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15821. Beijing’s Appointment of Xia Baolong Signals a Harder Line on Hong Kong

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Beijing has signaled a much tougher policy toward the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) with the announcement on February 13 that Xia Baolong (夏宝龙), the Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), would take up a concurrent appointment as Director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO). In the official pecking order of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a CPPCC vice-chairman is reckoned as a “state leader”—and therefore, this move portends the raising of the status of the HKMAO and the overall importance of Hong Kong affairs in national policy. Also significant is the fact that from 2002 to 2007, when Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping was party secretary of the coastal Zhejiang Province, Xia was deputy party secretary. The fact that Xia, who began his career in the Tianjian municipality, is an important Xi protégé is well-known among China analysts (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], February 14; HK01.com, February 13). The HKMAO is usually headed by a ministerial-level official. Zhang Xiaoming (张晓明), a veteran of the HKMAO whom Xia replaced, is a ministerial-level cadre. After being demoted, Zhang remains the Executive Vice-Director of the HKMAO with the title of minister. However, it seems clear that his job will be to execute policies as directed by Xia—and above Xia, Xi Jinping. With the appointment of a key associate as head of the HKMAO, Xi also indirectly takes over the position of the highest arbiter of Hong Kong and Macau affairs. This is despite the fact that according to division of labor, the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) member in charge of Hong Kong—the Head of the Central Coordination Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs (CCGHKMA)—is PBSC member and Vice-Premier Han Zheng (韩正). In the past few years, Han has focused on infrastructure programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Greater Bay Area Project, leaving Hong Kong-related political issues to Xi as the “lifelong core” of the party (BBC Chinese Service, February 13; ITN.com [Taipei], December 3, 2019; PRC State Council, March 1, 2019).
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

15822. Beijing Purges Wuhan: The CCP Central Authorities Tighten Political Control Over Hubei Province

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Following a slow reaction to the initial outbreak of the COVID-19 virus, since late January the zhongyang (中央), or central authorities, of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have conducted a concerted public relations effort to present themselves as actively engaged in directing efforts to combat the epidemic. This has included the creation of a new senior-level CCP “leading small group” focused on the epidemic (China Brief, February 5), and a messaging campaign to assert that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has been personally “commanding China’s fight” against the outbreak (Xinhua, February 2). Senior officials have also made a range of recent public appearances intended to demonstrate zhongyang concern for, and control over, the campaign against the epidemic. These actions have been accompanied by a host of positive news stories in state media about the response to the outbreak. The CCP Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) reportedly held a meeting on February 3 focused on this issue; directives emerging from the meeting stressed that party organs must “perform well in propaganda education and strengthen work to guide public opinion” (做好宣传教育和舆论引导工作, zuo hao xuanchuan jiaoyu he yilun yindao gongzuo) about the epidemic response. To this end, media should emphasize not only inspirational stories about the efforts of local workers, but also “deepen propaganda on the major decisions and deployments of the party center” (深入宣传党中央重大決策部署, shenru xuanchuan dang zhongyang zhongda juece bushu) (HK01, February 5).
Topic:
Governance, Local, Domestic Policy, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15823. China-Iran Relations: The Not-So-Special “Special Relationship”

Author:
John Calabrese
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Over the years, unremitting hostility between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran has created opportunities as well as dilemmas for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, and the subsequent adoption of a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, presented mixed challenges and opportunities for the PRC. Beijing has sought to exploit the rift between Washington and Tehran without further fueling Sino-American tensions. For the past year, Washington and Tehran have been locked in an action-reaction cycle of escalation. This dangerous spiral reached new heights with the January 2 U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander General Qasem Soleimani, which was followed by retaliatory Iranian missile attacks on two coalition bases in Iraq that injured dozens of American troops. Although both sides managed to pull back from the brink of war in early January, underlying tensions remain—as does the possibility of a more direct military confrontation. In what manner and to what extent has the current unstable situation affected China’s interests in, and relationship with, Iran? What is the likelihood that, as this latest round of high-stakes poker between Washington and Tehran continues to unfold, Beijing will seize it as yet another opportunity to profit from America’s entanglements in the wider Middle East?
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

15824. The Illicit Wildlife Trade in China and the State Response Following the Coronavirus Outbreak

Author:
Leo Lin
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 coronavirus (新型冠状病毒, xinxing guanzhuang bingdu) in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), wildlife trade and consumption have become a top issue in the country. The disease, which has caused 3,215 deaths in China and over 6,500 total deaths worldwide (per official figures, as of March 15), has been identified as a zoonotic virus (i.e., one originating in an animal species) with a possible point of origin in the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan, Hubei Province (China Brief, January 17; WHO, February 28; Johns-Hopkins University, ongoing). China, as well as many other countries, suffered from the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003. [1] SARS was also zoonotic in nature: its origin was traced to civet cats (CDC, January 13, 2004), which are considered a delicacy among some mainland Chinese citizens. Seventeen years have passed since the SARS epidemic, and it seems that history repeats itself. Experts in the field of infectious disease have warned that governments should take measures to regulate (or ban outright) the trade and consumption of many wildlife species. The Chinese government has taken several measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19, including a ban on the trade in wild animals—both those that are hunted or captured in wilderness areas, and those that are farmed by people. What lessons have the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the Chinese public, learned about the potential consequences of the wildlife trade? This article examines the Chinese government’s policy response towards the wildlife trade in the wake of the COVID-19 epidemic, and what this might portend for the future.
Topic:
Trade, Illegal Trade, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Wildlife
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15825. Limited Payoffs: What Have BRI Investments Delivered for China Amid the Coronavirus Outbreak?

Author:
Johan Van de Ven
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The coronavirus outbreak, now declared to be a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO, March 11), offers a prism through which to assess how China interacts with the rest of the world in a time of crisis—one that was at first confined to China’s borders, but has since become a global emergency. Some commentaries on the connection between the COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have portrayed Xi Jinping’s centerpiece foreign policy program as a dangerous vector enabling the pandemic—even though China was engaged in international trade and transportation prior to the commencement of the BRI in 2013 (Foreign Policy, January 24). For its part, state media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has linked BRI relationships to support for China amid the initial stages of the crisis, citing positive examples of support from media outlets in South Africa, Russia, and Pakistan (People’s Daily, February 20). More recently, as the spread of the disease has abated in China and increased elsewhere, Chinese authorities have sought to illustrate their support, via the “warmth” of the Belt and Road, for current hotspots such as Italy and Iran—while also criticizing the U.S. response to the crisis (Zhejiang News, March 12). Such developments in China’s foreign relations amid the coronavirus outbreak offer a window to assess the effectiveness of the BRI in one of its central goals: namely, expanding the soft power available to the PRC. Applying an understanding of soft power as a state’s ability to induce other states to take actions favorable to its own interests, available evidence across domains related to the initial phases of the COVID-19 pandemic—such as the issuance of evacuation orders, and restrictions on public transportation—indicates that BRI investments have had only modest success in building China’s soft power. International support for China was piecemeal and rhetorical, leaving China economically and politically isolated. Demonstrating the lack of soft power available to Chinese authorities, the state tabloid Global Times demanded on February 12 that countries that “have completely cut off traffic communications with China” should “reconsider and revoke these practices” (Global Times, February 12).
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15826. Disposing of “Zombies”: Why the Reform of Non-Performing State-Owned Enterprises Has Gotten Even Harder

Author:
April A. Herlevi
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Normally at this time of year, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government would be holding the large plenary meetings known as the “Two Sessions” (两会, lianghui). China watchers would be monitoring these meetings to assess whether and how the CCP is achieving its 2020 goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society” (小康社会, xiaokang shehui). However, the COVID-19 outbreak (China Brief, multiple dates) has not only halted key meetings (National People’s Congress, February 27), but has also put into question many of China’s economic goals. This includes key goals discussed at the Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) held in December 2019, which focused on “three categories of risk: financial, environmental, and external” and “identified six areas of priority for China’s 2020 economic policy agenda” (China Brief, December 31, 2019). The 2019 CEWC meetings identified at least 10 distinct issues to be pursued in order to move China on the path towards a more balanced economy (Xinhua, December 12, 2019). This article will focus on one aspect of China’s efforts to achieve “high-quality development” (高质量发展, gao zhiliang fazhan): the dismantling of “zombie firms” (僵尸企业, jiangshi qiye). CCP efforts to deal with non-performing and debt-ridden “zombies” has been an ongoing effort since at least 2015. The inclusion of policies to reduce non-performing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy follows official guidance set forth in 2016, and several policy actions taken since. First, this article will discuss what “zombie firms” are, and why they are a drag on the economy; second, it will summarize the key policies intended to dismantle zombie firms. It will then examine why zombie firms are so difficult to dismantle, and conclude by noting that the COVID-19 outbreak and the resulting economic losses due to quarantines are likely to further disrupt the ability of provincial governments to deal with non-performing firms and accumulating debt. As a result of these factors, zombie firms are likely to linger for some time to come.
Topic:
Reform, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15827. China’s Other Viral Crisis: African Swine Fever and the State Effort to Stabilize Pork Prices

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Since January, much of the international news coverage surrounding the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been dominated by the story of the COVID-19 outbreak—a previously unknown coronavirus that first manifested in the central Chinese city of Wuhan in early December, and which has since rapidly proliferated throughout China and many other countries throughout the world (China Brief, January 29; Johns-Hopkins University, ongoing). The COVID-19 pandemic has largely crowded out international attention to another viral outbreak that Chinese authorities and farmers have been battling for eighteen months: African Swine Fever (非洲猪瘟, Feizhou Zhuwen), which throughout 2018 and 2019 devastated pig populations in both the PRC and surrounding countries. The virus has caused major disruptions to both supplies and the cost of pork, the primary staple meat in Chinese society. As such, it has had a significant impact on the Chinese economy, and has also given senior officials of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reason to fear the potential impacts on “social stability” (社会稳定, shehui wending)—the CCP’s perennial overriding domestic concern.
Topic:
Economics, Food Security, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Animals
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15828. China’s Deepening Diplomatic and Economic Engagement in Afghanistan

Author:
Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On February 29, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed the “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” in Doha, Qatar, which laid out a framework for ending the 18-year old conflict in Afghanistan (U.S. State Department, February 29). Despite skepticism in many quarters regarding the viability of the deal, the negotiations leading to the agreement have been supported by many international actors, to include the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On February 18, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang (耿爽) commented on the U.S.-Taliban negotiations by stating that “China firmly supports the broad and inclusive peace and reconciliation process [and] welcomes the news that the U.S. and the Taliban are expected to reach and sign a deal… China stands ready to step up cooperation with all parties to the Afghan issue and the international community for peace, stability and development in Afghanistan” (PRC Foreign Ministry Briefing, February 18). As the U.S plans to draw down its forces in Afghanistan—a key element of the February 29 deal—China is set to further deepen its involvement in Afghanistan (Nikkei Asian Review, January 14, 2019). Beijing wishes to achieve at least two key objectives. First, it wants once and for all to block any contact between the Taliban and ethnic Uighur Muslim militants seeking independence from China (China Brief, April 24, 2019). Second, the PRC wants long-term stability in Afghanistan in order to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—to the war-wracked country. Beijing sees Afghanistan as a primary link between the Central Asian republics and the CPEC (China Brief, December 10, 2019). To achieve its objectives, Beijing has pursued positive engagement with the Taliban movement that controls more than half of Afghanistan’s territory. These ties have increased over the past couple of years: for example, in 2019 Taliban representatives paid at least two visits to Beijing (in June and September) for talks with PRC officials (CGTN, June 20, 2019; Al-Jazeera, September 23, 2019).
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, Middle East, and Asia

15829. Global Supply Chains, Economic Decoupling, and U.S.-China Relations, Part 1: The View from the United States

Author:
Sagatom Saha and Ashley Feng
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The trade war has defined the current adversarial relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While President Donald J. Trump has at times openly expressed admiration for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, his administration has pursued policies consistent with economic and technological decoupling. These policies include reforms that strengthen the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS); greater usage of the export control system, especially the Entity List; and threatening the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to force U.S. companies back to the United States. These policies, taken to their logical end, would see the secular decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies and the rerouting of the global supply chains that bind them. The interim trade deal has done seemingly little to change the structural economic conflict between Beijing and Washington. If economic decoupling came to pass, it would portend a sweeping reorientation of the global economy that many analysts regard as lying outside the bounds of conventional analysis. Yet some Trump administration officials, such as Director of Trade and Manufacturing Policy Peter Navarro, have promoted economic decoupling as their desired aim (SCMP, June 20, 2018; Forbes, December 3, 2019). President Trump himself has “ordered” American companies to look for alternative suppliers outside of China, or to return production to the United States (Twitter, August 23, 2019). The Trump Administration’s trade and investment restrictions have not been limited to U.S. companies—they also include pressuring third-party countries and foreign companies to abide by U.S. restrictions. Chinese companies are also relocating their manufacturing capabilities abroad—in part because of secular economic trends, but U.S. actions are accelerating the process. Simply put, sustained U.S. policies on China can encourage economic decoupling, but only if global economic trends continue to cooperate. Those policies are nascent, but could likely become a structural feature of the U.S.-China economic relationship—especially since a harder stance towards China has gained traction among both major parties. This has been demonstrated by widespread criticism of Chinese trade practices in both parties, and in bipartisan votes on legislation antagonistic to Beijing, such as the Hong Kong Democracy and Human Rights Act or the UIGHUR Act (see further below). The Trump Administration has pursued a three-pronged approach in breaking down economic supply-chain links: 1) escalating tariffs, which discourages bilateral trade; 2) imposing investment restrictions and export controls that punish tech transfers; and 3) issuing threats to U.S. firms that do business in China under the IEEPA. These current policies preview what could become a new orientation in U.S. policy towards China, regardless of who leads the United States at the beginning of next year.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Conflict, Trade Wars, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15830. The Chinese Charm Offensive Towards Italy as the Coronavirus Crisis Deepens

Author:
Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
One year ago, Italy was hitting the headlines as Rome became the first G7 country to formally sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China to join the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI (China Brief, April 24, 2019). For Italy-China relations, 2020 would have been in any case a vital year: marking fifty years since the establishment of official diplomatic ties, the Italian President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella was due to visit China by the end of the year, after People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping came to Italy in March 2019 to sign the MoU (La Repubblica, January 17). However, twelve months later, Italy is finding itself facing the worst health and economic crisis it has experienced since World War II—a crisis in which the PRC is playing a number of prominent roles. This global pandemic has been caused by a new strain of coronavirus that emerged in the central Chinese city of Wuhan (Hubei Province) in late 2019. Officials of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at first tried to cover up the outbreak, before having to admit to its existence (China Brief, January 17; China Brief, January 29). It was just a matter of weeks before this disease started spreading worldwide. Beyond China itself, the country that has faced the most virulent outbreak is Italy: as of March 31, the COVID-19 virus had claimed the lives of 11,591 Italians, while 14,620 have recovered out of 101,739 people who tested positive (Corriere della Sera, March 31). Such a horrific outbreak has thrown Italy into the worst crisis of its republican history, and one of the worst in its unitary history. This crisis soon assumed a multifaceted dimension: it became not merely a public health emergency, but also developed into a political, institutional, economic, security, and even psychological emergency, with entire Italian communities under lockdown for weeks.
Topic:
Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Travel
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

15831. The Coronavirus Pandemic and the Rise of Chinese Civil Society

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
According to figures provided by People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities, the COVID-19 pandemic peaked in early March. One day after Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping made his only inspection tour of Wuhan on March 10, the epicenter of the outbreak, official statistics indicated that only eight new cases had appeared in the city—with only 15 new cases in China overall. Also per official figures, on February 25 more newly confirmed cases of COVID-19 originated from outside of China rather than inside the country (WHO, February 26). At least from one perspective, the authority and prestige of Xi seem to have been salvaged to some extent. However, public intellectuals, journalists, whistleblowers and other members of civil society have insisted that if Xi had been forthcoming about the outbreak from day one—and if adequate medical facilities and equipment had been transported to Hubei Province in good time—the number of cases in China would have been significantly lower than 80,000 and that almost certainly, the number of fatalities would have been much less than the official figure of 3,199 as recorded on March 15 (Economic Times, March 15; Straits Times, March 12). At a time when parts of China are under quasi-martial law, Xi has taken this opportunity to hit out at China’s nascent civil society. A large group of intellectuals risked their personal safety to eulogize the contribution of the late Wuhan doctor Li Wenliang (李文亮), who was one of the first whistle blowers to expose the severity of the coronavirus. On December 30, Li was among the first medical professionals to warn of a large virus outbreak; he subsequently fell victim to COVID-19 associated pneumonia and passed away on February 6 (Radio French International, February 20; BBC Chinese Service, February 7). Public intellectuals such as famed law professor Xu Zhangrun (许章润) of Tsinghua University and constitutional expert and activist human rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong (许志永) have disappeared (Chinese PEN, February 20; Radio Free Asia, February 19). Meetings of institutions of civil society, such as both the legally recognized and the underground churches, have also been suppressed in the name of curtailing public gatherings (Christian Times (HK), March 20). The police state apparatus also took advantage of the quasi-curfew atmosphere to mete out a ten-year jail term to Hong Kong’s Causeway Bay bookseller Gui Minhai (桂敏海), who was first detained in Thailand in 2015 for publishing a rash of books deemed embarrassing to the CCP’s red aristocracy. While Gui has nothing to do with the pandemic, his heavy sentence seemed a warning to intellectuals who dare expose the party’s treatment of advocates of freedom of expression (HKEJ.com, February 25; Apple Daily, February 25).
Topic:
Civil Society, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15832. Military Activity and Political Signaling in the Taiwan Strait in Early 2020

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 16, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force aircraft conducted a set of unusual nighttime sorties over the sea to the southwest of Taiwan. At least one KJ-500 airborne early warning and control (AEWC) aircraft and an undisclosed number of J-11 FLANKER-L jet fighters participated in the mission, and at one point crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which prompted a scramble by Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) F-16 fighters in response (Focus Taiwan, March 17; Taipei Times, March 18). Although the nature of the mission was unusual—this marked the first time that PLA aircraft flew in the vicinity of Taiwan at night—the incident was otherwise consistent with a pattern of increasingly provocative naval and military aviation operations conducted in the vicinity of Taiwan by PLA units in the first quarter of 2020. This uptick in tactical military activity has been accompanied by more assertive rhetoric from People’s Republic of China (PRC) media outlets and spokespersons since the landslide reelection of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen (蔡英文) on January 11 (China Brief, January 17). These military operations (see further discussion below) have also taken place as PRC officials and citizens have scrambled to cope with the social, economic, and political impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic that first manifested in the central Chinese city of Wuhan in December (Jamestown, ongoing). This suggests that senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials wish to project the message that the crisis has not inhibited the PLA’s capabilities to defeat Taiwan “separatism”—and may further wish to use such operations to assert an image of strength in the face of the internal crisis produced by the pandemic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

15833. The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting Offensive Strike on the High Seas

Author:
Roderick Lee
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In early 2020, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted the fifth iteration of its “ZHANLAN” far seas training series (Ministry of National Defense, February 2, 2019). [1] The PLAN established ZHANLAN in 2016 as an annual far seas training event, with each iteration growing in complexity (Ministry of National Defense, May 27, 2016). Live fire and combat training often draws the most attention during such PLA training events, but the critical highlight of ZHANLAN-2020A was the training focus on combat support, rather than kinetic operations. The key takeaway from this training event is that the PLAN is developing the proficiencies to sustain limited offensive strikes against U.S. forces—perhaps as far out as Hawaii. This article argues that the PLAN is close to being able to execute offensive naval operations outside of the first island chain (and perhaps beyond the second island chain) in a wartime environment. The PLA has long discussed the concept of conducting offensive naval operations beyond the first island chain, and by comparing observables from the ZHANLAN-2020A training event with the list of proficiencies necessary to conduct deep strike, the PLAN is likely close to operationalizing this concept. The ZHANLAN-2020A training task force consisted of four vessels: DONGDIAO-class AGI (AGI-857); FUYU class (Type 901) support ship CHAGAN HU (查干湖) (AOR-967); LUYANG III class (Type 052D) guided missile destroyer HOHHOT (DDG-161); and JIANGKAI II guided missile frigate XIANNING (FFG-500). A fifth vessel, the ocean-going tug NANTUO-195 (南拖-195), took part in a limited role during the task force’s return journey.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15834. Mind the Trap: What Basing Rights in Djibouti and Sri Lanka Reveal About the Limitations of Debt as a Tool of Chinese Military Expansion

Author:
Scott Wingo
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On November 24, 2019, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa told reporters during his first interview as president that he hoped to renegotiate the terms of the deal that gave a Chinese firm a 99-year lease over the Hambantota Port (Strategic News International, November 24, 2019). The port had been handed over as Sri Lanka struggled to make loan payments on the loss-making Chinese-built facility—thereby leading to debates as to whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had set a “debt trap” by intentionally lending Sri Lanka more than it could afford to repay, in hopes of eventually foreclosing on the port (China Brief, January 5, 2019). The subtext was that with a leasehold in hand, the PRC could use the port as a naval installation geared toward patrolling Indian Ocean shipping lanes. As can be observed by the Sri Lankan government’s desire to renegotiate, this has not happened. To the contrary, Sri Lankan security policy has trended against China since the debt-equity swap occurred. A comparison with Djibouti, where the PRC has established its only overseas military base to date, illuminates how this came to pass. In both Djibouti and Sri Lanka, Beijing has used infrastructure loans as a means to entice political leaders to allow naval access. However, three factors led to very different outcomes: 1) the recipient countries’ inherent willingness to host a base; 2) the degree of political competition faced by recipient leaders; and 3) the degree to which recipient leaders can diversify toward different sources of funding to reduce overreliance on China.
Topic:
Debt, Imperialism, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15835. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor: Delays Ahead

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Although no new deals were struck during People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping’s trip to Myanmar on January 17 and 18, the visit was significant for several reasons. The visit was the first by a PRC president to Myanmar in 19 years, and the first by Xi to this country in his role as president. The visit was widely touted as marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the PRC and Myanmar. However, Xi’s first trip abroad this year was aimed at expediting implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (CGTN, January 17). During the visit, the two governments signed 33 agreements, memorandums of understanding, protocols and letters of exchange relating to railways, industrial and power projects, and trade. Several of these agreements firm up Myanmar’s commitment to the CMEC’s three central components: the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which includes a deep-sea port, an industrial park and other projects; the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone; and an urban development plan for Yangon (The Irrawaddy, January 18). However, just weeks after Xi’s visit saw the two sides take steps to expedite CMEC projects, Beijing’s plans have run into new problems. CMEC projects are running late, and in an op-ed piece published on the eve of his Myanmar visit, Xi stressed the need for CMEC projects to be moved from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” (New Light of Myanmar, January 16). The coronavirus pandemic has emerged as the latest challenge in the long list of obstacles that have slowed CMEC projects over the years. According to Khriezo Yhome, a New Delhi-based analyst of developments in Myanmar, it “may be too early to assess the impact of the coronavirus crisis on CMEC projects,” given that the pandemic is still only at an “initial phase” in Myanmar; however, there is “no doubt” that it “will slow down the implementation of CMEC projects in the short-term.” [1]
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

15836. Responding to the Epidemic in Wuhan: Insights into Chinese Military Logistics

Author:
Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has portrayed its response to the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan in heroic terms: battling against an insidious enemy, PLA personnel courageously and tirelessly helped to mitigate the disaster in the epidemic-ravaged city. The PLA has even made the amazing (and highly improbable) claim that it accomplished this while suffering zero infections within its own ranks (China Military Online, March 3). Despite the hype, the crisis has provided an opportunity for the PLA’s newly reformed logistics system to test its ability to mobilize resources in exigent circumstances. The Joint Logistic Support Force (联勤保障部队, Lianqin Baozhang Budui) or JLSF, which was created in September 2016 as part of Xi Jinping’s larger overhaul of the military, has been at the forefront of the PLA’s response. [1] The JLSF’s role in Wuhan illuminated several key strengths of the PLA logistics system—including centralized control, effective use of information technology, and civil-military coordination—while also suggesting potential deficiencies. At a minimum, the crisis likely resulted in “lessons learned” that could improve the JLSF’s role in supporting commanders during wartime.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Leadership, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15837. Epidemic-Related Unrest and the CCP’s Reinforced Political Loyalty Indoctrination for China’s Police

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The central Chinese city of Wuhan, in Hubei Province, was the original epicenter from which the COVID-19 viral outbreak first emerged in November-December 2019. Hubei Province was placed under a strict lockdown in mid-January that lasted for over two months (China Brief, January 29). On March 25, authorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced the lifting of most travel restrictions for residents of Hubei Province, with the exception of Wuhan City itself (Xinhua, March 25). (Restrictions for residents of Wuhan were later eased on April 8). However, the lifting of these restrictions has not proceeded entirely smoothly. On March 27, a major social disturbance occurred on the bridge over the Yangzi River that connects the town of Xiaochi in far eastern Hubei with the town of Jiujiang in northern Jiangxi Province. On that Friday, Hubei residents attempted to cross the bridge, but were blocked by police from the Jiangxi side. A tense stand-off escalated into a riot that reportedly involved not only citizens and police, but also clashes between police from the two bordering provinces (see accompanying images) (Radio Free Asia, March 27). Regional tensions were revealed in video of the incident, in which angry citizens could clearly be heard to chant “Let’s go, Hubei” (湖北加油, Hubei jiayou) when marching to confront barricades set up by Jiangxi police (HK Free Press, March 27). The police barricades were presumably ordered by Jiangxi officials—acting in apparent contravention of official national policy—who were fearful that an influx of people from Hubei could once more spread COVID-19 infections. This likely revealed skepticism on the part of regional officials towards the central government’s message that the epidemic has been contained in Hubei. It also revealed issues of fear and discrimination against Hubei persons on the part of Chinese from other provinces, a problem acknowledged in official PRC press outlets (China Daily, March 30). The March 27 incident provided a dramatic example of the sort of social unrest that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials have clearly feared could materialize in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths inside China and across the globe. [1] Hubei citizens have been subject to harsh conditions under government quarantines, resulting in a steady build-up of popular anger (China Brief, April 1). This incident may not be the last of its type to emerge as a result of the pandemic, and the CCP has taken active steps over the past two months to reinforce political indoctrination for local police agencies—thereby attempting to ensure that police officers will remain loyal to the ruling party in the event of any major incidents that might threaten “social order and stability” (社会治安稳定, shehui zhi’an wending) in the country.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, Police, Police State, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

15838. Coronavirus Lockdown Exacerbating Domestic Violence in Jordan

Author:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:
The coronavirus pandemic has entered every home in one way or another. Strict lockdown measures to prevent the spread of the disease, are giving rise to a surge in domestic violence to which the UN is referring to as ‘the shadow pandemic’. To some, it is not safe to be home, therefore the UN Secretary General has called for governments to incorporate domestic abuse policies as a key part of their national response strategies against COVID-19. Realizing those serious human rights violations and their direct association to financial hardship; which are on the rise due to the loss of jobs/ curfew as a result of the coronavirus crisis, the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan has immediately launched its 20th poll, as part of its “Jordanians’ Barometer – The Pulse of the Jordanian Street” series of polls, to reflect on the effect of the coronavirus crisis on the degree of domestic violence exacerbations among Jordanian households during the curfew. The poll was conducted between the 20th -26th of April, 2020, on a representative sample of the Jordanian community; taking into consideration the different age groups, educational levels and governorates. The collected data was processed and weighed by CSS research experts; to ensure the statistical representation of all governorates, within a margin of ±3% error. The outputs of the poll disclosed state-of-the-art statistics on domestic violence surge during COVID-19 lockdown in Jordan, originating a public debate among officials and citizens alike and starting a huge media campaign on television channels, radio stations and social media platforms. Furthermore, a hotline for reporting cases of domestic violence was launched by the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) and Al-Mamlaka TV; being its foremost impact.
Topic:
Public Health, Coronavirus, Pandemic, COVID-19, Domestic Violence, Polls, and Lockdown Policies
Political Geography:
Middle East and Jordan

15839. Gender Equality in Jordan: Impact Analysis of COVID-19

Author:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:
As the novel coronavirus pandemic continues to spread across the globe, the gender gap appears to be expanding; exacerbating inequalities for women and girls and putting them at great economic, health and domestic violence risks. A nation-wide systematic cross-sectional quantitative study is conducted on the whereabouts of women and girls amidst the coronavirus pandemic and strict curfew measures in Jordan, via telephone interviews with 1,300 research participants (49%) males, 51%) females); in terms of health/ psychological, economic, psychosocial, legal/ political and educational aspects. The results show that the coronavirus pandemic impacted females more than their male counterparts, exacerbating gender-inequalities in terms of: access to healthcare services for pregnant women (51%) of pregnant women were impacted negatively); psychological wellbeing (sadness, anxiety, isolation, lack of interest in activities); household responsibilities (15%) more females); marital and domestic violence (verbal, psychological, physical and neglect); working remotely (higher rate of working from home/ higher percent of tasks given); and awareness of reporting domestic violence means (less females know how to contact authorities/ specialized institutions).
Topic:
Economics, Education, Gender Issues, Health, Women, Inequality, Psychology, Voting, COVID-19, Abuse, and Domestic Violence
Political Geography:
Middle East and Jordan

15840. Changes in Consumer Behavior Of Gen Y’ers in Covid-19 Pandemic

Author:
Cemal Aksoy and Ahu Ergen
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AURUM Journal of Social Sciences
Institution:
Altinbas University
Abstract:
The economic challenges in different countries from past to present have global effects affecting the whole consumers. Today, especially young consumers are at the centre of the economy and understanding their consumer behaviour deeply in especially economically challenging days such as this pandemic of COVID-19 enables companies to make the right decisions. In this study, the effects of the economic challenges and the changes in the consumer behaviour of Generation Y’ers in the COVID-19 pandemic are examined both theoretically and practically. This study was conducted with 12 consumers from Generation Y living in Istanbul. The analysis shows that they prefer cheap and discounted products. They are more careful about spending money and they avoid extravagance. The results show that consumers are negatively affected by the economic consequences of COVID-19.
Topic:
Economics, Interview, COVID-19, Generation Y, and Consumer Behavior
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Mediterranean