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3361. The African Union’s Gender, Peace, and Security Mechanisms: Policy Options for Protecting Women in Conflict

Author:
Hussaina J. Abdullah
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
This brief addresses the mechanisms of the African Union (AU) for protecting and promoting women’s rights during conflict and their participation in post- conflict peacebuilding processes. These mechanisms can be found in the policy frameworks and structures of the Protocol Relating to the Establish- ment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (the PSC Pro- tocol) of 2002, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol), adopted in 2003, and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) of 2004. Other mechanisms include the AU Action Plans on Gender Main- streaming in peace and security, as well as a special rapporteur on women’s rights, appointed in 1999, a special envoy on women, peace, and security, appointed in 2014, and the AU’s Five-Year (2015–2020) Gender, Peace, and Security Programme. While the AU scores high on de jure instruments designed to improve the legal framework for women’s rights and gender equality, the evidence sug- gests less progress in terms of the de facto practices directed toward their implementation. For example, the Maputo Protocol—the African Women’s Bill of Rights—whose full ratification and enforcement were envisaged by 2015 and its domestication by 2020—has not been ratified by fourteen member states,2 and two countries, Botswana and Egypt, have not even signed the in- strument. Even some of the countries that ratified it did so with reservations. Furthermore, while member states are also expected to send biennial reports on the implementation processes in their respective countries, only Malawi had complied with this provision as of December 2015. And although the protocol demands the protection of women against violence in war and in peace times, reports indicate the continued perpetration with impunity of sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV) against women in conflict-affected settings. The PSC protocol, the normative framework on which the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)4 is based, recognizes the need to protect women from violence in conflict-affected areas, but in doing so it makes them appear as mostly passive victims of war. An approach is needed that recognizes women can be perpetrators of violence as well as agents of change pro- moting peace and reconciliation. The integration of an all-encompassing organizational gender strategy to guide the AU’s work in conflict and post-conflict situations will strengthen effectiveness in conflict-affected societies with regard to the women, peace, and security (WPS) goals of participation in post-conflict governance; protec- tion from SGBV and acts of impunity; prevention of the abuse of women, girls, and children; and the promotion of gender equality. The mandate of the AU’s special envoy on WPS to “ensure that the voices of women and the vulnerable are heard much more in peacebuilding and in conflict resolu- tion” is both timely and relevant. Priority should be given to coordinating mechanisms for an Africa-centered gen- der, peace, and security framework and to promoting synergies among women’s organizations, national gov- ernments, and peace support operations to ensure the implementation of actions that make a difference in the lives of women in conflict-affected countries. The spe- cial envoy should also engage closely with stakeholders to ensure full domestication of the Maputo Protocol is achieved by 2020. In sum, although the AU has made some progress in establishing a gender, peace, and security framework to ensure the protection of women’s rights and promote gen- der equality in conflict and post-conflict settings, some gaps and coordination challenges continue to limit its ef- fectiveness. Gender mainstreaming mechanisms across the peace and security sector, including capacity building initiatives, need to be addressed critically to prevent the continued violation of women’s physical and bodily integ- rity in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries.
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa

3362. Is UNSCR 1325 Empowering African Women to Negotiate? Peace Insights and Policy Options

Author:
Pamela Machakanja
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
Africa faces formidable challenges with regard to the relatively few women influencing decisions and policies related to peace and security. A study on women’s participation in thirty-one peace processes between 1992 and 2011 showed that of the fifteen African countries, only five had women on their ne- gotiating teams (Burundi, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, and Uganda); five had women witnesses or observers ( Liberia, Si- erra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda); two had women lead mediators (DRC and Kenya); and only one (DRC) had women signatories.1 Although UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 “reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security,”2 its full implementation remains a work in progress in Africa, as women’s participation in peace and security remains more symbolic than substantive, and their capacity to influence and engage in peace negotiations is often resisted by local cultural norms and patriarchal hierarchies.
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, Culture, Feminism, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa

3363. Violence and Security Concerns in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland

Author:
Imren Borsuk
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Eighteen years after the Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland struggles with a lingering sense of insecurity. This article discusses the underlying reasons for a sense of insecurity and vulnerability in this post-conflict context. First, ongoing sporadic communal violence reactivates communal divisions and the psychological burden of “the Troubles.” The activities of spoiler paramilitary groups and sporadic communal troubles still fuel people’s anxiety about the possibility of renewed violence, as the history of political violence proves how these influences can be a destabilizing factor in inter-communal relations. Second, the unchanging patterns of political mobilization, based on the historical division of unionism and nationalism, reinforce the previous cleavages and continue to inform the boundaries of the communal divide. The political arena is still plagued by ethnic outbidding and intransigent party politicking, both of which pit communities against each other and keep the zero-sum bias between the groups alive. Third, the working-class communities that constituted the backbone of the political violence carry on the legacy of war with their continued paramilitary presence and legacy of sectarianism. The social vulnerabilities of working-class areas, such as continuing paramilitary presence, the legacy of sectarianism in segregated neighborhoods, persistent mistrust toward the police, and growing youth unemployment, need to be addressed in order to generate a long-term social infrastructure for peace.
Topic:
Security, Violence, and Post-Conflict
Political Geography:
Northern Ireland

3364. State Legitimacy, Fragile States, and U.S. National Security

Author:
CAP National Security and International Policy
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The continued growth of powerful transnational challenges poses grave and persis- tent threats to the security and well-being of the United States. America’s approach needs to be updated to include new foreign policy tools and new approaches. The heart of the new foundation for U.S. foreign policy should be an investment in the efforts of nations at risk of collapsing and unleashing global threats to build legitimacy and to escape the trap of repression followed by upheaval. International Compacts for Governance, Prosperity, and Security could transform how the international community works in partnership with fragile states to improve their legitimacy and security over time. The United States will need the political will and leadership to support steady, long-term, and carefully designed investments in fragile states. This will also require rebalancing U.S. foreign policy resources toward development, diplomacy, economic statecraft, and justice sector reform, while maintaining the world’s most powerful military. All of these tools are required to move from a focus on countering terrorism to a focus on defeating extremism and enabling other nations to build the legitimacy they need themselves. This is the strategy that will most effectively and sustainably ensure America’s national security—and, indeed, global security as well.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, Reform, and transnationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3365. 5 Big Ideas for U.S. Policy in the Americas

Author:
Dan Restrepo, Michael Werz, and Joel Martinez
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The Americas affect U.S. national and homeland security, economic prosperity, and stability perhaps more than any other region in the world. Collectively, they are the destination for more than 40 percent of all U.S. exports,1 the source of 65 percent of all U.S. energy imports,2 and the region of origin or heritage for 17 percent of the U.S. population.3 As the next administration looks to the Americas, it will have a fundamental choice: It can embrace the partnership model that seeks to work with those in the region willing and capable to engage on the wide range of bilateral, regional, and global issues that have predominated the past eight years. Or, in contrast, the administration can unreasonably attempt to wall the United States off from its closest neighbors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
South America, Central America, North America, and United States of America

3366. Toward a More Perfect Union: The Struggle for Security in Libya

Author:
William Danvers
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Libya’s militia problem—which is a primary source of political and economic instability—is more complicated than defeating IS because it is more widespread. Dealing with it is a fundamental part of any effort to build a unified Libyan state. There are said to be as many as 2,000 militias across Libya, and while most are independent, they do fall into three general categories.10 There are those militias aligned with the GNC, many of which are Islamist but not necessarily jihadi. There are those that are generally anti-Islamist, loyal to the HoR and its military strongman supporter General Khalifa Haftar. Then there are those that are radical jihadis, such as IS and Ansar al-Shariah, which have ties to Al Qaeda.11 These militias form coalitions when it suits their purpose and at other times are at odds with each other. Regardless, they have helped create a failed Libyan state with no central authority or security structure.12 The criminal underground in Libya has been functioning since the time of Gadhafi. There are a number of groups, but there is no real central power structure similar to the mafia. Instead, these criminal groups operate independently, and they traffic in a variety of things, including guns, drugs, and people. They work with whoever serves their purpose, including IS. The role of the criminal underground has increased as the Libyan economy continues to crumble. In a very real sense, these criminal groups are the connective tissue between the jihadis and the militias, with all three impeding efforts to rebuild Libya.13 If Libya devolves into further instability—in effect becoming a failed state—it creates a threat to the region; a threat to Europe because of the increased flow of refugees and migrants from Libya; and a threat to both the United States and European Union because of the presence of IS and Al Qaeda affiliates. While addressing Libya’s security crises is an essential piece of the effort to build a functioning state, it will certainly be a difficult and complicated process. Nonetheless, there are things that can be done that will help make Libya more secure.
Topic:
Security, Fragile/Failed State, Peace, and State Building
Political Geography:
Africa and Libya

3367. Moscow on the Potomac

Author:
CAP National Security and International Policy
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
On October 16, 2016, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson issued an extraordinary statement, indicating that the “U.S. Intelligence Community is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations.”1 The release of this hacked information was all directed at the Democratic presidential campaign and its affiliates, with no hacked information leaked regarding the campaign of the Republican presidential nominee, and now president-elect, Donald Trump. These senior U.S. intelligence officials pointed out that Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, had used similar tactics across Europe and Eurasia to bolster right-wing nationalist parties and that “[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the U.S. election process.” Director Michael Rogers, head of the National Security Agency, noted, “There shouldn’t be any doubt in anybody’s minds, this was not something that was done casually, this was not something that was done by chance, this was not a target that was selected purely arbitrarily. This was a conscious effort by a nation-state to attempt to achieve a specific effect.”2
Topic:
Security, Corruption, National Security, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

3368. Brexit and Baltic Sea Security

Author:
Riina Kaljurand, Tony Lawrence, Pauli Järvenpää, and Tomas Jermalavicius
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The result of the UK’s June 2016 referendum on continued membership of the EU was unexpected and its consequences may be wide-ranging and grave. This report considers the impact of the UK’s exit from the European Union (‘Brexit’) on the security of Estonia, the Baltic Sea region and Europe more widely. Its focus is hard security – military security and defence. The UK is a defence and security actor of considerable prominence, able to contribute significant military capability to the organisations and operations in which it participates. It is, however, sceptical about the place of the EU in defence matters and has achieved a certain level of infamy for its perseverance in obstructing the further development of an EU defence dimension. One immediate consequence of the Brexit referendum result was a burst of ideas for further EU defence integration, which has led to an agreement on the first steps for implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence. Not all member states, however, are enthusiastic for these ideas. Interviews conducted for this report with officials and researchers in the Baltic Sea states of Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, and also in the UK found that interviewees believed that their countries shared with the UK approaches to security that would be harder to pursue after Brexit without the active support of the UK itself, and were largely sceptical about the need for further defence integration in the EU. In general, though, interviewees felt that the character of the European security environment post-Brexit is very difficult to forecast and the many factors that will contribute to shaping it are highly uncertain, complex, and intertwined. In these circumstances, scenario planning methodologies offer perhaps the best means of thinking about the future and informing policy decisions. The report thus identifies a range of possible post-Brexit scenarios as a vehicle for testing policies and identifying those likely to result in maximum benefit and minimum cost.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

3369. Strategic Standoff: The U.S.-China Rivalry and Taiwan

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The CCP views Taiwan as a grave threat to its grip on power. Consequently, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is the armed wing of the CCP, considers the invasion of Taiwan to be its most critical mission. Getting the strategic competition with China right will ultimately help America secure unprecedented levels of prosperity, freedom, and stability for all Pacific nations by the century’s midpoint.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3370. The Russian Reality Check on Turkey's Gas Hub Hopes

Author:
Morena Skalamera
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
On Nov 24, 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet after it veered into its airspace for 17 seconds. On December 13, a Russian ship fired warning shots at a Turkish vessel in the Aegean Sea. Bilateral tensions, with overt military dimensions, have seemed to quickly replace the goodwill that characterized relations only a year ago. Over the past few weeks, experts and observers have debated whether this incident will jeopardize deep Turkish-Russian energy cooperation—and whether newfound tensions between Moscow and Ankara will thwart Turkey’s ambition to transform itself into an energy hub. A closer look suggests grounds for both optimism and pessimism. Given the deep interests of both parties in continuing energy cooperation, and the mutual nature of the dependency, tensions over Syria are unlikely to adversely impact energy cooperation in a fundamental way. Turkey, however, is unlikely to realize its vision of an energy hub—not because of Russia, but because of a combination of domestic and other geopolitical factors.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Economics, Energy Policy, Oil, Geopolitics, Gas, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Turkey