Topic: Security / Publication Year: within 10 Years

201. U.S. Fosters Rwanda-Congo Peace Deal for Mineral Rights

Author:: Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: On 27 June in Washington, the foreign ministers of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda signed a peace agreement, reached under U.S. auspices. It is based on a “security for minerals” formula. Although it carries the promise of development by linking the economies of the DRC, Rwanda, and the U.S. in the extractive sector, the chances of its full implementation are slim.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, Extractive Industries, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Africa, Rwanda, United States of America, and Congo

202. The sea as a strategic interest for Europe. A European perspective on the ocean and its challenges

Author:: Didier Piaton
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The return of a forgotten conflict, both in everyday life and in the subconscious of European democracies since the end of the Cold War, invites us to revisit the foundations of geostrategy and the place of oceans within it. Europe is an island in the geostrategic sense: it has many maritime assets. In the new era ushered in by Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine and in the context of a ‘decentring of the world’[1], the European Union is gradually asserting its own strategic identity. The European initiative launched in early 2025 to offer security guarantees to Ukraine, under the dual pressure of Russian military operations and the US diplomatic shift, illustrates the need to take a new step forward. To live up to its ambitions, Europe must fully embrace the geostrategic dimension of the maritime sphere.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Maritime, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe and Oceans

203. Joe Biden Administration’s Security Policy and What It Means for the Baltic States

Author:: Martinas Malużinas
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: The aim of this article is to analyse the US security policy during the presidency of Joe Biden, with the main emphasis on military security and its importance for the Baltic states, which perceive the US as the main guarantor of their security. This is particularly important in the context of challenges related to China’s expansion in the region or Russia’s display of strength. Based on realist theories of international relations, using methods of content analysis, synthesis, and comparison, it was possible to analyse the role of the so-called B3 Baltic states in US foreign policy. There is no doubt that the US is positioning itself as one of the key strategic partners of the B3 states; therefore, in this context, it is necessary to consider the US strategic options toward the B3, which have evolved along with the change in the geopolitical situation in the European region. The Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine confirmed the decisive response of the B3 states, perceiving Russia as a threat to the security of the region. The time frame is limited to Biden’s four-year term in 2021–2024. For research purposes, the contemporary literature in the field of political science and security was used, as well as primary sources related to US decisions and presidential statements that are relevant to this article.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Joe Biden, Military Security, and Security Policy
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, United States of America, and Baltic States

204. Violence has gone down during Xiomara Castro’s term, but has security improved in Honduras?

Author:: Tiziano Breda
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: Armed violence has significantly decreased during President Xiomara Castro’s term so far, particularly in the country’s main cities that have long been plagued by gang violence. The measures adopted by the outgoing Castro administration do not fully explain the drop, which suggests it also responds to shifts in gang dynamics and tactics. Violence in rural areas, often linked to land disputes, has significantly increased in the Colón and Olancho departments. The expansion of coca crops in mostly rural departments hints at the diversification of drug trafficking groups’ activities and poses an added risk for rural security.
Topic:: Security, Domestic Politics, Violence, Rural, Organized Crime, and Gangs
Political Geography:: Latin America and Honduras

205. Mainstreaming Security Norms as Japanese Strategy to Gain its Global Power: A Content Analysis on ODA Documents

Author:: Surwandono Surwandono, Ratih Herningtyas, and Rizki Dian Nursita
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: Japan's defeat in World War II did not discourage its obsession to become a global power that influences the behaviour of other countries and the world order at large. Following World War II, despite being constrained by the 1947 Constitution, Japan emerged as an economic agent capable of playing a significant role on the global stage through economic and cultural instruments. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) has become one of the key tools for Japan to actively participate and contribute to current global politics. This article aims to identify Japan's strategy in using ODA to maintain its influence as a global power. Using content analysis of 2015 ODA Charter or Development Cooperation Charter (DCC) and the White Paper on Development Cooperation (WPDC), this article finds that Japan's strategy to maintain its influence at the global level is carried out by prioritising human security norms in ODA distribution. The Japanese government consistently applies normative and operational norms regarding human security rather than national security to ensure acceptance from recipient countries. These efforts begin with the development of Japan's legal governance framework, which is designed in a smart, systematic, objective, and visionary manner. Japan demonstrates how a country facing constitutional constraints can become a stable global power.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Development Aid, and Human Security
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

206. Sino-Russian Cooperation and its Impacts on Central Asia

Author:: Giorgio Romano Schutte and Diego Noveli Valadares
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This article analyzes Sino-Russian cooperation in Central Asia, examining China’s growing economic presence and the reconfiguration of Russian influence in the region. Since 2014, Western sanctions and geopolitical tensions have led Moscow and Beijing to deepen their partnership. While China expands investments through the Belt and Road Initiative, Russia maintains its central role in regional security and financial influence. The study argues that despite China’s rise, Central Asia has become a space for strategic accommodation, where both powers avoid direct conflicts and consolidate their global presence.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Investment
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

207. Focus on Eurasia: Russia's war against Ukraine: Will it lead to crisis in Moscow?

Author:: Fiona Hill, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine: Will it lead to crisis in Moscow? A conversation with Fiona Hill: Tuesday, December 2 Speaker: Fiona Hill is a senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings Institution and Chancellor of Durham University. Hill served as deputy assistant to the president and senior director for European and Russian affairs on the US National Security Council from 2017 to 2019, as well as national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the US National Intelligence Council from 2006 to 2009. She has researched and published extensively on issues related to Russia, the Caucasus, regional conflicts, and strategic issues, as well as the link between deindustrialization and political populism. She is the author of the bestselling memoir "There Is Nothing for You Here: Finding Opportunity in the 21st Century" and co-author of "Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin." In December 2023, Hill was recognized by the United Kingdom as a Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George, for services to international relations and in July 2024, she was appointed by Prime Minister Keir Starmer to be an external reviewer for a Strategic Defense Review for the Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom. Discussants: Carol Saivetz is a senior fellow in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of “Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine” as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and U.S.-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is co-faculty director of the MIT-Eurasia Program and founding faculty director of the MIT-Ukraine Program at CIS.
Topic:: Security, Domestic Politics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

208. Focus on Eurasia: The Axis of Upheaval

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Carol Saivetz, and David Wood
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Focus on Eurasia: The Axis of Upheaval: How Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea Seek to Change the World: Tuesday, October 28 Speaker: Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a senior fellow and director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). She works on national security challenges facing the United States and Europe, focusing on Russia, authoritarianism and threats to democracy, and the state of the transatlantic alliance. Discussants: Carol Saivetz is a senior fellow in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and U.S.-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is director of the MIT-Ukraine Program at CIS.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea

209. Understanding Different Perspectives on International Relations in MENA (Session 2)

Author:: Peter Krause
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Understanding Different Perspectives on International Relations in MENA: US, Gaza, and the Future for Palestinians An online mini course for the MIT community with Peter Krause (PhD '11). Krause is an associate professor of political science at Boston College and a research affiliate with the MIT Security Studies Program. This webinar is hosted by the MIT-MENA program at the MIT Center for International Studies. About the speaker: Peter Krause is an associate professor of political science at Boston College. His research and teaching focus on international security, Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, nationalism, and rebels and revolution. He currently teaches courses on Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, research methods, and international relations. He is a faculty associate in the International Studies Program and the Islamic Civilization and Societies Program at Boston College, as well as a research affiliate with the MIT Security Studies Program.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Palestinians, Regional Politics, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North Africa, and United States of America

210. A Costly Illusion of Control: No Winners, Many Losers in U.S.-China AI Race

Author:: Paul Triolo
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: The aggressive U.S. approach to China risks triggering conflict between the two nations while upending any progress to a global framework for AI safety and security
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Security, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

211. Policy Responses to Climate Impacts in Light of Fragility, Instability, and Climate Security Dynamics

Author:: International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD)
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD)
Abstract:: In this policy brief, we critically examine the ‘double burden’ for countries that are highly vulnerable to and affected by climate change impacts while experiencing political instability, fragility, or conflict. Vulnerabilities compound and effective responses are constrained in these states, which receive disproportionately low and insufficient support through climate finance and tend to be forgotten in climate action. The global fragility landscape is becoming increasingly complex, marked by the convergence of unprecedented climate extremes, rising state fragility, and the related deepening of socio-economic vulnerabilities. The 1.5-degree limit of global average temperature increase was exceeded in 2024. There now is a high risk for escalating compound risks, with mounting human and economic losses, including loss of life and intense pressure on social cohesion. This comes as already more than two billion people live in highly or extremely fragile contexts – a number which is only expected to rise. Policy responses in fragile and conflict-affected settings need to be thoroughly context-specific. Policy makers thus face complex challenges, the finance gap being a central obstacle. Current climate finance flows remain biased towards stable contexts, leaving critical gaps for those most in need. Concrete barriers that restrict access include donor risk perceptions, burdensome procedures, and preference for large-scale projects, which often exceed local capacity. Debt distress further amplifies the need for grants, yet the global share of grant-based finance remains limited. Despite these structural obstacles, locally embedded responses demonstrate the potential for flexible, trust-based, and highly adaptive approaches that bypass the rigidities of conventional finance.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Instability, Fragility, and Localization
Political Geography:: Global Focus

212. The Security Dividend of Climate Policy

Author:: Timothé Beaufíls, Michael Jakob, and Matthias Kalkuhl
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: By reducing reliance on fossil fuels, EU climate policy substantially lowers Russia’s financial strength, thereby limiting its military capabilities to sustain its aggression on Ukraine and beyond. We provide estimates for the security dividend of EU climate policy. A one-euro reduction in oil consumption in the EU results in a security dividend of 37 cents (central estimate). Based on the security dividend alone, a significant carbon price (central estimate of 60 euros per ton of CO2) on oil consumption is justified – in addition to its climate, terms-of-trade, and local health benefits. Ambitious EU climate policy that reduces demand for oil and natural gas should be seen as an important pillar of the European security architecture, complementing military spending, diplomatic efforts, and continued support to Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

213. NATO and the Middle East: Turkey’s threat conceptions and attempts at stability in post-Assad Syria

Author:: Olli Ruohomäki, Toni Alaranta, and Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: With the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and potential growing instability in Syria, NATO has struggled to formulate a coherent position on the Middle East and to build a cohesive network of partners in the region. As the stakes rise and Europe becomes more invested, both economically and militarily, in Euro-Atlantic defence, the Alliance should not neglect the chance to further develop its cooperative security agenda in the Middle East. In this context, Turkey – NATO’s only member state in the region – can act as a link between the Alliance and the Middle East. Turkey and other NATO members have long held different threat conceptions, resulting in differing priorities in counterterrorism. However, ongoing negotiations between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), aimed at ending their long-standing conflict, could ease this divergence. While deeper cooperation between Turkey and European countries in the new European security arrangements depends on Turkey’s willingness to choose a side in the Europe-Russia confrontation, European NATO allies could still work with Turkey in areas where there is clear common ground with other Middle Eastern states, such as safeguarding an orderly political transition in Syria.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Terrorism, Governance, European Union, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

214. Addressing environment-related risks in the EU’s crisis management: From greening to foresight and preparedness

Author:: Emma Hakala
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The EU and its crisis management efforts are increasingly challenged by environment-related risks, such as extreme weather events and their implications for stability, migration and food security. Greater recognition of environmental risks could bolster resilience and preparedness not only within specific crisis management missions, but also across the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. The integration of environmental issues into crisis management has been hindered by unclear mandates, lack of knowledge and expertise, and a failure to recognize the potential benefits for preparedness. For better mainstreaming, the environment needs to be seen as a key part of comprehensive preparedness, for example by producing foresight data, identifying linkages between the environment and security, and contributing to early-warning systems.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Environment, European Union, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Europe

215. National Action Plans as Tools for Effective Small Arms Control: Lessons from West Africa

Author:: Luc Chounet-Cambas, Alizée Henry, and Julien Joly
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Small Arms Survey
Abstract:: Guidance provided at the Fourth Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in June 2024 underscored the importance of aligning national action plans (NAPs) with sustainable development, security, and gender-responsive policies, in addition to the need for inter-agency collaboration and the inclusion of non-governmental stakeholders in small arms control efforts. While this shift signals a transformative paradigm in small arms control—moving beyond a compliance-driven model rooted in international norms and standards toward a more integrated approach that positions arms control as a tool to advance national objectives in human security, development, and governance—it raises a critical question: how can NAPs be effectively leveraged to ensure this alignment? National Action Plans as Tools for Effective Small Arms Control: Lessons from West Africa, commissioned by the Mines Advisory Group, is a Briefing Paper that examines the current state of practice of NAPs on small arms and light weapons in West Africa, their impact, and existing opportunities to enhance their effectiveness and potential in integrating small arms control into broader public policy frameworks that address development and security concerns.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Development, Weapons, and National Action Plan
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

216. The Republic of Kadamol: A Portrait of the Rapid Support Forces at War

Author:: Joshua Craze and Raga Makawi
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Small Arms Survey
Abstract:: After almost two years of war, Sudan is in the grip of a humanitarian and political catastrophe. A conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues to devastate the country. In recent months, the RSF has lost ground, and its efforts to create a government seem likely to come to naught. But what is the RSF, and what can learning about the paramilitary organization tell us about the future of Sudan? The Republic of Kadamol: A Portrait of the Rapid Support Forces at War is a new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project. Based on interviews on the ground and with RSF personnel, the paper offers an insight into RSF recruitment strategies, war aims, and command and control problems. To understand Sudan's future, it is indispensable to understand the RSF, and this paper is the first to give a synthetic analysis of the RSF since the war began.
Topic:: Security, Humanitarian Crisis, Armed Conflict, and Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
Political Geography:: Africa and Sudan

217. Autopsiadel asalto a la frontera de Ceuta en2021: entre lazona grisyla gestión de crisis

Author:: Luis de la Corte Ibáñez
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: This paper analyses a significant incident that took place on the border of Ceuta between 17 and 19 May 2021, when more than 10,000 people entered the Spanish city from Morocco without authorisation, causing the most serious border crisis experienced in the city during the democratic era. The article begins with a diplomatic contextualisation of the crisis, linked to the deterioration of relations between Spain and Morocco, and sets out its immediate background. It then describes the development of the assault on the Ceuta border in all its relevant aspects. The incident is then analysed from three perspectives. The first offers a strategic reading of the border crisis, based on the hypothesis that the crisis should be interpreted as the result of an operation promoted by the Kingdom of Morocco, within the framework of an escalation in the grey zone, with the aim of influencing Spanish foreign policy. The second perspective offers a detailed analysis of the different phases and dimensions of the border crisis management process. This analysis is based on the hypothesis that, at the time of the crisis, the Spanish state did not have specific mechanisms and protocols in place to deal with incidents that could jeopardise the integrity of either of the two Spanish cities in North Africa, Ceuta or Melilla. The third perspective applies two approaches from the social sciences: the black swan and the gray rhino. The article concludes with an assessment of the diplomatic consequences of the border crisis and a reflection on its strategic implications for Spanish security policy.
Topic:: Security, Crisis Management, Borders, Gray Zone, and Irregular Migration
Political Geography:: Spain and Morocco

218. Global Terrorism Index 2025

Author:: Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:: Terrorism remains a persistent global threat, with 2024 marking another year of shifting patterns and evolving challenges with the geographic reach of terrorism spreading. The number of countries experiencing at least one terrorist incident increased from 58 to 66, the most countries affected since 2018. In 2024, more countries deteriorated than improved for the first time in seven years, with 45 countries reporting a higher impact from terrorism, while only 34 showed improvement. Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates remained the deadliest terrorist organisation in 2024, responsible for 1,805 deaths across 22 countries. The four major terrorist organisations, IS, Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Shabaab continued to increase their activity, with deaths attributed to these groups increasing by 11 per cent to 4,204. In 2023, these groups were active in 29 countries which increased to 30 countries in 2024. In 2024, 36 per cent of terrorist attacks were not claimed by an organisation. IEP has developed a machine learning model to assign these incidents to likely groups. The analysis found that deaths attributed to IS would have been 58 per cent higher, while those linked to JNIM would have been 176 per cent higher. This underscores the challenges in accurately assessing the impact of different terrorist organisations. In 2024, deaths from terrorism fell to 7,555, representing a 13 per cent decline from the previous year. This reduction was entirely due to the large spike in the prior year from the Hamas October 7th attack, otherwise deaths would have been approximately the same. The number of terrorist attacks also declined, falling by three per cent to 3,492. The drop in incidents was primarily driven by an 85 per cent decrease in terrorist activity in Myanmar. Excluding Myanmar, global terrorist attacks would have increased by eight per cent. In the West, lone actor terrorism is on the rise with terrorist attacks increasing from 32 to 52 in 2024. These attacks are typically carried out by youths, often in their teens, who have no formal ties to terrorist organisations. Instead, they become radicalised through online content, constructing personal ideologies that often blend conflicting viewpoints influenced via access to fringe forums, gaming environments, encrypted messaging apps and the dark web. Because there are no affiliations, it means these types of attacks are difficult for intelligence agencies to track. Social media algorithms also accentuate biases, pushing disaffected youth towards more radicalised content. In Europe, one in five persons arrested for terrorism is legally classified as a child. In Europe, terrorist incidents doubled to 67, including attacks by IS and Hamas. The resurgence of attacks was particularly notable in seven Western countries - Sweden, Australia, Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland, with Germany being the worst ranked nation at 27th on the Index. There are now seven Western countries ranked amongst the 50 most impacted countries on the GTI. Meanwhile, in the US, antisemitic and Islamophobic hate crimes escalated sharply following the start of the Gaza war, with FBI-recorded incidents targeting the Jewish community rising by 270 per cent in just two months. Similar patterns emerged in Europe and Australia, where attacks on synagogues were reported throughout the year. Terrorism in the Sahel has increased significantly, with deaths rising nearly tenfold since 2019. In 2024, the Sahel accounted for 51 per cent of all terrorism deaths, while overall conflict deaths in the region exceeded 25,000 for the first time since the inception of the Index. Of these, 3,885 were attributed to terrorism. Terrorism deaths here are now ten times higher than in 2019. The Sahel remains the global epicentre of terrorism, accounting for over half of all terrorism-related deaths in 2024 with the number of countries affected increasing. Five of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism are in this region. Although Burkina Faso remains the most affected country, both deaths and attacks declined, falling by 21 and 57 per cent respectively, however the country is still responsible for a fifth of all terrorism deaths globally. Niger highlights how fragile progress in reducing terrorism deaths can be. In 2024, the country recorded the largest increase in terrorism deaths globally, rising by 94 per cent to a total of 930, reversing previous improvements from 2022 when it had the second largest improvement. Niger’s example may mean that the improvements in Burkina Faso are transitory. Geopolitical changes continue to shape security dynamics across the Sahel. The Alliance of Sahelian States, comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has moved away from the West, instead strengthening ties with Russia and China. This shift, along with the bloc’s withdrawal from ECOWAS, has created opportunities for groups such as JNIM to expand their activities into coastal West Africa. Togo recorded its worst year for terrorism since the inception of the Index, reflecting the broader spread of terrorist activity beyond the Sahel’s traditional hotspots.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Youth, Threat Assessment, and Lone Wolf Attacks
Political Geography:: Global Focus

219. From Syria to the Black Sea: Containing Russia, Partnering with Turkey?

Author:: Bernard Siman
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The outcome of the Russo-Turkish power competition in Syria will impact the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This, in turn, will impact the outcome of any peace negotiations with Ukraine and its relative position in the Black Sea. The future of Syria very much matters for the EU, therefore. Because blunting Russia’s attempts at achieving dominance over the Black Sea will play an important role in Europe’s security. And because the Syrian coast is only 300KM from Cyprus, the EU’s southeastern most border. Syria is the EU’s neighbour for all intents and purposes. In Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, Turkey and the EU finally have a key strategic objective in common.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Syria, and Black Sea

220. Silence in the Sahel does not Equal Stability

Author:: Nina Wilén
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Sahel is no longer on the frontpages. In the past few years – even in the past few months – the geopolitical context has changed radically. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine understandably turned European attention to the East in 2022. The Israel – Palestine armed conflict which restarted in 2023 and has taken unprecedented proportions has also called for attention, while the last three years of Rwanda- supported rebel invasion in the East of the DRC recently caught the news. In more recent weeks, the new US administration’s deeply disturbing dismantling of national institutions and international order has predictably stolen the headlines. Yet, in the meantime the different crises which have plagued the Sahel over more than a decade are continuing and the situation is worsening. The military regimes which came to power in the latest coup wave in the Sahel region on the promise of quelling jihadist violence have not been able to deliver on this promise. Instead, jihadist groups are expanding across the region, with deadlier attacks against civilians in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, the three states which created the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) in 2023. The Sahel is today the region in the world which is the most affected by jihadist violence. The AES countries are also experiencing a deepening authoritarian turn, as the transitions to democratic elections and return to constitutional order have been stalled with continuous extensions of transitional period and repression against opposition voices. These developments are unfolding within a heavily restricted media landscape, where local independent and foreign journalists and news agencies are either silenced through repression or driven into exile, while civil society faces continued intimidation and oppression, including forced military recruitment, arbitrary arrests and in some cases summary executions. This article analyses the latest developments in the security and political sphere in the Sahel with a focus on the AES states. It examines the expansion of jihadist violence and assesses the political situation. It argues that despite the current geopolitical context and Europe’s decreasing influence, there is still a need for the EU and its member states to stay engaged. It is crucial to closely monitor developments in the region to better grasp the political and security landscape, and potential implications both within and beyond the African continent. This article is the first of a series of two analyzing the shifting political and security landscape in the Sahel. The next article will examine the AES countries’ shifting regional and international partnerships.
Topic:: Security, Authoritarianism, Political stability, Violence, Coup, and Salafi-Jihadism
Political Geography:: Africa and Sahel

221. DRC-Rwanda: Why the 27 June Agreement is not Enough and How CENCO-ECC might Improve the Odds of Peace

Author:: Erik Kennes
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On 27 June, a Peace Agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Rwanda was undersigned in Washington, witnessed by the US government. The agreement is based on the “Declaration of Principles” undersigned on 25 April by the Congolese and Rwandan Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This is the last in a series of agreements and arrangements concluded over the last 25 years which never resolved the basic problems underpinning the recurrent conflict, notably the foreign security and economic policy of Rwanda, and the structural weakness of the DRC state and security forces. In their conception or implementation, they did not address the fundamental “root causes” of the crisis in the East either. Will it be different this time? Two elements are new: it is the first direct bilateral peace agreement between DRCongo and Rwanda, to a certain extent guaranteed by the US state department. It is concluded between the real decision-makers but ignores most existing procedures and regulations set up after previous crises. Secondly, it considers economic aspects crucial for durable peace, while political issues are simply discarded.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Central Africa

222. Japan Looks Ahead to Trump 2.0

Author:: Bart Gaens
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Today, on the eve of the presidential inauguration in the US, Japan’s current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces a new Trump administration, and, in a more volatile regional and global environment, also more challenges in terms of foreign and security policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and United States of America

223. The EU’s Dilemmas in the Black Sea Region: Security and Enlargement

Author:: Koen Claessen
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Black Sea region has gained renewed strategic importance for the European Union following Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As an area of considerable economic and geopolitical significance, as well as a focal point for potential future EU enlargement, its stability is now an urgent concern for European policymakers. Russia’s sustained efforts to undermine security in the Black Sea necessitate a coherent EU vision, moving beyond the fragmented scope of earlier initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy and aspects of the Eastern Partnership.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Enlargement
Political Geography:: Europe and Black Sea

224. More Than a Systemic Rival: China as a Security Challenge for the EU

Author:: Tauno Tõhk
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The EU's ties with China rank just behind its transatlantic ones in significance. With China being a major trading partner, the focus has long been on economic opportunities. In recent years, there has been a shift in how the EU frames its relationship with China. Yet, despite increasing emphasis on systemic rivalry and economic security, security risks remain underrepresented in EU China policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

225. Climate, Peace and Security in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author:: Katongo Seyuba
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Local communities in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) face the combined challenge of climate change and violent conflict, which exacerbates vulnerabilities, poverty, displacement and human insecurity. This SIPRI Insights Paper examines how climate change interacts with existing vulnerabilities in North Kivu and South Kivu to heighten human insecurity and conflict risks. The findings highlight that the link between climate change and conflict is shaped by the governance and accessibility of natural resources such as land and water. Changes in the availability and quality of such resources may increase the risks of tensions and intercommunal conflicts, especially in areas where such resources are already contested. Climate-related security risks present both immediate and long-term challenges to an already fragile peacebuilding environment in the region. Consequently, this paper recommends integrating climate and environmental considerations into peacebuilding and stabilization efforts.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Development, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa and Democratic Republic of the Congo

226. Sino-Russian Interactions Regarding Kazakhstan

Author:: Richard Weitz
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Many Russian strategists see Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asia country and a border state of Russia, as a strategic buffer shielding the Russian Federation from external threats. Russia derives considerable leverage over Kazakhstan from the two countries’ shared history, geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and defense ties. The Chinese government has cultivated extensive diplomatic, economic, and energy ties with Kazakhstan; Beijing has approached security ties more cautiously, not wishing to antagonize Russia. Kazakhstan is a critical participant in Beijing’s trans-Eurasian transportation initiatives due to the country’s pivotal location between China and Europe. Trilateral security cooperation remains modest while Russian-Chinese-Kazakhstani trade is increasing due to expanding rail, pipeline, and dual-use transfer networks connecting all three countries.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

227. The Yemen Review Quarterly: October-December 2024

Author:: Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Houthi leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi sought to reposition his movement as the head of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. Israel’s destruction of Gaza and attacks on Lebanon’s Hezbollah, including the killing of its influential leader, Hassan Nasrallah, have left the alliance weakened, a point underscored by the rapid fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Iran has tried to avoid direct conflict with Israel and the West, leaving the Houthis as the only undiminished group continuing to fight. Abdelmalek has increasingly spoken as if on behalf of the entire alliance, condemning the war in Gaza and chastising Saudi Arabia for pursuing normalization with Israel. The Houthis dissolved their Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHA), transferring its responsibilities to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. SCMCHA oversaw humanitarian operations and was notorious for its interference and aid diversion. The move follows the arrest and detention of dozens of humanitarian workers in June, some of whom have since been charged with espionage.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Economy, Houthis, and Military
Political Geography:: Middle East and Yemen

228. Law of duty: The case for a US-inspired EU Preparedness Act

Author:: Tiago Antunes
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Europe faces an era of geopolitical uncertainty, demanding a stronger response to security threats. Increased defence spending is essential but not enough. To be truly prepared, the EU needs a whole-of-society approach. An EU Preparedness Act, partly inspired by the US Defense Production Act (DPA), would empower the EU to mobilise industrial capacity, protect critical infrastructure, safeguard supply chains and ensure access to raw materials during crises. Current EU emergency tools fall far short of the scope of the DPA because they lack the command-and-control authority needed to address systemic disruptions. While the DPA cannot be replicated wholesale, some of its provisions could be adapted to the EU legal context. The adoption of an EU Preparedness Act finds legal basis in existing treaty provisions and adheres to the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Geopolitics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

229. Tough Times, Tough Choices: Charting PEPFAR’s Next Chapter While Safeguarding Its Legacy

Author:: Rachel Bonnifield and Janeen Madan Keller
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:: The Trump administration and key congressional lawmakers are shaping a new US government approach to the future of PEPFAR, alongside other global health programs like malaria and tuberculosis. The emerging vision emphasizes country ownership and greater government-to-government support via bilateral Global Health Compacts, paired with a financial drawdown of US assistance. The government’s proposed approach offers a broadly reasonable blueprint for PEPFAR’s evolution. Yet, the pace and scale of proposed changes are unprecedented in global health history, posing significant risks to hard-won PEPFAR results. Thoughtful and calibrated risk mitigation measures are needed to prevent financing gaps, service disruptions, and accountability breakdowns. We propose a differentiated three-track framework to operationalize a responsible PEPFAR transition while meeting the administration’s key strategic goals: Track 1 – Graduation: For wealthier and stable partner countries able to feasibly absorb PEPFAR funding on a relatively rapid timeline, following a phased shift of service delivery to government systems Track 2 – Toward self-reliance: For poorer, higher-burden countries, allowing extended timelines to gradually increase domestic financing while sustaining PEPFAR funding for key treatment and prevention outcomes Track 3 – Compassionate: For the poorest and most fragile countries where sustained PEPFAR investment is required, with potential scope for partial service delivery via national systems in some settings. This analysis and proposed timeline only apply to PEPFAR, and should not be extended to other global health programmatic areas and investments. We urge the administration and congressional leaders to pair adequate financial, technical, and human resources with a prudent operational approach to implement this next chapter of PEPFAR—protecting public health outcomes and preserving PEPFAR’s extraordinary legacy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, HIV/AIDS, Development, Global Health, and US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief(PEPFAR)
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

230. Supporting Effective Policing by Lebanon’s Embattled Security Agencies

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? Since October 2019, Lebanon’s economic crisis has gutted funding for the country’s security forces, including the army and national police. Overstretched, these agencies have resorted to makeshift solutions for keeping the peace, including initiatives that allow communities to help police themselves. Why does it matter? With the country’s security institutions struggling for resources, public safety in Lebanon is maintained by a patchwork of ad hoc solutions and quick fixes that cannot hold forever. As formal institutions continue to weaken, security will fray. Violence could follow, particularly in neglected and impoverished areas. What should be done? Donors should keep pressing Lebanon’s leaders to better address the economic crisis so that the government can reinvest in the security forces’ long-term viability, especially after the latest destabilising Israel-Hizbollah war. In parallel, targeted interventions by donors can help bolster the security forces’ performance and professional integrity.
Topic:: Security, Reform, Economy, and Donors
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

231. Indispensable Enemies: The Shifting Dynamics of Israeli–Turkish Relations

Author:: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Electra Nisidou
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This study explores the dynamics of Israeli–Turkish relations amidst two pivotal conflicts: the war in Gaza, where Turkey has vocally supported the Palestinian side, and the Syrian crisis, where both countries maintain significant territorial and strategic stakes. While Turkey and Israel operate from distinct ideological and strategic positions, their interactions are neither those of allies nor outright adversaries, but rather of two regional powers navigating overlapping challenges. The analysis highlights how these conflicts reveal a duality in their relationship characterized by ideological divergence in Gaza and pragmatic considerations in Syria, offering insights into their complex coexistence within the rapidly shifting Middle Eastern landscape. Turkey was among the first Muslim-majority countries to recognize Israel in 1949, establishing early diplomatic ties grounded in Turkey’s pro-Western orientation and NATO ambitions. The rise of the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the 2000s gradually transformed Turkish foreign policy, emphasizing solidarity with the Muslim world and a more vocal defence of the Palestinian cause. Divergences over Gaza, Syria, and energy politics in the Eastern Mediterranean further strained relations, while shared economic interests and US mediation prevented a complete breakdown. The 2023–2025 Gaza war became a defining moment, with Turkey’s strong condemnation of Israel paired with pragmatic economic continuity and, later, participation in the peace process. For the first time, many Israelis and Turks saw Turkey and Israel respectively as one of their country’s key security threats. The likelihood of direct conflict between Israel and Turkey has substantially decreased, as both states prioritize stability, reconstruction, and regional influence over open rivalry. While ideological and rhetorical tensions persist, Israeli–Turkish relations are entering a new phase characterized by pragmatic coexistence, mutual recognition, and shared regional responsibilities.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Regional Power, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

232. From umbrella to arsenal: boosting Europe's nuclear deterrence

Author:: Juraj Majcin
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Europe is entering its most dangerous decade since the Cold War. The post-Cold War peace has been shattered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and an escalating campaign of hybrid aggression aimed at destabilising the continent. Military and intelligence leaders are sounding the alarm with growing urgency: within the next three to five years, Russia could be in shape to launch a direct attack on a NATO member, plunging the Alliance into open war. To prevent such a catastrophe, deterrence must remain the bedrock of Europe’s defence strategy. In response to these threats, frontline states along NATO’s eastern and northern flanks have begun unprecedented rearmament efforts. However, deterrence without a nuclear dimension is incomplete—and, in the face of a nuclear-armed adversary, potentially ineffective. Nuclear deterrence has long been central to European security. During the Cold War, it was the US nuclear umbrella, combined with forward-deployed conventional forces, that held the Soviet threat in check. Today, however, cracks are emerging in the transatlantic bond, as the current US administration’s mixed signals on NATO commitments have deepened European anxieties about the reliability of American security guarantees. Even more concerning, Russia has developed and deployed new intermediate-range nuclear missiles on NATO’s doorstep, while intensifying its nuclear sabre-rattling through explicit threats and provocative rhetoric aimed at undermining allied resolve. Against this backdrop, Europe must confront a pressing question: how can it strengthen its own nuclear arsenal to ensure a credible deterrent against Russia—with or without the backing of the US umbrella?
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, and France

233. Directed Energy Weapons and the Future of European Defence

Author:: Chris Kremidas-Courtney
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Europe stands at the edge of a new defence frontier defined by beams of light and pulses of energy. As warfighting evolves into the age of mass precision, the weapons that will shape tomorrow’s battlefield may not make noise or leave shell casings behind. Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) are no longer science fiction, since they are rapidly becoming a vital element of European air defences. As Europe faces intensifying threats ranging from drone swarms to missile attacks, DEWs offer rapid-response, low-cost-per-shot solutions that can intercept threats at the speed of light. DEWs, which include high-energy lasers, high-power microwaves (HPM) and particle beam systems are emerging as transformative capabilities in 21st-century defence. They employ electromagnetic or photonic energy to disable or destroy multiple targets with remarkable precision, unlike kinetic munitions that rely on ballistic interception. Lessons from the invasion of Ukraine and the Red Sea Crisis tell us that Europe requires these capabilities now.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Innovation, and Directed Energy Weapons
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

234. Dual-use innovation: Confronting the challenges and delivering EU security and competitiveness

Author:: Alison Hunter
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The EU is navigating a complex security and defence (S&D) transition. Responding with speed and certaint is difficult at a time of geopolitical upheaval. Europe is meeting the sharp wake-up call heralding the end of the peace dividend with a significant absence of preparedness. At the same time, the Union must confront new global threats to its economic competitiveness. It stands at an inflection point, where security and defence ambitions are no longer peripheral – they are existential. Defence innovation must be understood as a lever for the EU to respond to this new reality, allowing the Union to position Europe’s industrial defence as the driver of its global competitiveness and the key to determining its future. Despite many new instruments – such as the SAFE1 facility, the Defence Industrial Strategy (2024) and the Readiness Roadmap 2030 – Europe’s defence production and technological agility lag significantly behind the United States and key global competitors. The EU’s industrial defence bottlenecks are deep- rooted and structural. National sovereignty concerns and disharmony among the EU27 impede collective action, while Single Market deficits prevent the scale and direction of the industrial response needed. This has resulted in security incrementalism, where siloed, short- term actions replace systemic and long-term strategic direction. There is no amount of financing, smart policy or political rhetoric that can compensate for the decisive and collective action needed. This paper advocates for the design of an EU dual- use innovation framework spanning technologies, infrastructures and financing frameworks that serve both civilian and military purposes. This will help the Union overcome the current impasse and drive its international security and competitiveness. Achieving this is a complex endeavour. It involves fundamental changes to the regulatory environment and reforms to the Union’s approach to trans-national collaboration across the entire innovation spectrum – from industry, to investment, to infrastructures. Dual-use innovation must permeate all EU territories. Delivery depends on more than higher defence-related spending. It requires a ‘whole of government’ and ‘dual-use by design’ approach, through upgraded governance systems, legislation and institutional capacity, navigated by a high level of ‘buy-in’ from political, policy, industrial and civil society actors. In short, dual-use innovation must be re-positioned from being part of the EU’s innovation agenda to acting as its driving force. A new arsenal of EU, industrial, defence-driven policy and investment measures have taken shape, with more on the way to respond to the Union’s industrial defence-readiness needs and production capacity deficits. Success requires a clearer understanding of the trade-offs associated with an industrial effort of this magnitude. Improved strategic coordination is underway but must be strengthened under the new Readiness Roadmap and proposed Defence Semester. The European Commission’s proposals related to the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) seek to embed defence spending across key policy instruments. However, the scope for defence-related innovation to serve a broader range of EU objectives (e.g. targeting the EU’s multiple transition challenges and boosting sub-national preparedness efforts) has, so far, been vastly under-acknowledged. A dual-use innovation approach can help to bridge solutions – across military and non-military contexts – thereby confronting a range of societal challenges and strengthening the mileage of innovation defence investments. It could unlock political, societal and financing tensions.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Innovation, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:: Europe

235. Additive Manufacturing and the Future of European Defence

Author:: Chris Kremidas-Courtney
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Additive manufacturing is rapidly becoming central to how Europe supplies, repairs, and sustains its armed forces, giving it an edge over adversaries like Russia who are struggling with sanctions and supply chain constraints. This policy paper explores how AM is reshaping logistics, strengthening strategic autonomy, and recommends steps European leaders must take to maximize this advantage. To transform AM from a tactical novelty to a strategic capability, Europe and NATO must act decisively in six areas: 1. Standardize and certify. Finalize one set of interoperable AM standards via EDA and NATO Standards Agreements (STANAGs), aligning material properties, testing, and digital workflows. 2. Build secure digital infrastructure. Develop federated digital part libraries compatible with NATO’s RAPID–e system and protect them within cyber-secure IP frameworks. 3. Reform procurement. Shift defence acquisitions to value AM’s lifecycle benefits and not just unit cost. Enable flexible contracting for digital files and fieldable AM printers. 4. Accelerate joint R&D and training. Expand EDF and DIANA-supported AM projects; launch a European AM Centre of Excellence for training, best practice exchange, and field trials. 5. Reduce external dependencies. Invest in Europeancontrolled software platforms, advanced materials R&D, and open-access design libraries to reduce reliance on US-held intellectual property and supply chains. Prioritize the development of sovereign feedstocks, firmware, and precision AM systems tailored to EU operational and certification needs. 6. Invest in industry and skills development. Support SMEs and academic partners to scale AM capacity. Establish EU-wide training pathways to build a qualified military-industrial AM workforce.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Manufacturing, and Industry
Political Geography:: Europe

236. Accept, prepare, leverage: How Europeans can manage a changing transatlantic security partnership in the Trump era

Author:: Iana Maisuradze
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The transatlantic security partnership is entering a new phase. Europeans must assume greater responsibility for their own defence as the United States under President Donald Trump no longer prioritises Europe. Trump’s approach to trying to end the war in Ukraine, including attempts at direct negotiation with Russian President Vladimir Putin and ambiguous security guarantees for Kyiv, pose significant challenges that risk undermining the transatlantic security relationship. For the foreseeable future, however, European security will continue to depend on the United States. To manage that reality, European governments face three main tasks: first, to understand and accept Trump’s political calculations and interests; second, to prepare NATO’s European members and the EU to take the lead on their continent’s security; and third, to ensure that guarantees for Ukraine are credible enough to deter renewed or enhanced Russian aggression.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

237. The Axis of Upheaval: Gauging the Growing Military Cooperation Among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a critical catalyst for cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—what the authors call the “axis of upheaval.” Already, defense cooperation between these countries has enabled Russian aggression against Ukraine, increased their military capabilities in ways that make each country a more formidable threat, emboldened their more brazen and destabilizing actions, and magnified gray zone actions against the United States and its allies. Although much of this cooperation occurs bilaterally among specific dyads of the axis, that cooperation is increasingly beneficial to the overall group. Russian advancements on the battlefield in Ukraine and experience in modern warfare, for example, are diffusing to each axis country. Iranian drone technology now flows through Russia to North Korea and China, and Russian defense officials frequently travel from one axis capital to the next, creating connectivity among multiple members of the axis that would not otherwise exist. The cooperation among the axis of upheaval will persist, despite some claims that Russia’s and China’s limited support for Iran amid Israeli and U.S. strikes spell the end of their ties. China, Iran, and North Korea deliberated for months on the sidelines of Russia’s war before moving to more fully support Moscow after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. China gave little more than its diplomatic support to the Kremlin in the first months after Russia’s invasion, and it was nearly six months until public reports documented the arrival of Iran’s drones in Russia. While these countries are reticent to incur unnecessary costs on behalf of their partners, they will seek out opportunities to support one another, especially in ways that help them withstand Western pressure. The incentives fueling their cooperation have not changed since Israel’s actions against Iran, and, if anything, Russia, China, and North Korea are likely to see value in helping Tehran reconstitute its capacity to antagonize the United States and create policy dilemmas for Washington.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Cooperation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea

238. Quad: The Next Phase

Author:: Lisa Curtis, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, Keerthi Martyn, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: T The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is becoming the focal point for economic and technological cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as the competition between the United States and China intensifies and regional power dynamics continue to evolve. The Quad nations share democratic values and seek to advance an affirmative vision for the region that promotes an inclusive regional architecture and offers options for regional partners, which are charting their economic and security futures in the face of growing great power competition. The second Trump administration is signaling its commitment to deepening Quad cooperation to counter China’s efforts to dominate the region and to ensure other countries in the region remain prosperous, peaceful, and free from coercion. However, the administration also has indicated that it wants to streamline the work of the Quad and whittle down its dozens of different working groups to focus on a handful of priorities. With the need to deliver tangible results, the administration is interested in maintaining fewer—yet more active—working groups that produce substantial outputs.1 While the Quad has made notable progress since it was revived nearly eight years ago, there is opportunity to expand and deepen its work to fulfill its promise of promoting a free, open, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. To
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

239. The Global State of al-Qa`ida 24 Years After 9/11

Author:: Colin Clarke and Clara Broekaert
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: Al-Qa`ida has evolved considerably over the past four decades. Today, it is no longer a hierarchical organization with charismatic leadership, but rather a decentralized network of franchise groups dispersed throughout Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and beyond. The group has not conducted spectacular external operations (EXOPS) for many years, but instead has been focused on patiently rebuilding, dedicating its resources and manpower to forging relationships with regional affiliates and championing their grievances, which are often locally focused. Al-Qa`ida Central, including its senior leadership, has been attenuated, but the organization’s branches in Somalia and the Sahel are gaining momentum, and there is growing concern that al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is also looking to rebound. All of this is occurring against a backdrop of decline in the overall tempo of Western counterterrorism efforts, signaling the end of more than two decades of the Global War on Terrorism. Even in its diminished form, 24 years after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qa`ida and its global network of affiliates pose a serious latent security threat, including to the West, which takes these groups for granted at its own peril.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and Al Qaeda
Political Geography:: Africa, South Asia, Middle East, and Global Focus

240. Ten Years Later: The Legacy of the Paris Attacks on Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks in the West

Author:: Alexandre Rodde
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: A decade ago, the terrorist attacks in Paris illustrated the risks and challenges posed by complex coordinated terrorist attacks (CCTA) in a Western capital. These marauding attacks, striking multiple scenes in quick succession, were different from the bombing of public transport in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. This article explains the evolution of the Western law enforcement response while facing such attacks, and how the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2015 Paris attacks led to operational and tactical evolutions in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow demonstrates the continuing threat posed by CCTA outside of the West. The constantly evolving modus operandi used by terrorists requires a strong anticipation effort by law enforcement agencies in order to prepare for a potential return of CCTA in the West.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

241. Security and stability scenarios for the Western Balkans

Author:: Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: This report has examined how the Netherlands, the EU and NATO can enhance their security approach to address potential security developments in the Western Balkans in the period up until the end of 2029. Therefore, it has first assessed the current security and stability situation in the Western Balkans, displaying current threats to territorial, physical, economic, ecological, social and political, and international (legal) security and stability. ''The current tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the conviction of Bosnian-Serb leader Milorad Dodik show that broader instability in the Western Balkans remains a real risk. Our latest report doesn’t just look at the chances of (armed) conflict—it also explores how climate change, organized crime, and economic and democratic developments shape the region’s long-term stability. The EU and US play a key role in tackling security challenges in the Western Balkans, but their sustained cooperation will be crucial'', reasercher Wouter Zweers says. Especially the lack of normalisation between Serbia and Kosovo and persisting secessionist agendas and a lack of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as a manifestation of ethnic tensions and organised crime have in the last few years threatened physical and territorial security in the region. The report also highlights continued weaknesses in the democratic governance of the Western Balkan countries, which also negatively impact economic stability and bring about migrationrelated security challenges. The region’s ecological security is mainly threatened by (climate change-)induced natural disasters, environmental pollution, as well as insufficient energy security. Lastly, stability is undermined by external actors such as especially Russia, but also by the effects of the war in Ukraine, heightened global geopolitical tensions, global pressure on democracy and uncertainty surrounding transatlantic cooperation. Subsequently, the report has presented (the synopses of) four scenarios that showcase fictional but potential security developments in the Balkan region over the next five years. Two of those scenarios foresee a violent escalation, respectively in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in North Kosovo. The other two scenarios see, respectively, a relatively successful EU integration path marked by external security challenges, and a muddle-through scenario with an intensification of several already persistent security challenges.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Political stability, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Kosovo, Serbia, and Western Balkans

242. The First 90 Days of Trump 2.0

Author:: Rachel Tausenfreund, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Claudia Schmucker, Aylin Matlé, and Stefan Meister
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: This report examines the first 90 days of the Trump 2.0 administration and offers strategic recommendations for the new German government and its partners in Europe and beyond. DGAP experts analyze the administration’s priorities and methods across key policy areas and explore how best to respond. The opening chapter outlines the ideological foundations of Trump’s new coalition and their foreign policy implications, concluding with key insights and policy takeaways.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Climate Change, Migration, Science and Technology, Trade, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and United States of America

243. Precarious Peace: The Complexities and Risks of the Gaza Plan

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Intense Israeli strikes after the ceasefire caused heavy casualties and highlighted ongoing violations of Trump’s Gaza plan. Despite US mediation, Israel restricted aid, exceeded withdrawal limits, and disputed security terms, leaving the truce fragile and Gaza’s civilians at risk.
Topic:: Security, Humanitarian Aid, Civilians, Ceasefire, Mediation, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

244. Protection of Civilians According to the Approaches of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Analysis of Assumptions and Challenges during Peace, Crisis Management, Armed Conflicts and War

Author:: Tomasz Rubaj and Anna Ludwiczak
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article presents the conclusions of research in the area of Protection of Civilians (PoC). The first part discusses the essence, purpose, main components, and dimensions of PoC. The introductory section provides a comparative analysis of the principles of PoC under the UN and NATO approaches, indicating both similarities and the reasons for existing differences. The research focuses on the evolving challenges of PoC, taking into account lessons learned from crises, armed conflicts, and wars. The purpose of the article is to analyse the main assumptions of PoC adopted by the UN and NATO during crises and wars. The research problem is expressed through the following question: How are the basic assumptions of PoC formulated in the UN and NATO approaches, what similarities and differences exist between them, and how can they be improved in light of experiences from contemporary crises, armed conflicts, and wars? The article also identifies the main challenges related to PoC and the management of international organizations. It presents the theoretical framework, research findings, and issues for further discussion.
Topic:: Security, NATO, United Nations, Crisis Management, Civilians, Armed Conflict, and Protection
Political Geography:: Global Focus

245. EU–Türkiye Defense Cooperation: Why Now—and How Far?

Author:: Kadri Tastan, Martin Quencez, Georgina Wright, and Galip Dalay
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: For decades, Europe’s security framework has rested on NATO and, above all, US leadership. That framework is now under pressure. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended assumptions about lasting peace on the continent, while Donald Trump’s return to the White House has reignited European concerns about the reliability of American security commitments. In an urgent response to these developments, defense and security top the EU agenda. Member states are significantly increasing military spending, and Brussels has launched the €800 billion Re-Arm Europe initiative, an ambitious effort to strengthen Europe’s defense capacity and reduce dependence on external powers. Leaders are also working to build new coalitions inside NATO through the emerging “European pillar” and outside the alliance via bilateral and multilateral frameworks such as the Franco-British initiative to provide Ukraine with security guarantees. A central question emerges as EU moves to increase its strategic autonomy: Who fits within this new security architecture? While Norway and the United Kingdom are generally seen as natural partners, Türkiye’s role remains more ambiguous. This raises a key unresolved issue about the country’s position in Europe’s evolving security architecture. Türkiye is not just another partner. As a NATO member state, it occupies a strategic crossroads linking Europe, the Middle East, and the Black Sea. It has played an active role in supporting Ukraine militarily and has developed a sizable, increasingly sophisticated defense industry. But despite these strengths, Türkiye’s relations with the EU remain complex and often tense. Political disagreements, normative differences, the unresolved Cyprus conflict, and enduring Greek-Turkish rivalries continue to restrict formal cooperation. Moreover, the Türkiye-EU relationship is undergoing a deep structural shift. In the past, ties were largely shaped by shared responses to external threats and hopes of closer integration. Links today are increasingly defined by the dynamics of a multipolar global order, the declining influence of the geopolitical West, and EU’s efforts to redefine its identity and role, internally and externally. Türkiye and EU are repositioning themselves in global politics, and this realignment will shape the future of their interactions. This report does not merely describe the state of Türkiye-EU defense ties. It analyzes the impact of historical legacies, great-power competition, and shifting regional dynamics on reshaping the foundation of the relationship between the two. It probes core strategic questions: What role will Türkiye play in Europe’s emerging security framework? What are the long-term costs and benefits of deeper defense cooperation? And how can this cooperation be embedded within a normative framework acceptable to both sides?
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Middle East

246. The EU’s New Black Sea Security Strategy: Right Goals, Unclear Means

Author:: Bogdan Cozma and Laurențiu Pleșca
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The Black Sea region has always been a strategic battlefield of ideologies and influence, not least during the Cold War. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it experienced a period of relative tranquility as the geopolitical focus shifted toward other hotspots such as the Middle East and the South China Sea. In more recent times—notably after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and its war in eastern Ukraine—the region and its importance for the security architecture of Europe slowly re-emerged on the agenda of policymakers in the EU and the United States. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 then pushed it to the forefront of transatlantic security concerns. Today there is a clear consensus among the EU, NATO, and the United States that they need a fundamental rethink toward a strong, long-term strategy for the Black Sea. Having expressed its willingness to become more of a geopolitical actor, the EU has now reiterated its commitment to the region by adopting a strategy on Black Sea security, which was published on May 28. The strategy identifies five countries as key players in the region and calls for closer cooperation with them: member states Bulgaria and Romania, candidate countries Moldova and Ukraine, and Türkiye, a NATO member with a substantial military presence and strategic influence in the region. Unfortunately, however, the EU’s new strategy does not contain a concrete action plan, a clear implementation timeline, or, most importantly, a dedicated budget. Without these, the EU’s ability to translate its political intentions into concrete outcomes for the security of the Black Sea states will remain significantly limited. If its strategic approach remains largely declarative, this increases the risk of ceding influence to Russia in the immediate region and beyond it. A more concrete, robust, and coordinated EU security presence there is still urgently needed.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Domestic Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Black Sea

247. Case Study on Conspiracy to Smuggle U.S.-Origin Military Equipment and Dual-Use Technology to North Korea

Author:: Jessica Kim and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: A Chinese national, Shenghua Wen, pleaded guilty in 2024 to conspiring with North Korea to export restricted items without a license, violating the U.S. International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, and Executive Orders. At the direction of the North Korean government, Wen acted from his private residence in the United States, buying military goods domestically and providing false shipping information to send the items to Hong Kong, and then to North Korea. The case demonstrates that though North Korea can achieve limited success through such schemes, its agents face a high risk of exposure, detainment, and prosecution. Beyond firearms, ammunition, and other military equipment, North Korea sought civilian aircraft engine blueprints to manufacture engines for its drone program. At present, Wen’s scheme does not appear to indicate the presence of a more sophisticated smuggling network. Thus far, Wen’s partners/co-conspirators, the unnamed Hong Kong-based “broker,” and front company mentioned in the criminal complaint have not faced any punitive action from the U.S. government.
Topic:: Security, Sanctions, Smuggling, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

248. Iraqi Kurds Could Facilitate and Mediate in PKK-Turkish Peace Process 

Author:: Wladimir van Wilgenburg
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: New developments in the PKK-Turkey peace process are a window of opportunity for Iraqi Kurdish parties to stabilize areas of Iraqi Kurdistan affected by the conflict and help facilitate a lasting peace. In a major development, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leadership announced on May 12 that the group would disband, potentially marking an end to its forty year conflict with Turkey after a peace process began between its imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan’s and the Turkish state last October. However, much of the conflict has unfolded not in Turkey but in Iraq—and specifically the Kurdistan Region of Iraq—where Turkey has fought the PKK since the 1980s in a conflict that has threatened civilian lives, prompted internal displacement, and damaged the local economy. Given the destabilizing role of this conflict there, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has proven keen on a successful peace process in Turkey, since it could remove what it sees as PKK’s territorial encroachment in Iraqi Kurdistan. Both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the KDP have also played mediating roles in the previous peace processes between Turkey and the PKK. While the PKK entered the Qandil mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan via a deal with the KDP in 1982, the PKK subsequently extended its presence outside of Qandil in the 1990s and came into conflict with the KDP during the Kurdish civil war. And during Turkish military cross-border operations against the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan, which have increased since 2019, there have also been skirmishes and tensions between the KDP and PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan, including clashes between the PKK and Peshmerga, assassinations, market fires, and drone attacks on Peshmerga forces. The Turkish-PKK conflict has also led to civilian casualties in Iraqi Kurdistan, such as when eight Iraqi tourists were killed in 2022 in Turkish strikes, sparking diplomatic tensions between Baghdad and Ankara. These activities have been deeply concerning to the KDP, leading it to call on the PKK to return to Qandil and leave other areas of Iraqi Kurdistan in 2021 and offering its support for new peace talks with Turkey in return.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Kurds, Political Parties, PKK, and Peace Process
Political Geography:: Middle East and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

249. To Halt the Jihadist Advance in Somalia, Work with Turkey and the UAE

Author:: Ido Levy
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Overhauled Turkish and Emirati training programs for the Somali army and renewed funding for the African Union mission could provide the boost that Mogadishu needs, and Washington should push for both. n July 27, the al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist group al-Shabab seized the town of Mahas in central Somalia. For the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the loss of Mahas after a series of defeats is particularly stinging, as the town was liberated by African Union (AU) and government forces in 2014. Al-Shabab’s latest onslaught, which began earlier this year, has brought it additional territories around the capital. The empowered al-Qaeda affiliate is also still bent on attacking U.S. interests around the world. Last year, a federal court convicted an al-Shabab operative in New York of plotting a “9/11-style attack,” and in 2023, U.S. authorities charged an American citizen arrested in Kenya for attempting to join al-Shabab to attack the United States. Moreover, the UN has reported a budding tactical relationship in which the Yemeni Houthis transfer weapons and know-how to al-Shabab, while the Somali group agrees to ramp up piracy to support Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping. Seizing more territory in Somalia gives al-Shabab additional resources and infrastructure for such activities abroad.
Topic:: Security, Training, Jihad, and Al-Shabaab
Political Geography:: Africa, Turkey, Middle East, Somalia, and United Arab Emirates

250. Spy Versus Spy: Iran’s Playbook for Espionage in Israel

Author:: Sarah Boches and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Tehran’s recruitment of Israelis for military surveillance, sabotage, assassination plots, and other operations is on the rise, showing how the shadow war between the two adversaries continues to evolve even after their recent hot war.
Topic:: Security, Conflict, Surveillance, and Espionage
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Israel

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS