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3141. State Legitimacy, Fragile States, and U.S. National Security

Author:
CAP National Security and International Policy
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The continued growth of powerful transnational challenges poses grave and persis- tent threats to the security and well-being of the United States. America’s approach needs to be updated to include new foreign policy tools and new approaches. The heart of the new foundation for U.S. foreign policy should be an investment in the efforts of nations at risk of collapsing and unleashing global threats to build legitimacy and to escape the trap of repression followed by upheaval. International Compacts for Governance, Prosperity, and Security could transform how the international community works in partnership with fragile states to improve their legitimacy and security over time. The United States will need the political will and leadership to support steady, long-term, and carefully designed investments in fragile states. This will also require rebalancing U.S. foreign policy resources toward development, diplomacy, economic statecraft, and justice sector reform, while maintaining the world’s most powerful military. All of these tools are required to move from a focus on countering terrorism to a focus on defeating extremism and enabling other nations to build the legitimacy they need themselves. This is the strategy that will most effectively and sustainably ensure America’s national security—and, indeed, global security as well.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, Reform, and transnationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3142. 5 Big Ideas for U.S. Policy in the Americas

Author:
Dan Restrepo, Michael Werz, and Joel Martinez
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The Americas affect U.S. national and homeland security, economic prosperity, and stability perhaps more than any other region in the world. Collectively, they are the destination for more than 40 percent of all U.S. exports,1 the source of 65 percent of all U.S. energy imports,2 and the region of origin or heritage for 17 percent of the U.S. population.3 As the next administration looks to the Americas, it will have a fundamental choice: It can embrace the partnership model that seeks to work with those in the region willing and capable to engage on the wide range of bilateral, regional, and global issues that have predominated the past eight years. Or, in contrast, the administration can unreasonably attempt to wall the United States off from its closest neighbors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
South America, Central America, North America, and United States of America

3143. Toward a More Perfect Union: The Struggle for Security in Libya

Author:
William Danvers
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Libya’s militia problem—which is a primary source of political and economic instability—is more complicated than defeating IS because it is more widespread. Dealing with it is a fundamental part of any effort to build a unified Libyan state. There are said to be as many as 2,000 militias across Libya, and while most are independent, they do fall into three general categories.10 There are those militias aligned with the GNC, many of which are Islamist but not necessarily jihadi. There are those that are generally anti-Islamist, loyal to the HoR and its military strongman supporter General Khalifa Haftar. Then there are those that are radical jihadis, such as IS and Ansar al-Shariah, which have ties to Al Qaeda.11 These militias form coalitions when it suits their purpose and at other times are at odds with each other. Regardless, they have helped create a failed Libyan state with no central authority or security structure.12 The criminal underground in Libya has been functioning since the time of Gadhafi. There are a number of groups, but there is no real central power structure similar to the mafia. Instead, these criminal groups operate independently, and they traffic in a variety of things, including guns, drugs, and people. They work with whoever serves their purpose, including IS. The role of the criminal underground has increased as the Libyan economy continues to crumble. In a very real sense, these criminal groups are the connective tissue between the jihadis and the militias, with all three impeding efforts to rebuild Libya.13 If Libya devolves into further instability—in effect becoming a failed state—it creates a threat to the region; a threat to Europe because of the increased flow of refugees and migrants from Libya; and a threat to both the United States and European Union because of the presence of IS and Al Qaeda affiliates. While addressing Libya’s security crises is an essential piece of the effort to build a functioning state, it will certainly be a difficult and complicated process. Nonetheless, there are things that can be done that will help make Libya more secure.
Topic:
Security, Fragile/Failed State, Peace, and State Building
Political Geography:
Africa and Libya

3144. Moscow on the Potomac

Author:
CAP National Security and International Policy
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
On October 16, 2016, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson issued an extraordinary statement, indicating that the “U.S. Intelligence Community is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political organizations.”1 The release of this hacked information was all directed at the Democratic presidential campaign and its affiliates, with no hacked information leaked regarding the campaign of the Republican presidential nominee, and now president-elect, Donald Trump. These senior U.S. intelligence officials pointed out that Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, had used similar tactics across Europe and Eurasia to bolster right-wing nationalist parties and that “[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the U.S. election process.” Director Michael Rogers, head of the National Security Agency, noted, “There shouldn’t be any doubt in anybody’s minds, this was not something that was done casually, this was not something that was done by chance, this was not a target that was selected purely arbitrarily. This was a conscious effort by a nation-state to attempt to achieve a specific effect.”2
Topic:
Security, Corruption, National Security, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

3145. Brexit and Baltic Sea Security

Author:
Riina Kaljurand, Tony Lawrence, Pauli Järvenpää, and Tomas Jermalavicius
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The result of the UK’s June 2016 referendum on continued membership of the EU was unexpected and its consequences may be wide-ranging and grave. This report considers the impact of the UK’s exit from the European Union (‘Brexit’) on the security of Estonia, the Baltic Sea region and Europe more widely. Its focus is hard security – military security and defence. The UK is a defence and security actor of considerable prominence, able to contribute significant military capability to the organisations and operations in which it participates. It is, however, sceptical about the place of the EU in defence matters and has achieved a certain level of infamy for its perseverance in obstructing the further development of an EU defence dimension. One immediate consequence of the Brexit referendum result was a burst of ideas for further EU defence integration, which has led to an agreement on the first steps for implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence. Not all member states, however, are enthusiastic for these ideas. Interviews conducted for this report with officials and researchers in the Baltic Sea states of Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, and also in the UK found that interviewees believed that their countries shared with the UK approaches to security that would be harder to pursue after Brexit without the active support of the UK itself, and were largely sceptical about the need for further defence integration in the EU. In general, though, interviewees felt that the character of the European security environment post-Brexit is very difficult to forecast and the many factors that will contribute to shaping it are highly uncertain, complex, and intertwined. In these circumstances, scenario planning methodologies offer perhaps the best means of thinking about the future and informing policy decisions. The report thus identifies a range of possible post-Brexit scenarios as a vehicle for testing policies and identifying those likely to result in maximum benefit and minimum cost.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

3146. Strategic Standoff: The U.S.-China Rivalry and Taiwan

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The CCP views Taiwan as a grave threat to its grip on power. Consequently, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is the armed wing of the CCP, considers the invasion of Taiwan to be its most critical mission. Getting the strategic competition with China right will ultimately help America secure unprecedented levels of prosperity, freedom, and stability for all Pacific nations by the century’s midpoint.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3147. The Russian Reality Check on Turkey's Gas Hub Hopes

Author:
Morena Skalamera
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
On Nov 24, 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet after it veered into its airspace for 17 seconds. On December 13, a Russian ship fired warning shots at a Turkish vessel in the Aegean Sea. Bilateral tensions, with overt military dimensions, have seemed to quickly replace the goodwill that characterized relations only a year ago. Over the past few weeks, experts and observers have debated whether this incident will jeopardize deep Turkish-Russian energy cooperation—and whether newfound tensions between Moscow and Ankara will thwart Turkey’s ambition to transform itself into an energy hub. A closer look suggests grounds for both optimism and pessimism. Given the deep interests of both parties in continuing energy cooperation, and the mutual nature of the dependency, tensions over Syria are unlikely to adversely impact energy cooperation in a fundamental way. Turkey, however, is unlikely to realize its vision of an energy hub—not because of Russia, but because of a combination of domestic and other geopolitical factors.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Economics, Energy Policy, Oil, Geopolitics, Gas, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Turkey

3148. Handbook on Civil Society Documentation of Serious Human Rights Violations

Author:
Federica D'Alessandra, Sander Couch, Ilina Georgieva, Marieke de Hoon, Brianne McGonigle Leyh, and Jolien Quispel
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:
Increasingly, civil society actors engage in documentation and investigation processes, seeking to collect evidence against those responsible for serious human rights violations. The purpose of this Handbook is to provide guidelines and best practices for the collection and management of information on serious human rights situations for those that are not professionally trained in such documentation practices. While the Handbook strongly emphasizes the need to refrain from investigating human rights abuses and to refer to professionals, practice shows that this is not always possible. Only under such circumstances and as a last resort may civil society actors consider engaging in certain documentation practices and not in others, always seeking to include professionals when and where possible. They may however only do so by adhering to the ethical principles and documentation guidelines that are provided in this Handbook. These enable unofficial investigators to do no harm, identify security risks, preserve crime scenes, prevent the loss of evidence, and manage the information in manner that preserves confidentiality, security and probative value, with an eye to possible use in later redress processes and without jeopardizing the future work of professionally trained and officially appointed investigators.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Human Rights, and Law
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3149. Violent Extremism in Africa: Citizen Perspectives from the Sahel Epicenter and Periphery

Author:
Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Sibusiso Nkomo
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The Sahel is one of Africa’s most fragile regions and suffers from multiple longstanding and overlapping challenges, including entrenched poverty, underdevelopment, climate risks, and food insecurity. These chronic vulnerabilities have been exacerbated in recent years by the spread of a byzantine network of extremist and armed groups that have instrumentalized simmering local grievances and inter-community tensions to spread across the region’s porous borders. The fall of the Libyan regime in 2011 and the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali were the genesis of ongoing instability in the region. Over the past decade, extremist and armed groups have continued to both entrench themselves in northern Mali and expand their operational footprint into Burkina Faso and Niger.2 Collectively, these three countries now constitute the core of the Sahel crisis (Cooke, Sanderson, Johnson, & Hubner, 2016). A variety of bilateral and multilateral military operations in Mali and across the wider Sahel region have been unsuccessful in stemming the violence, and since 2015, the number of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has risen year on year (ACLED, 2019). The deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has generated increasing concern among bordering West African states about the possibility of further regional spillover of conflict into their respective territories (United Nations, 2020a). This paper looks at the impact that violent extremist activity has had on citizens in the Sahel epicenter countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger as well as the periphery countries of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, the Gambia, and Togo. Using Afrobarometer Round 7 survey data collected in 34 African countries between late 2016 and late 2018, it examines citizens’ perceptions of how governments are handling the violence and looks at potential vulnerability factors that may expose West African states to the spread of violent extremist activity, including governance performance, trust in institutions, civil liberties, and ethnic and religious tensions or marginalization. The security situation across the Sahel region is highly fluid. Burkina Faso, for example, has seen a rapid deterioration in security since fieldwork for the Round 7 survey was conducted, which would not be captured in the data presented below. However, the findings do provide an important snapshot of public opinion on a range of issues relevant to building more effective counter-terrorism policy.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Poverty, Food, and Violent Extremism
Political Geography:
Africa, Sahel, Northern Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso

3150. Violent Extremism in Africa: Public Opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn

Author:
Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, the threat posed by violent extremist groups that espouse fundamentalist religious narratives has grown substantially across Africa (Hallowanger, 2014). The colonial era and the undemocratic rule that characterized many post-independence governments generated anti-Western and jihadist movements across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world (Moore, 2016). These movements advocate conservative religious rule as a cure for modern societies’ social ills. By the 1990s, these ideologies had begun to spread to Africa, where porous borders, poor security apparatuses, weak governance, corruption, ethnic divisions, and high youth unemployment created conditions under which violent extremist groups thrived (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014). In Nigeria and Somalia, for example, violent extremist organisations began as ethnically homogenous movements with purely domestic concerns – the overthrow of their respective governments. Over time they have evolved toward more ambitious political goals and established an active presence in neighbouring states. These groups generally favour border regions due to lower levels of government presence and security, which facilitate illicit networks and vulnerable border communities. Such a situation challenges not only the internal stability of many countries, but also the stability of the broader region. Moreover, links between national and international jihadist groups have increased over the past decade. In 2012, al Shabaab declared allegiance to al Qaeda, but there has been recent infighting over whether to shift this allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In early 2015, the Nigerian group Boko Haram publicly declared allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Guardian, 2015). These international networks not only help these groups with material and operational support, but also build their credibility within the broader jihadist movement, thereby facilitating international recruitment (CNN, 2015). Security-led approaches have largely failed to contain the geographic footprint of violent extremists in sub-Saharan Africa. This has prompted the emergence of more development-oriented approaches, such as countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives, which seek to address root political and socioeconomic causes of extremism (Zeiger & Aly, 2015). In the past two years, both the United States and the European Union have officially outlined their approaches to CVE.1 Several initiatives have also emerged on the African continent, including Nigeria’s Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism (NACTEST). These development-oriented approaches place emphasis on the environments in which violent extremism thrives. Public opinion research offers insight into violent extremism’s impact on ordinary citizens by presenting their perceptions, attitudes, and policy preferences. It also allows researchers to identify areas and populations in which possible drivers of extremism, such as low levels of social cohesion or high levels of distrust toward the state, are present.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, and Horn of Africa