Search

Begin New Search Topic International Cooperation Journal China Brief Publication Year within 25 Years Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Can Beijing be Flexible on U.S. Policy?

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
General Secretary Xi Jinping did not mention “America” in his opening report to the 20th Party Congress (Xinhua, October 16). Nevertheless, Xi made clear that China faces a difficult international environment, precipitated in large part by the U.S. challenge, which threatens the realization of national rejuvenation. For Xi, the threat appears particularly acute in two areas: technology and Taiwan. He called for winning the “battle of key core technologies” by building on breakthroughs in areas such as supercomputing and quantum computing, space exploration, nuclear energy, satellite navigation and biomedicine (Xinhuanet, October 16). On Taiwan, Xi issued a thinly veiled ultimatum to Washington, stating that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will strive for “peaceful reunification” to incorporate Taiwan into the Motherland, which he called “an inevitable requirement for realizing the great rejuvenation.” Should this approach fail, Beijing reserves the right to employ military force to counter “interference by external forces” and “Taiwan independence” separatists (Central Committee Taiwan Work Office, October 16).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. The Strategic Implications of Chinese-Iranian-Russian Naval Drills in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In early December, Major General Shao Yuanming (邵元明), the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), traveled to the Islamic Republic of Iran for rare high-level military meetings. These meetings were held for the purpose of organizing a series of unprecedented joint naval drills between China, Iran, and Russia, which were held in the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Oman from December 27–29. The drills took place just as escalating tensions between the United States and Iran reached a crisis point at the end of 2019. The exercise also signified a deepening relationship between Iran and the PRC in economics, diplomacy, and security affairs. China and Russia have both increased military and economic cooperation with Iran in the year and a half since the U.S. government pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, while Iran’s government has repeatedly touted its deepening relations with China and Russia as a show of diplomatic strength, its allies have been less public about the growing relationship. In December, Iranian officials lauded the trilateral exercises—titled “Marine Security Belt”—as proof that Iran can outlast crippling sanctions with aid from its non-Western allies, and declared that the drills signaled a new triple alliance in the Middle East (Tasnim News, December 29, 2019). [1] By contrast, officials from Russia and the PRC were more restrained, framing the joint exercises as part of routine anti-piracy operations, highlighting their peacekeeping priorities and seeking to depoliticize the drills (South China Morning Post, September 23, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), October 2, 2019).
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Navy, Maritime, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

3. Pakistan and CPEC Are Drawn Into the U.S.-China Rivalry

Author:
Adnan Aamir
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Leaders in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan were stunned in late November when a senior U.S. government official issued a strong verbal attack on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). On November 21 in Washington, D.C., U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and Central Asia Affairs Alice Wells spoke at length about the CPEC at a public event, criticizing multiple elements of the $62 billion flagship component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Ambassador Wells cast doubt upon claims that CPEC will generate sustainable economic development in Pakistan and criticized the project’s cost escalations and non-transparent processes of awarding CPEC contracts to Chinese firms. She appealed to Pakistan’s citizens to ask tough questions of the PRC regarding the CPEC and China’s related projects in Pakistan (U.S. State Department, November 21, 2019). In the past, the U.S. government had raised concerns over CPEC and China’s “debt-trap diplomacy,” but it had never presented such a direct and detailed set of criticisms. Ambassador Wells crossed that line—bringing the notoriously stalled out CPEC back under international scrutiny just after Chinese and Pakistani leaders had brokered a cautiously optimistic set of funding deals to jumpstart progress a month before (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC), October 9, 2019). Chinese representatives were quick to respond to Ambassador Wells’s criticisms. The next day, PRC Ambassador to Islamabad Yao Jing(姚敬) said that he had been “shocked and surprised to see the remarks of Alice,” and that Ambassador Wells lacked accurate knowledge and had relied on “Western media ‘propaganda’” for her accusations. He called on the U.S. to “show your evidence, give me evidence” of specific cases of corruption related to the CPEC, and questioned whether Wells was taking potshots at the CPEC to score political points. Ambassador Yao challenged the U.S. to suit its actions to its words: “If there is any sincerity… [the U.S. should] come forward to invest in Pakistan. We [China] welcome U.S. investment in Pakistan.” (INP (Pakistan), November 22, 2019; VOA, November 22, 2019). In addition to refocusing negative attention on the CPEC, Assistant Secretary of State Wells’ speech drew a reluctant Pakistan further into the tumultuous U.S.-China political rivalry. Pakistan faces a balance of payments crisis and a severely weakened currency, which has led it to grow increasingly dependent on economic ties with China. At the same time, the Pakistani leadership has navigated a complex and multifaceted historic security and political partnership with the U.S. If, as Ambassador Wells’ statement seems to imply, Pakistan’s engagement with China is seen to come at the expense of its bilateral relationship with the U.S. – or vice-versa – then Pakistan’s delicate power balancing diplomacy will soon become even more tenuous.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. The Future of Chinese Foreign Economic Policy Will Challenge U.S. Interests, Part 1: The Belt-and-Road Initiative and the Middle Income Trap

Author:
Sagatom Saha
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and other senior CCP leaders have prudently planned for the slowing economic growth that China now faces. CCP officials plan to transition China from its current export-led growth model to one driven by indigenous innovation, and one in which China’s rising global prominence confers to it many of the same advantages traditionally enjoyed by the United States (such as low borrowing costs and influence within international institutions). Although U.S.-China relations have become further fraught amid the trade war, many prominent China hands nevertheless assert that Beijing’s long-term economic plans do not run counter to U.S. strategic interests. [1] However, many of China’s planned foreign economic initiatives—to include the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), global value chain advancement, and renminbi (RMB) internationalization—will come at U.S. expense. Policymakers in both Washington and Beijing should accordingly expect U.S.-China tensions to persist beyond the Trump administration. China’s need for new growth vehicles is twofold: its economic size has not translated into global influence, and its current economic model is losing steam. First, China’s transformation into the world’s second-largest economy has yet to yield equivalent influence in the international system. Beijing’s sway in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, lag behind China’s status as the largest trade partner and foreign investor for much of the world. The United States, by contrast, has leveraged its economic status to maintain effective control of the Bretton-Woods institutions, to obtain low borrowing costs, and to exercise punishing sanctions programs against unfriendly governments. Second, Chinese growth has seen a secular decline over the last decade (see figure 1). The official projected GDP growth rate for 2020 is 6.1 percent (Xinhua, November 30, 2019), but some Chinese officials have hinted that they expect lower sub-6 percent growth in 2020 (South China Morning Post, November 14, 2019). This is a noteworthy signal, for CCP discourse has previously identified the benchmark of 6 percent GDP growth as necessary to avoid social unrest (China Brief, March 22, 2019).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Sino-Indian Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism: Not Truly “Hand-in-Hand” At All

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 7, 2019, infantry units of the Indian Army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commenced the “Hand-in-Hand 2019” combined military exercise at Umroi in the northeastern Indian state of Meghalaya. The fortnight-long exercise ran through December 20, and focused on counter-terrorism operations in semi-urban terrain: to include training evolutions such as cross-training on small arms, hostage rescue, and recognizing improvised explosive device (IED) traps. Approximately 130 personnel from each country participated in the exercise, with the PLA contingent consisting of troops stationed in Tibet (Indian Ministry of Defense, December 2, 2019; Global Times, December 8, 2019; China Military Online, December 23, 2019). It was in January 2001 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first expressed interest in cooperating with India in combating terrorism (The Hindu, January 14, 2001). Since then Beijing and New Delhi have taken several steps to facilitate such cooperation: the two sides have set up a Counter-Terrorism Dialogue Mechanism, a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, and a High-Level Dialogue on Counter-Terrorism and Security to facilitate such engagement. In addition to leadership-level discussions, officials are engaging in talks on a range of terrorism-related issues. In October 2018, the two sides signed an Internal Security Cooperation Agreement, which aims at strengthening cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and narcotics control (Business Standard, October 22, 2018). The “Hand-in-Hand” exercises were first set in motion in 2007, and the December 2019 training in Meghalaya represented the eighth round of these counter-terrorism exercises. Such events—as well as the joint agreements between the two governments—present a picture of India and China as closely engaged on counter-terrorism issues. The truth is quite different, however—and the two sides are far from “hand-in-hand” in their understanding of terrorism.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

6. The Future of Chinese Foreign Economic Policy Will Challenge U.S. Interests, Part 2: Renminbi Internationalization and International Economic Institutions

Author:
Sagatom Saha
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Complications surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the dangers of the “middle-income trap,” are not the only factors impacting the international economic policies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Furthermore, poor capital efficiency is not the only feature of the Chinese economy that frustrates the country’s policymakers. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has roughly doubled in the last decade, but Beijing’s pull in the international monetary and financial system remains lackluster. This lack of progress stems in part from the dollar’s centrality around the world, as well as U.S. dominance in international economic institutions. Beijing’s economic planners have long advocated against the dollar while attempting to increase the global role of the PRC’s own renminbi (RMB) currency. While past efforts stumbled, RMB internationalization and increased Chinese influence will directly confront U.S. economic and geopolitical interests.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. China-Iran Relations: The Not-So-Special “Special Relationship”

Author:
John Calabrese
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Over the years, unremitting hostility between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran has created opportunities as well as dilemmas for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, and the subsequent adoption of a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, presented mixed challenges and opportunities for the PRC. Beijing has sought to exploit the rift between Washington and Tehran without further fueling Sino-American tensions. For the past year, Washington and Tehran have been locked in an action-reaction cycle of escalation. This dangerous spiral reached new heights with the January 2 U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander General Qasem Soleimani, which was followed by retaliatory Iranian missile attacks on two coalition bases in Iraq that injured dozens of American troops. Although both sides managed to pull back from the brink of war in early January, underlying tensions remain—as does the possibility of a more direct military confrontation. In what manner and to what extent has the current unstable situation affected China’s interests in, and relationship with, Iran? What is the likelihood that, as this latest round of high-stakes poker between Washington and Tehran continues to unfold, Beijing will seize it as yet another opportunity to profit from America’s entanglements in the wider Middle East?
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

8. China’s Deepening Diplomatic and Economic Engagement in Afghanistan

Author:
Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On February 29, U.S. and Taliban representatives signed the “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” in Doha, Qatar, which laid out a framework for ending the 18-year old conflict in Afghanistan (U.S. State Department, February 29). Despite skepticism in many quarters regarding the viability of the deal, the negotiations leading to the agreement have been supported by many international actors, to include the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On February 18, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang (耿爽) commented on the U.S.-Taliban negotiations by stating that “China firmly supports the broad and inclusive peace and reconciliation process [and] welcomes the news that the U.S. and the Taliban are expected to reach and sign a deal… China stands ready to step up cooperation with all parties to the Afghan issue and the international community for peace, stability and development in Afghanistan” (PRC Foreign Ministry Briefing, February 18). As the U.S plans to draw down its forces in Afghanistan—a key element of the February 29 deal—China is set to further deepen its involvement in Afghanistan (Nikkei Asian Review, January 14, 2019). Beijing wishes to achieve at least two key objectives. First, it wants once and for all to block any contact between the Taliban and ethnic Uighur Muslim militants seeking independence from China (China Brief, April 24, 2019). Second, the PRC wants long-term stability in Afghanistan in order to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—to the war-wracked country. Beijing sees Afghanistan as a primary link between the Central Asian republics and the CPEC (China Brief, December 10, 2019). To achieve its objectives, Beijing has pursued positive engagement with the Taliban movement that controls more than half of Afghanistan’s territory. These ties have increased over the past couple of years: for example, in 2019 Taliban representatives paid at least two visits to Beijing (in June and September) for talks with PRC officials (CGTN, June 20, 2019; Al-Jazeera, September 23, 2019).
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, Middle East, and Asia

9. Mind the Trap: What Basing Rights in Djibouti and Sri Lanka Reveal About the Limitations of Debt as a Tool of Chinese Military Expansion

Author:
Scott Wingo
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On November 24, 2019, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa told reporters during his first interview as president that he hoped to renegotiate the terms of the deal that gave a Chinese firm a 99-year lease over the Hambantota Port (Strategic News International, November 24, 2019). The port had been handed over as Sri Lanka struggled to make loan payments on the loss-making Chinese-built facility—thereby leading to debates as to whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had set a “debt trap” by intentionally lending Sri Lanka more than it could afford to repay, in hopes of eventually foreclosing on the port (China Brief, January 5, 2019). The subtext was that with a leasehold in hand, the PRC could use the port as a naval installation geared toward patrolling Indian Ocean shipping lanes. As can be observed by the Sri Lankan government’s desire to renegotiate, this has not happened. To the contrary, Sri Lankan security policy has trended against China since the debt-equity swap occurred. A comparison with Djibouti, where the PRC has established its only overseas military base to date, illuminates how this came to pass. In both Djibouti and Sri Lanka, Beijing has used infrastructure loans as a means to entice political leaders to allow naval access. However, three factors led to very different outcomes: 1) the recipient countries’ inherent willingness to host a base; 2) the degree of political competition faced by recipient leaders; and 3) the degree to which recipient leaders can diversify toward different sources of funding to reduce overreliance on China.
Topic:
Debt, Imperialism, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China and Asia

10. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor: Delays Ahead

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Although no new deals were struck during People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping’s trip to Myanmar on January 17 and 18, the visit was significant for several reasons. The visit was the first by a PRC president to Myanmar in 19 years, and the first by Xi to this country in his role as president. The visit was widely touted as marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the PRC and Myanmar. However, Xi’s first trip abroad this year was aimed at expediting implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (CGTN, January 17). During the visit, the two governments signed 33 agreements, memorandums of understanding, protocols and letters of exchange relating to railways, industrial and power projects, and trade. Several of these agreements firm up Myanmar’s commitment to the CMEC’s three central components: the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which includes a deep-sea port, an industrial park and other projects; the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone; and an urban development plan for Yangon (The Irrawaddy, January 18). However, just weeks after Xi’s visit saw the two sides take steps to expedite CMEC projects, Beijing’s plans have run into new problems. CMEC projects are running late, and in an op-ed piece published on the eve of his Myanmar visit, Xi stressed the need for CMEC projects to be moved from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” (New Light of Myanmar, January 16). The coronavirus pandemic has emerged as the latest challenge in the long list of obstacles that have slowed CMEC projects over the years. According to Khriezo Yhome, a New Delhi-based analyst of developments in Myanmar, it “may be too early to assess the impact of the coronavirus crisis on CMEC projects,” given that the pandemic is still only at an “initial phase” in Myanmar; however, there is “no doubt” that it “will slow down the implementation of CMEC projects in the short-term.” [1]
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

11. The “22 vs. 50” Diplomatic Split Between the West and China Over Xinjiang and Human Rights

Author:
Roie Yellinek and Elizabeth Chen
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On July 8, 2019, a group of 22 states issued a joint letter to the 41st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which condemned China’s mass detention of Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang region of northwest China. [1] In the letter, the signatories expressed their countries’ concerns about “credible reports of arbitrary detention in large scale places of detention” in the region and “widespread surveillance and restrictions” targeting Uyghurs and other minorities. The letter (hereafter “First Letter”) called upon the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to uphold its national laws and international commitments, and to “refrain from the arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of movement of Uyghurs, and other Muslim and minority communities in Xinjiang” (UNHRC, July 8). Just four days later, on July 12, 2019, another group of 37 states issued a competing letter to the UNHRC that backed the PRC’s policies in the Xinjiang region (Xinhua, July 13). This letter (hereafter “Second Letter”) asserted that “the work of [UNHRC] should be conducted in an objective… non-confrontational and non-politicized matter,” and expressed “firm opposition to relevant countries’ practice of politicizing human rights issues, by naming and shaming, and publicly exerting pressures on other countries.” This Second Letter commended “China’s remarkable achievements” in “protecting and promoting human rights through development.” The letter further “call[ed] on relevant countries to refrain from employing unfounded charges against China,” and urged the UNHRC to approach the Xinjiang situation “in an objective and impartial manner… with true and genuinely credible information” (UNHRC, July 12). One signatory state, Qatar, subsequently withdrew its support. [2] However, by the time the Second Letter was re-issued later in July, representatives of thirteen additional states and the Palestinian Authority had added their support, bringing the total number of signatories to fifty. [3] This letter exchange between 22 critics and 50 supporters of the PRC’s policies in Xinjiang demonstrates how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has leveraged its economic and political influence over other voting members at the UNHCR to advocate for its own positions, and to weaken legal and procedural frameworks of the international human rights regime.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Human Rights, International Cooperation, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus