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351. Innovation as resilience: Demand-side strategies for critical mineral supply chain security

Author:
Alexis Harmon and Reed Blakemore
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This report, the first in the Redefining Resilience series of publications, examines demand-side innovation for critical mineral supply chains: the set of strategies that reduce how much of a constrained mineral an economy requires and expand the range of viable supply options. It argues that critical mineral supply chain policy has a structural blind spot. It has been organized around the question of where materials come from while largely ignoring an equally consequential set of questions: how much of these materials economies actually need, how that demand is shaped, and who shapes demand. Material substitution, material efficiency, and system and product redesign are not substitutes for supply-side investment, but they are essential complements that remain underused. Drawing on a roundtable convened under the Chatham House Rule by the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, this report examines two sectors, batteries and permanent magnets, to show how demand-side innovation either reaches deployment or stalls. The barriers are concrete and addressable: financing systems poorly structured for first-of-kind technology, procurement frameworks that privilege incumbent materials, qualification processes that slow substitution, and, overarchingly, a policy architecture focused overwhelmingly on supply. Closing these gaps requires targeted interventions: demand-pull mechanisms that bolster markets for alternative technologies, standards reform that enables substitution, and better coordination that brings manufacturers and system designers into supply chain policy alongside miners and processors. The goal is not to replace supply-side interventions but to build the complementary demand-side infrastructure needed to strengthen and de-risk mineral supply chains.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Innovation, Supply Chains, Energy, Energy Security, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Global Focus

352. Powering data centers in emerging markets

Author:
Phillip Cornell
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The rise of artificial intelligence and global demand for cloud computing is rapidly redrawing the geography of digital infrastructure. The International Energy Agency projects that global data center electricity consumption will more than double by 2030 to 945 terawatt hours, with AI-optimized servers driving the bulk of that growth. As mature digital hubs in the United States, Europe, and East Asia run up against the limits of grid capacity, permitting cycles, and land availability, investment is shifting toward emerging markets. Large parts of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and the Black Sea region feature available land, high renewables potential, stranded energy, and accelerating digital demand. This report examines the conditions under which emerging economies can convert that interest into durable, smart, digital infrastructure. It argues that emerging markets are not merely overflow capacity for saturated hubs but increasingly demand centers in their own right; India for example hosts 20 percent of the world’s data yet accounts for less than 6 percent of global capacity. The same markets, however, present structural risks: limited grid redundancy, volatile electricity pricing, uneven regulation, equipment bottlenecks, and shallow workforce pipelines. Drawing on case studies from Malaysia’s Johor corridor, South Africa, Brazil, Turkey, and India, the report shows how hybrid energy strategies, coordinated permitting, and workforce investment can convert latent advantages into bankable infrastructure.
Topic:
Emerging Markets, Infrastructure, Artificial Intelligence, Energy, and Data Centers
Political Geography:
Africa, South Asia, Turkey, Latin America, and Indo-Pacific

353. Promote the antidote: Reducing the risk from toxins

Author:
Bipartison Commission on Biodefense at Atlantic Council
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
While toxins occur naturally, contaminating food and feed with sometimes deadly consequences, malevolent actors have weaponized toxins for assassination and mass-casualty terror. Nation-states, terrorists, and lone actors continue to produce and weaponize these agents. The February 2026 confirmation by European governments that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was assassinated using epibatidine (a lethal neurotoxin derived from a South American poison dart frog) underscores the twenty-first century reality of state-sponsored toxin warfare. Yet, national and international defenses remain fractionated. Efforts to address toxin threats span the agriculture, defense, law enforcement, and public health sectors, which often operate in silos. The policymaking community is not fully aware of the expansion of the threat from toxins, instead focusing on contagious biological threats arising from viruses and bacteria. Significant and systemic governmental policy gaps persist despite a clear history of accidental contamination, criminal use, and the continued development of toxins in foreign offensive biological weapons programs. The United States cannot afford to ignore these vulnerabilities. It must identify and bridge these policy gaps immediately, as any biological event involving toxins will have profound implications for national and global security.
Topic:
Security, Biodefense, Defense Technology, and Toxins
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

354. Mapping mobility and opportunity: How place, gender, and ethnicity shape economic outcomes in Ecuador

Author:
Paolo Brunori, Diego del Pozo, H. Xavier Jara, and Lorena Moreno
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
Integrating administrative data from the civil registry, social security, and national censuses, we provide novel evidence on intergenerational income mobility and equality of opportunity among 514,890 formal workers in Ecuador. Our results show substantial intergenerational mobility (rank–rank slope 0.22, elasticity 0.17). Formal employment substantially equalizes mobility: gender differences are minimal, and ethnic disparities are compressed, although ethnic minorities face barriers at the bottom. Model-based recursive partitioning (MOB) endogenously identifies 63 spatially homogeneous areas based on intergenerational income elasticity (IGE) and highlights a large degree of variation, with elasticities ranging from 0.09 to 0.23. We complement our analysis with a Roemerian equality of opportunity framework using transformation trees, which shows that equality of opportunity is relatively limited: the worst-off earn 74% of average income, and circumstances predict 33% of total inequality. Our findings suggest that stable formal employment serves as an important equalizing mechanism for intergenerational mobility among formal sector workers, though the persistent ethnic disparities and spatial heterogeneity we observe point to remaining challenges in achieving equality of opportunity across all groups and regions in Ecuador.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Machine Learning, Social Mobility, and Equal Opportunity
Political Geography:
South America and Ecuador

355. Social protection in South Korea: Transition from the developmental to the universal welfare state

Author:
Huck-ju Kwon and Eunju Kim
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
South Korea’s social protection system has undergone a profound transformation from a developmental welfare state, in which social protection policies were subordinated to the economic development goal, to a universal welfare state. This study traces this trajectory by examining six key programmes—Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance, National Health Insurance, National Pension, Employment Insurance, the National Basic Livelihood Security Scheme, and the Basic Pension—focusing on their functions, policy design, coverage expansion, and responses to new social risks. Findings show that initial programmes targeted formal-sector workers to support industrialization, but were gradually expanded to encompass broader populations. They were sequentially extended from large enterprises to small firms and then to the general population, with contribution rates increased incrementally to ensure administrative feasibility and fiscal sustainability. Democratization and electoral competition opened policy windows for universalization, while economic crises accelerated programme inclusivity. The analysis reveals that social protection facilitated structural economic transformation while progressively recognizing social rights. However, persistent labour market dualism, population aging, and high elderly poverty underscore the need for recalibrating Korea’s welfare system toward greater inclusivity and sustainability.
Topic:
Development, Welfare, and Social Protection
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

356. Intergenerational mobility through the lens of the elderly: New estimates from India and a comparison with existing measures

Author:
Rajdeep Chaudhuri, Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay, and Kunal Sen
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
The literature on intergenerational mobility for many countries in the world focus on household surveys that capture the education of parents and their children. While they pay particular attention to issues regarding co-residency of fathers and son, they are somewhat weaker in information on women: daughters who live with their in-laws as well as resident women outside the reproductive age group (15--49), for whom information on parents is typically missing. In this paper we examine how estimates from a nationally representative survey of the elderly in India (LASI)---that over-samples adults who are 45 years and above and contains information about their parents---compare with existing studies that provide analogous estimates. We find that while estimates using father-son pairs are similar to extant literature on India, we can provide robust estimates for pairs that involve women, as parents and daughters, due to a relatively larger sample size, especially for the period before 1970s. Thus, we contend that LASI can be especially useful for studying temporal changes in human capital investment in daughters relative to sons.
Topic:
Development, Human Capital, Survey, and Social Mobility
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

357. Does implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) increase resource revenue in developing countries?

Author:
Neerbewendé Abdoul Rachid Pafadnam
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
The need for developing countries to increase their domestic revenue has always been relevant, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, which weakened their public finances. This paper analyses the dynamic treatment effects of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) implementation on resource revenue mobilization. We use a sample of 83 developing countries from 1995 to 2019, and our empirical strategy relies on the recent dynamic heterogeneity-robust difference-in-differences estimator. Our results show that implementing the EITI increases resource revenue in member countries through improved governance from greater transparency, increased foreign direct investment, and extractive resource exports. These findings are robust to several robustness checks. This study highlights the significant contribution of the EITI implementation in domestic revenue mobilization and the necessity to improve transparency in natural resources management, especially as international demand for critical mineral resources is expected to grow strongly.
Topic:
Development, Political Economy, Natural Resources, Tax Systems, COVID-19, Extractive Industries, and Revenue
Political Geography:
Global Focus

358. Jihadist taxation and order-making in Mali and Niger

Author:
Yvan Guichaoua and Ferdaous Bouhlel
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
This paper explores the forms of taxation practised by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State branches operating in Mali and Niger. It builds on insights from the rebel governance literature and an original conceptualisation of jihadist taxation and its effects. Unlike classic perspectives in the rebel governance literature, we argue for an ‘all at once’ approach to jihadist governance and warfare, where taxation is the beginning and the end of acts of warfare due to the fundamental political nature of Islamic taxation. Empirically, we stress the adaptiveness of jihadist groups to local circumstances, alternatively for doctrinal or pragmatic reasons.
Topic:
Governance, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Conflict, Tax Systems, and Jihadism
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, Sahel, and Niger

359. Israel-Kurd Relations in the Middle East Post-October 7

Author:
Uri Zaki
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
This policy paper examines the relationship between Israel and the Kurdish nation against the backdrop of the dramatic changes in the Middle East since the events of October 7, 2023. The collapse of the old order in Syria, developments in the Turkish arena, and the deepening confrontation between Israel and Iran have created a new regional reality in which the Kurds – a nation of 40 million dispersed across Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran – have become a significant actor in shaping the regional balance of power. This paper is based on in-depth discussions with senior Kurdish officials and opinion leaders from the four major territories populated by Kurds, and seeks to diverge from an approach that views the Kurds as an assemblage of disparate communities. Consistently emerging from these discussions is the perception of the Kurds as a single nation despite the political and legal differences between their various concentrations, and the expectation of Israel to adopt an overarching long-term policy, tailored to the various Kurdish arenas. From Israel’s perspective, its relations with the Kurds should be considered an independent component of its regional policy rather than a by-product of its confrontations with other regional actors. In the Syrian arena, the continued existence of effective Kurdish autonomy serves Israel’s interests of decentralization, containment of Turkish influence, and protection of minorities. In the Turkish arena, the Kurd issue is intertwined with efforts to deal with a hostile Hamas-supporting regime, while in Iran, the Kurds constitute a unique opposition with potential for domestic action. This paper was completed shortly before the recent events in northeastern Syria, which included aggressive military actions against Kurd autonomy by the al-Sharaa regime, which threaten the community’s very existence. These developments underscore the fragility of the arrangements in the Syrian arena and reinforce the need for an Israeli strategy vis a vis the Kurds. The English transaltion of the original Hebrew memo, is published in the midst of the war between the US & Israel and Iran. In which the Kurds, again, might play a crucial role. This paper proposes a series of actionable recommendations for a proactive Israeli policy based on diplomatic and security tools and on soft-power civilian, academic, and cultural tools, grounded in an understanding that the question is not whether Israel will be forced to take a stand on the Kurdish issue, but how it should do so in an informed, strategic manner. Read here
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Kurds, Regional Politics, October 7, 2023 Gaza War, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Kurdistan

360. IMEC 2.0: A New Regional Vision After the Gaza War

Author:
Gedaliah Afterman
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was launched as a transport and connectivity initiative linking India, the Gulf, and Europe. That logic remains relevant, but the post-Gaza regional environment demands a broader and more resilient design. Political constraints have tightened, Israel’s room for manoeuvre has narrowed, and regional cooperation is increasingly shaped by risk management rather than visibility. In this context, IMEC cannot function effectively as a linear corridor alone. This paper argues for reframing IMEC as a networked regional architecture, IMEC 2.0, that integrates physical infrastructure with digital systems, energy transition, economic stabilisation, and diplomatic coordination. This approach reflects current regional realities more accurately, allows cooperation to advance unevenly and in sequence, and reduces political exposure without stalling momentum. For Israel, IMEC 2.0 offers a way to re-anchor itself in the region through practical contribution leading to political normalisation. The paper assesses the post-Gaza regional landscape, maps the constraints and opportunities facing Israel, and outlines how a networked IMEC can support regional integration, stabilisation, and long-term economic resilience. It argues that the central risk for Israel is not only exclusion by design, but marginalisation through delay. Early positioning, including credible action on the Palestinian front within emerging regional architectures, will determine whether Israel helps shape the systems that define regional connectivity or is forced to adapt to them later.
Topic:
2023 Gaza War, India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), Diplomacy, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
Middle East, India, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

361. From the Global Friction and Intra-‘West’ Fracture, Through the Multi-front (Gaza) War to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Author:
Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
This paper analyzes how the October 7 attack and the ensuing multi-front and Gaza war reshaped the region within the broader context of global power competition, inducing intra-Western fractures. While the war strengthened Israel’s regional military position and weakened Iran and its proxies, it simultaneously eroded Israel’s legitimacy in much of the West. Yet it also generated an East–West divide in Europe between states viewing Israel more as a security asset and those treating it as a normative liability. Despite intensified polarization across Western societies, the Global South, and the Middle East, international support for the two-state solution has not declined. On the contrary, it has consolidated into a broad Euro-Arab diplomatic alignment that frames the two-state formula as the only acceptable resolution framework. Ultimately, the interaction between global friction, regional war, and domestic polarization reinforces—not weakens—the international consensus around two states as the sole viable pathway forward. The paper shows that the war produced a paradox: military developments shifted the regional balance toward Israel and the US, yet political dynamics increased pressure for conflict resolution.
Topic:
Polarization, Palestinians, Regional Politics, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

362. Cross-Border Power Connectivity

Author:
Bar Rapaport
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
This report examines the advancement of electricity interconnections between Israel and both neighboring and more distant countries. It argues that such connectivity would make a significant contribution to Israel’s energy security and could serve as a powerful tool for Israel’s integration into the Middle East and for fostering regional stability. The report discusses the advantages and challenges of cross-border electricity interconnections, drawing on international experience, and then examines trends in electricity connectivity in Israel and across Middle Eastern countries. It proposes concrete steps to be incorporated into Israeli policy to advance the issue and lays the groundwork for a long-term vision of a regional Middle Eastern electricity grid. The report recommends linking political and energy rationales: beginning with the creation of backup connections to Jordan and Egypt-specifically as a lever for Israel’s planned connection to Europe via Cyprus-continuing with the development of regional institutional infrastructure, and embedding the energy vision as part of a broader regional reconstruction process. Involving the Palestinians could encourage Middle Eastern countries to connect with Israel, incentivize state-level investment, and support the development of an independent Palestinian electricity sector, while reducing the burden on Israel’s electricity system.
Topic:
Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Borders, Connectivity, and Energy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, and Cyprus

363. Transforming Towards Regional Sustainability: A Framework Based on Sustainability Transitions and Nexus Thinking

Author:
Nathan Marom
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The twenty-first century confronts humanity with an unprecedented constellation of interrelated challenges and crises – environmental, economic, social, political, technological – that together demand far-reaching transformations in our modes of living, our societies and governance systems, and our ecological impacts on the planet. Because these multiple crises are interconnected across countries and continents, sectors and scales – recently described through the notion of “polycrisis” – our responses must be interconnected as well. Addressing them requires “nexus thinking”, recognizing the multiple interdependencies, trade-offs, and synergies across energy, water, and food systems, climate and ecological changes, socio-economic settings, and geo-political conflicts. It also demands “transformation thinking”, the capacity to reimagine and redesign systems so they transition from their current crisis trajectories toward sustainability and peace. Together, these two approaches form the foundation for the Nexus Transformations framework explored in this paper. This paper develops a new conceptual framework of Nexus Transformations to support regional sustainability and peacebuilding efforts. It hopes to make several contributions to how sustainability is perceived within the fields of security and peace studies and adjacent policy fields. At the same time, the paper will be of interest to a wide range of stakeholders concerned with the fundamental question of our age: how to contribute to transforming existing conflictual and detrimental systems into more stable and sustainable systems conducive to peaceful conditions – in our region and beyond. First, the paper introduces two of the most prominent approaches in the academic study of sustainability and in the fields of environmental and climate policy: namely, Sustainability Transitions (ST) and Nexus approaches. It offers a brief and accessible introduction to the main concepts and themes of these two approaches – intended to researchers in security and peace studies, as well as to policymakers and practitioners working in post-conflict reconstruction or in sustainable development more broadly. Second, the paper offers a conceptual yet practical synthesis of the Sustainability Transitions and Nexus approaches. Despite common concerns and potential synergies, these two influential approaches have, by and large, been addressed separately in the academic and policy literature. However, there are good reasons for combining them in different policy domains and in real world applications. We could think of their complementary qualities in a simple and practical way: The Nexus approach is concerned with the interrelations between systems that require integration and transformation. It focuses on what to transform, and offers technical, infrastructural, and spatial insights. However, it lacks a theory of systemic change and a detailed understanding of institutional and social-economic dynamics shaping these systems. Sustainability Transitions offers such a theory of systemic change. It focuses on how to transform, and adds important organizational, institutional, social-economic, and temporal insights. But, so far, it mostly lacks the powerful interrelational outlook of the nexus that connects these distinct socio-technical systems in real places. To bridge this gap, the paper introduces an integrated framework of Nexus Transformations as a systematic way to address these interrelated questions of how to transform and what to transform. Third, the Nexus Transformations framework offers an expanded and holistic articulation of nexus approaches, interconnecting the FEW nexus of food, energy, and water systems, critical at the urban scale, with the MORE nexus of regional mobility, economic, and ecological systems, and with the PLENTY nexus of security, prosperity, and peace within planetary boundaries. Nexus Transformations thus frames seemingly local and site-specific sustainable development challenges, including post-conflict reconstruction, as multi-level and multi-scale opportunities for systemic transformation. To apply the Nexus Transformations framework and further specify the FEW-MORE-PLENTY path, the paper outlines a series of stages, considerations, and guiding questions. This is proposed as a roadmap to guide policy makers and practitioners in planning, shaping, and catalyzing multi-level sustainable transformations. In this way, the Nexus Transformations framework can be applied across diverse domains and scales of sustainable development, from integrated infrastructure, urban, and regional development, through post-conflict reconstruction, to the governance of transitions for living within planetary boundaries. While the paper remains at a conceptual level, it connects to several recent Mitvim initiatives, including policy papers on a humanitarian strategy for Gaza and post-war reconstruction of the Gaza Region. It wishes to push further the definition and the ambition of reconstruction – as a profound systemic transformation towards sustainability and peace. This is relevant not just for Gaza, but across the Middle East and the planet at large. The hope, therefore, is that this paper, together with its predecessors, could open a set of discussions with partners across the region and globally, who are committed to the principles of transforming holistically from conflict and climate emergency towards sustainability and peace.
Topic:
Peace, Sustainability, Green Transition, 2023 Gaza War, and Climate Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

364. Is there still a Path for an International Security Force in Gaza

Author:
Jacob Stoil
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The US twenty-point peace plan that marked the end of Gaza War created an opportunity to break the political stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and advance major moves. Yet, progress on some of the most critical areas of security and stability is proceeding slowly. There has been some progress like the return of all the hostages, alive and dead, and the establishment of the National Committee for Administration of Gaza (NCAG), and the partial opening of Rafah crossing with the return of an EU assistance mission. However, in today’s reality, absent a concerted effort, the chance for a broader, more immediate and meaningful change in Gaza that could lead to a broader diplomatic initiative is gradually receding. As a result, the danger is that the “yellow line” will become the new border and that the situation in Gaza where the IDF controls over fifty percent of the Strip while Hamas continues to rule over the majority of the Gazan population, will continue. This would leave the population dependent on basic humanitarian aid and exploited by a reconstituting Hamas looking forward to another war while Israel attempts a return to a strategy of conflict management. At the center of the UN resolution was the creation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) for Gaza whose role it was to oversee the disarmament and demilitarization of the territory and create the security environment to allow for reconstruction and an alternative Palestinian Government. Such a force would need to be both robust and capable with a mandate to disarm and demilitarize the territory, protect reconstruction and governance efforts, and in possession of the authorities to complete the mission against any opposition. At this point, it looks increasingly less likely the ISF, if it deploys, will resemble this ideal, and in the meantime, Hamas is entrenching its power, repositioning it capabilities, and rearming. This begs the question as to whether there is still a way for an ISF and therefore the Twenty Point Peace Plan to succeed. While all hope may not be lost without a robust ISF, the path to success will be narrow and rely instead upon an indirect approach.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Security, Reconstruction, Hamas, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

365. Reconstruction as a Lever for Political Change: How reconstruction tools can strengthen Palestinian governance in Gaza and serve as a positive model for the West Bank

Author:
Noa Shusterman Dvir
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The reconstruction process of the Gaza Strip, whose cost is estimated at approximately $70 billion, is not limited to a purely humanitarian response but constitutes a strategic decision point for building a governing alternative to Hamas, which may reshape the entire Palestinian arena. At the center of this move stands the technocratic committee (NCAG), operating under the authority of the “Board of Peace” defined in the 20-Point Plan and approved by UN Security Council Resolution 2803, whose purpose is to stabilize governance in Gaza while creating a horizon for a future transfer of authority to a reformed Palestinian Authority and connecting the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While the committee’s potential success may positively affect the entire Palestinian arena and regional dynamics, at the geopolitical level the committee is expected to face a range of challenges, including: • Tension with the Palestinian Authority, which is in a “strategic trap” – the committee’s success may highlight Ramallah’s lack of relevance, while its failure will prevent the Authority’s future return to Gaza; • Israeli control over crossings and the security space (the “yellow line”) creates territorial ambiguity that complicates the establishment of independent Palestinian sovereignty and delays the flow of international resources; • Hamas will seek to replicate the “Hezbollah model,” in which it maintains its military strength under the cover of civilian calm. The reconstruction process should serve as a tool to weaken Hamas’s power centers by creating economic and diplomatic dependence of the population on the West and Gulf states, while attempting to transform Gaza from a “resistance enclave” that threatens Israel into a functioning political entity integrated into the vision of regional stability. This document analyzes the expected scenarios in the Gaza Strip and the anticipated challenges for the technocratic committee’s activity and proposes principles for action and concrete and immediate recommendations for the technocratic committee and the international community.
Topic:
Governance, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, Post-Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and West Bank

366. Gaza Reconstruction: Risks, Opportunities, and Israel’s Role

Author:
Arnon Houri-Yafin
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
As part of the Trump administration’s “20-Point Plan,” the international community is preparing for a large-scale reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. For Israel, this process presents a multidimensional strategic opportunity: pushing Hamas out of power in favor of more moderate forces, promoting processes of moderation within the population, and deepening Israel’s integration into the regional axis (with the backing of the United States and Gulf states). Even if a moderate alternative to Hamas does not emerge, successful reconstruction could serve as a temporary incentive for stability in the Strip. At the same time, the process carries a significant risk: the diversion of reconstruction resources toward Hamas’s renewed military buildup. To realize the opportunity while mitigating the risk, Israel must employ a diverse toolbox that includes monitoring, the threat of halting reconstruction, and partnership. Monitoring prevents rearmament; the threat of halting aid provides internal Gazan legitimacy for excluding Hamas; and partnership serves as a driver of moderation. While each of these tools is critical, their combination creates internal tensions. This paper focuses on the early years and recommends emphasizing different tools across different sectors. In the construction sector, which involves large volumes of resources that may be diverted to Hamas, the paper recommends a strict version of monitoring policy. In sectors traditionally managed by civil society organizations, such as education, it recommends partnership. After several years – particularly if a moderate government gains public legitimacy in Gaza – the focus can shift toward trust-building and partnership within state institutions as part of a broader political process.
Topic:
Reconstruction, Institutions, Post-Conflict, Trust-building, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

367. The Role of Israeli and Palestinian Civil Society in the Reconstruction of Gaza

Author:
Suheil Diab
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The reconstruction of Gaza is an extremely complex task. The extensive and profound destruction requires a comprehensive, long-term reconstruction effort that demands significant resources and partnership among the local community, Israel, regional states, and the international community. Bold policy decisions are required to link the reconstruction process with an Israeli–Palestinian and regional peace process, thereby providing a sustainable framework for reconstruction. Cooperation between political leadership and the business sector is necessary to restore economic life in Gaza and the surrounding region. Significant involvement of Israeli, Palestinian, and global civil society is also essential. Civil society is a critical component for the success – and under current conditions, even the initiation – of a sustainable reconstruction effort. It fills gaps left by political processes when political considerations lead to suboptimal decisions. It also compensates for limitations in the business sector when profit motives prevent necessary investments or divert resources inefficiently. Civil society fills a moral gap as well, and possesses substantial resources and assets to do so. This document focuses on the roles of Israeli and Palestinian civil society (in Gaza and the West Bank) at the present moment, in promoting the necessary transition from war to reconstruction within the framework of an Israeli-Palestinian-regional peace process. It outlines the characteristics of the civil society arena, guiding principles for action in the immediate and medium term, and proposes several concrete steps forward.
Topic:
Reconstruction, Post-Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

368. Normalization Through Strength? A Dual Israeli–Saudi Examination of Power, Perception, and the Limits of Military-Centric

Author:
Eitan Ishai
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
This paper examines the concept of “normalization through strength” through a dual Israeli-Saudi lens, arguing that military power alone cannot generate sustainable regional integration. Tracing the rise of this framework within Israeli strategic thinking – especially after the Abraham Accords and following October 7 – the paper shows how Israeli leaders and much of the public came to believe that demonstrations of force could substitute for diplomacy and political compromise. Juxtaposing this with the Saudi perspective, which prioritizes stability, predictability, territorial integrity, and political legitimacy, the paper demonstrates how the same Israeli actions interpreted domestically as deterrence were perceived in Riyadh as destabilizing and risky. Focusing on the Israeli-Saudi case, it argues that “normalization through strength” failed not because Israel lacked power, but because power was decoupled from restraint, diplomacy, and credible political horizons – most notably regarding the Palestinian issue. The paper concludes that future normalization depends less on raw strength than on reliability: the ability to embed military capability within a coherent diplomatic strategy grounded in restraint, accountability, and regional stability.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia

369. Financing Sustainable Reconstruction of Gaza

Author:
Hafez Ghanem and Liel Maghen
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
This paper argues that the reconstruction of Gaza will depend not only on the amount of funding mobilized, but on how financing is structured, governed, and anchored within a broader political context. In a setting shaped by movement restrictions and weak institutions, financial design is not neutral but shapes priorities, distributes power, and determines what can be implemented on the ground. The paper examines the key challenges that have limited the translation of financial commitments into actual projects, alongside emerging approaches that seek to address these barriers, and argues for a financial architecture that strengthens local capacity, ensures transparency, and supports long term recovery rather than reinforcing dependency and fragmentation. It contends that such an approach can only be effective if it is accompanied by a clear political horizon, including the lifting of the blockade, which will support the well-being of the local population and create the conditions to reduce risk and attract private investment.
Topic:
Reconstruction, Investment, Sustainability, Post-Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

370. Community Involvement as the Foundation of Post-Conflict Gaza Reconstruction

Author:
Liel Maghen
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
This paper argues that the reconstruction of Gaza cannot succeed without Palestinian agency, rights, and meaningful participation. Drawing on comparative experience and field based insights, it shows how externally driven models tend to reproduce dependency and fragility rather than support long term recovery. It emphasizes the need to anchor reconstruction at the neighborhood level, develop participatory planning mechanisms, and address housing, land, and governance issues early in the process. It also highlights the importance of linking humanitarian action with political frameworks and rethinking transitional spaces as foundations for community life. Ultimately, reconstruction is not only about rebuilding infrastructure, but about restoring the social and institutional fabric of society. Its success will depend on whether Gazans are able to shape their own recovery from the outset.
Topic:
Governance, Reconstruction, Recovery, Post-Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

371. Europe’s Digital Markets Act Under Review: Ways to Make it More Pragmatic, Proportional, and Predictable

Author:
Andrea Dugo, Fredrik Erixon, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The Digital Markets Act (DMA) marked a major shift in EU competition and regulatory policy, moving from an effects-based and ex-post approach to a prescriptive, ex-ante regulatory framework. While the DMA rested on some clear observations about competition in platforms markets, the Act also came with some conceptual ambiguities and structural flaws. They could have been addressed in the implementation and enforcement of the DMA but, unfortunately, these processes have exacerbated rather than moderated the problems. In this Policy Brief, we argue that there is now a new opportunity to improve enforcement practices and make the DMA more pragmatic, proportional, and predictable. The central argument is that there is a growing gap between the DMA’s stated goals, its enforcement, and real-world effects. While some targeted interventions in the DMA implementation improved competition and specific user experiences somewhat, it is difficult to find any evidence supporting the proposition that the DMA has meaningfully reshaped competitive dynamics in digital markets. However, business compliance costs have increased significantly – and, importantly, not just for so-called gatekeepers. DMA enforcement is now also generating tensions with other EU regulatory frameworks, particularly in the areas of data protection, cybersecurity, intellectual property rights, and consumer protection. A key concern is that enforcement has gradually expanded the DMA beyond its original scope. Enforcement actions and regulatory discussions now seem to extend into areas such as cloud computing and generative AI, often without clear evidence that these sectors exhibit the same structural competition problems that motivated the DMA. Perhaps the expansion is motivated, perhaps it is not. It is difficult to make a judgement when the European Commission do not present material evidence supporting their enforcement actions. The risk is that expansion weakens the coherence and legitimacy of the framework in the absence of transparent analysis and robust evidentiary standards. DMA enforcement also presents structural challenges. Its reliance on predefined obligations and broad legal concepts – such as “gatekeeper” status or “interoperability” – grants significant discretion to regulators while limiting the role of effects-based analysis. In practice, this has led to increasing regulatory uncertainty and, increasingly, a shift from regulating conduct to influencing product design, pricing structures, and platform architecture. Enforcement dynamics further complicate the picture. Parallel investigations by national authorities, combined with overlapping EU legal frameworks, have created a layered system of governance in which the same conduct may be assessed under multiple regimes. This risks duplication, inconsistent outcomes, and fragmentation of the Single Market – precisely the outcomes that the DMA was intended to prevent. The enforcement of interoperability obligations illustrates these tensions particularly clearly. Originally conceived as a tool to lower entry barriers, interoperability is increasingly applied as a prescriptive design requirement, often without sufficient regard for differences across platforms or for legitimate concerns related to privacy and security. In some cases, these obligations may even weaken existing competitive dynamics, while introducing new technical and regulatory risks. More broadly, the DMA increasingly reflects a shift in EU regulatory philosophy, from prohibiting harmful conduct to prescribing how digital systems should operate. When combined with other prescriptive regimes, this approach creates unavoidable trade-offs between competition, security, and privacy objectives. This Policy Brief argues that better enforcement approaches could improve the DMA’s chances of achieving its objectives. Enhancing enforcement approaches require a recalibration of methods and instruments towards greater predictability, better proportionality, and more evidence-based decision-making. To this end, five key recommendations are proposed: Clarify the DMA’s core objectives to prevent enforcement drift. Strengthen evidentiary standards for enforcement actions. Apply interoperability obligations in a proportionate and context-sensitive manner. Improve coordination with adjacent regulatory frameworks. Ensure that any enforcement expansion is grounded in clear competition-based evidence. In sum, for the DMA to improve competition and user experience – and not damage them and Europe’s security and digital capabilities – it needs better enforcement and alignment with the original purpose of supporting competitive, innovative, and user-oriented digital markets.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Institutions, Artificial Intelligence, Data, Digital Policy, Emerging Technology, Digital Markets Act (DMA), and Single Market
Political Geography:
Europe

372. Europe’s Frontier Countries: The EU’s Geopolitical Test

Author:
Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe’s European neighbours have become the arena in which the European Union’s geopolitical credibility is being tested in real time. From Ukraine and Moldova to the Western Balkans, Belarus and the wider Black Sea region, developments along the EU’s immediate periphery now shape Europe’s own security environment more directly than at any point since the end of the Cold War. These frontier countries are no longer a buffer or a preparatory space for gradual integration; they are the place where power is contested, deterrence is measured, and Europe’s ability to act under pressure is exposed. This policy brief argues that the EU enters this geopolitical test with a widening gap between ambition and readiness. Over the past two years, Brussels has adopted an increasingly geopolitical vocabulary and launched a series of important initiatives from the White Paper on European Defence and the Readiness 2030 agenda to ReArm Europe, military mobility efforts, a new Black Sea strategy, and the European Political Community (EPC) initiative. Taken together, these steps acknowledge that Europe faces a harsher strategic environment. Yet they have not resolved the core problem: the EU still struggles to convert political declarations, financial resources and regulatory power into timely, coherent geopolitical action. Institutional fragmentation, slow decision-making and unresolved dependencies continue to limit Europe’s ability to shape outcomes in its own neighbourhood. The EU’s European neighbours function in this paper not as case studies, but as stress-tests. They reveal how the EU performs when confronted with fast-moving crises, security risks and external competition. Military mobility offers the most tangible example: despite repeated reports and funding commitments, cross-border movement of forces and equipment remains constrained by legal, infrastructural and political obstacles that are incompatible with Europe’s security rhetoric. Similarly, the Black Sea strategy signals growing awareness of regional importance, yet avoids hard choices about deterrence, escalation management and the division of labour between the EU and NATO. These internal challenges are now compounded by an external shock. The United States’ evolving strategic priorities underline that European assumptions about transatlantic leadership and alignment can no longer be taken for granted. This does not signal a US withdrawal from Europe, but it does expose how dependent the EU remains on external actors for security outcomes in regions it defines as vital to its own stability. The central conclusion of this brief is deliberately uncomfortable: Europe’s frontier countries are not testing the EU’s intentions, but its capacity to act as a geopolitical actor. The question facing the Union is no longer whether it wants to be more strategic, but whether it is willing to address the political, institutional and practical constraints that prevent it from doing so. If the EU cannot adapt its posture in the regions closest to it, its broader ambitions from strategic autonomy to global influence will remain aspirational.
Topic:
Security, Globalization, Governance, European Union, Institutions, Trade, and Single Market
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Western Balkans

373. Reigniting Productivity: A New Growth Model for the Asia-Pacific

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Badri Narayanan Gopalakrishnan
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The Asia-Pacific region is reaching the limits of the scale-based and China-driven growth model, as manufacturing specialisation and global value-chain integration now deliver diminishing returns. Data regressions (and testing over 120 socio-economic variables) show productivity drivers have inverted: Exports correlate negatively with productivity, while imports – especially services – provide the strongest productivity gains, showing that openness to innovation and services remains the key lever for economic growth. Moreover, connectivity dividends are exhausted. Productivity does not depend on more internet users, but on the uptake of business technology, such as cloud, AI, and enterprise software. Also, inward FDI (i.e., investments by foreign multinationals) expands the local availability of support services essential for organisational efficiency that also becomes available to domestic SMEs. However, these productivity contributions remain uneven due to regulatory fragmentation and country-specific compliance costs. Taken together, many businesses in the region, and SMEs in particular, face technological and organisational capability constraints rather than just infrastructure gaps (i.e., access to roads, ports, or broadband). The Asia-Pacific region needs a capability-driven growth model, enabled by investment diversification, services integration, and reducing the fixed costs of technology adoption that hinder SME growth. These remedies are distinct from those prescribed for Europe in the Draghi report, which emphasise scale, reindustrialisation, and state investments. Recommended actions are: Re-anchor openness by liberalising and deregulating business and digital services, advancing mutual recognition via plurilateral services and investment arrangements. Mobilise capital for technology adoption through FDIs, easing borrowing mandates for IT and software, and treating digital capability as a factor of production. Reduce regulatory uncertainty by maintaining stable legal regimes, enabling modular voluntary (“opt-in”) frameworks for data and cloud services firms, g., regionally recognised certification schemes for personal data, trusted cloud, and AI developer designations, with deeper convergence across APEC, CPTPP, and ASEAN. Unlock SME scaling by reforming corporate taxation that encourages formalisation of the grey economy, simplifying cross-border rules, and ensuring access to computational infrastructure such as cloud and AI tools. In the long term, exploit demographic asymmetries in the region via skills-based migration, higher-age worker retention, and expanding female labour-force participation.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Regulation, Economic Growth, Industry, Productivity, and Micro-Small-Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific

374. Rethinking Europe’s Space Strategy for the 21st Century: From Legacy Champions to the New Space Economy

Author:
Andrea Dugo and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe stands at a critical juncture in the evolution of the global space economy. Once a technological leader with deep capabilities across the space value chain, the EU now risks structural marginalisation as the sector shifts from a state-led model (“Old Space”), driven by geopolitical competition, to a commercially driven, innovation-intensive paradigm (“New Space”). This transformation is characterised by declining launch costs, large-scale satellite constellations, and the integration of space infrastructure with advanced digital technologies. Against this backdrop, we argue that Europe’s relative decline is not incidental but rooted in three mutually reinforcing structural challenges: a persistent capital markets gap, insufficient and fragmented public investment, and an industrial policy framework that continues to favour legacy incumbents over emerging high-growth firms. The US has led this transition through deliberate policy choices that fostered competition and enabled private firms to scale. China is increasingly following a similar path, combining strong state direction with growing commercial dynamism. Europe, by contrast, has struggled to adapt its institutional and industrial frameworks to this new reality. Empirical evidence reveals a widening gap between Europe and its global competitors. Across key indicators, Europe consistently underperforms relative to the US and China: Launch capability remains limited and volatile. In 2025, the US recorded 181 orbital launches, while China conducted 92, compared to just 8 in the EU, following a collapse to only 3 launches annually in 2023 and 2024. Satellite deployment has grown only incrementally. The EU increased deployments from 16 satellites in 2015 to 135 in 2025, while China added 371 satellites and US actors, driven largely by SpaceX, deployed over 3,700 satellites in 2025. Innovation capacity has also declined. The EU’s global share of space-related patents fell from around 11 per cent in 2000 to about 6 per cent in 2023, while China surged to over 70 per cent – driven by high patenting volumes, though concerns about average quality persist – and the US declined to roughly 12 per cent. Drawing on evidence from our ECIPE Space Economy Database, the paper identifies three core challenges underpinning Europe’s declining space competitiveness.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Economy, Institutions, Aerospace, and Single Market
Political Geography:
Europe

375. From Digital Tax Symbolism to Meaningful Reform: Europe’s Substantial VAT Gap as a Source of Untapped Fiscal Capacity

Author:
Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe does not suffer from a lack of tax instruments – it suffers from too many. Over the past decade, new layers of corporate, digital, and global tax rules have been added to an already complex system, often delivering limited revenues while increasing legal uncertainty, compliance costs, and economic distortions. We argue that stronger industrial competitiveness and sustainable public finances will not be achieved through new digital taxes or unilateral corporate tax initiatives, but by strengthening existing tax bases and improving the efficiency, simplicity and predictability of current frameworks. The multilateral approach has delivered some tangible progress, notably by enhancing transparency through country-by-country reporting, even if the full effects of its implementation are still unfolding. That said, further OECD initiatives should be rejected if they risk adding additional layers of complexity without enhancing global coherence or legal certainty. Alongside international coordination, the most promising path lies in domestic tax reform. Governments should prioritise simplification, transparency and the strengthening of broad-based consumption taxes, particularly VAT, which remain the backbone of European public finances. Well-designed domestic reforms can strengthen fiscal resilience, enhance industrial competitiveness by reducing economic distortions and compliance burdens, and enable countries to secure first-mover advantages in an increasingly competitive global environment.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Tax Systems, Institutions, and Single Market
Political Geography:
Europe

376. From Factories to Ideas: The New Map of Global Power

Author:
Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Globalisation is not collapsing but transforming. Rather than retreating, global economic integration is shifting from a system organised around physical goods and factories to one increasingly driven by intangible assets such as data, services, intellectual property, and knowledge-intensive collaboration. Intangible flows are reshaping how integration occurs. Unlike goods trade, these flows are largely weightless, collaborative, scale at near-zero marginal cost, and are far less constrained by physical distance, weakening the traditional link between geography and economic exchange. Distance has been redefined from geographic to geopolitical. In the intangible economy, cross-border exchange depends less on how far countries are apart and more on political trust, security alignment, and institutional compatibility, including shared norms around governance, data, and the rule of law. Economic power is reorganising around “idea blocs.” Because intangible assets are harder to protect than goods, firms and investors increasingly concentrate collaboration among politically aligned countries with strong institutions, producing new groupings that surpass geography and reshape global alliances. This shift demands a new framework for understanding globalisation. Existing models cantered on supply chains and production networks cannot explain current patterns of integration, power, and cooperation; globalisation must instead be understood through the political economy of intangibles, institutions, and trust.
Topic:
Globalization, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Services, Innovation, and Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

377. Audiovisual Services: A Neglected Area of EU Competitiveness

Author:
Hannes Berggren
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Audiovisual services are a fast-growing part of EU services trade and constitute an area of EU competitiveness. Between 2006 and 2023, EU exports in audiovisual services rose by 271 per cent, making the EU one of the world’s largest exporters in the field. Unlike other digitally delivered services such as telecommunications or computer services, audiovisual services remain largely excluded from trade liberalisation at both multilateral and bilateral levels. Rooted in cultural protection policies and the EU’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the exclusion of a big category of trade limits market access for EU firms and weakens the EU’s hand in trade negotiations. Recent measures, such as Canada’s levy on foreign streaming services, is a “canary in the coal mine”: if the EU continues to carve out audiovisual services from trade agreements, other countries may take similar actions against EU economic interests. To boost its growing digital competitiveness, the EU should take a more constructive approach and discard its long-standing opposition to include cultural services in trade agreements. The review in 2026 of the EU’s audiovisual regulation is an opportunity to change domestic policy, enabling Europe to make trade commitments in audiovisual services. A more liberal approach would strengthen the EU’s position in digital trade and expand market opportunities for EU companies.
Topic:
European Union, Services, Trade, Industry, Digital Policy, Economic Competition, and Audiovisual Services
Political Geography:
Europe

378. The Economic Burden of the Revised Product Liability Directive on EU and Non-EU Countries

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Any manufacturer or innovator – whether headquartered in Munich, San Francisco, Zurich, or Mumbai – that places a product on the European market will soon face a spike in liability risk under the revised EU Product Liability Directive (PLD). Introduced as a consumer protection measure, the economic consequences of the Directive for enterprises, citizens, and the broader EU economy have been systematically underestimated. This study demonstrates that by fundamentally overhauling the regulatory landscape of the EU Single Market, the revised PLD imposes a dual economic burden: it acts as a structural drag on European economic output, while simultaneously raising new trade barriers that negatively impact non-EU countries. The threat to innovators and manufacturers is imminent: the PLD is currently being implemented across EU member states, before the December 2026 deadline.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Economy, Institutions, Liability, and Single Market
Political Geography:
Europe

379. The WhatsApp World Order: Learning to Live with the New Global Political Economy

Author:
David Henig
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
An inter-connectivity and technology revolution transformed the world over the last 30 years – with AI being the latest instalment. Multiple, interlocking, instant networks now cover the world like an ever-expanding changing set of WhatsApp groups, affecting all countries and governments. Today’s trade is responsive, resilient, diverse, and above all global as a result. Modern globalisation has in turn proved resistant to the many claims of its demise. Yet clearly this is not creating a happy world. Politics has not kept pace with the changes. National control, stability, optimism and trust are as a result particularly in short supply. At a macro level, challenger economies – most notably China – are engaged in mutual suspicion with the former hegemons EU and US, not helped by issues around subsidies and access to markets. All the major powers are undermining existing global rules while simultaneously suggesting an impossible retreat into self-sufficient manufacturing as they seek to come to terms with today’s economy. They are not helped by political debate that largely misunderstands the moment. Meanwhile corporate concentration in global markets has entrenched dominant private actors who navigate diverse regulations but can undermine competitiveness and governments. Political turmoil is enhanced by demographic shifts to ageing populations, social media, and citizen dislocation in the face of intense societal change and financial insecurity. Government failure to deal with challenges they are wrongly assumed to have created is too often simply leading to a search for scapegoats. Matters may even get worse given that the major powers have weaponised trade to a degree in recent years. Many urge them to intensify planning for economic warfare. This is turning dependencies from an inevitable by-product of greater product availability to a dangerous weakness. Such approaches threaten peace and prosperity, reflecting frustration that public demand for control in an inter-connected world cannot be met. Better approaches need to be found, that start with accepting today’s technology-enabled world including a strong China and other emerging economies. Governments must recognise that adaptive institutions will be more effective than trying to second-guess complex supply chains or put in place extensive new national rule-sets, particularly given their diverse public policy objectives. They must then protect where they must, prioritise where they can including for national security, and guide the public through their choices based on the best information that they have. For Europe in particular, long-standing respect for and implementation of rules that balance societal interests is more important than protecting all old industries. Internationally, agreements among friendly countries can be helpful but will not be sufficient. What is required is all countries accepting and enhancing core trade principles which were specifically designed to prevent a 1930s style global descent into mutual suspicion. WTO rules should be modernised to reflect today’s inter-dependencies and the dangers of weaponisation, rebalancing commitments on the basis of a broad definition of reciprocity, and avoiding of concentration of supply when countries grow. This though can only happen satisfactorily when the largest powers understand the need to discipline their own behaviours. Challenges such as dealing with dominant companies and scarce raw materials will never be easily resolved. Improvements will require international cooperation similarly based on trust, and should draw upon global networks of expertise that have developed as another result of today’s inter-connected world. Economies do adjust to new circumstances. Governments must therefore stop decrying resilience as an easy but incorrect way to be seen doing something, and focus instead on rebuilding economies and societies that adjust to today’s emerging inter-connected global order.
Topic:
Globalization, European Union, Trade, Artificial Intelligence, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

380. The Copyright Trap

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The current debate on EU copyright law and AI training must move beyond the creative sector to include the wider European economy. While the rights of creators are legitimate and must be protected, the rules governing data use for AI models have far-reaching economic consequences. At its core, this is a debate about Europe’s economic competitiveness and its ability to reverse the technological stagnation identified in the Draghi report. The EU’s current approach to AI is marked by a profound policy paradox that helps explain why its private AI sector is lagging behind the US and China. While the EU invests billions of euros in public funds to build world-class supercomputing and AI-related infrastructure, its restrictive digital regulations constrain the data needed for its private AI economy to flourish. These regulatory restrictions deprive European start-ups of essential inputs such as data, undermining the development and deployment of AI in the EU. EU policymakers must carefully weigh the economic trade-offs of making copyright law more restrictive. The European creative industries are undeniably significant, generating €202 billion in value added. However, the combined value added of the rest of the economy is far larger. To offset just a 1 per cent reduction in value added across data-intensive sectors such as ICT, financial services, automotive, pharmaceuticals and chemicals the creative industries would need to increase output by more than 9 per cent. The EU cannot subsidise its way out of a self-imposed data scarcity problem. Instead, policymakers should preserve the current copyright framework as a genuine asset for AI development and work towards making data an abundant economic resource. Such an approach would not only support a thriving domestic AI economy capable of developing the models that will power and transform Europe’s industrial and service sectors, but also contribute to achieving the strategic autonomy sought by EU policymakers. This brief sets out six targeted policy recommendations to achieve these objectives: Treat the Text and Data Mining (TDM) exception as a strategic asset: the EU should recognise the TDM exception as central to its technological competitiveness and strategic autonomy. Policymakers should subject any proposals that would narrow this exception to a mandatory economic impact assessment. Contain the opt-out mechanism: expanding it risks rendering the TDM framework unworkable. The EU should resist broadening the categories of content subject to opt-out and maintain the requirement for affirmative, machine-readable reservations of rights. Stabilise the legal framework: to reduce regulatory uncertainty, the EU should avoid further legislative changes to the TDM framework. The EU’s digital rulebook is already undergoing significant change. Recently adopted digital regulations should be allowed to reach operational maturity before new compliance obligations are introduced, and efforts to simplify EU digital rules should be implemented before any changes to EU copyright law are considered. Exercise caution on top-down licensing: policymakers should reject statutory mandatory licensing regimes for AI training data, which disproportionately harm start-ups. The EU should allow private markets to develop licensing solutions, intervening only where clear market failures emerge. Reframe the policy problem: the debate surrounding generative AI is fundamentally about market competition and economic displacement, rather than copyright infringement. Policy responses should therefore focus on market adaptation rather than expanding copyright protection. Learn from innovation-first jurisdictions: the EU should draw lessons from countries such as Singapore and Japan which implement broad, technologically neutral exceptions for computational data analysis and actively attract AI investment by treating data as a vital economic endowment.
Topic:
Intellectual Property/Copyright, European Union, Economy, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe

381. The Rise of Collective Actions and the Risk to Portugal’s Economy

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, Portugal has systematically transformed its economy, moving away from traditional sectors to build a tech-intensive knowledge economy. This deliberate strategy relies on regulatory stability and predictability to attract high-value Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). However, a fundamental tension has now emerged that threatens this progress: Portugal has rapidly become a highly attractive jurisdiction for collective actions. This report examines how the country’s emergence as a major European hub for mass litigation fundamentally contradicts its economic ambitions and jeopardises its digital transition. This surge in mass litigation is facilitated by a unique, claimant-friendly procedural framework that currently ranks as the second most open regime in the EU. As a result, Portugal has experienced one of the fastest growth rates in case volume across Europe. For a ‘catch-up innovator’ that is still building its technological resilience, this rapid expansion of legal risk is particularly dangerous, as it directly deters the foreign capital required to sustain its economic trajectory. This permissive legal environment could be significantly amplified. The revised EU Product Liability Directive (PLD) acts as a powerful multiplier within Portugal’s expanding litigation ecosystem. By explicitly bringing software, digital services, and AI systems under the scope of strict liability and lowering evidentiary barriers, the PLD concentrates new, highly unpredictable legal risks squarely on the digital economy. The empirical analysis in this report quantifies the scale and direction of this threat, revealing four critical findings: Sectoral Targeting: Mass litigation in Portugal is not evenly distributed; it disproportionately hits the strategic sectors that are the engines of the country’s growth. Between 2018 and 2025, the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector faced the highest volume of collective actions (29 per cent of all cases), followed closely by manufacturing (26 per cent). This litigation directly targets the primary providers of FDI in Portugal. Impact on GDP: The aggregate cost of private enforcement through collective actions could impose a heavy drag on national output. Scenario analysis estimates that the absolute economic impact of this litigation burden could reach between EUR 640 million and EUR 1.93 billion, representing up to 0.63 per cent of Portugal’s GDP. Impact on Innovation: Excessive litigation distorts and depresses research and development. The chilling effect on innovation is highly quantifiable: the projected decline in market capitalisation for Portugal’s top R&D investors, resulting from heightened litigation risk, is estimated at between EUR 63 million and EUR 188 million. The Decoupling from Harm: The surge in litigation is a supply-side phenomenon driven by financial incentives, rather than a demand-side response to product malfunction. The data shows a clear decoupling from actual consumer harm, evidenced by consistently low product-safety alerts and consumer confidence levels that remain above the EU average. As a ‘catch-up innovator’, Portugal remains highly sensitive to regulatory shocks. The fear of aggressive mass litigation could act as a significant deterrent to the foreign capital required to sustain its economic trajectory. This unpredictable liability environment risks unravelling Portugal’s digital transition and chilling future investment. The careful implementation of the PLD – which must be designed to avoid acting as an amplifier for collective actions – is an imperative for Portugal’s continued economic development and competitiveness.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Knowledge Economy, and Mass Litigation
Political Geography:
Europe and Portugal

382. Consumer Protection in the Age of AI: Transposing the New EU Product Liability Directive in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Digital technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) are transforming Europe’s economy. The legal frameworks designed to govern them are catching up – perhaps too hastily. The EU’s revised Product Liability Directive (PLD) provides a good example of the tension between the speed of technological progress and the need for norms that balance the rights and obligations of users and producers of these technologies. The PLD seeks to modernise product liability rules by recognising that software, AI systems and connected devices are now integral to everyday products and services. For the first time, digital manufacturing files, algorithms and software fall within the scope of strict liability, meaning that producers can be held responsible for harm caused by defects in code or data as much as by flaws in hardware. While well-intentioned, the Directive risks imposing heavy economic costs, particularly in countries whose competitiveness depends on digital innovation. Expanding liability may discourage companies from experimenting or launching new products as even routine design improvements could be construed as evidence of past defects. Faced with greater legal uncertainty, firms are likely to divert resources from research and development into compliance documentation, testing and risk management in order to minimise litigation exposure. For Denmark, Finland and Sweden – among the world’s most digitalised and research-intensive economies – the stakes are high. Scenario analysis suggests that if the PLD were to encourage mass litigation and if this reached even a fraction of United States levels, the combined market value of their most innovative firms could fall by between €2 billion and €7 billion, equivalent to several years of public R&D spending. Technology-intensive sectors such as ICT and life sciences would bear the brunt of this impact, with potential knock-on effects for GDP and employment across the Nordic economies. The new PLD continues a broader EU trend of favouring private regulatory enforcement through the courts, rather than the traditional model of public oversight that has been the preferred model in Europe, and especially in the Nordics. This shift marks a departure from the Nordic region’s tried and tested approach where public regulators and other public authorities, including Ombudsmen, resolve disputes efficiently and at low cost. If transposed without regard for this well-established model, the PLD could erode not only innovation-driven growth in the Nordic countries but also the foundations of their existing consumer protection systems. Nordic policymakers should shape the PLD to fit their own systems, ensuring that national implementation preserves the strengths of their regulatory traditions. This study outlines the following recommendations: Transpose the PLD with caution. Nordic governments should implement the Directive in line with existing procedural frameworks and avoid a simple copy-and-paste of the directive. Seek Interpretive Guidance from the European Commission. PLD’s regulatory complexity runs contrary to the EU’s goals of simplification and economic competitiveness. Nordic governments should lead a joint initiative to request formal interpretive guidance from the Commission. Such guidance is essential to ensure a consistent and harmonised application of the Directive across the Single Market, clarify ambiguous terms, prevent unintended consequences, and protect against litigation abuses. Clarify the application of new legal principles. Legislators should specify how and when courts are to apply the new presumptions brought in by PLD and establish clear and rigorous standards for disclosure of evidence based on existing rules. The presumptions introduced in the PLD should be integrated carefully within the laws in the Nordic countries and interpreted narrowly, in keeping with the EU’s intent that there should be no reversal of the burden of proof. Clarify liability boundaries for digital and AI technologies. National guidance and sector-specific standards should define how liability applies to software, AI systems, and connected devices, especially where responsibility is shared across supply chains or evolves through updates. Preserve proportionality and retain the development-risk defence. The development risk clause should be maintained to prevent liability for defects that could not have been detected with existing scientific and technical knowledge at the time of production. Ensure coherence across the regulatory landscape. The PLD’s implementation should align with existing frameworks on data protection, cybersecurity, and digital services to avoid duplication, legal uncertainty, and conflicting enforcement. Maintain the Ombudsman-centred model for consumer redress. The Nordic tradition of public oversight and accessible dispute resolution should remain the primary mechanism for enforcement, with litigation reserved only for systemic failures. This approach has long safeguarded both consumer trust and innovation at a fraction of the cost of mass litigation seen in other countries.
Topic:
European Union, Artificial Intelligence, Digital Technologies, and Product Liability Directive
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden

383. Boosting Competitiveness: 10 Actions for Deeper and Better Capital Markets in EU Member States

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Ismail Abdi, Andrea Dugo, Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Deeper, richer, and more sophisticated capital markets are central for boosting Europe’s competitiveness and prosperity. High-performing capital markets supply all types of firms – big and small – with multiple and varied opportunities to fund themselves and their growth at all stages of development. If Europe develops policies encouraging more savings to be invested in equities, bonds and securities there will be more funding available for EU companies. Importantly, such a development would also improve opportunities for companies to seek funding that is better tailored for their development and growth prospects. As pointed out in Mario Draghi’s report on European competitiveness, better capital-market policies are a key priority for boosting European economic performance. A good capital market is an ecology based on many different investment institutions and that is supported by a general business environment that allows businesses to grow and thrive, making them attractive for investment. Consequently, improving European capital markets requires many different types of reforms that make it easier to save, invest, innovate and build businesses in Europe. While the EU can advance such an agenda, it is critically important that reform efforts focus on national governments. The heavy lifting to improve capital markets in Europe will have to be done by national governments. Many governments have already made reforms that have improved outcomes, and other EU countries can learn profoundly from these experiences. The European Union is now changing approach. It has recently launched a new strategy for a Savings and Investment Union (SIU) that will succeed the Capital Markets Union (CMU). New initiatives have already been tabled. This is an opportunity to reflect on past achievements and shortcomings, and to advance new policies and targets that forcefully can drive capital market development across the EU. The fault lines of capital markets in Europe are known. While European households have a high savings rate, large parts of these savings are invested in real estate or in low-yielding assets that are distant from corporate funding markets. Generally, the market is too dominated by banks, which limits the diversity and resilience of funding sources and leaves firms – especially SMEs – more vulnerable to credit cycles and banking sector stress. What is less known is that there is huge variability between EU Member States – both in capital market performance and policy. In fact, some EU countries like Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands have high-performing capital markets that are distinctly different from other EU markets. Obviously, high-performing countries have pursued national capital-market policies that are better suited to achieve the common objectives. While EU-level legislation has so far delivered limited results, national reforms hold considerable untapped potential. If all Member States were able to converge towards the standards and effectiveness of the most dynamic markets, the cumulative effect could transform the EU’s financial landscape – broadening access to capital, increasing cross-border investment, and strengthening the overall resilience and competitiveness of the European economy. In the new SIU, the EU should promote national capital-market development and leverage the experience of high-performing European countries. While there are remaining cases for removal of barriers within the EU and a move towards a single market for capital, the reality is that many past harmonisation efforts have failed to move policy or performance much. New strategies are needed – and there are big payoffs if national governments start to progress capital-market reforms that are necessary and that have proven remarkably successful in other EU Member States. In this report, we are proposing 10 actions for deeper and better capital markets in the EU. They are all tailored to affect national improvements. We propose a new SIU Scoreboard of seven specific action targets – some are outcome-oriented but most of them reflect policy areas that should be reformed. They include new policies on pensions, investment funds, and public markets – and combine ambitions to raise the volume of capital invested in capital markets with targets for improving access to niche funding, not least for small and high-growth companies. Three actions are about EU institutions and the process going forward. We propose a functional role for the SIU – and complement it with a distinct role for the European Semester in national capital-market development, including annual country-specific recommendations. We also propose conditioning access to certain EU funds on capital-market reform.
Topic:
European Union, Institutions, Economic Competition, Capital Markets, and Single Market
Political Geography:
Europe

384. Time is Money: The Cost of Delaying the Ratification of the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Between 2021 and 2025, the EU sacrificed €183bn in exports and €291bn in gross domestic product due to its failure to ratify the EU-Mercosur Agreement. These figures represent the net present value of economic activity that would have materialised had the agreement been implemented as originally scheduled in 2021. This accumulated nominal GDP loss, which reflects not only foregone exports but also unrealised gains from improved access to inputs and diversified supply chains, corresponds to approximately 1.6 per cent of the EU’s total economic output and is equivalent to roughly two years of nominal European economic growth at the rates observed in 2023 and 2024. Should ratification continue to be deferred through 2026, the cumulative toll will continue to grow. Total foregone exports would reach €216bn, while lost GDP would climb to €344bn. To place this in perspective, the cumulative export loss would exceed the total annual trade of goods between the EU and Switzerland, the EU’s fourth-largest trading partner. Every additional month of delay during 2026 amounts to €4.4bn in foregone GDP and €3bn in missing exports. The economic burden of delay is concentrated in economic sectors where the EU maintains a competitive advantage. Transport equipment faces the most severe impact, with a shortfall of €94bn in exports over the six-year delay scenario. Machinery and equipment constitute the second-largest loss category at €23.8bn, followed by chemicals at €21.2bn, iron and steel and agri-food at €12.6bn each, and pharmaceuticals at €11.5bn. These sectors are precisely those that drive European economic dynamism. Pharmaceuticals and chemicals rank among the top five manufacturing sectors for labour productivity, while transport equipment and machinery sit in the top ten. For transport equipment, chemicals, and iron and steel, the six-year delay represents lost sales equivalent to more than two years of each sector’s annual research and development budget. The services sector has also experienced substantial forgone gains, with a five-year delay translating into €3bn in lost service exports, concentrated in trade and logistics (€1.9bn), communications (€0.6bn), and financial services (€0.4bn). The costs of delayed ratification fall across every EU member state. Germany has had the largest absolute loss at €71bn, equivalent to 1.7 per cent of GDP, incurred during a period when the economy contracted. France experienced €38bn in foregone exports (approximately one year of nominal economic growth), while Italy lost €29bn (roughly 1.6 years of growth). Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, and Austria also had substantial absolute losses. While smaller, export-oriented economies have lower absolute losses, their relative exposure is significant: Portugal, Hungary, Belgium, Finland, and Sweden experienced losses exceeding 1 per cent of national GDP. The cost of delaying the EU-Mercosur Agreement goes beyond sale losses. Faced with policy uncertainty, European firms are diverting capital and establishing supply chains that will not return to Mercosur, surrendering market share to China and eroding Europe’s influence in the region. Crucially, the delay is also detrimental to strengthening the EU’s economic resilience. By delaying the ratification of the agreement, the EU is losing preferential access to Mercosur’s vast critical raw materials. Ultimately, Europe’s hesitation prolongs its dependence on Chinese supply chains for these essential inputs. The opportunity cost of continued delay substantially exceeds any remaining policy concerns. The political framing of delay as a cost-free option that allows for additional deliberation is inaccurate and counterproductive. The costs of postponement are real, measurable, and growing. For European policymakers, the imperative is clear: ratifying the EU-Mercosur Agreement is not merely a trade policy decision but an essential step toward strengthening Europe’s economic growth, competitiveness, and economic resilience.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Institutions, Trade, Mercosur, and Single Market
Political Geography:
Europe

385. Cloud Resilience and Security: Why Exit, Portability, and Lifecycle Design Matter

Author:
Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The future of computing points to cloud services remaining deeply embedded across sectors. As cloud technologies converge with edge networks and connected devices, resilience and security are no longer secondary technical issues but central policy concerns. This paper shows that resilience is strengthened not by isolation or localisation mandates, but by preserving architectural choice, interoperability, and competitive multi-cloud options across the lifecycle. Many of the decisive factors that affect resilience occur at onboarding – how a cloud provider, tools, licences, and security controls are selected and integrated – and whether workloads and safeguards can in practice be reconfigured, substituted, or exited during disruption. Across business, standards, cybersecurity, and competition communities, resilience is understood as a structural property of architecture, governance, and contractual control. The key test is whether organisations retain credible choices at every stage of the cloud journey, from migration to multi-cloud to exit. Concentration becomes a risk only when portability and switching are restricted in practice. The analysis shows that ending restrictive licensing and contractual practices are the most effective policy lever for strengthening resilience. Licensing determines what can be deployed at onboarding and whether workloads can be duplicated, migrated, or recovered under stress. Restrictions on licence mobility, discriminatory pricing, licensing practices that require re-purchase upon migration or dual-running, and limits on redundancy transform scale into dependency on a single cloud vendor. By contrast, prescriptive technical regulation to try and address cloud reliability carries higher risk. Cloud architectures and security ecosystems are complex and evolve rapidly, and even specialist engineers rarely have full visibility across dependency chains. Software equivalence should become a functional requirement, ensuring comparable performance, security, and service levels across cloud environments, rather than a requirement to use the same architecture or interfaces. In practice, this means that cloud and software vendors should not offer degraded functionality, security updates, or support conditions when their products run on third-party clouds compared to their own infrastructure. Mandating technical designs or standardised interfaces, by contrast, risks reducing architectural diversity and increasing correlated failure risks. Resilience is therefore best supported through proportionate, technology-neutral policy focused on preserving lifecycle multi-cloud choice rather than redesigning infrastructure. Competition also has a constructive role when it targets practices that restrict lifecycle choice rather than focusing narrowly on market shares. Enforcement against discriminatory licensing, tying practices, and artificial switching barriers aligns competition objectives with operational resilience and critical infrastructure protection. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) could contribute positively where it removes contractual barriers to switching and choice and interoperability. By contrast, applying platform-style technical obligations indiscriminately to cloud services risks weakening specialised environments, narrowing security tool choice, and reducing practical exit options. The paper also cautions against equating resilience with technological or geographic sovereignty. Empirical evidence shows that even services marketed as “sovereign” typically rely on globally integrated cloud components. Resilience is strengthened not by isolation or localisation mandates, but by preserving architectural choice, interoperability, and competitive multi-cloud options across the lifecycle.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Cloud Computing, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:
Europe

386. More Than Just Chips: What Europe Can Learn from Taiwan’s Industrial Strategy

Author:
Andrea Dugo and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Taiwan is widely regarded as the global epicentre of semiconductor manufacturing. The island accounts for well over half of all global chip foundry manufacturing and nearly all of advanced chip output. At the heart of this system stands the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which alone contributes 8.9 per cent of national GDP and dominates the world’s leading-edge logic foundry market. Yet framing Taiwan’s economic success as a TSMC story risks oversimplifying both its growth model and the policy lessons it offers. Taiwan’s competitiveness is best understood not as the product of semiconductors alone, but as the outcome of a broader industrial ecosystem. Taiwan had already reached advanced-economy income levels in the late 1990s, when chips still accounted for only a modest share of national output. Importantly, growth remains broad-based, with substantial contributions still coming from the wider industrial economy. The semiconductor sector’s decisive contribution has not been to “create” Taiwan’s prosperity, but to accelerate its transformation into a technological frontrunner. Counterfactual estimates suggest that without chips, Taiwan would remain a high-income economy – but it would lose much of its current convergence momentum with the world’s innovation leaders. Taiwan’s economic model is defined by its intense focus on innovation. The island ranks third globally in R&D expenditure as a share of GDP, with roughly 4 per cent of output devoted to R&D. Crucially, around 86 per cent of this spending is performed by firms rather than the public sector, ensuring that innovation remains closely tied to production capability and market demand. R&D investment is heavily weighted towards experimental development, which turns research into final prototypes and commercial products. Even excluding chips, Taiwan’s business R&D intensity would remain higher than that of 19 of the EU’s 27 Member States. This success has been engineered through deliberate, long-term statecraft that evolved from “state-led creation” to “state-enabled upgrading.” In earlier decades, institutions such as the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) helped Taiwan acquire and adapt foreign technologies, train engineers, and build pre-commercial capabilities. But Taiwan avoided locking itself into permanent state ownership and subsidy dependence: firms incubated in public settings were progressively spun off and pushed towards market validation, including the creation of global champions such as TSMC. From the 1990s onwards, Taiwan’s industrial strategy increasingly prioritised horizontal support measures rather than heavy-handed state intervention. The Taiwanese model consolidated around five reinforcing policy levers: (1) a state role focused on enabling private R&D rather than substituting for it; (2) sustained investment in human capital; (3) science park clustering; (4) deep integration into global trade and value chains; and (5) diversification and spillovers into adjacent high-tech sectors. For European policymakers, Taiwan’s experience suggests that subsidies alone do not constitute an industrial strategy. Instead, the central lesson is ecosystem-building: policies that connect research to scaling, talent to industrial capability, and innovation to globally competitive production. Ultimately, Taiwan offers a model of how public policy can shape innovation capacity and competitiveness without displacing private-sector dynamism.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Manufacturing, Semiconductors, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

387. Transitional Justice and Institutional Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip Post-War: A Policy Vision for Preserving Civil Peace and Restoring the Justice System under UN Security Council Resolution 2803

Author:
Islam Atallah
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In the aftermath of the war on the Gaza Strip, and amid the widespread collapse of institutional, judicial, and security structures, including the destruction of courts, prosecution offices, and law enforcement facilities, as well as the loss of large numbers of official files and records, this paper presents a policy discussion on the need for a transitional approach to rebuilding the justice system and preserving civil peace in Gaza. The paper examines the impact of institutional collapse on society, including the expansion of the judicial and security vacuum, the accumulation of cases and disputes, and the growing reliance on reconciliation committees, community committees, and tribal mechanisms as emergency tools for addressing daily conflicts in the absence of formal institutions. It also highlights the risks associated with these mechanisms becoming permanent and unregulated alternatives, and the legal, institutional, and social challenges this may pose to rights protection and community trust. The paper analyzes several policy alternatives for rebuilding the justice sector in Gaza, including the centralized restoration of the formal system, the institutionalization of tribal and community structures, and linking justice to reconstruction and spatial justice. It concludes by emphasizing the importance of adopting a hybrid transitional justice model that balances the urgent need to fill the judicial and security vacuum with the necessity of preserving constitutional principles and human rights, through an organized framework that integrates formal justice institutions, community-based mechanisms, digital documentation, and institutional reform. The paper stresses that rebuilding Gaza’s justice system should not be viewed solely as a legal or administrative matter, but as a fundamental condition for preserving civil peace, restoring trust between citizens and institutions, and preventing daily disputes, property claims, and rights-related conflicts from becoming additional drivers of social fragmentation in the post-war phase.
Topic:
Reconstruction, Transitional Justice, Armed Conflict, 2023 Gaza War, and Civil Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

388. Inclusive or Exclusion: The Legislative Framework for Ensuring Youth and Women’s Presence in Palestinian Governance Institutions

Author:
Pal-Think for Strategic Studies Research and Studies Unit
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This paper provides a policy diagnosis of the legislative framework governing women’s and youth representation in Palestinian governance institutions, at a moment when the Palestinian political system is undergoing a rare simultaneous reshaping: an institutional reform programme for the Palestinian Authority; local elections that produced a women’s representation rate of 33% in April 2026; and a new transitional governance structure for Gaza operating under UN Security Council Resolution 2803 — with only one woman among its 15 members. This gap between marginal progress in local elections and deep institutional absence at higher tiers of governance reveals that the Palestinian legislative system produces presence in the lower layers of power while entrenching exclusion at its upper echelons. Youth — among whom those under 24 constitute more than 60% of the total population, while those between 18 and 29 represent over 22% by the UN definition — remain outside any binding representative framework. This paper is published as part of the project “Shared Vision for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity” implemented by Pal-Think for Strategic Studies in partnership with the Consulate General of France in Jerusalem.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Women, Youth, Representation, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

389. Digital Hate Speech in Gaza: Social Media Platforms and Their Impact on Social Cohesion

Author:
Mahmoud Abd Al-Hadi
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This policy paper addresses the phenomenon of digital hate speech in the Gaza Strip during the ongoing war since October 2023 and analyzes its destructive impact on the Palestinian social cohesion. Amid the collapse of traditional institutions and the displacement of more than 90% of the Strip’s population, social media platforms have become the broadest public sphere and, at the same time, the most fragile incubator for the escalation of incitement, bullying, and sectarian and regional stereotyping. The paper provides a precise diagnosis of the patterns of digital hate speech, analyzes the structural factors that fuel it in the specific context of the Gaza Strip, and measures its impact on youth, women, and vulnerable groups, drawing on comparative international experiences from Rwanda, Syria, and Iraq. In its diagnosis, the paper relies on a qualitative-analytical methodology that combines a review of relevant literature, in-depth interviews with experts in law, digital media, mental health, and humanitarian work, and a limited focus group that included 20 young people, activists, and users of social media platforms in Gaza. The paper treats these data as exploratory indicators for understanding the phenomenon, not as a statistically representative sample of Gazan society as a whole. The paper concludes with five actionable policy recommendations directed at civil society organizations, decision-makers, and youth as central actors in the process of rebuilding social cohesion.
Topic:
Social Media, Hate Speech, Social Cohesion, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

390. Conditions for the Emergence of New Political Parties in Palestine After the War: From the Representational Vacuum to the Reconstitution of the Political Field

Author:
Pal-Think for Strategic Studies Research and Studies Unit
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This paper argues that the emergence of new Palestinian parties after the war does not depend solely on opening party registration or holding elections, but on building a comprehensive political pathway: a guaranteeing law, public freedoms, a gradual electoral track, a clear civilian framework for party organization, financial independence, and a social base encompassing Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the diaspora. The paper addresses the conflation of parties with electoral lists, initiatives, and armed groups, and reads the Deir al-Balah local elections as a dual signal: the possibility of the ballot box returning even in a devastated environment, and the limits of trust when politics unfolds amid displacement and service collapse. The paper also expands the scenario analysis of possible pathways for new party formation, from internal reform to youth and civic parties, the transformation of independent initiatives, and municipal pathways. It concludes with four focused recommendations to make the new party an accountable institution rather than another name on a crisis-ridden map.
Topic:
Elections, Political Parties, Post-Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Gaza, and West Bank

391. Palestinian Youth and the Future of Governance: From Marginalization to Political Agency

Author:
Ali Abdel-Wahab
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In light of the political transformations facing the Palestinian political system, particularly under the current circumstances following the recent war on the Gaza Strip, this paper discusses the issue of representation of youth within the governance structure. Although Palestinian society is predominantly young, pathways for political representation remain limited, especially in the absence of legislative elections since 2006. The paper discusses how this reality has widened the gap between decision-makers and youth generation. It also examines the structural conditions that hinder youth from moving from marginalization to meaningful political agency, and proposes a deep understanding of how participation and representation can be rebuilt in ways that reflect the social and demographic transformations within Palestinian society. This paper is published as part of the project “Shared Vision for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity” implemented by Pal-Think for Strategic Studies in partnership with the Consulate General of France in Jerusalem.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Youth, and Marginalization
Political Geography:
Middle East and Palestine

392. A new face of war: Russian military strategy post-Ukraine

Author:
Oscar Jonsson
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Among Russian strategists, there is a strong renewed appreciation for positional warfare and a strategy of attrition. This is a pivot from Russia’s pre-war strategy of “active defence,” which sought to move away from positional defence towards manoeuvre. The strength of a positional and defensive strategy comes from technological innovation, with an exponential growth in unmanned systems and space-based sensors, which are believed to make the battlefield transparent. The transparent battlefield concept challenges key principles of manoeuvre warfare, such as concentrating forces and surprise. A key priority for Russian strategists is to break the positional deadlock and re-establish the conditions for manoeuvre. This can be done through technological development in AI and drones and a more networked military that can mass fires across the entire depth of the adversary. In a potential war with Russia, NATO will face a military that is experienced on a drone- and sensorrich battlefield and that is increasing its ability to look beyond the frontline and strike further into the operational depth. The Russian military is putting effort into re-establishing the conditions for manoeuvre while denying their adversary the ability to do the same.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

393. Moscow’s views of the war of tomorrow

Author:
Andrew Monaghan
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s vision of “tomorrow’s war” differs sharply from NATO’s. Moscow envisions not a localized conflict in north-eastern Europe but a large-scale global confrontation with geoeconomic roots with the United States as the primary driver of instability. Russia’s core scenario is a U.S.-led “21stcentury blitzkrieg”: waves of missile strikes coordinated with highly mobile, multi-domain forces, with particular emphasis on maritime threats. Russia is preparing for full mobilization warfare, modernizing its nuclear triad, reconstituting large ground formations and tightly integrating the armed forces into the state’s socioeconomic fabric. Doctrinal innovation remains limited despite Ukraine. Adaptations are tactical, not strategic --- formal doctrine is unchanged.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Innovation, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

394. War is a mind game: countering weaponized information

Author:
Marek Havlík and Jiří Horáček
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Cognitive warfare is the weaponization of information that exploits natural cognitive vulnerabilities to disrupt, manipulate and control individuals’ perceptions of reality. NATO’s current countermeasures, such as pre-bunking, strategic communications, and trust-building efforts, don’t fully address the deeper psychological and cognitive vulnerabilities targeted in cognitive warfare. In addition to common cognitive vulnerabilities like emotions, cognitive biases, and uncertainty, other critical traits are being exploited on the cognitive battlefield to manipulate and control vulnerable individuals.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Information Warfare, and Cognitive Warfare
Political Geography:
Global Focus

395. Trade off : an economic analysis of North Korean-Russian relations

Author:
Giangiuseppe Pili and Cosimo Meneguzzo
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia and North Korea have set up an extensive system for transshipments of strategic goods, such as military materiel for Russia and oil and food for North Korea. Between September 2023 and February 2024, North Korea delivered munitions and rockets worth between USD 4.3 billion and USD 4.8 billion to Russia. Both countries can be expected to maintain their cooperation in the short to medium term. North Korea will provide Russia with military supplies and labour, while Russia will supply petroleum products, minerals, fertilizers and possibly nuclear and military know-how. NATO and its member states would be well advised to cooperate more closely with regional enforcement eff orts via the Indo-Pacifi c Four (IP4).
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Asia, and North Korea

396. Mind the minds: China’s education strategy and its implications for NATO

Author:
Veronica Strina
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Education lies at the heart of China’s grand strategy as it advances its global ambitions and reshapes strategic competition in nontraditional security terms, compelling NATO to rethink the ‘China challenge’ beyond the military domain. China is racing at unprecedented speed to become a global education superpower, fuelling its scientific and technological dominance. Yet deep-seated structural weaknesses within its socio-educational system, together with mounting international mistrust, risk slowing its ascent. NATO in its education and training institutions would be well placed to cultivate the critical thinking necessary for securing the intellectual edge.
Topic:
NATO, Education, Science and Technology, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

397. Betting on blue: how to improve NATO military forecasting for acquisitions

Author:
Ben Connable
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Effective acquisition strategies require a solid, evidence-grounded forecasting methodology and real-world data. But at least for land warfare, that baseline is inadequate. Absent a global understanding of land war – by far the most common and strategically relevant type of conventional and irregular war – NATO acquisitions may not best address even the pressing threat from Russia. Analysis of the new Ground Combat Database shows how important findings and questions relevant to acquisitions can be drawn from longitudinal case data. Even better analytic approaches are readily available, as are better data. Action plan forecasting and acquisitions can be improved with aggressive and evidence-grounded analyses.
Topic:
NATO, Military, and Warfare
Political Geography:
Global Focus

398. Beam me up: leadership skills in space

Author:
Maria Soto
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
As NATO nations enhance their space capabilities, there is a critical need for leadership development. Current training focuses heavily on technical skills, often overlooking essential leadership qualities such as creativity, resilience and emotional intelligence, which are crucial for effective command in joint operations. Successful space leaders must cultivate the interconnected qualities of individual agility, trust, resilience and self-awareness to navigate the complexities of this domain. To develop effective space leaders, NATO should integrate leadership training with technical education, prioritize cross-domain collaboration and leverage partnerships with industry.
Topic:
NATO, Partnerships, Leadership, and Space
Political Geography:
Global Focus

399. Mitigating the Risks of Private Sector Involvement in the Electricity Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa

Author:
Olakunle Alao and Peter Twesigye
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) faces an electricity access crisis, with over 600 million people lacking access to reliable power. Chronic underinvestment, institutional fragility and fragmentation, and operational inefficiencies have rendered many state-run utilities incapable of sustaining reliable service delivery, let alone meeting rising demand. In response, governments often running on budget deficits and influenced by international financial institutions have embraced private sector participation (PSP) as a means to mobilise capital, improve operational efficiency, and accelerate electrification. Yet the outcomes of PSP across SSA are mixed, raising questions about its effectiveness, equity, and long-term sustainability. This study undertakes a comprehensive, mixed-methods analysis of PSP in SSA’s electricity sector. It maps the evolution and extent of private sector engagement across generation, transmission, and distribution; quantifies its prevalence; and assesses its impact on six core performance indicators: financial viability, access, affordability, quality of supply, operational efficiency, and decarbonisation. The findings of this study affirm that PSP, when embedded within robust governance and regulatory frameworks as well as transparent procurement mechanisms and coherent sector planning, can contribute positively to power sector performance. However, these gains are not automatic. The strongest correlations between PSP and performance are observed in countries where governance is credible, regulatory agencies are functional, and policy environments are stable. Conversely, in contexts where institutions are weak, PSP has often produced limited or even adverse outcomes, such as overcapacity, fiscal strain, high tariffs, and social inequities. In summary, PSP can be a valuable tool for accelerating power sector transformation, but only when it is thoughtfully designed, responsibly governed, and firmly aligned with the public good. Further, sustainable electrification requires not just more investment, but smarter, fairer, and more accountable systems that prioritise resilience, equity, and long-term development.
Topic:
Privatization, Electricity, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

400. Roadmap for Feminist Local Humanitarian Leadership

Author:
Gita Rani Adhikary, Jermaine Baltazar Bayas, and Clementine Novales
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Gender and power inequalities continue to shape humanitarian responses in Asia, both within crisis-affected communities and within the humanitarian system itself. These inequalities are deeply rooted, intersectional, and often reinforced by top-down international approaches. This roadmap sets out Oxfam in Asia’s commitment to a feminist, locally led humanitarian system that centres crisis-affected people and recognizes gender and inclusion-focused civil society organizations (CSOs), especially feminist women’s rights organizations (WROs), as leaders, not just implementers. Developed with feminist partners across Asia, the roadmap provides a shared vision and practical direction for transforming how power, resources and leadership are exercised in humanitarian action from 2025 to 2030.
Topic:
Partnerships, Leadership, Feminism, Gender, and Humanitarian Response
Political Geography:
Asia