Publication Year: within 25 Years / Topic: Military Affairs

1. The War against Ukraine and Its Lessons for NATO Militaries: Food for Thought

Author:: Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: One year of full-fledged conventional war fought on the European continent between two large countries, including a nuclear power, is obviously a historical watershed for NATO and the whole Euro-Atlantic area, whose strategic implications are yet to be fully assessed. The conflict has already destroyed a number of expectations widely shared in Western Europe, including the ideas that Putin would not have invaded the whole of Ukraine, that Western sanctions would have paralysed his ability to wage a prolonged military campaign, or that Europeans would have diminished their military support to Ukraine over the first wartime winter. Given the ongoing “fog of war” and uncertainty about future scenarios, it is perhaps too early to identify lessons for allies and their militaries. Still, the following elements may be considered food for thought for the Western defence policy communities, cum grano salis.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. China Maritime Report No. 25: More Chinese Ferry Tales: China's Use of Civilian Shipping in Military Activities, 2021-2022

Author:: J. Michael Dahm
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities from October 2021 through September 2022. As of 2022, the PLA and its reserve civilian merchant fleet are still probably unable to provide significant amphibious landing capabilities or the maritime logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, large volume lift exercises conducted in 2022 suggest that the PLA has made significant progress in the use of civilian vessels for the large-scale lift of PLA troops and equipment into undefended ports, a capability that may be leveraged in a military assault on Taiwan. This report also discusses other civil maritime-military activities not previously observed, including the use of civilian vessels and infrastructure to conceal PLA troop movements, operations from austere ports, use of ocean-going vessels to transport PLA forces along inland waterways, and logistics support for China’s South China Sea outposts.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Shipping, Logistics, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. China Maritime Report No. 26: Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan

Author:: Lonnie D. Henley
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: If there is a war over Taiwan, an extended Chinese blockade is likely to determine the outcome. While a blockade might include intercepting ships at sea, the primary focus would be on sealing airfields and ports, particularly on the west coast of Taiwan. China could sustain that type of blockade indefinitely. Penetrating a prolonged blockade and keeping Taiwan alive would require a serious U.S. investment in systems and operational concepts that we currently do not have. Unless we make that investment, we may win the first battle, defeating an attempted landing. But we cannot win the war.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Maritime, Port, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Blockade
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

4. Prescription for Military Paralysis: Wartime Reactor Meltdowns (Occasional Paper 2305)

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: More than 15 months into the war, Russian attacks against Ukraine’s nuclear plants have yet to release any radiation. As the likelihood of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant reopening quickly declines and Putin’s desire to distract the world from his declining political and military standing increases, some experts fear he may want to induce a radiological release from the plant. In any case, Putin’s military assaults against the Zaporizhzhia plant have already set a worrying precedent. Last December, NPEC held a wargame, the results of which The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists just published, to examine what might happen in a future Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this reinvasion in 2037, Russia targets power reactors in Ukraine, Poland, and Romania. The United States plans to build scores of new reactors in these countries. What if Russian missiles targeted them in a future war? NPEC tapped the expertise of Ukrainians, Romanians, NATO officials, Poles, US security experts, and Hill staff to find out. It hosted five sessions over two weeks and ran a three-move wargame. The game’s play revealed how the uncertainties and dangers of military attacks against nuclear power plants can paralyze decision-making and fundamentally alter the course of wars. The military disruptions these uncertainties introduce may far outstrip the safety issues any reactor radiological release might otherwise present. The game’s play revealed three reasons why.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, War Games, Nuclear Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. FACTORS IN CONSTRUCTING INDONESIA’S PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDO-PACIFIC

Author:: Mohd. Agoes Aufiya
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The term “Indo-Pacific” became increasingly significant and was accepted by several countries, including Indonesia. The government welcomed the term as part of its foreign policy projection, which developed its unique perspective or interpretation, including inclusivity, a rule based on international law, and ASEAN’s centrality and cooperation for regional growth. This study would answer the question of how the concept of Indo-Pacific will be interpreted within Indonesia's unique context compared to other countries. Thus, this research aimed to describe several key factors in constructing the Indonesian perspective on the Indo-Pacific concept, particularly under President Jokowi’s leadership. This research applied qualitative with library methods from the primary and secondary data sources. This paper argued six factors that constructed Indonesia’s perspective on Indo-Pacific: maritime historical legacy; the “Bebas-Aktif” principle; ASEAN values; geographical position; and democratic values. The research concluded that Indonesia is one of the major countries that consistently championed the term “Indo-Pacific” within the regional and international spheres, with a “moderate” status in terms of its foreign policy implementation, which is mainly characterized by inclusivity and cooperation in the economy by constructively engaging all countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

6. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:: Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Arctic

7. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

8. Russia’s Military Industry Forecast 2023-2025

Author:: Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: After the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the arms expenditures and military budget of Russia skyrocketed and continue to grow for the foreseeable future. However, the military industry is under threat Despite the additional massive financial inflow. The military industry could not—with few exceptions—increase the production capacity significantly nor solve its other major problems of workforce deficit and annual net losses. Moreover, the Western embargo on the supply of components, industrial equipment, and technologies makes the further development of the Russian military industry doubtful. Even reverse engineering has become an impossible task. However, the Kremlin’s choice in this situation would be in favor of more arms expenditures and extending the practices of the command economy.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Budget, Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

9. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Critical Vulnerabilities to Russia’s Military Operations and Systems

Author:: Rob Lee and Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Some of the critical vulnerabilities to Russia’s military operations and systems—revealed during the war in Ukraine—are due to its military culture and poor strategic choices at the beginning of the war including overly ambitious strategic aims. Deficiencies in Russian military culture include a highly centralized decision-making process, a disregard for the welfare of its soldiers, and flagrant dishonesty. Certain aspects of Russia’s military culture, especially the disconnect between front-line soldiers and senior officers, complicate the Russian military’s ability to adapt, develop solutions to obvious deficiencies, and institutionalize lessons learned from the battlefield. Other critical Russian military vulnerabilities are not inherent to its military culture but to Russia’s national demographic and industrial capabilities. Limits in these areas make it difficult for Russia to regenerate military power by either increasing the size of its military or increasing the quality of its weapons systems. Even if Russia’s military culture experiences a post-war military renaissance, its ability to regenerate military power lost in Ukraine will be limited by its declining population and industrial bases as well as Western sanctions on high technology.
Topic:: Sanctions, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

10. Moving to an Offshore Balancing Strategy for East Asia

Author:: Peter Harris
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Those calling for Washington to expand U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific have misread the regional security environment. The United States can reduce its military footprint in East Asia without jeopardizing its national security or the stability of the region. China is not poised to dominate East Asia or any other part of the Indo-Pacific region. While the distribution of power in East Asia has shifted in favor of Beijing, it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. Regional powers can deter China from launching wars of aggression by investing in the right kinds of defensive weaponry to capitalize on geographic advantages. The United States should play the role of an “offshore balancer” by helping China’s neighbors to become more resilient to coercion from Beijing. The leaders of several prominent states in East Asia are anxious to avoid a “cold war” between the United States and China. Washington should heed their calls for restraint. Pushing these governments to choose a side in the U.S.-China rivalry would needlessly antagonize them. The issue of Taiwanese security presents a special challenge for the United States and its allies. Taiwan has the most to lose from China’s rise and perceives U.S. military support as essential to its survival as a de facto independent entity. However, the United States can retrench from East Asia without “abandoning” Taiwan to China. Peace in East Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific does not depend upon the United States enjoying primacy in the region. On the contrary, the pursuit of U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific will make it more difficult to maintain regional security and promote economic prosperity over the long term.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

11. The social identity of the Ukrainian soldier in the conditions of the legal regime of martial law

Author:: Serhii A. Mul and Kostiantyn V. Hromovenko
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The purpose of the article is to study the social identity of the Ukrainian soldier under the legal regime of martial law. The social identity of a Ukrainian soldier under martial law determines his characteristics, perception of his role in society, sense of responsibility to it, and willingness to perform courageous actions in the interests of the country. This essential factor helps to raise the morale and motivation of a soldier in a military conflict. The concept of a soldier's social identity is used on the basis of the analysed literature and the survey conducted among military personnel. The authors propose and substantiate the thesis that the social identity of a Ukrainian soldier under martial law can be characterised by a sense of commitment to his nation and his essential role in the defence of the country.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Identity, Readiness, Russia-Ukraine War, and Martial Law
Political Geography:: Ukraine and Eastern Europe

12. EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul: Part 1 – What went wrong? The decision-making moments

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: What went wrong in Kabul and what were the critical junctures in the West’s decision-making? This Paper explores these two questions in detail. Two moments stand out in the chaotic evacuation from Kabul: the establishment of the military withdrawal schedule in mid-April and when all the countries involved scrambled to get their civilians out too. What is clear is that EU institutions were not prepared and were equally blindsided by the speed of events and decisions. This Paper shows that the dereliction of prudence, planning and duty also extends to the EU. This is the first paper of a three-part Report examining the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. The Report is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:: NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

13. EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul: Part 2 – Critical factors in the failure to prepare for evacuation

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The EU has yet to engage in a comprehensive ex-post evaluation of the factors of failure ahead of and during the critical summer months in 2021. By failing to deal with the past, one also does not learn about the future. Building on the preceding chapter’s analysis of the events leading up to and during the evacuation of Kabul, this paper identifies three main factors in the West’s Kabul fiasco: a collective failure of anticipation, NATO groupthink and dependence on the US, and the absence of European will and capabilities. This is the second Paper of a three-part Report examining the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. The Report is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:: NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, Crisis Management, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Europe

14. Russia-China Defense Cooperation

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia’s invasion, China has remained an essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital lifeline for the Kremlin including by parroting Russian talking points about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow cut off by the West. Warnings by senior U.S. officials that China is contemplating providing Russia with lethal military aid in support of its war against Ukraine underscore the depth of their partnership.1 Emerging reports that Chinese companies have provided rifles and dual-use equipment such as drone parts and body armor only add credibility to these warnings.2 Although it remains unclear at the time of writing whether China will ultimately decide to send lethal aid to Russia, the last year has provided further evidence that Russia and China are deeply aligned and that the persistence and evolution of their partnership will continue to pose challenges that the United States and its allies must navigate. This working paper will focus on the challenges that Russia-China military cooperation poses to the United States and its allies and partners. This aspect of their relationship has been one of the most consequential dimensions of their deepening partnership. Already, China has obtained key capabilities from Moscow such as Su-27 and Su-35 fighter aircrafts, S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and anti-ship missiles, which bolster China’s military posture in the Indo-Pacific.3 Russia too has benefited from a large market for its arms sales and access to technological components it can no longer access following the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014—a need that has grown exponentially since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, more frequent and elaborate joint exercises have signaled to onlooking countries the two partners’ mutual support for each other’s security priorities and willingness to push back against the United States. In the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and increasing U.S.-China tensions in the Indo-Pacific, it has become even more urgent to understand how future military cooperation between Russia and China could evolve and what it would mean for the United States and its partners. This memo examines this aspect of the partnership, including what is driving it, how it has evolved following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the implications for the United States and its allies and partners.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

15. U.S.-China Competition and Military AI: How Washington Can Manage Strategic Risks amid Rivalry with Beijing

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Noah Greene
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Two tectonic trends in the international security environment appear to be on a collision course. The first trend is the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). The second trend is the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. This report explores how the United States can manage strategic risks—defined as increased risks of armed conflict or the threat of nuclear war—that could be created or exacerbated by military AI in its relationship with China. It begins by providing an overview of China’s views on and policies toward AI. Beijing sees AI playing roles in both its civilian economy and the modernization of its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At home, Chinese leaders want to leverage AI to boost growth and innovation, address economic and social challenges, and secure the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic rule. AI also plays a key role in China’s military ambitions, especially its goal to become a “world-class military” by midcentury, in part through the “intelligentization” of its forces. Intelligentization relies on integrating AI and other emerging technologies into the joint force with the goal of gaining an edge on the United States. China argues that its governance model, including its military-civil fusion policy, gives Beijing a competitive advantage over Washington. Realization of that vision, however, remains uncertain and will require China to overcome external and internal obstacles.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. Campaign of Denial: Strengthening Simultaneous Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe

Author:: Becca Wasser
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The United States faces an unprecedented challenge: simultaneously deterring large-scale conventional aggression by two nuclear-armed powers. The nation will need to deter these major adversaries from overt aggression in the near term in two primary, yet distinct, regions: China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. However, the U.S. military is unprepared to concurrently meet the challenges posed by China and Russia. These challenges have become more pronounced as Beijing continues its ambitious military modernization and Moscow continues to threaten European security despite its currently diminished military strength. Effective simultaneous deterrence requires the United States to reembrace the basic principles of deterrence to reverse unfavorable trends in military power that are eroding long-standing U.S. warfighting advantages. It necessitates U.S. forces to project power into far-flung regions that are contested by China and Russia to uphold America’s extended deterrence commitments to its allies and partners. To do so, the Pentagon must shift from previous approaches designed to deter opportunistic aggressors and respond to crises. While the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has realigned its strategy to focus on great-power deterrence, it has faced hurdles in strategy implementation that have stymied changes needed to organize more effectively for simultaneous deterrence. This is due in part to a sizable mismatch between strategy and resources. The U.S. military does not have the kinds and numbers of forces required to simultaneously deter China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe from conventional conflict. This deficit is especially telling in two priority scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China, and a Russian invasion of the Baltics. American forces lack the modernized capabilities, necessary posture, right levels of readiness, and familiarity with executing the types of warfighting missions needed to meet the current challenge.1 The balance between meeting global demands and responding to persistent threats while shifting to emphasize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe is precarious. Concentrating on strategic priorities requires accepting risk in other regions, as the United States, with fewer forces and resources stretched around the globe, moves capabilities and forces to priority theaters. A new approach to simultaneous deterrence is needed. The Biden administration has outlined the concept of campaigning as a key component of peacetime deterrence. This concept seeks to sequence and link military activities so they intentionally counter coercion by priority adversaries. The intent is to enable the Pentagon to respond to challenges posed by China and Russia, while still meeting global demands. But the concept is currently ill-defined and expansive, and its broad interpretation does not help the DoD meet its deterrence requirements or align strategy and resources. Instead, campaigning runs the risk of engaging U.S. forces in activities that do not contribute to or are counterproductive to deterrence. A failure to curb these activities will result in either the need to expand force size, or the hindrance of modernization efforts.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

17. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on Taiwan

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has sharply escalated its pressure campaign targeting the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Beijing appears likely to use Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 as a pretext to apply more pressure on the self-governing island, particularly in the “gray zone” using China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with other tools of state power. There is no precise and commonly agreed upon definition of what gray zone activities are and are not. In general, though, the concept refers to actions that fall into the space between, on one side, peace and, on the other, full-scale kinetic war.1 Gray zone activities are coercive and aggressive but designed to stay below the threshold of triggering major conflict. China uses gray zone operations as part of a comprehensive strategy to pressure Taiwan that spans the areas of diplomacy, information, economics, and security. This policy brief examines one major component of that campaign: gray zone military and security operations. It starts by detailing the capabilities and tactics China uses to put security pressure on Taiwan. Then, it explains what Beijing seeks to achieve with those actions. The paper concludes with recommendations for how U.S. and Taiwan policymakers can resist and counter China’s gray zone operations.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Military Affairs, and Information
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

18. CTC Sentinel: October/November 2023 Issue

Author:: Devorah Margolin, Matthew Levitt, Paul Cruickshank, Brian Dodwell, and Caroline Morgan
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: On October 7, Hamas killed 1,200 Israelis in the largest terror attack since 9/11, carrying out acts of brutality that matched, and even surpassed, the worst atrocities of the Islamic State. The resulting war in Gaza, the escalation in tensions across the Middle East, and the anger in Arab and Muslim communities over the large number of Palestinian civilians killed in the conflict so far have upended the international terror threat landscape, creating acute concern about reprisals, and given the attacks already seen in France and Belgium, raised the specter of a new global wave of Islamist terror. In our feature article, Devorah Margolin and Matthew Levitt write that “The brutal Hamas-led October 7 attack on Israeli communities near Gaza represented a tactical paradigm shift for the group.” They observe that “the group’s explicit targeted killing and kidnapping of civilians [on October 7] baldly contradicts Hamas’ articulated revised political strategy since it took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Ironically, Hamas’ sharp tactical shift only underscores that the group never abandoned its fundamental commitment to the creation of an Islamist state in all of what it considers historical Palestine and the destruction of Israel.” Global jihadi groups have been exploiting the conflict in Gaza to call for attacks. In our feature interview, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Ilkka Salmi says that “these calls to attack or to engage in some terrorist activity spread extremely quickly on social media and that’s why they could have a rapid and serious impact on the security situation. It reminds me of the days back in 2014-2016 when Daesh propaganda was at its high peak. The situation in Israel, combined with that sort of propaganda, could change the security situation in the E.U. quite drastically.” Tore Hamming writes that “three factors are likely to determine the impact of the ongoing events on the trajectory of the terrorism threat in the West: the length of the war, the scale of Israel’s offensive in Gaza, and the degree of support from Western nations to Israel.” Erik Skare stresses that analysts need to holistically examine both what Hamas says and does to better understand the group. He writes: “October 7 likely signifies the victory of those in the movement who have grown frustrated with an excessive focus on politics, advocating instead for a renewed emphasis on violence to reach their long-term goals.” In our second interview, General (Retired) Stephen Townsend, who commanded AFRICOM until August 2022, warns about intensifying jihadi terrorist threats across Africa. He says that al-Qa`ida’s affiliates there are “probably the largest threat to U.S. interests in the region today. And as they gain capacity, they’ll broaden their picture to the region and globally, to include our homeland eventually, I think.” Finally, Asfandyar Mir examines the counterterrorism dilemmas facing the United States in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He writes: “Al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State are pivoting to exploit Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack on Israel and the civilian harm in Israel’s military campaign in Gaza since … Policymakers should take seriously the risk of a surprise terrorist provocation from Afghanistan.”
Topic:: Terrorism, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Hamas
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

19. The Next Generation of Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Technical Advances, Strategic Objectives, and Potential Western Responses

Author:: Farzin Nadimi
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: On May 25, 2023, Iran’s minister of defense, Gen. Mohammad Reza Qaraei Ashtiani, unveiled the so-called fourth generation of the Khoramshahr liquid-fuel ballistic missile—aka Kheibar—amid heightened tensions with Israel and the West regarding Tehran’s nuclear program and renewed talk of preventive strikes against Iran’s key nuclear sites. Ashtiani spoke at the Hakimiyeh Aerospace Industries Organization complex, east of Tehran, against a backdrop with the new missile and a large model of Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. The name Kheibar comes from a fortified oasis settlement north of Medina, Saudi Arabia, inhabited by Jewish tribes before the Islamic era. In AD 628, the Jews there were defeated by Muslim armies led by Ali ibn Abi Talib, who has become a legendary figure in Shia Islam. The message to Israel implicit in the Kheibar announcement was therefore unmistakable. The Khoramshahr is Iran’s most advanced liquid-fuel ballistic missile and probably the first using storable liquid fuel, with its first version having been introduced at a military parade on September 22, 2017. The missile is believed to have much in common technically with the North Korean Hwasong-10—itself based on the retired Russian R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Iran is thought to have received several Hwasong-10 missiles from North Korea in 2005 for reverse engineering purposes. The Khoramshahr is also Iran’s first departure from the Russian Scud and scaled Scud-generation propulsion systems.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

20. Enemy at the Gates: A Strategic Cultural Analysis of Russian Approaches to Conflict in the Information Domain

Author:: Nicholas H. Vidal
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: When studying the strategic behavior of a foreign adversary, the act of mirror imaging one’s own conceptual frames often risks producing inaccurate assessments. To avoid such outcomes, some scholars promote the study of strategic culture as a framework for generating more empathetic analyses of foreign state decision-making. This article maintains that strategic cultural approaches are particularly useful for conceptualizing contemporary Russian understandings of confrontation in the information domain. To this end, it is argued that while contemporary Russian thinkers view information as a crucial asset in their country’s ongoing “struggle” with the West, Moscow’s use of informational nonmilitary means remains ultimately a critical, albeit subordinate element of a broader multidomain coercive strategy.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Strategic Culture, and Information
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

21. The Human Weapon System in Gray Zone Competition

Author:: Bonnie L. Rushing and Kyleanne Hunter
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Russia’s experience in Ukraine highlights the importance of the human weapon system in next generation warfare. They show that despite technological superiority and investment in sophisticated weapons and equipment, such as hypersonic missiles, people are the core of a successful military strategy. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in kinetic and largely conventional warfare, the human weapon system is essential across the range of military operations, particularly in gray zone operations. There may be no place where the human weapon system is more important; strategic and meaningful management of the human weapon system for use in countering gray zone activities may prevent escalation into kinetic operations.
Topic:: National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Employment, Diversity, Gray Zone, Strategic Competition, Hybrid Warfare, and Inclusion
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

22. Intermediate Force Capabilities: Countering Adversaries across the Competition Continuum

Author:: Peter Dobias and Kyle Christensen
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article outlines the relevance of intermediate force capabilities as a key enabler for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in the gray zone.1 NATO adversaries, well aware of the NATO thresholds for employment of lethal force, intentionally operate in a way that limits the alliance’s options in crisis and conflict situations. At present, these options are often restricted to two extremes of mere presence or the use of lethal force. Summarizing almost two decades of NATO research into nonlethal/intermediate force capabilities, the article examines the applicability of these capabilities across the competition continuum. Finally, the article makes two key observations. First, it identifies future modeling and simulation requirements to represent employment of intermediate force capabilities, and second, it identifies possible promising research and development of subdomains in directed energy nonlethal weapons.
Topic:: NATO, Military Affairs, Gray Zone, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

23. Colonel John Boyd's Thoughts on Disruption A Useful Effects Spiral from Uncertainty to Chaos

Author:: Brian R. Price
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: A close examination of John R. Boyd’s concept of disruption as recorded in his 1987 presentation, “An Organic Design for Command and Control.” This article draws attention to a series of disruptive actions Boyd lists, including uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, and chaos, noting that the list begins with the mildest effect but that it progresses regularly toward collapse and chaos. The author argues that Boyd was specific in listing these effects in order and notes that this cycle could be developed into a useful effects spiral, which, once understood, can be catalyzed to enhance enemy disruption in a Joint all-domain operations (JADO) environment. In the postscript, this article argues that officers seeking to operate in a multi- or all-domain environment can benefit from a broad educational base to unlock creativity in approaching wicked problem sets. This creativity, when coupled with concepts like the effects spiral, can enhance traditional maneuver and combat, triggering an opponent’s collapse without the need for annihilation.
Topic:: Education, Military Affairs, Psychological Warfare, and Uncertainty
Political Geography:: Global Focus

24. The attack-reconnaissance squadron as a new formula and a new quality of the attack helicopter squadron of the Polish Armed Forces

Author:: Sylwester Lubiejewski
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: This paper takes a comprehensive look at the current state of army aviation attack helicopter squadrons of the Polish Armed Forces. The aim of the article is to present a concept for the functioning of the attack reconnaissance squadrons of the Polish Armed Forces, which takes into account the identified requirements of the Land Forces of the Polish Armed Forces in relation to army aviation on the battlefield and the current limitations in the functioning of the attack helicopter squadrons of the Polish Armed Forces. To meet this aim, qualitative research included interviewing, observation and the collection and qualitative analysis of texts and documents. The study revealed that it is necessary to organise attack-reconnaissance squadrons with a modular organisational structure including: a headquarters, a command company, three attack-reconnaissance companies, an aviation maintenance company and a supply company, capable of conducting autonomous operations in independent directions (areas). The squadrons should be equipped with new attack-reconnaissance helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles as well as equipment for their technical and logistical support that will be part of their individual subunits. The results of the research are the basis for further, in-depth research on the issue of improving the functioning of attack helicopter squadrons, so that they are fully capable of supporting the land forces of the Polish Armed Forces in large scale combat operations.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Aviation
Political Geography:: Europe and Poland

25. The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force

Author:: Eric Bissonette, Thomas Bruscino, Kelvin Mote, Matthew Powell, and Marc Sanborn
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The US military must create standing, numbered, and regionally aligned Joint warfighting headquarters— American Expeditionary Forces (AEFs)—around a command council and a staff organized into Joint centers and cells. Calls for standing Joint force headquarters are not new, but the demonstrated military effectiveness of the Joint Task Force (JTF) model coupled with increasing service-specific resource requirements and tightening fiscal constraints have resulted in little evolution in joint force headquarters construction since the end of World War II. Analysis of the historical record has shown that joint warfighting is best conducted with a Joint warfighting command subordinate to the geographic combatant commands. However, the Joint Task Force model is problematic because the ad-hoc, post-crisis activation of JTFs, along with their antiquated command and control structure, inherently puts the United States at a strategic and operational disadvantage. In the future, the US military will primarily maintain its competitive advantage, especially in great-power competition, by being a superior and sustainable joint force sooner than its adversaries. The proposed AEFs draw on generations of hard-earned experience to maintain and grow American supremacy in Joint warfighting in an increasingly dangerous world.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Army, and Joint Operations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

26. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

27. EU Defense After Ukraine: A New Capabilities Agenda

Author:: Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second considers the EU’s longer-term efforts to enhance European military capabilities through initiatives adopted and proposed in the light of the war.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

28. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:: Chris Miller
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

29. The Wisdom of U.S. Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Author:: Andrew Doris
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Afghanistan was not Korea. False analogies to peacetime military garrisons cheapen war and conflate wildly different forms of “support” to U.S. allies. War in Afghanistan was costly—to taxpayers, to civilians, to American soft power, to democratic legitimacy, and to the West’s strategic attention. Thus, withdrawal saved a fortune, saved lives, aided America’s reputation, honored democratic and constitutional principles, and focused Western strategists. War was not protecting Americans from terrorism. Keeping troops in but one of many places terrorists may operate did not meaningfully reduce Americans’ microscopic risk of being harmed in a terrorist attack. War was not helping Afghanistan. Democracy is a strong word for what U.S. forces propped up. Far from maintaining stability, the continued presence of those forces only prolonged armed struggle against a corrupt rentier state, impeding organic or sustainable long-term development. Credibility is highly contextual and unaffected by admitting defeat after 20 years of futile effort. If anything, the resources freed up by withdrawal make the United States better able to honor other commitments.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

30. Bases, Logistics, and the Problem of Temptation in the Middle East

Author:: Benjamin Denison
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The wisdom of making wars easier depends on the wisdom of the wars. Rapid military response to all global trouble may sound good, but it can tempt policymakers to intervene even for non-vital interests. U.S. military bases and logistics hubs in and near the Middle East are the primary examples—they make foolish wars too easy to start. Maintaining the ability to use rapid military force in the region has become an end unto itself, unmoored from any clear vital strategic interest. Closing bases will make wars more challenging to start, which will help spur public debate about potential interventions due to the transparent upfront costs required. This will give diplomacy an opportunity to return as the primary policy option in the region. This recommendation is consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s logic. Democracy’s benefit for foreign policymaking is its ability to consider many options and give more time to think through various proposals.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Middle East and United States of America

31. Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade

Author:: Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face growing challenges ranging from China and Russia to regional threats such as Iran and North Korea, all of whom seek to undermine their neighbors’ stability and revise geopolitical relationships in their favor. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn, each of these potential adversaries continued to improve its military capabilities, especially the number and reach of precision missiles able to strike U.S. allies and slow or prevent intervention by U.S. naval forces. Supported by commercial and military surveillance networks in every domain, weapons located on adversary territory are capable of threatening U.S. and allied ships, troop formations, and aircraft hundreds of miles away. U.S. naval aviation risks sliding into irrelevance unless Navy and Marine Corps leaders embrace organizational and investment changes that would enable more effective operational concepts against peer adversaries. To support the approaches, naval air forces will need greater reach, adaptability, and capacity, which this study proposes to address by changing the composition of carrier air wings and repurposing aircraft based ashore or on surface combatants and amphibious ships. Rebalancing naval aviation primarily involves force management, supported by additional procurement or modification of existing aircraft and payloads. This contrasts with prevailing Navy and Marine Corps plans, which sustain the existing force with minimal improvements while prioritizing development of next-generation capabilities. Not only does this approach fail to address the urgent nature of Russian and Chinese threats, but it also perpetuates the Navy’s expectation that revolutionary new capabilities will fix problems that demand tactical, organizational, or adaptive technical solutions. That strategy failed to deliver in the cases of the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class carrier. The F/A-XX program for a sixth-generation air superiority fighter-even if successful-is unlikely to transform naval aviation but could consume resources needed to address peer adversaries during the next decade. The shortfalls facing naval airpower against the People’s Republic of China are significant, but not insurmountable. Analysts have pronounced the death of the aircraft carrier several times since the end of World War II, but by exploiting its adaptability and mobility U.S. naval forces could remain relevant against peer opponents despite the emergence of long-range sensor and precision weapon networks. However, achieving the reach and capacity necessary to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific will depend on carriers focusing on the mission only they can do sustainably and at scalelong-range counter-air and strike warfare. Navy and Marine Corps leaders have an opportunity to substantially improve the ability of maritime airpower to influence events in the Indo-Pacific. However, rebalancing naval aviation will require overcoming cultural, organizational, and programmatic hurdles. As described in this report, the necessary changes are possible and affordable, but only if naval leaders embrace the urgency of their challenges and do not continue to hope they can continue to push their problems-and solutions-out into the future.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

32. Regaining Decision Advantage: Revising JADC2 to Buttress Deterrence in Our Window of Greatest Need

Author:: Herbert "Hawk" Carlisle, Scott Swift, and Eric Wesley
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: We believe that Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is a critical priority for the Department of Defense (DoD) as it represents the best path towards deterring potential People’s Republic of China (PRC) aggression and addressing the other military challenges of our time. To the DoD, JADC2 represents the capability to sense and make sense of information at all levels, in all phases of war, across all domains, and with all partners, thereby ensuring information advantage at the speed of relevance.1 JADC2 is therefore the US military’s essential technical enabler to leverage joint and coalition capabilities in complex military operations. Practically speaking, this means choosing important operational problems and wiring together the right sensors and decision aids to deliver the right effects to solve them. The result will create operational dilemmas for our adversaries, and new options for US commanders.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

33. Building a Team for Next Generation Air Dominance

Author:: Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: US air and naval forces face contested environments over wider areas than ever before. Opponents fighting near their home territory can use long-range surface-to-surface missiles and air defense systems—enabled by a combination of commercial or military satellites and airborne sensors—to threaten US or allied airfields, ships, and aircraft thousands of miles away, as depicted in Figure 1.1 By showing they can slow or prevent US intervention in their regions, aggressors like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and Iran hope they can convince neighbors to accept their demands for access, influence, or territory. And if coercion proves unsuccessful, these revisionist powers could employ long-range precision weapons as part of a military offensive to achieve their objectives. Although formidable, long-range weapon and sensor complexes like that of the PRC would not be impenetrable. For example, countermeasures and stealth capabilities could degrade the ability of enemy sensors to target and communicate the location of US ships or aircraft, and self-defense systems could prevent small attacks from being successful. As Figure 1 suggests, against the larger strikes likely to be mounted during war, US ships, aircraft, and bases could also be positioned farther from enemy missile batteries to shrink weapon salvos to within US units’ defensive capacities.3 However, reducing their detectability and attacking from longer ranges would reduce the number and intensity of effects US ships or aircraft could generate. Consequently, adversary leaders may have greater confidence in their ability to win a war on acceptable terms.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Air Force
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

34. THE DAY AFTER: Anticipating trouble in the event of a US withdrawal from Syria

Author:: Jomana Qaddour
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: With approximately nine hundred troops in northeastern and southeastern Syria, the United States ostensibly aims to prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State group (IS). The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, initiated by the Trump administration and completed by the Biden administration, was followed by the rapid collapse of the pro-Western government of Afghanistan and its replacement by the Taliban. This has led to questions about what will happen if and when US forces withdraw from northeastern Syria. A new issue brief by Atlantic Council’s Senior Fellow Jomana Qaddour examines the social, political, and economic implications and the challenges to US presence in Syria. While the US military presence remains limited in number, this report also underscores how aggregate US influence is much more potent than a force number of nine hundred suggests. US troop presence has enhanced counterterrorism operations, obstructed IS and Iranian smuggling routes, and facilitated humanitarian aid and economic benefits to a population in Syria that would be languishing under even more dire conditions. It can be argued that it has also limited local violence and halted a resurgence of public IS activities. According to the most recent Syria policy review, US presence is limited to the goal of counterterrorism operations, which implies that it is a conditions-based, not calendar-based deployment. Those conditions should include local Syrian forces that can reasonably deny IS a safe haven from which to plot terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies. It is well known that the Assad regime is not likely to provide the necessary capability to assure the United States and its allies that it can prevent IS’s return. In reality, there is little room to positively read the reassertion of Syrian government control over northeastern Syria; and withdrawal from Syria would be a serious gamble for US national security concerns in Syria and the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Islamic State, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

35. Entangling alliances? Europe, the United States, Asia, and the risk of a new 1914

Author:: Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: How has alliance formation and maintenance changed since the Cold War? As Russia invades Ukraine, China threatens Taiwan, Iran harasses Gulf States, and Turkey’s neighbors worry about Ankara’s designs, it is a good time to reassess the validity of alliances for global security. Some believe that traditional military alliances are getting weaker or outmoded, and will increasingly be replaced by looser ad hoc groupings such as the Quad, the defense-alliance trio known as AUKUS, or coalitions for given operations such as those in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya. However, standing alliances are proliferating (increasing in numbers), widening (welcoming new members), and deepening (reinforcing solidarity and cooperation). The result is a network of interlocking defense relationships, to which an ever-thicker layer of new security groupings and quasi alliances is being added. The emerging system is complex, and policymakers would do well to think through possible future crises to imagine how the various moving parts would end up interacting. They should avoid drawing on the Cold War as a guiding epoch, as it was a comparatively stable and predictable bipolar order. Alliances will also be consistently tested as well, because, as alliances are created or reinforced, adversaries react and probe their limits. Will this expanding network of alliances create more stability or more instability? Does alliance proliferation reduce or increase the risk of war? And if war erupted somewhere, what would be the risks of escalation? The dawning multipolar world, featuring an increasingly dense network of security arrangements, uncomfortably remind us of the years 1912-1914, shortly before the outbreak of World War I. A definitive answer may be impossible to arrive at, but evidence suggests that the current proliferation of alliances is, on balance, more stabilizing to world order than not. The broad set of alliances, suballiances, and security arrangements act as a “safety belt” for world order, rather than as a “conveyor belt” to catastrophe.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Alliance, and Instability
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and United States of America

36. Belarus's Reaction to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: From the very beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Belarusian authorities have sided with Russia, supporting it politically and militarily, including making its territory available to the Russian troops. In this way, Belarus is also an aggressor and, as a consequence, the EU and the U.S. have imposed further sanctions on it. Regardless of the attempts to engage in Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, Belarus will be negatively affected by the consequences of its government’s policy and the country, although formally sovereign, has ceased to be perceived as an independent entity in international relations.
Topic:: International Relations, Sovereignty, War, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus

37. Are Gender Inclusive Militaries Better at Integrating Disruptive Technologies?

Author:: Shira Eini Pindyck
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: Recent advances in big data and analytics, cyber security, automation, and artificial intelligence can make critical contributions to the demonstration of power on the international stage. New technologies not only offer militaries the ability to conduct operations with greater effectiveness but also reduce the potential human cost of operations. In an increasingly digitized world, organizations that do not adopt and leverage these advances can become inefficient and even fall by the wayside. Yet, despite the immense promise of emerging technologies, many organizations struggle to integrate and utilize them. This is true in both the military and business sectors. For business organizations, a failure to adopt and use novel technologies may threaten profits and even their survival. For militaries, where soldiers’ lives are on the line, the consequences can be even more severe. Why is the integration of new technologies often so difficult? This policy brief highlights an important and overlooked reason, namely how gender policy can affect resistance to organizational change. Gender policy reform requires organizations to invest resources in the recruitment and retainment of an inclusive workforce, and therefore demands that organizations be flexible and resilient. Flexibility and resilience are also required to integrate disruptive innovations. Rather than trying to chain a new technology to old systems of ascension and reward, organizations that want to advance technologically must rethink their incentive systems and work hard to restructure entrenched hierarchies.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, International Security, Military Affairs, Innovation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Global Focus

38. The U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship: Complexities, Contradictions, and Challenges

Author:: David Witty
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Shared security interests, such as maintaining and expanding Arab-Israel peace efforts, can serve as the foundation of future ties. Since the Egypt-Israel peace treaty was signed in 1979, Washington has given Cairo more than $50 billion in military grant aid. But a strong military relationship has raised as many questions as it has answered: about the ethics of working with an increasingly harsh authoritarian government; about the partnership’s success in achieving American interests in the region; about the Egyptian military’s willingness to reform; and about whether conditioned aid can spur political change. Correspondingly, the post–Arab Spring years have seen rough patches, caused by U.S. limitations on military aid following the 2013 overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, America’s chafing at Egyptian human rights abuses, and Cairo’s eventual turn toward less restrictive partners such as Moscow and Paris for military supplies. In this comprehensive Policy Focus, David M. Witty—a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel and foreign area officer—probes the complexities of the U.S.-Egypt military rapport before proposing that Washington base its future ties on shared security interests, including Arab-Israel peace efforts, negotiation of ceasefires between Israel and the Palestinians, and permission for U.S. military transit of Egyptian waterways and airspace.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: North Africa, Egypt, and United States of America

39. Fighting Jihadists By, With, and Through U.S. Partners: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects

Author:: Ido Levy
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Special forces have succeeded especially in such missions, but any BWT effort requires some U.S. ground presence to achieve its goals. As part of its bid to end Middle East “forever wars,” the United States has employed a “by, with, and through” (BWT) doctrine for fighting jihadist adversaries. Such operations rely on local partner forces to assume the bulk of the hard ground combat, sometimes with U.S. accompaniment, while American advisors provide support through training, intelligence, heavy air and artillery assets, equipment, funding, and logistics. BWT missions have seen success over the past two decades in theaters such as Iraq (with the Counter Terrorism Service), Syria (with the Syrian Democratic Forces), and Somalia (with the Danab Brigade). But they do not succeed on their own and must be guided by several principles, including a serious U.S. commitment, alignment of American and partner interests, and strong interpersonal relations between advisors and local actors. In this tightly argued Policy Note, military analyst Ido Levy emphasizes the particular success of U.S.-created special forces in missions against jihadist forces. But he cautions that BWT efforts cannot thrive without some U.S. ground presence and, as occurred in Afghanistan, would likely fail amid an outright American withdrawal.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, and Jihad
Political Geography:: Middle East and United States of America

40. Iran's Nuclear Hedging Strategy: Shaping the Islamic Republic's Proliferation Calculus

Author:: Michael Eisenstadt
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Tehran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program may offer opportunities to stoke regime concerns about the potential costs of moving forward. Since halting its crash nuclear weapons program in 2003, the Islamic Republic has pursued a cautious hedging strategy that has enabled it to become an advanced nuclear threshold state, while also avoiding a military confrontation with the United States and Israel. Yet Iran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program in order to ease pressure—and in turn to pursue more urgent objectives—may help Washington constrain Tehran’s nuclear ambitions by amplifying its concerns about the potential risks and costs of proliferating. In this Policy Focus, military analyst Michael Eisenstadt surveys the evolution of Iran’s nuclear hedging strategy and suggests ways for the United States, along with its allies and partners, to shape the regime’s proliferation calculus with the goal of preventing an Iranian breakout and a nuclearized Middle East.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

41. China’s 2022 Defense Budget: Behind the Numbers

Author:: Amrita Jash
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: At the fifth session of the 13th National People’s Congress in early March, the Chinese government announced a defense budget of 1.45 trillion yuan (about $229 billion) for fiscal year 2022, which is a 7.1 percent year-on-year increase from 2021 (Xinhua, March 5). After years of double digit increases in the 2000s and early 2010s, this is the seventh consecutive year that China’s defense spending has grown by single digits. Nevertheless, China has moved up in the global defense spending rankings, and is now second only to the United States in expenditures. In the Indo-Pacific region, China’s military spending increasingly dwarfs that of its neighbors. For example, China now spends more on its military than Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and India combined (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], April 2021). For instance, at $229 billion, China’s military spending is three times that of India’s $70 billion figure for 2022 (The Economic Times, March 5). An increase in Beijing’s defense budget raises red flags for China’s neighbors and the U.S. given the growing tensions over Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border dispute in the Himalayas. However, in Chinese eyes, as Beijing-based military expert Wei Dongxu argues, the budget is “proper and reasonable” (Global Times, March 5).
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, and Transparency
Political Geography:: China and Asia

42. Gay in the PLA: Chinese Military Views on Homosexuals Serving in the Armed Forces

Author:: Brian Waidelich
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Chinese President Xi Jinping has identified the recruitment and retention of top-notch human capital as key to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) transformation into a “world-class military” by mid-century. In late January 2022, under Xi’s guidance as chairman, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) issued its “Decision on Strengthening Military Talent Work in the New Era” (关于加强新时代军队人才工作的决定, Guanyu jiaqiang xin shidai jundui rencai gongzuo jueding), which calls human talent “a key element driving the Chinese military’s high-quality development and for winning the initiative in military competition and future warfare.” The decision calls on the PLA to develop high quality, professional talent in key areas—joint operations command, new-type combat forces, science and technology innovation, and strategic management—and for these individuals to provide “firm support” for achieving the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military-strengthening goal and building the PLA into a world-class military (Xinhua, January 26). The CMC’s decision echoes similar past statements by Chinese leaders who have emphasized the need for the “right” kind of people to lead and support China’s armed forces (US Army War College, July 23, 2021). A common thread is the requirement for PLA personnel to fill increasingly specialized billets as the force receives and operates new, high-tech information systems, weapons, and equipment (China Brief, January 14). Apart from pronouncements of desired education and experience levels for incoming servicemembers, the PLA also publicizes certain exclusion criteria. The PLA’s official conscription and recruitment website, for example, specifies several physical requirements including minimum height and passable body mass index (Zhongguo Zhengbing Wang, January 14, 2021). However, evidence indicates other potential exclusion criteria for Chinese service members that are less clearly stated. This article offers a preliminary analysis of PLA views on homosexuals—in most cases, gay men specifically—serving in China’s armed forces. [1] The analysis draws upon 12 academic papers published by PLA-affiliated authors between 2009 and 2019 whose research focused on issues related to homosexuality and/or homosexuals serving in China’s armed forces. Ten of the 12 studies involved test subjects. This topic was difficult to explore due to the paucity of primary source material (PLA authorities may deem content on sexual minorities sensitive and unfit for public consumption). Yet it remains an important issue, as it has implications for the talent pool the PLA can draw from and for homosexual servicemembers’ ability to survive, thrive, and contribute to China’s objective of developing a world-class military force.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military Affairs, LGBT+, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

43. Europe’s Area of Maritime Interest in Northeast Asia

Author:: Philip Shetler-Jones
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Participation in the monitoring of UN sanctions on North Korea is Europe’s most prominent operational contribution to Indo-Pacific security, but is also characterised by a fragmented, bilateral approach that contradicts the trajectory of recent European policies that strive for a more meaningful and coordinated investment in this area. A coordinated European presence in the region built around the sanctions monitoring task is within reach, and steps taken to achieve it would dramatically enhance the policy coherence and impact of European action on Northeast Asian security.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and North Korea

44. Bureaucratic policy and defense cooperation among the Baltic states

Author:: Olevs Nikers and Otto Tabuns
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The objectives of this paper are to (1) comparatively analyse defence strategies of the Baltic countries against the theory of institutionalism, focusing on factors that affect policy maintenance or change within defence cooperation and (2) assess the current state of defence cooperation in the Baltic countries. The study gives a theoretical overview, relating the theory of new institutionalism to the subject of debate over bureaucratic institutions, which also plays a role in the regional security politics of the Baltic countries. An empirical study compares the defence strategies of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. While few studies have investigated this subject before, that the conclusion reached by this investigation is that administrative bodies in the defence sector of the Baltic countries are affected by politically driven processes pertaining to the foreign affairs domain, which play a key role in matters related to cooperation and synchronisation of the defence and security of the Baltic States. The findings suggest that a more focused analysis of the role of institutions and bureaucratic policy in the policy making of the three Baltic countries needs to take place. The study concludes that (1) the current state of defence cooperation in the Baltic countries can be called “developing”; (2) the operation of defence establishments can be called “path dependent”, which is mainly influenced by “external” factors or pressures.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, International Security, Military Affairs, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:: Europe and Baltic States

45. The performance of the Portuguese Armed Forces and the relevance of military capabilities in 21st century: The different perspectives of citizens and militaries

Author:: Paulo Jorge Gomes
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: A high performance level in a public organisation is fundamental. The Portuguese Armed Forces can influence the environment, both external and internal, and should therefore have a high performance level and adequate development of military capabilities. For that, it is fundamental to understand the importance of military capabilities for combatting the threats of the 21st century. This paper aims to analyse the influence of military capabilities for combating the current threats and risks in fulfilling the various operations, and for optimising the performance of the Portuguese Armed Forces. A quantitative analysis was carried out from citizen and military convenience samples through correlations between variables, as well as measures of central tendency like mean and standard deviation. The results show that the development of military capabilities has a positive effect on the performance of the Portuguese Armed Forces, combatting conventional threats and risks, as well as threats to civil protection. This capabilities performance is related with the execution of military operations (external and internal). Therefore, a proper development of military capabilities (output) with a special focus on human resources and privilege and the efficiency and quality of the missions (outcomes) are essential to combat the threats of the 21st century.
Topic:: History, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Economic Security, and Perception
Political Geography:: Europe and Portugal

46. The Military’s Return to Brazilian Politics

Author:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:: Throughout history, the Brazilian Armed Forces have looked inwards towards their own territory and peoples. They are centred around the construction of an ‘internal enemy’ to justify its tactics, strategies, and accumulation of forces. The art for this dossier highlights emblematic ‘internal enemies’ constructed throughout history. These portraits, placed alongside other historical artifacts, rekindle a collective memory. They are, in fact, portraits of ourselves – the people, the poor, and the dispossessed – in the act of resistance.
Topic:: Politics, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: Brazil and South America

47. China - A Non-neutral Party in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:: Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: In the Russo-Ukrainian war, we cannot call the position of one of the main challenges of the 21st century, communist China, “neutral”. Beijing’s position was obvious even before the war: it is pro-Russian, clearly antiWestern, and especially anti-American. China does not condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor does it call it an invasion. At the same time, reports have emerged of the prospect of Beijing providing military assistance to Moscow, and it is not beyond imagination that China will also help Moscow avoid the sanctions. The course of the war, and time, will show China’s level of support for its strategic partner, Russia. However, despite Moscow’s support and negative attitude towards the West, Beijing will still act according to its long-term strategic goals, and if China distances itself from Russia on specific issues, it will not be because of solidarity with Ukraine, but for its own strategic interests.
Topic:: Security, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

48. Military Effects Of Economic Sanctions On Russia

Author:: Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Russia’s military industry is a fundamental factor of its national power. The enterprises operating in its defense sector are largely state-owned. Consequently, Russia’s sizeable military corporations and their subsidiary organizations operate not on the principles of a competitive domestic market, which is one of the key foundations of technological progress, but their main goal is to pursue Moscow’s political interests and ensure the stability of the regime. Accordingly, along with military capabilities, having a powerful economic leverage in the form of energy resources, encourages Russia not only to pursue its own economic interests but also intimidate neighboring countries and extort their territories to satisfy its imperialist intentions. The responsibility of the defense industry in Moscow’s current governing model is exactly on what the Russian government itself has based its legitimacy - military modernization, restoring Russia’s strength and greatness. One of its ill-favored manifestations is the military aggression in Ukraine which is claiming the lives of thousands of innocent people. The unprecedented scale of sanctions imposed by the West will clearly affect Moscow’s defense capabilities but the only questions are - when and to what extent? Russian military production, on the one hand, helps the country to pursue an aggressive foreign policy and, on the other hand, arms exports are an important source of country’s budgetary revenues. At the same time, this allows it to exert political influence over the purchasing states. The collapse of the Russian attack on Ukraine may not only sacrifice the hegemonic goals of the latter but also lead to the loss of existing and potential customers of its military weapons. There is no doubt that Russia is experiencing colossal military losses as a result of the war and, at the same time, questions are being raised about the quality of its arms and heavy equipment. Until now, there has been a consensus that Russian armaments were a viable and affordable alternative to Western weapons, although this statement could also be another victim of the war. As a result of the sanctions, Russia faced not only financial but also technical problems. In addition to Western countries, Asia’s leading technology powers have restricted Russia’s access to critical components needed for military production. Existing restrictions apply to advanced technologies such as semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, software and encryption, microelectronics, aviation systems, oil extraction equipment and other manufacturing components. In this context, it is important to discuss the impact that economic sanctions may have on Russia’s military capabilities, its recovery prospects and its aggressive foreign policy in the future.
Topic:: Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

49. War in Ukraine enters its second month: serious implications and far-reaching changes

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine in its second month witnessed several developments, including the failure of the Russian forces to achieve a quick and decisive military victory and the Russian leadership's reduction of its primary objectives.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

50. An Israeli National Guard?

Author:: Meir Elran
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: The establishment of the Israeli Guard was announced recently, based on lessons learned from the May 2021 clashes between Arab and Jewish Israelis. Comprising police officers and volunteers, the new body’s main purpose will be to provide the Border Police with much-needed reinforcement. This is an essential, welcome measure, no less important than the quantitative and qualitative additions to the regular police. Yet no less essential is the establishment of a genuine National Guard, which will be able to provide effective assistance in all emergency situations and mass disasters
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Middle East and Israel

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS