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42. On the Brink of War: US and Iranian Calculations in the New Negotiations
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 02-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- The United States and Iran conducted a new round of negotiations amid US preparations to strike Iran and demands for greater concessions than before.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Conflict, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
43. Effects of the EU’s Migration Diplomacy: Lessons from Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan
- Author:
- Sophie Meiners and Svenja Niederfranke
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Migration diplomacy is a central field in the foreign policy of the European Union. In recent years, the EU has expanded its engagement with countries in the MENA region, concluding deals with Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. This report assesses what these deals have actually achieved in practice and what not. Further, it offers five recommendations for the European Commission, the European Parliament, and EU member states to improve the EU’s approach to migration diplomacy.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, European Commission, and Migration Policy
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, Middle East, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Mauritania
44. New Governments, New Opportunities: US Relations with Bangladesh and Nepal Three Months In
- Author:
- Nilanthi Samaranayake
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- In the past two years, Bangladesh and Nepal have experienced significant upheaval in their respective political orders. Both witnessed violence in response to public protests and ousted their leaders. Both transitioned from interim governments and conducted elections with new prime ministers entering office. During roughly the first 100 days of the two governments, both have had the United States reach out through official visits, agreements, and opportunities for future cooperation. In Nepal, Prime Minister Balendra Shah took office in late March, and senior US diplomats sought to engage the new government immediately. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Paul Kapur made a stand-alone trip to Nepal in April. This is notable because trips to the region by US officials usually cover multiple countries and often include India. US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Sarah Rogers visited the next month, as did Sergio Gor, US Special Envoy for South and Central Asia. News reports suggest that Gor sought a meeting with Prime Minister Shah, who is insisting on a policy of meeting only with ministerial-level or higher-level officials. This was a missed opportunity for Shah to meet with President Trump’s Special Envoy for the region. Shah and his party were elected by many younger voters disillusioned with the previous era of politics, and observers expect his government to demonstrate more creativity and flexibility than previous administrations. Unlike in Nepal, the United States currently has an ambassador posted in Bangladesh, Ambassador Brent Christensen, to facilitate American diplomacy on the ground. After Prime Minister Tarique Rahman entered office in February, Assistant Secretary Kapur visited Bangladesh in early March and discussed a range of economic and security issues. The United States has been Bangladesh’s leading national export market, and US companies are Bangladesh’s largest foreign investors. Meanwhile, Bangladesh ranks among the largest apparel-exporting countries to the United States.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Elections
- Political Geography:
- Bangladesh, South Asia, Nepal, and United States of America
45. A New Government in Israel: What the Future Might Hold
- Author:
- Steven Simon
- Publication Date:
- 09-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Washington is waiting out Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The implicit assumption is that he alone is responsible for policy differences between the United States and Israel. A new government under former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett or former army chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot would set things right and revive Israel’s reputation in American public opinion. It is a comfortable assumption — but also a deep misreading of what has gone wrong and what fixing it requires. The crisis in US–Israel relations does not originate solely with Netanyahu or his partners. It comes from policies with broad Israeli backing that his successors would likely continue, whatever personal reservations they might harbor. Bennett supports building in the E1 corridor, which would sever the northern West Bank from the southern and make a Palestinian state deeply impractical. Eisenkot has recently said that to do so would be “a mistake” but without pledging to drop it. On the Gaza Strip, a new cabinet would likely oppose renewed Jewish settlement in the enclave but still leave governance bound to President Donald Trump’s peace plan through 2027, as the Board of Peace slips and reconstruction shrinks to a pilot program in Rafah. On Iran, there is a strong Israeli consensus to continue to confront Tehran. Divisions are about competence and alliance management, not core strategies. Settler violence in the West Bank is where a new government would move fastest, but the ceiling is low. Removing Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir would reduce state cover for extremist networks and lax enforcement. But today only three percent of cases against Israeli settler violence end in conviction; a situation that Bennett or Eisenkot could remedy. The sharpest measure is the benchmark of normalization with Arab states. Saudi Arabia’s threshold for normalization is a “clear and irreversible path” toward Palestinian statehood. Bennett and Eisenkot oppose statehood. Eisenkot wants to keep the Jordan Valley and every settlement bloc under Israeli control. Neither reaches the Saudi threshold. American public opinion is further out of reach. Gallup shows sympathy for Israel over Palestinians has flipped for the first time since 2001: 60 percent of Americans view Israel unfavorably. Pollsters call the shift structural, having accumulated over years of war rather than in response to any one leader. A friendlier face in Jerusalem will not reverse a long-term trend accelerated by the Gaza death toll, West Bank violence, and war with Iran. None of this makes Bennett or Eisenkot another Netanyahu. Either of the former would be easier to work with, more predictable, and less inclined to meddle in American politics. That is worth something. However, it is not a reset. Policies serving American interests in peace and stability in the region will still need to be at the center of bilateral diplomacy.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Elections, and Benjamin Netanyahu
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
46. The Wrong Race: The US, China, and AI Competition
- Author:
- Alvin Wang Graylin
- Publication Date:
- 09-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The conventional wisdom in Washington says the United States and China are locked in an existential race to reach a decisive strategic advantage in developing artificial intelligence, or AI. Take Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s recent comments: “Beating China — there is no day after tomorrow if China wins at this … If they were to pull ahead of us on AI, then nothing else matters.” President Donald Trump has made similar comments lately, citing competition with China as the reason for his refusal to slow down AI growth, stating that “whoever wins AI wins.” Such assumptions about the AI race now underwrite close to a trillion dollars a year in capital expenditure, a comprehensive export control regime, and arguments that AI is a national security matter that should not be subject to the ordinary give-and-take of market competition and government oversight. At the extreme, some in Washington have even raised the possibility of military strikes should China appear poised to gain artificial general intelligence, or AGI, first. But the assumptions behind the “AI race” framework are deeply flawed. While there are legitimate national security concerns around AI, there is no decisive “finish line” to AI innovation that will grant a final victory to either the United States or China. As with previous transformative technologies, we should prepare for the continuing long-term development of AI through competitive markets, not total geopolitical victory for one side. US–China capability gaps at the frontiers of AI technology typically last only a few months, and there is no competitive “moat” that will secure a permanent advantage to either nation. The idea that the greatest AI security threat to the United States lies only in large frontier models sponsored by a nation-state like China is flawed as well. The most dangerous models are often those smaller specialized ones that could be created or utilized by non-state rogue actors for the purpose of deploying biological, chemical, or cyber weapons. The assumption of US–China conflict prevents the exact global cooperation to protect against this very real threat. The upcoming summit between President Trump and President Xi Jinping is an opportunity to chart a cooperative path forward that moves beyond the flawed model of an existential AI race and establishes sensible cooperative measures around shared harm and safety standards. We outline specific proposals for such measures in this brief. Beyond the summit, the United States should reject the idea of any “national security exemption” for AI labs from ordinary market discipline and legal regulation and, instead, take steps to safeguard American workers from the threat of displacement by automation.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, National Security, Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
47. Structural Misalignment and the Limits of Pressure: Trump and Brazil’s 2026 Election
- Author:
- Andre Pagliarini and Feliciano de Sá Guimarães
- Publication Date:
- 09-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- A conservative wave is spreading across Latin America. Since 2025, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Honduras have elected right-wing governments that have all largely deferred to President Trump. Now attention turns to the Oct. 4 election in Brazil, a neck-and-neck race in the region’s largest country. On the surface, a victory by right-wing candidate Flávio Bolsonaro would suggest Brazil will align with Trump administration policies. But Brazil’s diverse commercial relations and commitment to regional leadership complicate this narrative. Washington should temper its expectations and recognize potential structural conflicts between US priorities — especially exclusionary policies toward China — and Brazil’s national interests. Throughout the 20th century and into the 21st century, Brazilian governments of all ideological persuasions have consistently resisted perceived subordination to the US. Regardless of who wins the presidency, we should expect Brazil to continue prioritizing national sovereignty. Ignoring this reality threatens to place the US and Brazil on a collision course, potentially harming both nations. Brazil has increasingly attempted to triangulate its foreign policy with the United States and China. As Brazil’s largest trading partner, China is essential to Brazil’s economic standing, making decoupling from China unrealistic. The Trump administration should accept this reality and refrain from economic coercion aimed at forcing Brazil to cut ties with China. Coercive pressure on this or other issues would stoke nationalistic fervor across Brazil’s ideological spectrum — a reaction Washington would also provoke by meddling in the election process. The United States should refocus diplomacy on security. It should lean into collaborative efforts to crack down on cartel violence in Brazil, which are broadly popular among Brazilians. Brazil should, in turn, reassure the United States that it has no intention to expand its relationship with China into a military partnership. Such security collaboration, paired with these reassurances, would let Brazil triangulate between the world’s two superpowers, putting its sovereignty in service of its citizens’ security and its economic vitality. Cooperation between the United States and Brazil is possible if either Bolsonaro or Lula wins. But it would require each country to recognize the structural differences that exist between them and reach understandings accordingly. As a self-described nationalist, Trump should understand Brazil’s sovereigntist instincts and pursue a diplomatic path consistent with both his administration’s security aims in the Western Hemisphere and Brazil’s vital interests.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, Donald Trump, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America
48. Containment, Resistance, and the MOU: The US–Iran Negotiations in Historical Context
- Author:
- Hadi Kahalzadeh
- Publication Date:
- 07-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran could be a watershed moment in resolving the deadlock between the two countries dating back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Alternatively, it could break down under the same pressures that have sustained conflict between the two countries for so long. This brief outlines the recent history and consequences of the interaction between Iranian resistance strategies and the American strategy of coercion and containment. The US–Iran War laid bare the failures of both strategies, failures that should galvanize each country to pursue a new arrangement based around reciprocity, restraint, and reconstruction. Containment and coercion have been the consistent throughline of US policy toward Iran, a strategy seen by Iranian leadership as a perpetual American effort to isolate their country. In this sense, the launching of a full-scale war on Iran was the culmination of an over 40-year American effort to defeat the Islamic Republic. The war’s outcome is a complete indictment of this US approach. The United States and Israel killed hundreds of Iranian senior leaders and caused $270 billion in direct economic damage through its targeting of Iranian military, economic, and institutional infrastructure central to the regime’s hold on power. Despite this, the United States did not force Iranian submission and created risks to the world economy through Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the war reflects the disconnect between the Iranian resistance strategy and the well-being of the Iranian people. The resistance model has stymied economic growth, prevented development, and intensified poverty, even as the Islamic Republic has adapted to economic coercion. As this brief documents, Iran’s economy today is likely approximately half as large as it could have been had Iran not been under sanctions and periodically at war for the past decade, implying that the total costs Iran has paid for its resistance strategy run into the trillions of dollars. While successful in preventing an American victory, Iran remains highly vulnerable in a post-war landscape, as it is governed by a corrupt, unpopular regime and in dire economic straits. In this 60-day MOU window, both sides should work toward a realistic, mutually beneficial outcome which permits an exit from the coercion-resistance spiral, one in which Iran agrees to verifiable restraints on its nuclear program in exchange for US sanctions relief. Absent good-faith diplomacy from both sides toward this objective, the United States and Iran will once again succumb to a push and pull that has led to destructive war and instability. There has never been a better opportunity to transcend this pernicious dynamic toward a transformative deal. Both the United States and Iran should seize it.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economy, 2026 Iran War, Containment, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, United States of America, and Strait of Hormuz
49. Are Qatar and Saudi Arabia Reassessing Their Reliance on the US?
- Author:
- Annelle Sheline
- Publication Date:
- 02-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- America’s Arab partners once viewed the United States as their primary security provider. Yet since President Trump returned to the White House in 2025, the Middle East has experienced increasing volatility, much of it driven by Israeli and American aggression. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the two largest purchasers of American defense articles, have been reassessing the value of the US security guarantee, especially as Washington threatens to attack Iran and plunge the region again into war. Based on the author’s interviews with Qatari and Saudi officials, academics, and think tank experts, this brief examines the evolving state of Qatari and Saudi foreign policy and the future impact on US alliance structures and involvement in the Middle East. Israel’s bombing of a civilian building in a residential neighborhood in Doha, Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, was both the first Israeli attack on a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, and the first time a major non–NATO US ally attacked another. In response, Trump enhanced the US–Qatari relationship, pledging to provide Qatar with a NATO Article 5-like security guarantee. While the US may have tacitly allowed the attack, Qatar nonetheless reaffirmed its strong partnership with Washington. Yet Qatar has also turned to regional balancing in recent years, building a stronger military relationship with Turkey and strengthening ties with the United Kingdom and France. Qatar wishes to avoid a public rift with Trump, while quietly expanding its partnerships to prepare for a more regionally oriented security landscape. Although Saudi Arabia would welcome an iron-clad security guarantee from the US, the relationship between Riyadh and Washington is complicated by the two countries’ different, and at times incompatible, goals. The Saudi government has condemned Israel’s war on Gaza as genocide, and remains steadfast on Israel’s recognition of a Palestinian state as a requirement for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Although Riyadh has tried to accommodate Washington’s demands to reduce exposure to Chinese technology in order to secure access to cutting-edge American technology, China remains a critical trade partner; Riyadh is wary of the US pressuring it to take sides between the US and China. Saudi Arabia is no longer as dependent on Washington, having strengthened relations with Pakistan and Egypt and mended ties with Iran and Turkey. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts to transform the Kingdom’s economy and society require the free flow of investment and capital as well as regional stability. But President Trump’s push for global economic protectionism — as well as a US war on Iran — threatens the success of Vision 2030 and the future viability of the Saudi economy. Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s efforts to maintain close ties to the US while also enhancing their capacity to provide for their own security reflect a broader reconsideration among Gulf countries of an excessive reliance on US security patronage and a move toward greater self-sufficiency. Yet ongoing tensions among GCC members have thwarted periodic efforts to empower the GCC as a security institution. Israel and the United States are increasingly seen as the main sources of destabilization in the region, rather than Iran, a perception that would become undeniable if the US follows through on its threats and again embarks on a war of choice in the Middle East.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Partnerships, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United States of America
50. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a changing security order with a mix of diplomacy and deterrence.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine