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101. Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Author:
Grace Price
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Pacific Island countries (PICs) have long attracted development and security assistance from the region’s traditional partner states—the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. However, the Pacific has received renewed attention from them as China actively vies for influence. Despite increased engagement, the PICs are still turning to China in pursuit of their development and security needs. This report will map out efforts the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are taking to increase influence, obstacles that are hindering effective cooperation in the Pacific, and recommendations for improving their collective engagement with the PICs.
Topic:
Security, Development, Partnerships, and Alliance
Political Geography:
North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

102. Terrorism and Immigration: 50 Years of Foreign-Born Terrorism on US Soil, 1975–2024

Author:
Alex Nowrasteh
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Terrorism is a hazard to human life and material prosperity that should be addressed in a sensible manner whereby the benefits of government actions taken to contain it outweigh the costs. Whether policies are sensible depends on the risks that terrorism poses, the harms that terrorism inflicts, and the costs of anti-terrorism policies. This risk analysis of foreign-born terrorism is a crucial step in evaluating anti-terrorism policies related to immigration.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, and Immigration
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

103. Net assessments for Australia

Author:
Andrew Carr
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Established in 2023 in the Australian Department of Defence, net assessments will play an increasingly important role in shaping the future of the Australian Defence Force, disciplining long-term capability decisions to a series of key scenarios of concern. With Australia’s security requirements ranging across many more domains — and dependent on careful analysis of trends and networks beyond its shores — four additional Directorates of Net Assessment should be established, in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Home Affairs, Treasury, and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Net assessments will help Ministers better understand key strategic problems as well as potential conflict scenarios and outcomes, assisting them to make effective decisions to improve Australia’s competitive position and prepare the nation for any conflict in its region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Training, and Assessment
Political Geography:
Australia

104. Terminating Insurgency in Mozambique: Reflections on the SADC Mission In Mozambique

Author:
Oita Etyang, Lweendo Kambela, and Stephen Muleya
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
The continued threat of insurgency in Mozambique has triggered academic and policy interest in the recent past. Indeed, the ramifications caused by acts of insurgency globally and in Africa remain endemic. This calls for the need to establish sustainable and context-specific interventions at regional and national levels. The Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regions have not been spared from the lethality of insurgency, with Mozambique morphing into the epicentre of interest. Insurgency has caused untold suffering to communities in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, prompting the deployment of a SADC mission. As a regional peace operation, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed on 15 July 2021 following approval by the Extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Maputo, Mozambique on 23 June 2021. The main objective of SAMIM was to support the Republic of Mozambique to combat armed groups and acts of insurgency, particularly in the Cabo Delgado province. This article seeks to understand the impact of the SAMIM intervention. It mainly interrogates SAMIM’s mandate, structure, success, challenges and lessons learned using both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies and various open data sources, including programmatic documents.
Topic:
Security, Insurgency, Peacekeeping, COMESA, and South Africa Development Community (SADC)
Political Geography:
Africa, Mozambique, and Cabo Delgado

105. Analysing the Root Causes of Armed Conflicts in Northern Ethiopia

Author:
Alemu Mullaw
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
Armed conflicts that need constructive measurement are rampant in various corners of the world. Currently, there are wars occurring in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Armed conflict can be understood as a battle between two parties, at least one of which is a state government, over a government or territory, using armed forces.1 The notion of conflict is evolving along with understandings of states, borders, relationships, actors, issues, and globalisation. Mary Kaldor described this expanded understanding as ‘New Wars,’ which applies to the 2020 Ethiopian armed conflict.2 Ethiopia maintained its independence during the colonial period and emerged with its present borders and ethnic make-up at the end of the 19th century due to the territorial expansion undertaken by Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913). However, the history of the country is riddled with intra- and inter-state conflicts and it has experienced acute political and economic contradictions.3 The country has been a federal republic since 1994, with the official name of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, subdivided into nine ethnically based regional states (Killil), each with a large degree of autonomy, and two autonomous cities with regional state status, namely Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.4
Topic:
Security, Peace, Armed Conflict, and Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)
Political Geography:
Africa and Ethiopia

106. ‘Something for Something’: The Face of Peace and Security in Africa under Trump 2.0

Author:
Joel Odota
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
The second Trump Administration is reverberating across global systems – politically, economically, socially, and culturally. The world is observing an increasingly transactional and disruptive foreign policy approach, from dramatic aid cuts to multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), to militaristic threats in West Asia and elsewhere and a regressive stance on gender rights. One of the defining characteristics of this Administration is the emergent doctrine of ‘something for something,’ whereby the United States (US) engagement in global affairs, particularly in peace and security, is conditional upon tangible benefits – primarily economic or strategic resources. A pertinent example of this approach is the Trump Administration’s reported demand for 50% of Ukraine’s critical minerals – including graphite, uranium, titanium, and lithium – in exchange for continued security assistance.[1] Lithium, essential in battery production for electric vehicles, is of particular strategic interest. A similar arrangement appears to be unfolding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the African government is seeking a security deal with Washington in exchange for access to the country’s abundant natural resources. In fact, Trump appointed his in-law Massad Boulos as the Senior Advisor for Africa, and Massad’s first overseas trip was to the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. The visit was to do two things: to ‘get more momentum on the peace agreement and the peace process in eastern DRC, and also, how to bring US investment to the region in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region.’[2] A review of Senior Advisor Boulos’s professional background reveals a strategic alignment with President Trump’s objectives in the DRC. Boulos brings decades of experience in sectors closely tied to the Administration’s emerging interest in resource-for-security exchanges. Notably, he previously held senior executive roles, including Director of Peugeot Nigeria Ltd., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Nissan Nigeria Ltd., and Managing Director/CEO of SCOA Nigeria Group. The SCOA Group is a prominent conglomerate engaged in the assembly, distribution, sales, and servicing of a wide range of global brands in sectors such as automotive, construction and mining equipment, agriculture, power generation, oil and gas, and industrial machinery. Additionally, the company has substantial interests in contracting and real estate development. Boulos’s extensive background in extractive industries and infrastructure development, especially within the African context, positions him as a key figure in shaping and advancing Trump’s transactional approach to US-Africa relations, particularly in countries like the DRC where strategic natural resource access is a central concern.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Natural Resources, Leadership, Peace, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

107. The African Union’s Pace of Integration: The Sahelian Crisis as a Challenge to Supranational Expectations

Author:
Matteo Peccini
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
This article contributes to the ongoing and dynamic debate surrounding the process of continental integration promoted by the African Union (AU). The article investigates how the African integration process has evolved, particularly from the perspective of peace and security, with a specific focus on the case study of the central Sahel. How can the continental approach to the Sahelian crisis be assessed in light of the AU’s longstanding integrative ambitions in the fields of peace and security? Can the instability in the Sahel be considered a missed opportunity for strengthening the continental response to such a significant crisis? This article reflects on these central questions and proposes the Sahel as a potential lens through which to interpret broader continental dynamics.
Topic:
Security, Peacekeeping, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Burkina Faso

108. National Dialogues in Africa’s Fragile States: Power Struggles, Diversity Management, and the Precarious Fight Against State Collapse

Author:
Distinct Obuzor Imaka and Tonye Marclint Ebiede
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conflict Trends
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
National dialogues have become an increasingly important conflict management tool in countries facing political instability, conflict, or transitions of power. In many African contexts, it is often seen as a last resort by national stakeholders, an attempt to prevent complete collapse or to guide a nation through a significant political shift. Unlike traditional negotiations that usually involve only political elites or those in power, national dialogues are designed to be more inclusive. They bring together a wide range of voices from across society, including opposition groups, civil society, religious leaders, and community representatives. In recent years, this approach has gained prominence in Africa as a response to ongoing crises. While the outcomes of national dialogues have been mixed, they are generally seen as opportunities to reset national priorities, address long-standing grievances, and open pathways toward reform and reconciliation. This article examines the role of national dialogues in Africa’s fragile states, where contested power, deep divisions, and the risk of state collapse shape the political landscape. In such situations, national dialogue has emerged as a way to manage diversity, resolve conflict, and create space for inclusive reform. The article explores how these dialogues navigate power struggles and whether they offer a meaningful path toward long-term stability.
Topic:
Security, Peace, Mediation, Fragility, and National Dialogue
Political Geography:
Africa

109. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 10

Author:
John Coyne and Henry Campbell
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 10, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months. Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include: Northern Australia and Defence, Developing Northern Australia, Northern Australia new policy opportunities, Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities, Articles are authored by a range of experts across these varied topics. Volume 10 also features a foreword by The Hon Lia Finocchiaro MLA, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Finocchiaro calls readers attention to the Northern Territory’s unique place in Australia’s defence history, its enduring strategic importance, and the Territory’s defence capabilities. The 34 articles in this Compendium provide practical policy options which government could implement in the short term. Facilitating both the security and economic prosperity of northern Australia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Development, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Australia and Northern Australia

110. Northern Australia: securing a developing economy to secure a developed nation

Author:
John Coyne and Ian Satchwell
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Northern Australia is central to the nation’s future. Economically, it serves as the gateway to Indo-Pacific trade, is home to world-class resources and represents a frontier of opportunity. Strategically, it’s the keystone of Australia’s national defence posture. Yet, despite its immense importance, the region continues to face persistent structural challenges, including limited private-sector investment; low local economic capture from major projects; workforce and service deficits; and deteriorating public safety indicators. The Northern Australia Action Plan 2024–2029 describes a refreshed agenda for the north, encompassing economic development and delivering on a broad range of government priorities to support the region’s success. Its policy priorities cover many of the north’s needs. The action plan remains framed largely within nationwide policy approaches, however. This report reframes northern Australia not as a peripheral problem but as a developing economy within a developed nation. It calls for a renewed, coordinated investment agenda, treating spending in the north as a nation-building imperative. Inaction will incur higher costs in the future, but it will also expose Australia to intolerable risks. This investment—needed now—needs to be premised on the strategic advantage offered by the North’s space—literally and figuratively—for ideas, initiatives and infrastructure that strengthen the nation’s security and sovereignty through fields such as energy development, trusted and resilient minerals supply chains and military endeavours including with allies, all of which blends government responsibilities, traditional ownership and commercial development. Drawing on a detailed analysis of the Northern Territory (NT) and extending to northern Queensland and northern Western Australia (WA), this report presents a comprehensive, evidence-based argument for nation-building through targeted investment. It highlights not only the economic, security and strategic benefits but also the moral imperative to close the gap in service access, infrastructure quality, and life outcomes. Much of the analysis focuses on the NT, as the economic data for northern Queensland and northern WA is often distorted by the prosperity of those states’ southern regions. That makes it more difficult to isolate the structural challenges unique to the north in those states. However, the NT shares key demographic, geographic and economic characteristics with northern Queensland and WA—including low population density, high infrastructure costs, limited private-sector depth, and service delivery challenges in remote communities—making it a strong proxy for the broader region. The north shouldn’t be treated as a region apart but as the leading edge of Australia’s future prosperity and security. Ten years on from the Australian Government’s 2015 Our north, our future: White Paper on developing northern Australia, and four years since the 2021 Australian Infrastructure Plan, where progress has been mixed, this report outlines actionable recommendations across the federal, state, territory and private-sector domains. Australia is operating within an unstable international environment, involving an uncertain global outlook that doesn’t just include wars in Europe and the Middle East but growing tensions and security threats in the Indo-Pacific. Australia needs to view investment in the North as not just a local prosperity matter but vital for Australia’s long term security, deterrence of adversaries and preparation and resilience should deterrence ever fail and when inevitable natural disasters occur. In this way, this report provides a practical road map to secure a resilient, sovereign and prosperous future for the north and the nation.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Borders, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Australia and Northern Australia

111. Australia-Indonesia defence and security partnership: Overcoming asymmetric aspirations to tackle common threats

Author:
Euan Graham and Gatra Priyandita
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australian officials accustomed to dealing with Indonesia are cognisant of the limitations to strategic cooperation, but Canberra needs to be more realistic and creative in how it approaches the critical relationship with Jakarta. Australia places greater strategic value on the relationship with Indonesia than vice versa. That dynamic is unlikely to change fundamentally. Optimism and ambition will still be needed to achieve a more balanced partnership, but it’s also crucial that Australian policymakers ground their expectations in this reality. Politicians, in particular, should guard against optimism bias. There are still plenty of opportunities for both countries to engage more deeply across a range of shared security challenges. This report analyses the defence and wider security partnership and identifies several areas where Indonesia and Australia should productively concentrate their efforts in the coming years, particularly to counter the rise of hybrid threats. The 2024 Australia–Indonesia Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) is best understood as a continuation of, rather than an acceleration in, the strategic relationship. But it provides Australia with useful avenues to expand its defence relationship with Jakarta, at a time when Indonesia finds itself courted by other countries that don’t share Australia’s security interests. Ultimately, the DCA reflects Canberra’s long-term investment in a defence partnership that can address evolving regional security challenges. From disaster response and maritime patrols to multilateral peacekeeping, the agreement lays the groundwork for a future in which the two countries’ armed forces can operate together effectively. Continued engagement should centre on expanding military training programs, enhancing operational coordination, and exploring new areas of cooperation, especially to counter hybrid threats. The DCA’s future success will depend on the ability of both sides to manage their differing aspirations, motivations and strategic outlooks in a rapidly deteriorating global security environment. Proper management of those differences, rather than avoidance of them, would better position the two countries for practical cooperation on clear common interests but which, too often, is limited to positive prose instead of action. Revitalising the Australia–Indonesia security relationship requires a shift in focus, away from treating defence cooperation as simply an expression of goodwill or strategic alignment and towards framing it as a joint response mechanism to shared vulnerabilities. Australia and Indonesia face a convergence of challenges, such as maritime insecurity, cyberattacks, disinformation, illegal fishing and transnational crime, that affect both nations and undermine the broader stability of the Indo-Pacific. Responses to those shared concerns can still guide the two countries’ defence partnership in the absence of strategic alignment. By investing in functional collaboration—through interoperable training, coordinated hybrid threat responses and trilateral maritime frameworks involving states such as the Philippines—both countries can build a more flexible and purpose-driven security partnership. This approach acknowledges the limitations to cooperation without being paralysed by them, allowing the relationship to evolve around problem-solving rather than the chimera of strategic convergence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, ASEAN, and Strategic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

112. A critical juncture: Sustaining and strengthening the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
As Australia navigates an increasingly complex security landscape, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) stands at a crossroads. With cyber threats, foreign interference, grey-zone competition, and the prospect of Indo-Pacific conflict reshaping our national security, the need for robust, adaptive oversight of intelligence agencies has never been more pressing. This report from ASPI’s Statecraft and Intelligence Policy Centre underscores the need to reform and reinforce the PJCIS to ensure it remains an effective pillar of democratic accountability for Australian intelligence. Key to that reform will be refocusing the future work of the committee back towards intelligence oversight. Strengthening the PJCIS’s structure, clarifying its remit, and enhancing its resources are essential to maintaining public trust and ensuring effective oversight of the national intelligence community. The reforms outlined in this report offer a roadmap for renewal – one that the next chair of the PJCIS can seize with urgency and resolve.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, National Security, Cybersecurity, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Australia and Asia-Pacific

113. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 11

Author:
John Coyne and Susan Thomson
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 11, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months. Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include; 1. Defence, 2. Critical minerals, 3. Supply chain resilience, 4.Environmental disaster preparedness, Articles are authored by a range of experts across these varied topics. Volume 11 also features a foreword by Senator the Hon Nita Green, Assistant Minister for Northern Australia. Senator Green calls readers attention to the Federal Government’s commitment to the North, while pointing to the rich opportunities available to northern Australia with the right continued investment. The 34 articles in this Compendium provide practical policy options which government could implement in the short term and the articles work together to create an overarching narrative that centres northern excellence. Thus, facilitating both the security and economic prosperity of northern Australia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Defense Industry, Supply Chains, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Northern Australia

114. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world

Author:
Raelene Lockhorst, Charles Lewis Taylor, Justin Bassi, Danielle Cave, and Marc Ablong
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
For more than a decade, which has included the 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2022 federal elections, ASPI has helped to generate ideas and foster debate about Australian strategic policymaking through Agenda for change, a wide-ranging collection of analyses and recommendations to assist the next Australian Government in its deliberations and planning. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world continues in its tradition by providing focused and anticipatory policy advice for the 48th Parliament of Australia. The agenda strives to highlight, and present solutions to, the most pressing questions that our next government must consider in order to advance and protect Australia’s national interests in a more disordered and challenging world. This edition reflects five interrelated aspects of Australia’s position in 2025, focused on the need to: defend Australia navigate our place in a new world (dis)order reform our security architecture and policies secure our critical infrastructure protect and use our natural resources. In 2025, that means equipping the next government for the reality of the contest in which our country is engaged. Since the previous edition of Agenda for change in 2022 we’ve seen: Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and public confirmation of the China–Russia ‘no limits’ partnership change in Australia’s policy towards China, with a focus on ‘stabilisation’, accompanied by reduced economic coercion against Australia but a ratcheting up of military intimidation, including an unprecedented PLA Navy circumnavigation of Australia heightened aggression by China against the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Taiwan a lowering of the national terrorism threat level to ‘possible’ in 2022, before it was raised back to ‘probable’ not quite two years later the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the resulting war in Gaza and an increase in politically motivated violence in Australia the rise of artificial intelligence, including the landmark release of ChatGPT in late 2022 and then DeepSeek in 2025 the return of Donald Trump to the White House, bringing tension among allies and question marks over the future of the US-led international order. Each chapter in Agenda for change includes a limited number of prioritised policy recommendations, which are intended to be discrete, do-able and impactful. Although, when dealing with some of the more existential challenges facing Australia, the recommendations are necessarily and similarly expansive. In addressing that extraordinary range of developments, ASPI has drawn on a wide range of expertise for the 2025 edition of Agenda for change. The views expressed are the personal views of the authors and don’t represent a formal position of ASPI on any issue, other than a shared focus on Australia’s national interests.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, United Nations, European Union, Counter-terrorism, Defense Industry, and Defense Economics
Political Geography:
Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

115. Indonesia in 2035: Climate risks to security in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Michael Copage, Robert Glasser, and Isabelle Bond
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Indo-Pacific region is particularly exposed to climate impacts, and Indonesia, like many countries, will be severely affected by climate impacts in the decade to come. The effects of climate-amplified disasters, combined with the political, social and economic consequences of climate impacts originating from within and across the region, will strain Indonesia’s economic and national-security interests. This report presents the findings of a narrative-driven scenario to stress-test Indonesia’s climate risks emerging by 2035. Its objective is to identify opportunities for Indonesia and its economic and strategic partners to prepare for and mitigate the risks. While Australian policymakers have devoted significant attention to the existential risks that Pacific island countries face, Southeast Asian countries are also highly exposed and often face similar risks. Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s climate risks have received very limited attention despite its high exposure to climate hazards, its very large population (over 10 times larger than all Pacific island countries combined) which is densely concentrated in vulnerable coastal areas and small islands, and its history of political unrest associated with disruptions to food and energy security. It’s also one of the closest neighbouring countries to Australia. Figure 1 on page 5 provides a visual summary of the interacting hazards, risks and consequences highlighted in this report. The population size of Southeast Asian countries and their often-close proximity to one another means that climate impacts in one country will often have consequences beyond their borders and for their neighbours across the region. Gaining a better understanding of how Indonesia, as the largest country in Southeast Asia, will be affected by climate developments is vital, given both the domestic and regional consequences. Even below the ‘safe’ threshold of a 1.5°C rise in global average temperature—the aspirational target set in 2015 by the signatories to the Paris Agreement—countries around the world are already experiencing serious, record-setting, climate-driven disruptions on a large scale. The era of climate-induced disruption is clearly already upon us—and it will intensify rapidly. Building resilience while preparing for future disruption requires an enhanced appreciation of climate risk that goes beyond adapting to more frequent and severe natural hazards, such as floods and fires. Development-assistance and defence communities have embraced the importance of treating climate change as a threat to human, economic and traditional military security. The challenge is to build the capacity and tools to assess the broad suite of security-related risks of climate change—and to translate that information into measures to mitigate the risks. Understanding the complexity and uncertainty associated with climate trends is a daunting task, greatly complicated by the need to incorporate the many ways climate change affects social, political and economic systems. The scenario developed in this report isn’t a prediction of the future, but rather a description of a possible future. It identifies many climate impacts, but suggests three primary pathways through which Indonesia may face compounding and destabilising climate disruptions: Significant food insecurity from losses to domestic production due to shifting precipitation timing and extremes across the wet and dry seasons, heightened sensitivity to shocks in global food prices, and reduced government ability to absorb economic shocks, such as food-price hikes. Large-scale coastal population displacement driven by Indonesia’s high coastal population density and the significant exposure of that population to sea-level rise and climate-induced coastal flooding. Slowed economic growth from lost agricultural output, declining revenues from stranded fossil-fuel assets, rising disaster costs at home and abroad affecting economic infrastructure and supply chains, and rising challenges in responding to domestic crises driven by food insecurity and population displacements. A major finding of this research is that, in little more than a decade, Indonesia is likely to experience major climate disruptions that also amplify climate and security risks in the region, resulting in a range of additional and cascading risks for Australia. A second overarching finding in the report is that Indonesia may be underestimating the likely scale of the climate risks and should devote greater attention to analysing them. It’s in Australia’s interests to do the same and, as a good neighbour, to coordinate an Australian whole-of-government effort to support Indonesia to mitigate the risks, including cross-border risks.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Climate Change
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

116. British public opinion on foreign policy: President Trump, Ukraine, China, Defence spending and AUKUS

Author:
Sophia Gaston
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Results snapshot President Trump Britons support an open and engaged foreign policy role for the United Kingdom. In light of the re-election of President Donald Trump, 40% believe Britain should continue to maintain its current active level of engagement in world affairs, and 23% believe it should play a larger role. Just 16% of Britons support a less active United Kingdom on the world stage. When asked what Britain’s response should be if the United States withdraws its financial and military support from Ukraine, 57% of Britons would endorse the UK either maintaining (35%) or increasing (22%) its contributions to Ukraine. One-fifth would prefer that the UK reduces its contributions to Ukraine. UK–China relations Just a quarter (26%) of Britons support the UK Government’s efforts to increase engagement with China in the pursuit of economic growth and stabilised diplomatic relations. In comparison, 45% of Britons would either prefer to return to the more restricted level of engagement under the previous government (25%) or for the government to reduce its relations with Beijing even further (20%). A large majority of Britons (69%) are concerned about the increasing degree of cooperation between Russia and China. Conservative and Labour voters share similarly high levels of concern, and Britons over 50 years of age are especially troubled about the trend of adversary alignment. Defence and security When asked whether the UK will need to spend more on defence to keep up with current and future global security challenges, a clear two-thirds (64%) of the British people agree. Twenty-nine per cent of Britons strongly agree that defence spending should increase. Just 12% disagree that the UK will need to spend more. The majority of Britons believe that collaboration with allies on defence and security projects like AUKUS will help to make the UK safer (55%) and that partnerships like AUKUS focusing on developing cutting-edge technologies with Britain’s allies will help to make the UK more competitive towards countries like China (59%). Britons are somewhat less persuaded that AUKUS will succeed as a deterrent against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, although the largest group of respondents (44%) agree that it will.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Alliance, AUKUS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Australia, and United States of America

117. The future of US Indo-Pacific policy

Author:
Greg Brown, Nerida King, and Eric Lies
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
How might US policy in the Indo-Pacific change over the next four years? In anticipation of a new US administration and Congress in 2025, ASPI USA held an “alternative futures analysis” exercise in mid-October 2024 to explore the drivers of US policy and how they might evolve through to November 2028. The workshop involved seven Indo-Pacific experts, who discussed a range of factors that could determine US policy and assessed how key factors could drive different outcomes. The participants determined that the two key drivers affecting the US role in the Indo-Pacific over the next four years that are simultaneously most uncertain and most determinative for US policy are: Washington’s perception of China’s strength in the Indo-Pacific the level of US attention to the region. The former is a key determinant of Washington’s threat perception, and the latter is a key determinant of Washington’s capacity to sustainably engage in the region. The nexus of those drivers produced a skeleton of four potential scenarios: Failing to walk and chew gum: Perceived high China power and a low level of US attention. In this scenario, Beijing continues to advance its interests across the region while Washington fails to prioritise imperatives in the Indo-Pacific amid ongoing conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Follow US: Perceived high China power and a high level of US attention. In this scenario, the possibility of Chinese regional hegemony is growing, but the US adopts a focused, harder-edged security strategy and leads like-minded states to confront the challenge. The Peaceful Pivot: Perceived low China power and a high level of US attention. In this “stars align” scenario, the perception of diminishing competition and conflict with China couples with the US implementing the decade-old promise of a pivot to Asia. Leading from behind: Perceived low China power and a low level of US attention. China’s capacity to project power falters in this scenario, but the US—pulled into global events elsewhere and distracted by its own domestic politics—does not provide forceful leadership in the region and leans on allies and partners to carry the load.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

118. The many contending futures of UN peacekeeping

Author:
Corine van Emmerik and Peter Albrecht
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
This DIIS Working Paper examines how UN peacekeeping operations are being reimagined in an era of global uncertainty. Through analysis of key UN documents and interviews with officials and diplomats, the research reveals multiple competing visions for peacekeeping's future — from a return to core principles to modular approaches and even a dramatic downscaling of peacekeeping as we have known it since the turn of the millennium. As peacekeeping operations face diminished legitimacy, host state resistance, and a deadlocked Security Council, the study argues that peacekeeping's chronic challenges are inherently unsolvable and must be continuously navigated. The paper comes at a critical moment following the closure of the Mali mission, considerable challenges in the DRC, and ahead of the 2025 Peacekeeping Ministerial, with implications for the future of global conflict management in an increasingly multipolar world.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, United Nations, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Global Focus

119. Russian military thinking about the Baltic Sea and the Arctic

Author:
Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Russia is likely to continue its military build-up in both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic in the long-term perspective. Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, Russian military thinkers and planners are increasingly seeing the two theatres as contiguous areas.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Finland, Sweden, Arctic, and Baltic Sea

120. The rise and fall of the Wagner Group

Author:
Karen Philippa Larsen
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Wagner Group’s rise, conflict and fall show a process firstly of endorsing private military companies in Russia, only to later seek to regain control by including the groups in the official security structures. The plane crash that killed the leader of the Wagner Group, oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and six other high-ranking Wagner Group members in August 2023 marked the literal and figurative fall of the Wagner Group’s considerable influence on Russian foreign policy. The Wagner Group is what Russia calls a private military company (PMC), which tends to have a much closer relationship to the state than we would normally expect from a private company in the West.
Topic:
Security, Wagner Group, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

121. China and Russia challenge the Arctic order

Author:
Patrik Andersson
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation is real but limited – and should not distract from the broader strategic challenges each country poses individually. While the partnership merits attention, some aspects are more symbolic than substantive, with Russia ultimately controlling the pace and direction. Media narratives often highlight the growing alignment between China and Russia in the Arctic and the potential threat this poses to other states. Yet the partnership remains constrained by diverging priorities, Russia’s wariness of Chinese influence, and China’s reluctance to expose itself to sanctions or engage in risky ventures. At the same time Russia’s increasing dependence on China since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has given Beijing opportunities to pursue deeper access to the Russian Arctic on its own terms and in areas that align with its long-term objectives. Rather than engaging broadly, China is selective in how and where it invests or participates – a dynamic that could intensify underlying frictions between the two even as global geopolitical shifts continue to draw them closer in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Arctic

122. Denmark needs to rethink its multilateral engagement

Author:
Rens van Munster and Corine van Emmerik
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Uncertainty about NATO’s future and American commitment to European security is challenging the foundations of Danish foreign and security policy. Denmark must face this new reality and strengthen its commitment to multilateralism as central to its long-term security and influence. Denmark’s 2023 foreign policy strategy acknowledges that ‘the rule-based world order and multilateralism are under pressure’ – a stark reality for a small state whose security and prosperity fundamentally depend on international rules. Intensified geopolitical competition, rival visions of global governance, and the erosion of consensus on international security norms have plunged multilateralism into a full-blown crisis, placing Denmark – like many countries – in an increasingly difficult position.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

123. A Turning Point, or Not? Principles for a New European Order

Author:
Richard Youngs
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Despite repeated declarations of historic turning points, deep structural reforms to the European project remain elusive. While defense spending rises are welcome, EU governments must also pursue systemic changes to Europe’s political and security architecture.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Reform, European Union, Democracy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

124. The Montreux Convention and its Importance for International Peace and Security

Author:
Ioannis Antonopoulos
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL)
Institution:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL)
Abstract:
Since its conclusion, the Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the Straits (1936) constitutes an important pillar of the international order. This may be proven by many historical events from the 20th century until today: From the application of the Convention in WWII to its recent invocation in the ongoing Ukrainian conflict. The Convention’s significance derives from its subject-matter, the freedom of transit through the Dardanelles/Turkish Straits in regard to the warships and aircraft in time of peace and in time of war. This is a legal analysis of the Montreux Convention under the scope of International Law providing a brief look at the historical background of events that have led to the signature of the Convention, an extensive presentation of the legal framework of its provisions regarding passage of warships and overflight of aircraft, as well as, some thoughts on its importance for the international peace and security.
Topic:
Security, International Law, History, Peace, International Order, and Montreux Convention
Political Geography:
Europe

125. The geoeconomic turn in the Americas: The Dominican Republic at the centre of Washington’s return

Author:
Lauri Tähtinen
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The tide is turning rapidly as the United States shifts its response to China’s industrial rise, with Washington returning to the Western Hemisphere in search of not only new trade relationships but also industrial, foreign, and security policies. This shift reflects a geoeconomic turn in the Americas, where economic actors – from drug cartels to critical supply-chain partners – are increasingly treated as security concerns, blurring the line between commerce and security. The Dominican Republic is positioning itself as a partner in both the joint development of the Americas and US security. Its growing alignment with the United States reflects global shifts elsewhere, such as in Finland’s relationship with Washington. The Dominican Republic’s sustained economic growth and its location between the US territory of Puerto Rico and the region’s security challenges place it at the centre of Washington’s attempt to re-engineer hemispheric value chains and security partnerships.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economic Growth, Trade, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and United States of America

126. Drivers of Extremist Sympathies: Security, Ideology, and Firearms in Lebanon and Tunisia

Author:
Doaa' Elnakhala, Gergely Hideg, and Darine Atwa
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Lebanon and Tunisia share a common struggle against extremism, but the social, political, religious, and ideological make-up of each country is quite different. The Small Arms Survey conducted a general population survey in the two countries between September and November 2023, in which 3,339 adults were interviewed about their views on key elements of their lives, violent extremism, and firearms. Drivers of Extremist Sympathies: Security, Ideology, and Firearms in Lebanon and Tunisia—the latest Briefing Paper from the Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project—demonstrates a clear linkage between firearms and violent extremism, though manifested differently in the two countries. The paper also demonstrates that chronic insecurity and the absence of effective state-provided security play a significant role in fostering affinity for violent extremist groups. The findings have implications for other countries struggling with similar issues, both in the Middle East and North Africa region and beyond.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Violent Extremism, Weapons, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Lebanon, and Tunisia

127. The Sahel Seeks Sovereignty

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
On the heels of popular military coups, how are Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger returning to a path of sovereignty while navigating a legacy of dependency and internal-external security challenges?
Topic:
Security, Development, Sovereignty, Coup, and Economic Dependence
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Burkina Faso

128. Climate Crisis and Gender Equality: Emerging Security Risks in the Euro-Mediterranean Region

Author:
Manale Abou Dagher, Noura Abdelwahab, Sarine Karajerjian, Suzanne Baaklini, and Zeina Moneer
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
This policy study focuses on a critical and timely intersection – gender equality and climate change – and highlights the disproportionate impact of climate change on women, especially those living in climate-vulnerable rural areas. This publication is the result of discussions held during the session “Climate Crisis and Gender Equality in the Euro-Mediterranean Region: Emerging Security Risks” at the High-Level Conference on Women for the Mediterranean, co-organised by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the Commissioner for Gender Equality of the Republic of Cyprus on 30-31 May. The event brought together experts from the region to share insights, challenges and policy recommendations, highlighting the importance of empowering women in climate decision-making processes to effectively address these emerging risks. Research shows that women’s leadership in climate action increases the effectiveness of policies, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, water management and renewable energy, where they are disproportionately affected by climate change. However, barriers such as limited access to finance and technology and under-representation in green sectors continue to hamper their potential to drive climate solutions.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Women, Leadership, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:
Europe

129. Safeguarding U.S. interests in a Ukraine war settlement

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should pursue a peace deal in Ukraine that serves America’s best interests, even when these diverge from its European partners. The primary U.S. objective should be to achieve a “lasting peace” that endures over the long term. A final settlement of the Ukraine war should address five key issues: territory; ceasefire terms; arrangements for Ukraine’s future security; stabilizing relationships between Russia and NATO and Russia and the United States; and mutual assurances between Russia and Ukraine. Full resolution of all five dimensions would not be required to end a “hot war,” however. Issues of territory will be determined on the battlefield, and any ceasefire should be maintained with a demilitarized zone and some combination of a neutral, international monitoring force and remote and autonomous technologies, lke drones and sensors. Offering Ukraine a binding security commitment is not in U.S. interests, whether through NATO or otherwise. Instead, the best option is “armed neutrality,” which would leave Ukraine without external guarantees but help it build a credible, self-sufficient deterrent—with Europe leading the provision of military aid. Mutual security assurances between Ukraine and Russia, including restrictions on locations of forces and weapons, can reduce the risk of renewed conflict. The Trump administration should use willingness to talk about the future U.S. role in Europe’s security as a bargaining chip to get Russia to make necessary concessions. The United States gives up little by discussing these issues of high political value to Russia. Some changes in U.S. posture in Europe may also advance U.S. efforts to shift defense burdens to allies and partners.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

130. Grand strategy: The limits of military force

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Since the Cold War, the United States has engaged in a number of military conflicts abroad, yet despite its preponderant military power, it has been unable to translate force into political success, especially when it comes to nation-building. In the absence of another great power to constrain it, the United States initiated regime change wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but by the same token it lacked an external imperative to devote the resources needed to achieve its ambitious nation-building goals. As costs and casualties mounted, public opinion soured. Policymakers thought U.S. technological superiority would keep casualties in these conflicts low and the attractiveness of liberal values would make nation-building easier. They underestimated how much coercive power would be needed on the ground to maintain order and the popular consent necessary for legitimate governments to emerge. Later attempts to intervene abroad with limited or no boots on the ground, as in Libya and Syria, were similarly unsuccessful, leaving vacuums of power, failed states, and long-term civil wars. Policymakers need to become more sober about the limits of military power. The United States’ abundant security means that it would benefit from more diplomacy and deal-making with adversaries, rather than threatening to overthrow or sanction their regimes.
Topic:
Security, Cold War, Regime Change, Grand Strategy, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

131. From Stalemate to Solution: Rethinking EU Approaches to Bilateral Disputes in the Context of Enlargement

Author:
Steven Blockmans and Butrint Berisha
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In cataloguing the various disputes, this report distinguishes between disputes involving a member state and a candidate country, and those between candidate countries themselves, classifying them into categories such as statehood identity issues post-conflict issues, border demarcation and/or territorial disputes, minority rights protection, and economic issues. While many disputes exist among candidate countries, the more challenging ones for the EU to resolve are those which involve a member state. Member states can strategically misuse their veto power in the pre-accession process to gain political leverage over a candidate country, as currently seen with Bulgaria vis-à-vis North Macedonia and Hungary towards Ukraine. The authors argue that the ability to manage and resolve them is not merely a technical requirement for enlargement but increasingly a strategic necessity for the EU in a more conflicted geopolitical environment. In reviewing past practice, the report highlights the EU’s non-interventionist approach before the early 2000s, noting how the EU itself served as a framework for cooperation and dispute resolution, as demonstrated in the case of Northern Ireland. Around the time of the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004, the EU’s approach underwent a shift, with the prior resolution of disputes increasingly becoming a condition for accession. However, this long-standing expectation warrants a critical re-examination in light of inconsistencies in policy application, stagnation in existing dispute settlement mechanisms, mounting blockades, and the rise of nativist populism in Europe. The report assesses a wide range of EU instruments and third-party resolution mechanisms provided by the Council of Europe, United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Existing proposals to overcome the misuse of veto power are also analysed. The authors argue that a more strategic, consistent, and principle-based approach to dispute resolution—supported by legal tools, political incentives, and coordination with third-party actors—is essential to re-dynamise the enlargement process and sustain the EU’s credibility as a promoter of peace, stability, and integration. To that end, they emphasise that the Commission should abandon the habit of seeking unanimity at every interim step of the enlargement process, which is not prescribed by EU law, and that the EU should create an Enlargement Dispute Resolution Mechanism (EDRM) that separates between issues that fall under the aquis chapters for membership negotiations and those that should rely on external arbitration and mediation. Furthermore, they advocate that the EU should double down on its preventive efforts to manage latent bilateral disputes through early-warning diplomacy and structured dialogue.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe

132. Hague Summit Series: The Central Issue. Defence Spending

Author:
Felix Gasper
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In 2014, the NATO Allies agreed that within a decade, they would spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Allies have focused more on strengthening their military posture. Donald Trump's insistence that Europe should take larger responsibility for its own security and the doubts he has sown regarding America’s commitment to its NATO obligations have strengthened European resolve and emphasised the need for the continent to foster greater military independence, including from the US. Trump’s vigorous return to these ideas at the start of his second term will make defence spending, in particular the Secretary General’s proposal for a new NATO target, the key agenda item for The Hague Summit.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

133. The Rise and Fall of Afghanistan’s Local Defense Forces

Author:
Arturo Munoz
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
A counterinsurgency campaign is more likely to succeed when local people are willing to confront the insurgents and have the means to do so. Insurgencies usually seek to become the government and rural villagers must decide which side best provides protection and promotes their interests. Normally, there are not enough troops to patrol every community and provide security. General Stanley McChrystal addressed this issue in arguing for popular support. “The Afghan people will decide who wins this fight… We need to understand the people and see things through their eyes… We must get the people involved as active participants.” [1] Armed civilian defense forces (CDFs) are a proven counterinsurgency tool used successfully throughout the world. The most effective CDFs are organized in accordance with local culture and history, using local leaders. In Afghanistan, the traditional Pashtun arbakai village guards provided a strong base for creating local forces. Although the CDFs must be organized by the government, it should be done in a way that the villagers see this program as arising out of their own communities for their own goals. National governments, on the other hand, tend to consider arming villagers as a potential threat, or a source of instability, particularly if the CDFs are tribal or ethnically-based. Consequently, it is essential that the national authorities support a CDF program in good faith, otherwise, it will not be sustainable. CDFs are not meant to be independent entities that may devolve into private militias. The best means to achieve a productive balance of national and local interests is for the government to provide continuing support, especially in the form of military quick reaction forces (QRF) that respond immediately to help fend off attacks.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Counterinsurgency, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

134. Iraq’s Unfinished War: Security in the Post-Saddam Era

Author:
Diane M. Zorri
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Iraq War offers critical lessons in irregular warfare, particularly regarding the use of local forces, and highlights the challenges in recruiting, training, and coordinating with Iraqi police and militias. This study analyzes the long-term consequences of decisions made during the conflict. It examines factors that contributed to the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and identifies missed opportunities to prevent its emergence. Key takeaways include the necessity of preserving existing security structures unless there is a sufficient occupation force and understanding ideological divisions within the population to identify opportunities for realignment.
Topic:
Security, Islamic State, and Warfare
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

135. Parameters to Assess Escalation Risks in Space

Author:
Nivedita Raju
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Space-enabled services are critical for various civilian and military purposes. Current military uses of space—for example, in the Russia–Ukraine War—indicate several avenues for unpredictability and ambiguity, which can increase potential for escalation, both in space and on earth. Yet, there is no common understanding of escalation risks in the international community. This SIPRI Research Policy Paper identifies four parameters to assess escalation risks in the space domain: the target, the capability used, the effect and the consequences. These parameters can help establish a standardized approach to assess whether an attack is escalatory. Based on current trends that undermine predictability and transparency in space activities, these parameters inform recommendations to minimize escalation risks. These recommendations include proposals to limit attacks on high-value strategically significant space systems; undertake exchanges on critical infrastructure; characterize acts that are especially escalatory; to enhance resilience of space-based services for civilians; and to build a typology that identifies potential harms. The recommendations also demand further action from states to implement and enforce international law governing space activities and to engage with commercial actors to raise awareness and clearly establish their accountability.
Topic:
Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Disarmament, Space, Risk Assessment, and Nuclear Security
Political Geography:
Global Focus

136. From Silos to Synergies: Partnering for Social Cohesion in the Sahel

Author:
Simone Bunse, Caroline Delgado, and Rachel Blair
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The Sahel Resilience Partnership (SRP) is a German government-funded initiative that unites two United Nations entities and Germany’s international development agency to address converging crises in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The SRP is an example of the operationalization of the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus. The partners use coordinated, multisectoral programming covering food and nutrition security, climate-resilient ecosystems, social services and conflict resolution to enhance resilience to shocks and foster social cohesion. Key strengths include a multilevel steering structure and an adaptable joint regional plan. However, the SRP faces persistent operational challenges, notably navigating political instability and governance issues in the Sahel. Additionally, coordinating across agencies with different mandates, budgets, timelines and set-ups complicates efforts to achieve thorough geographical and programmatic convergence. The SRP and other organizations at the HDP nexus need to deepen complementarity, proactively share data and—where possible—seek operational convergence at the village level.
Topic:
Security, Governance, International Development, Peace, Social Cohesion, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Africa, Germany, and Sahel

137. Shallow Ramparts: Air and Missile Defenses in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War

Author:
Sam Lair
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
There are two remarkable stories about defenses during the war between Israel and Iran in June 2025. One is the failure of Iran’s much-discussed air defense system; the other, the success of the Israeli missile defense system. This chapter begins with the poor Iranian performance before turning to the Israeli defensive efforts. Ultimately, the war underscored how fragile Iran’s air defenses were, how key air superiority was to Israeli strategy, and how strained the Israeli air and missile defense system was despite its impressive performance. The June 2025 war illustrates the difficulty of air and missile defense in modern high-intensity conflict, demonstrating challenges facing defenders and strategies for the offense.
Topic:
Security, Missile Defense, Armed Conflict, and Air Defense
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

138. Strengthening the OSCE’s Climate Security Agenda

Author:
Emma Hakala and Florian Krampe
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Despite a clear mandate from the December 2021 Stockholm Ministerial Council Decision on Strengthening Co-operation to Address the Challenges Caused by Climate Change, the Organ­ization for Security and Co-oper­ation in Europe’s (OSCE) approach is yet to reach its full potential. An analysis of the cur­rent strategy shows that while the OSCE has strengths, such as a com­prehensive security man­date and a grass­roots presence through its field operations, its effectiveness is undermined by weaknesses, such as geopolitical distractions, a tendency to focus on general environmental work rather than security and poor integration between headquarters and field missions. To strengthen its work, the OSCE should frame climate change as a cross-dimensional security risk, create an annual integrated climate and environmental security assessment and improve internal cooperation. These actions would better prepare the organ­ization for a changing security landscape.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Development, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Global Focus

139. Climate Change, Human Mobility and Security

Author:
Kheira Tarif
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This SIPRI Policy Brief explores the connected challenges of climate change, human mobility and security, highlighting how fragmented policies and misconceptions—such as the myth of mass climate migration—hinder effective responses. The brief contributes to addressing this gap by presenting findings on three underexplored dynamics across the mobility spectrum. It finds that urban migration can support adaptation but also strain urban conditions, involuntary immobility can heighten people’s vulnerabilities, and poorly designed climate action can lead to displacement, inequality or unrest. These dynamics show that governance determines the security outcomes of human mobility. To address this, the policy brief calls for safe, rights-based migration that facilitates climate adaptation; support for the most vulnerable, immobile populations; and people-led, democratic climate action.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Governance, and Mobility
Political Geography:
Global Focus

140. Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific

Author:
Timothy A. Walton and Thomas Shugart
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The United States’ airfields face a threat of severe Chinese military attack. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strike forces of aircraft, ground-based missile launchers, surface and subsurface vessels, and special forces can attack US aircraft and their supporting systems at airfields globally, including in the continental United States. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has consistently expressed concern regarding threats to airfields in the Indo-Pacific, and military analyses of potential conflicts involving China and the United States demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of US aircraft losses would likely occur on the ground at airfields (and that the losses could be ruinous). But the US military has devoted relatively little attention, and few resources, to countering these threats compared to developing modern aircraft. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) expects airfields to come under heavy attack in a potential conflict and has made major investments to defend, expand, and fortify them.1 Since the early 2010s, the PLA has more than doubled its hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) and unhardened individual aircraft shelters (IASs) at military airfields, giving China more than 3,000 total aircraft shelters—not including civil or commercial airfields. This constitutes enough shelters to house and hide the vast majority of China’s combat aircraft. China has also added 20 runways and more than 40 runway-length taxiways, and increased its ramp area nationwide by almost 75 percent. In fact, by our calculations, the amount of concrete used by China to improve the resilience of its air base network could pave a four-lane interstate highway from Washington, DC, to Chicago. As a result, China now has 134 air bases within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait—airfields that boast more than 650 HASs and almost 2,000 non-hardened IASs. In contrast, US airfield expansion and fortification efforts have been modest compared to US activities during the Cold War—and compared to the contemporary actions of the PRC. Since the early 2010s, examining airfields within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, and outside of South Korea, the US military has added only two HASs and 41 IASs, one runway and one taxiway, and 17 percent more ramp area. Including ramp area at allied and partner airfields outside Taiwan, combined US, allied, and partner military airfield capacity within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait is roughly one-third of the PRC’s. Without airfields in the Republic of Korea, this ratio drops to one-quarter, and without airfields in the Philippines, it falls further, to 15 percent. Overall, this creates an imbalance in which PLA forces would need to fire far fewer “shots” to suppress or destroy US, allied, and partner airfields than the converse (see figure 1). This imbalance ranges from approximately 25 percent if the US employed military airfields in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan to as great as 88 percent if it employed only military airfields in Japan.2 Operationally, this could make air operations in a conflict significantly easier to sustain for the PRC than for the United States; strategically, this destabilizing asymmetry risks incentivizing the PRC to exercise a first-mover advantage. China could initiate a conflict if it sees an opportunity to nullify adversary airpower on the ramp.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Air Force
Political Geography:
China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

141. A Better Understanding of Nigeria’s Problems

Author:
James Barnett
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In a recent post on Truth Social, President Donald Trump instructed the United States military to prepare to go into Nigeria “guns-a-blazing.” The development may be surprising for some, but those who closely follow US-Nigeria relations should not be surprised that the president, or Republicans more broadly, would express concern over violence against Christians in Nigeria. The president cited this violence as his basis for threatening military action on November 1, one day after announcing that he would redesignate Nigeria as a country of particular concern (CPC) for violations of religious freedom. But there are two fundamental problems with the approach the president has outlined: The nature of militant violence in Nigeria is more complicated. First, the premise that Christians in Nigeria face something akin to nationwide persecution is questionable, as Christians and Muslims alike suffer from Nigeria’s rampant insecurity. Nigeria is not, as some believe, the site of a concerted war against Christians. Rather, the country faces something more like a death by a thousand cuts, in which various militant groups in different corners of the country degrade state sovereignty, causing increased violence and extremism. Military intervention comes with serious risks. Depending on their scale, scope, and form, US military operations in Nigeria could recklessly destabilize Africa’s most populous country. On the other hand, operations could be limited in impact and largely symbolic. The latter scenario is more likely but not without its own risks. If the US insists on being a more highly visible military partner than it has traditionally been, its strategy may contradict Nigerian preferences and further polarize Nigerian society. The Nigerian government could have taken steps to reduce the chances of American intervention. But officials have at least made it clear over the past 48 hours that they do not seek to escalate the situation. It is entirely conceivable that President Trump will walk back his maximalist initial salvo and settle for some form of renewed bilateral security cooperation. While this is unlikely to affect the state of Nigeria’s conflicts in the near term, it would be politically agreeable to both governments. The Trump administration and Nigerian officials should both recognize certain truths. The US administration needs to understand that (a) Nigeria cannot immediately and effortlessly dismantle all militant networks within its borders, and (b) religiously divisive narratives will make it harder for the Nigerian government to achieve the necessary political consensus to tackle insecurity. Abuja, for its part, should understand that many in Congress are frustrated with Nigeria, in part because they believe the country has repeatedly failed to utilize American security assistance effectively against terrorists. With sufficient political will, President Bola Tinubu’s administration could use this crisis to (1) reform Nigerian security forces so that they can combat terrorism better, and (2) address some of the conflict’s underlying drivers. This would be the best potential outcome of the current situation, one that is by no means guaranteed. Before considering what this resolution might entail, American policymakers should understand some essential context about insecurity in Nigeria.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

142. Security Guarantees for Ukraine: A Layered Approach

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
President Donald Trump met last week with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska, and then met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and several top European leaders at the White House this week. Yet for Ukraine to secure the just peace it deserves, Kyiv, Washington, and their partners need to resolve two outstanding issues. First, Ukraine is concerned with maintaining internationally recognized borders. Russia fully controls the Crimean Peninsula, which Moscow illegally seized from Ukraine in 2014. But Russian forces do not control the full administrative territory of any other Ukrainian oblast that it wants to annex (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia). And since November 2022, Russia has expanded its occupation by only about 2,240 square miles—less than 1 percent of Ukraine’s total land area. For comparison, Russia’s territorial gains after 1,000 days of war amount to roughly the same proportion as if a foreign power occupied only Central Park out of all five boroughs of New York City. These limited gains have cost Russia an estimated one million casualties and tens of thousands of pieces of equipment. Understandably, Kyiv remains unwilling to relinquish control over areas Russia has not even conquered. Ultimately, the Ukrainian people should determine the future status of these territories. Second, Ukraine wants stronger security guarantees. Unlike the territorial control question, security guarantees require the United States’ involvement. Ukraine remains understandably wary of assurances that sound strong but prove meaningless, as has happened previously. The West’s weak responses to Russia’s invasions of Crimea in 2014 and mainland Ukraine in 2022 demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2014–15 Minsk agreements, respectively. The most immediate and effective way to guarantee Ukraine’s long-term security is membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is technically possible even if some of Ukraine’s territory remains under Russian occupation. This should remain Kyiv’s final goal. But President Trump does not support Ukraine joining NATO, nor will he commit to sending combat troops to Ukraine. With this political reality in mind, policymakers should instead consider a five-layered approach to guaranteeing Ukrainian security. While no single layer is sufficient on its own, together they will provide the most robust protection currently possible.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

143. Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? A violent siege of Haiti’s capital in early 2024 triggered the creation of a transitional government and the eventual arrival of a Kenyan-led mission to help counter the gang threat. But infighting has paralysed the government, empowered the gangs and made it unlikely that planned elections can come off safely. Why does it matter? Haiti urgently needs a legitimate government able to lead the campaign to curb gang violence and respond to the country’s dire humanitarian emergency. But holding polls prematurely could backfire, allowing gangs to play a deciding role in the vote and entrenching their power. What should be done? Haiti’s transitional authorities should strive to overcome internal wrangling and chart a realistic path to safe elections and constitutional reform. With future U.S. funding in doubt, the UN Security Council must find a way to support either the existing international security force or a peacekeeping mission to weaken the gangs.
Topic:
Security, Domestic Politics, Violence, Organized Crime, and Political Transition
Political Geography:
Caribbean and Haiti

144. A deep dive in the White Paper on the Future of European Defence

Author:
Spyros Blavoukos and Panos Politis-Lamprou
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The White Paper on the Future of European Defence, released in March 2025, represents a landmark initiative by the European Commission to articulate a cohesive vision for strengthening the EU’s defence posture amid mounting geopolitical instability. Acting as a framework for the ReArm Europe plan, the document proposes mobilising hundreds of billions of EUR in defence investments, making use of national and EU resources. The ReArm Europe Plan and the White Paper clearly succeed in politically signalling the EU’s renewed commitment to defence investment and military readiness. However, despite their rhetorical strength, four major concerns could undermine their transformative potential: Coordination gaps: Without a robust coordination mechanism, national funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other – national and/or domestic – objectives and interests. In the meantime, the Union will not achieve effectiveness and efficiency unless it focuses on standardisation and interoperability. Financial markets’ sensitivity: While the activation of the national escape clause offers fiscal leeway, it is unclear how the financial markets will react to increased national debts. Alternative instruments, such as the Defence Eurobonds or the European Defence Mechanism, could be examined. Creative ambiguity: The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation includes references presented vaguely enough to allow for multiple interpretations and thus avoid frictions. In view of the negotiations in the Council, the issue of a third country’s participation in a procurement consortium must be further elaborated and clarified. Democratic legitimacy and parliamentary oversight: Article 122 TFEU sidesteps the European Parliament, despite the latter’s willingness to further support the EU defence initiatives. Without adequate parliamentary involvement, defence investments risk alienating public opinion in a policy area which requires broad societal consensus. All the aforementioned shortcomings reflect a deeper structural issue: the absence of a common threat perception and a truly common foreign and security policy. Without a coherent strategic vision at the EU level, member-states remain inclined to prioritise national over collective objectives and interests.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, Financial Markets, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Europe

145. Between Power and Paradox: Militarisation, Defence Ambitions, and Turkey’s Strategic Struggles

Author:
Ahmet Erdi Öztürk and Can Selçuki
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Turkey occupies a distinctive position—geographically proximate to the epicentres of regional crises and institutionally is embedded in Western security structures such as NATO. However, Turkey is more than a geopolitical bridge; it has emerged as a multidimensional actor with ambitions to act both as a regional stabilizer and as a global mediator. Turkey’s position within this evolving global order is both advantageous and inherently paradoxical. As a long-standing NATO member, Turkey remains structurally embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet its geostrategic identity—historically, culturally, and geographically intertwined with the volatile landscapes of Eurasia, the Middle East, and North Africa—drives it to adopt a multi-vector foreign policy. From an economic standpoint, Turkey’s position remains marked by deep-seated contradictions. While its customs union with the European Union and strategic access to multiple regional markets confer structural advantages, these are significantly offset by institutional fragility, regulatory ambiguity, and elevated geopolitical risk premiums. Turkey’s defence industry has evolved into more than a military instrument; it is now a key lever for diplomatic influence and geopolitical ambition. Positioned at the heart of NATO, yet often at odds with its Western allies, Ankara has expanded its strategic footprint across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus by leveraging domestically-developed military platforms. Turkey must articulate a clear strategic rationale to underpin its defence investments. This involves moving beyond reactive threat perceptions and developing a holistic framework that aligns defence policy with broader developmental and diplomatic objectives. The protection of democratic institutions is an integral part of this framework, while two interrelated concepts are essential: economic security and open strategic autonomy.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Geopolitics, Defense Industry, and Militarization
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

146. Turkey’s Defence Industry and the EU SAFE Regulation

Author:
Dimitris Tsarouhas
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
From Ottoman-era modernization through to its advanced capabilities today, Turkey has transformed itself into a major global defence exporter, with $6.3 billion in exports in 2024 and flagship products like the Bayraktar TB2 drone. Turkey leverages its NATO membership and geographic position to strengthen defence ties and secure influence in alliance decision-making, while at the same time contributing to the Alliance advanced technologies. The EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative allocates €150 billion for joint defence procurement to boost Europe’s defence industrial base, reduce reliance on non-EU suppliers, and enhance interoperability. Ankara’s SAFE participation rationale rests on enabling technological collaboration, market access, and stronger EU ties, leveraging Turkey’s expertise in drone systems, cybersecurity, and unmanned technologies. Turkey’s SAFE participation should remain conditional on Ankara improving its bilateral political relations with member states, and on making explicit assurances on the inviolability of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all EU member states.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Regulation, Exports, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

147. La Ciberguerra y su impacto en el Orden Mundial

Author:
Enrique Cubeiro
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
El ciberespacio es un ámbito artificial y en continua expansión de tal forma que el abanico de objetivos potenciales que pueden ser afectados por medio de alguna de las múltiples técnicas de ciberataque es muy amplio. El artículo explica las peculiaridades del ciberespacio, su transversalidad, la opacidad, la asimetría y el impacto del ciberespacio en las potencialidades del débil con respecto al fuerte, así como en la diversidad de las amenazas que genera, la inefectividad de la disuasión, la disociación ofensivo-defensiva, el amplio abanico de posibles daños y su efectividad en creciente progresión. El artículo explica también la dificultad de aplicación en este campo del derecho internacional humanitario donde, además, los Estados juegan con reglas diferentes, y cómo muy pocos Estados cuentan con un poder ciberespacial completo, contribuyendo, con ello, a establecer una jerarquía entre Estados en términos de seguridad.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Human Rights, Cybersecurity, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

148. Military retention crisis undermines Europe’s defence surge

Author:
Chris Kremidas-Courtney
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Europe is racing to rearm, but its militaries are losing talent faster than they can recruit it. Unless governments prioritize retention, Europe risks building hollow forces that look strong on paper but can’t deliver when it matters. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has triggered Europe’s most profound defence awakening in decades. It is a moment where the continent must reckon with hard choices and, finally, take ownership of its own security. European governments are rearming and raising defence budgets in response to the renewed threat from Moscow. Collective defence spending by EU countries jumped over 30% between 2021 and 2024, and NATO allies have announced ambitious plans to grow their armed forces.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Defense Spending, Russia-Ukraine War, and Armament
Political Geography:
Europe

149. Understanding Russia’s Calculus on Opportunistic Aggression in Europe

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Kate Johnston, and Greg Weaver
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Numerous factors are working to dissuade Russia from directly challenging NATO, but once Moscow reconstitutes its military, one scenario stands out as a plausible path to a NATO-Russia war: The United States becomes involved in a major crisis in the Indo-Pacific. Russian President Vladimir Putin could view this as his last best chance to undermine the alliance, judging that Washington would have neither the political interest nor the resources to rapidly come to Europe’s defense, and that absent the U.S. capabilities being redeployed to the Indo-Pacific, the European members of NATO would be vulnerable.1 In the event of a crisis in the Indo-Pacific, the United States would likely fulfill some of its requirements by drawing on capabilities already in Europe and/or those in the United States that NATO expects would be used to reinforce Europe in the event of a conflict there, generating gaps in European defense. Even a lower-intensity crisis in the Indo-Pacific, like a blockade, would likely create gaps in Europe because the United States would probably view such a crisis as the opening phase of a larger conflict and would flow military assets to reinforce the region. The military requirements in the Indo-Pacific—and therefore the gaps in Europe’s defenses—would grow as any crisis worsened. The resources required to defend Taiwan are different to the largely land-based forces that are required to bolster European security, but there are significant areas of overlap where resources are in short supply, giving rise to challenges in the following areas: space-based assets and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; strategic enablers; maritime support; ground-based air and missile defense; long-range precision fires; drones; and combat aircraft. There are also likely to be shortages in the pool of ready forces (in Europe), sustainment units, munitions stockpiles, specialist personnel, and special operations forces. These gaps in European security would erode the credibility of NATO’s deterrence and defense, leading Moscow to perceive a golden opportunity to accomplish its aims: to divide the United States and Europe, expand its sphere of influence, and relitigate the post–Cold War security order in Europe. The greater the gaps and vulnerabilities in NATO’s conventional forces that Russia perceives, the greater the risk Moscow is likely to accept in pressing its ambitions. Moscow is likely to assume that, with hostilities in Asia, the imperative for the United States and Europe would be to de-escalate, creating a context that the Kremlin would view as exceptionally permissive.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Indo-Pacific

150. Countering the Swarm: Protecting the Joint Force in the Drone Age

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
fter decades of air dominance and a near monopoly on precision strike, the United States now faces a dramatically different, more hostile world as the proliferation of cheap drones has democratized mass precision fires. It is likely that in any future conflict, drones will pose an unavoidable threat to American forces. As this report’s analysis of U.S. defense spending reveals, the Department of Defense (DoD) has invested in both legacy and emerging counter–uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) capabilities for nearly a decade. However, these efforts have been hindered by insufficient scale and urgency. Despite the Pentagon’s shortfalls in procuring purpose-built C-UAS capabilities, U.S. counter-drone operations in the Middle East have been notable. The United States views China as its foremost strategic threat, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly advancing its drone capabilities by developing more autonomous systems and acquiring them at scale. Without deep magazines of substantially enhanced counter-drone capabilities, the United States risks having its distributed warfighting strategies overwhelmed by massed Chinese drone attacks, and the United States could lose a war over Taiwan. This is a complex challenge with no silver bullet solution. The DoD must act swiftly. The stakes are not theoretical—without adequate defenses, even the most advanced systems and tactics will be rendered irrelevant in the face of overwhelming drone attacks. Overall Recommendations for the Department of Defense Prioritize counter-drone defense and extend capabilities beyond the air defense community. Drone defense cannot be siloed to dedicated air defense units. Every unit will need the ability to defend itself against small uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). Expand counter-drone training across the Joint Force. The Pentagon needs to develop and share best tactics, techniques, and procedures and ensure that all forces are trained in drone self-protection. Improve the rigor and realism of counter-drone prototype testing. The current test and evaluation process fosters a false sense of confidence in prototype counter-UAS, as they are often assessed using unrealistic facsimiles of enemy drones and low-fidelity tests of electromagnetic weapons.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America