Over the last year we have witnessed a deteriorating climate in Russian-Western relations - or at least this has been the perception. The Russian financial crisis has accelerated the trend in Russia to blame the West - in particular the US - for their troubles. In America and Europe a new debate has been spawned on what kind of Russia we are now dealing with. Old truths, or old perceptions, are being questioned and relations are being reassessed.
In this report we wish to provide a brief account of what the EWI Baltic Initiative Fund has accomplished in its first year, and of some of the things we are hoping to achieve in the future. Our experience over the past eighteen months has convinced all of us at EWI that there is a job to be done, and that we have a real contribution to make. The very favorable responses we continue to receive from our Baltic partners encourage us to believe that our program is indeed worthwhile and fills an important need.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, and Government
The Communist dominated Duma sent a stern message to President Yelstin on September 7th by rejecting his nominee, Viktor Chernomyrdin, for the second time. The vote was 273 against and 138 for (with one abstention). While Chernomyrdin's showing improved substantially from the Duma's first ballot, he still fell far short of the 226 votes needed for Duma approval. Furthermore, his gains came largely from Zhirinovsky's nationalist faction, which has a crass history of trading votes to “the highest bidder.” Yelstin's opposition, on the other hand, benefited from the support of independent deputies comprising a group called “Regions of Russia”: their approval of Chernomyrdin dropped from 86% to 50% in the second round.
Allen Collinsworth, Robert Orttung, Rado Petkov, and Rick Petree
Publication Date:
08-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
At approximately 12.30 p.m. EST today, the Duma rejected Chernomyrdin's nomination as Prime Minister by an open ballot vote of 251-94 (with 105 abstaining). 226 votes are needed to confirm him. Chernomyrdin's own Our Home Is Russia party provided most of his support (64 votes). Zhirinovsky's party, the Liberal Democrats, abstained (49 votes). Analysts underscored the weakness of support for Chernomyrdin by noting that, in the first round of voting on the nomination of Prime Minister Kiriyenko five months ago, Kiriyenko polled 143 votes in favor. This was in secret balloting, however, which to some extent invalidates the comparison.
The latest private reports from Moscow indicate that the Duma is very likely to reject Viktor Chernomyrdin's candidacy for Prime minister next week. Tomorrow, Aug. 28 th , at 3:00 pm, the Duma and the Federation Council will meet to decide whether to recommend a vote on Chernomyrdin's candidacy. Whereas Chernomyrdin's chances are bleak, the fluid nature of current Russian political situation makes it impossible to firmly rule out his confirmation as prime minister, a post which he very much wants.
Since our Aug. 20th report, the situation in Russia has developed dramatically. On Friday (Aug. 21st), the lower house of the Russian parliament (the Duma) overwhelmingly called for Yeltsin's resignation and changes in the government and the leadership of the central bank. The Duma also passed a non-binding resolution demanding nationalization of some banks and restriction of foreign participation in domestic capital markets. In response, the RTS index of leading Russian shares fell 5.56% to 81.76 on negligible trading volume of $4.2 million. Central bank head Dubinin announced plans to activate Russia's precious metals reserves (approximately $5 billion of $15.1 billion total foreign exchange reserves) to support the ruble. On Sunday, Aug. 23rd, in an action anticipated in our Aug. 17th report, Yeltsin dismissed Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko and installed in his place Viktor Chernomyrdin.
Russian capital markets were already in what George Soros described as a “financial meltdown in . . . its terminal phase” on August 12th. Since then, capital markets have deteriorated significantly in reaction to measures announced by the Russian Government on Monday, Aug. 17th (summarized in Section II below). IEWS is actively evaluating the nature and extent of the crisis and trying to project its likely course.
Since 1992-93, the Institute for EastWest Studies (IEWS) has been organizing meetings of a 'Strategy Group for Strengthening Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe'. The Strategy Group brings together representatives of the Central and Eastern European Associates of the European Union and Ukraine (and Western states and neighbouring countries where appropriate) to discuss the security challenges facing the region. The Strategy Group aims to foster the development of cooperative solutions to the problems facing Central and Eastern Europe. Participants in Strategy Group conferences and workshops come from diverse backgrounds, including governmental representatives, politicians, business people, academics and non- governmental representatives.
Doubts were expressed as to the extent one could define the Caucasus and Central Asia as a single region, particularly for the purposes of exploring the potential for subregional cooperation to develop among its constituent states. External considerations (complex relationship between Russia and the states involved; presence of other outside actors; energy transit perspectives; influence of external conflict, i.e. Afghanistan) may point towards consideration of the Southern Tier as one region. However, internal perspectives, geographical, historical, political and cultural, suggest that treating subregionalism separately in the Caucasus and Central Asia might be a more realistic and potentially fruitful approach.
Topic:
Development, Economics, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
New York, Europe, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Maryland
The EastWest Institute is interested in the issue of banking supervision as one of the primary goals of our Economics Program since 1990 has been to support the establishment of a reformed, market-based banking system in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). As an integral component of our broader work in providing expert support to commercial bank managers and economic policymakers on the concrete aspects of implementing reform-oriented practices and strategies, we see the underlying stability and transparency of the banking system to be of critical importance. In Hungary as elsewhere, banks are indispensable to the smooth functioning of the economy, and the EWI has long subscribed to the view that the banking sector (e.g. in the context of privatisation) is a 'special' sector and requires special treatment.