Number of results to display per page
Search Results
15802. Making Sense of Technological Spheres of Influence
- Author:
- Valentin Weber
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- The deterioration of Sino-American relations and the rise of novel forms of statecraft have given way to a worrying new feature of the international system: technological spheres of influence. In this Strategic Update, Valentin Weber explains how we have arrived at this novel geopolitical arrangement, where in the world the greatest contestation lies, and what the future of technospheres may hold.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and International System
- Political Geography:
- China and United States of America
15803. Reporte de Recomendaciones de Política: Hacia un Loreto más próspero
- Author:
- Ricardo Hausmann, Miguel Angel Santos, Jorge Tudela Pye, Frank Muci, Yang Li, Fernando Miralles-Wilhelm, Ana Cristina Grisanti, and Jessie Lu
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Loreto es un lugar de contrastes. Es el departamento más grande del Perú, pero se encuentra entre los de menor densidad poblacional. Su capital, Iquitos, está más cerca de los estados fronterizos de Brasil y Colombia que de las capitales de sus regiones vecinas en el Perú - San Martín y Ucayali. Sólo se puede llegar a Iquitos por vía aérea o fluvial, lo que la convierte en una de las mayores ciudades del mundo sin acceso por carretera. Desde la fundación del departamento, la economía de Loreto ha dependido de la explotación de recursos naturales, desde el boom del caucho a finales del siglo XIX y principios del XX hasta la extracción petrolera y explotación de recursos forestales que predomina en nuestros días. Este modelo ha traído consigo daños ambientales significativos y ha producido un patrón de crecimiento lento y volátil, que ha abierto una brecha cada vez más amplia entre la economía de la región y la del resto del país. Entre 1980 y 2018, Loreto creció a una tasa promedio compuesta anual cuatro veces menor a la del resto del Perú. Es decir, mientras el resto del Perú triplicó el tamaño de su economía, la de Loreto creció algo menos que un tercio. En la última década (2008-2018), la región también se ha venido distanciando de sus pares amazónicos en el país (Ucayali, San Martín y Madre de Dios), que han crecido a una tasa promedio anual cinco veces mayor. En este período, el ingreso promedio por habitante en Loreto ha pasado de ser tres cuartas partes del promedio nacional en 2008 a menos de la mitad para 2018. Además del rezago económico - o quizás como consecuencia de él -, Loreto también se ubica entre los departamentos con peores indicadores de desarrollo social, anemia y desnutrición infantil del Perú. En este contexto, el Laboratorio de Crecimiento de la Universidad de Harvard se asoció con la Fundación Gordon and Betty Moore para desarrollar una investigación que proporcionara insumos y recomendaciones de política para acelerar el desarrollo de la región y generar prosperidad de forma sostenible.
- Topic:
- Environment, Natural Resources, Economic Growth, and Sustainability
- Political Geography:
- South America and Peru
15804. The Strategic Implications of Chinese-Iranian-Russian Naval Drills in the Indian Ocean
- Author:
- Syed Fazl-e Haider
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In early December, Major General Shao Yuanming (邵元明), the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), traveled to the Islamic Republic of Iran for rare high-level military meetings. These meetings were held for the purpose of organizing a series of unprecedented joint naval drills between China, Iran, and Russia, which were held in the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Oman from December 27–29. The drills took place just as escalating tensions between the United States and Iran reached a crisis point at the end of 2019. The exercise also signified a deepening relationship between Iran and the PRC in economics, diplomacy, and security affairs. China and Russia have both increased military and economic cooperation with Iran in the year and a half since the U.S. government pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, while Iran’s government has repeatedly touted its deepening relations with China and Russia as a show of diplomatic strength, its allies have been less public about the growing relationship. In December, Iranian officials lauded the trilateral exercises—titled “Marine Security Belt”—as proof that Iran can outlast crippling sanctions with aid from its non-Western allies, and declared that the drills signaled a new triple alliance in the Middle East (Tasnim News, December 29, 2019). [1] By contrast, officials from Russia and the PRC were more restrained, framing the joint exercises as part of routine anti-piracy operations, highlighting their peacekeeping priorities and seeking to depoliticize the drills (South China Morning Post, September 23, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), October 2, 2019).
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Navy, Maritime, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia
15805. Pakistan and CPEC Are Drawn Into the U.S.-China Rivalry
- Author:
- Adnan Aamir
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Leaders in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan were stunned in late November when a senior U.S. government official issued a strong verbal attack on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). On November 21 in Washington, D.C., U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and Central Asia Affairs Alice Wells spoke at length about the CPEC at a public event, criticizing multiple elements of the $62 billion flagship component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Ambassador Wells cast doubt upon claims that CPEC will generate sustainable economic development in Pakistan and criticized the project’s cost escalations and non-transparent processes of awarding CPEC contracts to Chinese firms. She appealed to Pakistan’s citizens to ask tough questions of the PRC regarding the CPEC and China’s related projects in Pakistan (U.S. State Department, November 21, 2019). In the past, the U.S. government had raised concerns over CPEC and China’s “debt-trap diplomacy,” but it had never presented such a direct and detailed set of criticisms. Ambassador Wells crossed that line—bringing the notoriously stalled out CPEC back under international scrutiny just after Chinese and Pakistani leaders had brokered a cautiously optimistic set of funding deals to jumpstart progress a month before (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC), October 9, 2019). Chinese representatives were quick to respond to Ambassador Wells’s criticisms. The next day, PRC Ambassador to Islamabad Yao Jing(姚敬) said that he had been “shocked and surprised to see the remarks of Alice,” and that Ambassador Wells lacked accurate knowledge and had relied on “Western media ‘propaganda’” for her accusations. He called on the U.S. to “show your evidence, give me evidence” of specific cases of corruption related to the CPEC, and questioned whether Wells was taking potshots at the CPEC to score political points. Ambassador Yao challenged the U.S. to suit its actions to its words: “If there is any sincerity… [the U.S. should] come forward to invest in Pakistan. We [China] welcome U.S. investment in Pakistan.” (INP (Pakistan), November 22, 2019; VOA, November 22, 2019). In addition to refocusing negative attention on the CPEC, Assistant Secretary of State Wells’ speech drew a reluctant Pakistan further into the tumultuous U.S.-China political rivalry. Pakistan faces a balance of payments crisis and a severely weakened currency, which has led it to grow increasingly dependent on economic ties with China. At the same time, the Pakistani leadership has navigated a complex and multifaceted historic security and political partnership with the U.S. If, as Ambassador Wells’ statement seems to imply, Pakistan’s engagement with China is seen to come at the expense of its bilateral relationship with the U.S. – or vice-versa – then Pakistan’s delicate power balancing diplomacy will soon become even more tenuous.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Leadership, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, China, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America
15806. Making Foreign Companies Serve China: Outsourcing Propaganda to Local Entities in the Czech Republic
- Author:
- Martin Hala
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- The fast build-up and equally sudden decline of Chinese influence in the Czech Republic offers an interesting case study of vulnerability and resilience in the newly democratic small states targeted by the united front operations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). [1] Recent revelations about a powerful Czech financial corporation manipulating public opinion in favor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) demonstrate the complex dynamics between political and economic actors—both Chinese and local—and how private companies are being leveraged to spread pro-PRC propaganda (Aktuálně, December 10, 2019 / English translation). The main vector of influence in the Czech Republic has been the PRC’s “economic diplomacy,” which downplays political differences and emphasizes the economic opportunities offered by closer relationships with China (Sinopsis, March 11, 2019; China Brief, May 9, 2019). In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), it builds on promises of investments into local economies still lagging behind those in Western Europe. The promised investments may or may not materialize, but the economic enticement alone creates a conducive environment for the cooptation of local political and business elites in a manner similar to more traditional united front tactics (China Brief, May 9, 2019). Apart from the promised investments by Chinese companies, the reverse allure may consist of market access in China for local companies, which may then be manipulated into becoming propaganda echo chambers for the CCP. The Czech Republic offers examples of both of these phenomena.
- Topic:
- Propaganda, Local, Private Sector, and Public-Private Partnership
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Czech Republic
15807. Beijing Piles More Pressure on Taiwan after a Historic Victory by Tsai Ing-Wen
- Author:
- Willy Wo-Lap Lam
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- How will Beijing react to Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s resounding re-election victory on January 11, when she garnered a historic 8 million votes, or 57.13 percent of the electorate? So far, Beijing’s response to this triumph by the candidate of the theoretically pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been relatively non-belligerent. The spokesman of the cabinet-level Taiwan Affairs Office said a few hours after the polls that Beijing would “insist on the basic objective of ‘peaceful unification and one country, two systems’,” even though he also indicated that Beijing would not tolerate “any form of ‘Taiwan independence’.” Another post-election commentary by the official Xinhua News Agency said that “the mainland firmly holds the initiative in bilateral relations.” In an article in the usually hawkish Global Times, Editor-in-Chief Hu Xijin said Chinese society was “prepared for war with Taiwan independence,” but that it was not yet ready for “immediate warfare” (Xinhua, January 12; Phoenix TV News, January 12; Global Times, January 11; South China Morning Post, January 11). Observers of Taiwan Strait dynamics have noted that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, the highest-ranking decision-maker on Taiwan issues, was bitterly unhappy about the margin of Tsai’s victory; and that the commander-in-chief will likely order a series of measures to boost “war preparation,” squeeze Taiwan’s diplomatic space, suppress Taiwan’s economy, and nurture the so-called “fifth column” in Taiwan society (Chinatimes.com, January 12; HK01.com, January 11). The fifth column is a reference to Taiwanese politicians and businesspeople who, while professing to defend their island against Communist aggression, are proposing more communication and even “pro-unification talks” with Beijing as a result of their dependence (financial or otherwise) on the CCP.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
15808. The State Response to a Mystery Viral Outbreak in Central China
- Author:
- John Dotson
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In December, a mysterious outbreak of infectious disease emerged in the central Chinese city of Wuhan (Hubei Province). The epicenter of the outbreak was the Wuhan Huanan Seafood Market (武汉华南海鲜批发市场, Wuhan Haixian Pifa Shichang), which was closed by officials in Wuhan on January 1 pending further investigation of the origin of the disease (see accompanying images). As of January 11, public health officials in Wuhan stated that there were a total of 41 identified cases of infection, among which two persons had been discharged from treatment, seven were seriously ill, and one person had died; 739 other persons were identified as having contact with those infected, and were to be subject to medical observation (Wuhan Health Commission, January 11). Chinese researchers have identified the pathogen as a previously-unknown strain of coronavirus. This a large family of viruses—including the common cold, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)—that are zoonotic in origin (i.e., transferred via human-animal contact) and cause respiratory illnesses with widely varying levels of severity (WHO, undated). The viral outbreak in Wuhan inspired inevitable comparisons to the SARS pandemic that originated in southern China and swept through the country (and spread to other countries) in two waves in 2002-2003 and 2003-2004. It also follows on the heels of other recent infectious zoonotic disease incidents in China, such as a minor outbreak of pneumonic and bubonic plague in Inner Mongolia in November 2019 (AFP, November 28). The Wuhan coronavirus outbreak affords an opportunity to observe and compare the government’s handling of this latest public health crisis alongside those that have occurred in recent years. It also illustrates the continued contradictions faced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in attempting to improve its capacity for governance, while also maintaining a monopoly over the public dissemination of information.
- Topic:
- Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
15809. New Wine Into New Wineskins: The Evolving Role of the PLA Navy Marine Corps in Amphibious Warfare and Other Mission Areas
- Author:
- Ying Yu Lin
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Historically, the Marine Corps was not a branch greatly valued by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The explanation for this had much to do with the PLA’s mission priorities: the PLA has looked to the Taiwan Strait as its main focus area for amphibious warfare, and the PLA Army (PLAA) has traditionally held the primary role in this functional area, with the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) operating in a secondary role. The former Nanjing Military Region—since reorganized as the Eastern Theater Command (China Brief, February 4, 2016)—has amphibious mechanized units that were subordinate to the PLAA 1st and 73rd Group Armies (now reorganized as the 72nd and 73rd Group Armies, respectively) (China Military, December 2, 2018). The amphibious mechanized units of the PLA Army feature heavier firepower and greater mobility than the PLAN Marine Corps (which originally consisted of only two brigades, the 1st and 164th, both subordinate to the South Sea Fleet). The PLAA amphibious forces focused on “big island” targets: these “big island” targets obviously included Taiwan, the PLA’s top priority scenario for resources and contingency planning. By contrast, the PLANMC was oriented largely towards the defense of islands or reefs in the South China and East China Seas. As the PLAN has become increasingly stronger in recent years, its efforts to field greater numbers of modern warships—and the deployments and training of these ships—have attracted ever-greater attention. In line with the expansion of its parent service, the PLAN Marine Corps has also grown, in terms of both numbers and missions, to align with China’s growing overseas interests. The two original brigades of the Marine Corps have been augmented in recent years by six more—four combined arms brigades, a special operations brigade, and elements of a shipborne helicopter aviation brigade—based in multiple locations along the length of China’s coastline (China Brief, February 1, 2019). Only in recent years has the PLA as a larger institution started to rethink the value and use of the Marine Corps—a change resulting from the PLAN’s improvements in capability, and China’s growing national power and increasing overseas interests. Recent training exercises provide some indication of likely future missions for the PLAN’s larger and more capable Marine Corps branch.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Navy, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
15810. The Vatican Stays Away from the Hong Kong Crisis Due to Fears of Beijing’s Retaliation
- Author:
- Emanuele Scimia
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- On January 9, in his annual message to diplomatic envoys accredited to the Holy See, Pope Francis voiced concern for the conflicts ravaging parts of the Middle East, Africa, the Caucasus, and Ukraine, as well as for the increasing number of political crises gripping Latin America. However, not a single word was offered about the situation in Hong Kong (Vatican News, Vatican State Website, January 9). Serious socio-political unrest began in Hong Kong last June over a now-withdrawn extradition bill that, according to protesters, would allow the extradition of political dissidents to mainland China (China Brief, June 26, 2019). The pontiff has so far said nothing about the crisis in the city, much to the chagrin of many local Catholics. It seems that the Vatican has no intention of supporting the anti-government movement in Hong Kong, as such a move would hinder its attempts to improve relations with the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Religion, Leadership, Catholic Church, and Humanitarian Crisis
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Vatican city
15811. The Future of Chinese Foreign Economic Policy Will Challenge U.S. Interests, Part 1: The Belt-and-Road Initiative and the Middle Income Trap
- Author:
- Sagatom Saha
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and other senior CCP leaders have prudently planned for the slowing economic growth that China now faces. CCP officials plan to transition China from its current export-led growth model to one driven by indigenous innovation, and one in which China’s rising global prominence confers to it many of the same advantages traditionally enjoyed by the United States (such as low borrowing costs and influence within international institutions). Although U.S.-China relations have become further fraught amid the trade war, many prominent China hands nevertheless assert that Beijing’s long-term economic plans do not run counter to U.S. strategic interests. [1] However, many of China’s planned foreign economic initiatives—to include the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), global value chain advancement, and renminbi (RMB) internationalization—will come at U.S. expense. Policymakers in both Washington and Beijing should accordingly expect U.S.-China tensions to persist beyond the Trump administration. China’s need for new growth vehicles is twofold: its economic size has not translated into global influence, and its current economic model is losing steam. First, China’s transformation into the world’s second-largest economy has yet to yield equivalent influence in the international system. Beijing’s sway in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, lag behind China’s status as the largest trade partner and foreign investor for much of the world. The United States, by contrast, has leveraged its economic status to maintain effective control of the Bretton-Woods institutions, to obtain low borrowing costs, and to exercise punishing sanctions programs against unfriendly governments. Second, Chinese growth has seen a secular decline over the last decade (see figure 1). The official projected GDP growth rate for 2020 is 6.1 percent (Xinhua, November 30, 2019), but some Chinese officials have hinted that they expect lower sub-6 percent growth in 2020 (South China Morning Post, November 14, 2019). This is a noteworthy signal, for CCP discourse has previously identified the benchmark of 6 percent GDP growth as necessary to avoid social unrest (China Brief, March 22, 2019).
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America
15812. The CCP Response to the Wuhan Coronavirus: A Preliminary Assessment
- Author:
- Ryan Oliver
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In December 2019, a novel coronavirus (冠状病毒, guanzhuang bingdu) emerged in the central Chinese city of Wuhan. The precise origin of the coronavirus remains unclear, although experts agree that it is zoonotic and likely originated at a now-closed marketplace that sold seafood and other animal products for consumption. After initial submissions to the World Health Organization (WHO) on December 31 reported that an unknown pneumonia virus had infected 59 people in Wuhan, cases soon began to surface in other Chinese cities (WHO, December 31). The disease—now officially designated “2019-nCoV”—has spread beyond China’s borders and is now present in 16 other countries. As of January 28, the Wuhan coronavirus has resulted in 4,599 confirmed cases of infection and 106 fatalities (Phoenix News, January 28). Faced with another spreading epidemic, the central government has responded with more speed and transparency than during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002-2004. Wuhan and several other cities in Hubei province have imposed quarantines that limit public transportation, and have initiated measures to isolate these cities’ populations. Major cities like Beijing and Shanghai have also imposed restrictions to manage the flow of travelers. Officials also closed many tourist sites and postponed or canceled many Lunar New Year events nationwide, while extending the New Year holiday for three additional days in support of response efforts (Xinhua, January 26). Questions remain as to how effective these control measures can be in limiting the movement of people in and around China—particularly in light of the size of the cities in question, and the mass exodus of holiday travelers typical for this time of year. Besides these quarantine measures, efforts to isolate and slow the spread of 2019-nCoV have also included sending significant financial and medical resources to Wuhan and other affected areas. In addition to the deployment of medical teams from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s National Health Commission has dispatched over 1,000 personnel in six medical teams from across the country to the Wuhan area (World Journal, January 26). The China Development Bank has issued a 2 billion yuan ($288.3 million) emergency loan, while the Ministry of Finance has allocated 1 billion yuan ($144.2 million) towards combating the 2019-nCoV virus (Sina, January 25). Alongside the official response from Beijing, China’s private sector—including companies such as Tencent, JD.com, Lenovo and Xiaomi—has also offered contributions of funds and medical supplies (SCMP, January 25).
- Topic:
- Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
15813. The “Democratic Life Meetings” of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo
- Author:
- John Dotson
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- On December 26 and 27, China’s central leadership held a “democratic life meeting” (民主生活会, minzhu shenghuo hui) for the full membership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo (Xinhua, December 27, 2019). This has become an annual end-of-year tradition for the Politburo, with similarly-designated meetings held in late December of each year from 2015 to the present (see accompanying chart). Official press treatment of the meetings since 2015 has consistently emphasized the authoritative position of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, invariably stating that he “presided over the meeting and delivered an important speech” (主持会议并发表重要讲话, zhuchi huiyi bing fabiao zhongyao jianghua) to the other assembled members.
- Topic:
- Politics, Leadership, State Building, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
15814. Sino-Indian Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism: Not Truly “Hand-in-Hand” At All
- Author:
- Sudha Ramachandran
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- On December 7, 2019, infantry units of the Indian Army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commenced the “Hand-in-Hand 2019” combined military exercise at Umroi in the northeastern Indian state of Meghalaya. The fortnight-long exercise ran through December 20, and focused on counter-terrorism operations in semi-urban terrain: to include training evolutions such as cross-training on small arms, hostage rescue, and recognizing improvised explosive device (IED) traps. Approximately 130 personnel from each country participated in the exercise, with the PLA contingent consisting of troops stationed in Tibet (Indian Ministry of Defense, December 2, 2019; Global Times, December 8, 2019; China Military Online, December 23, 2019). It was in January 2001 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first expressed interest in cooperating with India in combating terrorism (The Hindu, January 14, 2001). Since then Beijing and New Delhi have taken several steps to facilitate such cooperation: the two sides have set up a Counter-Terrorism Dialogue Mechanism, a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, and a High-Level Dialogue on Counter-Terrorism and Security to facilitate such engagement. In addition to leadership-level discussions, officials are engaging in talks on a range of terrorism-related issues. In October 2018, the two sides signed an Internal Security Cooperation Agreement, which aims at strengthening cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and narcotics control (Business Standard, October 22, 2018). The “Hand-in-Hand” exercises were first set in motion in 2007, and the December 2019 training in Meghalaya represented the eighth round of these counter-terrorism exercises. Such events—as well as the joint agreements between the two governments—present a picture of India and China as closely engaged on counter-terrorism issues. The truth is quite different, however—and the two sides are far from “hand-in-hand” in their understanding of terrorism.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
- Political Geography:
- China, India, and Asia
15815. The Future of Chinese Foreign Economic Policy Will Challenge U.S. Interests, Part 2: Renminbi Internationalization and International Economic Institutions
- Author:
- Sagatom Saha
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Complications surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the dangers of the “middle-income trap,” are not the only factors impacting the international economic policies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Furthermore, poor capital efficiency is not the only feature of the Chinese economy that frustrates the country’s policymakers. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has roughly doubled in the last decade, but Beijing’s pull in the international monetary and financial system remains lackluster. This lack of progress stems in part from the dollar’s centrality around the world, as well as U.S. dominance in international economic institutions. Beijing’s economic planners have long advocated against the dollar while attempting to increase the global role of the PRC’s own renminbi (RMB) currency. While past efforts stumbled, RMB internationalization and increased Chinese influence will directly confront U.S. economic and geopolitical interests.
- Topic:
- Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
15816. How the Wuhan Epidemic Has Dented Xi Jinping’s Authority and Prestige
- Author:
- Willy Wo-Lap Lam
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In his telephone conversation with President Trump on February 6, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping expressed confidence that Beijing can beat the coronavirus outbreak, and asserted that “the fact that China’s economy will be better in the long run will not change.” But at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) a few days earlier, Xi expressed fears about the adverse impact that the Wuhan pneumonia epidemic could have on China’s reform and open door policy (RTHK.hk, February 7; HK01.com, February 6; Ming Pao, February 4). Of even greater concern to the CCP leadership, however, is the sustainability of state power and Beijing’s ability to “uphold stability” (维稳, weiwen) in Chinese society. Much of this hinges on the performance of Xi—who is also state president, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the “life-long core” of the party leadership. That Beijing has failed to contain the alarming spread of the virus, however, demonstrates that Xi is facing the gravest crisis since he came to power in late 2012. It is clear that Xi is still in solid control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the regular police, and the police state surveillance apparatus. Both central CCP officials and supportive foreign dignitaries are projecting confidence. While visiting Beijing in late January, Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus praised China’s efforts against the coronavirus disaster, saying that Chinese authorities had displayed “Chinese speed and Chinese efficiency” (People’s Daily, January 29). After an unusual period of public absence in late January and early February, Xi has reappeared to assert his leadership and to declare a “people’s war” against the epidemic (Xinhua, February 11).
- Topic:
- Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
15817. The CCP’s New Leading Small Group for Countering the Coronavirus Epidemic—and the Mysterious Absence of Xi Jinping
- Author:
- John Dotson
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- The “2019-nCov” virus epidemic that first appeared in December in the central Chinese city of Wuhan continues to sweep throughout the country: as of February 11, there were over 43,000 official reported cases of persons who had fallen ill from the virus, and over 1,000 reported deaths (Johns-Hopkins CSSE, February 11). Aside from the human toll, the epidemic has resulted in large regions of Hebei Province being placed under quarantine, which is placing a severe strain on the Chinese economy. The crisis is also presenting a severe test of governance for the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—which, after being caught flat-footed in December and early January, is scrambling to stop the spread of the disease and to mount an effective medical response for those already affected. The second half of January saw a dramatic change in the posture of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) central government towards the epidemic. For the first three weeks of January, PRC state media organs downplayed the seriousness of the 2019-nCov outbreak, while emphasizing a steady stream of positive news stories: such as the successful achievement of government goals for poverty reduction, preparations for Lunar New Year celebrations, and the exalted status of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping as “People’s Leader” (人民领袖, renmin lingxiu) (China Media Project, January 30). This changed around January 20-21, when Xinhua outlets shifted to coverage of the epidemic by reporting on Xi’s “important directions” (重要指示, zhongyao zhishi) for responding to the viral outbreak (Xinhua, January 20). This was followed in turn by the announcement of special meetings focused on the crisis: State Council meetings on January 20 chaired by PRC Premier Li Keqiang, and on January 23-24 by Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan (PRC Government, January 20; PRC Government, January 24); and a Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) meeting on January 25 chaired by Xi Jinping (PRC Government, January 25). Then, on January 26 state media unveiled a newly-formed policy-making and coordination body at the top echelon of the CCP: the “Central Leading Small Group for Work to Counter the New Coronavirus Infection Pneumonia Epidemic” (中央应对新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情工作领导小组, Zhongyang Yingdui Xin Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu) (hereafter, “Coronavirus Leading Small Group,” or CLSG). In an unusual move for such a high-profile policy issue, Xi Jinping did not take direct ex officio control of the CLSG—instead delegating the chairmanship to the nominal #2 figure in the party-state hierarchy, State Council Premier Li Keqiang (李克强). Per commentary in state media, the purpose of the new body is to operate “under the leadership of the Politburo Standing Committee, strengthening unified leadership and unified direction for prevention and control of the national epidemic” (Xinhua, January 26).
- Topic:
- Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
15818. China’s Declining Birth Rate and Changes in CCP Population Policies
- Author:
- Linda Zhang
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Demography may not be destiny, but China has always been conscious of rearing the next generation. One of the three unfilial acts, according to the ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius, is the failure to bear a son. The Chinese have traditionally viewed offspring as a form of wealth, and have placed immense value on fecundity. [1] Despite such traditional beliefs, in the years after the Cultural Revolution senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) feared that overpopulation would exhaust the country’s scarce resources. In 1980, the CCP formally implemented the One Child Policy (独生子女政策, Dusheng Zi Nu Zhengce), or OCP, a national family planning policy that limited parents to only one child (Xinhua, November 16, 2015). However, after over three decades of efforts to reduce population growth, People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials are now concerned about a shrinking workforce and an aging population. The CCP leadership repealed OCP in 2015, but the fertility rate in China is nowhere near pre-OCP levels. Furthermore, the PRC has seen a significant decline in birth rate in recent years (see discussion below). The true extent of the decline is impossible to verify, but the downward trend in birth numbers is worrisome. This article examines both official PRC statistics on total birth numbers for recent years, as well as discussions among Chinese netizens using unconfirmed statistics, to analyze the deep uncertainties surrounding China’s demographic and political future.
- Topic:
- Population, Domestic Policy, Birthing, and Birth Rates
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
15819. The PRC’s Cautious Stance on the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy
- Author:
- Yamazaki Amane
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In June 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a major new policy document, the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which asserted that “Inter-state strategic competition, defined by geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions, is the primary concern for U.S. national security.” The document was clear as to which country it identified as the greatest source of strategic concern: “In particular, the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks to reorder the region to its advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce other nations.” [1] This was followed by the U.S. State Department document A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision, issued in November 2019. This document stated that “Authoritarian revisionist powers seek to advance their parochial interests at others’ expense,” and that therefore “the United States is strengthening and deepening partnerships with countries that share our values.” [2] In using such language, the United States is not alone. Japanese Prime Minister (PM) Abe Shinzo has advocated Japan’s own “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” which he has discussed since 2016. This concept emphasizes economic development assistance and infrastructure construction, promotion of the rule of law, and freedom of trade. It particularly emphasizes maritime security and freedom of navigation—which connect directly to the territorial disputes that are a key point of ongoing contention between Japan and China. [3] The U.S. and its allies have advanced their cooperation on this new “Indo-Pacific Strategy” quietly but steadily: in one notable example, on February 4, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and its Japanese counterpart signed the “Memorandum of Cooperation [MOC] on Strengthening Energy and Infrastructure Finance and Market Building.” Brent McIntosh, Under Secretary for International Affairs in the U.S. Department of the Treasury, noted that the MOC is “a testament to our shared commitment to advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 4, 2020). Given that several regional governments—including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India (the so-called “QUAD” group), as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—have incorporated the term “Indo-Pacific” as a part of their official strategy or policy, the significance of this broad concept will continue to increase in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, China’s reaction to the Indo-Pacific Strategy has been restrained so far, although it is certain that Beijing is closely monitoring it. This article considers the narrative on Indo-Pacific-related affairs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), by focusing primarily on how officials of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have dealt with the concept, as well as how cooperation among regional states has developed since the latter part of 2017.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
15820. Fair-Weather Friends: The Impact of the Coronavirus on the Strategic Partnership Between Russia and China
- Author:
- Johan Van de Ven
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In June 2019, during a visit to the Kremlin by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation announced that they had “agreed…to upgrade their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era” (Xinhua, June 6, 2019). This continued the warming of bilateral relations nurtured by Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who have met at least 30 times during their respective tenures. The strengthening of ties has seen unusually relaxed encounters between the pair, such as when they made blini (traditional Russian pancakes) together in Vladivostok in September 2018 (People’s Daily, September 12, 2018). In more substantive terms, support from Chinese state-linked financial institutions has played a critical role in the construction of a new wave of Russian energy infrastructure, ranging from the Yamal Liquified Natural Gas Project to the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline. However, the ongoing COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak has opened a stress fracture in the bilateral Sino-Russian relationship. After weeks of gradually escalating restrictions, reports emerged in late February that Moscow public transit drivers had been instructed to call police if they witnessed Chinese passengers using the transit system (Wangyi Keji, February 25). The PRC Embassy in Russia warned that such actions “will harm the good atmosphere for developing Chinese-Russian relations” (Novaya Gazeta, February 25). While China was initially restrained it its public criticism of Russian measures taken in the course of the COVID-19 epidemic, the decision of the PRC Embassy in Moscow to highlight the discrimination being faced by Chinese citizens in Moscow is a reminder of just how quickly tensions can arise between the two countries, even in the age of “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and Asia