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1741. Strategic Instability: Challenges for Deterrence and the Changing Character of Warfare

Author:
Philip Ritcheson
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The Cold War was replaced by what the late commentator Charles Krauthammer termed a “Unipolar Moment.” The Soviet Union disintegrated without the Cold War turning hot, and the United States led a broad international coalition to reinforce the rules-based international order in the First Persian Gulf War. Some thought that without an ideological alternative to liberalism, there was an “end to history.” Meanwhile, a sense of strategic complacency set into the United States as it forgot that it needed to compete geostrategically, resulting in hubris. Still, the United States was in an enviable position of not having to seriously account for strategic escalation with an adversary. That said, autocracy regained its footing in Russia, and a multi-dimensional form of competition emerged with China. In the background, terrorists planned, prepared, and conducted the September 11, 2001 attacks, and the United States focused on the Global War on Terror and linkages between rogue regimes, terrorists, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. In Europe, a growing NATO alliance seemed more focused on diplomatic engagement than military capability development and deterrence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Deterrence, Instability, and Warfare
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

1742. Countering Terrorism in a Period of Great Power Competition

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Over more than 20 years, the U.S. built a counterterrorism enterprise that proved remarkably successful at preventing another catastrophic terrorist attack like September 11. By investing heavily in counterterrorism over such a long period of time, America not only created new agencies dedicated to fighting terrorism but also systems that enabled the military and other security agencies to carry out a high rate of operations across multiple geographic areas, supported by unique collection platforms and tools. These further benefited from robust intelligence analysis capabilities that translated vast amounts of collected information into timely and actionable intelligence. But the inherent tradeoff was that all those dollars, intelligence resources, and more went to support primarily kinetic missions. Thus, two factors—widening the national security aperture to address other priority threats and making the counterterrorism mission more sustainable over the long term—now underlie the need to rationalize counterterrorism efforts. Today, the threats that demand quick, dedicated investments emanate from states like China and Russia and from emerging transnational threats such as climate change and pandemic preparedness.
Topic:
Intelligence, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1743. NATO’s “Back to the Future”: A Conversation with Dr. Benedetta Berti

Author:
Benedetta Berti
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
In 2022, the Concept was written right in the middle of Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. All of those assumptions that we had in 2010 simply don’t work. The potential of conventional war cannot be dismissed. The notion that the Euro-Atlantic area is an area of stability and predictability—well, the reality is that those tools that provide for predictability and stability are all under tremendous pressure. So this Concept starts by saying: unfortunately, our security environment is the most complex that we’ve had for generations, and we need to act and prepare accordingly. One of the priorities is to rebuild the ability to ensure the territorial defense of Allies and to rebuild our deterrence and defense posture in a way that is credible for what is essentially a much more competitive world. So that’s a big change. It’s just beyond words. If you accept that assessment, it requires a significantly more robust investment in defense, in rebuilding our militaries, in investing in the right capabilities, and in rebuilding our defense industry. So, it is a generational shift.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Instability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

1744. Going Nuclear on Rosatom: Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Rosatom, its entities, and its senior personnel should be subjected to far greater sanctions by the United States and its allies. Sanction carveouts or waivers can be granted for nuclear reactor safety considerations, operating nuclear reactors, and for other Rosatom customers as they wind down existing contracts. However, the status quo is not sustainable. It leaves the United States and its allies vulnerable to political and economic pressure by Rosatom and its owner Russia, with the constant threat that this Putin-controlled entity could cut off energy supplies. This already happened to Germany in September 2022 when Gazprom, another Putin-controlled entity, cut off natural gas supplies to Germany as a result of a clash over Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Only a mild winter staved off serious and needless suffering by the German people. Rosatom deserves sanctions today. It is not just a benign commercial nuclear energy supplier. Rosatom has actively participated in the illegal seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP), a seizure causing an increased risk of a major nuclear accident. Rosatom officials are not authorized to operate these reactors. IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi has called this situation “not sustainable” and “risks nuclear safety and security.” Rosatom is also complicit in the human rights violations of Ukrainian plant personnel, violations that include torture. Rosatom also actively contributes importantly to the production of Russian weapon systems used against Ukraine. A case in point is the participation of one of its subsidiaries in the production of the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone that Russia has used to destroy much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure and terrorize its civilian population.
Topic:
Sanctions, Nuclear Energy, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

1745. Alabuga’s Greatly Expanded Production Rate of Shahed 136 Drones

Author:
David Albright, Igor Anokhin, Sarah Burkhard, Victoria Cheng, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Over the last two years, Russia has launched thousands of Shahed 136 drones against Ukraine. Although most of these relatively noisy, slow-moving drones have been shot down, about 15 percent on average have gotten through, causing immense damage to Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure. The Russian manufacturer of these drones, JSC Alabuga, contracted with Iran in early 2023 in a $1.75 billion dollar franchise deal to supply 6000 of the drones to the Russian Army by September 2025 in a three-stage arrangement, shown in Figure 1. While there were initial delays and skepticism about Alabuga being able to supply 6000 drones, data on Russian launches of Shahed drones collected by the Ukrainian military indicate that Alabuga is ahead in its production schedule and has already supplied approximately 4500 of the promised 6000 drones as of late April 2024. Based on these data, Alabuga has almost tripled its average production rate recently. It has, for the last several months produced Shahed drones at an average rate of about 20 drones per workday, equivalent to two shifts per day at the production facility, compared to a contract amount for 2023 of about 7 drones per workday followed by 10 drones per day. At this new rate, about 5200 drones per year, Alabuga could fulfill its commitment of supplying 6000 drones a year early, by mid-August 2024, and it could supply an additional 5400 drones by September 2025.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Production, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Ukraine

1746. Russian Decoy Drones that Depend on Western Parts Pose a Great Challenge to Ukrainian Defenses

Author:
Igor Anokhin and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russia has developed and deployed several types of decoy drones to assist missile and drone strikes on Ukraine. This report discusses two of those decoy drones, the Gerbera (also known as Gerber) and the Parody (also known as Parodiya) UAVs that mimic the Shahed 136 and other drone systems. Both of these drones can be mass produced quickly and are built from simple materials like plywood, foam, and a few electronics, making them inexpensive compared to their more costly counterparts. Ukraine has become increasingly proficient at identifying, tracking, and intercepting Russian airborne platforms, like missiles and drones. To increase the effectiveness of Russian barrages, these decoy drones are launched in large numbers alongside missiles and attack drones, like the Shahed 136 and Lancet-3, to overwhelm and confuse Ukrainian defenses to draw anti-aircraft fire on the decoys, allowing other weapons to reach their targets. Ukrainian defenders can never be entirely certain that an incoming drone does not carry an explosive warhead, forcing them to expend valuable munitions intercepting these drones. Because Ukraine has limited stockpiles of interceptor missiles, anti-aircraft artillery ammunition, and hunter-killer-drones, deploying decoy drones is a viable strategy to wear down Ukrainian defenders. Using decoy drones can also help Russian forces identify where Ukraine has positioned anti-aircraft defenses, radar, and electronic warfare systems, and target those in subsequent attacks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Drones, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

1747. Action from Semiconductor Companies is Long Overdue

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The United States and its allies have struggled to stop the supply of controlled microelectronics to Russia, which then uses them in a variety of drones, missiles, and other weapon systems in its brutal war against Ukraine. While the United States and its allies can do more, it is time to turn far greater attention to the Western companies making these goods and demand far more from them. A recent companion study of trade data charting exports from China to Russia in a twenty-month period up to the end of 2023, conducted by one of us, showed that exports of the most critical microelectronics, electronic integrated circuits, amounted to $1.5 billion, steadily increasing throughout 2023, despite Western restrictions and pressure on China, which remains uncooperative, even hostile. 1 Electronic integrated circuits take on special significance, because Russia cannot make them, and there are limited manufacturers in the world, almost all in the United States and Europe. In a four-tier U.S. priority listing of banned electronic and other components and the means to make them, Tier 1 is exclusively composed of electronic integrated circuits. Aided importantly by China, Russia is countering the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies. Without more countermeasures and enforcement, it would be unsurprising to find Russia continuing to acquire large quantities of restricted Western microelectronics needed for its war production.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Semiconductors, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

1748. Chinese Export of Restricted High Priority Battlefield Items to Russia

Author:
Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed more than 295,000 commercial import-export trade manifest records from May 2022 through the end of December 2023, detailing exports of restricted Tier One Harmonized System Codes (HS Codes) items on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL) being exported by Chinese companies to Russian importers. The BIS CHLP applies trade restrictions to Russia on the most sensitive and sought-after Western electronics and other commodities that Russia requires to build its war machine. Tier One covers key items that Russia cannot domestically produce and that have limited manufacturers and constitutes four HS Code chapter 84 codes (8542.31, 8542.32, 8542.33, and 8542.39) detailing the most important electronics which Russia needs to build drones, missiles, and other weapon systems. Russia depends on illicit import practices and networks to acquire these goods from overseas, mainly Western goods via China. Without these critical commodities, Russia would be crippled in its ability to produce the advanced missiles, drones, and other combat systems it needs to wage its war of aggression in Ukraine. More than $1.5 billion worth of restricted Tier One commodities were found being exported from China to Russia during the assessed period. The shipments contained electronics designed and produced by Western firms, but shipped by often obscure and little-known Chinese companies to Russian firms. Shipments containing Western brands found in the trade data include Texas Instruments, XILINX, Analog Devices, Intel, NVIDIA, ST Microelectronics, and other major sought-after designers and producers of electronics. Many of these companies’ products have been frequently found in Russian weapons used in Ukraine, especially in drone systems such as the Shahed 136 and the Lancet kamikaze drones, and Kometa anti-jamming equipment. For example, XILINX field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, all of which were found in the assessed trade data, are essential components in the Shahed 136, hundreds of which are being launched at Ukraine each month. 1 NVIDIA Jetson AI modules play a key role in how the Lancet—another drone launched by Russia at Ukraine in the thousands—autonomously identifies, tracks, and engages targets. 2 These amounts of drones, as well as other weapon systems like missiles and other drones, demand a huge quantity of Western Tier 1 goods to keep up production rates and meet the Russian military’s operational needs.
Topic:
Weapons, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

1749. Unsealed Indictment Shows Iranian Agents Acquired Controlled Camera with Nuclear Weapons Application from United States

Author:
Sarah Burkhard, Chloe DeVere, and Kendall Roach
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In the spring of 2023, the U.S. Justice Department unsealed an indictment from 2012, which shows that in addition to the previously known high-speed cameras Iran purchased from Russia, brokered by Mohsen Vanaki, 2 Iran also acquired another camera with applications in nuclear and ballistic missile testing at the same time from the United States. 3 From 2006 to 2009, five agents residing in Iran, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Canada worked together to purchase the camera, which required an export license, from a U.S. company. They then shipped the camera via Canada and the UAE to an Iranian customer with known ties to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program. While a first attempt to purchase the camera failed, a second attempt succeeded, requiring an elaborate scheme with multiple transshipment points, front companies, and falsified end-user information. Ironically, the Iranian end user experienced multiple technical issues with the camera post-shipment, requiring prolonged back-and-forth communication among the network and with the manufacturer. Despite efforts taken by the multiple agents to ship the camera and conceal its end use, this case reveals red flags and missed opportunities to stop the initial shipment or the repair and technical consultations post-shipment. While it is difficult to determine in what way the camera could have contributed to Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts, there are several indications that Iran was continuing nuclear weapons related activities previously conducted under the Amad plan during that time frame, and multiple governments agreed at the time that Iran’s nuclear weapons program was likely ongoing. The case highlights that Iran seeks controlled high-speed cameras for nuclear and military applications. It also serves as an important reminder that Iran does have the type of sophisticated equipment needed to conduct various aspects of nuclear weapons development, then and today. Additionally, this case again shows the value of dual-national and other Iranian procurement agents located outside of Iran, especially in Western countries. Moreover, if they are arrested and prosecuted, Iran has effectively developed a strategy of trading them for innocent Western hostages it has arbitrarily seized inside Iran.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Weapons, and Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1750. Russian Company Drake LLC’s Procurements for JSC Alabuga’s Military Drone Projects - JSC Alabuga’s Weaponization of Commercial Drones for Military Use in Ukraine

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
With the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, JSC Alabuga shifted from centering on hosting domestic and international civilian manufacturing facilities at its Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to direct military production of military drones, in particular the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone under a supply and franchise contract with Iran. This shift has necessitated the large-scale procurement of a variety of different types of goods abroad. One of JSC Alabuga’s important procurement arms has been Drake LLC, aka Dreik LLC, which contracts with Alabuga Development Company, JSC Alabuga’s main construction and production arm. Drake’s role in outfitting military industries was recognized on February 23, 2024, when it was sanctioned by the United States. However, its precise dealings which warranted this designation have received little public scrutiny. The case of Drake exposes a part of Alabuga’s drone production supply chain and its broader interest in military drones in addition to the Shahed 136 drone. This case study reveals how Alabuga Development Company purchased in early 2023 via Drake and a third party in Kazakhstan, DRONE.kz, up to 30 Dragonfish drones from Autel Robotics, a major Chinese drone manufacturer with a strong U.S. presence, for modification at Alabuga for military use in Ukraine. The planned changes included extending the drone’s range, strengthening its ability to defeat jamming from enemy electronic warfare systems, and/or attaching a universal delivery system for a variety of ordnance, such as grenades and video-guided rocket propelled grenades.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Manufacturing, Procurement, Russia-Ukraine War, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

1751. Russian Company Elmak Procures “High Priority” Items for Russia’s War Efforts via China

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russian weapons, including bombs, missiles, and drones, depend on crucial electronic components, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, many of which cannot be made by Russia. In many cases, produced only by Western companies, these essential components are being sourced by Russian electronics importers and trading companies in large quantities from, foremost, China. The Russian trading company Elmak LLC, aka Kometa LLC, has imported over $5 million of Western electronic goods, almost entirely via China. Over 90 percent of the items fall under Tier 1 of the Bureau of Industry and Security and European Union List of Common High Priority Items banned for export to Russia and at heightened risk of being diverted to Russia illegally due to “their importance to Russia’s war efforts.” China’s lack of action to prevent these sales justifies NATO’s recent labeling China as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine,” 1 adding weight to calls for the application of more sanctions against Chinese suppliers and enabling banks. But U.S. and other Western companies need to do more. They should not ship to China any electronics known to be used in weapons against Ukraine. U.S. companies should show greater due diligence on the final use and end users of their products and simplify supply chains to prevent unauthorized transfers of electronics with restricted Harmonized System (HS) codes. At the very least, companies should agree not to export the most important electronic items to China, which have been identified in Russian weapons downed in Ukraine. Otherwise, as the war continues, with more U.S and other Western manufacturers’ electronics found in Russian weapons in Ukraine after causing casualties and destruction, these manufacturers look increasingly insensitive and powerless against their own complicity in supporting Russia’s illegal war.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Imports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

1752. Iran/Russia Military Technology Axis: Russia Showcases to Iran New and Advanced Military Technology

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
A dangerous new weapons technology partnership between Iran and Russia is emerging with deadly consequences for the United States, Israel, and their allies. This axis, helped importantly by China, exchanges finished military hardware and the technology to replicate and produce it. With the advent of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the transfer of weapons technology from Iran to Russia has developed on a large scale. The Ukraine war has led Russia to seek goods from Iran, including prominently a $1.75 billion purchase of Shahed 136 kamikaze drones and their production know-how. As it produces the Shahed drones, known in Russia as the Geran 2 drone, Russia has improved it. Based on the extensive interactions in Iran and in Russia between Iranian experts and the drone manufacturer, JSC Alabuga, there are grounds to believe that Russian improvements in the drone’s design and production have filtered back to Iran. Additionally, Iran is interested more generally in Russian military technologies.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Trade, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

1753. The Future of U.S.-Turkish Ties: A New Relationship, Not a Reset

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Despite the welcome news on Sweden, the old Turkey is not coming back, but Erdogan’s apparent shift to legacy-building mode will give Washington opportunities to leverage his influence abroad. On January 23, Turkey’s parliament ratified Sweden’s accession to NATO, opening the path for Stockholm’s eventual membership in the alliance. The Biden administration attaches great importance to NATO expansion amid Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and while the Swedish membership bid must still await a vote by Hungary’s parliament, Turkey’s decision is a major step forward. Previously, Ankara had held off greenlighting Stockholm’s application for nearly two years after it was submitted in May 2022, and the issue became symbolic of deeper dysfunction in U.S.-Turkish ties. This week’s parliamentary vote promises to end that epoch, giving both Washington and Ankara an opportunity to chart a new course even as other differences persist.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, Sweden, and United States of America

1754. Beijing’s Passive-Aggressive Middle East Policy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The real threat to U.S. interests in the region isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of Washington's influence. Will China broker a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? It is a question nobody is asking, because the answer is obvious—not a chance. Yet after Beijing hosted Iran-Saudi talks that led those two rivals to re-establish diplomatic relations in March 2023, some observers wondered if China had supplanted the U.S. as the Middle East’s diplomatic broker. Since Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre, China has put such illusions to rest: its conduct shows that it is less interested in the success of its own initiatives than in the failure of Washington’s. The real threat to U.S. interests in the Mideast isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of our own...
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

1755. The Impact of the War in Gaza on Israel-Jordan Cooperation

Author:
Saud Al-Sharafat
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Gaza war’s impact on Jordan has been significant and at times uncontrolled, with a primary focus on demands to halt all forms of “bilateral cooperation” with Israel. However, the implementation of the energy for water project is likely only a matter of time, although contingent on cessation of hostilities. The war in Gaza has cast a dark shadow over the promising water and energy cooperation projects between Jordan and Israel. Water and energy are among the most economically and politically sensitive sectors in contemporary Jordan due to the country’s chronic water shortage and the difficulty of securing energy sources for local use. Jordan imports more than 96 percent of its energy needs, with an annual import bill exceeding $3 billion, according to official statistics. The Gaza war has had a direct impact on Jordanian public opinion, with increasing demands that the country withdraws from all its commitments, treaties, and agreements with Israel and halt all forms of cooperation. So far, however, it appears these demands have disrupted only one project, Project Prosperity—or energy for water agreement—which is sponsored by the United Arab Emirates with U.S. approval. Although the project has been suspended, it will likely resume after the war ends, since both parties have an interest in this type of cooperation. Indeed, despite the current tensions, this type of coordination is almost inevitable given the respective situations of both countries, and as one of the most important means of interconnection and networking that can help mitigate armed crises and conflicts between them.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Water, Public Opinion, Energy, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Jordan

1756. Egypt Polling Shows Rise in Positive Views of Hamas; Iran-Backed Groups and the Muslim Brotherhood Remain Unpopular

Author:
Mohamed Abdelaziz
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
While Hamas has experienced a surge of popular support in Egypt, these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood. Iran’s proxies, namely Hezbollah and the Houthis, remained deeply unpopular among Egyptians. Arecent public opinion survey of Egyptian citizens, commissioned by the Washington Institute and conducted in November/December by a regional commercial firm, revealed that after years of adopting a negative view towards Hamas, three-quarters of Egyptians now view the movement positively, demonstrating the impact of the Israel-Hamas war on Egyptian public opinion. The majority of Egyptians continue to reject ties with Israel and Israelis, while Iran’s proxies remain unpopular, while the majority of Egyptians believe that the United States can put an end to the war in Gaza. Regarding the United States’ role in the ongoing war in Gaza, the current poll showed that more than three-quarters of Egyptians agreed that “the U.S. is still in the best position to help end the war in Gaza, even if I disagree with its policies.” However, Egyptians are currently divided on the proposition that “We cannot count on the U.S. these days, so we should look more to other nations like Russia or China as partners.” While 57% of Egyptians agreed with this proposition, 42% disagreed. In terms of the role that Arab countries should play in the ongoing conflict, the current poll showed mixed views. A significant majority of Egyptians (97%) demanded that Arab states take a tough stand against Israel and “immediately sever all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.” Yet although not unanimous, over two thirds (69%) of Egyptians likewise agreed that “Arab governments should take a more active role in Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking, offering both sides incentives to take more moderate positions.” Moreover, an overwhelming majority (96%) of Egyptians believed that their country should provide more humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, even if that requires some practical coordination with Israel. Notably, while Hamas has experienced a surge of popularity—in line with significant jumps among other Arab publics polled—these views have not impacted those who say that they have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The current Egyptian government finds both the Muslim Brotherhood itself and its Palestinian offshoot threatening to domestic politics. For almost eight years, since the release of the Fall 2015 poll results, where Hamas received negative scores, the majority of Egyptians demonstrated a negative attitude towards Hamas. In contrast, the current poll shows that three-quarters of Egyptians view Hamas positively, while less than a quarter hold a negative view. Likewise, the large majority expressed agreement with the view that the war in
Topic:
Public Opinion, Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, Polls, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Palestine, and Egypt

1757. How Washington Emboldened the Houthis

Author:
Noam Raydan and Grant Rumley
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Greater decisiveness would have shortened the conflict, lessened the toll on global maritime trade, and reassured U.S. partners in the region and beyond. Since the Houthis launched their assault on global shipping in November, the United States and its partners have scrambled for ways to restore calm and commerce to the Red Sea. First, on December 18, Washington assembled a maritime coalition designed to boost the U.S. presence in the area and promote regional security. Then, in January, the United States started intercepting Iranian military shipments bound for the Houthis and issued multiple warnings to the group. Finally, after nearly two months of continuous attacks in the Red Sea, the United States and the United Kingdom launched a barrage of strikes against the Houthis’ facilities. But these attacks have not halted or seemingly slowed the onslaught. The group has continued to lob missiles and drones, prompting continued strikes by Washington and its allies...
Topic:
Maritime, Houthis, Shipping, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

1758. Tunisia at the Crossroads: What Role for the United States in a Multipolar World?

Author:
Ghazi Ben Ahmed
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The United States, in recognizing the limits of its traditional “bloc-building” approach, faces the imperative to adapt to a multipolar reality. Embracing multipolarity as a fundamental principle of its foreign policy could pave the way for more flexible and effective international engagements. In today’s global landscape, the clear-cut divisions of the Cold War era have given way to a complex web of challenges and a multipolar world marked by competitive dynamics. This shift demands a nuanced approach from the United States, a move away from seeking dominance through large-scale coalitions against adversaries like China, since such strategies risk escalating tensions in a world that lacks the bipolar stability of the past. In this global reconfiguration, the role of “swing countries” like Tunisia gains unprecedented importance. In the midst of North Africa's political upheaval, countries like Tunisia stand at a critical crossroads, evaluating the merits of their longstanding alliances with Western nations against the enticing prospects of deepening relations with Eastern powers, particularly Russia and China. Against this backdrop, the United States has yet to articulate a definitive stance on engaging with nations such as Tunisia, where authoritarian tendencies are on the rise and anti-Western sentiments increasingly pronounced. This ambiguity raises important questions about Washington’s strategic approach in a region caught between historical affiliations and the lure of new partnerships.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Partnerships, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
North Africa, North America, Tunisia, and United States of America

1759. A Pathway to Addiction: Tracing Drug-Trafficking Networks in Lebanon’s Roumieh Prison

Author:
Fatima al-Othman
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Roumieh’s drug networks have been an ongoing and pervasive challenge for Lebanon. Over the course of a single year in Lebanon’s Roumieh prison, an upstanding young Syrian doctor referred to here as “Maher”— detained in an attempt to join his family in Lebanon—became a patient in need of rehabilitation for drug addiction. Maher’s descent into drug use while in prison exemplifies the much larger problem of drug smuggling and consumption for which Roumieh prison is becoming increasingly notorious in Lebanon. Lebanon’s largest prison is located in Roumieh, Matn District, east of Beirut, and usually houses about 5,500 inmates. Considered one of the most overcrowded prisons, Roumieh houses both pre-trial prisoners and those who have been convicted. It has separate sections for young teens, women, and men. Given its large size and testimonies as to the prison’s pervasive drug networks, this prison is becoming a contributor to Lebanon’s struggle with drug addiction in its own right.
Topic:
Crime, Prisons/Penal Systems, and Drug Trafficking
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

1760. The Islamic State on the March in Africa

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Local branches now control territory in Mali, Somalia, and Mozambique, setting the stage for new foreign fighter mobilizations, resource extraction opportunities, and perhaps even external operations against the West. Nearly five years after losing territorial control in its core areas of Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State is once again racking up territorial gains around Africa. In Mali, IS forces seized portions of the rural eastern Menaka region and the Ansongo district in southern Gao last year, while foreign fighters reportedly became more interested in traveling to Wilayat Sahel, the group’s self-styled “Sahel Province.” Elsewhere, IS “provinces” in Somalia and Mozambique have taken over various towns in the Puntland and Cabo Delgado regions over the past two months, further destabilizing the area and in some cases jeopardizing important natural gas projects.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, Foreign Fighters, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:
Africa