11. Is Liberalism as an Ideological Assumption Over?
- Author:
- Marlène Laruelle
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Institution:
- Brown Journal of World Affairs
- Abstract:
- Much ink has been spilled debating the implications of the results of the U.S. November 2024 elections. In Europe, following the June 2024 elections, more than 40 far-right parties hold seats in the European Parliament, a growth from 25 the previous term. The far right also managed to increase its vote share in nine out of the 13 European states that held legislative elections in 2024.1 Compared to a decade ago, analysts understand that these events are not exceptional mo- ments, glitches in the system, or accidents of history. Nonetheless, many still prioritize short-term explanations such as, in the United States’ case, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris’ weak campaign performance, high levels of inflation, and unprecedented influxes of irregular migration. Others attribute far-right victories to either morally unacceptable sentiments such as racism and xenophobia or brainwashing via fake news and social media propaganda—whether through X (in the United States’ case and in Germany’s February 2025 elections)2 or TikTok (as in Romania’s first round of presidential elections).3 In both cases, these explanations provide moral reassurance: only citizens with bad intentions, victims of propaganda, or those unable to appreciate lib- eralism’s idealistic goals could vote for the far right. However, these arguments are insufficient in understanding the wave of rejection that societal order seems to be arousing amongst citizens. If one thinks that Donald Trump won only because his voters are systemic racists or susceptible to fake news, then one does not see that he may have won because his political program spoke to a multiracial coalition of blue-collar and white-collar voters and resonated with a growing number of Hispanics and young African American men.4 Our interpretation of Trump’s victory impacts the search for solutions: in the first scenario, the Democrats are not held responsible for their defeat; in the second, they must engage in a deep rethinking of their political platform. Far-right electoral gains are no accidents of history. Illiberal leaders and parties have expanded electorally worldwide in many countries beyond the United States and Europe in varying cultural contexts, such as in Turkey, India, the Philippines, and El Salvador. This suggests that the explanation for their success must be found in structural transformations of our socioeconomic and political landscape, not in one-off sets of issues or grievances. To truly understand the rise of illiberalism, citizens and activists anxious to defend liberal demo- cratic principles must analyze these broader systemic evolutions be- fore discussing what they mean for our vision of liberalism. They should grasp why these systemic challenges have so far been more successfully addressed, electorally speaking, by the right than by the left. The main argument of this paper is that liberalism’s cultural hegemony is over, and those defending liberal principles must recognize that they are now in genuine competition with other political ideologies. To this end, they must abandon the notion that liberalism represents “common sense,” while its op- ponents embody “nonsense.” Ironically, this very contrast is mirrored by illiberal voters, who see their recent electoral success as a return to politics grounded in reality and opposing liberal “wokeness.”
- Topic:
- Politics, Culture, Elections, Ideology, Voting, and Liberalism
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America