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16141. Between Politics and Finance: Hong Kong's "Infinity War"?

Author:
Alessia Amighini
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
As the Covid-19 pandemic strikes hard, protests in Hong Kong appear to have abated. Distant seem the days when yellow umbrellas and balaclavas saturated global media. And yet, just like at the start of what has now come to be known as the 2019 “global protest wave”, Hong Kong remains at the frontline of political contestation worldwide. The protests against the 2019 Hong Kong anti-extradition law unearthed one of the main points of contention between Hong Kong and mainland China. Through the protests, China’s increasingly assertive stance has found a counterweight, revealing how important the city is to Beijing. Apart from Hong Kong’s role as a major global trade and financial area, China’s actions towards Hong Kong might also serve as a litmus test for Beijing’s ability to mediate and pacify its neighbourhood. Meanwhile, the Covid-19 pandemic risks further heightening tensions between the two. What makes Hong Kong special? To what extent have the protests exacerbated or eased over time? How will the city’s role in mainland China’s outward-looking plans change, if the protests continue?
Topic:
Politics, Finance, Protests, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

16142. Forward to the Past? New/Old Theatres of Russia’s International Projection

Author:
Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The Covid-19 emergency will likely exacerbate many longstanding vulnerabilities that Russia has been facing for years: excessive dependence on energy exports, clashes with the West, demographic problems, and a constant foreign policy overreach. On foreign policy, however, Russia is not expected to take a step back. Today's Russia is back in many “old” theatres where the Soviet Union was actively engaged. More than a quarter of a century after the fall of the USSR, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has made restoring his country's great power status a primary goal of his 20 years in power. What are the elements of continuity and change between Russia’s foreign policy and the Soviet Union’s? What are the political, historical, military and economic dimensions of Russia’s return to old Soviet theatres of influence? And how does this interact with Moscow's long-standing narrative of a return to a multipolar world?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, COVID-19, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia

16143. Infrastructure in a Changing World: Trends and Challenges

Author:
Carlo Secchi and Alberto Belladonna
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
In a world on the brink of a global recession caused by COVID-19, the Infrastructure efforts of today and tomorrow are more crucial than ever. They are an indispensable countercyclical tool to mitigate the negative effects of the economic paralysis. But they also constitute a pivotal component of a country’s development and competitiveness in the long term. That is why infrastructure will continue to play a critical role even when the pandemic crisis has been tamed. Rapid demographic growth, increasing urbanization, especially in developing countries, coupled with the mounting climate change are challenges that won’t disappear with the virus. These significant challenges will come with equally difficult questions. How to cope with these long-term trends? How to finance the increasing need of infrastructure? Which major international actors will take the lead? And finally, what role will technology play in shaping the future of infrastructure efforts?
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Strategic Competition, COVID-19, and Recession
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16144. The Logic of Geopolitics in American-Russian Relations

Author:
Allen C. Lynch
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
One of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s first requests as President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor in 1977 was to ask the Pentagon for its plans – including targets – for nuclear war against “Russia”. Brzezinski was outraged when he was presented with the plan for nuclear war against the Soviet Union. He could not believe that the U.S. military had no plans to spe- cifically weaken the Russian core of the Soviet empire. For the Pentagon planners, Russia and the Soviet Union were one and the same.1 I begin with this anecdote because it reflects well an enduring geopolitical logic to American-Russian relations: American policy toward Russia, whether it be in the Tsarist, Soviet, or post-Soviet period, has not been based on opposing a strong Russian state per se. (That state married to communist ideology was something else altogether.) In the after- math of the Russian Civil War, for instance, the United States delayed recognition of Baltic independence until 1922, two years after Soviet Russia had recognized the independence of Estonia in the Treaty of Tartu, on the grounds that Polish and Finnish independence apart nothing should be done to call into question the territorial continuity of the Russian Em- pire.2 Indeed, American officials seldom viewed the Soviet Union as an empire, as the Pen- tagon war plans just cited illustrate. Historically, the logic of geopolitics i.e., the influence of organization in space on international political relationships has often tended to frame American-Russian relations in terms of complementarities of interest. Of course, geopolitics is not the only logic in AmericanRussian relations; ideology, domestic politics, as well as vested institutional interests all play their role in varying degrees under varying circum- stances. But historically, insofar as geopolitical factors have prevailed, American-Russian relations have generally been harmonious, if also remote and indirect in nature. (By indirect I mean that each sees the other mainly in terms of other powers or processes, e.g., the state of the balance of power in Europe and/or Northeast Asia.) Let us recall that Russia, whether it be under Imperial, Soviet, or post-Soviet auspices, is an essentially continental Eurasian power. Its primary state interest for centuries has been to build and consolidate a trans-continental, multi-national and imperial state while also man- aging international power politics with a series of powerful adversaries throughout Asia and Europe. Above all, Russia sought to ensure that no powerful coalition of external (and in Eu- rope technologically superior) powers could unite to challenge the Russian Empire’s territorial or political integrity. Russian diplomats and rulers thus learned to play the European balance of power with considerable finesse (e.g., the Treaty of Nystadt, 1721, under Peter the Great; the Congress of Vienna, 1815, under Alexander I; the Treaty of Rapallo between Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany, 1922; the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 1939; the Grand Alliance with the United States and Great Britain, 1941–45; and the Helsinki Final Act, 1975, to name just a few instances). As with Great Britain, maintaining a favorable European balance of power has been central to Russian statecraft.3 The United States, by contrast, is functionally an insular power (albeit on a continental scale) with respect to the rest of the world, surrounded as it is by two great oceans and militarily weak and isolated neighbors (i.e., Canada and Mexico). America’s primary foreign policy concern throughout most of its history has thus been, like Russia’s, to prevent the emergence of a hostile European hegemon that could threaten the country’s expansion in North America and its own hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Once the United States had stabilized its independence from Britain after the War of 1812, U.S. and British geopo- litical interests tended to coincide.4 In this context, American and Russian interests have more often been complementary than antagonistic. It has been primarily the intrusion of ideological elements, reflecting for example Americans’ global democratic aspirations or the Soviet Union’s ultimate objec- tive of the triumph of communism worldwide, that have rendered the bilateral relationship intransigent and even dangerous.5
Topic:
International Relations, Cold War, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Post Cold War, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Soviet Union, North America, and United States of America

16145. Fluctuating Images of Enemies and Friends: Abkhazia, With Turkish Cyprus’ Lens

Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Since1the 2008 Russian-Georgian war over breakaway regions, journalists talk about the undergoing colonization of Abkhazia by Russia through a number of processes: finan- cial and military aid, missiles installation in the region, infrastructure and telecommuni- cations control, Russian business and migration. Although, for various security reasons, welcomed by the Abkhaz elites while building their political entity against Georgians, one cannot but think of parallels with the Northern Cyprus developments over the last 30 years. In a similar process, Turkey sponsored the construction of the Turkish Cyprus de facto state. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, considerable resources were used to ‘prove’ the affinity with Turkey and Turks, to construct the enemy image of Greek Cypriots and, in so doing, to legitimate the separatist cause and friendship with the sponsor-State. However, anthropological studies in the North of the island show how living side by side with settlers from Turkey modified Turkish Cypriots’ self-identification as distinct from their new neighbours. Turkish Cypriots of all political convictions are uncomfortable and count critical stories about “people from Turkey.” They distinguish “us” Cypriots from “them” the settlers and simultaneously the image of former ‘enemy’, the Greek Cypriots, is vested with less hostile shapes. A civic identification develops as collective perceptions change. This, in turn, has implications for political cleavages as new options for (de)constructing the de facto state and new party programs emerge. How this identity transformation oc- curs? What triggers changing policies towards our enemies and friends? The article’s objective is to map and compare the ‘colonization’ process that took place in Northern Cyprus and the one observed in Abkhazia and to detect changes that occur in the image of ‘friends and enemies of the nation’ during this process and in the ethnic versus civic State-building endeavours. How external factors affect these transformations? Following Anthony Smith and George Schöpflin, enemies and friends are constantly redis- covered and re-interpreted, and their (re)construction account for “our” territory, justify col- lective claims and mobilize collective action. These fluctuations adapt to the needs of the moment, to an external threat, and to structural changes. When fluctuations in perceiving the ‘Other’ take place and how do they translate into the political construction of de facto states? Although the Abkhazian case is recent and in the making, establishing parallels with the Turkish Cyprus case may shed light on patterns of fluctuating nation-building processes, and by the same token, in (de facto) state-building.
Topic:
Development, Conflict, Rivalry, and Identity
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Cyprus

16146. Economic Transformation and Privatization

Author:
Richard J. Hunter Jr. and Leo V. Ryan
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
In its simplest form, privatization is de-statism – that is, removing the state as the owner of property and assets. From the outset of the transformation process in Poland, significant systemic limitations to the privatization process existed1. A developed market infrastructure was absent. Businesses that were being prepared for privatization lacked the ability to conduct market research, and advisory and consulting services were in short supply. Procedures and benchmarks for property valuation were almost non-existent. The financial infrastructure was immature and data on the profitability of firms being prepared for privatization was problematic. In addition, both the quality and level of competency of civil servants (the nomenklatura) and private managers remained low-largely due to the negative legacy of Poland’s communist past.
Topic:
Economics, Privatization, Governance, and Economic Transformation
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

16147. Micro level factors leading to a migratory decision: Migrant groups in the Czech Republic

Author:
Zivka Deleva and Antonin Mikes
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Multidisciplinary work has yielded a variety of attempts to formulate unified theoretical frameworks to aid our understanding of the complex flow of individuals under the rubric of migration. While these attempts have greatly enhanced our understanding of determi- nates of aggregate flows comparatively little is known about remigration trends, second generation returnees or migrant resettlement during multistage migratory phases. Taking into account the reality that migrant itineraries are continuously under development and are subject to change, this work seeks to clarify our understanding of migratory flows into the Czech Republic with a particular focus on highly educated migrants2. This has been made possible by analysis of the responses collected from a snowball sample of migrants in the Czech Republic3. In the interest of developing a better understanding of the complex web of flows and micro flows within and across the target region the researchers have targeted several dis- tinct migrant groups. These groups have been divided into distinct linguistic groupings; Slovak speakers, Russian speakers (including Ukrainians and Belarusians) and English Language speakers (from a variety of source countries)
Topic:
Migration, Immigrants, Language, Identity, and Microaggression
Political Geography:
Europe and Czech Republic

16148. Stereotypes of the political left and right in Hungary

Author:
Nora Anna Lantos and Nora Orsolya Balazs
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The meaning, perception and psychological correlates of liberal-conservative or left- wing – right-wing ideologies are very popular topics in political psychology. This direction of research focuses on the affective/ motivational background of party and ideological preferences, assuming essential psychological differences behind them. These differ- ences were detected by multiple methods in previous studies. Some, using self-reporting questionnaires, focus on the personality, attitude or value differences between partici- pants with a left-wing or right-wing orientation1, 2, 3, while others place the emphasis on the general perception of differences between leftist-rightist orientation and the attributions given to them4, 5. The latter approach is related to the concept of stereotype.
Topic:
Leftist Politics, Identity, Stereotypes, Partisanship, and Right-Wing Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Hungary

16149. Georgia’s Road to NATO: Everything but Membership?

Author:
Marion Kipiani
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine continues to jolt the architectural plans of Euro-Atlantic security developed over the past 25 years. Predictions of a “new Cold War,” and anxiety over Russia’s ambitions in its neighborhood, have led to calls for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to step up efforts to ensure security on the European continent and protect its newer members in close geographic proximity to the Russian Federation. After more than two decades, during which NATO was transforming into a military alliance fo- cused on out-of-area missions, the collective defense at the heart of the 1949 Washington Treaty has suddenly appeared to regain its relevance. Since the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the escalation of military conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas region a year ago, NATO has demonstrated its commitment to the security of its Eastern European member states through reassurance measures that have included increased air and maritime patrols, as well as the rotation of ground forces. There are however countries partnering with NATO – but not covered by its collective defense protective umbrella – which fall into a gray zone of influence between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic allies. These countries, including Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine itself, are particularly concerned by Russia’s strategic objective of keeping a sphere of i
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Georgia, and North America

16150. Where are We on the European Map? Comparing Public Service Motivation in Central and Eastern Europe with Neighboring Countries

Author:
Palina Prysmakova
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Despite some similarities within regions, the composition of the public sector differs across the world. This also applies to the working culture of this sector. While recogniz- ing the desire to help others and to improve one’s personal financial situation as essen- tial work motives, all around, the public sector, employees emphasize the importance of these purposes with varying degrees of strength in different areas. Shaped to a large extent by the communist past, the public sector of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries continues to stand out amongst other countries on the continent. Much has been said about the historical determinants that have shaped the motivation of people from the region. While acknowledging the significance of the former regime, this article aims to analyze the current state of the public sector workforce in CEE and to examine its present distinctions from the private sector. The main research question of this article is what type of motivation drives public sec- tor employees and whether this motivation is different from the private business sector. Thus, the article compares intrinsic and extrinsic work motives of both sectors within the region and contrasts them to other European countries. Being a part of a larger compara- tive research project, this particular piece is devoted to CEE countries from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
Topic:
Public Sector, Private Sector, Public Service, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:
Europe

16151. Reconsidering Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

Author:
Teimuraz Papaskiri
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The Russian occupation of Crimea in February-March 2014, marked the beginning of a new phase of tension between the Western world and Russia. Although it was predicted several years prior to the conflict that Ukraine would be Russia’s next victim,1 nobody paid much attention to these warnings. Thus, the Russian moves proved surprising for most Western societies, especially for the leaders of Western countries. It effectively ended the inefficient policy of “reset”, which was actually stillborn, because of the inability of the American administration to understand Vladimir Putin’s person and his goals. In June 2001, Putin met US President George W. Bush, who said after this meeting: “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul; a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country.”2 President Bush was ridiculed for these words, yet even nine years later, he did not acknowledge his mistake. In 2010, he said: “I did not make a mistake in [my] assessment of Russian leader Vladimir Putin [...] Putin became a different person [...] I think, to a certain extent, he changed.”3 It seems that George W. Bush was not able to figure out that it was not Putin who had changed. It was the fact that U.S. and Eu- ropean leaders did not grasp which country Vladimir Putin was “deeply committed” to. For the Russian president, “his country” meant the Soviet Union, not the Russian Federation. He even officially declared that, “the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopo- litical catastrophe of the century”.4 (Emphasis added – T.P.) This phrase was not just mere nostalgia for the “good old times”, otherwise no one in his right mind would ever call the break-up of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” When talking about the 20th century, during which two world wars cost more than 80 million lives combined, the break-up of one empire with nearly no casualties cannot be considered “the greatest catastrophe.” Therefore, those words meant that Putin’s intention was to re- store, at least, to some extent, the “old greatness” of the Soviet Empire.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Empire, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

16152. Russia’s Peacekeeping Operations in the Post-Soviet Space: “Mirotvorchestvo” Applied

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
According to a general definition, a conflict is a process in which one party perceives that its interests are being opposed or negatively affected by another party1. Conflict is manifested through adversarial social action involving two or more actors and the ex- pression of differences is often accompanied by intense hostilities. Most significantly, pro- tracted conflict arises from failure to manage an antagonistic relationship2. A special kind of conflict involves force being used by both parties to the conflict. Armed conflicts in the neighbourhood of Russia emerged during the disintegration of the USSR, when parts of former Soviet republics began to claim independence. This is when Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria decided to form inde- pendent states, thus infringing on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Mol- dova – all states with international recognition. The parties on both sides of these ethnic and political conflicts had been attempting to resolve these situations by themselves, but the management process was then joined by “third parties”: Russia, Iran, Turkey, CIS and other international organizations such as the UN and the OSCE, and, recently, also the EU.
Topic:
Hegemony, Peacekeeping, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe

16153. The Kaliningrad Region – Key to Security in East-Central Europe

Author:
Krzysztof Zegota
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Political transformations in East-Central Europe after 1989, and the advancing pro- cesses of integration, have resulted in a significant increase in the importance of the Ka- liningrad region of the Russian Federation for the stabilisation of this part of Europe in two dimensions: the Kaliningrad region provides a unique example and a specific “testing ground” for cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Russia, and also plays a crucial geopolitical role for the southern part of the Baltic Sea region. For the Russian Federation, this region has become especially important in view of the integration pro- cesses occurring in East-Central Europe over the last twenty-five years. The European integration process has been ongoing, with significant milestones marked by two stages of the EU expansion in 2004 and 2007, when a series of East-Central European states gained membership. An increase in the cohesion of this part of Europe was also affected by progressive Euro-Atlantic integration, a subsequent step of which was the eastward expansion of NATO in 1999 and in 2004. Thus, the area of European and Euro-Atlantic inte- gration significantly neared the borders of the Russian Federation. It is important that the Kaliningrad region has entered into intensive interactions with various entities from the EU member states, becoming involved – to some extent – in the network of relations with the EU: through the integration of local governments, universities, non-governmental organi- zations, and by utilizing various cross-border cooperation programmes.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

16154. Price of Aggression: The Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy

Author:
Kazimier Dadak
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
In late February of 2014, president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, a staunch ally of Russia, lost power. This event sent into motion a sequence of events that pitched Rus- sia against its neighbour and the West. Faced with the loss of influence, if not control, over Ukraine, Vladimir Putin immediately took steps that, in his mind, were to secure the interests of his country. First, in March 2014, Russia seized and annexed Crimea; soon af- terwards a Russian-inspired rebellion engulfed eastern Ukraine. These measures drastically increased Putin’s popularity at home, but made him a pa- riah abroad. Initially, the West, including the European Union, imposed diplomatic sanc- tions1. They had no effect on Russian behaviour and, in July, the West expanded punitive measures to the economy2. President Putin did not budge, and in September, the United States and the European Union increased the pressure by imposing additional sanctions on the financial sector3. As a result, Russian companies, including large banks, were effec- tively cut off from western financial markets. Past experience, such as the U.S. led sanc- tions on Iran, shows that this type of punishment is very effective and this paper illustrates that they exacted a price on the Russian economy as well.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

16155. How the Socialist Economy was destroyed in the USSR (One reason for the collapse of the country)

Author:
Rudolf Pikhoia
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
On 25 September 1990, one of the first meetings of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia was held in the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. The agenda consisted of the issue of ensuring the economic sovereignty of Russia in the USSR. Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Yuri Skokov, responsible for industrial policy, spoke with bitterness about his meeting with Minister of Metallurgy of the USSR Seraphim Baibakov: “We spoke to him about our sovereignty, and he said: ‘I’m sorry, but last year I became an owner of property and a legal successor of state property.’ Kolpakov became Krupp. Now he cre- ates 10-15 companies, leaving a small management structure. It is presidential rule in the steel-casting complex.” Frankly speaking, after I became familiar with the transcript of this meeting, it made me think. When assessing the reforms that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s it is, perhaps, the only question to which all representatives of Russian political science an- swer in the same fashion. Both supporters of radical reforms (we shall call them, conven- tionally, the E. T. Gaidar-Anatoly Chubai school) and their opponents in the wider political spectrum – from former Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov, to pre- sent Assistant to the President and scholar, S. Y. Glazyev, answer the question about the beginning period of privatisation and destruction of the public sector in the same manner. They are unanimous in recognising that privatisation dates back to the early 1990s, and is concentrated in the period from 1992 to 1996.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, Empire, and State Building
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Soviet Union

16156. Public and Private Hate Speech in Poland

Author:
Magda Stroinska and Grażyna Drazazga
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
“W ords can be like tiny doses of arsenic: they are swallowed unnoticed, appear to have no effect, and then after a little time the toxic reaction sets in after all,” wrote Vic- tor Klemperer in his study of the language of the Third Reich (Klemperer 1946/2000: 15- 16). The importance of language for effective persuasion has been acknowledged by the teachers of rhetoric and orators since the age of antiquity. In modern times, there were both politicians who practiced deception through language for political or other gains, and also those who studied the effects of language-based manipulation. Among the most profound research on the mechanisms and effects of propaganda, one could name the writings of George Orwell, Friedrich Hayek, or Michał Głowiński. In this paper, we focus on one particularly disturbing aspect of propaganda: the use of hate speech. The reason for this choice of topic is the unprecedented explosion of populism all over the world, and the spread of perhaps its strongest weapon – hate through political and social fearmongering and use of what Klemperer referred to as ‘poisonous language’. Both political discourse in general and political propaganda in particular, tend to use a number of linguistic mechanisms in order to maximize the way they affect their target audiences and stir up hostility towards certain minorities. The most effective techniques, proven throughout history, include stereotyping for the purpose of singling out individu- als or groups as the proverbial “other” and, making that “other” out to be the scapegoat (cf. Stroińska 1998), as well as ad hominem attacks and redefining the meaning of certain keywords.
Topic:
Minorities, Discrimination, Language, Hate Speech, and Speech
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

16157. Shaking the Foundation: the Trump Administration and NATO’s East

Author:
Metthew Bryza
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Ultimately though, my very last remarks are ultimately optimistic, because President Trump lacks geopolitical vision, lacks historical insight or, really even, frankly – I don’t mean to be disrespectful, but – curiosity about history. Everything is about the deal. One and one, the individuals, the people – that’s why he had nobody in a room which is what Putin wanted, besides Rex Tillerson and the interpreter when they met. And so, what’s inevitably going to happen is he will start up with a grand bargain, where something hap- pens in Ukraine mostly cut over the heads of the Ukrainians. But thank goodness with Am- bassador Volker there, I know he’s no fool and will fight against that, but probably though there will be an agreement which I know that the Trump administration, from my own contacts within, has been cooking up, hoping for, for a longtime, whereby President Putin gets what he needs. He gets an excuse to exit Donbass, because that’s a failed operation, the uprising that he expected never happened, Russian troops are dying, it’s an economic albatross around the neck of Russia. But he can’t just leave, he can’t just pull out Russian troops, because that would really hurt him domestically, politically. So, okay, he says: “We’ve reentered the geopolitical stage, we’re at the center of it with President Trump”. Putin will say “We’ll pull out of Donbass, we’re never leaving Crimea”, That will be the deal I think. Donbass – if the Ukrainian government offers autonomy – will have a sort of a frozen political conflict, troops gone, heavy weapons pulled back on the Russian side, Crimea still what it is – anschlussed by Russia. And then the other area where there will be coopera- tion is in Syria. And we’ve already seen in Southeastern Syria there is a modest cease-fire that seems to be holding – that’s great, may it work, however it also provides U.S. bless- ing for Russian troops to base deeper in the Middle East, and that has never happened before. But leave that aside, maybe it will bring peace. Eventually that cooperation in Syria will collapse. Russia has no history of successfully establishing peace and rebuilding economies and complex cultures. It used brutality in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, to build the Soviet Union, but it doesn’t have the finesse to rebuild something on the scale of Syria. And so, Trump is going to be disappointed with President Putin. President Putin will inevitably overplay Russia’s hand, and finally at that point my last remark – if the EU and NATO have maintained their cohesion, remain strong, maintain the geopolitical vision of President Duda and Secretary of State Szczerski, then we have a chance to take these positive developments and push away the lack of clarity, the dalliance with Putin and the security services on the part of team Trump, and finally wake up – just as Obama woke up, just as President Bush woke up and realized he that he hadn’t see Putin’s soul, and then maybe we can rebuild. So, the key to all this is that you all are doing exactly what you’ve said, Mr. Secretary of State – taking the strategic reins in your own hands, pursuing initia- tives like the Three Seas, changing the geopolitical facts on the ground so that when the U.S. does finally wake up – we know which way to move. Thank you very much!
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

16158. Remarks on Regional Security

Author:
Graeme P. Herd
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
I am delighted to be in Warsaw on this panel. In 1994 when I graduated with a PhD, and held my first academic post, the first international conference I went to was in Wrocław, and obviously I had to travel through Warsaw. So, it’s really nice to be back in Poland and have the opportunity to present in the capital when older and wiser. Today, I am going to try and look at how we understand the rationality, the logic of Russia’s foreign policy, particularly the destabilization efforts against neighbours and come to a conclusion has to how sustainable and long-term this approach will be. Will it gradually diminish or is it set to stay as it is or even increase? To try and understand Russia’s foreign policy, we need to look into the domestic eco- nomic, political, and social system created by a system-forming figure that is President Vladimir Putin. The two key data points here really are two strategic vulnerabilities that Russia has to deal with. The first is the hydrocarbon dependence, 50% of GDP and 70% of exports, and 98% of corporate tax. The vulnerability is that Russia is dependent on hy- drocarbon revenues but cannot affect the price of oil globally (which sets the price of gas). Oil can be priced at $110pb or at $25pb and the shift can take place over a matter of months. The second vulnerability is the popularity of the president. When Putin has de-modernized Russia, de-institutionalized and de-globalized Russia it means that if his popularity decreases then you have an existential crisis within the federation. The destabi- lizing question is: “If not Putin, then whom?” There are no contingency plans, no succession mechanism to replace the leader. So, essentially we are looking at Russia’s foreign policy operating in a context where the economy is in the toilet as reflected in a 0.2% average GDP growth since 2009; 2012 – 0% growth and since 2012 when Kudrin resigned from the government. Normally, the popularity of a president – as was the case in the first 8 years of Putin’s presidency from 2000 to 2008 – tracks the economy, or maybe lags a little bit behind. As economic performance increases and revenues distributed to the population, so the popularity of the president. So, this is very abnormal politics.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

16159. Kremlin Propaganda and Disinformation in Georgia: tools, channels, narratives

Author:
Małgorzata Zawadzka
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Georgia is an object of special interest for the Russian Federation for several reasons, mainly due to its strategic location. First of all, Georgia connects oil-rich Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea with Turkey and the Black Sea. The route through Georgia is also the shortest way from Russia to Armenia, which would shorten and ease the transport of military equip- ment to the Middle East. Further, the trade route through Georgia is one of the few routes connecting China with European markets simultaneously omitting Russia. Finally, Georgia is situated in the area called Russia’s “soft underbelly”, territory considered by Moscow as its natural sphere of influence, hence NATO’s or the European Union’s presence there is unwelcome. Yet Georgia is important to Russia for one more reason. Although the Au- gust war in 2008 was in general won by the Russian Federation, to Moscow’s surprise international public opinion did not follow the Kremlin narration of the events’ course. Rus- sia lost the war on information and is unable to dispose of the occupant-aggressor image.
Topic:
Hegemony, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Georgia

16160. Turkey and East Central Europe: idealism, pragmatism, misperception or clash of interests?

Author:
Konrad Zasztowt
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Turkey is Russia-centric in its East European policies. This approach is a legacy of the Cold War, when the Communist bloc countries were regarded not as sovereign states, but merely the Soviet Union’s “satellites”. Even when they regained full independence after 1989, from Turkey’s point of view, they constituted rather a kind of Russia’s backyard and were generally little known to the Turkish public. Obviously the newly independent states established after the collapse of the Soviet Union were to an even greater extent than the post-communist states perceived in Turkey in the sphere of influence and special interests of Russia. These clichés were shared by Turks and with many in Western societies, as Tur- key remained on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey