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51. Structural Misalignment and the Limits of Pressure: Trump and Brazil’s 2026 Election

Author:
Andre Pagliarini and Feliciano de Sá Guimarães
Publication Date:
09-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A conservative wave is spreading across Latin America. Since 2025, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Honduras have elected right-wing governments that have all largely deferred to President Trump. Now attention turns to the Oct. 4 election in Brazil, a neck-and-neck race in the region’s largest country. On the surface, a victory by right-wing candidate Flávio Bolsonaro would suggest Brazil will align with Trump administration policies. But Brazil’s diverse commercial relations and commitment to regional leadership complicate this narrative. Washington should temper its expectations and recognize potential structural conflicts between US priorities — especially exclusionary policies toward China — and Brazil’s national interests. Throughout the 20th century and into the 21st century, Brazilian governments of all ideological persuasions have consistently resisted perceived subordination to the US. Regardless of who wins the presidency, we should expect Brazil to continue prioritizing national sovereignty. Ignoring this reality threatens to place the US and Brazil on a collision course, potentially harming both nations. Brazil has increasingly attempted to triangulate its foreign policy with the United States and China. As Brazil’s largest trading partner, China is essential to Brazil’s economic standing, making decoupling from China unrealistic. The Trump administration should accept this reality and refrain from economic coercion aimed at forcing Brazil to cut ties with China. Coercive pressure on this or other issues would stoke nationalistic fervor across Brazil’s ideological spectrum — a reaction Washington would also provoke by meddling in the election process. The United States should refocus diplomacy on security. It should lean into collaborative efforts to crack down on cartel violence in Brazil, which are broadly popular among Brazilians. Brazil should, in turn, reassure the United States that it has no intention to expand its relationship with China into a military partnership. Such security collaboration, paired with these reassurances, would let Brazil triangulate between the world’s two superpowers, putting its sovereignty in service of its citizens’ security and its economic vitality. Cooperation between the United States and Brazil is possible if either Bolsonaro or Lula wins. But it would require each country to recognize the structural differences that exist between them and reach understandings accordingly. As a self-described nationalist, Trump should understand Brazil’s sovereigntist instincts and pursue a diplomatic path consistent with both his administration’s security aims in the Western Hemisphere and Brazil’s vital interests.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, Donald Trump, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America

52. Are Qatar and Saudi Arabia Reassessing Their Reliance on the US?

Author:
Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
America’s Arab partners once viewed the United States as their primary security provider. Yet since President Trump returned to the White House in 2025, the Middle East has experienced increasing volatility, much of it driven by Israeli and American aggression. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the two largest purchasers of American defense articles, have been reassessing the value of the US security guarantee, especially as Washington threatens to attack Iran and plunge the region again into war. Based on the author’s interviews with Qatari and Saudi officials, academics, and think tank experts, this brief examines the evolving state of Qatari and Saudi foreign policy and the future impact on US alliance structures and involvement in the Middle East. Israel’s bombing of a civilian building in a residential neighborhood in Doha, Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, was both the first Israeli attack on a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, and the first time a major non–NATO US ally attacked another. In response, Trump enhanced the US–Qatari relationship, pledging to provide Qatar with a NATO Article 5-like security guarantee. While the US may have tacitly allowed the attack, Qatar nonetheless reaffirmed its strong partnership with Washington. Yet Qatar has also turned to regional balancing in recent years, building a stronger military relationship with Turkey and strengthening ties with the United Kingdom and France. Qatar wishes to avoid a public rift with Trump, while quietly expanding its partnerships to prepare for a more regionally oriented security landscape. Although Saudi Arabia would welcome an iron-clad security guarantee from the US, the relationship between Riyadh and Washington is complicated by the two countries’ different, and at times incompatible, goals. The Saudi government has condemned Israel’s war on Gaza as genocide, and remains steadfast on Israel’s recognition of a Palestinian state as a requirement for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Although Riyadh has tried to accommodate Washington’s demands to reduce exposure to Chinese technology in order to secure access to cutting-edge American technology, China remains a critical trade partner; Riyadh is wary of the US pressuring it to take sides between the US and China. Saudi Arabia is no longer as dependent on Washington, having strengthened relations with Pakistan and Egypt and mended ties with Iran and Turkey. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts to transform the Kingdom’s economy and society require the free flow of investment and capital as well as regional stability. But President Trump’s push for global economic protectionism — as well as a US war on Iran — threatens the success of Vision 2030 and the future viability of the Saudi economy. Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s efforts to maintain close ties to the US while also enhancing their capacity to provide for their own security reflect a broader reconsideration among Gulf countries of an excessive reliance on US security patronage and a move toward greater self-sufficiency. Yet ongoing tensions among GCC members have thwarted periodic efforts to empower the GCC as a security institution. Israel and the United States are increasingly seen as the main sources of destabilization in the region, rather than Iran, a perception that would become undeniable if the US follows through on its threats and again embarks on a war of choice in the Middle East.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Partnerships, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United States of America

53. A US Framework for Baltic Security and Russia Policy

Author:
Eldar Mamedov
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Geographically exposed, politically hardline, and highly militarily dependent on the United States and other Western allies, the Baltic states are both a vulnerability and a potential trip wire in the relationship between NATO, America, and Russia. Understandable historical trauma from Soviet occupation — reinforced by Russia’s more recent aggression against Ukraine — fuels a maximalist anti–Russia stance in the Baltics. This posture pushes the countries’ leaders toward confrontational EU/NATO policies, which risk unintended escalation, including inflexible opposition toward efforts to end the war in Ukraine. The risk of confrontation is only increased by the prominent role that figures from the Baltics play in the leadership of the European Union. The risk of a dangerous confrontation in the Baltic region diverts finite resources and strategic attention from higher US priorities: securing the homeland, managing challenges in the Western Hemisphere, and countering China — the United States’ sole peer competitor. This contradicts the central tenets of the new US National Security Strategy, which explicitly prioritizes achieving strategic stability with Russia and ending NATO expansion. As documented in this brief, the conventional threat of a Russian invasion in the Baltic remains limited. However, the risks of escalation stemming from Baltic hardline policies — a resurgent Russian “war party” and continued war in Ukraine — are unacceptably high. To counteract these dynamics, the United States should begin shifting the burden for Baltic and broader European security to European members of NATO, while reaffirming the United States’ commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5 guarantees. Washington should also privately press Baltic leaders to moderate escalatory rhetoric and policies and to work pragmatically toward a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. As a corollary to these policies, the United States should begin building a genuinely inclusive European security architecture. Such an order would embed both Ukraine and Russia in a framework that removes, or at least substantially mitigates, the risk of another major war on the Continent. An inclusive security order that removes the Ukraine War as an open wound in Europe is, ultimately, the most stable framework to enhance Baltic security and accord with the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy. However, achieving a stable and inclusive European security architecture will require lowering the temperature in the Baltics.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Prussia, United States of America, and Baltic States

54. Community Guidelines for Smart Openness In US Research Collaboration

Author:
Caroline S. Wagner and Denis Simon
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
China was long perceived as the junior partner in the US–China scientific relationship, but is now at the cutting edge of scientific research in many areas. As China has reached new frontiers, an exclusive focus on security concerns has driven a stark decline in US–China cooperation. This has put the two countries on a path to scientific and research decoupling, which is throttling US visibility into China’s frontier work. It also cuts deeply into the US commitment to scientific openness at a time when US national interests would most benefit from some form of continued engagement. Preventing further damage will require a new paradigm that balances beneficial scientific cooperation among the world’s foremost powers with appropriate attention to both opportunities and security concerns. In other publications, we have outlined the broad conceptual framework and argument for a “smart openness” framework. In this brief, we lay out a path to implementing it. Implementing the smart openness framework, especially in the current atmosphere of mutual suspicion and hostility between Washington and Beijing, will require the participation and buy-in of the research community itself. Government cannot and should not define the frontiers of research. This brief begins the process by proposing an initial classification of field-specific standards for what’s in and what’s out in the major fields of international scientific research. We develop and explain three categories of risk for this classification: a green (low risk) category, a yellow (manageable risk) category, and a red (high security-disqualifying risk) category. Such a categorization allows the research community to make informed, considered decisions about collaboration, rather than relying on vague federal advisories. The framework is intended as a starting point for deliberation among professional societies, research security officers, disciplinary experts, and government liaisons. As we further explain in the brief, agreeing on a smart openness security classification can jump-start a process allowing the scientific community to self-monitor in a unified manner, curtailing the generalized suspicion of all US–China scientific collaboration.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Collaboration, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

55. Emerging Challenges and Opportu-Nities in Humanitarian Assistance in Mozambique: A Case Study from Cabo Delgados

Author:
Fátima Chimarizeni Papelo
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
This paper aims to analyze the emerging challenges and opportuni-ties derived from the humanitarian assistance actions applied in Cabo Del-gado in the context of violent extremism that has been ravaging the province since 2017. This topic is relevant because the traditional concept of huma-nitarian assistance presupposes support for victims of a disaster caused by nature or man-made, and the province of Cabo Delgado presents a growing demand for humanitarian assistance due to the ongoing prolonged violent conflict. In Cabo Delgado, there are victims of a violent, unconventional, low-intensity conflict. More than 1 million people are in need of humanita-rian assistance, of which more than 50% are women and children (OCHA 2021). Along with terrorism, climate disasters, such as Cyclone Keneth in 2019, and the COVID-19 Pandemic, which began affecting Mozambique in 2020, are exacerbating the state of vulnerability of humanitarian victims. Combined, these events force non-state humanitarian actors to operate in an environment characterized by uncertainty, insecurity, and unpredictability. Nevertheless, these humanitarian actors may operate beyond what is defined by traditional humanitarian principles, which concern saving lives and allevia-ting the suffering of humanitarian victims, including developmental actions that may result in the reduction of state power in the humanitarian space and that lead to the implementation of political action by external forces. If prolonged, this scenario may accentuate the weakening of state power. Given this context, one wonders what challenges and opportunities are derived from the humanitarian support process in Cabo Delgado. This paper seeks to reflect on the emerging challenges and oppor-tunities arising from the humanitarian assistance process in Cabo Delgado. Specifically, it sought to a) define what humanitarian assistance is; b) analyze the emerging challenges for humanitarian actors in Cabo Delgado; and c) analyze the emerging opportunities for humanitarian actors within the pro-cess of humanitarian assistance in the region. We started from the hypothesis that the problem of the humanitarian assistance process in the context of violent extremism creates emerging challenges and opportunities for non--state humanitarian actors that are linked to human security, management, and coordination of humanitarian actions.
Topic:
Security, Violent Extremism, Armed Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Political Geography:
Africa, Mozambique, and Cabo Delgados

56. Strengthening Peace and Security in West Africa: A Conversation with Anthony Antem

Author:
Denis Foretia
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
As regional and global challenges related to peace and security continue to evolve, collaboration and knowledge-sharing remain critical to fostering sustainable solutions. The ReCAP Final Regional Conference, taking place in Dakar, Senegal, from February 10-11 2025, brings together experts, practitioners, and researchers from across West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin to reflect on lessons learned in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and the fight against violent extremism. In this insightful conversation, Anthony Antem (AA), Head of the Conflict Prevention Unit at the Nkafu Policy Institute, discusses the peace and security landscape in West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin. He highlights Nkafu’s contributions to the ReCAP project, shares expectations for the conference, and reflects on the importance of regional collaboration in fostering sustainable peace. The discussion is led by Ayukmba Nkonghonyor (AN), Senior Communications Manager at the Denis and Lenora Foretia Foundation.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Peace, Interview, Countering Violent Extremism, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Africa and West Africa

57. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a changing security order with a mix of diplomacy and deterrence.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

58. Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Criminal gangs have tightened their grip on much of Port-au-Prince, with the multinational security mission making little headway and transitional authorities mired in internal disputes. The UN Security Council should quickly decide how to respond to Haiti’s request for further assistance in restoring public safety.
Topic:
Security, UN Security Council, Organized Crime, Gangs, and Public Safety
Political Geography:
Caribbean and Haiti

59. Practical Guidance for Integrating Climate into WPS National Action Plans

Author:
Christina Vetter and Jessica Smith
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
In this practical guidance note, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security explores the capacity for National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security (WPS NAPs) to be effective tools for national-level implementation of the WPS Agenda that is responsive to climate-related security risks. WPS NAPs have become the primary tool for national-level efforts to implement the WPS Agenda. To remain relevant and effective, NAPs must be responsive to the ever-changing security landscape and emerging threats to peace and security, like climate change. While the share of NAPs that mention climate change has slowly increased, many include just one cursory reference to climate change in the background section that does not comprehensively address the impacts of climate-related security risks across all four pillars of WPS or include specific actions or commitments related to climate in the NAP’s implementation framework. This report presents actionable policy recommendations for WPS NAPs to more meaningfully address climate change and related security risks throughout their design, drafting, and implementation. The report, authored by Christina Vetter and Dr. Jessica Smith, was made possible with support from the Embassy of Denmark in Washington, D.C.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

60. Exploring options for advancing Kosovo-NATO relations

Author:
Ramadan Iazi and Jeta Loshaj
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
NATO’s role in Kosovo has been vital since the 1999 intervention and KFOR remains integral for guaranteeing security and stability not only in Republic of Kosovo but also the wider Western Balkans. Public sentiment for full NATO membership is extremely high in Kosovo—over 90% support—reflecting Kosovars’ enduring trust in the NATP alliance. However this overwhelming public support can be affected if Kosovo’s aspirations for closer ties with NATO are not addressed. While, Kosovo’s formal progress toward full membership is politically constrained by the fact that four NATO member states have yet to recognize its independence, there are other options that NATO can pursue to advance relations with Kosovo. In this context, this paper explores options how can Kosovo and NATO advance relations and cooperation. The 1995 study provides core principles for options that are examined in this paper. These principles remain highly relevant for Kosovo. While formal membership is stalled by non-recognizing NATO member states, the paper argues that an inclusive, step-by-step approach can be adapted for a flexible, deeper engagement with Kosovo. A central recommendation is the creation of a “Kosovo Enhanced Cooperation Initiative,” a tailored version of NATO’s partnership mechanisms (e.g., Partnership for Peace, Planning and Review Process, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre). KECI would aim to strengthen Kosovo’s defense institutions, enhance interoperability, support civil emergency preparedness, and develop broader crisis-management capabilities. Crucially, it would not force any change in the political stance on recognition among NATO member states. The EU-facilitated normalization dialogue between Republic of Kosovo and Serbia is one of the essential elements especially for Kosovo to build the confidence of both skeptical NATO member states and international partners when it comes to Euro-Atlantic integration process of the country. Regular coordination with NATO and the EU, particularly concerning sensitive actions in the north, would affirm that Kosovo’s leaders prioritize strategic partnerships and diplomacy over moves that risks and undermine support for Kosovo. Nevertheless, without any concrete carrots such as anything close to a guarantee that Kosovo gains an open perspective for NATO’s PfP, it is rather difficult for Kosovo to be encouraged to deliver on either an agreement with Serbia or any other agreement.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Partnerships, Normalization, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia