Journal: Conflict Trends - CIAO Search Results

1. Military Coups in Africa: A Continuation of Politics by Other Means?

Author:: Nana Amoateng
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The military has been an important institution for protecting States from external threats since antiquity. In fulfilling this fundamental role, military institutions have also posed security risks to their own governments, given that the ‘ability to use coercive force, though necessary to defend the nation against threats, creates the danger that the military will turn its weapons on the very regime that empowered its existence’.[1] Military personnel can fuel civil conflicts and undermine the stability of political regimes mostly in States with loose political control of the military. As Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast have argued, ‘Societies experiencing a civil war, by definition, do not have consolidated control of the military’.[2] In Africa, military institutions have, on one hand, helped to protect States from both internal and external threats, including local insurgencies. On the other hand, they have destabilised several political regimes through coup d’états. Military coups – ‘when the military, or a section of the military, turns its coercive power against the apex of the state, establishes itself there, and the rest of the state takes its orders from the new regime’[3] – have been relatively common in post-independent African States,[4] thereby raising several issues, including how to understand the relationship between politics and military coups. This article contributes to the discussion by highlighting how coups are a continuation of politics by other means, particularly in West Africa.
Topic:: Politics, Governance, Leadership, Coup, and Military
Political Geography:: Africa

2. Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding: Addressing the Root Causes of Conflict in Darfur

Author:: Zurab Elzarov
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The relationship between climate change and deadly conflict is complex and context-specific, but it is undeniable that climate change is a threat multiplier that is already increasing food insecurity, water scarcity and resource competition, while disrupting livelihoods and spurring migration. In turn, deadly conflict and political instability are contributing to climate change.[2] Darfur captured international headlines in 2004 when United States (US) Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that genocide was occurring in Sudan in his testimony to the US Senate.[3] The early-2000s conflict in Darfur between rebel groups on one side and government forces and allied militias on the other caused an estimated 300 000 deaths, and about 2.5 million people live in displacement camps across Darfur.[4] Most observers agree that the immediate cause was a regional rebellion, to which Khartoum responded by recruiting Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to wage a campaign of ethnic cleansing against African civilians.[5] They also argue that the three core drivers of violence in Darfur at present are disputes over land and resources, the complex network of militias and paramilitary forces, and the weakness of the rule of law and security institutions.[6] Eighteen years after the eruption of the conflict in Darfur, these conclusions regarding the main causes and triggers of the conflict remain valid. In 2021, despite the signed Juba Peace Agreement, the security situation in Darfur remained volatile, with significant inter-communal violence and fighting between government forces and rebels in the Jebel Marra area. The instability in the region continues to cause large-scale displacement, with more than 200 000 people displaced in Darfur since the beginning of 2021.
Topic:: Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Africa and Darfur

3. Natural Resource (In)justice, Conflict and Transition Challenges in Africa: Lessons from the Niger Delta

Author:: Luke Amadi
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The term ‘natural resource (in)justice’ has been used in various contexts by various scholars. Contemporary resource justice scholarship highlights several different areas of debate, including power and inequality in resource access, control, ownership, greening, eco-efficiency, feminist ecology, resource transparency, just transitions,[1] resource equity, resource rights, and fairness with regards to global inequality in North/South natural resource policies.[2] Resource injustice underlines two dynamic and interwoven contexts. First, there is the anthropogenic context, which examines the adverse effects of natural resource extraction on humans, including exclusion, degradation, inequality, and unfair treatment in natural resource allocation. Second, there is the eco-centric context, which explores the adverse effects of natural resource extraction on the ecosystem or the natural environment. The broader terrain within which natural resource justice is being pursued is rapidly changing. With the rise of natural resource justice movements, new ecological threats, the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, and lethal feedback with deleterious capitalist resource extraction in the global South, resource justice is confronted with new challenges, notably resource conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a considerable and increasing number of studies on natural resource conflict, including on questions of resource appropriation or what has become known in resource conflict debates as the ‘resource curse’, which points out the paradox of poverty among resource-rich countries.[3] Conflict and poverty are intertwined. In 2013, 471 million people lived in fragile and conflict-affected countries, while 78% of the world’s poor lived in these countries (181 million people).[4] Natural resources – land, water, forests, air – are essential to life on Earth.[5] Natural resource conflict accounts for the incompatibility of goals in natural resource use or appropriation. The rural poor in developing countries remain the most vulnerable, as they directly depend on natural resources for their food and livelihood security, while the livelihoods of 2.5 billion people depend wholly or partly on agriculture.[6] The dynamics of fair and equitable resource allocation in contexts associated with resource injustice are largely unknown. This is true especially where the resource-bearing local population is either marginalised or excluded in decision-making processes regarding natural resources.
Topic:: Environment, Natural Resources, Transitional Justice, Conflict, and Justice
Political Geography:: Africa and Niger Delta

4. Peacebuilding Policies and Frameworks in Kenya

Author:: Sylvan Odidi
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Peacebuilding is both a contested and evolving concept,with no universally accepted definition.[1] Despite being a broadly fluid term without clear guidelines or goals, most scholars agree that the fundamental task of peacebuilding is to improve human security.[2] The term first emerged through Johan Galtung’s peace work. He advocated for the establishment of a peacebuilding system to stimulate long-lasting peace by finding a solution to sources of violent conflicts and enhancing local capacities for conflict resolution and peace management.[3] A report by Boutros Boutros-Ghali entitled ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping’ refers to peacebuilding as ‘an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict’.[4] A peacebuilding agenda is critical in the realisation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which advocate for ‘peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’.[5] In the Kenyan context, peacebuilding activities and regulatory frameworks are recognised as vital processes and instruments that are necessary for the achievement of Vision 2030, which is the country’s new development blueprint that aims to transform Kenya into a new industrialising middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizen by 2030. On the one hand, the peacebuilding, conflict management, and security strategy of the political pillar of Vision 2030 underscores the need for promoting peacebuilding and reconciliation, deepening policies and legal and institutional frameworks that promote order in society, as well as institutionalising dialogue between and among communities to promote harmony among racial, ethnic and other interest groups. On the other hand, the social pillar aims at establishing ‘a just and cohesive society that enjoys equitable social development in a clean and secure environment’.[6] Nyambura Githaiga observes that from a cursory glance, Kenya is not an immediate or apparent choice for a peacebuilding case study.[7] This can be attributed to the fact that peacebuilding studies primarily focus on nations that experienced highly destructive and horrific civil wars and require international intervention. However, Kenya has suffered intermittent and localised destructive conflicts, such as the 1992, 1997, and 2007-2008 election-based violence. Therefore, Kenya offers a peacebuilding case study which is not related to civil war, but part of a tactical response to repeated incidents of local destructive conflicts.[8]
Topic:: Infrastructure, Conflict, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Kenya and Africa

5. From Terrorism to Banditry: Mass Abductions of Schoolchildren in Nigeria

Author:: Freedom C. Onuoha and Joseph Chukwunonso Akogwu
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Kidnapping in Nigeria is not a new phenomenon but has assumed an alarming dimension in recent times. Acts of kidnapping are increasingly perpetrated by different criminal elements, such as militias, gangs, ritualists, and terrorists, among others, for a variety of reasons. However, the increased frequency, geographical spread, and operational sophistication of kidnapping for ransom (K4R) is a major source of concern for individuals, organisations, the diplomatic community, and, indeed, the Nigerian Government. Much of the concern is about the safety of the victims as well as the cost of this expanding criminal enterprise. For instance, Nigeria’s main geopolitical intelligence platform, SBM Intelligence, estimated that between 2011 and 2020, Nigerians paid at least US$18.34 million (₦7 billion) in ransoms to kidnappers.[1] In the first half of 2021, 2 371 people were kidnapped and the sum of about US$23.84 million (N10 billion) was demanded in ransoms in Nigeria.[2] The targets are as diverse as the actors who benefit from and the factors that underpin the upsurge in K4R. Expatriates, businesspeople, schoolchildren, women, politicians, government officials, diplomats, and traditional rulers, among others, are increasingly being targeted by criminal gangs.[3] The wanton predation on schoolchildren through mass abduction by armed groups that are ideologically or economically motivated is the latest worrisome trend in the pattern of criminal victimisation in Nigeria. This article examines the trajectory of the mass abduction of schoolchildren in northern Nigeria, highlighting the drivers of mass abduction and evaluating emerging responses by the government.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Governance, Leadership, Peace, and Abductions
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

6. The Role of Youths in Countering Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria

Author:: Angela Ajodo-Adebanjoko
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Northeast Nigeria is the epicentre of violent extremism in the country. Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, in particular, record high incidences of extremism regularly. Extremists have been responsible for various killings and wanton destruction in the north and other parts of Nigeria. At the centre of the violence are youths, who constitute the majority of the members of these extremist groups. Young people are easier targets for recruitment by extremist groups because of peer pressure, drug use, gang involvement, prior delinquency, family member gang-involvement, membership in a cult, and the quest for adventure, among others. In spite of their involvement in violent extremism, it is recognised globally that the youth can be equal partners in its prevention. The youth should be considered a country’s asset, as the future of the country as well as having the potential to be leaders of today. However, a growing ‘youth bulge’ of unemployable young people trying to survive – and subject to recruitment by armed extremist groups – is problematic, and can even present a threat to prosperity and peace.
Topic:: Violent Extremism, Youth, Conflict, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

7. The Risk Pivot: Great Powers, International Security and the Energy Revolution

Author:: Felix Shihundu
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The Risk Pivot: Great Powers, International Security and the Energy Revolution shows a good understanding of conflict trends in Africa. The book highlights and provides evidence for the dangers existing in the energy revolution from fossil fuels to much-needed environmentally friendly, sustainable, and renewable energy that has become the next frontier in great power rivalries. Both the United States (US) and China are valuable stakeholders in this area and command geopolitical influence on the African continent. The book brings into perspective the geopolitical consequences of the revolutionary energy supply, demand and flow and how it is transforming the global economy, international security, and the order of states. According to the authors, the emergence of global middle-class countries, such as the Asian giants, a fast-growing source of energy demand, combined with security-challenged energy producers and exporters, such as Algeria, Libya and Nigeria in Africa, represents geopolitical instability. The authors lay out the foreign policy and security implications of dramatic changes in energy production, distribution and consumption. The danger, what the authors refer to as risk pivot, in international security is caused by a number of factors. The first factor is the increasing dependence of rising Asian powers, such as India and China, on Middle East oil and gas supplies. The second factor is the new energy partnership between China and Russia, a leading fossil fuel producer. The third factor is the shifting centre of global energy markets as a result of energy revolutions in the US. The fourth factor is the increased energy demands due to the rising global middle class, which poses challenges for governance and development. The final factor is the role of the US in securing energy flows from the Middle East following its Asia re-alignment.
Topic:: International Security, Power Politics, and Energy
Political Geography:: Africa

8. Insurgency in Mozambique: the Role of the Southern African Development Community

Author:: Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Since early October 2017, when the Islamist militants or jihadists – identified as the Ansar al-Sunna – launched their first attacks in the villages and towns of Mozambique’s northern province of Cabo Delgado, insurgency and conflict has continued to escalate, targeting civilians, public infrastructure and government buildings. Although the Government of Mozambique continues to make concerted efforts to fight and subdue the terrorist insurgency through its national defence forces, the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM), a series of battles with the terrorist militants has resulted in widespread violence, insecurity, the death of over 2 400 people[1] and the displacement of over 500 000 civilians by the end of November 2020.[2] It has also disrupted economic activities, especially farming, thereby worsening food insecurity.
Topic:: Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Food Security, Displacement, and Jihad
Political Geography:: Africa and Mozambique

9. Elections and Electoral Violence in Côte d’Ivoire: ECOWAS’s Efforts towards Stability

Author:: Mubin Adewumi Bakare
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Côte d’Ivoire’s presidential election on 31 October 2020 marked the fifth presidential election held in the country since the death of the “pere foundateur de la nation” (father of the nation), Félix Houphouët-Boigny, in 1993. The election was held in a tense political and volatile security atmosphere, driven by opposition protests against President Alassane Ouattara’s third-term candidacy, which was a breach of the 2016 constitution. The political contest among the political stakeholders also bordered on matters around the electoral code, the voter register, implementation of the constitutional reforms and the composition of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which opposition parties denounced as non-inclusive, unbalanced and partisan.[1] The inability of the ruling party and the opposition parties – which formed a common political front, led by Henri Konan Bédié – to reach common ground in addressing these issues led to a series of protests, which escalated into violence across the country. On the eve of the election, Bédiéand Pascal Affi N’Guessan, the two major opposition candidates, reneged their participation in the election and called on their supporters to block the election. The election result declared by the IEC proclaimed Ouattara as the winner, having amassed 94.27% of the votes cast. N’Guessan got 0.99%, Bédié was credited with 1.66% and Kouadio Konan Bertin obtained 1.99%.[2] These results, which were ratified by the Constitutional Council on 9 November 2020, as stipulated in the constitution, endorsed President Ouattara as the winner. However, N’Guessan, on behalf of the opposition parties, announced his non-recognition of Ouattara’s victory and thereby installed a National Transitional Council, with Bédié as the president.Protests by opposition parties and their supporters led to violence, which resulted in about 85 deaths recorded in localities including Yopougon, Bonoua, Mbatto, Bongouanou, Daoukro and others.
Topic:: Elections, Election watch, Domestic Policy, and Opposition
Political Geography:: Africa and Côte d'Ivoire

10. Female Participation in Peacebuilding Efforts in Africa: A Review of Recent Academic Contributions

Author:: Jenny Nortvedt
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The year 2020 marked the 20th anniversary of the unanimous adoption of the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; 25 years since the World Conference on Women in Beijing; and the conclusion of the African Women’s Decade. Since 2000, the UN has adopted 10 subsequent resolutions and several strategies under the normative framework of the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda. On the African continent, the African Union (AU) and its member states have promoted the WPS agenda through several legal guidelines, training manuals and normative frameworks, including Aspiration 6 of Agenda 2063, the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004), The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003) and the AU Gender Policy (2009). Furthermore, in 2016, more than 19 AU member states adopted Resolution 1325 national action plans and, in 2018, the AU adopted the regional Strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (2018–2028).[2]Still, despite progress in many areas, the advancement of women’s meaningful participation in peacebuilding efforts and the promotion of gender equality in peace and security has been slow.[3] Since the adoption of Resolution 1325 and the resolutions that followed, which now constitute the WPS normative framework, a substantial body of literature has emerged. The literature has concentrated on some key thematic areas – participation, protection, prevention and gender perspectives – which, to a large degree, mirror the four main pillars in Resolution 1325. In 2018, The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace and Securityexamined the growing academic and policy contributions to the WPS agenda over the past two decades and highlighted remaining challenges.[4] Therefore, the recent anniversary presents an opportunity to continue on this track and to take stock of recent and ongoing empirical studies and emerging topics within the WPS agenda. This review explores (1) recent academic and policy contributions to the WPS agenda on the African continent from 2017 onwards, with a special emphasis on participation; and (2) relevant new contributions regarding emerging challenges to female participation in peacebuilding efforts. There have been several reviews regarding the operationalisation and implementation of the goals set out in Resolution 1325 by both the UN and the AU, and in academic communities – for example, the AU Commission Review; Implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Africa; the Continental Results Framework: Monitoring and Reporting on the Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Africa (2018–2028);[5] the review Women, Peace and Security – Implementing the Maputo Protocol in Africa (2016),[6] the recent 10-year Review of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda of the AU Peace and Security Council (2020)[7] and the 2015 UN review, including the UN Global Study.[8] However, the main focus of this article is a review of the academic contributions in the past few years, to evaluate the empirical foundation for the next decade of the WPS agenda.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Peacekeeping, Peace, Participation, and Equality
Political Geography:: Africa

11. Patriarchy is the Constraint: Resolution 1325 Two Decades Later

Author:: Seema Shekhawat
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Two decades ago, history was made as far as gender security is concerned. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) led a revolutionary policy change by passing Resolution 1325 – also known as the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda – on 31 October 2000. The resolution marked the United Nations’ (UN) full-fledged attention to gendered aspects of peace and conflict. This was revolutionary: advocacy for placing women at the centre of peace processes – not merely as victims, but as peacebuilders. The resolution called for the full participation of women in all efforts towards conflict prevention, resolution, peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction. This resolution is considered a crucial international document for advocating gender equality in all processes of peacebuilding, both during conflict and post-conflict.[1] It brought into focus the official endorsement of the involvement of women in formal peace processes.[2] This article[3] argues that since we recently celebrated the 20th anniversary of UNSC Resolution 1325 in Africa, and elsewhere, a reality check is in order.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Gender Issues, United Nations, Peacekeeping, Feminism, and Equality
Political Geography:: Global Focus

12. Mission to Civilise: The French West African Federation

Author:: Christopher Zambakari
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Imperial powers such as Rome, Persia, Japan and China have justified their conquests as a benefit to those that were conquered by virtue of bringing a superior civilisation to their world.[1] Among imperial powers, one of the most strident were the Second and Third French Republics.[2] The civilising mission – or what French historian Raoul Girardet refers to as “colonial humanism”[3] – came to define French colonial statecraft in the early 19th century crusade to improve the lives of people who France saw as backward in Asia, Africa and the Pacific. For intellectuals such as Leroy-Beaulieu, civilisation was to be spread through commerce, trade and exchanges between people, rather than through conquest.[4] By the early 1800s, the republican ideals that inspired the French Revolution were slowly abandoned for a more forceful assimilationist policy exemplified by colonial expansionist policies. According to Jules Brévié, governor-general of French West Africa from 1930 to 1936 and of French Indochina from 1936 to 1939, the most important task for the French was to bring about a cultural renaissance to the indigenous people.[5] Brévié called for a redefined mission with a focus on teaching colonised subjects to live according to “authentic African traditions”.[6] As with the British before them, French policy adapted to the local context and shifted towards a more “indirect mode of rule”,[7] casting foreign rule as the protectors of indigenous cultures. This article analyses the French imperial project in Africa, with a focus on the Federation of French West Africa (consisting of today’s Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal). It outlines differences and similarities between the French mode of direct rule and the British mode of indirect rule. To understand the methodology of rule, one must first understand the system of knowledge production that informed, shaped and guided the colonial project. A policy change occurred after the French experienced a crisis of empire, which ushered in fundamental transformations before World War I (1909 and 1912) and the interwar years between 1918 and 1939 (from “assimilation” to that of “association”). The new policy shifted the focus from antagonism towards Islam to collaboration with Islamic representatives, from civilisations to conservation, from a focus on progress to law and order, and a preoccupation with local customs while managing social and cultural differences (pluralism).[8] This article is offered as an important contribution to the political and intellectual history of the largest colonial state in Africa: the Federation of French West Africa.
Topic:: Imperialism, Intellectual History, Colonialism, Assimilation, and Customs
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, France, Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Mauritania, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Benin

13. Youth Engagement in Peace Processes in Africa

Author:: Maryline Njoroge
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Since International Youth Day was celebrated on 12 August 2020, it is a good time to take stock of the youth and their role in peacebuilding and peace processes in Africa. With the youth, peace and security agenda gaining ground in recent years, this is an opportune time for youth-focused organisations to strengthen their work on youth and peacebuilding, while contributing to the ongoing discourse. The youth, peace and security agenda is currently backed by three United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions adopted between 2015 and 2020, namely UNSC Resolutions 2250 (2015), 2419 (2018) and 2535 (2020). Among other priorities, the resolutions emphasise the importance of youth as agents of change in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security;[1] reiterate the need for stakeholders to take young people’s views into account and facilitate their equal and full participation in peace and decision-making processes at all levels; and recognise the positive role young people can play in negotiating and implementing peace agreements and in preventing and resolving conflict.[2] The third resolution, adopted in July 2020, also establishes a regular biennial reporting requirement on youth, peace and security by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, which is a great step forward in mainstreaming the youth, peace and security agenda into the work of the UN – especially since youth engagement in peacebuilding and peace processes is ad hoc and intermittent. The reporting requirement will therefore provide a snapshot of ongoing processes and how engagement can be enhanced and deepened in future processes.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, United Nations, Peacekeeping, Youth, Peace, and Participation
Political Geography:: Africa

14. A New Coup Era for Africa?

Author:: Jonathan Powell, Abigail Reynolds, and Mwita Chacha
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: It was not long ago that the decline of coups was being celebrated, not just in Africa, but globally. New African magazine asked in Fall 2015 why coups are going out of style.[1] Writing in September 2017, Schiel and her co-authors pointed to a two-year period since the last attempted coup in Africa, with the continent approaching three full years since the last successful attempt.[2] A month later, former Malian Foreign Minister Kamisssa Camara – even in the context of herself serving shortly after a coup –suggested that ‘the time for coups is over’.[3] Though perhaps not a long period at first glance, this was the longest coup-less stretch in Africa since decolonisation. Various efforts have been made to explain this shift, including the institutionalisation of more open political systems and the role of external actors such as the African Union (AU).[4] Though the November 2017 coup against Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe was a new coup, coups remained something of an afterthought in subsequent years. More recently, commentary at the Council on Foreign Relations concluded that ‘old style’ coups in which soldiers attempted to seize power had been supplanted by incumbents scheming to maintain it.[5] This has changed since August 2020, with successful coups taking place in Chad, Guinea, and twice in Mali as well as a failed effort to seize power in Niger, and both a failed and successful coup in Sudan. This apparent resurgence in the phenomenon has prompted much discussion on the causes of these events, whether they are related, and what – if anything – the region can do to buck the trend. Independent African states have experienced over 200 coup attempts since 1950, of which over 100 have succeeded (see Figure 1).[6]
Topic:: Governance, Leadership, Coup, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Africa

15. Political Reforms and Implications for Democracy and Instability in West Africa: The Way Forward for ECOWAS and Member States

Author:: Mubin Adewumi Bakare
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: With the restoration of democratic order in the Gambia in 2017, the West African region regained the attention of the world with renewed hope and optimism for democratic consolidation in Africa. The Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) rejection of the undemocratic retention of power by former President Yahya Jammeh and its threat to apply force, coupled with Gambians’ resistance, resulted in the restoration of democratic order in the country. Similarly, ECOWAS’ preventive diplomacy efforts following the recent military incursion in 2021 affirmed the regional body’s zero-tolerance stance for power acquired through unconstitutional means. The practice of accessing political power through credible elections under the watch of civil society and international actors is progressively taking firm root across the region. However, despite these democratic gains, the region is also witnessing setbacks in emerging political developments across Member States. According to the Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World Report 2021’, of the 12 countries with the most significant decline in democracy year-on-year, five are in West Africa.[1] The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index (2020) showed that only Ghana and Cabo Verde still qualify as fully-fledged democracies in the region.[2] Recently, the region has also witnessed a resurgence in military interregna in Mali and Guinea. This democracy backsliding portends political instability, and its attendant economic consequences for the ECOWAS is concerning considering the developmental agenda of the region. Central to this negative democratic trend are concerns around political reforms that have undermined electoral integrity, inclusiveness and legitimacy in Member States. The application of some of these reforms has fuelled crises, which have led to the resurgence of coups d’état and threatened stability, peace and security in the region.
Topic:: Politics, Governance, Reform, Democracy, Instability, Peacebuilding, and ECOWAS
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

16. Self-defence Militias and State Sponsorship in Burkina Faso

Author:: Viljar Haavik
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Burkina Faso has been engulfed in an ongoing conflict with jihadist insurgent groups active across the Sahel in West Africa. The conflict originally started in Mali in 2012 and later spread to Niger. In June 2021, the worst attack in Burkina Faso since 2015 occurred in the village of Solhan, where suspected jihadists massacred 160 civilians.[1]Naturally, discussions in the media revolved around who perpetrated the attack, but the attack also brought to the forefront the role of self-defence groups or militias in the Burkina Faso conflict. While the use of armed militias in Burkina Faso has become widespread and is actively sponsored by the State, there are concerns that self-defence militias perpetuate conflict. The main reasons are that self-defence militias in Burkina Faso are exacerbating mutual distrust, tension and violence among different communities, while the use and State sponsorship of militias are exposing the civilian population to reprisals from the insurgents who perceive them as a threat. The result is that President Roch Marc Kaboré may be doing more harm than good by creating self-defence militias under the legal framework of the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDPs) adopted unanimously by Burkina Faso’s Parliament in January 2020.
Topic:: Politics, Governance, Violence, Militias, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:: Africa and Burkina Faso

17. Banditry in Nigeria: Insights from Situational Action and Situational Crime Prevention Theories

Author:: Tope Shola Akinyetun
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Insecurity in Nigeria is a recurring phenomenon that threatens the well-being of its citizens. The multipronged occurrence constitutes a bane to development and leads to the proliferation of crime. As a multifaceted quandary, insecurity assumes varying dimensions in different geopolitical zones. The South West is plagued by a surge in cybercrime, armed robbery, kidnapping, domestic crime, extrajudicial killings, herder-farmer conflicts, ritual killings, and banditry. The South East is a haven for ritual killings, commercial crime, secessionist agitation, kidnapping, herder-farmer clashes, attacks by unknown gunmen, and banditry. The South remains threatened by militancy, kidnapping, and environmental agitation. The North East has been subject to a humanitarian crisis lasting over a decade and caused by the Boko Haram insurgency and the Islamic State in West Africa Province. Meanwhile, the North West is enmeshed in illegal mining, ethnoreligious killings, and banditry. It is, therefore, an axiom that insecurity in Nigeria has assumed a disproportionate geopolitical stance and that it has claimed thousands of lives and extensive damage and loss of property.
Topic:: Security, Crime, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

18. The Interaction of Mass Media and Social Media in Fuelling Ethnic Violence in Ethiopia

Author:: Muna Shifa and Fabio Andres Diaz Pabon
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Social media platforms play a prominent role in modern society by providing tools for various voices to communicate ideas, perspectives and worldviews. Such potential has been illustrated by the role of these platforms in supporting social movements, mobilisation in defence of the environment, and the defence of marginalised communities and groups across different latitudes.[1]However, in many instances, social media has also been used to spread misinformation, broadcast hate speech, and incite violence. The role of social media has been documented as interacting and co-creating narratives with mass media in contexts of conflict. We understand mass media as a diverse set of media platforms that use mass communication to reach a large audience and operate within visible organisational structures. Platforms such as radio, television, newspapers, and magazines are examples of mass media. We define social media as decentralised broadcasting platforms that allow users to create and share content as well as engage in social networking. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are examples of social media platforms. The role of social media and its interaction with mass media in relation to conflicts remains a growing area of study, particularly after the Arab Spring.[2] The Arab Spring highlighted the importance of social media in social mobilisations leading to uprisings and the emergence of armed conflicts. It illustrated how conflicts and even armed action can be coordinated via social media platforms (as in Syria and Iraq). Despite this, the role of social media and its interaction with mass media in fuelling tensions across ‘ethnic’ groups in armed conflicts remains an under-researched area. Thus, while social media and mass media appear ubiquitous, little research has been conducted to examine how traditional mass media and social media interact in fuelling ethnic conflict.
Topic:: Civil Society, Mass Media, Social Media, Ethnicity, and Violence
Political Geography:: Africa and Ethiopia

19. Why Integrate National Peace Structures? Building Community Platforms for Resilience, Early Warning and Dialogue

Author:: ACCORD
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: In the last two decades, West Africa has become an incubator for violent conflict whose origins are mostly believed to be rooted outside the region. The current climate of poverty, unemployment, under-development, poor governance, human rights abuses, repression, unprecedented delays and denial of access to justice, and ongoing conflicts have made West Africa a breeding ground for terrorism. The spread of terrorism across the region has intensified exponentially over the past 20 years more than any other time in the history of the region. Terrorism is a major security challenge for Africa as a whole, considering the rising number of attacks, the multiplicity of active terror networks, and the growing links between and among terror groups. Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) are some of the deadliest terrorist organisations that are still highly active in Africa. They constantly mutate into incognito networks, and their actions are also labelled as banditry or cattle rustling, among others, in Nigeria. Terrorism is violence without borders, and its dynamics are highly unpredictable, especially with the skill and ingenuity with which terrorist organisations conceal their real identities.
Topic:: Civil Society, Peace, Resilience, Dialogue, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

20. The July 2021 Protests and Socio-political Unrest in South Africa

Author:: Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: During the period 9 to 17 July 2021, South Africa experienced violent protests and socio-political unrest characterised by widespread looting of shops and businesses, as well as burning and destruction of public facilities and private properties, mostly in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and Gauteng. The socio-political unrest and violence were largely sparked by initial low-intensity and sporadic protests in parts of KZN against the arrest and imprisonment of former President Jacob Zuma. The Constitutional Court of South Africa sentenced the former president to 15 months imprisonment for defying its order to comply with the summons to appear before the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State, and for undermining the authority of the Court through his casual and scandalous attacks. There has been wide-ranging debate across the country on whether the ‘Free Zuma’ protests, looting and socio-political unrest was caused by the imprisonment of Zuma or not. However, what stands out is not only the undeniable fact that the developments resulted in colossal socio-economic damage countrywide at a time when the Covid-19 pandemic is wreaking havoc on national economic growth and people’s lives and livelihoods, but also the valuable lessons for sustainable future prevention, management and resolution of conflict, violence and socio-political unrest in South Africa. This article deepens the analysis into the causes and consequences of the Free Zuma socio-political unrest while reflecting on the possible valuable lessons that can be drawn from the events to avoid the recurrence of such and to manage and resolve similar conflicts in the future sustainably.
Topic:: Governance, Leadership, Protests, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:: Africa and South Africa

21. The Risk of Violent Extremism and Terrorism in the Coastal States of West Africa

Author:: Festus Aubyn
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The activities of violent extremist and terrorist groups in West Africa have been on the rise since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since January 2021, high-profile attacks by groups affiliated with the Islamic State (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda have been recorded in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Although the Sahel region of West Africa is currently the epicentre of violent extremism and terrorism (VET), the threat is gradually spilling over into the littoral States along the Gulf of Guinea (GoG).[1] Several coastal States along the GoG have recently either witnessed attacks or identified the presence of terrorist groups in parts of their territory.[2]Ghana provides a clear example of the contagion effects of VET in the coastal States, although the countryhas not witnessed any direct terrorist attacks. In July 2021, the Minister of Information, Kojo Oppong Nkrumah, affirmed this and noted that ‘terrorist groups operating in West Africa have managed to recruit some Ghanaians to aid their cause.’[3] Unlike its neighbouring countries, like Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire that are experiencing terrorist attacks, Ghana has managed so far to prevent attacks despite its vulnerabilities. This raises critical questions about Ghana’s seeming resilience against the risk of VET and how it is responding to the scourge. This article probes these questions by examining the factors that render Ghana vulnerable to, and at the same time resilient to, VET. It also assesses Ghana’s response to the threat and concludes with some policy recommendations.
Topic:: Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Violence, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

22. Conflict Dynamics in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province

Author:: Theo Neethling
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The ongoing militant insurgency and conflict in the upper north-eastern Cabo Delgado province in Mozambique has been brewing since 2017. However, it only gained the attention of the international community in mid-August 2020 when the Islamist extremist movement, Al Sunnah wa Jama’ah (or Ansar al-Sunna), captured the port town of Mocimboa da Praia in the north-eastern part of the country. This was not the first capturing of the town, as the insurgents – many of whom reportedly are originally from Mocimboa da Praia – earlier also briefly took control of the town in March 2020. At the same time, the town of Quissanga, approximately 180 km further south, then became the most targeted area in 2020, although the insurgents focused attacks on several other towns and districts. The insurgents further specifically targeted military and police forces, while the population in Cabo Delgado experienced horrific brutality in the form of killings, including beheadings, and other forms of violence that led to internal displacements and food shortages in the affected areas.[1] What followed were harsh security responses from the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (Mozambican Defence and Security Forces) (FDS),[2] similar to indiscriminate responses elsewhere in conflict zones in Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel, and the Maghreb. The escalating attacks and heavy-handed responses have only heightened distrust among local residents and are alleged to have enhanced recruitment by the insurgents.[3] Currently, Cabo Delgado province is caught up in a security challenge with national, regional and international implications. The situation not only endangers the lives of tens of thousands of Mozambicans, but is also destabilising the upper north-eastern parts of Mozambique and certainly poses a threat to foreign direct investment pertaining to large-scale infrastructure, mining, exploration (especially natural gas), and other projects in Mozambique and the region.[4]
Topic:: Security, Insurgency, Governance, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa and Mozambique

23. Climate-related Peace and Security Risks in Africa

Author:: Kheira Tarif and Anab Ovidie Grand
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The effects of climate change are felt globally in frequent and severe disasters, increasing temperatures, and changing rainfall, with significant implications for society. Climate security acknowledges that climate change can undermine peace and increase levels of violence by affecting the drivers of conflict.[1] Somalia, South Sudan, and Mali are all exposed to climate change, face complex security challenges, and host large peacekeeping forces. Increasing temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, droughts, and floods have disrupted livelihoods and forced migration in three African countries. Climate change contributes to farmer-herder competition over land and water. Elites take advantage of climate-related disruptions by exploiting marginalised groups, as do armed groups seeking to recruit youth. The relationship between climate change and insecurity has been recognised in multilateral organisations with a mandate in climate, peace and security (CPS) in Africa. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has included climate security-specific language in country situation and peacekeeping mission resolutions, which has led to the creation of an Environmental Security Advisor position in the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).[2] The African Union (AU) is advancing analysis and responses to CPS across Africa, including in high-level fora and in coordination with Regional Economic Communities (RECs).[3] The European Union (EU) is a global leader in development aid and climate finance, and several of its Member States have been instrumental in international climate diplomacy and CPS discussions.[4] This article[5] discusses climate change and conflict and describes a risk-based approach to investigating links between the two.[6] It further outlines relevant climate data and context-specific climate vulnerabilities in Somalia, South Sudan, and Mali and analyses five themes in CPS in the three countries. The article concludes with recommendations for institutional responses. The research is based on a review of academic literature and institutional reports. Early versions of case studies formed the basis of consultations with government ministries, thematic experts, and CPS practitioners.[7]
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Violence, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:: Africa

24. From Cattle Raids to Violence: A Processual Analysis of the Baragoi Massacre in Northern Kenya

Author:: Willis Okumu
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: In pre-colonial times, young men from pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya conducted cattle raids to enable their households or clans to replenish decimated herds after droughts or to acquire livestock for the payment of bridewealth.[1]Today, such raids are carried out mainly to solidify ethnic-based group identity for political competition or as resource scrambles.[2] Mobilisation for large cattle raids is carried out with ethno-nationalistic orientations that seek to entrench ‘us’ versus ‘them’ narratives as a prerequisite for the raids.[3] Although cattle raids are carried out by warriors (circumcised young men between the age of 15 and 30), the violence that accompanies the raids is significantly fuelled by ethnic identity politics and ethno-nationalistic mobilisation involving politicians and the educated elite.[4] In the town of Baragoi in Kenya, major raids and massacres have occurred after periods of mobilisation based on ethnic identities. In this article, a massacre is described as the intentional, indiscriminate murder of a group of people due to their socio-political orientations, such as ethnic identity or political allegiance. Unlike cattle raids of the pre-colonial era in which the aim of violence was to acquire cattle forcefully, recent massacres among pastoralists in Northern Kenya are intended to convey a message of incompatibility between two or more communities within a common geographical area (often in-land and in boundary zones). Disputes between communities may be aimed at forcefully evicting political opponents and their supporters from a common area in the run-up to a competitive political period, thus denying them a chance to cast their ballots. Massacres may arise out of such disputes and may be perpetrated to ensure a win for the organisers of the massacre. This article, therefore, examines the processes of violence escalation based on the assumption that the escalation of conflict into violence elucidates the contested relationships between two warring groups.[5]
Topic:: Violence, Pastoralism, Massacre, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Kenya and Africa

25. Towards Multi-Level Partnerships in Building Sustainable Peace in West Africa

Author:: Osei Baffour Frimpong
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Despite the solid progress made in democratic consolidation, regional cooperation, and economic growth in recent years, West Africa has been in the global spotlight due to persistent insecurity and accompanying humanitarian crises. Indeed, the current peace and security climate in West Africa is replete with existing and emerging threats that are national, regional, and global in character. The threats are occasioned by incidents of terrorism, violent extremism, election violence, intercommunal violence, ethnic violence, farmer-herder conflicts, transnational organised crime, and climate change, among others. The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic has also induced adverse effects on human security. Efforts to assuage the varied threats to security in the region have prompted the development and activation of an array of frameworks and interventions by actors including the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), France, the United States (US), and civil society organisations (CSOs). Notwithstanding these interventions, the threats continue to be exacerbated and evolve, invoking critical questions about the effectiveness of existing responses.[1] The volatile security climate coupled with escalating violence has sparked unprecedented humanitarian crises across the region. In 2019 alone, more than 4 000 deaths were recorded (compared to 770 in 2016) due to the resurgence of violence in certain countries, especially Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali.[2] Between 2019 and 2020, the fatality rate increased from 4 385 to 5 606, an annual increase of more than 1 200 fatalities.[3]
Topic:: Peacekeeping, Partnerships, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

26. South Sudan’s Civil War: Violence, Insurgency and Failed Peacemaking

Author:: Stephen Arrno
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: This scholarly contribution by John Young offers an insightful critique and evaluation of liberal peacemaking and internationalism that has shaped post-cold war approaches to Africa. Examining South Sudan’s peacemaking process, the book refutes modernist and liberal peace epistemologies that deficiency in governance, underdevelopment, and failed peace are caused by internal factors. The main argument is that failed peacemaking in South Sudan, and previously in Sudan, has been induced by external forces. Organised into eight chapters, South Sudan’s Civil War: Violence, Insurgency and Failed Peacemaking outlines missed opportunities to resolving the Sudan conflict. The author takes the Turco-Egyptian empire that exposed South Sudan to a global economy of slavery as the starting point. The British who came to the Sudan to avenge the death of Gordon Pasha established an administration of ‘benign neglect’ that ended in the integration of South Sudan into an asymmetrical economy and polity. After two civil wars, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) enabled the birth of an independent South Sudan, with the Agreement providing a trade-off between self-determination and democratic transformation (p. 10). The ruling party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), manufactured shallow political unity to promote the referendum for independence. All promises for an elaborate transformative agenda and successful post-independence transitional period were abandoned and neglected. The book criticises the liberation movement (SPLM) and the United States (US) administration for causing conflict. The central thesis of the book considers the independence of South Sudan as the root cause of conflict by endorsing the SPLM’s tyranny (p. 65).
Topic:: Civil War, Insurgency, Violence, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Africa and South Sudan

27. Gadaa as an Alternative Understanding of Democracy in Africa

Author:: Biruk Shewadeg
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: In understanding democracy in Africa, it is crucial to locate the process of democratisation in its historical context. The colonial enterprise is important in the understanding of the postcolonial erosion of democratic institutions. Indeed, colonialism was not a democratic system, and its masters were not the mentors of democracy as they propagated. Rather, they took self-governance away from Africans while destroying indigenous democratic values and institutions without building stable replacements. Democracy need not be seen as the exclusive property of the West; it can be found in various African cultural contexts. Defining democracy can be difficult as its expression remains controversial in many African countries and other parts of the world. Does democracy necessarily mean Western ideas of democracy? Is there only a distinct model for every country, irrespective of its traditions and culture? These are some notable questions to address in dealing with democracy in its entirety. Africans must draw on features within their societies to give local relevance to democratic concepts, rather than run the risk of having democracy transplanted without adaptation, as they have done with technology. Although the idea of Africa’s openness to external ideas may not be strange, these external ideas would prove more useful if they were modified to harmonise with African values, ensuring proper understanding by the population at large. If democracy is to exist on the African continent, Africans will have to keep reinventing it. The constant reinvention of democracy based on African initiatives is what is needed in Africa. The Gadaa system among the Oromos highlights that Africans are not just students of democracy but actually owners of democratic ingredients themselves.
Topic:: Democratization, Politics, Democracy, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Africa

28. The Economic Community of Central African States and Conflicts in the Region

Author:: ACCORD
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Conflict is a complex phenomenon that dwells in the domain of human relations. It rears its head when interests clash, opinions differ, needs fail to be met, agreements are breached, and the parties involved fail to find common ground for peace, or to continue relating to one another. Conflict can mutate and develop new dimensions. It can occur at the interpersonal, sectional, racial, ethnoreligious, national, regional, continental and international levels. Wars start as smaller-scale conflicts. Once a certain group in a given population continues to feel aggrieved, marginalised, frustrated or threatened, conflicts will likely arise. But human societies also make efforts to prevent conflicts before they occur, manage them when they do, and resolve them to sustain peace. Conflict handling thus includes the phases of prevention, management, and resolution. Prevention entails early efforts to avoid the occurrence of conflict. Management entails efforts to contain it. Resolution entails the de-escalation of conflict. It involves negotiation on the conditions or materials of dispute, reopening interaction, increasing cooperation, fostering positive attitudes, building trust, and sustaining peace among the parties.
Topic:: Economy, Conflict, Regional Politics, and ECOWAS
Political Geography:: Africa and Central Africa

29. Ignoring the Roots of Mozambique’s War in a Push for Military Victory

Author:: ACCORD
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Nearly 2 900 people were killed[1] and most of the population displaced[2] by early June 2021 in a civil war that began in October 2017 in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique’s north-eastern province. From a single initial attack involving 30 men, insurgents now control most of four districts and parts of three others in a block roughly 70 km wide and 200 km from north to south. The second-largest natural gas field in Africa is being developed in the far north-east of Mozambique, with more than US$20 billion in investment predicted. The French company Total is developing the project, but insurgents reached the gates of the development zone in December 2020, and Total pulled out its staff and halted work on 1 January 2021. The Total Chief Executive Officer (CEO) told President Filipe Nyusi personally that Total would only return if Mozambique could guarantee security in a 25 km cordon around the gas project on the Afungi Peninsula. On 22 March 2021, Nyusi staked his personal reputation and that of the nation on a promise of security. Total agreed to resume construction. Two days later, insurgents occupied Palma, which is within the security cordon. Total withdrew its staff again and, on 26 April 2021, declared ‘force majeure’[3] on its Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project. The company stated that it would only return if Mozambique ended the war.
Topic:: Security, Conflict, Peace, Peacebuilding, and Military
Political Geography:: Africa and Mozambique

30. Implications of Emerging Technologies on Peace and Security in Africa

Author:: Velomahanina T. Razakamaharavo
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Like other continents, Africa has embraced the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution. Emerging technologies are defined as those that are radical or novel and may have disruptive effects in the sectors where they are deployed and in society.[1] For example, in Africa, drones have improved the way healthcare is provided in Rwanda as they are being used to deliver blood in remote areas, thus helping to ensure the security of the people. Some of these emerging technologies are being researched and tested. Others have already been deployed, including mixed reality merging the virtual and the real world, Augmented Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR), 5G, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and Blockchain, among others. Currently, Africa is also engaged in technological Research and Development and deployment. Some countries on the continent already have thriving AI hubs, such as Nigeria and Ethiopia. Google has its own AI hub in Ghana, and the United Nations (UN) has an AI centre, the UN Global Pulse lab, in Kampala.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa

31. The Crisis of Ethiopian Foreign Relations

Author:: ACCORD
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Amid continued domestic upheaval, Ethiopia’s foreign relations are also in crisis. This is particularly true of relations with Ethiopia’s neighbouring countries. Ethiopia’s rapprochement with Eritrea, for which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed received the Nobel Peace Prize, has morphed into a joint security pact that has now seen Eritrean troops occupy parts of northern Ethiopia for more than six months, in an attempt to defeat the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), whose forces are now rebranded as the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF).[1] The war between Ethiopian and Eritrean allied forces and the TPLF/TDF has led to numerous atrocities, a humanitarian and development disaster, and brought the Tigray region to the brink of widespread famine.[2] Even after sustained military operations and despite the higher number of Ethiopian federal and Eritrean troops, the TPLF/TDF have not been defeated and, as was predicted, they still retain the capacity to mount guerrilla attacks.[3] There is little prospect that the war will be won outright by either side and, to date, the Ethiopian federal government’s commitment to withdraw Eritrean forces has yet to be fulfilled.[4] Recent, albeit unconfirmed, reports have suggested that Somali troops may also be involved in the war in Tigray, prompting Somali parliamentarians to demand an investigation into the location of their troops.[5]
Topic:: International Relations, Security, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Africa and Ethiopia

32. Rethinking South Sudan’s Path to Democracy

Author:: Andrew E. Yaw Tchie
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: One of the world’s youngest nations, South Sudan, broke out into civil war in December 2013. The civil war was marked by persistent disregard for the sanctity of civilians, especially women and children. At the time of the conflict, both the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Government (SPLM-iG) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Opposition (SPLM-iO) carried out massacres, which spread like wildfire across the country. Troops from both sides raped and slaughtered civilians, while government troops in Juba went door-to-door, seeking out opposition ethnic groups. After several failed regional mediation attempts, neighbouring states and international partners pressured President Salva Kiir, SPLM-iO leader, Riek Machar, and former detainees to sign the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS)[1] in August 2015 in Addis Ababa. The Agreement aimed to end the violent civil war and support comprehensive political reform during a three-year inclusive Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU). Additionally, the ARCSS provided a pathway to demilitarise many well-equipped militias and mechanisms for transitional justice and reparation, immediate measures to facilitate humanitarian access, and a programme to redress the economy. Nevertheless, just after the ARCSS was signed, Kiir, by presidential decree, ordered an increase in the number of states from 10 to 28.[2]
Topic:: Civil War, Government, Democracy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, Sudan, and South Sudan

33. Silencing the Guns Requires a Multi-Pronged Approach

Author:: Ramtane Lamamra
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: To translate the vision of the 2013 Solemn Declaration into action, the Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns by Year 2020 (AUMR) was adopted by the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council in 2016. The AUMR was to be executed by the AU Commission in collaboration with key stakeholders, including regional economic communities; economic, social and cultural communities; organs of the AU; the United Nations (UN) and civil society organisations. Speaking to this endeavour, the 33rd AU Ordinary Summit took stock of achievements and challenges encountered in implementing this flagship project of Silencing the Guns by 2020. It further sought to devise a more robust action plan, informed by the Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism of the AUMR, for a peaceful and prosperous Africa. Conflicts have robbed Africa of over US$100 billion since the end of the Cold War in 1991. The continent has unfortunately witnessed some of the world’s biggest fatalities, food and humanitarian crises and the erosion of social cohesion, coupled with the total breakdown of economies and decimation of the environmental and political landscape. It is worrisome to see countries such as South Sudan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Mali and Libya continuing to witness persistent levels of armed conflict, and the decolonisation conflict in Western Sahara is remaining unresolved for so long. The threat posed by COVID-19 has considerably slowed the momentum of the silencing the guns agenda and has abruptly added to the existing challenges, slowing down the attainment of peace and development
Topic:: Security, Civil Society, International Cooperation, Peace, African Union, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Africa, Libya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Mali, South Sudan, and Central African Republic

34. We Will Not Silence the Guns Without Women

Author:: Bineta Diop
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: This reality has been further exacerbated by the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, which threatens the progress made over the years towards gender equality. It has also shown, as in many previous crises, that women and girls continue to be disproportionately affected, hence stressing the need for a strong women, peace and security (WPS) agenda in response to societal threats. It is from this perspective that the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) of the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission on Women, Peace and Security virtually convened the first Africa Forum on Women, Peace and Security, from 10 to 12 November 2020. The Forum brought together representatives of member states, women peacebuilders, youth peace ambassadors, women peacekeepers, women refugees, media and centres of excellence on WPS, with the aim to federate efforts to accelerate actions for peace. These actions are located in the broader agenda for peace and security in Africa and its clarion call to “silence the guns by 2020” – the guiding theme that represents the overarching aspirations of the AU’s Agenda 2063.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Peace, COVID-19, Equality, and Empowerment
Political Geography:: Africa

35. The African Union, regional economic communities and regional mechanisms and United Nations: Leveraging the Triangular Partnership to Silence the Guns in Africa

Author:: A. Sarjoh Bah
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The partnership is underpinned by the twin principles of subsidiarity and complementarity.2 Although the RECs/RMs are not uniform entities, it is well established that neither the AU nor the UN can undertake a successful peacemaking venture without the active involvement of the dominant REC/RM in a particular sub-region. For example, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) pivotal role in the mediation efforts that led to the signing of the Revitalised-Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) is the most recent demonstration of this trend.3 Similar examples exist in West, Central and southern Africa, where the RECs/RMs in these sub-regions continue to serve as anchors for security and stability.
Topic:: Security, Development, Regional Cooperation, Political stability, Conflict, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa and South Sudan

36. What Kind of Leadership does the Vision of “Silencing the Guns” Require?

Author:: Youssef Mahmoud
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU) in 2013, African leaders solemnly declared “not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans” and “to end all wars in Africa by 2020”.1 The AU Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want,2 adopted two years later under the aspirational goal of an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens”, reaffirmed that “all guns will be silent by 2020”, meaning that Africa “shall be free from armed conflict, terrorism, extremism, intolerance and gender-based violence, which are major threats to human security, peace and development”. The AU Agenda 2063 rightly recognised that good governance, democracy, social inclusion, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law are the “necessary pre-conditions for a peaceful and conflict free continent”. The framers of this document were keenly aware – as many others are – that without addressing the pervasive, internal democratic, governance and development deficits at the root of much of the violence on the continent, sustainable peace would, at best, be elusive
Topic:: Gender Issues, Leadership, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa

37. How a Strong African Union–United Nations Partnership can Sustain the Silencing the Guns Agenda Beyond 2020

Author:: Daniel Forti and Priyal Singh
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The strategic partnership between the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), the two principal international organisations tasked with addressing peace and security challenges on the African continent, remains a priority for both organisations. The organisations and their member states have worked in tandem since the AU’s creation in 2002 and the subsequent establishment of the AU’s Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). During this time, the partnership has focused primarily on joint conflict resolution and crisis management efforts.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, International Cooperation, United Nations, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa

38. The African Peer Review Mechanism and Silencing the Guns in Africa

Author:: Eddy Maloka
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Seven years ago, the African Union (AU) set the target of silencing the guns in Africa by 2020. We are already within the target year, but there are no signs that conflict is about to retreat completely from our continent. Instead, Africa still has battlefields in the Great Lakes region, and the menace of terrorism remains a challenge over vast swathes of land in East Africa, North Africa and West Africa. In some African countries, we have seen tempers running high in the streets, among other things due to disputes over elections and the Constitution. All these experiences, as well as ongoing flames in countries such as Libya, are a call to action to find an African solution to these African problems.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Terrorism, Conflict, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa

39. We Stand at a Very Uncertain Future for Humanity

Author:: Kumi Naidoo
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: If the global coronavirus outbreak and the subsequent COVID-19 pandemic has shown us anything, it is that there is no them and us. The virus does not discriminate, and nature does not negotiate. That lethal combination does not bode well for our species. Currently, all indications point to the fact that millions of people across the world will be infected and that hundreds of thousands, if not millions, more will die.
Topic:: Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Africa

40. Global Health: A Pressing Foreign Policy Issue of our Time

Author:: Ayanda Ntsaluba
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Recognition of the nexus between foreign policy and public health is not new; it has found episodic expression that tended to dissipate, only to re-emerge with time. This has been the case because traditional notions of advancing national interests through foreign policy have tended to be anchored around the fields of trade and defence, with health seen as part of so-called “low politics”. This has tended to underplay the foreign policy dimensions of health.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Civil Society, International Cooperation, Ebola, and Public Health
Political Geography:: Africa and Europe

41. The impact of COVID-19 on Peace Operations in Africa

Author:: Cedric De Coning
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly disrupted peace operations. In the short term, activities have been reduced to the most critical, rotations have been frozen and most staff are working remotely. Most of the missions have adapted remarkably well. However, even more changes are likely in the medium term, when the global economic recession that is expected to follow in the wake of the virus may force peace operations to contract drastically in size and scope.
Topic:: Peace, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Africa

42. Threats to Ethiopia’s Fragile Democratic Transition

Author:: Patrick Wight
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Highlighting the precarious standing of any regime attempting to transition towards democracy in a multi-ethnic state that is defined by relatively weak institutions.
Topic:: Governance, Democracy, Fragile States, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Africa and Ethiopia

43. Challenges of Peacebuilding in Africa

Author:: Sandy Africa
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Examining the objective conditions that gave rise to current iterations of violence and assessing whether the policy measures and strategies adopted at the international, regional and national levels bring the continent closer to sustainable peace.
Topic:: Peacekeeping, Conflict, Peace, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Africa

44. Reappraising Conflict Trends in Nigeria amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:: Harrison Adewale Idowu
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic has seen the restriction of terrorist activities, with casualties now mostly from the Nigerian Armed Forces rather than the civilian population.
Topic:: Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

45. The Land Question in South Africa

Author:: Mark Chingono
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Considering the land challenge question and its many dimensions in South Africa, it is important to adopt a holistic approach that locates the land question within the broader framework of sustainable development.
Topic:: Development, Land, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Africa and South Africa

46. The Role of Libraries in Post-conflict Societies

Author:: Zurab Elzarov
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The implementation of the Library of Peace project was a model of successful cooperation between UNAMID, the Government of Sudan (State Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth), UNICEF, civil society and the public library personnel
Topic:: Civil Society, Governance, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa and Sudan

47. Multinational Interventions to Defend African Democracies against Extremist Violence

Author:: Andreas Velthuizen
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: An appropriate response in situations such as the Lake Chad Basin and Rovuma Basin is to defend and promote African aspirations in a multinational response involving the AU, RECS and international partners.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Violent Extremism, Democracy, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa

48. Ethnicity and Conflict Instigation in Sierra Leone

Author:: Joseph Lansana Kormoh
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Critically examining current trends in Sierra Leone's political landscape from the point of view of ethnoregional politics and hate messages.
Topic:: Development, Geopolitics, Discrimination, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa and Sierra Leone

49. Language and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa

Author:: Biruk Shewadeg
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Language is an important factor of identity formation, and given the multilingual nature of Africa, political discourse related to ethnic and nation-state issues founded on the language factor is crucial to a holistic understanding of the situation. A brief glance at divergent conceptualisations of multilingualism in sub-Saharan Africa may enrich the discussion of language, ethnicity and the nation-state nexus.
Topic:: Culture, Ethnicity, Domestic Politics, and Language
Political Geography:: Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

50. Youth Demonstrations and their Impact on Political Change and Development in Africa

Author:: Tafadzwa Maganga
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Young people constitute the biggest proportion of the African population, and are the most affected demographic group in any country’s socio-economic and political developments. By 2019, almost 60% of Africa’s population was estimated to be under the age of 25 years, making Africa the world’s youngest continent.1 According to United Nations (UN) demographic projections, the median age in Africa in 2020 is 19.8 years.2 Almost 16 million young Africans – around 13.4% of the total labour force of 15–24-year-olds – are unemployed, more than 40% of young Africans consider their current living situation to be very bad or fairly bad, and 60% of Africans (especially youth) think that their governments are doing a very bad or fairly bad job at addressing the needs of young people.3 Young people are not represented well and are marginalised and excluded from development processes in many African countries. This pushes them to participate in demonstrations as they try to change political systems that are perceived to be incompetent and responsible for the daily suffering of people. These demonstrations have challenged institutions of power, but their influence has failed to go beyond post-protest governments and development. This article provides an overview of some of the causes and achievements of youth-led demonstrations in many parts of Africa since the Arab Spring in 2010. It also highlights several lessons from the recent developments that occurred in Sudan in 2019, where protests gave rise to a coalition government with the military and a roadmap to a civilian government through elections in three years.
Topic:: Development, Social Movement, Youth, and Demonstrations
Political Geography:: Africa

51. The Hidden Population

Author:: Irene Dawa
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Many refugees in Uganda do not have the necessary identity documents to guarantee their protection, employment and so on, because most of them moved to urban cities on their own. They experience discrimination, poverty and difficulty in attaining sustainable livelihoods. Many South Sudanese and Congolese refugees have been in Uganda or years, yet still have not achieved full refugee status. Arua and the West Nile sub-region at large are in the unique position of having a number of tribes that share common heritage and ancestry across the borders of Uganda, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Most of the South Sudanese from Yei, Morobo and Kajo-Keji in the Western Equatoria region and Congolese from the north-eastern part of Ituri province (Imgbokolo and Abia) not only share the same language, but also have relatives across the border in Uganda. Therefore, in situations of conflict in South Sudan and the DRC, these family members quickly identify with each other and provide easy access to these refugees to enter Uganda. This is commonly seen among the Lugbara, Madi and Kakwa tribes who are predominant in the region. Using qualitative research methods (semi-structured interviews and ethnographic observations), this article presents the challenges of urban refugees and how they have attempted to improve their lives and realise their aspirations. The article concludes by proposing options to support urban refugees.
Topic:: Refugees, Discrimination, Urban, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Uganda and Africa

52. Gender, Peacebuilding and Entrepreneurship

Author:: Oluchi Gloria Ogbu
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: This article draws from a skills-building project carried out by the Nneola Foundation for Women and Children Development, a livelihoods and peacebuilding initiative for women in Nigeria. The organisation was founded by the author to support women in developing work-related skills that aid socio-economic development. This project was a one-year (2017–2018) skills acquisition training for women that took place in Delta State, Nigeria. The Nneola Foundation partnered with a local tailoring organisation in Delta State to teach sewing skills to five unemployed married women, who were selected from a pool of applicants based on their financial needs and interest in acquiring tailoring skills. Drawing on insights from a year-long interaction with the project coordinator, this article discusses the potential and limitations of tailoring as a peacebuilding and skills-building initiative that seeks to provide women with livelihood and community engagement opportunities. Situated within Johan Galtung’s concepts of positive peace and structural violence,1 the article further demonstrates how structural violence (inequality) can be addressed through positive peacebuilding (livelihood opportunities). This was a relatively small project, and the lessons learnt are summarised and discussed, with recommendations for those considering similar projects in the future.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Peacekeeping, Entrepreneurship, Peace, and Community
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

53. The Six Principles of Adaptive Peace-building

Author:: Cedric De Coning
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Peacebuilding is about influencing the behaviour of social systems that have been, or are at risk of, being affected by violent conflict. A society sustains peace when its social institutions are able to ensure that political competition is managed peacefully, and that no significant social or political groups use violence to pursue their interests. Peacebuilding attempts to assist societies to prevent and mitigate the risk of violent conflict. For peace to be self-sustainable, a society needs to have sufficiently strong social institutions to identify, channel and manage disputes peacefully.
Topic:: Peacekeeping, Conflict, Local, and Peace
Political Geography:: Global Focus

54. Reinvigorating the African Solidarity Initiative for robust implementation of the African Union’s Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy

Author:: Babatunde F. Obamamoye
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Some developments in Africa during the first decade of this century ushered in a shared viewpoint within the African Union’s (AU) institutional space that one of the ways to propel sustainable peace within the African continent is through the forceful implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and development projects. This was a period when it became evident, both regionally and globally, that Africa would not achieve its desired prosperity and development unless sustainable stability was restored in a number of post-conflict states. In activating a coordinated effort to pursue a conflict-free Africa,2 AU policymakers placed priority on post-conflict peacebuilding activities.3 The first prominent action carried in this regard was the development of the AU’s Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy in 2006. Six years later, it became apparent to African regional actors that the visionary ideas embedded in the PCRD framework were utopian and unrealistic unless there was a clear demonstration of African self-reliance, leadership and ownership in the area of resource mobilisation for such a complex enterprise. This consensual acknowledgement invariably culminated in the launch of the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI) in 2012 as a flagship continental mechanism for mobilising resources within the African continent to build the institutional capacity of African states that were, and are, emerging from conflict.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, Conflict, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa

55. Social Media

Author:: Carolyne Mande Lunga
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The power of social media in contemporary society cannot be ignored. Social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp, among others, provide a space in which society can communicate freely and cheaply, articulating their divergent viewpoints. Social media can be used to promote peace and tolerance if used carefully. However, academics have noted that social media can also have destructive consequences for society, such as heightened conflicts and hatred, due to the spread of “fake” information from various sectors of society. There is empirical evidence showing how social media has been used as a tool to promote hate speech and the isolation of certain groups in society. When parties with divergent viewpoints take their conflict into the offline sphere, it can lead to bloodshed and death.
Topic:: Mass Media, Social Media, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Global Focus

56. South Africa's Possible Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court

Author:: Innocent Mangwiro
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Human rights violations continue to dominate Zimbabwe’s social and political spaces. Despite being a signatory to continental and global human rights conventions, Zimbabwe’s commitment to human rights remains questionable. As there remains a rift between the African Union (AU), some member states and the International Criminal Court (ICC), the South African government tabled a motion in parliament to withdraw from the Rome Statute in October 2019. This followed an earlier attempt in October 2016 to withdraw, one year after the then AU chairperson, Robert Mugabe, insisted that its members must not cooperate with the ICC, as it was accused of being anti-African.1 South Africa initially rejected the call for non-cooperation but, in 2015, refused to arrest Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, with the ICC’s powers of universal jurisdiction, signalling contempt of court.2 Given this context, this article contends that it will not be South Africans who will bear the consequences if the country eventually succeeds and withdraws from the ICC, but other African people living under regimes without good human rights records, such as Zimbabwe. While the dimension of South Africa’s geopolitical interests in Africa has sufficiently been analysed by Isike and Ogunnubi,3 I argue that the implications for human rights of the country’s withdrawal have not been exhausted.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Cooperation, International Criminal Court (ICC), African Union, and Human Rights Violations
Political Geography:: Africa, South Africa, and Zimbabwe

57. Key Lessons for Global Counter-Insurgency from the Fight against Boko Haram

Author:: Andrew Hankins
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Whilst the number of insurgencies has steadily increased since the end of the 1990s, today they constitute the majority of all globally monitored conflicts.1 Insurgencies, defined as “organized subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region”2 have consequently become a key focus for conflict analysts, with counter-insurgency (COIN) operations now a central tenant within the education of modern professional armed forces.3 COIN itself consists of a “combination of measures undertaken by a government, sometimes with […] multinational partner support, to defeat an insurgency”.4 These missions have been primarily conducted by Western forces, which this article defines as those belonging to the European Union, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom or the United States of America – as not only are these states in line with what is traditionally considered Western society, but are well documented as leaders of Western COIN operations.5 However, non-Western COIN operations now constitute the majority of global COIN operations. One such example is the ongoing operation against the Islamist group known as Boko Haram, in the Lake Chad Basin.6 Despite the fact that Boko Haram continues to operate today, between 2011 and 2019 the Nigerian Joint Task Force (NJTF), as part of the Lake Chad Basin Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), successfully reduced both the ability and reach of Boko Haram. This was achieved by adopting the widely accepted best practices of COIN: a regional focus, a political strategy and a population-centric security focus.7 This article explores each of these strategies, analysing them through a theoretical lens, before outlining the mission’s shortcomings and finally considering the lessons that can be learnt and contrasting them with Western COIN missions in Afghanistan, Vietnam and Kenya.
Topic:: Terrorism, Military Strategy, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Boko Haram
Political Geography:: Global Focus

58. The Efficacy of Governments of National Unity in Zimbabwe and Lesotho

Author:: Dudziro Nhengu and Stanley Murairwa
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Electoral disputes have long played a role in directing political conflicts towards the attainment of ephemeral peace in both Zimbabwe and Lesotho – two countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement (GPA) helped to end conflict in the country, further establishing a government of national unity (GNU) with institutional mechanisms and conditions that enabled transition to a more peaceful context. A decade later, Zimbabwe is still at a crossroads, facing almost the same political and economic hardships that it did in 2008, when the GPA was signed. The current political stand-off between the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is a manifestation of the deep-seated political problems in the country, and proof that the GNU did not enable lasting solutions to Zimbabwe’s politico-economic crisis.
Topic:: Nationalism, Governance, Elections, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Africa, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho

59. Reflecting on the Role of Regional and International Interventions in Resolving the Post-coup Crisis in Sudan

Author:: Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The overthrow of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir from the presidency of Sudan by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on 11 April 2019, following several months of protests and civil uprisings by Sudanese citizens, resulted in a prolonged governance and political crisis. Al-Bashir, who was a SAF lieutenant general, came to power in June 1989, through a military coup d’état staged against Sadiq al-Mahdi, who was the then-prime minister of Sudan. Al-Bashir had been in power for almost 30 years, making him one of the longest-serving presidents on the continent. Following his ousting on 11 April 2019, internal political players and stakeholders – mainly the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) and a coalition of protesters and opposition groups, led by the Alliance for Freedom and Change/Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) in Sudan – failed to speedily agree and settle on an effective transitional governance authority.
Topic:: Governance, Social Movement, Military Intervention, Protests, Coup, and Transition
Political Geography:: Africa and Sudan

60. Healing the Wounds of the Past

Author:: Darlington Tshuma
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: This article is an attempt to contextualise Zimbabwe’s complex history of political violence and conflict while providing an analysis of reconciliation, peacebuilding and nation-building attempts since 1980. The article contends that prospects for successful peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction in any society hinge on the development of a specific set of skills to attend to the various challenges and opportunities presented by conflict and violence. In Zimbabwe, the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) represents a first major attempt in this regard. The NPRC is an attempt to resolve past violent conflicts while building local capacities to guarantee a peaceful and harmonious future for all. In Zimbabwe, while conflicts today find expression in different interconnected layers, ranging from a household level (domestic violence) to broader social-level land conflicts, the majority of conflicts remain deeply rooted in disputes over national power (politics) and socio-economic hardships. In attempting to provide analyses of the crises in Zimbabwe, this author remains aware that the crises are complex and multidimensional. Because of this limitation, this article only explores issues that have a bearing on the healing, reconciliation and nation-building process in Zimbabwe.
Topic:: Conflict, Peace, State Building, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Africa and Zimbabwe

61. Ethnic Conflict under Ethnic Federalism

Author:: Biruk Shewadeg
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Investigating whether Ethiopia's political system divides rather than unites people by creating mutual suspicion and instituted ethnic dynamics.
Topic:: Nationalism, Ethnicity, Federalism, Identity, and Centralization
Political Geography:: Africa and Ethiopia

62. Women and Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau

Author:: Clara Carvalho
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Examining the role of women’s organisations in conflict resolution in a country marked by prolonged, systemic political crises.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Women, Fragile States, Conflict, and NGOs
Political Geography:: Africa and Guinea-Bissau

63. Indigenous Community-based Natural Resources Management Mechanisms

Author:: Gashaw Ayferam Endaylalu
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Prior to the advent of so-called scientific knowledge and systems, indigenous knowledge was the single-most important aspect of human development utilised by communities across the world to sustain their well-being. With the advance of technology, indigenous knowledge is often mistakenly labelled as unscientific, illogical, irrational, traditional and a development impediment.1 Such conceptions of indigenous knowledge resulted in the favouring of scientifically driven approaches, which are mainly Eurocentric, as the main solutions to the development–democracy challenges of underdeveloped nations. Indigenous knowledge is also usually viewed as valueless to sustainable development. Consequently, newly independent states in Africa, South America and Asia have followed the adoption of a “one-fits-all” approach to development. Unfortunately, the adoption of foreign-born and -grown development and democracy models without integration into indigenous development and values creates political and development uncertainties in Third World countries. Policymakers and development planners have thus failed to achieve sustainable development. A dependency syndrome of developing states on Western fabricated development models has thus emerged. Nevertheless, the last three decades have witnessed a paradigm shift from the total sidelining of indigenous knowledge to the importance of promoting, empowering and linking it to solutions. A new area of interest is indigenous natural resource management mechanisms. As mentioned previously, conservationists and policymakers downgraded indigenous resource management mechanisms. According to Zelealem and Williams:2 “[R]ecent interest by conservationists in indigenous resource management systems, however, has arisen from the failure of many other types of conservation initiatives and the search for viable and sustainable alternatives to current models for managing resource use.” In this regard, Ethiopia is very rich in indigenous knowledge systems, practice, knowledge creation (such as Qine), architecture, medicine, agriculture, cottage industry, conflict resolution, governance, natural resource management mechanisms, terracing experience (of the Konso people) and building (of houses from stone in North Shewa and Tigray). However, these indigenous knowledge systems and practices are not systematically identified, studied, documented and utilised in a manner that meets sustainable development goals and improves quality of life. The indigenous knowledge system in Ethiopia is an unseen, underutilised and neglected resource with incomparable potential for development.
Topic:: Environment, Governance, Democracy, Indigenous, and Community
Political Geography:: Africa and Ethiopia

64. Communications Shutdowns

Author:: Irene Dawa
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Internet shutdowns – and especially social media disruptions – in Africa are becoming more frequent, mostly around election times and during national exams. A significant communications shutdown occurred in Cameroon in 2018 and lasted 249 days, costing the country US$38 853 122.1 In 2016, an internet shutdown in India cost US$968 080 702.2 Data shows that globally, India leads, with 70% of all known large-scale shutdowns.3 In Africa, Cameroon leads, with 249 days in 2018.4 Some of the reasons cited by governments for shutting down the internet and communications includes national security, political events and school exams. A communications shutdown entails cutting people off from the rest of the world, creating ambiguity and frustration and preventing access to information, which triggers strikes or protests that may become violent. This article examines two case studies – Kashmir and Cameroon – where recent communications shutdowns have led to violent conflict. The information for Kashmir was collected qualitatively – that is, observation and interviews were the key tools used, during a visit to Kashmir in 2019. Ten key informant interviews were conducted with different stakeholders who were affected by the crisis. The interviewees worked in local hospitals or small businesses. In the case of Cameroon, a desk review was undertaken to understand and analyse the conflict. Information was also gleaned from non-governmental organisations working in Kashmir and Cameroon. The communications shutdowns in Cameroon and Kashmir involved disrupting telephone, internet and mobile networks. These recent events in the two countries, which hampered people’s ability to communicate with each other and be informed, and which also included detention of people without trial, especially in Kashmir, violated Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reasons and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Also, Article 9 states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrests and detention,”5 and calls for the right of political prisoners to have access to justice and get fair trials, which was apparently not the case. There is a close link between conflict, human rights and the denial of rights, as they can lead to the frustration of needs related to identity, welfare, freedom and security, which are fundamental rights for survival. If rights are denied, needs are frustrated – which can lead to violent conflict as people seek ways to address their basic needs and violated rights.6 Everyone has the fundamental right to express their opinion, as indicated by the United Nations (UN): “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”7
Topic:: Communications, Social Media, Conflict, Oppression, and Freedom of Press
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Africa, India, Asia, Kashmir, and Cameroon

65. Threat of Secession

Author:: Hussain Taofik Oyewo
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: There is a considerable popular feeling of exclusion and perceived sense of injustice among various units of the Nigerian federation – a situation that has led to alienation, suspicion and apprehension among various groups in the country. Over time, different groups have pursued separatist ambitions in Nigeria – some examples are Ogoni nationalism and the Boko Haram insurgency. This article focuses on Nigeria’s unresolved ethnic tensions and suspicions of domination that led to the declaration of the state of Biafra, leading to the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970, and the subsequent persistent agitation for an independent state of Biafra since the end of the war.
Topic:: Minorities, Ethnicity, Discrimination, State Building, and Secession
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

66. The African Continental Free Trade Area

Author:: Onyinye Nkechi Onwuka and Kingsley Chigozie Udegbunam
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: At the African Union’s (AU) 18th Ordinary Session in January 2012, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the heads of state and government of African countries agreed to establish the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).1 This free trade area is outlined in the African Continental Free Trade Agreement among 54 of the 55 AU member states currently. The AfCFTA is the largest in the world in terms of participating countries since the formation of the World Trade Organization,2 as it translates to a market potential for goods and services of 1.2 billion people, and an aggregate gross domestic product of about US$2.5 trillion.3 The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) estimates that the agreement will boost intra-African trade by 52% by 2022.4 The AfCFTA treaty, one of the flagship projects of the AU Agenda 2063 and a landmark continental agreement, is aimed at creating a single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of businesspeople and investment. The agreement was brokered by the AU and was signed by 44 of its 55 member states in Kigali, Rwanda on 21 March 2018.5 The agreement went into force on 30 May 2019 and entered its operational phase following the AU Summit on 7 July 2019.6 This article examines the key provisions of the AfCFTA with the aim of identifying its prospects, and the challenges that may impede the exploitation of its full potential.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Free Trade, Industrialization, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa

67. Building State Resilience

Author:: Katherine Meyer
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: In 2017, the Global Terrorism Database reported 2 402 incidents of terrorism in Africa.1 Perhaps this number is not shocking when considering the extensive international media coverage over the past decade, displaying headlines detailing terrorism-related violence erupting in African countries such as Mali and Libya. Even so, this number is marginally lower than the annual tally over the past five years.2 Counterterrorism strategies by African governments, foreign powers such as France, and multilateral efforts from the African Union, among others, have contributed to the decline. However, to begin to disregard terrorism as an extreme risk on the continent would be a grave mistake. The threat must be considered not only for its intensity, but for its reach as well. Given the pervasiveness of terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel region, international scholars and practitioners have given their attention to analysing and mitigating the threats in these regions. Yet, recent terrorism-related violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique and Tanzania demonstrates the need to carefully consider the risk of terrorism spreading south-east. The key characteristics that have rendered many of the North African and Sahel countries vulnerable to increased terrorism also exist in southern and eastern Africa; these include poverty and unemployment/underemployment, fragile state governance and civilian grievances. Considering further the poor response to terrorism by the DRC, Mozambique and Tanzania governments, better response mechanisms for this region are needed. Based on the insufficient capacity to protect against the nascent but potentially expanding terrorism, this article argues for urgent attention to be brought to building state resilience that will successfully confront and reverse the spread of terrorism in southern and eastern Africa. This requires developing strong leaders who can make necessary socio-economic and political system changes.
Topic:: Civil Society, Poverty, Terrorism, Governance, State Building, and Unemployment
Political Geography:: Africa and North Africa

68. Political Fatalism and Youth Apathy in South Africa

Author:: Darlington Tshuma and Gilbert Tinashe Zvaita
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: On 8 May 2019, South Africans went to the polls to elect a government of their choice. This election was South Africa’s sixth since the country held its first democratic election in 1994. Twenty-five years later, questions are being asked about whether the ruling party has delivered on its electoral promises since its victory in the April 1994 election. These and other questions have arisen due to the country’s socio-economic challenges such as increasing youth unemployment, massive public-private sector corruption and deep-seated inequality. These challenges have resulted in renewed calls for political alternatives. This search for political alternatives is evidenced by a significant increase in the number of new political parties that have formed since 1994 – over 40 political parties contested the May 2019 election in various parts of the country. In spite of the growth in the number of political parties, the question that has not generated sufficient debate in either political and policy circles is the role of the youth in South Africa’s democracy, and in electoral processes in particular. This article reports on the findings of a socio-anthropological research study on society, politics and electoral processes in South Africa, conducted as part of an international research project titled Re-examining Elections after African Experiences.1 The article provides an analysis on what the electoral process and voting specifically means to South African youth.
Topic:: Civil Society, Elections, Democracy, and Anthropology
Political Geography:: Africa and South Africa

69. Amnesties and Human Rights within the Framework of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights

Author:: Frederic Foka Taffo
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Many African countries, over the past years, have suffered the effects of civil war – and, more specifically, gross human rights violations. During peace negotiations, victims of human rights abuses are generally not prioritised, as the focus on peace is seen by political actors as superseding the interests of victims and justice. However, what kind of peace can be built in total disregard of the suffering of hundreds or thousands of people? Can a democratic society and sustainable development be achieved where there is no accountability for human rights abuses? Usually, amnesties are used as an instrument of conflict settlement. The effect of these amnesties is to preclude any investigation or prosecution of perpetrators of human rights abuses committed during the conflict period. Amnesties are often an insurmountable obstacle to the victims’ right to a fair trial, and an ineffective remedy for the prejudice suffered. Amnesties can be defined as the legal measures that are used in transitional processes, often as part of peace settlements, to limit or preclude the application of criminal processes and, in some cases, civil actions against certain individuals or categories of individuals for violent actions committed in contravention of applicable human rights and international humanitarian law rules.1 From this definition, “amnesties have a long pedigree in peace negotiations and have historically been commonly used as part of peace settlements even for armed conflicts manifesting most atrocious acts.”2 Amnesties bring into confrontation two fundamental needs of all democratic societies: the need for peace and the need for justice. For example, this was the case after the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The need for peace led the new regime, with Nelson Mandela at the helm, to opt for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission rather than using the judiciary to inquire into past atrocities. As such, the aim of this article is to put forward the position of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter African Commission) on the question: are amnesties compatible or incompatible with the human rights obligations of state parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter African Charter)?
Topic:: Civil War, Human Rights, Democracy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa

70. Human-wildlife Conflict and Wildlife Conservation

Author:: Yolanda Sadie
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The problem of human-wildlife conflict (HWC) in Africa – meaning the interaction between humans and wildlife that results in negative effects for both humans and wildlife – poses risks to the preservation of livelihoods as well as wildlife conservation. HWC affects the food security of people, it decreases their physical and psychological well-being and increases their workload.1 In Botswana, for example, where the largest concentration of elephants on the continent can be found (estimated at 126 114 in October 2018),2 the significant number of elephants is not only putting pressure on the ecosystem, but has also led to increased HWC. The wildlife numbers pose a threat to human life, with official statistics indicating that between February 2018 and June 2019, 20 deaths by elephants and several injuries were recorded.3 Elephants encroach on communities, not only killing people but also destroying crops, thereby impoverishing the rural communities who rely on farming for their livelihood. Hidden costs in the form of diminished psychosocial well-being and disrupted social activities raise additional concerns.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Conservation, and Wildlife
Political Geography:: Africa and Botswana

71. ECOWAS’s efforts at resolving Guinea-Bissau’s protracted political crisis, 2015-2019

Author:: Brown Odigie
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony in West Africa with a population of 1.8 million people,1 has been embroiled in political and institutional crises since August 2015, following the run-off presidential elections of May 2014 that produced President José Mário Vaz. The political and institutional crises had roots in certain structural factors common to most post-colonial African states: an underdeveloped economy, overdependence on foreign aid and former colonial masters, fractionalised and factionalised elites, a praetorian army serving personal interests, and general governance deficits. The case with Guinea-Bissau, however, is peculiar. It has a long history of political and institutional fragility dating back to its independence in 1974, with recurring coups and assassinations of political leaders.2 With the exemption of President Vaz, whose constitutionally mandated term of office ended on 23 June 2019, no elected president has ever completed a term of office – an indicator of the gravity of the country’s political instability. This article examines the lingering political crisis that erupted in August 2015 within the leadership cadre of the country’s governing elites, following the dismissal of Prime Minister (PM) Domingos Simões Pereira by President Vaz and the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) sustained efforts to foster peace, political stability and harmonious relationships among the country’s governing members. It concludes by noting that although ECOWAS and friends of Guinea-Bissau have a responsibility to assist the country in finding enduring solutions to its political and institutional crises, the primary responsibility rests with the country’s political and military leaders and their resolve to collectively act in the best interest of the country.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Leadership, Political stability, and African Regional Economic Communities
Political Geography:: Africa, West Africa, and Guinea-Bissau

72. Oil Pipeline Vandalism in the Niger Delta

Author:: Al-Chukwuma Okoli
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: This article examines the basis of petroleum pipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta, against the backdrop of the high prevalence and incidences of such events in the region in recent years. Nigeria is an oil-endowed state and an example of a petro-dependent economy. Oil wealth and petroleum resources account for about 75% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings.1 The petroleum sector is thus, justifiably, the mainstay of the economy. Although the petroleum sector has rightly been the backbone of Nigeria’s economy, it has paradoxically doubled as a centre for the primitive accumulation of wealth as well as a platform for petro-rentier crimes. Within this sector, petroleum rents have been the object of an opportunistic scramble by corrupt political elites and their counterparts. In effect, the significance of oil wealth in Nigeria has been contradictory: it has been a blessing as well as a curse, by generating both revenue and criminality. This seeming paradox resonates with the “resource-curse” thesis – which holds, among other things, that oil-rich nations have the tendency to squander their development prospects through the abuse or mismanagement of their oil wealth.2 Over the years, the Nigerian petroleum sector has presented many petro-rentier problems: corruption, armed criminality, violence, and so on. A critical dimension of the manifestation of the petro-rentier problem in Nigeria’s oil industry is the phenomenon of petroleum pipeline vandalism – the wilful and malicious destruction of oil and gas pipelines for economic, political or idiosyncratic reasons. Incidences of petroleum pipeline vandalism in Nigeria have spiralled over the years. By way of example, such occurrences surged from 57 incidents in 1998 to over 2 500 incidents in 2008.3 This is rather ominous, considering the primacy of the petroleum sector vis-a-vis the sustenance of the Nigerian economy. The alarming occurrence and trajectory of petroleum pipeline vandalism in Nigeria has caught the attention of scholars and policymakers. There now exist many scholarly and policy-based studies on the various aspects of this subject.4 Nonetheless, most of the insights into petroleum pipeline vandalism in Nigeria has been inadequate in proffering a rigorous interrogation of the socio-structural basis of the phenomenon. What is more, the existing works have overtly concentrated on the political economy of organised crime and violence, with disproportionate emphasis on how the factors of “greed” and “grievance” provide impetus for the crimes. Beyond refreshing the aforementioned perspectives, this article adds the variable of “need” in an attempt to proffer a more robust and comprehensive account of petroleum pipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta. Thus, based on the factors of “need”, “greed” and “grievance”, this article provides a socio-structural analysis of the oil pipeline challenge. The article is a by-product of the author’s doctoral research, undertaken in 2015-2016, on oil pipeline vandalism in select communities of the Niger Delta.5 What is reported in this article derives substantively from the outcome of the study.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, and Socioeconomics
Political Geography:: Africa and Niger

73. Appraising Intergroup Contact in Zambia’s Electoral Politics

Author:: Kabale Ignatius Mukunto
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: While senior leaders on both sides of Zambia’s political divide may communicate civilly when faced with differences, the majority of their rank and file members seldom do so. For the latter, the handling of political conflicts is synonymous with violence. The socialisation of the current cohort of political party stalwarts is devoid of peace-oriented mechanisms of dealing with political dissent. Electoral politics have continued to be characterised by skirmishes, discontent and violence, 54 years after the country’s political independence. Political players are no strangers to polarisation, and differences in ideologies or ascension to leadership positions have culminated in splinter parties. What is worrisome is the propensity for violent engagements when managing political disagreements, especially at the lower strata of the Zambian polity. There is very little effort invested in cultivating an environment that facilitates collegial contact among political party affiliates. Such an environment of contact may also promote and support mutual understanding, tolerance and a sense of coexistence. Contact and learning about other parties (outgroups) reduce preconceptions and negative assumptions that drive hostilities, antagonisms and violence within the polity. Elite interparty interactions, even if on a slighter scale, also ought to permeate all political party structures horizontally. This article therefore appraises intergroup contact in light of Zambia’s electoral politics and the emergent violence.
Topic:: Elections, Ethnicity, Peace, and Political Culture
Political Geography:: Africa and Zambia

74. Food Aid, Village Politics, and Conflict in Rural Zimbabwe

Author:: Mark Chingono
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Much has been written on the politics of food aid. In the literature,1 food aid has been variously depicted as necessary to address the chronic food insecurities in poor countries; an instrument of foreign policy by donor countries; destroying local agriculture while securing markets for subsidised farmers in donor countries; entrenching the dependency syndrome; and fuelling the rampant practice by politicians of using food aid to reward supporters and punish opponents. A little known, if not more insidious, dimension of the politics of food aid is its impact on communities at the grassroots level This article focuses on the Tandi chiefdom in rural Zimbabwe and critically examines the dynamics, impacts and politics of food aid distribution at grassroots level. The article shows that the food aid distribution system is flawed and is abused by villagers, and that village politics determines who gets food. It identifies the inherent flaws and popular criticisms of the food aid distribution system. Specifically, it shows that the selection of food aid recipients is not always based on the “poorest and most vulnerable” principle as espoused by donors, but is oftentimes determined by the village politics of kinship, alliances and power. Consequently, some of the poorest and most vulnerable fail to get food aid, while some of the rich get it. Even worse still, food aid tends to exacerbate community conflict, promote laziness and entrench the dependency syndrome. The article ends by considering policy options to address some of the challenges of the food aid distribution system. Analytically, the article provides a micro-level analysis of the relationship between village politics and food aid distribution, and of the unintended consequences of free food aid. It exposes the underlying oppressive structures that produce egoistic and violent behaviour exhibited during food aid distribution. Methodologically, it is based on critical observations and interviews conducted by the author during the 2008–2009 food aid distribution in the Tandi chiefdom.
Topic:: Politics, Food, Conflict, Rural, Local, and Community
Political Geography:: Africa and Zimbabwe

75. A Leadership Perspective for Sustainable Peace in the Central African Republic

Author:: Opeyemi Ademola Olayiwola
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: On 6 February 2019, a peace agreement was signed between the government of the Central African Republic (CAR) and 14 armed groups that control most of the country. After two weeks of talks in Sudan, the Khartoum Agreement was agreed upon to end years of civil war in the CAR. While the agreement is seen by some as a step towards lasting peace, others are sceptical about its viability.1 Such pessimistic reactions are understandable for several reasons. First, the Khartoum Agreement is the eighth of such agreements to attempt to bring peace to the CAR since the country descended into conflict in 2013. Second, less than a month after the new peace agreement was signed, one of the 14 armed groups that signed the agreement abandoned the deal, while another armed group quit a new government designed to be the keystone to the agreement.2 The failure of such peace agreements to stabilise the CAR suggests a need to examine the role of leadership in processes of building peace. Since independence in 1960, the CAR has suffered five successful coups d’état. The 2013 coup, orchestrated by the Séléka – Séléka means “coalition” in the Sango language – occurred against the backdrop of a phantom state and a collapsed economy.3 The Séléka rebels opposed the regime of President François Bozizé. After Bozizé fled from the CAR to neighbouring Cameroon, Michel Djotodia, head of the Séléka, declared himself president of the country on 25 March 2013. Due to the perception that the Séléka was a foreign Muslim force pillaging and perpetrating deadly violence in a country with a Christian majority, the CAR sank into an unprecedented ethno-religious conflict, predominantly between the Séléka and the mostly Christian Anti-Balaka groups. As a result, the international community and regional powers increased pressure on Djotodia to step down; he yielded on 10 January 2014. Catherine Samba-Panza took the lead as interim president that same month, paving the way for the election of Faustin-Archange Touadéra as president of the CAR in March 2016.4 However, instability and violence continued, in spite of these political transitions and the measures put in place to stop the fighting, reconcile warring parties and stabilise the CAR. This article argues for a process-based leadership perspective for achieving sustainable peace in the CAR. A process-based approach to leadership, rather than one that narrowly focuses only on particular personalities or individuals in formal positions of authority, offers a potential for peaceful solutions that are the product of interaction between those administering peace and the whole of the affected society receiving peace. Process-based leadership is conceptualised as process – it opens up the possibility of finding lasting solutions to conflict, from within wider society.5 This article looks at the historical and contemporary roots of conflict in the CAR. The dilemma of peacebuilding in the CAR is then discussed, followed by leadership as a process in peacebuilding.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Leadership, Peace, Sustainability, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:: Africa and Central African Republic

76. Election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author:: Naila Salihu
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been home to the one of the oldest peacekeeping missions in the world – the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) – due to many periods of instability. Since independence in 1960, the country has been embroiled in conflict. Joseph Kabila succeeded his late father, Laurent Kabila, as president, following the latter’s assassination in 2001. He ruled the country for almost 17 years, and controversially won two elections, in 2006 and 2011. His tenure expired in November 2016, necessitating presidential and legislative elections. However, in September 2016, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) announced the postponement of elections, citing reasons of violence in parts of the country, as well as logistical and financial constraints. CENI also petitioned the Constitutional Court and obtained authorisation to postpone elections to compile a fresh voter register. These developments were met with widespread anger and protests over what some saw as Kabila’s refusal to relinquish power at the end of his second constitutionally mandated term. In the face of a legitimacy crisis and mounting domestic and external pressures from western powers, the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), combined presidential, legislative and provincial elections were held on 30 December 2018. The initial announcement to the elections was met with some reservations. Nonetheless, the elections took place. Contrary to widely held views of machinations by the incumbent government to cling to power, long-time opposition leader, Félix Tshisekedi, emerged as the new president of the DRC, having secured over 7 million votes, representing 38.57% of the total votes cast. The runner-up – another opposition candidate, Martin Fayulu, leader of the Lamuka coalition – garnered about 6.3 million votes (34.38%). The ruling coalition’s candidate, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, came in third with over 4.3 million votes, representing 23.84% of votes cast.1 The voter turnout was 47.6%. However, Fayulu, who led the pre-election polls, filed a fraud complaint with the country’s highest court, calling for a recount of the official results. The court upheld the results. The DRC’s Catholic Church also intimated that the results gathered by its 40 000-strong monitoring team pointed to a different outcome than announced by the electoral commission.2 The disputed elections have larger consequences for the post-Kabila government. This article discusses the issues surrounding the elections and implications for stability in the post-election environment. The first section discusses the contentious issues that characterised the pre-election phase. This is followed by an analysis of developments in the post-election environment and the overall implications for stability.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:: Africa and Democratic Republic of the Congo

77. Revitalising the Peace in South Sudan

Author:: Sandra Tombe
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The date 12 January 2019 marked four months since the government of South Sudan, under the leadership of President Salva Kiir; the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), under Riek Machar; and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, among others, signed the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018. The agreement stipulates that its implementation will be done in two stages. First, the Pre-Transitional Phase (PTP) has an eight-month time frame in which parties to the agreement, through the National Pre-Transitional Committee (NPTC), will prepare for the implementation of the R-ARCSS. Phase Two, effectively, is the implementation phase: a three-year period of a Revitalised Transnational Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) to begin at the end of the PTP. The three-year period of the RTGoNU is then to be followed by national elections. Although Kiir released some political prisoners and detainees in accordance with the R-ARCSS shortly after its signing, there was no shortage of concerns regarding whether the agreement would hold. The R-ARCSS – an endeavour to resuscitate its predecessor of 2015, the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) – is the 12th such attempt at present to broker peace between the main opposition parties and end the conflict in the world’s newest state. If anything can be gleaned from the short South Sudanese past in relation to the conflict, it is that one has no reason to expect a significantly different outcome from the R-ARCSS. It could fall apart the way agreements that came before it did. However, times have also changed, and there is a potentially different outcome that could be expected. At this juncture, Sudan to the north and Uganda to the south are much more “invested in peace” in South Sudan. For Sudan, not only does championing peace present President Omar Al-Bashir with the opportunity to rebrand himself regionally as a peacemaker, but it also diverts from the turmoil and uncertainty he faces at home because of the tanking Sudanese economy, which recently led to the declaration of a state of emergency.2 For Uganda, brokering peace not only allows it to counter recent credible reports of its role in arms supply to the South Sudanese warring parties, but it may provide the state with an opportunity to show a “positive” side of its interventionist politics in the region – if not quite a paradigm shift in its foreign policy.3 Uganda also faces an influx of thousands of South Sudanese refugees, displaced by the violence and insecurity in their home country. For both Sudan and Uganda, the war in South Sudan comes with significant costs, including economic challenges that only worsen with time.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Peace, Transition, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:: Africa and South Sudan

78. Disengaging from Violent Extremism

Author:: Ingvild Magnaes Gjelsvik
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration for members of violent extremist groups during ongoing conflict is a tricky matter. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes are normally implemented after a peace agreement is in place. However, this does not apply to south central Somalia, as well as other conflict-ridden areas around the world today. Providing adequate security for those wanting to leave violent extremist groups is arguably a key element for success for programmes operating in such contexts. This article looks at some of the security challenges the Defector Rehabilitation Programme (DRP) for al-Shabaab members has encountered in south central Somalia. The lessons learnt presented in this article were mainly gathered through discussions and presentations made at a training held in Nairobi in November 2017 by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for programme staff in the DRP. Interviews and conversations were also carried out with staff members and partners involved in different stages of the programme, and practitioners and stakeholders working to prevent or counter violent extremism in Somalia, during field trips to south central Somalia between 2013 and 2017.
Topic:: Security, Violent Extremism, Peace, and Rehabilitation
Political Geography:: Africa and Somalia

79. Constructive National Dialogue in Zimbabwe

Author:: Edknowledge Mandikwaza
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Beyond offensive international diplomatic actions, court applications and protests, a national dialogue appears the best alternative to resolve Zimbabwe’s swelling socio-economic and political afflictions. The country is at a crossroads as its political and economic crises deepen. To salvage it from complete collapse, President Emmerson Mnangagwa, on 22 January 2019, called on political parties, churches and civic society leaders to participate in a national dialogue. Only political parties, however, were invited to the inaugural dialogue, which commenced on 7 February 2019. Churches, on the other hand, have mooted their own national dialogue process. The dominant purpose of both dialogue initiatives, however, remains vague to ordinary citizens and to diverse stakeholders, yet the principle of inclusivity should underpin such developments. This article therefore provides insights on what constitutes a national dialogue, why it is necessary, the potential for success, challenges, and possible steps towards an inclusive process.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nationalism, Elections, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:: Africa and Zimbabwe

80. How Mediation based on African Approaches to Conflict Resolution can Transform the Conflict over the Nile

Author:: Robin Faibt
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: National interests and unilateral action hinder cooperation between the Nile riparian countries.1 While there is broad consensus that cooperation provides a solution to conflict over the Nile River, the question is how to transform the conflict towards cooperative behaviour. Mediation between the main conflict parties – Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia – is necessary. The mediation efforts should be based on African approaches to conflict resolution, focusing on the realisation that one’s own well-being is intrinsically linked to the well-being of others. Mediation based on such a framework could change perspectives from national interests towards cooperation, which is not merely interested in mutual gains but reflects a sense of solidarity between the conflict parties and how benefits are interconnected.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Territorial Disputes, Water, Maritime, and Land
Political Geography:: Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt

81. The Migrant Crisis in Libya and the Nigeria Experience

Author:: Ugwumba Egbuta
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The drive for survival and for greener pastures has continued to force millions of West African young men and women to gamble with death in attempts to cross over to Europe and other parts of the world. This quest to escape poverty, hunger, unemployment and insecurity, among other reasons, caused a major segment of Nigeria’s population to seek alternatives for better livelihood prospects for themselves and their families.1 Those seeking economic survival see irregular migration as the best alternative, given the difficulty and resources involved in migrating through regular and legitimate routes. In many instances, very few of the original number who set out on these dangerous journeys live to tell their stories. While many regularly drown in the Mediterranean Sea, many also die in the deserts, and others are sold as slaves in a modern slave market. Most of the victims of this trade are from West Africa. Many of them leave home with expectations of getting to Europe and other destinations perceived to have better economic prospects for them, but they end up in the slave merchant nets in North Africa. The victims are put in camps and sold in open markets in Libya, while the international community watches in silence. The geographical location of Libya renders it a transit route for migrants journeying to Italy and many other parts of Europe. The migration crisis in Libya and its attendant consequences was made more possible by the instability in Libya, occasioned by the October 2011 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led war against Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. The fall of that regime left the country even more politically unstable, with increased security threats that are spilling over into other parts of Africa. Europe, in particular, lost a credible partner in its efforts to address or reduce irregular migration from Africa. Poor governance and institutional ruin as a fall-out of the war paved the way for the emergence of criminal syndicates, whose trade in human beings is now finally attracting some global attention. To address this, the European Union (EU) proposed setting up reception centres in Libya for African migrants while their asylum applications undergo consideration.
Topic:: Human Rights, Migration, Slavery, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Africa, Libya, and Nigeria

82. Terrorism in Africa

Author:: Lweendo Kambela
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: There are currently a number of debates among scholars and researchers in social sciences, particularly those whose research work is on the issues of war and peace. These debates are around the notion of “new” and “old” wars, and were sparked by scholars such as Kaldor, who argued that new wars are significantly distinct from old wars in many ways. In her writing, she described new wars as “a mixture of war, organized crime and massive violations of human rights in which actors are both global and local, public and private. These wars are fought for particularistic political goals using tactics of terror and destabilization that are theoretically outlawed by the rules of modern warfare.”1 Following this argument, this article presents a similar view: that new wars are distinct from old wars. In describing old wars, Kaldor explains that they were fought by regular armed forces of states, and were financed by the respective states. To a greater extent, these wars were fought within the dictates of international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of armed conflict (LOAC). This article advances this idea by adding terrorism as one dimension of new wars. It discusses terrorism as a phenomenon of new wars, and narrows down this discussion to modern terrorism activities perpetrated by the Boko Haram and al-Shabaab terrorist groups. Such activities are principally a manifestation of new wars on the African continent.
Topic:: Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Conflict, and Boko Haram
Political Geography:: Africa

83. Reviving Peace in South Sudan through the Revitalised Peace Agreement

Author:: Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) on 12 September 2018 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, by the warring parties in South Sudan, has been widely extolled and commended as a significant development signalling the dawn of peace. The peace deal is an attempt to revive the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) of 17 August 2015, which had apparently broken down as a result of the outbreak of civil war triggered by the violent confrontations that erupted on the night of 7 July 2016 in Juba. Whilst it is not very surprising that almost all South Sudanese, stakeholders to the conflict and commentators across Africa and beyond have expressed fervent hope, generous optimism and great expectations for peace and stability, given the intractability of the conflict in South Sudan, it is equally important to undertake a timely analysis of the R-ARCSS – specifically the possible and probable interplay of factors that may have implications for the success, or otherwise, of the peace agreement. The idea is always to systematically and constructively identify critical issues that may be pertinent to consider as all relevant stakeholders invest efforts towards peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes in South Sudan. This article therefore examines the R-ARCSS within the context of the South Sudanese internal and external conflict environment, and presents the key enablers and obstacles to the success of the peace agreement.
Topic:: Civil War, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa and South Sudan

84. The Potential and Limits of Peace Agreements

Author:: Bard Drange
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: In most cases, political solutions to armed conflicts are professed by a plethora of local, regional and international actors. In practice, however, durable political solutions – typically symbolised through peace agreements – are scarce. While peace agreements may be signed, political willingness, as well as the ability to implement them, is often in short supply. Hence, many peace agreements remain words on paper, not actions in the field. This is also the case in Africa, where many conflict areas see peace agreements being signed, violated and forgotten. This article examines the 2015 peace agreement in Mali and the case of the 2016 peace agreement in Colombia. The 2015 Bamako Agreement for Mali – despite hopes to end armed violence and provide a framework for peace – has had little impact on the ground and serves to illustrate some of the limitations of peace agreements. Does the commonly considered successful case of Colombia shed light on the struggling Malian peace process? This article suggests that the Colombian peace process does provide useful insights into the challenges in Mali. This is discussed in the context of what, with whom and when to negotiate. Following this analysis, some lessons learnt are identified, along with concluding remarks on how these two cases illustrate both the potential and limits of peace agreements.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa, Colombia, South America, and Mali

85. National Election Response Groups as infrastructures for Peace

Author:: Reuben J.B. Lewis
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: It is now commonplace that every election in any country across Africa is a defining moment for statebuilding or a potential source of conflict – and for countries coming out of civil war, the stakes are even higher. Therefore, systems and structures must be operationalised as a catalyst to prevent or avert political violence in times of elections. In West Africa, National Elections Response Groups (NERGs) are being developed as response structures to mitigate election-related conflict, and their operationalisation is proving to be successful in a number of countries that have held elections – including, most recently, in Sierra Leone. NERGs are designed as infrastructures for peace, and serve as platforms for peaceful dialogue and shuttle diplomacy with political parties during national elections. NERGs also respond to incidences of harassment, intimidation and violence; work towards keeping communities calm and organised; and engage with all political groups to keep the peace. This article discusses the development and operationalisation of NERGs as an infrastructure for peace during recent elections in some West African countries.
Topic:: Peacekeeping, Elections, Democracy, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

86. Protecting the Environment and Women in Darfur through Fuel-Efficient Stoves

Author:: Zurab Elzarov
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The protracted conflict since 2003 in Darfur, Sudan, has resulted in massive loss of human lives and assets, disrupted livelihoods and led to severe food insecurity in some areas. Some 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) are registered as living in camps. For unregistered IDPs – that is, displaced people living in rural settlements and urban areas – estimates vary considerably, especially as there is no systematic registration of displacement outside of camps.1 IDPs and their host communities have limited livelihood options and often rely on unsustainable coping strategies, such as unmanaged cutting of trees and shrubs for fuelwood and charcoal production. This places an additional burden on Darfur’s fragile ecosystem and related livelihoods.2
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, and Fossil Fuels
Political Geography:: Africa, Sudan, and Darfur

87. Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution

Author:: Jude Nsom Waindim
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Long before Africa was colonised, and way beyond the advent of slave trade, African societies had institutional mechanisms as well as cultural sources to uphold the values of peace, tolerance, solidarity and respect for, and of, one another. These structures were responsible for “peace education, confidence-building, peacemaking, peacebuilding, conflict monitoring, conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict resolution”.1 If these mechanisms were effective in handling and managing conflicts among the people, it was largely because they reflected the sociopolitical orientation of the African people, addressing all the social, political and economic conflicts among a people who lived a communal way of life. Thus, it was customary as well as common currency to happen upon people sitting down informally to discuss and agree on important issues.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Conflict, Peace, and Tradition
Political Geography:: Africa and Cameroon

88. Conflict Dynamics in the Bidibidi Refugee Settlement in Uganda

Author:: Irene Dawa
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: This article presents the results of a study conducted in the Bidibidi Refugee Settlement in the Yumbe District of Uganda between June and August 2018. It examines the conflict trends between refugees and host communities. The aim was to understand the drivers and dynamics of conflicts in the settlement. This article highlights the key findings of the study and some suggestions for conflict transformation for better relationships. The data collection process took 20 days. The methodology used for this research was based on qualitative study design. Qualitative data collection was done through focus group discussions using interview guides, direct observation, and structured and semi-structured interviews with different community-level committees, such as refugee welfare committees (RWCs) and the host population. Non-structured interviews and informal meetings were also held to collect complementary information, especially with the various stakeholders, such as local government officials, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other implementing partners. Direct observation was used to confirm conflict dynamics reported during interviews, for validity and reliability. This study was inspired by the conflict transformation theory of Lederach. According to Lederach,1 conflict is normal and dynamic within human relationships and can be seen as a catalyst for growth.
Topic:: Refugees, Displacement, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Uganda and Africa

89. Looking Beyond 2023

Author:: Darlington Tshuma
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: In 2013, Zimbabweans overwhelmingly endorsed the adoption of a new constitution through a referendum held in March 2013. The constitution was hailed by many as constituting a break from the past; thus the document represented an “aspirational nation”. The ”YES Vote” campaign drew support from across the political divide. An overwhelming 94.4 % of the electorate voted in support of the new constitution while the “No Vote” campaign fronted by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) garnered less than 5% of the national vote.1 One possible explanation for the overwhelming endorsement is that the proposed constitution touched on bi-partisan issues that the electorate saw as important in moving the country forward and breaking with the past. For example, it guaranteed freedom of speech and association, introduced presidential term limits and also proposed mechanisms to increase and enhance the visibility of women in national politics. A closer analysis of the exercise, however, reveals that constitution making was in fact cumbersome. Political party representatives involved in the processes tried hard to outsmart each other in an attempt to sway the process to either camp’s advantage. So arduous was the process that the constitution making exercise had to be briefly aborted as the main political actors, namely, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations reached a political stalemate. Once the challenging issues had been resolved, the process continued and a new constitution was finally birthed and adopted in May 2013.
Topic:: Politics, Democracy, Political Parties, and Parliamentarism
Political Geography:: Africa and Zimbabwe

90. Practice and Perils of Vote Buying in Nigeria’s Recent Elections

Author:: Freedom C. Onuoha and Jide Ojo
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: “Going, going, gone!” is a refrain commonly used to herald the determination of the highest bidder of an item being sold on auction. This process of presenting items for bid, taking bids, and then selling them to the highest bidder aptly encapsulates a questionable practice that has permeated Nigeria’s recent electoral experience: vote buying. Vote buying is not fundamentally new to Nigeria’s electoral politics or only restricted to Nigeria or Africa.1 According to Matenga, however, “nearly 80% of voters from 36 African countries believe voters are bribed – either sometimes, often or always. Furthermore, 16% of voters in African countries reported being offered money or goods in exchange for their vote during the last election”. Since the return of democracy to Nigeria in May 1999, vote buying has steadily grown in scale and brazenness. Several videos and images have emerged, showing unabashed sharing of cash, food and valuable items among the electorate by politicians and parties during recent elections in Edo, Anambra, Ondo and Ekiti states. This has led to the apt description of Nigeria’s electoral politics as “cash-and-carry democracy”. If not urgently addressed, this trend portends grave danger for Nigeria’s democracy. This article therefore highlights the nature, causes and implications of vote buying for democratic governance in Nigeria.
Topic:: Corruption, Governance, Elections, Democracy, and Bribery
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

91. The Power of Dialogue to Promote Reconciliation in Zimbabwe

Author:: Lawrence Mhandara
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Policy makers and scholarship on peacebuilding increasingly focus on reconciliation. In fact, peacebuilding efforts after violent experiences are usually accompanied by powerful calls to go the reconciliation route. Reconciliation is the mutual acceptance of the other in a peaceful relationship and the sustainability of that acceptance; accompanied by a commitment to bind relationships in accord with future interests rather than being stuck in a conflicted past. Yet reconciliation remains a profound challenge in societies that experience political violence. Zimbabwe is facing a similar situation despite a series of state-centred efforts at reconciliation. From the 1980 Policy of National Reconciliation to the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), a constant pattern of inefficacy is observed. This article arises from concerns about why reconciliation in Zimbabwe is elusive. The aim of the study, then, was to devise a restorative-based intervention to build capacity for reconciliation among a small sample of adults in Harare. The primary question was: How can people affected by political violence but continuing to live together build their own capacity to promote reconciliation in the absence of effective state interventions? I conceptualised a reconciliation that would be derived from the theory of restoration as an approach that can transform relationships toward peaceful interaction. This yielded a theoretical framework that combined elements of reconciliation, restorative justice and conflict transformation theories, which was the basis for designing and analysing findings. A qualitative methodology combining interviews and focus-group discussions was utilised. Action research was the main design, in which one action cycle was utilised by the action group to implement an intervention. Action group participants’ responses offer evidence of how building capacity for reconciliation needs to be conceptualised through interventions that are participatory, collaborative and centred on the locals. The article reveals that restorative-focused dialogical conversations are useful in restoring broken relationships among political opponents. This is a viable alternative for promoting reconciliation in the absence of effective state responses.
Topic:: Nationalism, Violence, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Africa and Zimbabwe

92. Understanding the Herder-Farmer Conflict in Nigeria

Author:: Ugwumba Egbuta
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Since the return to democracy in 1999, Nigeria has been grappling with diverse security challenges, chief among them are insurgency, election violence, kidnapping and most recently, the herder-farmer conflicts among others. The north central states of Benue, Plateau and Nasarawa and other states have experienced conflicts that led to thousands of deaths and displacements as a result of clashes between pastoralists (herders) and local farmers in several communities. In January 2018 alone, Amnesty International reports indicate that 168 people were killed as a result of herdsmen-farmer clashes.1 Struggle over grazing land and scarce resources have over the years resulted in perennial and growing violent conflicts in terms of frequency, intensity and geographic scope. Underpinning the escalation in frequency of conflicts in Nigeria is a confluence of environmental and demographic forces, especially desertification caused by climate change and population explosion. Expectedly, with the depletion of arable land for subsistence farming largely as a result of increasing urbanisation and the adverse effect of climate change, especially along the Lake Chad basin, there is increased struggle between herdsmen and farmers – leading to violent confrontations and conflicts, deaths and forced displacement, as well as the destruction of agriculture and livestock. The persistent attacks in Benue state have had a spill-over effect on the neighbouring state of Nasarawa. In January 2018, the News Agency of Nigeria reported that over 18 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were in 11 camps in Nasarawa state. A major cause for the escalating intensity of the conflict is the increasing proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria. Given that host communities (including farmers) also have access to sophisticated weapons, minor disagreement or provocation often degenerates into violent clashes, resulting in widespread destruction of property and human casualties. This article interrogates the theoretical underpinnings of the conflict and analyses the trends and dynamics of the conflict. Recommendations are proffered to end the incessant herder-farmer conflicts, and by extension halt the killing and displacement of people.
Topic:: Natural Resources, Conflict, Rural, and Farming
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

93. Adaptive Mediation

Author:: Cedric De Coning and Stephen Gray
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: When United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres took up his post in December 2016, he observed that “conflicts have become more complex and interlinked than ever before”.1 The increase in complexity that Guterres refers to stems in part from a proliferation in the range of national and transnational stakeholders and interests that affect peace processes. We are now concerned with, for instance, the roles that governance, corruption, organised crime, increasingly fragmented opposition movements, violent extremism, the environment, gender, youth and natural resource management play in contributing to – or hindering – conflict resolution. The proliferation of actors and threats stretches the limits of traditional state and multilateral mediation processes. The challenge of navigating complex stakeholder landscapes is compounded by dynamic, interconnected and unpredictable local to global societal processes. Digital interconnectivity allows people to mobilise in ways that was not possible just a few years ago. The more the world is globalised, the more changes one factor can have in unpredictable and unintended political, economic, migration or conflict consequences elsewhere. The consequence of increasing complexity for peacemakers is that there are more variables that can affect peace processes, less stability in the behaviour of these variables, and less predictability when it comes to how peace and conflict processes are likely to unfold. Complexity therefore renders rigid adherence to analysis, plans and structures ineffective and potentially harmful. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for instance, Eriksen has argued that the state-building project of external actors has failed, in part, because their designs have been based on fixed, non-negotiable conceptions of what the state should eventually look like, without due regard to the complex and evolving interests and relations between domestic powers.2
Topic:: Globalization, United Nations, Conflict, and Mediation
Political Geography:: Global Focus

94. The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel

Author:: Natasja Rupesinghe
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel (Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel or FC-G5S) is the latest initiative by African member states to reduce the threat of terrorism in the Sahel, a region that is often framed as an arc of instability. The FC-G5S – which includes Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Chad – was authorised by the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 13 April 2017 for a 12-month period, and was later – on 20 June 2017 – welcomed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).1 It was reauthorised by the AU PSC for a 12-month period on 12 April 2018.2 This article focuses on the security pillar of the G5 Sahel, by examining the FC-G5S mandate to combat terrorism in the Sahel. After a brief background, the article provides an overview of the main jihadist protagonists in the Sahel, demonstrating that some of these groups emerge and thrive, due to distinctly local, societal problems, and should not only be viewed through the prism of terrorism. The article then examines the FC-G5S counterterrorism (CT) strategy and the conceptualisation and configuration of the force itself, and argues that currently there is a danger of advancing a security-first stabilisation strategy through relying on military-led CT operations to contain and deter the threat of terrorist groups. This approach depoliticises these groups, and risks reducing emphasis on the local, sociopolitical and economic factors that have enabled violent extremism to take root in the first place.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa and Sahel

95. Reconciliation, Integration and Healing Efforts in Zimbabwe

Author:: Darlington Tshuma
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: This article is an attempt to interrogate Zimbabwe’s national unity and reconciliation efforts through one of its key organs, the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC). It contends that while the NPRC potentially represents a first attempt at resolving Zimbabwe’s violent past, the central premise on which both the Commission and the government’s broader national unity and reconciliation policy are based is critically flawed. The unity that the government seeks to achieve as a vehicle for reconciliation relies upon a negation of accountability, itself a core component of national healing and reconciliation that allows for an open and honest engagement with Zimbabwe’s dark and gruesome past. The problem is further compounded by what has been seen by many as the government’s unwillingness to engage honestly and genuinely with the past, possibly because a good number of past and current serving senior government officials fear implication. The article also highlights some of the complexities that continue to characterise the national mood as far as national healing and reconciliation is concerned. For example, proposals were made recently at an Exchange Seminar of Civic Society Organisations (CSOs) in Bulawayo to have the NPRC’s mandate stretch from as far back as the 11th century. How to address all these issues holistically, given the limited time the Commission has before its official expiry, is something the Commission must be innovative about. These challenges demonstrate the mammoth task the NPRC has, and the responsibility it shoulders.
Topic:: Civil Society, Nationalism, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Zimbabwe

96. The African Military in a Democratic Age

Author:: Craig Bailie
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: At the end of the Cold War, Huntington described the expansion and contraction of democracy through history and across the world in terms of “waves”. Referring to what he called “democracy’s third wave” (argued to have begun in the mid-1970s), he asked whether the world was “[e]arly in a long wave, or at or near the end of a short one”.1 He could only speculate, however, as to the answer to his question. Although Huntington’s analysis of democratisation is not without criticism, it remains true that at the time of his writing, a significant number of countries in the world lacked democratic regimes – that is, political systems involving competition, inclusiveness and civil liberties.2 Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, “remained personal dictatorships, military regimes, one-party systems, or some combination of these three.”3 In Africa, the opportunity and need for democratisation was therefore significant.
Topic:: Globalization, Military Affairs, Democracy, and Post Cold War
Political Geography:: Africa

97. Harnessing Gender Transformative Opportunities within Humanitarian Crises

Author:: Anusanthee Pillay
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Originally protesting the corruption and inequality produced by state structures and calling for a return to a “purer”, more Islamic way of life, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lida’awati Wal Jihad (JAS, translated as “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”) – commonly known as Boko Haram – emerged in north-east Nigeria in 2005. Over time, the protest morphed into declaring control over territory, setting off bombs including through “suicide” bombers, forced recruitment, kidnapping and violence against women and girls, including sexual violence and forced marriage.1 As with all asymmetrical2 conflicts, those profoundly affected are the civilians. This conflict has affected over 14 million people, with an estimated 20 000 killed, about 2 million displaced and over 200 000 having fled to neighbouring states and countries.3 Borno State has been the epicentre of the conflict, with the neighbouring states of Adamawa and Yobe severely affected. These three states host 92% of internally displaced persons (IDPs), with females accounting for 52% of the IDP population. While 10.2 million people are estimated to be in need, there are varying levels of vulnerability within the affected communities, which are frequently defined by age and sex.4 Vulnerability assessments show that female-headed households, for example, are at higher risk of sexual and physical violence, and are also more likely to experience rape, sexual abuse and sexual exploitation – engaging in survival sex with humanitarian aid workers, security forces and community members who have access to food, shelter or non-food items. This is compounded by the fact that the social fabric – including supporting mechanisms and institutions – has collapsed and is unable to provide protection to the most vulnerable, such as the elderly, women and children. In addition, abductions, particularly of women and girls, have become a trend. While many girls are ultimately returned, they face stigma and discrimination when they try to reintegrate themselves and any children born as a consequence into their communities. This leaves them severely traumatised and isolated, which has led to further negative outcomes – even, in some cases, to the extent of rejoining their abductors.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Terrorism, Local, Boko Haram, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

98. Nhimbe: Utilising a Traditional Practice in Community Peacebuilding

Author:: Edknowledge Mandikwaza
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Little is known about the contribution of nhimbe, an indigenous collaborative work system, in peacebuilding – yet it has boundless potential to promote sustainable peace and community cohesion-building. Nhimbe is an indigenous traditional practice where community members come together to work towards a common goal. In the process of working together, individuals build relationships – they share experiences and develop a sense of family and community. Societal conflicts, tensions and problems are diffused, and some conflicts are resolved as people participate in nhimbes. This article proposes an indigenous conceptual model for peacebuilding using nhimbes, by reviewing how Heal Zimbabwe Trust, a community peacebuilding organisation, utilises nhimbe as a violence prevention and conflict transformation tool. The article demonstrates how nhimbe platforms promote community peace and social cohesion by empowering communities to become tolerant, mend individual and community relations and, ultimately, reconcile their past disputes.
Topic:: Local, Peace, Community, and Tradition
Political Geography:: Africa

99. Why States Fail

Author:: John H.S. Aberg
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: he tentative argument made in this article is that “failed states” have failed to develop successful projects of internal colonialism. Yet, in the present era, human rights norms and world society governance models denounce states that pursue internal colonial projects. This paradox highlights the great challenge of state making in the present age. Internal colonialism can be defined in terms of a failed state concept that conceives of the state along a strong-weak state continuum, based on three core factors: the monopoly of the legitimate use of force, effective institutions and national consensus.1 In that order, they relate to coercive power, administrative and infrastructural power, and cultural hegemony. Succeeding with these three core aspects of state making has historically been an internal colonial process – that is, it involved (1) pacification and subduance of enemies of the state; (2) dismantling of the existence of parallel institutions; and (3) suppression of rival cultural frameworks. The campaign of the Argentine state to establish dominance over Patagonia, known as the Conquest of the Desert, is an example of this internal colonial process, which had catastrophic effects for the indigenous people who inhabited the area. This was in line with the dominant understanding of the Westphalian ideal of the state where authority is one, bureaucracy is one and nation is one – and together they make up the trinity of the modern state. The fundamental contradiction between internal and external sovereignty inherent in the modern Westphalian system is evident.2 States gained external sovereignty through recognition before they gained internal sovereignty within their territories. Therefore, to establish internal sovereignty, states needed to engage in internal colonialism – that is, processes of organised violence, bureaucratic expansion and cultural assimilation. States that fail these processes thus fail in their projects of internal colonialism and, hence, fail in their state making project as conceived by the Westphalian ideal of the state.
Topic:: Governance, Fragile States, Colonialism, and State Building
Political Geography:: Global Focus

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS