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21. The Case for Cybersecurity Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Songdo, Korea as a Minilateralist Model

Author:
Hyunwoo Jo
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
This paper examines the prospects for cybersecurity cooperation in Northeast Asia, where intensifying cyber dependencies intersect with great power rivalry. While claims of a “new era of warfare” are often overstated, cybercrime targeting private sectors has become increasingly widespread, and sophisticated attacks on critical infrastructure remain a pressing concern. Despite skepticism toward global “tech alliances,” minilateral cooperation offers a more pragmatic path for trust-building and information sharing. This study addresses two central questions: Can Northeast Asian middle powers foster meaningful cybersecurity cooperation despite great power tensions? And how can Korea, through Songdo, Incheon, leverage its technological capacity and middle-power identity to establish a regional cybersecurity hub? By exploring these questions, the paper highlights the potential of Songdo as a platform for shaping norms and advancing security governance in the cyber domain.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, Collaboration, Minilateralism, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:
Asia and Korea

22. After the compromise: Australia’s COP31 blueprint for the Pacific

Author:
Melanie Pill, Georgia Hammersley, and Alexandre Dayant
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australia’s COP31 compromise with Türkiye, which allows Antalya to host this year’s global climate summit, secures Canberra’s control of official negotiations but weakens its influence over the wider summit, where practical decisions are made. The Pacific-hosted pre-COP is a critical opportunity to build political momentum ahead of COP31 by convening selected global leaders and placing Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in a visible leadership role to secure high-profile support for Pacific climate priorities. Australia can still deliver meaningful outcomes for the Pacific by aligning regional priorities with those of other climate-vulnerable countries, exercising ambitious leadership through the President of Negotiations, and redirecting hosting-related resources towards climate action in the region.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, and Conference of the Parties (COP)
Political Geography:
Australia, Pacific Islands, Turkey, and Global Focus

23. The Global South and the Russian War on Ukraine: Structural Constraints on Diplomatic Alignment: An assessment of the political, economic, and institutional factors shaping multilateral engagement with Russia's war against Ukraine

Author:
Paul R. Williams
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:
Three years into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a striking diplomatic gap persists between the breadth of international condemnation and the depth of practical alignment. While 141 states voted in the UN General Assembly to demand Russia's immediate withdrawal in March 2022, the countries that have joined Western-led sanctions regimes, restricted Russian access to their financial systems, or curtailed bilateral trade with Moscow represent a narrower group. That gap is not incidental and it reflects durable structural realities across the Global South that are rooted in economic dependencies, regional security pressures, institutional history, and the architecture of development finance. Understanding those realities is a prerequisite for any realistic assessment of how the conflict's diplomatic landscape might evolve. A related question follows from this analysis: given the structural depth of these constraints, whether Ukraine's diplomatic strategy would be better served by consolidating and sustaining existing Western commitments rather than investing heavily in outreach to states whose non-alignment is unlikely to shift within any operationally relevant timeframe.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Law, Sanctions, Multilateralism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global South

24. The Factors That Matter: A Formula for Understanding China’s Use of Force Calculus Over Taiwan

Author:
Lyle Morris
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
As the United States and China enter a prolonged period of instability and tension, how and under what circumstances China may use force, or, alternatively, be deterred from using force, has become of crucial importance to U.S. policymakers seeking to avoid conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While the United States can draw on its experience gauging threats and making difficult strategic calculations during the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, the emerging strategic rivalry with China is still in its early stages. The question of how to deter conflict with the PRC will be an increasingly important factor in the strategic calculations in Beijing and Washington, especially in times of heightened instability and crisis between the two powers. This, in turn, raises enormous and complex questions for U.S. policy regarding U.S.-China strategic stability, U.S.-China crisis management, and strategic and conventional deterrence vis-à-vis China. In spite of this emergent challenge, critical gaps remain in the Western understanding of PRC deterrence concepts. Most importantly, and most urgently, there is little understanding of how or why China may be deterred from resorting to military force in the event of a serious confrontation with the United States. To address these critical gaps, this paper explores China’s approach to deterrence in the military and diplomatic domain, in order to inform U.S. understanding of how it might deter China in a crisis or conflict. In particular, this paper introduces a set of key variables that matter most to China’s leadership in contemplating using force to “reunify” Taiwan with mainland China. This study develops a methodological formula that can be used by policy-makers and academics interested in understanding what has deterred Chinese leaders from using force against Taiwan, and what might cause China to change its calculus.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, Regional Security, and Use of Force
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

25. Implementing Effective U.S.-China Economic Engagement Channels

Author:
Brendan Kelly and Scott Shaw
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
As the state of U.S.-China relations has undergone significant fluctuations over the past decade, so has the structure and frequency of economic engagements between the two countries. The number and scale of such dialogues came under heavy criticism from Republican and Democratic China hawks alike—with one notable critic famously tying the rise of U.S.-China dialogues to the rise of the U.S. trade deficit with China. Some of this criticism misses the mark, however, and underestimates the value of select, well-conceived communication channels. A valid question is whether these dialogues lost the forest for the trees. U.S. officials consistently struggled to move the needle on big trade and investment issues, absent large carrots and sticks, such as WTO accession or significant tariffs. The U.S. government needs to exercise discipline in ensuring that dialogue mechanisms advance U.S. national interests and are not used by China to distract from or delay meaningful progress on core issues. Washington must also be clear-eyed that such dialogues or engagements will likely not “change China” or spur big policy and structural changes. Yet it is equally problematic that from the early stages of the pandemic in 2020 through mid-2023, the governments of the world’s two largest economies, with the world’s most complex trading relationship, had almost no engagement on economic and commercial issues. Just as national security experts emphasize the importance of U.S.-China military-to-military communications to mitigate misunderstandings and security crises, sustained channels for commercial and financial dialogues are critical for managing economic frictions. It is therefore remarkable that for multiple years the two sides lacked any such mechanisms to address commercial, financial and other economic issues. In its last year and a half, the Biden administration broadly addressed these areas through its Economic, Financial and Commercial Issues Working Groups, alongside technical consultations on issues such as export control enforcement, trade secrets, and anti-money laundering. These channels, with select cabinet-level meetings, enabled the U.S. to pursue “competitive actions”—such as export controls, tariffs, and sanctions—while maintaining a largely stable relationship. The Biden administration struggled, however, to make significant progress on the broader obstacles facing U.S. firms and exports in China, even as it was able to resolve certain company-specific issues and defuse some tensions arising from policy misunderstandings. After a sharp deterioration in bilateral economic ties in spring 2025—with tariffs essentially reaching trade embargo levels and export controls shutting down production lines in each economy—the second Trump administration has arrived at a tentative equilibrium with China on trade and technology issues. The Trump administration has an opportunity to strengthen this equilibrium, mitigate volatility, and advance U.S. interests by rebuilding and institutionalizing selective channels on key economic and technology issues. The goal should not be to return to the previous broad dialogue architecture, but rather to establish narrow mechanisms that support U.S. de-risking, reinforce policy discipline, and, with modest expectations, derive economic benefits for the U.S. from the relationship. Cabinet-level relationships with China’s top economic decisionmakers—that also address bureaucratic mismatches and silos in the two systems—are of utmost importance as the leadership dynamics and policy agendas of both governments continue to evolve. Communication mechanisms on macroeconomic, financial sector, and commercial issues have been essential—and as economic and national security issues have moved to the foreground, channels to discuss sanctions, export controls, and investment issues have become necessary as well. The Boards of Trade and Investment proposed by the two governments in recent discussions could serve as an organizing structure for most of these channels, depending on their participants and agenda. This paper reviews the historical evolution of U.S.-China economic dialogues and the key lessons learned—to suggest targeted areas where ongoing communications under these mechanisms can be most important, how these should be structured, and how to make U.S. economic statecraft toward China most effective. We appreciate the insightful inputs and comments on the paper from Craig Allen, Wendy Cutler and Paul Haenle.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Macroeconomics, Trade, Donald Trump, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. Positioning the KMT in the U.S.–China–Taiwan Triangle: Cheng Li-wun’s Early Tenure

Author:
Meghan Morris and Sheng-wen Cheng
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In March 2026, Kuomintang (KMT) chair Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) accepted an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit China from April 7–12—the first such visit by a sitting KMT chair since 2016. The visit presents both challenges and opportunities for Cheng, who is seeking greater dialogue and stability with China. It also comes just weeks before a scheduled major summit between President Trump and Xi in May and introduces new variables for all three leaders. For Xi, the symbolism of him and Cheng possibly meeting face-to-face to “mend fences” could portray an image of cross-Strait unity that could strengthen Xi’s hand in discussions with Trump. For Cheng, a successful China trip could bolster her political standing among the KMT base in Taiwan, but could also alienate opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) voters and swing voters, who may view Cheng as “selling out” Taiwan’s sovereignty in pursuit of easing tensions with mainland China. Finally, for Trump, the visit could complicate Washington’s relations with China. Trump will have to walk an even more delicate tightrope of signaling the United States’ enduring “One China” policy with Xi, while responding to the inevitable message from Xi that cross-Straits are “stabilizing” and that the United States should not intervene in the “internal matters of China.” Given this context, this paper seeks to examine the rise of Cheng Li-wun in Taiwanese politics and implications for her domestic, international, and cross-Strait agenda. We argue that while Cheng’s victory as KMT chair signals symbolic change, it has yet to translate into institutional renewal or political legitimacy. Her early appointments of KMT vice chairs suggest continuity rather than transformation—raising questions about whether the KMT is broadening or narrowing appeal within a younger electoral base. It also contends that Cheng’s rhetoric on China and the United States—calling for deeper alignment and accommodation with Beijing while simultaneously casting doubt on the value of Taiwan’s security ties with Washington—positions Cheng to potentially alter the trajectory of cross-Strait ties if the KMT achieves a majority victory in the 2028 presidential elections.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and United States of America

27. China’s Strategy in the Ukraine War and the Shaping of a Post-Conflict Order

Author:
Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Despite ongoing peace talks spearheaded by U.S. President Donald Trump, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues with seemingly no end in sight. While China might not play a primary role in peace negotiations, it nonetheless has an important stake in the outcome of the conflict. This paper seeks to assess Beijing’s calculus and potential role in brokering peace in the Ukraine conflict within the context of great power diplomacy among Moscow, Washington, Kyiv, and Brussels. Faced with Russia’s unrelenting military campaign, Washington, Brussels and Beijing have each adopted distinct positions on the war. The United States, as the key peace broker, continues to shift its policies to accommodate competing peace deal demands from Kyiv and Moscow. Meanwhile, the EU is increasingly aligning itself with Ukraine’s position, while China promotes neutral diplomatic initiatives that merely amplify a pro-Russian stance. Because China’s initiatives largely align with Russia’s position on the war, they have done little to realistically support ceasefire efforts. Rather, they are designed to portray Beijing as a principled international actor committed to peace and non-escalation. At the same time, these positions have not prevented China from establishing significant and highly pragmatic relations with Kyiv, particularly in trade and commerce. Politically, however, China’s stance has distanced Beijing from Kyiv’s key objectives regarding the terms and conditions of a ceasefire. Accordingly, this article seeks to answer the following questions: What are China’s intentions toward Ukraine amid an ongoing stalemate in peace negotiations? And how are China’s diplomatic proposals being received in capitals around the world?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Negotiation, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

28. Emerging Regional Architecture of Cooperation in Central Asia

Author:
Kristin Höltge
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Central Asia has defied early conflict predictions by moving towards peaceful regional integration through treaties, hydro-diplomacy, and institutional cooperation. The C5 framework (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), now expanding to include Azerbaijan, reflects growing regional unity and subjectivity. This self-driven shift from hotspot to hub offers valuable lessons for conflict-prone regions on how local diplomacy can replace external intervention. However, internal imbalances or external shocks still pose risks to this nascent regionalization.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Natural Resources, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Central Asia

29. Strengthening Cooperation: The Goals and Outcomes of the Iraqi Prime Minister's Visit to Turkey

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On July 28, 2026, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi paid his first visit to Ankara since taking office in April 2026, in response to an invitation from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The visit comes amid a full agenda that reflects Baghdad's priority on development and the economy in the period ahead. It also comes against the backdrop of both countries' pursuit of stronger strategic relations, at a time when bilateral ties face complex files, including water, energy, and security. Turkey also hopes that relations between the two countries, which rose to the level of a strategic partnership during the tenure of former Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani, will witness further development and a deepening of cooperation during al-Zaidi's tenure as head of government.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Economy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, and Middle East

30. Diversifying Partnerships: What Are the Motives Behind the South Korean President’s Tour of Latin America?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung visited three Latin American countries — Brazil, Chile, and Argentina — his first such visit since assuming office in June 2025. The trip formed part of a broader 11-day foreign tour, held from July 24 to August 3, 2026, that also took him to San Francisco and Frankfurt. During his stops in Latin America, Lee held summit talks with his counterparts from the three countries, focused on expanding trade and investment, opening new markets, resuming negotiations on a free trade agreement between Korea and the “Mercosur” bloc, updating the free trade agreement with Chile, and expanding the horizons of Korean diplomacy toward the Global South.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Global South, and Trade
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Latin America, and Chile