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571. Israel-Africa Relations: What Can We Learn from the Netanyahu Decade?

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since he came to power in 2009, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not made Israeli-African relations a priority in his foreign policy. After they broke off diplomatic relations with Israel following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, most African states – besides Malawi, South Africa (apart from between 1975 and 1979), Swaziland and Lesotho – finally resumed relations with the Jewish state during the 1980s and 1990s and more recently for some others. The resumption of diplomatic ties was gradual, as peace efforts were initiated regarding Palestine. Israel now enjoys diplomatic relations with more than 40 sub-Saharan African states, but only has 12 embassies throughout the entire continent, including in Cairo. The last ones to be opened were in Kigali (Rwanda) in 2019 and Accra (Ghana) in 2011. The Israeli government today views Africa either as a longstanding sphere of influence (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Cameroon, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda and for the last two decades Rwanda) that needs to be strengthened, or as a new sphere of influence to be developed (the Sahel countries, central Africa, etc.) These relations operate through various conventional channels, including some that have been significantly weakened by Benjamin Netanyahu when he was Israeli prime minister between 1996 and 1999 and since 2009. This is particularly true for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its counterpart, Mashav, responsible for development cooperation. However, the security and intelligence sectors (Mossad), controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office, are strong drivers of Israeli foreign policy, hence Benjamin Netanyahu’s dominance over foreign affairs in general, and Africa in particular. The objective of this paper is to explain how political, economic and security relationships between Africa and Israel have developed in practice during the decade 2009-2020. The aim here is to go beyond a mere account of the history of these relationships. Since 2009, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – still in power at the time of writing – has frequently talked about his country’s return to the African stage, without necessarily providing his government with the financial resources to achieve this.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, and Benjamin Netanyahu
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, and Israel

572. Ukraine’s European Integration: The Russian Factor

Author:
Hanna Pashkova and Halyna Balanovych
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
National Security and Defence
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
The pace and effectiveness of Kyiv’s European integration course depends on many internal and external factors. The key ones being the political will of Ukrainian government, ability to implement and dedication to real pro-European changes in the country that would be tangible for Ukrainian citizens. This is the internal factor that is the main issue on the path to integration into the European community. That being said, European integration is a two-way street. The quality and level of Kyiv-Brussels relations to a great extent depend on the position and engagement of the European side, including EU’s internal processes and trends, which are rather complex, controversial and sometimes centrifugal in their nature at the moment. We are talking about an increased sentiment of restoring partnerships with Russia in the “business as usual” format inside the EU’s business and political circles. Russian hybrid aggression is a dangerous factor. For the Russian leadership that views post-Soviet countries as its zone of “privileged” interest, an independent Ukraine headed towards Europe and NATO is both a challenge and a threat. Firstly, Kyiv’s successful European integration is an incentive for other post-Soviet countries to step up, which means a failure for Russia’s plans of “forced” reintegration of Eurasian countries. Secondly, Kyiv achieving success in its European project is a model for Russian citizens and a convincing evidence of the inability of Russia’s authoritarian regime to offer an attractive democratic model of social development. This is why the Russian regime is using all of its available “hybrid warfare” to prevent Ukraine from integrating into Europe – from political and diplomatic pressure, economic blockade, information warfare to military intervention – occupation of Crimea and Donbas. Currently, Ukraine is a training ground and a testing area for Russia’s massive purposeful expansion into the EU territory. In particular, this includes discrediting the unifying European values and institutions, disorienting public opinion, interfering with elections, formation of pro-Russian lobby within the European establishment, support of radical movements, etc. The goal of this influence is to disintegrate the EU, reform Europe’s political system in line with the Russian scenario. An important factor is the EU member states’, institutions’ and other countries’ assistance and solidarity with Ukraine, as well as sanctions introduced by the West. Regrettably, over the period of almost six years, the sanctions have failed to stop Russia’s war against Ukraine, failed to change the nature of Kremlin’s aggressive foreign policy. Yet it is certainly crucial that the EU and other countries uphold a common course of conduct in regard to Russia, maintain and strengthen the “sanctions frontline”. At the same time, assessing the current confrontation in the notional Ukraine-EU-Russia “triangle”, it is worth noting that these problems have been temporarily overshadowed by the global COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, the pandemic has affected internal and external priorities of different countries, has shaken the global economy. On the other – it has “hit the pause button” for Ukraine’s European integration, made adjustments to EU-Ukraine Association Agreement implementation plans. Obviously, the problems that have been temporarily postponed will later resurface again – this time in the new circumstances and in the new form.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Conflict, Regional Integration, and Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

573. A New Direction: A Foreign Policy Playbook on Military Restraint for the Biden Team

Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Two decades of endless war and a bloated Pentagon budget that has proven useless in preventing Covid–19 deaths, now 270,000 and counting, are a jarring reminder that America’s foreign policy is thoroughly broken: It actually makes America and Americans less safe. Successive administrations have deployed the military in a costly, counterproductive, and indiscriminate manner, normalizing war and treating armed dominance as an end in itself. In consequence, the foreign policies of the United States are detached from any defensible conception of U.S. interests and from a decent respect for the rights and dignity of humankind. Marginal adjustments to the current approach will prove insufficient. A deeper rethinking of American foreign policy is warranted. This must be an undertaking that puts the well-being of the American people ahead of ambitions to dominate the globe. President-elect Joe Biden appears to recognize the need for a serious reorientation. His just-named national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, recently said that Biden has tasked his foreign policy team with “reimagining our national security for the unprecedented combination of crises we face at home and abroad,” including pandemics and the climate crisis. Moreover, Sullivan said that American foreign policy has to be judged by a basic question: Does it “make life better, easier, and safer” for Americans at home? Our foreign policy, in Sullivan’s words, has to deliver for American families.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, Grand Strategy, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Global Focus

574. Brothers in Arms and Faith? The Emerging US-Central and Eastern Europe ‘Special Relationship’

Author:
Vibeke Schou Tjalve and Minda Holm
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In this policy note, we explore the nature, strength and tensions of the contemporary US-Central Eastern Europe relationship. We describe the expanding US-CEE ‘brotherhood in arms’: growing trade relations, intensified military cooperation, and rekindled diplomatic ties. Further, we unpack the striking and largely ignored dimensions of the US-CEE ‘brotherhood in faith’: the many ways in which the United States and Central and Eastern Europe are tied together by overlapping ideologies of national conservatism and a particular version of Christian ‘family values’. This involves addressing the complexities of an increasingly influential and ambitious Visegrád Group, whose key players – Poland and Hungary – may be brothers, but are by no means twins. It also means raising some broader, burning discussions about the future of NATO and the meaning of ‘Europe’. Universalist, multicultural and postnational? Or conservative, Christian and sovereigntist?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, and Trade
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, North America, Central Europe, and United States of America

575. Measuring Russia’s attention to Europe and the world

Author:
Kristian Lundby Gjerde
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Based on a mapping of mentions of country names in more than 30,000 Russian official speeches, press conferences, meeting transcripts, and official statements, this brief provides insights into changes to Russia’s engagement with the world during the 21st century. Without disentangling the subtleties of relations – such as their security, economic, or cultural dimensions and their benign or adversarial features – this approach allows the brief to sketch answers to questions that would otherwise be left to guesswork.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Economics, and Culture
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

576. The Logic of Geopolitics in American-Russian Relations

Author:
Allen C. Lynch
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
One of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s first requests as President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor in 1977 was to ask the Pentagon for its plans – including targets – for nuclear war against “Russia”. Brzezinski was outraged when he was presented with the plan for nuclear war against the Soviet Union. He could not believe that the U.S. military had no plans to spe- cifically weaken the Russian core of the Soviet empire. For the Pentagon planners, Russia and the Soviet Union were one and the same.1 I begin with this anecdote because it reflects well an enduring geopolitical logic to American-Russian relations: American policy toward Russia, whether it be in the Tsarist, Soviet, or post-Soviet period, has not been based on opposing a strong Russian state per se. (That state married to communist ideology was something else altogether.) In the after- math of the Russian Civil War, for instance, the United States delayed recognition of Baltic independence until 1922, two years after Soviet Russia had recognized the independence of Estonia in the Treaty of Tartu, on the grounds that Polish and Finnish independence apart nothing should be done to call into question the territorial continuity of the Russian Em- pire.2 Indeed, American officials seldom viewed the Soviet Union as an empire, as the Pen- tagon war plans just cited illustrate. Historically, the logic of geopolitics i.e., the influence of organization in space on international political relationships has often tended to frame American-Russian relations in terms of complementarities of interest. Of course, geopolitics is not the only logic in AmericanRussian relations; ideology, domestic politics, as well as vested institutional interests all play their role in varying degrees under varying circum- stances. But historically, insofar as geopolitical factors have prevailed, American-Russian relations have generally been harmonious, if also remote and indirect in nature. (By indirect I mean that each sees the other mainly in terms of other powers or processes, e.g., the state of the balance of power in Europe and/or Northeast Asia.) Let us recall that Russia, whether it be under Imperial, Soviet, or post-Soviet auspices, is an essentially continental Eurasian power. Its primary state interest for centuries has been to build and consolidate a trans-continental, multi-national and imperial state while also man- aging international power politics with a series of powerful adversaries throughout Asia and Europe. Above all, Russia sought to ensure that no powerful coalition of external (and in Eu- rope technologically superior) powers could unite to challenge the Russian Empire’s territorial or political integrity. Russian diplomats and rulers thus learned to play the European balance of power with considerable finesse (e.g., the Treaty of Nystadt, 1721, under Peter the Great; the Congress of Vienna, 1815, under Alexander I; the Treaty of Rapallo between Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany, 1922; the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 1939; the Grand Alliance with the United States and Great Britain, 1941–45; and the Helsinki Final Act, 1975, to name just a few instances). As with Great Britain, maintaining a favorable European balance of power has been central to Russian statecraft.3 The United States, by contrast, is functionally an insular power (albeit on a continental scale) with respect to the rest of the world, surrounded as it is by two great oceans and militarily weak and isolated neighbors (i.e., Canada and Mexico). America’s primary foreign policy concern throughout most of its history has thus been, like Russia’s, to prevent the emergence of a hostile European hegemon that could threaten the country’s expansion in North America and its own hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Once the United States had stabilized its independence from Britain after the War of 1812, U.S. and British geopo- litical interests tended to coincide.4 In this context, American and Russian interests have more often been complementary than antagonistic. It has been primarily the intrusion of ideological elements, reflecting for example Americans’ global democratic aspirations or the Soviet Union’s ultimate objec- tive of the triumph of communism worldwide, that have rendered the bilateral relationship intransigent and even dangerous.5
Topic:
International Relations, Cold War, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Post Cold War, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Soviet Union, North America, and United States of America

577. On the Value of Nuclear Dialogue with China

Author:
David Santoro and Robert Gromoll
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper was written by Dr. David Santoro, Vice President and Director for Nuclear Policy at the Pacific Forum, and Dr. Robert Gromoll, former Director of the Office of Regional Affairs at the US Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Dr. Gromoll is now retired. Both Drs. Santoro and Gromoll participated in numerous dialogue rounds, and Dr. Santoro was a co-organizer. The paper is based primarily on the contents of the dialogue’s written reports, several of which were authored or co-authored by Dr. Santoro. By and large, the paper draws directly from these reports and reviews how the topics addressed in the dialogue were approached and discussed by the US and Chinese sides over time. (A list of these reports is included at the end of the paper; some have been published, others have not.) The paper is also based on the authors’ broader experience in participating in the Track-1.5 dialogue; the conversations they have had with US and Chinese participants on these issues over the years, both during the dialogue and on the margins; and their own personal research. This paper represents the views of the authors and not those of Pacific Forum or the US State Department.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China and Asia

578. Armenia's Foreign Policy: Where values meet constraints

Author:
Alexander Iskandaryan
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
The official foreign policy doctrine of Armenia is called "complementarism"; the idea at the core of this approach is that various foreign policy dimensions can and should complement each other and need not be perceived as mutually exclusive.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, and Complementarism
Political Geography:
Russia, Caucasus, and Armenia

579. Some Considerations on the Election of the BSEC Secretary General: The Georgian Perspective

Author:
Valeri Chechelashvili
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Multilateral diplomacy is an effective leverage to advance the foreign policy interests of a state in the network of international relations. This, similarly, applies to the regional level. Therefore, the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), despite the mostly justified criticism addressed towards it, in this sense remains in the focus of the attention of its member states.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Integration, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Georgia, and Black Sea

580. National Security Strategy of Armenia

Author:
Giorgio Bilanishvili
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The National Security Council of the Republic of Armenia approved a new national security strategy on July 10, 2020. The work on this document has been going on for almost a year. By the order of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, on July 17, 2019, an interagency commission was set up under the leadership of the Secretary of the National Security Council. It was instructed to develop a working version of the new national security strategy within one year. The previous National Security Strategy was approved by the National Security Council of Armenia a while ago on January 26, 2007. Thirteen years is quite a long period and the renewal of the national security strategy, in principal, should have happened earlier. Such a long pause indirectly indicates that the process of national security policy planning in the Republic of Armenia is not going appropriately. The purpose of this publication is to juxtapose and highlight the main differences between Armenia's national security strategies for 2007 and 2020 and also assess Armenia's external security environment based on the 2020 strategy.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and National Security
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Armenia