Parliamentary Diplomacy and Normative Contestation after Coups d’État in West Africa

Author:: Nádia Teresa dos Santos Loureiro
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: This article examines how international parliamentary organisations (IPOs) engage with situations of constitutional rupture following coups d’état in West Africa, focusing on political transitions in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea (Conakry) between 2020 and 2023. It addresses how parliamentary actors, lacking coercive authority, engage in contexts marked by military takeovers, suspended constitutional frameworks and contested political legitimacy. Drawing on a constructivist and post-Westphalian perspective, the article conceptualises parliamentary diplomacy operating through discursive practices and symbolic positioning. Empirically, the analysis examines the responses of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) based on qualitative documentary analysis of resolutions, statements and institutional reports. The findings show that, despite significant political and structural constraints, IPOs contribute to articulating expectations of legitimate governance by problematising the marginalisation of parliaments and reaffirming representative institutions as expressions of popular sovereignty
Topic:: Diplomacy, Sovereignty, Legitimacy, Coup, and Parliamentary Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Africa, West Africa, Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso

8. Duterte’s Populist Foreign Policy as Illiberal Defiance: Consequences and Prospects

Author:: Aries A. Arugay
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Barely two months into his presidency of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte attended the 2016 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Vientiane, Laos. The former mayor of Davao City had just swept the presidential election to become the first executive from outside of the Manila-based political establishment. Rather than reading a scripted speech, he launched into an impromptu tirade about colonial atrocities by the United States. Duterte went on to defend his violent war on drugs and rebut the criticisms of his equally violent purge of suspected criminals.1 The world was shocked by the bad manners exhibited by Duterte, especially his insult to then U.S. president Barack Obama.2 This was the beginning of the shift in Philippine foreign policy toward a more populist, illiberal, and revisionist posture—one that would last until Duterte’s presidency ended in 2022. This essay advances two core arguments about how Duterte’s right-wing populism shaped Philippine foreign policy. First, Duterte’s foreign policy was not motivated by an ideology, so much as by a performance anchored in symbolic defiance, personalized diplomacy, and selective norm rejection.3 Second, Duterte’s populist revisionism ultimately collided with entrenched structural constraints, including the country’s enduring security dependence on the United States, institutional resistance within the bureaucracy, and the democratic political succession that brought the nonpopulist President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to power. Taken together, these constraints exposed the limits of populist foreign policy in a small and militarily vulnerable state situated on the front lines of the U.S.-China rivalry. Since Duterte was elected, there has been widespread recognition that populism’s impact goes beyond national borders. In Europe, for instance, populists tended not to touch traditional foreign policy and security issues until the 2015 refugee crisis. The wave of populism that followed was marked by a contempt for the cosmopolitan European outlook that had long underpinned support for the European Union, liberal migration policies, and Europe’s reliance on the United States for its security.4 Populists on both the left and right are often skeptical of multilateral institutions because they restrain state power. Venezuela’s former president Hugo Chávez, for example, attempted to form alternative regional institutions in the Americas to counter U.S. hegemony.5 The revisionist impulse inherent in populism inclines its leaders toward foreign policy adventurism, even though abrupt shifts are uncommon given the durability of national strategic interests. Populist leaders also often exhibit a high risk tolerance—especially personalist leaders in command of highly concentrated state power.6 Moreover, they often see foreign policy as a means of weakening their political opponents and consolidating power at home. They also crave international recognition, which they pursue through “megaphone diplomacy” that foregrounds their personality and charisma.7 The burden of managing foreign relations is bearable for the populist up to the point that strategic reality intervenes, imposing itself in ways that leave scant room for performance. Populist politics, therefore, are unable to resist the water’s edge. This essay proceeds by tracing the right-wing populist currents in Philippine foreign policy under Duterte through three major international issues: disputes with China in the South China Sea, the attempted abrogation of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, and the country’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Respectively, each of these issues foregrounds one of the foundations of Philippine foreign policy that Duterte attempted to undermine: international law, the Philippines’ alliance with the United States, and human rights. The essay goes on to analyze how these foreign policy stances resonated with the revisionist orientations of countries that Duterte sought inspiration from—namely China and Russia. These revisionist narratives were reinforced in the Philippines through domestic disinformation networks that learned strategies from Russia and China.8 Finally, the essay highlights the implications of Duterte’s populist policies under the Marcos Jr. administration and examines the prospects of their revival in the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Populism, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:: Asia and Philippines

9. An Unbowed Petro Successfully Plays the Diplomat

Author:: Juan Antonio Martínez-Sánchez
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:: Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s positive meeting with Trump stands to benefit not only his coalition, but also the region writ large.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Donald Trump, Regional Politics, and Gustavo Petro
Political Geography:: Colombia, South America, North America, and United States of America

10. Diplomacy Meets Paradiplomacy: Unpacking Central Government Responses through Evidence from Turkey’s Paradiplomac

Author:: Esra Kaya Erdoğan and Emrah Atar
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This study examines the central government’s response to the paradiplomacy of sub-state actors through an analysis of the Turkish case, using a qualitative approach. As part of this research, a total of twelve face-to-face or virtual interviews were conducted with the representatives from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Marmara Municipalities Union, and academics between June 2023 and November 2023. It views paradiplomacy as an outcome of the ongoing trend to localize diplomacy and aims to identify varying central government responses to paradiplomacy. These responses are analyzed using a three-fold categorization: positive, negative and mixed. The characteristics of each category explored in the context of the Turkish case. The study suggests that, despite the central government’s opportunistic approach to paradiplomacy, its response has shown a cyclical tendency. The central government’s stance on paradiplomacy is therefore complex and politically driven. It fluctuates along a broad spectrum, ranging from direct support to outright exclusion. This reflects the shifting political dynamics in Turkey.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Government, Governance, Municipalities, and Sub-state Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

11. Diplomacy in the Foreground. The New EU Migration Policy Framework

Author:: Jolanta Szymańska
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: The migration, asylum and visa strategies, presented at the end of January this year by the European Commission, set the framework for EU migration policy for the coming years. According to both documents' assumptions, migration diplomacy is intended to support the Union's security and global competitiveness priorities. The planned reforms aim to eliminate abuses of the asylum and visa system and to attract skilled workers and investment to the EU. The implementation of the strategy will be challenged by both instability in Europe's neighbourhood and the persistent reluctance of member states to accept migrants.
Topic:: Diplomacy, European Union, Asylum, Visa, and Migration Policy
Political Geography:: Europe

12. Tech Diplomacy and Avenues for Digital Development in Africa

Author:: Folashadé Soulé
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: Tech diplomacy in Africa is gaining traction as a vital tool for advancing foreign policy goals, fostering regional integration, promoting economic development and attracting investments. It involves leveraging digital technologies and platforms to enhance communication, engage citizens and shape narratives on the global stage. Although challenges persist, African nations are actively exploring opportunities to build sovereign digital capabilities and participate in shaping global digital governance. Tech diplomacy will be critical to how Africa engages with itself as new and emerging technologies increasingly demand collaboration, whether in cross-border data flows, shared compute infrastructure, talent development and mobility, or digital public goods, including fair taxation regimes that make African countries more competitive globally than with one another. A stronger and more cohesive continental approach to tech diplomacy will ultimately enable the continent to build resilience and engage with other regions from a position of strength.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Data Governance, and Digital Governance
Political Geography:: Africa

13. Lessons from the 2025 G7 Cycle: Quantum, AI and Science Diplomacy

Author:: Michael P. A. Murphy
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: The 2025 G7 convened at a time of international instability. Nevertheless, its meetings achieved meaningful progress on emerging technologies. The 2025 G7 cycle’s outputs focused on scope, rather than concluding with a wide-ranging statement about geopolitical order, a fundamentally different perspective for middle powers. Michael P. A. Murphy argues that middle powers can use strategies of science diplomacy to navigate the current instability of international relations. Technical aspects of science policy have the potential to facilitate continued cooperation amid growing international tensions, as has been demonstrated by the key emerging technology outputs of the 2025 G7 cycle, and by emphasizing technical cooperation rather than debates on international order, middle powers can support the resilience of international institutions.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, G7, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: Global Focus

14. Emerging Powers’ Engagement in International Organizations: The Case of Vietnam’s Multilateral Diplomacy

Author:: Tran Chi Trung and Hoang Hien Thuong
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: It is widely believed that, with greater political and economic influence, emerging powers are increasingly playing larger roles within international institutions, ranging from global organisations, regional organisations, to various alternative platforms of minilateralism or coalition of the willing. Despite growing debates about the motivations of emerging powers when engaging in both new regional organisations and existing global institutions, there is limited research explaining this from the perspective of these nations. Hence, this article addresses this gap by studying the case of Vietnam’s multilateral diplomacy since 2021. The article adopts a qualitative research design, combining discourse analysis of official speeches, policy documents, and a case study of Vietnam’s participation in international and regional organisations following the new foreign policy direction of Viet Nam since 2021. We argue that while Vietnam and other emerging powers share a common aspiration for a more multipolar and equitable international order, their multilateral strategies diverge according to distinct priorities and challenges. After its 13th National Congress in 2021, Vietnam’s foreign policy focuses on leveraging multilateral institutions to heighten the country's international influence and position. Aiming to become a regional leader, Viet Nam has been more proactive in leading ASEAN’s agenda and pathways forward, advancing its convening capacity, and acting as a linchpin between ASEAN and regional and international organisations. While at the global level, Viet Nam is stepping up as a sectoral leader, focusing on new fields and domains of global governance to shape a conducive future for its national development path.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Organization, Multilateralism, ASEAN, and Regional Organizations
Political Geography:: Vietnam and Southeast Asia

15. Analysis of Emerging Powers Joining to International and Regional Organisations: Intentions and Implications

Author:: Mojtaba Eskandari, Farhad Farahani, Somayeh Hamidi, and Sara Torabian
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: The significant growth of regional and global cooperation in economic, military, and ideological areas is a common feature of modern diplomacy, as states have been continuously expanding these efforts. In today's geopolitics, these collaborations are not limited to specific regions but extend to superregional and global levels; this is evident in emerging powers that seek to increase their global influence through mutual agreements and the creation of regional or international organisations. The goal of this research is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the strategic considerations behind emerging powers' involvement in multilateral frameworks. Being part of international and regional organisations allows them to coordinate efforts and play a vital role in shaping the international order. To achieve this goal, a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis will be used, including analysis of documents, policies, expert reviews, and historical case studies.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Organization, Regional Cooperation, International Order, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Global Focus

16. Starr Forum: The Future of US-China Relations

Author:: Nicholas Burns and Yasheng Huang
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Starr Forum: The Future of US-China Relations | Tuesday, February 17, 2026 Speakers: Nicholas Burns is the Goodman Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He is the founder and faculty chair of the Future of Diplomacy Project and a faculty affiliate at Harvard’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Burns worked in the United States government for over three decades, serving six presidents and nine secretaries of state. Most recently, he served as the US ambassador to the People's Republic of China from 2021-2025, leading public servants from forty-eight US government agencies at the US mission to China in overseeing one of America's most important bilateral relationships. Moderator: Yasheng Huang is the Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He also serves as the faculty director of the MIT-China Program at the Center for International Studies. From 2013 to 2017, he served as an associate dean of MIT Sloan’s GlobalPartnership programs and its Action Learning initiatives. His previous appointments include faculty positions at the University of Michigan and at Harvard Business School. Huang is the author of 11 books in both English and Chinese and of many academic papers. His most recent book, “The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead to its Decline”, was a 2023 Best Book of the Year by Foreign Affairs magazine.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. IMEC 2.0: A New Regional Vision After the Gaza War

Author:: Gedaliah Afterman
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was launched as a transport and connectivity initiative linking India, the Gulf, and Europe. That logic remains relevant, but the post-Gaza regional environment demands a broader and more resilient design. Political constraints have tightened, Israel’s room for manoeuvre has narrowed, and regional cooperation is increasingly shaped by risk management rather than visibility. In this context, IMEC cannot function effectively as a linear corridor alone. This paper argues for reframing IMEC as a networked regional architecture, IMEC 2.0, that integrates physical infrastructure with digital systems, energy transition, economic stabilisation, and diplomatic coordination. This approach reflects current regional realities more accurately, allows cooperation to advance unevenly and in sequence, and reduces political exposure without stalling momentum. For Israel, IMEC 2.0 offers a way to re-anchor itself in the region through practical contribution leading to political normalisation. The paper assesses the post-Gaza regional landscape, maps the constraints and opportunities facing Israel, and outlines how a networked IMEC can support regional integration, stabilisation, and long-term economic resilience. It argues that the central risk for Israel is not only exclusion by design, but marginalisation through delay. Early positioning, including credible action on the Palestinian front within emerging regional architectures, will determine whether Israel helps shape the systems that define regional connectivity or is forced to adapt to them later.
Topic:: 2023 Gaza War, India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), Diplomacy, and Connectivity
Political Geography:: Middle East, India, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

18. Normalization Through Strength? A Dual Israeli–Saudi Examination of Power, Perception, and the Limits of Military-Centric

Author:: Eitan Ishai
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: This paper examines the concept of “normalization through strength” through a dual Israeli-Saudi lens, arguing that military power alone cannot generate sustainable regional integration. Tracing the rise of this framework within Israeli strategic thinking – especially after the Abraham Accords and following October 7 – the paper shows how Israeli leaders and much of the public came to believe that demonstrations of force could substitute for diplomacy and political compromise. Juxtaposing this with the Saudi perspective, which prioritizes stability, predictability, territorial integrity, and political legitimacy, the paper demonstrates how the same Israeli actions interpreted domestically as deterrence were perceived in Riyadh as destabilizing and risky. Focusing on the Israeli-Saudi case, it argues that “normalization through strength” failed not because Israel lacked power, but because power was decoupled from restraint, diplomacy, and credible political horizons – most notably regarding the Palestinian issue. The paper concludes that future normalization depends less on raw strength than on reliability: the ability to embed military capability within a coherent diplomatic strategy grounded in restraint, accountability, and regional stability.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia

19. Divergent Paths in the South Caucasus: Strategy, Survival, Retreat

Author:: Laura Linderman
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: When President Donald Trump welcomed Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to the White House in August 2025, the ceremony celebrated more than just the hope that decades of conflict between the two neighboring states might finally be coming to an end. The agreement initialed that day, which grants the United States long‑term development rights to a transit corridor ambitiously named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), marked a watershed moment in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. For the first time in modern history, a major peace process in the region had bypassed Moscow entirely in favor of Western mediation. Yet the TRIPP agreement’s deeper significance lies not in American diplomatic triumph, but in what it reveals about a regional transformation—and the limits of that transformation. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created a window of opportunity for the South Caucasus, a moment when Moscow’s strategic distraction has given regional states unprecedented room to maneuver. The question is not whether this window exists, it clearly does, but how long it will remain open, and which states have the capacity to exploit it before it closes. The answers vary dramatically. The South Caucasus has moved from what Zbigniew Brzezinski famously called the “grand chessboard,” where great powers moved regional states as pawns, to what Svante E. Cornell and Damjan Krnjević Mišković describe in the introduction to their edited volume, titled After Karabakh: War, Peace, and the forging of a New Caucasus (2025), as a “card table,” where each state holds its own sovereign hand of playing cards. But not all hands are equal. Azerbaijan sits at the card table with a strong hand, leveraging energy resources, geographic indispensability, and military victory to extract value from multiple powers simultaneously. Armenia plays a weak hand the best it can under the circumstances, having initiated much of the TRIPP process to escape isolation and avoid being further diminished by Azerbaijan; a survival strategy, but a strategy nonetheless. And one could say that it looks as if Georgia has lit its best cards on fire or eaten them, with its government seemingly choosing preservation over strategic opportunity. The scene at the metaphorical card table after the most recent hand has been dealt is not, as some Western commentators have assumed, a straightforward regional pivot away from Russia toward the West. Nor is it the emergence of a coherent new form of sovereignty. It is something messier: three states responding to the same geopolitical shock with radically different resources, constraints, and choices. The West has increasingly set aside the post‑Cold War vision of liberal internationalism, with its emphasis on open markets, multilateral institutions, and shared sovereignty, in favor of a more transactional approach to statecraft. States the world over, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, are adapting to this reality, but adaptation looks very different depending on whether you’re negotiating from strength or desperation.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, International Order, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and South Caucasus

20. Local Care and Feminist Foreign Policy: Lessons Learned from Mexico City’s UTOPÍAS

Author:: Evyn Papworth
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:: As feminist foreign policies face growing political backlash around the world, questions remain about how states can ensure these policies are grounded in the lived realities of the communities they seek to serve. One way to bridge the gap between international commitments and domestic implementation is through the care economy. This policy paper examines Mexico City’s UTOPÍAS—publicly funded community centers that provide care services, educational opportunities, cultural programming, and support for economic autonomy. Drawing on field research and interviews with policymakers, civil society representatives, and community members, the paper explores how these centers embody feminist principles through an intersectional approach to care, gender equality, and social inclusion. The paper argues that initiatives like the UTOPÍAS demonstrate how local governments can advance transformative care policies while contributing to broader feminist foreign policy goals. It highlights the potential of municipal feminist diplomacy and city-to-city exchanges as avenues for sharing innovative approaches to care, human security, and gender equality across borders.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economy, Feminism, and Autonomy
Political Geography:: Latin America, Mexico, and Mexico City

21. The Case for Cybersecurity Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Songdo, Korea as a Minilateralist Model

Author:: Hyunwoo Jo
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: This paper examines the prospects for cybersecurity cooperation in Northeast Asia, where intensifying cyber dependencies intersect with great power rivalry. While claims of a “new era of warfare” are often overstated, cybercrime targeting private sectors has become increasingly widespread, and sophisticated attacks on critical infrastructure remain a pressing concern. Despite skepticism toward global “tech alliances,” minilateral cooperation offers a more pragmatic path for trust-building and information sharing. This study addresses two central questions: Can Northeast Asian middle powers foster meaningful cybersecurity cooperation despite great power tensions? And how can Korea, through Songdo, Incheon, leverage its technological capacity and middle-power identity to establish a regional cybersecurity hub? By exploring these questions, the paper highlights the potential of Songdo as a platform for shaping norms and advancing security governance in the cyber domain.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, Collaboration, Minilateralism, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:: Asia and Korea

22. After the compromise: Australia’s COP31 blueprint for the Pacific

Author:: Melanie Pill, Georgia Hammersley, and Alexandre Dayant
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Australia’s COP31 compromise with Türkiye, which allows Antalya to host this year’s global climate summit, secures Canberra’s control of official negotiations but weakens its influence over the wider summit, where practical decisions are made. The Pacific-hosted pre-COP is a critical opportunity to build political momentum ahead of COP31 by convening selected global leaders and placing Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in a visible leadership role to secure high-profile support for Pacific climate priorities. Australia can still deliver meaningful outcomes for the Pacific by aligning regional priorities with those of other climate-vulnerable countries, exercising ambitious leadership through the President of Negotiations, and redirecting hosting-related resources towards climate action in the region.
Topic:: Climate Change, Diplomacy, and Conference of the Parties (COP)
Political Geography:: Australia, Pacific Islands, Turkey, and Global Focus

23. The Global South and the Russian War on Ukraine: Structural Constraints on Diplomatic Alignment: An assessment of the political, economic, and institutional factors shaping multilateral engagement with Russia's war against Ukraine

Author:: Paul R. Williams
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:: Three years into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a striking diplomatic gap persists between the breadth of international condemnation and the depth of practical alignment. While 141 states voted in the UN General Assembly to demand Russia's immediate withdrawal in March 2022, the countries that have joined Western-led sanctions regimes, restricted Russian access to their financial systems, or curtailed bilateral trade with Moscow represent a narrower group. That gap is not incidental and it reflects durable structural realities across the Global South that are rooted in economic dependencies, regional security pressures, institutional history, and the architecture of development finance. Understanding those realities is a prerequisite for any realistic assessment of how the conflict's diplomatic landscape might evolve. A related question follows from this analysis: given the structural depth of these constraints, whether Ukraine's diplomatic strategy would be better served by consolidating and sustaining existing Western commitments rather than investing heavily in outreach to states whose non-alignment is unlikely to shift within any operationally relevant timeframe.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Law, Sanctions, Multilateralism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global South

24. The Factors That Matter: A Formula for Understanding China’s Use of Force Calculus Over Taiwan

Author:: Lyle Morris
Publication Date:: 07-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: As the United States and China enter a prolonged period of instability and tension, how and under what circumstances China may use force, or, alternatively, be deterred from using force, has become of crucial importance to U.S. policymakers seeking to avoid conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While the United States can draw on its experience gauging threats and making difficult strategic calculations during the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, the emerging strategic rivalry with China is still in its early stages. The question of how to deter conflict with the PRC will be an increasingly important factor in the strategic calculations in Beijing and Washington, especially in times of heightened instability and crisis between the two powers. This, in turn, raises enormous and complex questions for U.S. policy regarding U.S.-China strategic stability, U.S.-China crisis management, and strategic and conventional deterrence vis-à-vis China. In spite of this emergent challenge, critical gaps remain in the Western understanding of PRC deterrence concepts. Most importantly, and most urgently, there is little understanding of how or why China may be deterred from resorting to military force in the event of a serious confrontation with the United States. To address these critical gaps, this paper explores China’s approach to deterrence in the military and diplomatic domain, in order to inform U.S. understanding of how it might deter China in a crisis or conflict. In particular, this paper introduces a set of key variables that matter most to China’s leadership in contemplating using force to “reunify” Taiwan with mainland China. This study develops a methodological formula that can be used by policy-makers and academics interested in understanding what has deterred Chinese leaders from using force against Taiwan, and what might cause China to change its calculus.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, Regional Security, and Use of Force
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

25. Implementing Effective U.S.-China Economic Engagement Channels

Author:: Brendan Kelly and Scott Shaw
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: As the state of U.S.-China relations has undergone significant fluctuations over the past decade, so has the structure and frequency of economic engagements between the two countries. The number and scale of such dialogues came under heavy criticism from Republican and Democratic China hawks alike—with one notable critic famously tying the rise of U.S.-China dialogues to the rise of the U.S. trade deficit with China. Some of this criticism misses the mark, however, and underestimates the value of select, well-conceived communication channels. A valid question is whether these dialogues lost the forest for the trees. U.S. officials consistently struggled to move the needle on big trade and investment issues, absent large carrots and sticks, such as WTO accession or significant tariffs. The U.S. government needs to exercise discipline in ensuring that dialogue mechanisms advance U.S. national interests and are not used by China to distract from or delay meaningful progress on core issues. Washington must also be clear-eyed that such dialogues or engagements will likely not “change China” or spur big policy and structural changes. Yet it is equally problematic that from the early stages of the pandemic in 2020 through mid-2023, the governments of the world’s two largest economies, with the world’s most complex trading relationship, had almost no engagement on economic and commercial issues. Just as national security experts emphasize the importance of U.S.-China military-to-military communications to mitigate misunderstandings and security crises, sustained channels for commercial and financial dialogues are critical for managing economic frictions. It is therefore remarkable that for multiple years the two sides lacked any such mechanisms to address commercial, financial and other economic issues. In its last year and a half, the Biden administration broadly addressed these areas through its Economic, Financial and Commercial Issues Working Groups, alongside technical consultations on issues such as export control enforcement, trade secrets, and anti-money laundering. These channels, with select cabinet-level meetings, enabled the U.S. to pursue “competitive actions”—such as export controls, tariffs, and sanctions—while maintaining a largely stable relationship. The Biden administration struggled, however, to make significant progress on the broader obstacles facing U.S. firms and exports in China, even as it was able to resolve certain company-specific issues and defuse some tensions arising from policy misunderstandings. After a sharp deterioration in bilateral economic ties in spring 2025—with tariffs essentially reaching trade embargo levels and export controls shutting down production lines in each economy—the second Trump administration has arrived at a tentative equilibrium with China on trade and technology issues. The Trump administration has an opportunity to strengthen this equilibrium, mitigate volatility, and advance U.S. interests by rebuilding and institutionalizing selective channels on key economic and technology issues. The goal should not be to return to the previous broad dialogue architecture, but rather to establish narrow mechanisms that support U.S. de-risking, reinforce policy discipline, and, with modest expectations, derive economic benefits for the U.S. from the relationship. Cabinet-level relationships with China’s top economic decisionmakers—that also address bureaucratic mismatches and silos in the two systems—are of utmost importance as the leadership dynamics and policy agendas of both governments continue to evolve. Communication mechanisms on macroeconomic, financial sector, and commercial issues have been essential—and as economic and national security issues have moved to the foreground, channels to discuss sanctions, export controls, and investment issues have become necessary as well. The Boards of Trade and Investment proposed by the two governments in recent discussions could serve as an organizing structure for most of these channels, depending on their participants and agenda. This paper reviews the historical evolution of U.S.-China economic dialogues and the key lessons learned—to suggest targeted areas where ongoing communications under these mechanisms can be most important, how these should be structured, and how to make U.S. economic statecraft toward China most effective. We appreciate the insightful inputs and comments on the paper from Craig Allen, Wendy Cutler and Paul Haenle.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Macroeconomics, Trade, Donald Trump, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. Positioning the KMT in the U.S.–China–Taiwan Triangle: Cheng Li-wun’s Early Tenure

Author:: Meghan Morris and Sheng-wen Cheng
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: In March 2026, Kuomintang (KMT) chair Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) accepted an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit China from April 7–12—the first such visit by a sitting KMT chair since 2016. The visit presents both challenges and opportunities for Cheng, who is seeking greater dialogue and stability with China. It also comes just weeks before a scheduled major summit between President Trump and Xi in May and introduces new variables for all three leaders. For Xi, the symbolism of him and Cheng possibly meeting face-to-face to “mend fences” could portray an image of cross-Strait unity that could strengthen Xi’s hand in discussions with Trump. For Cheng, a successful China trip could bolster her political standing among the KMT base in Taiwan, but could also alienate opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) voters and swing voters, who may view Cheng as “selling out” Taiwan’s sovereignty in pursuit of easing tensions with mainland China. Finally, for Trump, the visit could complicate Washington’s relations with China. Trump will have to walk an even more delicate tightrope of signaling the United States’ enduring “One China” policy with Xi, while responding to the inevitable message from Xi that cross-Straits are “stabilizing” and that the United States should not intervene in the “internal matters of China.” Given this context, this paper seeks to examine the rise of Cheng Li-wun in Taiwanese politics and implications for her domestic, international, and cross-Strait agenda. We argue that while Cheng’s victory as KMT chair signals symbolic change, it has yet to translate into institutional renewal or political legitimacy. Her early appointments of KMT vice chairs suggest continuity rather than transformation—raising questions about whether the KMT is broadening or narrowing appeal within a younger electoral base. It also contends that Cheng’s rhetoric on China and the United States—calling for deeper alignment and accommodation with Beijing while simultaneously casting doubt on the value of Taiwan’s security ties with Washington—positions Cheng to potentially alter the trajectory of cross-Strait ties if the KMT achieves a majority victory in the 2028 presidential elections.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and United States of America

27. China’s Strategy in the Ukraine War and the Shaping of a Post-Conflict Order

Author:: Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Despite ongoing peace talks spearheaded by U.S. President Donald Trump, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues with seemingly no end in sight. While China might not play a primary role in peace negotiations, it nonetheless has an important stake in the outcome of the conflict. This paper seeks to assess Beijing’s calculus and potential role in brokering peace in the Ukraine conflict within the context of great power diplomacy among Moscow, Washington, Kyiv, and Brussels. Faced with Russia’s unrelenting military campaign, Washington, Brussels and Beijing have each adopted distinct positions on the war. The United States, as the key peace broker, continues to shift its policies to accommodate competing peace deal demands from Kyiv and Moscow. Meanwhile, the EU is increasingly aligning itself with Ukraine’s position, while China promotes neutral diplomatic initiatives that merely amplify a pro-Russian stance. Because China’s initiatives largely align with Russia’s position on the war, they have done little to realistically support ceasefire efforts. Rather, they are designed to portray Beijing as a principled international actor committed to peace and non-escalation. At the same time, these positions have not prevented China from establishing significant and highly pragmatic relations with Kyiv, particularly in trade and commerce. Politically, however, China’s stance has distanced Beijing from Kyiv’s key objectives regarding the terms and conditions of a ceasefire. Accordingly, this article seeks to answer the following questions: What are China’s intentions toward Ukraine amid an ongoing stalemate in peace negotiations? And how are China’s diplomatic proposals being received in capitals around the world?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Negotiation, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

28. Emerging Regional Architecture of Cooperation in Central Asia

Author:: Kristin Höltge
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Central Asia has defied early conflict predictions by moving towards peaceful regional integration through treaties, hydro-diplomacy, and institutional cooperation. The C5 framework (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), now expanding to include Azerbaijan, reflects growing regional unity and subjectivity. This self-driven shift from hotspot to hub offers valuable lessons for conflict-prone regions on how local diplomacy can replace external intervention. However, internal imbalances or external shocks still pose risks to this nascent regionalization.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Natural Resources, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Central Asia

29. Strengthening Cooperation: The Goals and Outcomes of the Iraqi Prime Minister's Visit to Turkey

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On July 28, 2026, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi paid his first visit to Ankara since taking office in April 2026, in response to an invitation from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The visit comes amid a full agenda that reflects Baghdad's priority on development and the economy in the period ahead. It also comes against the backdrop of both countries' pursuit of stronger strategic relations, at a time when bilateral ties face complex files, including water, energy, and security. Turkey also hopes that relations between the two countries, which rose to the level of a strategic partnership during the tenure of former Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani, will witness further development and a deepening of cooperation during al-Zaidi's tenure as head of government.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Economy
Political Geography:: Iraq, Turkey, and Middle East

30. Diversifying Partnerships: What Are the Motives Behind the South Korean President’s Tour of Latin America?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: South Korean President Lee Jae-myung visited three Latin American countries — Brazil, Chile, and Argentina — his first such visit since assuming office in June 2025. The trip formed part of a broader 11-day foreign tour, held from July 24 to August 3, 2026, that also took him to San Francisco and Frankfurt. During his stops in Latin America, Lee held summit talks with his counterparts from the three countries, focused on expanding trade and investment, opening new markets, resuming negotiations on a free trade agreement between Korea and the “Mercosur” bloc, updating the free trade agreement with Chile, and expanding the horizons of Korean diplomacy toward the Global South.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Global South, and Trade
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Latin America, and Chile

31. Navigating Disagreement: Why Did the Brazilian President Visit the United States?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On May 6, 2026, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva traveled to Washington at the invitation of U.S. President Donald Trump, seeking to strengthen bilateral relations. The visit coincided with mounting domestic pressures on the Brazilian president, following a series of successive setbacks—most notably a vote by more than two-thirds of Congress members in favor of legislation proposing to reduce sentences handed down against former President Bolsonaro, despite the presidential veto, and the Senate’s rejection of da Silva’s nominee for the Supreme Court—the first time in decades that a president’s choice for the Court had been turned down. Those reverses gave fresh momentum to Bolsonaro’s son as a leading presidential contender in the 2026 elections, even as da Silva’s capacity to advance his domestic agenda showed signs of strain. Complicating the picture further were a number of unresolved Brazilian-American tensions, set against a turbulent international and regional backdrop marked by escalating U.S.–Chinese competition in Latin America, a dynamic that rendered the visit a practical test of Brazil’s ability to balance its rapprochement with Washington against its commitments to Beijing within the BRICS framework. Against that backdrop, the analysis that follows traces the most significant points of friction in Brazilian-American relations in recent times, examines the motives behind the visit and its anticipated outcomes, and assesses the potential repercussions for the wider region.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Lula da Silva
Political Geography:: Brazil, South America, and United States of America

32. Technical Alliance: The Turkestan Summit and the Digital Integration Drive Within the Organization of Turkic States

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States convened in Turkestan, Kazakhstan, on May 15, 2026, reaffirming the Organization’s standing as the foundational pillar of Turkic influence in Central Asia. Far from a ceremonial gathering, the summit appeared to be a concerted attempt to forge a new vision for the future of the Turkic world, one that moves beyond traditional cultural frameworks toward more substantive economic and technological partnerships. Founded on October 3, 2009, under the name the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (the Turkic Council), the Organization came into being following the signing of the Nakhchivan Agreement between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. At the Baku Summit in 2019, Uzbekistan announced its accession, bringing the total membership to five states, alongside Turkmenistan, Hungary, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as observers. At the Istanbul Summit in 2021, the body was formally renamed the “Organization of Turkic States.”
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, Regional Organizations, and Organization of Turkic States
Political Geography:: Central Asia and Turkic States

33. Arena of Rivals: China, Taiwan, and the Contest for Africa

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The China-Taiwan file has undergone a notable transformation at the African level. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te concluded his visit to Eswatini on May 5, 2026 — a trip that had originally been scheduled for April 22 to 26 before being postponed, after Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar revoked overflight permits for the Taiwanese presidential aircraft. Beijing, meanwhile, received the President of Mozambique from April 18 to 22, who met Chinese President Xi Jinping at the latter’s invitation, as well as Namibia’s Minister of International Relations and Trade from April 11 to 18.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Taiwan, Asia, and Eswatini

34. Balancing Act: Why China Chose “Pragmatic Neutrality” in the War on Iran

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Since the outbreak of the American-Israeli war on Iran on February 28, 2026, China has maintained what can best be described as a flexible, carefully calibrated stance. Foreign Ministry statements issued on February 28, March 2, and March 11 condemned the American-Israeli strikes, called for a halt to the escalation, and emphasized that the war serves no party’s interests. Complementing its public statements, Beijing reinforced its diplomatic engagement by dispatching its special envoy for Middle Eastern affairs, Zhai Jun, to the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Neutrality, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:: China, Iran, and Asia

35. Strategic Hedging in Motion: Japan’s Trajectory to Counter Growing Chinese Influence

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Japan has recently intensified diplomatic and security efforts to reinforce regional alliances and mitigate the potential repercussions of Beijing’s rising power amid China’s significant expansion of influence across Southeast and East Asia. Expanded security coordination and military cooperation with the United States, South Korea, and the Philippines now characterize these initiatives, raising important questions about their impact on the regional balance in East Asia.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Hedging, Foreign Influence, and Military Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

36. Behind the Ballots and the Bluster: Decoding Votes on Ukraine Resolutions at the UN

Author:: Nienke Wessel and Bob Deen
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an end to the war remains elusive. Ukraine is not only fighting Russia on the battlefield, but also in the diplomatic arena to secure international support. This report analyses the way this diplomatic war has unfolded by looking at two dimensions: votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and attendance of the peace conference in Bürgenstock. A closer look at voting patterns in the UNGA reveals a gradual decrease in support over the past few years. Immediately after the invasion, 141 states voted in favour of pro-Ukrainian resolutions; in December 2025, this number had dwindled to 79. Ukraine and its supporters in its diplomatic struggle against Russia could benefit from a careful analysis of the various reasons behind these shifting levels of support. This report therefore presents a clustering of voting patterns, which can help identify both the nations that hold fixed positions and those who vary in their voting behaviour and stated positions. A better understanding of the motivations behind these positions is crucial for a diplomatic strategy that aims to convince them to support Ukraine. The approach in this study is two-fold: it first discusses the narratives that have been promoted by both Russia and Ukraine and then analyses why these may or may not appeal to different states across the world. While Ukraine rightfully claims that the invasion is a violation of international law and posits itself as a democracy that has fallen victim to a brutal act of aggression, Russia instead promotes a narrative of defence against supposed threats by the West. While most countries around the world generally and rhetorically support international law, the narrative of the ‘threatening West’ also finds support across the world and particularly in the grouping of countries sometimes referred to as the ‘Global South’. However, the appeal of the Russian narrative is only part of the puzzle. Practical reasons are perhaps much more important to determine the level of support; many countries may have their own reasons to either support Russia or at least not jeopardize their relationship with Moscow. These include food security, maintaining trade relations with Russia, strategic voting considerations, or a preference for a multipolar world order. For any diplomatic strategy to be effective in convincing countries to support Ukraine, it requires listening to their individual concerns and addressing those to the extent possible. Understanding does not imply agreement as not all arguments have moral equivalence and some may not be put forward in good faith, but the West should also be wary of its own biases. A convincing argument should address both the narrative as well as the practical interests driving state positions. It should furthermore realise that there is no one-size-fits-all solution: while there are common patterns across the world, the different elements present themselves in different combinations for each individual nation. A convincing diplomatic strategy begins with listening.
Topic:: Diplomacy, United Nations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

37. Inspiration for AI Diplomacy: A Glance at the AI Strategies of the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, and Singapore

Author:: Maaike Heijmans and Alexandre Ferreira Gomes
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: In preparing to launch its forthcoming artificial intelligence (AI) diplomacy strategy, the Netherlands would benefit from a better understanding of leading peers’ (international) strategies and AI governance structures. This Clingendael Report contributes to this objective by offering an exploratory analysis of key initiatives and governance structures of the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, and Singapore. These countries stand out for their strong AI policies or their leadership in sub-fields such as AI safety. The case studies show that the United Kingdom (UK) has adopted a laissezfaire attitude towards AI, aligning with the United States (US) and focusing on attracting foreign investors. While this comes with development gains, it also poses risks to data sovereignty. The UK does have a notable ‘AI Security Centre’ focused on research around emerging AI risks and AI auditing, but it has recently withdrawn from international consensus-building efforts. Denmark’s approach consists of cultivating AI use across society in accordance with Danish values, with a particular focus on AI in the public sector and not so much in the private sector. Despite its focus on domestic sovereignty and risk management, it has made limited efforts internationally. France’s strategy somewhat resembles the underpinnings of the US’s DARPA program, focusing on funding a wide range of potentially good ideas instead of funnelling all investment into one project. This has led to the emergence of competitive startups, research hubs, and a pronounced international presence. However, this wide-scope approach means that France lacks centralised AI governance structures and has spread mandates across existing bodies. Singapore has a strong emphasis on safety, standards, and guidelines, and enables bottom–up development and testing of (opensource) models. It designates specific strategic niches in which it can carve out and sustain an edge and where it focuses its efforts. Its international presence is characterised both by its consensus-seeking efforts, and through providing a model for developing a well-rounded AI strategy using limited resources. While these four countries are frontrunners in specific domains, AI strategy and governance is an emerging field. The Netherlands would do well, first and foremost, to chart its path forward based on its own interests, priorities, and niches for AI development and not simply seek to replicate existing strategies.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Governance, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, France, Denmark, and Singapore

38. Coercive Extractivism: The mechanics of Trump’s transactional approach to Europe

Author:: Rem Korteweg and Diederick van Wijk
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The episode with Greenland was telling. US foreign policy under the Trump administration has become increasingly transactional, raising serious doubts about the transatlantic relationship across Europe. On 17 January 2026, the US president threatened European NATO allies with ten percent tariff walls “until such time as a Deal is reached for the Complete and Total purchase of Greenland.” Earlier, eight NATO allies had sent a very limited number of military personnel to Greenland for a reconnaissance mission, in response to the US president’s claims that Greenland was undefended and should therefore become part of the United States. Since coming to office in early 2025, the president had repeatedly made his ambition to annex Greenland clear. It was not the first time the US administration used European dependence on US economic or security ties to twist arms. This Clingendael Report examines the mechanics of Trump’s transactional approach to Europe, where security, economic and regulatory interests are fused in the pursuit of an ‘America First’ agenda. Based on a series of interviews conducted in Washington DC in late 2025, two papers drafted by US experts Max Bergmann and Peter Harrell, and an expert workshop in December 2025, eight key dynamics emerge that define contemporary US transactional policies. This, in turn, leads to a set of recommendations for how the EU and European countries, including the Netherlands, can respond. Europeans should expect President Trump’s transactional approach to continue as his administration aims to extract economic and political concessions from EU capitals. In the short-term, as European governments increasingly express concern about their dependence on the United States and seek to cushion themselves from US coercion, the extractive nature of US transactionalism could in fact intensify. Europe’s vulnerability will only diminish once steps to reduce lop-sided dependencies have materially delivered results. The report concludes with a set of options for how the relationship between Europe and the US could then evolve.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, Donald Trump, Coercion, and Extractivism
Political Geography:: Europe, Greenland, and United States of America

39. AI Diplomacy for a Multipolar World: Policy Brief Europe’s Moment to Act on Trusted AI Partnerships

Author:: Maaike Heijmans and Alexandre Ferreira Gomes
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: US and Chinese AI models and their embedded normative biases are spreading, without any clear European counterbalance or alternative. The Netherlands and the EU need an AI diplomacy strategy that builds a modular tech offer to safeguard global AI diversity, openness, and democratic governance. By working on AI diplomacy through the EU’s Global Gateway, the Netherlands can also strengthen its own competitiveness and digital development. Dutch technological niches that are in high global demand and make for concrete sectoral offerings include agritech, cybersecurity, healthtech, and edtech.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Governance, European Union, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, Netherlands, and United States of America

40. The State, Hezbollah and War: Lebanon's Enduring Political Impasse

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Following a series of meetings, Lebanese and Israeli delegations reached a US-backed framework agreement to advance negotiations. However, Lebanon’s internal divisions, Israel’s record of noncompliance, and overlapping regional conflicts complicate any lasting settlement.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Hezbollah, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Lebanon, and United States of America

41. America, China and the Middle East: Will the Failure in Iran Lead to a Decline in American Power?

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: US strategic failure in the Iran war rests on three claims: misreading limits of military power, failing to achieve core war objectives, and allowing the conflict’s effects to spill beyond the Middle East into broader international consequences.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

42. On the Brink of War: US and Iranian Calculations in the New Negotiations

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The United States and Iran conducted a new round of negotiations amid US preparations to strike Iran and demands for greater concessions than before.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

43. Effects of the EU’s Migration Diplomacy: Lessons from Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan

Author:: Sophie Meiners and Svenja Niederfranke
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Migration diplomacy is a central field in the foreign policy of the European Union. In recent years, the EU has expanded its engagement with countries in the MENA region, concluding deals with Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. This report assesses what these deals have actually achieved in practice and what not. Further, it offers five recommendations for the European Commission, the European Parliament, and EU member states to improve the EU’s approach to migration diplomacy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, European Commission, and Migration Policy
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Mauritania

44. New Governments, New Opportunities: US Relations with Bangladesh and Nepal Three Months In

Author:: Nilanthi Samaranayake
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: In the past two years, Bangladesh and Nepal have experienced significant upheaval in their respective political orders. Both witnessed violence in response to public protests and ousted their leaders. Both transitioned from interim governments and conducted elections with new prime ministers entering office. During roughly the first 100 days of the two governments, both have had the United States reach out through official visits, agreements, and opportunities for future cooperation. In Nepal, Prime Minister Balendra Shah took office in late March, and senior US diplomats sought to engage the new government immediately. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Paul Kapur made a stand-alone trip to Nepal in April. This is notable because trips to the region by US officials usually cover multiple countries and often include India. US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Sarah Rogers visited the next month, as did Sergio Gor, US Special Envoy for South and Central Asia. News reports suggest that Gor sought a meeting with Prime Minister Shah, who is insisting on a policy of meeting only with ministerial-level or higher-level officials. This was a missed opportunity for Shah to meet with President Trump’s Special Envoy for the region. Shah and his party were elected by many younger voters disillusioned with the previous era of politics, and observers expect his government to demonstrate more creativity and flexibility than previous administrations. Unlike in Nepal, the United States currently has an ambassador posted in Bangladesh, Ambassador Brent Christensen, to facilitate American diplomacy on the ground. After Prime Minister Tarique Rahman entered office in February, Assistant Secretary Kapur visited Bangladesh in early March and discussed a range of economic and security issues. The United States has been Bangladesh’s leading national export market, and US companies are Bangladesh’s largest foreign investors. Meanwhile, Bangladesh ranks among the largest apparel-exporting countries to the United States.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Elections
Political Geography:: Bangladesh, South Asia, Nepal, and United States of America

45. A New Government in Israel: What the Future Might Hold

Author:: Steven Simon
Publication Date:: 09-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Washington is waiting out Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The implicit assumption is that he alone is responsible for policy differences between the United States and Israel. A new government under former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett or former army chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot would set things right and revive Israel’s reputation in American public opinion. It is a comfortable assumption — but also a deep misreading of what has gone wrong and what fixing it requires. The crisis in US–Israel relations does not originate solely with Netanyahu or his partners. It comes from policies with broad Israeli backing that his successors would likely continue, whatever personal reservations they might harbor. Bennett supports building in the E1 corridor, which would sever the northern West Bank from the southern and make a Palestinian state deeply impractical. Eisenkot has recently said that to do so would be “a mistake” but without pledging to drop it. On the Gaza Strip, a new cabinet would likely oppose renewed Jewish settlement in the enclave but still leave governance bound to President Donald Trump’s peace plan through 2027, as the Board of Peace slips and reconstruction shrinks to a pilot program in Rafah. On Iran, there is a strong Israeli consensus to continue to confront Tehran. Divisions are about competence and alliance management, not core strategies. Settler violence in the West Bank is where a new government would move fastest, but the ceiling is low. Removing Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir would reduce state cover for extremist networks and lax enforcement. But today only three percent of cases against Israeli settler violence end in conviction; a situation that Bennett or Eisenkot could remedy. The sharpest measure is the benchmark of normalization with Arab states. Saudi Arabia’s threshold for normalization is a “clear and irreversible path” toward Palestinian statehood. Bennett and Eisenkot oppose statehood. Eisenkot wants to keep the Jordan Valley and every settlement bloc under Israeli control. Neither reaches the Saudi threshold. American public opinion is further out of reach. Gallup shows sympathy for Israel over Palestinians has flipped for the first time since 2001: 60 percent of Americans view Israel unfavorably. Pollsters call the shift structural, having accumulated over years of war rather than in response to any one leader. A friendlier face in Jerusalem will not reverse a long-term trend accelerated by the Gaza death toll, West Bank violence, and war with Iran. None of this makes Bennett or Eisenkot another Netanyahu. Either of the former would be easier to work with, more predictable, and less inclined to meddle in American politics. That is worth something. However, it is not a reset. Policies serving American interests in peace and stability in the region will still need to be at the center of bilateral diplomacy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Elections, and Benjamin Netanyahu
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

46. The Wrong Race: The US, China, and AI Competition

Author:: Alvin Wang Graylin
Publication Date:: 09-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The conventional wisdom in Washington says the United States and China are locked in an existential race to reach a decisive strategic advantage in developing artificial intelligence, or AI. Take Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s recent comments: “Beating China — there is no day after tomorrow if China wins at this … If they were to pull ahead of us on AI, then nothing else matters.” President Donald Trump has made similar comments lately, citing competition with China as the reason for his refusal to slow down AI growth, stating that “whoever wins AI wins.” Such assumptions about the AI race now underwrite close to a trillion dollars a year in capital expenditure, a comprehensive export control regime, and arguments that AI is a national security matter that should not be subject to the ordinary give-and-take of market competition and government oversight. At the extreme, some in Washington have even raised the possibility of military strikes should China appear poised to gain artificial general intelligence, or AGI, first. But the assumptions behind the “AI race” framework are deeply flawed. While there are legitimate national security concerns around AI, there is no decisive “finish line” to AI innovation that will grant a final victory to either the United States or China. As with previous transformative technologies, we should prepare for the continuing long-term development of AI through competitive markets, not total geopolitical victory for one side. US–China capability gaps at the frontiers of AI technology typically last only a few months, and there is no competitive “moat” that will secure a permanent advantage to either nation. The idea that the greatest AI security threat to the United States lies only in large frontier models sponsored by a nation-state like China is flawed as well. The most dangerous models are often those smaller specialized ones that could be created or utilized by non-state rogue actors for the purpose of deploying biological, chemical, or cyber weapons. The assumption of US–China conflict prevents the exact global cooperation to protect against this very real threat. The upcoming summit between President Trump and President Xi Jinping is an opportunity to chart a cooperative path forward that moves beyond the flawed model of an existential AI race and establishes sensible cooperative measures around shared harm and safety standards. We outline specific proposals for such measures in this brief. Beyond the summit, the United States should reject the idea of any “national security exemption” for AI labs from ordinary market discipline and legal regulation and, instead, take steps to safeguard American workers from the threat of displacement by automation.
Topic:: Diplomacy, National Security, Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

47. Structural Misalignment and the Limits of Pressure: Trump and Brazil’s 2026 Election

Author:: Andre Pagliarini and Feliciano de Sá Guimarães
Publication Date:: 09-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: A conservative wave is spreading across Latin America. Since 2025, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Honduras have elected right-wing governments that have all largely deferred to President Trump. Now attention turns to the Oct. 4 election in Brazil, a neck-and-neck race in the region’s largest country. On the surface, a victory by right-wing candidate Flávio Bolsonaro would suggest Brazil will align with Trump administration policies. But Brazil’s diverse commercial relations and commitment to regional leadership complicate this narrative. Washington should temper its expectations and recognize potential structural conflicts between US priorities — especially exclusionary policies toward China — and Brazil’s national interests. Throughout the 20th century and into the 21st century, Brazilian governments of all ideological persuasions have consistently resisted perceived subordination to the US. Regardless of who wins the presidency, we should expect Brazil to continue prioritizing national sovereignty. Ignoring this reality threatens to place the US and Brazil on a collision course, potentially harming both nations. Brazil has increasingly attempted to triangulate its foreign policy with the United States and China. As Brazil’s largest trading partner, China is essential to Brazil’s economic standing, making decoupling from China unrealistic. The Trump administration should accept this reality and refrain from economic coercion aimed at forcing Brazil to cut ties with China. Coercive pressure on this or other issues would stoke nationalistic fervor across Brazil’s ideological spectrum — a reaction Washington would also provoke by meddling in the election process. The United States should refocus diplomacy on security. It should lean into collaborative efforts to crack down on cartel violence in Brazil, which are broadly popular among Brazilians. Brazil should, in turn, reassure the United States that it has no intention to expand its relationship with China into a military partnership. Such security collaboration, paired with these reassurances, would let Brazil triangulate between the world’s two superpowers, putting its sovereignty in service of its citizens’ security and its economic vitality. Cooperation between the United States and Brazil is possible if either Bolsonaro or Lula wins. But it would require each country to recognize the structural differences that exist between them and reach understandings accordingly. As a self-described nationalist, Trump should understand Brazil’s sovereigntist instincts and pursue a diplomatic path consistent with both his administration’s security aims in the Western Hemisphere and Brazil’s vital interests.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, Donald Trump, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America

48. Containment, Resistance, and the MOU: The US–Iran Negotiations in Historical Context

Author:: Hadi Kahalzadeh
Publication Date:: 07-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran could be a watershed moment in resolving the deadlock between the two countries dating back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Alternatively, it could break down under the same pressures that have sustained conflict between the two countries for so long. This brief outlines the recent history and consequences of the interaction between Iranian resistance strategies and the American strategy of coercion and containment. The US–Iran War laid bare the failures of both strategies, failures that should galvanize each country to pursue a new arrangement based around reciprocity, restraint, and reconstruction. Containment and coercion have been the consistent throughline of US policy toward Iran, a strategy seen by Iranian leadership as a perpetual American effort to isolate their country. In this sense, the launching of a full-scale war on Iran was the culmination of an over 40-year American effort to defeat the Islamic Republic. The war’s outcome is a complete indictment of this US approach. The United States and Israel killed hundreds of Iranian senior leaders and caused $270 billion in direct economic damage through its targeting of Iranian military, economic, and institutional infrastructure central to the regime’s hold on power. Despite this, the United States did not force Iranian submission and created risks to the world economy through Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the war reflects the disconnect between the Iranian resistance strategy and the well-being of the Iranian people. The resistance model has stymied economic growth, prevented development, and intensified poverty, even as the Islamic Republic has adapted to economic coercion. As this brief documents, Iran’s economy today is likely approximately half as large as it could have been had Iran not been under sanctions and periodically at war for the past decade, implying that the total costs Iran has paid for its resistance strategy run into the trillions of dollars. While successful in preventing an American victory, Iran remains highly vulnerable in a post-war landscape, as it is governed by a corrupt, unpopular regime and in dire economic straits. In this 60-day MOU window, both sides should work toward a realistic, mutually beneficial outcome which permits an exit from the coercion-resistance spiral, one in which Iran agrees to verifiable restraints on its nuclear program in exchange for US sanctions relief. Absent good-faith diplomacy from both sides toward this objective, the United States and Iran will once again succumb to a push and pull that has led to destructive war and instability. There has never been a better opportunity to transcend this pernicious dynamic toward a transformative deal. Both the United States and Iran should seize it.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economy, 2026 Iran War, Containment, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, United States of America, and Strait of Hormuz

49. Are Qatar and Saudi Arabia Reassessing Their Reliance on the US?

Author:: Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: America’s Arab partners once viewed the United States as their primary security provider. Yet since President Trump returned to the White House in 2025, the Middle East has experienced increasing volatility, much of it driven by Israeli and American aggression. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the two largest purchasers of American defense articles, have been reassessing the value of the US security guarantee, especially as Washington threatens to attack Iran and plunge the region again into war. Based on the author’s interviews with Qatari and Saudi officials, academics, and think tank experts, this brief examines the evolving state of Qatari and Saudi foreign policy and the future impact on US alliance structures and involvement in the Middle East. Israel’s bombing of a civilian building in a residential neighborhood in Doha, Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, was both the first Israeli attack on a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, and the first time a major non–NATO US ally attacked another. In response, Trump enhanced the US–Qatari relationship, pledging to provide Qatar with a NATO Article 5-like security guarantee. While the US may have tacitly allowed the attack, Qatar nonetheless reaffirmed its strong partnership with Washington. Yet Qatar has also turned to regional balancing in recent years, building a stronger military relationship with Turkey and strengthening ties with the United Kingdom and France. Qatar wishes to avoid a public rift with Trump, while quietly expanding its partnerships to prepare for a more regionally oriented security landscape. Although Saudi Arabia would welcome an iron-clad security guarantee from the US, the relationship between Riyadh and Washington is complicated by the two countries’ different, and at times incompatible, goals. The Saudi government has condemned Israel’s war on Gaza as genocide, and remains steadfast on Israel’s recognition of a Palestinian state as a requirement for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Although Riyadh has tried to accommodate Washington’s demands to reduce exposure to Chinese technology in order to secure access to cutting-edge American technology, China remains a critical trade partner; Riyadh is wary of the US pressuring it to take sides between the US and China. Saudi Arabia is no longer as dependent on Washington, having strengthened relations with Pakistan and Egypt and mended ties with Iran and Turkey. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts to transform the Kingdom’s economy and society require the free flow of investment and capital as well as regional stability. But President Trump’s push for global economic protectionism — as well as a US war on Iran — threatens the success of Vision 2030 and the future viability of the Saudi economy. Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s efforts to maintain close ties to the US while also enhancing their capacity to provide for their own security reflect a broader reconsideration among Gulf countries of an excessive reliance on US security patronage and a move toward greater self-sufficiency. Yet ongoing tensions among GCC members have thwarted periodic efforts to empower the GCC as a security institution. Israel and the United States are increasingly seen as the main sources of destabilization in the region, rather than Iran, a perception that would become undeniable if the US follows through on its threats and again embarks on a war of choice in the Middle East.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Partnerships, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United States of America

50. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a changing security order with a mix of diplomacy and deterrence.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS