Topic: Security / Publication Year: within 10 Years

51. Structural Misalignment and the Limits of Pressure: Trump and Brazil’s 2026 Election

Author:: Andre Pagliarini and Feliciano de Sá Guimarães
Publication Date:: 09-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: A conservative wave is spreading across Latin America. Since 2025, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Honduras have elected right-wing governments that have all largely deferred to President Trump. Now attention turns to the Oct. 4 election in Brazil, a neck-and-neck race in the region’s largest country. On the surface, a victory by right-wing candidate Flávio Bolsonaro would suggest Brazil will align with Trump administration policies. But Brazil’s diverse commercial relations and commitment to regional leadership complicate this narrative. Washington should temper its expectations and recognize potential structural conflicts between US priorities — especially exclusionary policies toward China — and Brazil’s national interests. Throughout the 20th century and into the 21st century, Brazilian governments of all ideological persuasions have consistently resisted perceived subordination to the US. Regardless of who wins the presidency, we should expect Brazil to continue prioritizing national sovereignty. Ignoring this reality threatens to place the US and Brazil on a collision course, potentially harming both nations. Brazil has increasingly attempted to triangulate its foreign policy with the United States and China. As Brazil’s largest trading partner, China is essential to Brazil’s economic standing, making decoupling from China unrealistic. The Trump administration should accept this reality and refrain from economic coercion aimed at forcing Brazil to cut ties with China. Coercive pressure on this or other issues would stoke nationalistic fervor across Brazil’s ideological spectrum — a reaction Washington would also provoke by meddling in the election process. The United States should refocus diplomacy on security. It should lean into collaborative efforts to crack down on cartel violence in Brazil, which are broadly popular among Brazilians. Brazil should, in turn, reassure the United States that it has no intention to expand its relationship with China into a military partnership. Such security collaboration, paired with these reassurances, would let Brazil triangulate between the world’s two superpowers, putting its sovereignty in service of its citizens’ security and its economic vitality. Cooperation between the United States and Brazil is possible if either Bolsonaro or Lula wins. But it would require each country to recognize the structural differences that exist between them and reach understandings accordingly. As a self-described nationalist, Trump should understand Brazil’s sovereigntist instincts and pursue a diplomatic path consistent with both his administration’s security aims in the Western Hemisphere and Brazil’s vital interests.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, Donald Trump, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America

52. Are Qatar and Saudi Arabia Reassessing Their Reliance on the US?

Author:: Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: America’s Arab partners once viewed the United States as their primary security provider. Yet since President Trump returned to the White House in 2025, the Middle East has experienced increasing volatility, much of it driven by Israeli and American aggression. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the two largest purchasers of American defense articles, have been reassessing the value of the US security guarantee, especially as Washington threatens to attack Iran and plunge the region again into war. Based on the author’s interviews with Qatari and Saudi officials, academics, and think tank experts, this brief examines the evolving state of Qatari and Saudi foreign policy and the future impact on US alliance structures and involvement in the Middle East. Israel’s bombing of a civilian building in a residential neighborhood in Doha, Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, was both the first Israeli attack on a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, and the first time a major non–NATO US ally attacked another. In response, Trump enhanced the US–Qatari relationship, pledging to provide Qatar with a NATO Article 5-like security guarantee. While the US may have tacitly allowed the attack, Qatar nonetheless reaffirmed its strong partnership with Washington. Yet Qatar has also turned to regional balancing in recent years, building a stronger military relationship with Turkey and strengthening ties with the United Kingdom and France. Qatar wishes to avoid a public rift with Trump, while quietly expanding its partnerships to prepare for a more regionally oriented security landscape. Although Saudi Arabia would welcome an iron-clad security guarantee from the US, the relationship between Riyadh and Washington is complicated by the two countries’ different, and at times incompatible, goals. The Saudi government has condemned Israel’s war on Gaza as genocide, and remains steadfast on Israel’s recognition of a Palestinian state as a requirement for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Although Riyadh has tried to accommodate Washington’s demands to reduce exposure to Chinese technology in order to secure access to cutting-edge American technology, China remains a critical trade partner; Riyadh is wary of the US pressuring it to take sides between the US and China. Saudi Arabia is no longer as dependent on Washington, having strengthened relations with Pakistan and Egypt and mended ties with Iran and Turkey. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts to transform the Kingdom’s economy and society require the free flow of investment and capital as well as regional stability. But President Trump’s push for global economic protectionism — as well as a US war on Iran — threatens the success of Vision 2030 and the future viability of the Saudi economy. Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s efforts to maintain close ties to the US while also enhancing their capacity to provide for their own security reflect a broader reconsideration among Gulf countries of an excessive reliance on US security patronage and a move toward greater self-sufficiency. Yet ongoing tensions among GCC members have thwarted periodic efforts to empower the GCC as a security institution. Israel and the United States are increasingly seen as the main sources of destabilization in the region, rather than Iran, a perception that would become undeniable if the US follows through on its threats and again embarks on a war of choice in the Middle East.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Partnerships, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United States of America

53. A US Framework for Baltic Security and Russia Policy

Author:: Eldar Mamedov
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Geographically exposed, politically hardline, and highly militarily dependent on the United States and other Western allies, the Baltic states are both a vulnerability and a potential trip wire in the relationship between NATO, America, and Russia. Understandable historical trauma from Soviet occupation — reinforced by Russia’s more recent aggression against Ukraine — fuels a maximalist anti–Russia stance in the Baltics. This posture pushes the countries’ leaders toward confrontational EU/NATO policies, which risk unintended escalation, including inflexible opposition toward efforts to end the war in Ukraine. The risk of confrontation is only increased by the prominent role that figures from the Baltics play in the leadership of the European Union. The risk of a dangerous confrontation in the Baltic region diverts finite resources and strategic attention from higher US priorities: securing the homeland, managing challenges in the Western Hemisphere, and countering China — the United States’ sole peer competitor. This contradicts the central tenets of the new US National Security Strategy, which explicitly prioritizes achieving strategic stability with Russia and ending NATO expansion. As documented in this brief, the conventional threat of a Russian invasion in the Baltic remains limited. However, the risks of escalation stemming from Baltic hardline policies — a resurgent Russian “war party” and continued war in Ukraine — are unacceptably high. To counteract these dynamics, the United States should begin shifting the burden for Baltic and broader European security to European members of NATO, while reaffirming the United States’ commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5 guarantees. Washington should also privately press Baltic leaders to moderate escalatory rhetoric and policies and to work pragmatically toward a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. As a corollary to these policies, the United States should begin building a genuinely inclusive European security architecture. Such an order would embed both Ukraine and Russia in a framework that removes, or at least substantially mitigates, the risk of another major war on the Continent. An inclusive security order that removes the Ukraine War as an open wound in Europe is, ultimately, the most stable framework to enhance Baltic security and accord with the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy. However, achieving a stable and inclusive European security architecture will require lowering the temperature in the Baltics.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Prussia, United States of America, and Baltic States

54. Community Guidelines for Smart Openness In US Research Collaboration

Author:: Caroline S. Wagner and Denis Simon
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: China was long perceived as the junior partner in the US–China scientific relationship, but is now at the cutting edge of scientific research in many areas. As China has reached new frontiers, an exclusive focus on security concerns has driven a stark decline in US–China cooperation. This has put the two countries on a path to scientific and research decoupling, which is throttling US visibility into China’s frontier work. It also cuts deeply into the US commitment to scientific openness at a time when US national interests would most benefit from some form of continued engagement. Preventing further damage will require a new paradigm that balances beneficial scientific cooperation among the world’s foremost powers with appropriate attention to both opportunities and security concerns. In other publications, we have outlined the broad conceptual framework and argument for a “smart openness” framework. In this brief, we lay out a path to implementing it. Implementing the smart openness framework, especially in the current atmosphere of mutual suspicion and hostility between Washington and Beijing, will require the participation and buy-in of the research community itself. Government cannot and should not define the frontiers of research. This brief begins the process by proposing an initial classification of field-specific standards for what’s in and what’s out in the major fields of international scientific research. We develop and explain three categories of risk for this classification: a green (low risk) category, a yellow (manageable risk) category, and a red (high security-disqualifying risk) category. Such a categorization allows the research community to make informed, considered decisions about collaboration, rather than relying on vague federal advisories. The framework is intended as a starting point for deliberation among professional societies, research security officers, disciplinary experts, and government liaisons. As we further explain in the brief, agreeing on a smart openness security classification can jump-start a process allowing the scientific community to self-monitor in a unified manner, curtailing the generalized suspicion of all US–China scientific collaboration.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Collaboration, and Research and Development
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

55. Emerging Challenges and Opportu-Nities in Humanitarian Assistance in Mozambique: A Case Study from Cabo Delgados

Author:: Fátima Chimarizeni Papelo
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: This paper aims to analyze the emerging challenges and opportuni-ties derived from the humanitarian assistance actions applied in Cabo Del-gado in the context of violent extremism that has been ravaging the province since 2017. This topic is relevant because the traditional concept of huma-nitarian assistance presupposes support for victims of a disaster caused by nature or man-made, and the province of Cabo Delgado presents a growing demand for humanitarian assistance due to the ongoing prolonged violent conflict. In Cabo Delgado, there are victims of a violent, unconventional, low-intensity conflict. More than 1 million people are in need of humanita-rian assistance, of which more than 50% are women and children (OCHA 2021). Along with terrorism, climate disasters, such as Cyclone Keneth in 2019, and the COVID-19 Pandemic, which began affecting Mozambique in 2020, are exacerbating the state of vulnerability of humanitarian victims. Combined, these events force non-state humanitarian actors to operate in an environment characterized by uncertainty, insecurity, and unpredictability. Nevertheless, these humanitarian actors may operate beyond what is defined by traditional humanitarian principles, which concern saving lives and allevia-ting the suffering of humanitarian victims, including developmental actions that may result in the reduction of state power in the humanitarian space and that lead to the implementation of political action by external forces. If prolonged, this scenario may accentuate the weakening of state power. Given this context, one wonders what challenges and opportunities are derived from the humanitarian support process in Cabo Delgado. This paper seeks to reflect on the emerging challenges and oppor-tunities arising from the humanitarian assistance process in Cabo Delgado. Specifically, it sought to a) define what humanitarian assistance is; b) analyze the emerging challenges for humanitarian actors in Cabo Delgado; and c) analyze the emerging opportunities for humanitarian actors within the pro-cess of humanitarian assistance in the region. We started from the hypothesis that the problem of the humanitarian assistance process in the context of violent extremism creates emerging challenges and opportunities for non--state humanitarian actors that are linked to human security, management, and coordination of humanitarian actions.
Topic:: Security, Violent Extremism, Armed Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Political Geography:: Africa, Mozambique, and Cabo Delgados

56. Strengthening Peace and Security in West Africa: A Conversation with Anthony Antem

Author:: Denis Foretia
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: As regional and global challenges related to peace and security continue to evolve, collaboration and knowledge-sharing remain critical to fostering sustainable solutions. The ReCAP Final Regional Conference, taking place in Dakar, Senegal, from February 10-11 2025, brings together experts, practitioners, and researchers from across West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin to reflect on lessons learned in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and the fight against violent extremism. In this insightful conversation, Anthony Antem (AA), Head of the Conflict Prevention Unit at the Nkafu Policy Institute, discusses the peace and security landscape in West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin. He highlights Nkafu’s contributions to the ReCAP project, shares expectations for the conference, and reflects on the importance of regional collaboration in fostering sustainable peace. The discussion is led by Ayukmba Nkonghonyor (AN), Senior Communications Manager at the Denis and Lenora Foretia Foundation.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Security, Peace, Interview, Countering Violent Extremism, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

57. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a changing security order with a mix of diplomacy and deterrence.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

58. Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Criminal gangs have tightened their grip on much of Port-au-Prince, with the multinational security mission making little headway and transitional authorities mired in internal disputes. The UN Security Council should quickly decide how to respond to Haiti’s request for further assistance in restoring public safety.
Topic:: Security, UN Security Council, Organized Crime, Gangs, and Public Safety
Political Geography:: Caribbean and Haiti

59. Practical Guidance for Integrating Climate into WPS National Action Plans

Author:: Christina Vetter and Jessica Smith
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:: In this practical guidance note, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security explores the capacity for National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security (WPS NAPs) to be effective tools for national-level implementation of the WPS Agenda that is responsive to climate-related security risks. WPS NAPs have become the primary tool for national-level efforts to implement the WPS Agenda. To remain relevant and effective, NAPs must be responsive to the ever-changing security landscape and emerging threats to peace and security, like climate change. While the share of NAPs that mention climate change has slowly increased, many include just one cursory reference to climate change in the background section that does not comprehensively address the impacts of climate-related security risks across all four pillars of WPS or include specific actions or commitments related to climate in the NAP’s implementation framework. This report presents actionable policy recommendations for WPS NAPs to more meaningfully address climate change and related security risks throughout their design, drafting, and implementation. The report, authored by Christina Vetter and Dr. Jessica Smith, was made possible with support from the Embassy of Denmark in Washington, D.C.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:: Global Focus

60. Exploring options for advancing Kosovo-NATO relations

Author:: Ramadan Iazi and Jeta Loshaj
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: NATO’s role in Kosovo has been vital since the 1999 intervention and KFOR remains integral for guaranteeing security and stability not only in Republic of Kosovo but also the wider Western Balkans. Public sentiment for full NATO membership is extremely high in Kosovo—over 90% support—reflecting Kosovars’ enduring trust in the NATP alliance. However this overwhelming public support can be affected if Kosovo’s aspirations for closer ties with NATO are not addressed. While, Kosovo’s formal progress toward full membership is politically constrained by the fact that four NATO member states have yet to recognize its independence, there are other options that NATO can pursue to advance relations with Kosovo. In this context, this paper explores options how can Kosovo and NATO advance relations and cooperation. The 1995 study provides core principles for options that are examined in this paper. These principles remain highly relevant for Kosovo. While formal membership is stalled by non-recognizing NATO member states, the paper argues that an inclusive, step-by-step approach can be adapted for a flexible, deeper engagement with Kosovo. A central recommendation is the creation of a “Kosovo Enhanced Cooperation Initiative,” a tailored version of NATO’s partnership mechanisms (e.g., Partnership for Peace, Planning and Review Process, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre). KECI would aim to strengthen Kosovo’s defense institutions, enhance interoperability, support civil emergency preparedness, and develop broader crisis-management capabilities. Crucially, it would not force any change in the political stance on recognition among NATO member states. The EU-facilitated normalization dialogue between Republic of Kosovo and Serbia is one of the essential elements especially for Kosovo to build the confidence of both skeptical NATO member states and international partners when it comes to Euro-Atlantic integration process of the country. Regular coordination with NATO and the EU, particularly concerning sensitive actions in the north, would affirm that Kosovo’s leaders prioritize strategic partnerships and diplomacy over moves that risks and undermine support for Kosovo. Nevertheless, without any concrete carrots such as anything close to a guarantee that Kosovo gains an open perspective for NATO’s PfP, it is rather difficult for Kosovo to be encouraged to deliver on either an agreement with Serbia or any other agreement.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Partnerships, Normalization, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

61. Fueling the Future: Recommendations for Strengthening U.S. Uranium Security

Author:: Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Uranium is a crucial mineral for energy and national security—it fuels the nuclear energy that underpins today’s economy and is key to propelling future growth to meet the surge in energy demand from artificial intelligence. However, supply chain vulnerabilities and dependencies on foreign adversaries challenge U.S. leadership in the sector and create national and energy security risks. Russia and China are rapidly expanding their offtake of mined uranium from international partners, uranium enrichment capabilities, and nuclear infrastructure. To strengthen uranium and nuclear fuel supply chains, the United States must work with allies, implement conducive trade and tariff policies, and invest in both domestic enrichment capacity and uranium ore production abroad.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Economic Security, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, North America, and United States of America

62. Russia’s Shadow War Against the West

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Russia is conducting an escalating and violent campaign of sabotage and subversion against European and U.S. targets in Europe led by Russian military intelligence (the GRU), according to a new CSIS database of Russian activity. The number of Russian attacks nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024. Russia’s primary targets have included transportation, government, critical infrastructure, and industry, and its main weapons and tactics have included explosives, blunt or edged instruments (such as anchors), and electronic attack. Despite the increase in Russian attacks, Western countries have not developed an effective strategy to counter these attacks.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Transnational Threats
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

63. The Impact of Stereotyping on International Cyber Norm‑making: Navigating Misperceptions and Building Trust

Author:: Fan Yang
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Over the past three decades, cyberspace – a digital realm shaped by both technological and social dynamics – has evolved into a domain where a wide range of human activities now take place. These activities are marked by their anonymity, which complicates attribution, and their instantaneity, which challenges timely regulation. To address these challenges, states focus on two approaches: applying existing laws and creating new ones. While there is a general consensus that cyberspace should be governed by the rule of law, including international law, the application of existing legal frameworks to cyberspace remains an evolving challenge both in terms of state practice and academic discourse. At the same time, the international community has consistently sought to develop new norms to promote good governance in cyberspace. Against this backdrop, states – especially those with advanced cyber capabilities – are engaging in a competitive game of norm-making, striving to exert influence in shaping international rules to govern cyberspace. As part of this process, states often categorise each other by trying to highlight their counterparts’ most distinct characteristics. While such labelling is common in diplomatic interactions, it is particularly problematic in the context of international cyber norm-making. Labels reflect and reinforce stereotypes, which often oversimplify the complexities of states’ behavioural patterns in cyberspace and their underlying logic. States are thus roughly grouped by opposing indicators, such as those viewing cyberspace as a global commons versus sovereign territory, those advocating for an interconnected free Internet versus a fragmented “splinternet”, or those favouring multistakeholderism versus multilateralism as the dominant approach to the governance of cyberspace. Once established, these stereotypes are difficult to dismantle and can lead to distorted perceptions that obstruct constructive dialogue. This GCSP Policy Brief aims to identify the potential security challenges posed by stereotyping in international cyber norm-making processes. It then illustrates the policy implications of this problem and offers policy recommendations.
Topic:: Security, Cybersecurity, Norms, Cyberspace, and Trust
Political Geography:: Global Focus

64. Managing Global Biological Risks: Towards a Security-Health Coordination Framework

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros, Jeselyn, and Mely Caballero-Anthony
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The task of securing the world against biological risks is complicated by enforcement and information challenges. A security-health coordination framework is crucial for securing cooperation among a diverse set of actors with different but converging mandates.
Topic:: Security, Biosecurity, Crisis Management, Risk, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Global Focus

65. Biosecurity Awareness and Education in Southeast Asia

Author:: Julius Caesar Trajano and Jeselyn
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: ASEAN leaders recognise the critical importance of biosecurity. But there is a need to enhance the security culture and biosecurity awareness among life science, medical, and biotechnology professionals to mitigate the misuse of biological materials.
Topic:: Security, Education, Biosecurity, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

66. The U.S. Pursues Increasingly Aggressive Policy towards Latin America

Author:: Bartłomiej Znojek
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s administration is seeking to rebuild U.S. influence in Latin America. It is trying to convince the countries of the region that cooperation with the United States will bring development and increased security to the Americas. For the time being, however, this approach mainly serves U.S. security interests, in particular combating irregular migration, organised crime and drug trafficking, and reducing China’s influence. The current administration’s threats, inconsistent positions, and expansionist drive will deepen the distrust of the U.S. and antagonise important Latin American partners.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Drug Trafficking
Political Geography:: Latin America and United States of America

67. Hybrid threats: the new horizons for a "Europe of internal security"?

Author:: Jean Mafart
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Even today, most of our fellow citizens are unaware that the European Union is actively involved in the fight against terrorism, money laundering and drug trafficking, in border protection and in the harmonisation of criminal legislation[1]. This is why a European internal security strategy, ProtectEU published by the Commission on April 1st is important : it defines the European Union's work programme for the coming years, within the framework of the guidelines laid down by the European Council. The assessment of the previous internal security strategy (for the period 2020-2025) shows that this kind of programme has real scope: the Commission announced numerous initiatives that were actually completed, even if, as time goes by, the action inevitably deviates from the initial intentions in response to circumstances. Since the successive strategies are work programmes for a given period, none of them really resembles the previous one. On the other hand, the major underlying themes vary relatively little: terrorism, organised crime and external border control were, as it is the case today, key concerns of the ‘founding fathers’ of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ). The doubling of the staff of Europol, the agency responsible which supports Member States in the fight against crime, and the tripling of the staff of the European Border Guard, which are part of the Frontex agency, are also the most spectacular proposals of the new strategy, even if they had already been voiced by the President of the Commission at the beginning of her second term. The arrival of a new theme is therefore bound to attract attention: in this case, it is striking to see the space given over to hybrid threats (a whole chapter, eight pages out of the thirty in the document published on 1 April). A sad sign of the times: it is no longer conceivable to develop an internal security policy without addressing, alongside the more ‘traditional’ themes, the growing threat of destabilisation operations of all kinds coming from Russia or elsewhere. The link between the internal and external dimensions of security is obviously nothing new: in France, the White Paper on defence and national security published in 2008 already considered that ‘the distinction between internal and external security is no longer relevant’. Current geopolitical tensions and the development of hybrid threats are blatantly reinforcing this. How can the ‘internal security of Europe’, initially conceived to respond to internal issues - compensating for the effects of free movement between Member States - adapt to take better account of threats from the outside?
Topic:: Security, European Union, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:: Europe

68. When sleepwalkers awake: German plea for a new European security architecture - a German point of view

Author:: Stéphane Beemelmans
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: For three years, a war has been raging on Europe's borders between two geographically connected states – a conflict that originated in Russia's occupation of Crimea and Donbass almost 11 years ago. Since then, every political and military decision-maker in our part of Europe should have realized that there is a (great) power on our continent that is ready at any time to put ‘war as a continuation of politics by other means’ (Clausewitz) into practice. The deterrent mechanism between the former blocs, which had been effective for almost 50 years and thus prevented war, has evidently given way to a ‘laissez-faire’ on the part of the European states, which has allowed Russia to attack and partially occupy Ukraine with complete impunity, using a crude mix of historical and political justifications that violate international law. What should not have happened could not be seen and therefore could not be addressed appropriately. Our and NATO's ‘laissez-faire’ was based on the for malistic argument that no NATO member country had been attacked and on the lack of strategic foresight disguised as ‘hope’, the expression of which under international law was the ‘Minsk Peace Agreement’ of 2015. The hope, namely, that this attack could be localized and thus geographically restricted or ‘frozen’.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

69. Connecting Opportunities: Greece’s Strategic Role in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)

Author:: Dimitris Gavalas and George Dikaios
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This policy brief discusses the role of Greece in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), focusing mainly on those aspects related to infrastructure and ports and the global supply chain. It suggests a series of different actions and highlights different angles that Greece should take into account if it wants to be a major player in the establishment of the Corridor and its gateway to Europe/European Union. – IMEC will be a game changer in international trade relationships, regional tensions, and political challenges. – The main obstacles to IMEC’s establishment are the conflicts in the Middle East and other major national interests of key actors (such as the Chinese monopoly in the region). – Focus is given to port infrastructure, as ports are pivotal to the global supply chain. India pays significant attention to its ports, while the Port of Piraeus is the largest port in Eastern Europe. – The critical role and position of Greece are highlighted, underlying its role as a hub that connects India and the Middle East to Europe. – Greece needs to invest in infrastructure development, build a skilled workforce, and attract foreign investments. – Suggestions for establishing a successful commercial corridor between India and Greece are given, focusing on mutual interests and growth opportunities.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Trade, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, India, and Greece

70. The Yemeni Civil War: Territorial Partition as the Path to Peace

Author:: Riddhi Likhe
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: The Yemeni Civil War is a conflict that bears crucial regional significance due to its destabilising effect on the Middle East, with the country also being home to one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters. The conflict is characterised by a complex web of regional rivalries, sectarian tensions, and international interventions. This research paper offers a comprehensive assessment of the conflict by outlining its background, key actors and main conflict drivers, and hence proposes a theoretically, historically and contextually informed strategy for resolution- the peaceful territorial partition of Yemen into the historical entities of North Yemen and South Yemen. The paper outlines short-term, medium-term and long-term priorities that the ideal territorial partition plan would focus on, including and accounting for relevant primary, secondary and tertiary actors. The paper aims to showcase that through a nuanced understanding of Yemen’s demographic dynamics and history, a roadmap to ending the conflict focused on territorial partition can be charted out in collaboration with regional actors and the international community, hence leading to stable Yemens that can heal from the humanitarian catastrophe caused by the conflict.
Topic:: Security, Civil War, Peace, Humanitarian Crisis, and Partition
Political Geography:: Middle East and Yemen

71. Pakistan Security Report 2024: An Abridged Version

Author:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: Marking a 70% increase from the previous year, Pakistan experienced a total of 521 terrorist attacks in 2024. This intensified wave of terrorism claimed 852 lives, reflecting a 23% rise compared to the terrorism-related fatalities recorded the year before. Another 1,092 people were injured in these attacks recorded during the year. Although terrorist attacks were recorded in all four provinces and the federal capital in 2024, over 95% of them were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In 2024, a significant increase in militant fatalities was observed during operational strikes conducted by security forces in Pakistan. Compared to 373 militants killed in such operations in 2023, the number rose to 621 in 2024, marking a rise of over 66%. Overall, security forces and law enforcement agencies carried out 158 anti-militant operations in 2024, which was a 22% increase from the previous year. These are some of the key findings from Pakistan Security Report 2024, prepared and released by Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

72. Hate Crimes, Terrorism and the Framing of White Supremacist Violence with Shirin Sinnar (Episode 26)

Author:: Shirin Sinnar and Sahar Aziz
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: In the face of pervasive racial violence in American society, the effort to address and subdue white supremacist extremism has been underserved by the framing of “hate crimes,” and the movement to re-frame these events as domestic terrorism, as these terms do not meet the heavy task of eliminating the perpetuation of institutional oppression.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, White Supremacy, Racism, Hate Crimes, and Domestic Terrorism
Political Geography:: United States of America and North America

73. Public Expectations of Government Responses to Security Contingencies Around Japan

Author:: Satoshi Machidori, Harukata Takenaka, Amy Catalinac, and Kenneth McElwain
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: In this workshop, scholars Satoshi Machidori and Harukata Takenaka speak on Japanese public attitudes toward possible geopolitical contingencies in the light of changing international environment in East Asia. Their new, large-scale survey experiment examines voter assessments of possible government responses to security crises, including a possible Taiwan contingency. The report also analyzes how perceptions of shared ethnicity may affect public reactions to a hypothetical threat from a democratic regime, expanding the research on the relationship between ethnicity and democratic peace. This research is part of a multi-year study project by ROLES (Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies, University of Tokyo). Speakers: Satoshi Machidori, Professor of Political Science, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University, Japan Harukata Takenaka, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies = GRIPS, Japan Discussant: Amy Catalinac, Associate Professor of Politics, NYU Moderator: Kenneth Mori McElwain, Visiting Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Columbia University Hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and co-sponsored by China and the World Program and APEC Study Center.
Topic:: Security, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, and Ethnicity
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

74. Double Dealers: Lebanon and the Risks of Captagon Trafficking

Author:: Mohanad Hage Ali
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Lebanon’s financial collapse and the Syrian conflict have allowed for the growth of an illicit economy, giving rise to a new breed of drug traffickers with ties to Lebanese parties and influence in the security forces. To address this, the country must adopt a comprehensive approach.
Topic:: Security, Syrian War, Drug Trafficking, and Captagon
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

75. Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition

Author:: George Perkovich, Fumihiko Yoshida, and Michiru Nishida
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Preventing nuclear war and other existential military threats requires nations today to focus more on politics than on the qualities or quantities of weapons. Yet, many participants in nuclear policy debates do the opposite.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:: Global Focus

76. Reconsidering Sovereignty Amid the Climate Crisis

Author:: Nitya Labh
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The current international order is based on the presumption that our physical geography is fixed and unchanging. However, climate change—in the form of sea level rise and inundation—is shifting international boundaries. The world’s changing geography will force policymakers and legal experts to adapt the concepts of sovereignty, statehood, and citizenship to address the new global environment. This paper focuses its discussion of climate impacts and response policies on the Pacific islands. The changes befalling low-lying islands, like those in the Pacific, are a harbinger of the future that awaits the residents of coastal cities and shorelines on larger land bodies.1 Islands’ experiences of climate change offer insights into the shortcomings of the existing international system and demonstrate the fundamental tension between sovereignty and climate change. Ultimately, the Pacific region serves as an important case study and a critical blueprint for the future of global adaptation and stability. In view of this challenge, policymakers should consider new legal options to address climate-induced boundary changes. These may include the creation of fictitious boundaries, collective sovereignty, hybrid citizenship, and corridors for climate displacement. This paper does not seek to suggest that these new ideas for sovereignty are the only path to resolving the nexus of legal-climate challenges that exist today. Instead, this paper attempts to raise new questions and ideas about how policymakers should think about the international system at a time when anthropogenic climate and environmental change is rearranging its geophysical foundations.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Sovereignty, and International Order
Political Geography:: Indo-Pacific

77. Ending the New Wars of Attrition: Opportunities for Collective Regional Security in the Middle East

Author:: Amr Hamzawy
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The Middle East’s only viable path toward stability and security lies in fostering dialogue, coordinated initiatives, and joint diplomacy among its influential states.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Dialogue, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: Middle East

78. Q&A: What happened in the coastal region of Syria last week?

Author:: Muaz Al Abdullah
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: On 6 March, a group of armed supporters of former President Bashar al-Assad ambushed a group of security forces in Beit Ana village in the Lattakia countryside, killing and injuring several service members. Following the attack, the gunmen targeted an ambulance that tried to evacuate those who were killed and injured. This triggered a large-scale response by the security forces inside Beit Ana that included artillery shelling and helicopter strikes. Later that same day, Assad loyalists launched coordinated attacks across Lattakia and Tartus governorates to restore control over the main junctions that link the two provinces. This sparked a cycle of violence that included extrajudicial killings of people in the Alawite community by regime forces. At least 57 distinct locations in Lattakia, Hama, Homs, and Tartus governorates were the site of violence over four days (see map below).
Topic:: Security, Extrajudicial Killings, Armed Conflict, and Alawites
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

79. The Global Terrorist Threat Forecast in 2025

Author:: Liu Chunlin and Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The global terrorist threat remains persistent and pervasive as the world moves into 2025. Armed conflicts from Ukraine to Gaza and destabilisation by both State and non-State actors are redefining international stability. The influence of groups such as Islamic State, al-Qaeda and Iranian-backed militias underscores the enduring risks. Key challenges include geopolitical rivalries, radicalisation and increasingly sophisticated cyber and physical attacks. With the Middle East at the epicentre of escalating tensions and Africa emerging as a new hotspot, coordinated international efforts are essential to prevent and counter threats. States must strengthen cooperation in intelligence, security and strategic foresight to deal with a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous global landscape.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Collaboration, Threat Assessment, 2023 Gaza War, Transnational Threats, and Salafi-Jihadism
Political Geography:: Middle East and Global Focus

80. Europe’s next watershed – how liberal Europe should react to Trump 2.0

Author:: Fabian Zuleeg
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The return of Donald Trump to the White House and his “America first” doctrine inevitably poses a fundamental challenge for the EU. Trump’s second presidency represents a new watershed moment: the policies of the next US administration are not just likely to put Europe at a global disadvantage, they will threaten its core objectives of prosperity, sustainability, security, and democracy. This is why European countries will have to act decisively to safeguard the bloc’s unity and strengthen its autonomy in a changed world. Assuming that a second Trump administration will resemble the first would be a serious error. Trump has become more extreme in his policy positions, while facing fewer constraints and operating in a more favourable international environment. As a result, preparing for a worst-case scenario may be a wise approach. Trump’s adversarial, zero-sum approach to international trade is likely to undermine the structures and processes of multilateral economic governance. Measures such as tariffs also threaten the EU’s growth and competitiveness and risk deepening divisions within the bloc. Global progress towards greater sustainability is certain to suffer. A disengagement on behalf of the US from its leadership role in environmental and climate governance will be a significant setback in these efforts. Should the US turn away from its climate goals, this would send a strong signal to other countries that these objectives are no longer a priority. On security, any potential benefit that a Trump presidency might produce in terms of strengthening EU unity is strongly undermined by his stance on Ukraine, which is set to increase the threat facing Europe from Russia. A US-imposed ceasefire would be no guarantee of lasting peace or security for Ukraine or for Europe. In response, the EU and its members will have to take a much bolder and more proactive role, sharply increasing Europe’s own military capabilities and spending. Policies that signal a tolerance for the use of open and covert force, in violation of international law, will also have profound consequences for global security. Far-right and anti-democratic forces within Europe are likely to be emboldened by an incoming Trump government. His actions to exploit Europe’s political divides are set to put significant pressure on European integration – a project Trump will have no qualms in undermining. The entrenchment and normalisation of Trump’s style of populistic, divisive politics and ‘us against them’ rhetoric risks eroding democratic debate more broadly. His amplification of falsehoods and disinformation will undermine public trust in the US and beyond, and could also boost political figures adopting similar strategies in Europe. There is strong potential for Trump’s anti-establishment narrative to gain further ground in Europe, and Europe’s illiberal, regressive and new-nativist forces will no doubt seek to harness this to increase their power. Should they be successful, there is a very real risk of the EU becoming hollowed-out and ineffectual. In this context, achieving consensus and acting with unity will be a greater challenge than ever for the EU27. Those within the EU who are prepared to take the necessary steps to rise to the challenge posed by Trump may have to explore unconventional forms of cooperation to act effectively. Moving forward in this way poses its own legal and political risks. But with European democracy at stake, it may be the only path to achieving the necessary level of ambition and unity to mount a strong response to Trump 2.0.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Donald Trump, Sustainability, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Europe

81. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

82. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency: Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Acontingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options. Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid. Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do. U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so: Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency. Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities. Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible. Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States. Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub. Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Coalition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

83. Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding: Analyzing Yemeni Civil Conflict Deadlocks

Author:: Felipe Duran and Marcial A. G. Suarez
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The roots of the ongoing civil conflict in Yemen lie in the inability of Yemeni society to address and resolve the frustration arising from political marginalization, economic deprivation and the effects of an extractive, corrupt and rent-seeking state. By definition, such systems are characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of a restricted elite and impose few restrictions on their exercise of power. This systemic failure has produced a cycle of violence, political upheaval, and institutional collapse since the creation of the modern Yemeni state in the 1960s, of which the current conflict appears to be only the latest eruption. We propose, as a way of accessing potential possible results for resolving the contradiction, a proposal based on the combination of policies based on Peace Studies, understanding that the mechanisms of the Security Sector Reform processes and transitional justice are crucial for the construction and peacebuilding in the Republic of Yemen. This work analyzes how structural violence has perpetuated in recent years in Yemen and how we can direct the conflict towards positive peace.
Topic:: Security, Civil War, Reform, Peacebuilding, and Structural Violence
Political Geography:: Middle East and Yemen

84. Kangaroo Concerns About Swiming Dragon Ambitions

Author:: Saira Aquil and Waheed Ur Rehman
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: China has accelerated its naval modernization in recent years. There are multiple factors behind this modernization drive. The rise of China in many ways is impacting political, economic, and security dynamics around the world but particularly in Asia-Pacific (Indo-Pacific). Australia is one of the country in this region which is not an exception in this regard. This study looks for implications of China’s naval modernization on Australia. The study makes an important contribution to the literature because this part of the world has not been looked into while analyzing Chinese naval modernization. Data is collected through primary and secondary sources. Besides reviewing the existing literature data is collected through key informant interviews and policy documents of China and Australia. Australian threat perception is evaluated by analyzing Australian Defense White Papers, speeches of Australian leaders and analysis of the country’s security analysts. The study finds that challenges posed by other nations in the region is prompting China to modernize its navy. This in turn enhances security concerns in Australia which is always wary of securing its territorial integrity, economic interests, and global liberal world order which has contributed to its development and security. Australia, in response to these developments, has embarked on the path of modernizing its own forces. It has bolstered its alliances with the US and other partners.
Topic:: Security, Navy, Modernization, Strategic Interests, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

85. Starr Forum: The US and the World Under Trump: The First 100 Days

Author:: Juliette N. Kayyem and Kori Schake
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Starr Forum: The US and the World Under Trump: The First 100 Days: Wednesday, April 16th, 2025. Juliette Kayyem and Kori Schake analyzed President Trump’s first 100 days in office and what this means for our nation and the world. Speakers: Juliette Kayyem is the faculty chair of the Homeland Security and Security and Global Health Projects at Harvard University and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. She also serves as a senior national security analyst for CNN where she has been described as CNN’s “go to” for disasters. A contributing writer to The Atlantic, Professor Kayyem has a weekly security segment on NPR’s Boston station WGBH. Her most recent book, "The Devil Never Sleeps: Learning to Live in an Age of Disasters," was described in a New Yorker profile as an “engagingly urgent blueprint for rethinking our approach to disaster preparedness and response.” She served as President Obama’s assistant secretary for intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. Kori Schake leads the foreign and defense policy team at the American Enterprise Institute. She is the author of "Safe Passage: the Transition from British to American Hegemony," and a contributing writer at the Atlantic, War on the Rocks, and Bloomberg. Before joining AEI, Dr. Schake was the deputy director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. She has had a distinguished career in government, working at the US State Department, the US Department of Defense, and the National Security Council at the White House. She has also taught at Stanford, West Point, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, National Defense University, and the University of Maryland. She has written additional books, including "America vs the West: Can the Liberal World Order Be Preserved?" and is coeditor, along with former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, of “Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military.” Moderator: Evan Lieberman is the Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa and the director of the MIT Center for International Studies. He conducts research on the political-economy of development, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. He studies the democratic politics of governing ethnically and racially diverse societies, including the challenges of public health, climate adaptation, and ensuring respect for human dignity. Lieberman is the author, most recently, of "Until We Have Won Our Liberty: South Africa after Apartheid."
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Public Health, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

86. What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba

Author:: Dmytro Kuleba, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, former foreign minister of Ukraine: Tuesday, April 8th, 2025. Speaker: Dmytro Kuleba is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and served as the foreign minister of Ukraine from March 2020-September 2024. Prior to that, he was deputy prime minister on matters of European relations from August 2019 to March 2020. He is internationally recognized as one of the most influential diplomats of his generation and a global champion for democracy, freedom, and resilience. Discussants: Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and US-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is director of the MIT-Ukraine Program at CIS.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

87. Starr Forum: Sudan Under Fire

Author:: Mai Hassan, Cameron Hudson, Kholood Khair, and Ahmed Kodouda
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Starr Forum: Sudan Under Fire: Monday, April 7th, 2025. As we enter year three of civil war, experts discussed the global crisis that has been too often ignored. Moderator: Mai Hassan is an associate professor of political science at MIT and the faculty director of the MIT-Africa Program at the Center for International Studies. Her work examines topics that span across authoritarian regimes, bureaucracy and public administration, and contentious politics. Speakers: Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to multiple other academic posts, Cameron served in the US government, including as an intelligence analyst in the Africa Directorate at the Central Intelligence Agency. Kholood Khair is the founder and director of Confluence Advisory, a 'think and do tank' formerly based in Khartoum that works on three priority policy areas: peace and security, economy, and governance. She is currently at Yale University as a visiting fellow. Ahmed Kodouda is a policy, advocacy, and communication specialist. He has an extensive background in conflict and post conflict settings and experience working with and consulting for governmental and NGOs around the world, including in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kenya.
Topic:: Security, Civil War, International Security, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Africa and Sudan

88. North Korea, Russia, and China: Past Cooperation & Future Prospects

Author:: Sydney Seiler
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Syd Seiler argues that recent developments in the relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia should be examined within the context of past interactions and North Korea’s geopolitical reality over the past several decades. North Korea’s pursuit of a distanced approach toward China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its post-Cold War management of the bilateral relationships while developing nuclear weapons, and contemporary developments within the North Korea-China-Russia triangle highlight limited shared interests and few signs of deliberate trilateralism. Despite skepticism regarding the durability of trilateralism, Seiler warns against neglecting the threat of collaboration and cooperation among the three countries. In particular, the evolving relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia holds the potential to harm the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and embolden North Korea to believe that the use of force might be justified within the New Cold War structure. Seiler outlines three scenarios in which the evolution of trilateralism could lead to North Korea employing military force on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the critical role of China and Russia in either restraining or encouraging North Korean revisionism. To properly respond to the dangerous transformation of the geopolitical environment, Seiler recommends the United States, South Korea, and like-minded states reinforce conventional and extended deterrence by convincing China and Russia that they will incur high costs for enabling North Korea’s coercive and revisionist behavior.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and North Korea

89. Siloed No More: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict

Author:: Clint Work
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This project was motivated by and builds upon earlier research tracing the evolution and apparent alignment of U.S. and South Korean signaling on Taiwan, wherein the South Korean government adopted a more outspoken position regarding “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and framed it in increasingly expansive terms—as a regional and global issue yet also directly linked to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. The previous research indicated the U.S.-ROK alliance faced a gap between its topline diplomatic rhetoric on Taiwan and its preparedness to navigate an actual conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan and the attendant risk of a simultaneous conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This project aimed to go beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Forty-two interviews were conducted from June 2024 to February 2025 in both Washington and Seoul. Most were in-person interviews with some conducted virtually or by written response via email. Through these interviews with U.S. and ROK current and former government officials, think tank experts, and academics—as well as open-source research—this project offers insight on the evolution and state of U.S.-ROK alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict, key challenges obstructing such discussions, and critical variables or dynamics the alliance would have to navigate in the event of a conflict.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

90. US interests can benefit from stronger congressional ties with the Caribbean

Author:: Wazim Mowla and Maite Gonzalez Latorre
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The Caribbean’s geographic proximity to the United States—as well as its use as a transit point for US citizens, goods, and financial services—makes it a crucial hub for US national interests. However, the relationship has suffered from inconsistent and infrequent assistance. Changes in US policy priorities bring ever-changing adjustments to US engagement, leaving the Caribbean, its leadership, and its institutions with insufficient time to benefit from US policy action. For Caribbean countries, policy continuity is critical for implementation and to see tangible and meaningful development. The region’s small populations and markets, vulnerability to natural disasters and changing global commodity prices, and limited institutional capacity slow the pace of receiving and utilizing development assistance and support. Underpinning US-Caribbean ties with stronger US congressional engagement can provide needed longevity to the relationship. Congressional actions—like newly appropriated resources and committee hearings—can bring tangible benefits to US-Caribbean relations.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Politics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Caribbean, North America, and United States of America

91. The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete

Author:: Clementine G. Starling-Daniels and Theresa Luetkefend
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Strategic competition is likely to intensify over the next decade, increasing the demands on the United States to deter and defend against wide-ranging and simultaneous security challenges across multiple domains and regions worldwide. In that time frame, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Force should more effectively leverage the competencies of US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to compete with US strategic adversaries. Three realities facing the DOD over the next decade lend themselves toward leveraging USSOF more in strategic competition. First, the growing need to counter globally active and increasingly cooperative aggressors, while the broader Joint Force remains focused on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, underscores the value of leveraging USSOF to manage competition in other regions. Second, the desire to avoid war and manage competition below the threshold of conflict aligns with USSOF’s expertise in the irregular aspects of competition. Third, unless defense spending and recruitment dramatically increase over the next decade, the Joint Force will likely have to manage more security challenges without a commensurate increase in force size and capabilities, which underscores the need for the DOD to maximize every tool at its disposal, including the use of USSOF to help manage strategic competition. The US government must harness all instruments of national power, alongside its network of allies and partners, to uphold international security, deter attacks, and counter efforts to undermine US security interests. Achieving this requires effectively integrating and leveraging the distinct roles of the DOD, interagency partners, the intelligence community (IC), and the Joint Force, including components like USSOF that have not been traditionally prioritized in strategic competition. For the past two decades, USSOF achieved critical operational successes during the Global War on Terror, primarily through counterterrorism and direct-action missions. However, peer and near-peer competition now demands a broader application of USSOF’s twelve core activities, with emphasis on seven: special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, unconventional warfare, and direct action. Over the next decade, the DOD should emphasize USSOF’s return to its roots—the core competencies USSOF conducted and refined during the Cold War. USSOF’s unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. During that era, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, and that is how USSOF should be applied in the next decade to help manage strategic competition. This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to: Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally. Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation. Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial. Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder. This report seeks to clarify USSOF’s role in strategic competition over the next decade, address gaps in understanding within the DOD and the broader national security community about USSOF’s competencies, and guide future resource and force development decisions. By prioritizing the above five functions, USSOF can bolster the US competitive edge and support the DOD’s management of challenges across diverse theaters and domains.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, National Security, Terrorism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Middle East, Latin America, and United States of America

92. Friends with benefits: Assessing Russian-Chinese military exercises

Author:: Narantsatsral Enkhbat
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: China-Russia joint strategic air patrols and naval manoeuvres near U.S. territory in the Pacifi c have become a growing trend, serving as geopolitical messaging. China is likely to become more involved in maritime security and power projection in the Arctic, as evidenced by its Coast Guard’s manoeuvres with Russia in the Northern Pacifi c. Russia conducts military drills and manoeuvres with China in the South China Sea (and potentially in the Taiwan Strait) to show support to China on territorial issues.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Geopolitics, Navy, Maritime, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

93. Uncharted Rebellion: The Shifting Frontiers of Left-Wing Extremism

Author:: José Pedro Zúquete
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: For readers of Baku Dialogues, a journal dedicated to fostering intellectual exchange across the Silk Road region, the study of left‑wing extremism (LWE) offers a lens into global ideological currents that resonate even in this historically rich and geopolitically and geoeconomically significant area. The Silk Road region, stretching from the South Caucasus to Central Asia, has long been a crossroads of cultures, ideas, and political movements. Today, it faces many of the same challenges of radicalization and extremism that afflict other parts of the world, though often in unique local forms.
Topic:: Security, Geopolitics, Leftist Politics, and Political Extremism
Political Geography:: Central Asia and South Caucasus

94. Infrastructure Grids and Networks. The Challenges Ahead, amid Security and Efficiency

Author:: Carlo Secchi and Alessandro Gili
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: In recent years, accelerating geopolitical tensions, economic disruptions, and climate-related disasters have elevated resilience and economic security to the forefront of both global and European policy agendas. In response, strategies such as de-risking have driven substantial investments in redundancy, new trade corridors, and expanded infrastructure – including railway lines, highways, ports, electricity grids, pipelines, and undersea digital cables. This infrastructure forms the backbone of the global economy. It is not only crucial for maintaining competitiveness and supporting growth but also plays a central role in enabling the energy and digital transitions. As such, protecting these systems from hostile actions or third-party interference has become an urgent priority. At the same time, the long-standing trade-off between efficiency and security has grown more pronounced amid increasingly strained international relations. Both governments and private sector actors are now more willing to absorb higher costs in order to enhance the resilience of supply chains and connectivity networks. Against this backdrop, a new paradigm is emerging - one that raises two critical questions: Where will the balance ultimately settle between economic efficiency and security/resilience? And what investment priorities will shape the future of transport, energy, and digital connectivity infrastructure?
Topic:: Security, Infrastructure, Economy, Energy, and Digital Transition
Political Geography:: Global Focus

95. Friends and Foes in the Indo-Pacific: Multilateralism Out, Minilateralism In?

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Guido Alberto Casanova
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Minilateralism is already among us, and it is here to stay. The well-known shortcomings of the multilateral system of governance are pushing individual states in the Indo-Pacific to come up with new and different solutions to deal with the security and prosperity issues that current institutions are unable to tackle. Amid growing geopolitical rivalries and the uncertainty provoked by the re-election of Donald Trump, this report aims to shed some clarity on an emerging trend that is already affecting the foreign policy of great powers in a region that is central to global affairs.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Multilateralism, Institutions, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, India, Asia, North Korea, Philippines, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

96. Dilemmas for the EU in deficit-financing of defence expenditure and maintenance of fiscal discipline

Author:: Lucio Pench
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union is grappling with the challenge of increasing defence expenditure while maintaining fiscal discipline under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The European Commission has proposed activating the national escape clause available under the SGP to accommodate defence spending without triggering the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). However, the scope and enforcement of this measure remain uncertain. A proposed 1.5 percent of GDP cap on extra fiscal flexibility is legally questionable and unlikely to be enforced. While low-debt countries do not require the clause due to existing flexibility, highly indebted nations may find it insufficient in the face of rising debt costs. The escape clause may also serve as a backdoor for European Central Bank interventions under the Transmission Protection Instrument, which requires compliance with EU fiscal rules. The Commission has also proposed the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) funding mechanism, a €150 billion loan programme to finance national defence investments. SAFE relies on national borrowing and follows the model of the SURE (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) facility, put in place during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, SAFE’s limited scale and dependence on national fiscal capacities mean it falls short of the collective security funding approach advocated by economists. Meanwhile, Germany’s decision to reform its constitutional debt brake marks a major departure from its traditional fiscal policies. The reform establishes a permanent ‘defence golden rule’, exempting military spending from borrowing limits, alongside a €10 trillion infrastructure fund. Although this move does not endanger Germany’s fiscal sustainability, it undermines EU-wide fiscal coordination and conflicts with the SGP. This could weaken the European Central Bank’s position in future market interventions. Given these challenges, discussions on a new EU fiscal framework are necessary to ensure fiscal flexibility while maintaining debt sustainability.
Topic:: Security, Budget, European Union, Fiscal Policy, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe

97. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?

Author:: Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

98. Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform

Author:: Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The economic strategy being defined by the 2024-2029 European Commission seems to follow the prescriptions on innovation and single market reform, and the expansive approach to industrial policy, set out by Mario Draghi in his September 2024 report on European Union competitiveness, with two important differences. First, the Commission stops short of calling for World Trade Organisation-prohibited subsidies – this is welcome. Second, the Commission proposes a new state aid framework for national industrial policy rather than expansion of EU-level public investment funding. This runs the risk of weakening the single market and harming competition, with the unintended consequence of protecting incumbents and inhibiting structural change. In terms of specific policies, on defence, the Commission is right to face up to the challenge of defining an EU procurement mechanism that offers sufficient speed and cost advantages to justify large-scale funding. On economic security and international partnerships, the Commission is right to take a broader approach than a foreign economic policy focused only on supply chains. What is lacking is a much greater commitment to providing support for climate mitigation in developing countries. The second Trump presidency creates risks for the Commission strategy. President Trump has gone further than expected in threatening territorial expansion and with the speed, aggression and disregard for the rule of law with which he has started to implement his policies. These factors will complicate the EU-United States relationship. The best defence against both Trump and the competitive and security threats posed by China is to accelerate policies that address the EU’s structural weaknesses: raising productivity growth, defence capacity and economic security. Economic security, in turn, requires more resilient trade relationships, less financial dependence on the US and an improved standing with emerging market and developing economies. The EU should also seize the opportunity offered by the shift in US policy from subsidies to deregulation. While the EU should not race Trump to the bottom on environmental or financial deregulation, it should rapidly improve its own regulatory framework while building on its core strengths: human capital and the rule of law. Unlike tariff wars or discriminatory subsidies, a competition to provide a good business environment is not a zero-sum game.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Industrial Policy, Budget, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, Sustainability, European Commission, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

99. Ukraine: European democracy’s affordable arsenal

Author:: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: European NATO members must raise defence spending by enough to deter through strength an irredentist Russia. This must be done possibly without the United States and when ageing populations demand higher social spending. Raising defence spending to sufficient levels could result in a doubling of current primary deficits to just over 3 percent of GDP on average. This seems likely to be a fiscally unattainable goal for this group of countries. European NATO members, in addition to their quantitative defence spending challenge, face the qualitative challenge of significantly increasing their outlays on new modern military equipment, especially drones, to credibly deter Russia. This will require all European NATO members to significantly increase investments in their domestic and regional military-industrial capacities. While its armed forces are physically defending their country against Russia’s onslaught, Ukraine is transforming gradually into a very large, advanced and cost-competitive military equipment and weapons producer. Through the so-called ‘Danish Model’, individual European Union and NATO members are already actively funding Ukrainian defence production, helping it to help itself against Russia. Much more focus should be put on Ukraine’s ability, if fully integrated with the military-industrial sector in the rest of Europe, to produce much of the modern military equipment wanted by itself and the rest of Europe. This Policy Brief shows how Ukraine already produces drones and modern howitzers, arguably the two most important weapons in defensive warfare today, at prices well below those achieved by other Western military suppliers. The EU, with a fully integrated and funded Ukrainian military-industrial sector, will have the capacity to produce much of the cost-competitive military equipment it will need in future, while continuing to fund its welfare systems. To facilitate this development, the EU must in all defence and military-related matters begin treating Ukraine immediately as a full EU member.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Industrial Policy, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

100. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:: Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS