Topic: Security / Publication Year: within 10 Years

1. Protecting the North American Arctic and Beyond

Author:: Mathieu Boulegue, Rebecca Pincus, and Madison Lipson
Publication Date:: 11-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The United States has quickly adapted to the new security environment in a changing Arctic, as the region must deal with geopolitical tension stemming from Russia, the impact of climate change, and NATO’s increased role and presence. Many unknowns remain, however. Turning current and future US strategic documents and concepts about the Arctic into reality does not have any easy solutions. This will require continued endeavor and patience. The US should ensure prevailing in the Arctic in terms of homeland security and forward defense. Forward defense in the Arctic will require forward-thinking, notably what constitutes Arctic-specific integrated deterrence through tailored and calibrated presence as part of the Joint Force. A large part of this endeavor falls on the leadership of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM must be empowered to become the Department of Defense’s Arctic “capability advocate” under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the Total Force concept. USNORTHCOM must be emboldened to take the lead in associated challenges to defend the US homeland, secure the region, cooperate with allies, and bridge potential security gaps. This paper seeks to help USNORTHCOM leverage its influence in shaping the future of Arctic security for the US homeland. It offers plenty of innovative policy recommendations and action points aimed at streamlining the role of NORTHCOM to keep the Arctic safe and secure for the US and its allies. Future policy must address the need to enhance Arctic domain awareness and foster a new approach to Arctic-specific capabilities, technologies, and procurement tailored to the environment. Part of this endeavor is also connected to bridging potential gaps related to logistics, sustainment, maintenance, and transportation adapted to Arctic-specific requirements. This will ensure increased mobility and reach across the region. USNORTHCOM should ensure that regular Arctic drills and exercises under its supervision systematically include logistics and sustainment as essential parts of training. Policy must also clarify the role of the primary Arctic combatant command by identifying structural gaps and bridging them, especially in times of crisis or escalation. Better synchronization of efforts will help the US reach a common operating picture of the Arctic from a whole of government perspective.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and USNORTHCOM
Political Geography:: North America and Arctic

2. Aftermath of Al-Fashir’s Fall to Rapid Support Forces

Author:: Andrew McGregor
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured al-Fashir in late October after an 18-month siege, consolidating RSF control over western Sudan and providing a potential capital for a new state. After entering al-Fashir, the RSF carried out mass looting, ethnic targeting, and killed 460 people at the al-Saudi maternity hospital in an attack that brought international outrage. Parallel RSF sieges in Kordofan indicate a strategy to divide Sudan. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) is struggling to maintain control, but still currently favors a military solution over diplomatic negotiations.
Topic:: Security, Armed Conflict, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
Political Geography:: Africa, Sudan, and al-Fashir

3. Revitalizing Integrated Tactical Units to Combat West Africa’s Irregular Militant Groups

Author:: Fatai Alli
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Legacy battalion-based formations designed for conventional, linear warfare are poorly matched for the dispersed, fast-moving insurgent threats confronting multiple West African countries. Enhanced operational mobility ensures reach, speed, and tactical unpredictability. Effectiveness in contemporary irregular warfare depends on integrated tactical units, intelligence-enabled maneuver, and sustained operational reach.
Topic:: Security, Counterinsurgency, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Military
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

4. Prospects and Problems for Reinvigorating Superpower Nuclear Cooperation

Author:: Ariel Petrovics
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: A three-way nuclear arms race between the United States, China, and Russia looms — an escalation that would erode global nonproliferation and usher in an era of unchecked nuclear proliferation. This brief offers a path to preventing this destabilizing outcome through pragmatic nuclear cooperation — an approach that has strong historical precedent and accords with the strategic interests of all three nuclear superpowers. Superpower cooperation historically underpinned the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, but increasing great power competition erodes this entire system of international security. China and Russia have each modernized and expanded their nuclear programs and adopted more aggressive nuclear postures. The United States, in turn, has approved a nearly $2 trillion nuclear modernization program. This burgeoning arms race heightens risks of inadvertent escalation, as each of the superpowers become increasingly reliant on nuclear brinkmanship to hold off the growing capabilities of their adversaries. The deteriorating nuclear security environment places pressure on other states to similarly seek their own nuclear arsenals while weakening the nonproliferation tool kit that previously prevented these states from breaking out. As more armed states join the fray, they in turn multiply the number of potential nuclear flashpoints around the world. Reinvesting in superpower cooperation on nuclear security is not an idealistic bid for goodwill. Rather, halting unchecked competition is a pragmatic strategy that serves the interests of the United States, Russia, and China. It preserves a global nuclear system that has safeguarded the superpowers’ dominance for decades. Weakening it, on the other hand, undermines the international marketplace that has preserved U.S. dominance in private industry and innovation. Russia and China, in turn, risk a multifront nuclear competition, as proximate U.S. allies choose uncontrolled independent arsenals over existing security umbrellas. The superpowers can still step back from the abyss by reviving nuclear cooperation. Toward that objective, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Accept Russia’s offer to extend New START for a year, paired with verification pathways and transparency measures. Reinvigorate existing direct lines of communication (i.e., hotline systems) with both Russia and China. Initiate trilateral nuclear discussions with Russia and China toward the goal of capping arsenals at parity on specific warheads and delivery systems.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

5. The Case for Legal Reform in the IDF

Author:: Gabi Siboni
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: The war has exposed a troubling pattern of legal encroachment on the battlefield, with the legal system shifting from a supporting role to a dominant force shaping security outcomes—at times at the expense of victory and at increased risk to soldiers. This paper proposes reforms to restore the balance between legal advice and security needs, remove self-imposed constraints, and return the IDF to a single clear objective: decisive victory
Topic:: Security, Armed Forces, Reform, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

6. Turkey–Israel Relations: Strategic Context and Policy Considerations

Author:: Gabi Siboni and Erez Winner
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Between Ankara’s regional ambition, ideological and religious zeal, and economic vulnerability—implications for Israel’s security and diplomacy
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

7. As Erdogan Tightens His Grip on Syria, What Can Israel Do?

Author:: Eran Lerman
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Following the agreement between the al-Sharaa regime and the Kurds, the consolidation of Turkish influence in Syria presents strategic dilemmas for Israel
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Kurds, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Ahmad al-Sharaa
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

8. Deconstructing Kosovo's relations with Turkiye - Between Reality and Expectations

Author:: Asllan Zenunaj
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: This paper examines the evolution of relations between Kosovo and Türkiye from Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 to 2025, with a specific focus on the security dimension of this partnership. Its central aim is to analyse how Türkiye’s foreign policy tools and priorities toward Kosovo have evolved under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and how these changes are perceived domestically in Kosovo, particularly in light of Kosovo’s stated Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The analysis reveal change and continuities in Türkiye’s engagement, complementing an early emphasis on historical, religious and cultural narratives associated with “Neo-Ottomanism” to a more pragmatic “Erdoganism”, an interest-driven approach, particularly evident after 2022. The initial engagement under the AKP was heavily heavily influenced by Ahmet Davutoğlu's “Strategic Depth” doctrine, which emphasized soft power, shared heritage, and a “zero problems with neighbors” policy. This included religious diplomacy through institutions like the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs) and TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), which promoted a shared Sunni-Hanafi Islamic identity and renovated Ottoman-era heritage sites. The paper argues this has complimented by a more assertive “Erdoganism”, which combines strategic depth with hard-power tools, particularly economic and defense cooperation, where Türkiye has become a crucial partner in modernizing the Kosovo Security Force through the provision of advanced military hardware and joint industrial projects. Additionally, Türkiye’s command of KFOR in 2023 and 2025 underscores its central position in regional security underlying the strong coordination between the bilateral agreements within the spirit of NATO’s formal structure and coordination with key allies like the United States. The paper also finds out that the Strategic partnership between Türkiye and Kosovo can be seen as exceeding its line between cooperation and interference in Kosovo’s domestic affairs, nevertheless these perceptions often derive from the misconceptions regarding the excessive use of Ankara’s soft-power tools. Henceforth, although Türkiye has sought to shape the country’s cultural narratives and public discourse, leveraging historical memory and kinship ties to project influence within local institutions and communities, there is a notable divergence between public perception and strategic reality. While an overwhelming 91% of Kosovars view Türkiye favorably, strategic allegiance remains firmly with the United States, indicating that popular support is emotive and pragmatic rather than an ideological endorsement of Türkiye’s political model. The paper recommends that Kosovo navigate this complex dynamic by supporting the transition from personalized “brotherhood diplomacy” toward a more structured, transparent, and institutionalized state‑to‑state partnership, one that avoids political interference on either side, remains embedded within NATO‑compatible frameworks, and is clearly communicated as complementary to Kosovo’s Euro‑Atlantic integration. Such an approach would allow Kosovo to maximize the benefits of its partnership with Türkiye while safeguarding its secular, independent, and democratic principles.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Kosovo, and Balkans

9. Monitoring Demilitarised Zones in the Age of Uncrewed and AI Systems: Lessons from the Korean DMZ

Author:: Michael M. Bosack
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:: Demilitarised zones (DMZs) have demonstrated their utility in post-war peace processes. They separate forces, mitigating the risk of deliberate aggression or accidental incidents alike. However, the effective monitoring of DMZs can be challenging, because they tend to cover wide areas, sometimes with dangerous terrain replete with human-made and natural hazards. As such, parties responsible for monitoring DMZs rely on a passive posture where they simply respond to reported incidents, an active posture using personnel or technology wherever resources and the terrain will allow, or a combination of the two. With continued advances in uncrewed systems and artificial intelligence (AI), there are now ever-increasing calls for the employment of these technologies in DMZ monitoring functions. This is true of the Korean DMZ, a 240 km-long, 4 km-wide swathe of land that bifurcates the Korean Peninsula between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (or South Korea). In this area, the South Korean government is seeking to enhance its monitoring capabilities by using uncrewed and AI-based systems. In theory, there are many benefits to this approach, but in practice, policymakers and practitioners must address five inter-related dilemmas to ensure that these technologies actually support peace implementation instead of contributing to unintended conflict and tension. The problems associated with these dilemmas are not insurmountable, but they require deliberate steps and conscious implementation to maximise the opportunities that modern technologies provide while mitigating their risks. The lessons from the Korean DMZ are applicable in any post-war demilitarized zone, including the one envisioned between Russia and Ukraine. This Policy Brief proceeds as follows. It first outlines the function of DMZs in post-war environments and the practical challenges associated with monitoring them. It then examines the potential advantages that uncrewed and AI-enabled systems offer in addressing these challenges. Next, it assesses the implications of five inter-related policy dilemmas – legal, moral, technological, practical, and security – that arise from introducing such systems into DMZ contexts. This analytical framework is then applied to the Korean DMZ as a contemporary case study. Finally, policy recommendations are advanced aimed at ensuring that the use of emerging technologies strengthens, rather than undermines, peace implementation and long-term stability in DMZs.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, Post-Conflict, and Demilitarized Zones (DMZs)
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

10. Ecological Statecraft in the Midst of War: Water, Regeneration, and the Future of Gulf Security

Author:: Olivia Lazard and Ali Bin Shahid
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The 2026 U.S.-Iran war is radiating through the Gulf’s energy systems, maritime routes, supply chains, food corridors, financial flows, and regional diplomacy—and its effects will be long-lasting. In energy markets, the war is accelerating demand toward more autonomous sources like renewables. On food, the world is bracing for a compound crisis: a convergence of disrupted fertilizer supply chains, inflationary pressures, and El Niño–induced crop failures. These are cascading trends that will demand sustained attention for years to come. But one long-tail effect has already slipped out of view. The war has crossed a dangerous threshold: Infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including desalination facilities, has been directly targeted. Water infrastructure is emerging as a strategic target in kinetic warfare against a background of structural scarcity. This marks a qualitative shift in the Gulf’s security landscape. In a region defined by extreme aridity, collapsing groundwater reserves, and deep structural dependence on manufactured water, desalination infrastructure is not merely a technical utility; it is part of the region’s survival architecture. Millions depend on a relatively concentrated set of energy-intensive coastal plants for drinking water, industry, and urban continuity. The exposure of this infrastructure reveals that ecological fragility and military escalation are no longer parallel crises: They are becoming fused within a single battle space.
Topic:: Security, Infrastructure, Ecology, Statecraft, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

11. Lebanon and the Regional Conflict

Author:: Arab Barometer
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Before Israel’s recent airstrikes and ground invasion in southern Lebanon as part of the widening regional war centered on Iran and its proxies, Lebanon was already in a condition of profound structural weakness. A recent survey of 1,200 randomly selected Lebanese citizens conducted by Arab Barometer in partnership with the Middle East Consultation Group of the Munich Security Conference provides key insights into conditions shortly before these recent events. The November 2025 survey presents a picture of a country that remained deeply pessimistic about the economy, distrustful of political institutions, and frustrated by corruption and state failure. Yet it also revealed a limited but important shift: for the first time in many years, Lebanese citizens exhibited greater hope. Compared with a survey conducted in spring of 2024, which was conducted before Israel’s major military campaign that severely weakened Hezbollah, the 2025 survey finds Lebanese were willing to place some confidence in state institutions and the future of their country. The Israeli attacks and ground incursions into Lebanon in March 2026 have displaced hundreds of thousands and turned a substantial share of the country into an active evacuation zone come within this framework. Depending on the exact extent of the current conflict, it is possible that these minor gains will face a major setback. Beyond Israel’s incursions, Lebanon has faced a number of other recent crises. In 2019, Lebanon faced one of the worst economic collapses in modern history. Political stagnation and the entrenched sectarian system resulted in a period where Lebanon lacked a president for more than two years from October 2022 to January 2025. At the same time, Lebanon faced significant challenges from the Syrian crisis next door with well over a million refugees being hosted in the country
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Corruption, Education, Health, Governance, Democracy, Refugees, Economy, Institutions, Armed Conflict, Labor Market, and Political System
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

12. Palestine 2025: Views on Domestic Challenges and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Author:: Khalil Shikaki
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: This report is the second in a series covering the results of the ninth Arab Barometer (AB9) survey in Palestine. It presents findings related to three main issues: perceptions of the challenges confronting Palestinians two years after the Gaza war, attitudes toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and perceptions of regional and international actors. AB9 was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 8 and 26 October 2025. The period preceding the survey witnessed several important developments, including the continuation of the war in the Gaza Strip until a ceasefire was reached two days after fieldwork began. In the West Bank, settler violence and attacks continued against vulnerable and unprotected Palestinian communities, often without intervention by either Palestinian or Israeli police. In some cases, these assaults occurred with complicity or even encouragement from the Israeli government, while the Israeli army provided protection primarily to settlers. The army also imposed closures on Palestinian areas and restricted access to main roads throughout the West Bank. The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip was part of what became known as the 20-point Trump Plan, which made no reference to the situation in the West Bank. The period prior to fieldwork also witnessed a sharp decline in government services due to Israeli punitive measures against the Palestinian Authority (PA), including the seizure of clearance revenues. These measures forced the PA to pay only a portion of public sector salaries and curtailed its ability to provide basic services. Israel also imposed stringent conditions, demanding “reforms” that were widely rejected by Palestinian public opinion, such as changes to school curricula and the halting of payments to the families of prisoners and martyrs.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Public Opinion, Economy, Survey, and Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
Political Geography:: Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

13. If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Research on the possibility and likely outcome of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has expanded rapidly in recent years. Studies have focused on a broad range of questions related to deterrence, potential conflict dynamics, and possible conflict outcomes. Tabletop exercises have been used to identify gaps in the capabilities of the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan to assess potential escalation pathways and to better understand war termination strategies.1 Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the potential impact of cross-Strait conflict on the PRC itself and how that impact could shape President Xi Jinping’s risk calculus and decision-making about use of force against Taiwan. Xi’s risk calculus is crucial to understanding if and under what circumstances Beijing might take aggressive actions against Taiwan because any such decision would carry profound political, economic, and strategic consequences for the PRC and for him personally. Xi has tied his legitimacy to putting the PRC on an irreversible path toward the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation by 2049 and unifying Taiwan with the motherland is deemed essential to that goal. Yet a military conflict over Taiwan would risk massive economic disruption, catastrophic military losses, significant social unrest, and devastating sanctions, all of which could turn his dream into a nightmare and undermine his political authority. Xi’s calculus must therefore weigh the perceived benefits of using force to achieve unification against the potential costs. The centrality of Xi’s risk calculus to understanding future PRC decision-making about potential actions against Taiwan demands deeper investigation than has taken place so far. This report seeks to fill this research gap by examining how use of force against Taiwan would impact the PRC in four key areas: its economy, its military capabilities, its social stability, and international costs. Each issue set is evaluated in a separate paper, although all four are interrelated, a factor that the report’s conclusion addresses. Logan Wright and Charlie Vest assess potential implications for the PRC economy. Joel Wuthnow analyzes the possible impact on the Chinese military. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi consider the potential risks for social stability. Zack Cooper examines the likely international responses and costs. There is a broad range of possible scenarios for PRC use of force against Taiwan. Potential actions taken by Beijing may vary in terms of intensity and duration. To make comparisons possible across the four papers, the authors were given two baseline scenarios, a limited conflict and a major war. Both are described in detail below. In outlining these scenarios, specific triggers were not established. They would nevertheless be important in determining international responses and subsequently would have implications for the PRC economy and possibly for social stability. Although the absence of a detailed trigger is a limiting factor, in any crisis multiple actors will draw their own conclusions about what sparked the conflict, so perceptions of who was at fault would differ across countries. The authors were also permitted to assess cases situated between a minor conflict and a major war, given that the economic, military, political, and international costs may vary discontinuously across a range of scenarios. All scenarios were assumed to occur between 2026 and 2030. The first scenario that authors assess is a minor conflict lasting several weeks. In this case, PRC ships and aircraft surround Taiwan after a series of deadly air and maritime confrontations between their forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) then attempts to conduct a “quarantine” of major ports in Taiwan. The United States intervenes and its warships escort commercial vessels through the blockade zone without incident. For the purposes of this scenario, dozens of PRC and Taiwan armed forces members are assumed killed in incidents in the air and at sea. There are no losses of foreign personnel. The conflict terminates when both sides agree to de-escalate the situation. This results in a relatively low intensity and short duration conflict. The second scenario that authors were asked to review was a major conflict of several months that ends in a PLA defeat. This conflict starts with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in which initial PLA missile strikes target Taiwan’s military and US forces in Japan and Guam. PRC forces land on Taiwan but supplies and follow-on forces are hampered by sustained Taiwanese and US strikes on ships and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait. After several months of heavy fighting, PRC forces withdraw to the mainland after losing roughly 100,000 personnel. Taiwan suffers approximately 50,000 military casualties and 50,000 civilian casualties. The United States loses 5,000 military members and 1,000 civilians, while Japan loses 1,000 military members and 500 civilians. Beyond this, no substantial foreign losses occur. The conflict terminates when the PLA withdraws from the main island of Taiwan but retains control of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The purpose of these scenarios is not to assert that this is how a conflict over Taiwan would play out. The intention is instead to help describe in more detail what the costs would be to the PRC of a failed crossstrait operation. An important caveat is that the authors were asked to make their own assessments of the impact on the PRC in each of the four areas examined. They were not asked to put themselves in Xi’s (or his successor’s) shoes. Xi and his colleagues might underestimate (or overestimate) the costs that the PRC would incur in these scenarios. Even if Beijing anticipates that the costs of taking an action against Taiwan are high, they might proceed despite the perceived risks. National leaders often make choices that overlook high costs if the perceived benefits are high or overridden by political considerations. Xi might conclude that not acting is more costly for him personally than taking a risky action that he believes is necessary to demonstrate resolve. For example, if Xi views a step taken by Taipei as intended to permanently separate it from the PRC, and especially if he judges that Washington supports that goal, he is likely to move against Taiwan even if he expects that the PLA would suffer high casualties in attempting to seize it. Overall, the authors of these essays demonstrate that the costs to the PRC of a failed military operation against Taiwan would be substantial. As noted above, this is not to suggest that Beijing would necessarily be deterred from starting a conflict in the first place. But it would be a mistake to simply assume that the PRC would prevail in a conflict over Taiwan. The history of failed amphibious operations is long, and these essays demonstrate that an unsuccessful PRC-initiated conflict would have severe negative consequences for the country’s economy, military, social stability, and international standing.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

14. A Long Time Coming: Europe and India have discovered a strategic partnership

Author:: Garima Mohan
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The relationship between Europe and India is on the cusp of change. Later this month, in a historic first, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will serve as guest of honor, a position reserved for India’s top partners, at the country’s Republic Day ceremony. At the subsequent EU-India summit, the two sides are likely to sign a long-elusive free trade agreement (FTA) and an expansive security and defense partnership. They are also expected to announce initiatives designed to boost skilled migration, and to foster cooperation between European and Indian industry to enhance economic security. There are several other positive developments. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz just undertook his first official visit to India, also his first to a non-NATO ally. Accompanied by a substantial business delegation, he secured many agreements on defense industrial cooperation, semiconductors, and critical minerals. Recent German governments have made a point of sending top leadership to India before official visits to China, and Merz’s visit continues that convention. French President Emmanuel Macron is due to follow in February to cement his own country’s ties with New Delhi on emerging technologies, thereby broadening an already substantial and critical strategic partnership. India’s foreign minister, in a breakthrough for India’s small-group diplomacy in Europe, just joined a Weimar Format meeting for the first time. Lastly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to visit the continent in spring for the next India-Nordic summit. For some observers this momentum is the result of the rocky relationships that Europe and India have with the United States. In a world of fractured alliances and partnerships, Europe and India need each other like never before. But the groundwork for their current ties was laid over the last decade. Structural factors such as competition with China, and India’s policy of diversification that led it to focus on ties with the West, have brought them closer and raised bilateral ambitions. The relationship is, however, not without divergences, particularly on approaches to Russia. Based on interviews with policymakers in New Delhi, Paris, Berlin, The Hague, and Brussels, this piece will trace the evolution of the “India agenda” in European foreign policy and lay out Europe’s position among New Delhi’s foreign policy priorities.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe, South Asia, and India

15. Conflicts and Trends to Watch in 2026

Author:: Jessica Anania, Vicka Heidt, Anna Tuohey, and Jessica M. Smith
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:: Entering 2026, the global security landscape is defined by record-high levels of armed conflict, democratic backsliding, geopolitical fragmentation, and an accelerating climate crisis—dynamics unfolding alongside unprecedented cuts to foreign aid and development assistance. These converging pressures are reshaping conflict environments in ways that disproportionately endanger women and girls while eroding the systems meant to protect them, even as women remain central actors in humanitarian response, peacebuilding, and civic resistance. Women, Peace and Security: Conflicts and Trends to Watch in 2026 integrates gender-responsive analysis into conflict forecasting by drawing on insights from the Women, Peace and Security Conflict Tracker and expert consultations. This report identifies three cross-cutting trends expected to shape conflict dynamics in the year ahead: the increasing weaponization of hunger as a tactic of conquest and control, with devastating gendered consequences; political transitions that intensify repression, violence, and women’s exclusion at critical decision-making moments; and worsening climate shocks that compound displacement, insecurity, and economic loss for women and girls. The report also profiles 10 settings—Colombia, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel & Palestine, Mali, Pakistan, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Venezuela—where these dynamics are likely to be especially acute in 2026. By centering gendered risks as early warning indicators of instability, this report addresses a critical gap in mainstream conflict analysis and offers policymakers, donors, multilateral institutions, and civil society leaders a more inclusive framework for anticipating crises, protecting civilians, and advancing more durable and inclusive peace and security outcomes.
Topic:: Security, Women, Armed Conflict, Inclusion, Democratic Backsliding, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Colombia, Palestine, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Mali, South Sudan, and Global Focus

16. Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine: Massive Losses and Tiny Gains for a Declining Power

Author:: Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Despite claims of battlefield momentum in Ukraine, the data shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains and is in decline as a major power. Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II. At current rates, combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026. After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of between 15 and 70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy is under mounting strain, with manufacturing declining, slowing growth of 0.6 percent in 2025, and no globally competitive technology firms to help drive long-term productivity.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Intelligence, Science and Technology, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. Global Water Bankruptcy: Southeast Asia’s Water Future Is a Peace and Security Issue

Author:: Adam Hansen and Julius Cesar Imperial Trajano
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: As the world enters an era of water bankruptcy, Southeast Asia faces a future with increased competition over shared water resources. With data centres reliant on water-intensive cooling systems, adding to the region’s drivers of water insecurity, stronger multistakeholder cooperation and confidence-building measures are crucial to reduce tensions and enhance sustainable water management.
Topic:: Security, Natural Resources, Water, Peace, Competition, and Data Centers
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

18. Effective Sustainable Development

Author:: Barry Buzan
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: How can we make the concept of sustainable development more effective? Finding a pathway towards effective sustainable development (ESD) becomes more urgent as global warming specifically, and the Anthropocene crisis generally, intensify. It helps to take a long view of development and its role in global society (the anthroposphere) before focusing on what characteristics ESD needs to have.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Anthropocene, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:: Asia

19. The war in Iran: a test of the Gulf states' economic resilience

Author:: Julia Sochacka
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: Forecasts of the long-term economic consequences of the war in Iran for the Gulf states are unequivocally negative. The scale of the losses depends on whether the strategies for building economic resilience implemented by these countries can withstand the shock caused by regional destabilisation. Faced with Iran taking control of the Strait of Hormuz, the EU’s top priority in the short term will be to ensure energy security, and in the long term to diversify its economic partnerships.
Topic:: Security, Economics, European Union, Resilience, Energy, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

20. Hybrid threats: from geopolitics to internal security

Author:: Jean Mafart
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Although the concept of hybrid threats is now widely accepted despite its rather vague nature, there remains a blind spot in European discussions and strategic thinking: the phenomenon is still rarely addressed from the perspective of internal security policy. It has long been recognised that hybrid threats – whether cyberattacks, arson, disinformation, interference in electoral processes or the exploitation of migration flows – can strike within our borders. The European Union acknowledged this: the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) committees regularly address the issue and the Commission gives it considerable attention in its internal security strategy of April 2025. In fact, it is mainly on the basis of hybrid threats that the document justifies the proposal to double the staff of Europol. However, the emergence of these threats in the internal security policies of the EU and its Member States raises important questions, both in terms of principles and operations, most of which remain unanswered. It is instructive to browse through the wealth of analytical and policy papers available on hybrid threats: the geopolitical dimension of the phenomenon still predominates, and while authors sometimes address the resilience of European states and societies, there is almost nothing to be found on how to respond to these threats in the context of internal security policy or on the necessary adaptation of the instruments of this policy. In other words, it is as if the concept of hybrid threats, which originally concerned defence and foreign policy circles, had forcefully found its way into European internal security policy and had not yet been fully assimilated into the internal sphere. If we add to this the fact that European internal security policy itself remains little known despite the considerable proportions it has taken on in recent decades, the current state of strategic thinking is not conducive to the consolidation of a strategy to deal with hybrid threats in their internal dimension. However, a strategy of this kind would be very useful, following the example of what has long existed within NATO and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) for the external dimension: does the issue of hybrid threats, now referred to in every context but without a coherent approach, risk leading European internal security policy astray, diverting it from its primary purpose ? and how can the competences of the Union, its Member States and other actors be harmoniously combined when hybrid threats blur the line between internal and external security, or even between national security – which is in principle the remit of the Member States – and the competences of the Union?
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:: Europe

21. The European strategic approach to technological security: the challenges posed by China

Author:: Earl Wang
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: [1] Not only the US, but the EU and its Member States are also facing Chinese restrictions on foreign critical tech infrastructure. European telecom companies such as Nokia and Ericsson witness a drop by two-thirds in their market shares in China as compared to 2020. On the other way around, Chinese ‘high-risk suppliers’ of telecom networks such as Huawei and ZTE only encountered a 5-10% decline in Europe since EU institution and countries adopted the 5G cybersecurity toolbox in 2020. When it comes to European security in the cyber realm, we can also observe direct Chinese threats. Recent public cases of cyberattacks against France and the Czech Republic reminded us – again – of cybersecurity challenges from China which was also underlined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Among other topics, critical technologies, cyber and digital infrastructure top the EU’s list of tech security preoccupation with regard to China. This paper provides an analysis of the strategic formulation of EU institutions and European countries on tech security vis-à-vis China from 2013 to 2022. Cases of countries covered in the paper include France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom. The paper is structured as follows. The first part studies the gradual awareness of security implications of Chinese investment in European critical technologies following China’s Made In China 2025 policy. In the second part, the paper examines the security threats posed by Chinese companies’ engagement in European digital infrastructure and the coordinated approach of the EU to secure 5G networks. The third part introduces the EU framework for investment screening as a new tool to address security concerns deriving from foreign investment in and acquisition of critical technologies and digital infrastructure. In the fourth part, the paper investigates European cybersecurity agencies and how cybersecurity has become a fast-growing concern of the EU and European countries in its relations with China. This paper showcases that the European Union and its Member States have incorporated the increasing link between security and technology in their strategic formulation of policy on China. More importantly, the effectiveness of the EU’s strategy in tech security highly relies on the coordination and cooperation among Member States and between the EU and national levels.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, European Union, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: China and Europe

22. The 2024 Carlisle Conference on the PLA: Protracted War Against the PRC

Author:: Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The US Army War College’s 2024 Carlisle Conference on the People’s Liberation Army was held on October 16 and 17 at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference featured keynote speakers from the US Department of Defense and the think-tank community, and panels focused on assessing the People’s Republic of China’s understanding of and capability to carry out a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific. The conference brought together over 100 participants from government, military, US Intelligence Community, academic, and think-tank organizations. The conference papers were authored by expert speakers and panelists and were designed to provide insight into key People’s Republic of China and People’s Liberation Army advances that could enable Chinese forces in a future protracted war against a US-led coalition. The papers were also crafted to enable in-depth seminar discussions following each panel, allowing the authors to garner feedback to improve their analyses. The conference volume is organized into four sections based on the conference panels: understanding the People’s Republic of China’s views on historical and modern protracted wars; assessing the People’s Liberation Army’s operational endurance in the land, maritime, and air domains; analyzing China and the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to command and control a protracted war; and determining how Russia and North Korea could support the People’s Republic of China in a protracted war.
Topic:: Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

23. A Human-Centric Framework: Employment Principles for Lethal Autonomous Weapons

Author:: Brennan Deveraux
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: This monograph challenges the Department of War to reframe the conversation about humans’ involvement in lethal autonomous weapons systems by codifying a human-centric framework built on the employment pillars of certification, authority, restriction, and accountability. Although an ample body of literature discusses lethal autonomous weapon systems, this monograph takes a novel approach by proposing a theoretical framework and applying it to historical and hypothetical practical scenarios involving weapons with autonomous characteristics. In terms of methodology, the monograph relies heavily on primary sources, including UN documents and Department of War publications, which are augmented by secondary sources from experts in the field and creative speculation about the characteristics of future warfare. The study’s conclusions will help US military and policy practitioners manage and integrate lethal autonomous weapon systems. This study is designed to spark a necessary and likely uncomfortable conversation about when relying on lethal machines is appropriate. The monograph provides tangible recommendations to help shape future policy decisions about developing and employing lethal autonomous weapon systems.
Topic:: Security, Drones, Emerging Technology, and Autonomous Weapons Systems
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

24. Has Syria turned a corner on the landmine threat?

Author:: Muaz Al Abdullah
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: While Syria's security landscape has shifted since the fall of the Assad regime, the deadliest threat to civilians is no longer concentrated on active frontlines. Instead, it lies hidden beneath the ground. Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) continue to kill and injure civilians across the country.
Topic:: Security, Syrian War, and Landmines
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

25. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: More money, but not more Europe

Author:: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Despite the increasingly direct military threat from Russia and a weakening US commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union’s 27 member states have proven unwilling to harness their union to provide a common defense. Instead, EU members have responded individually, based on their own national interests and circumstances, such as their geographic proximity to Russia and levels of government debt. Failure to act collectively represents a wasted opportunity with potentially far-reaching and negative implications for the prospects of any further meaningful EU institutional integration. This Policy Brief analyzes the drivers of rearmament, especially military aid to Ukraine, and the ways in which such aid is increasingly being provided by different “coalitions of the willing” consisting of subsets of EU members and other countries, working with the Ukrainian military industrial sector. Kirkegaard argues that this approach will likely reduce the European Union to a peripheral role in providing for the continent’s military defense and national security. Instead, the European Union’s principal role will be that of a financier, limited to providing financial support for Ukraine, increasing sanctions pressure on Russia, overseeing Kyiv’s accession to the European Union, and trying to carve out a coordinating role in EU defense-related research and development. Rather than the European Union as a single institution, subsets of EU members together with nonmembers will drive European rearmament and the establishment of a largely independent long-term military deterrent to Russia.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

26. Promote the antidote: Reducing the risk from toxins

Author:: Bipartison Commission on Biodefense at Atlantic Council
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: While toxins occur naturally, contaminating food and feed with sometimes deadly consequences, malevolent actors have weaponized toxins for assassination and mass-casualty terror. Nation-states, terrorists, and lone actors continue to produce and weaponize these agents. The February 2026 confirmation by European governments that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was assassinated using epibatidine (a lethal neurotoxin derived from a South American poison dart frog) underscores the twenty-first century reality of state-sponsored toxin warfare. Yet, national and international defenses remain fractionated. Efforts to address toxin threats span the agriculture, defense, law enforcement, and public health sectors, which often operate in silos. The policymaking community is not fully aware of the expansion of the threat from toxins, instead focusing on contagious biological threats arising from viruses and bacteria. Significant and systemic governmental policy gaps persist despite a clear history of accidental contamination, criminal use, and the continued development of toxins in foreign offensive biological weapons programs. The United States cannot afford to ignore these vulnerabilities. It must identify and bridge these policy gaps immediately, as any biological event involving toxins will have profound implications for national and global security.
Topic:: Security, Biodefense, Defense Technology, and Toxins
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

27. Europe’s Frontier Countries: The EU’s Geopolitical Test

Author:: Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Europe’s European neighbours have become the arena in which the European Union’s geopolitical credibility is being tested in real time. From Ukraine and Moldova to the Western Balkans, Belarus and the wider Black Sea region, developments along the EU’s immediate periphery now shape Europe’s own security environment more directly than at any point since the end of the Cold War. These frontier countries are no longer a buffer or a preparatory space for gradual integration; they are the place where power is contested, deterrence is measured, and Europe’s ability to act under pressure is exposed. This policy brief argues that the EU enters this geopolitical test with a widening gap between ambition and readiness. Over the past two years, Brussels has adopted an increasingly geopolitical vocabulary and launched a series of important initiatives from the White Paper on European Defence and the Readiness 2030 agenda to ReArm Europe, military mobility efforts, a new Black Sea strategy, and the European Political Community (EPC) initiative. Taken together, these steps acknowledge that Europe faces a harsher strategic environment. Yet they have not resolved the core problem: the EU still struggles to convert political declarations, financial resources and regulatory power into timely, coherent geopolitical action. Institutional fragmentation, slow decision-making and unresolved dependencies continue to limit Europe’s ability to shape outcomes in its own neighbourhood. The EU’s European neighbours function in this paper not as case studies, but as stress-tests. They reveal how the EU performs when confronted with fast-moving crises, security risks and external competition. Military mobility offers the most tangible example: despite repeated reports and funding commitments, cross-border movement of forces and equipment remains constrained by legal, infrastructural and political obstacles that are incompatible with Europe’s security rhetoric. Similarly, the Black Sea strategy signals growing awareness of regional importance, yet avoids hard choices about deterrence, escalation management and the division of labour between the EU and NATO. These internal challenges are now compounded by an external shock. The United States’ evolving strategic priorities underline that European assumptions about transatlantic leadership and alignment can no longer be taken for granted. This does not signal a US withdrawal from Europe, but it does expose how dependent the EU remains on external actors for security outcomes in regions it defines as vital to its own stability. The central conclusion of this brief is deliberately uncomfortable: Europe’s frontier countries are not testing the EU’s intentions, but its capacity to act as a geopolitical actor. The question facing the Union is no longer whether it wants to be more strategic, but whether it is willing to address the political, institutional and practical constraints that prevent it from doing so. If the EU cannot adapt its posture in the regions closest to it, its broader ambitions from strategic autonomy to global influence will remain aspirational.
Topic:: Security, Globalization, Governance, European Union, Institutions, Trade, and Single Market
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Western Balkans

28. War is a mind game: countering weaponized information

Author:: Marek Havlík and Jiří Horáček
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Cognitive warfare is the weaponization of information that exploits natural cognitive vulnerabilities to disrupt, manipulate and control individuals’ perceptions of reality. NATO’s current countermeasures, such as pre-bunking, strategic communications, and trust-building efforts, don’t fully address the deeper psychological and cognitive vulnerabilities targeted in cognitive warfare. In addition to common cognitive vulnerabilities like emotions, cognitive biases, and uncertainty, other critical traits are being exploited on the cognitive battlefield to manipulate and control vulnerable individuals.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Information Warfare, and Cognitive Warfare
Political Geography:: Global Focus

29. A plan for a World Trade Organization sectoral agreement on semiconductors

Author:: Petros C. Mavroidis and Mario R. Palacios
Publication Date:: 07-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: To promote their economic security, or simply to inflict damage on other nations, countries are increasingly weaponising trade policy. To do so, trading nations must sidestep the rules-based system established in the aftermath of the Second World War because this system, in letter and spirit, opposes such behaviour. However, neglecting the rules-based system leads to uncertainty, and uncertainty incentivises trading nations to intensify their pursuit of national economic security, thus undermining the multilateral edifice even more. It does not have to be this way, however. Based on an analysis of trade in semiconductors (a product market in which there is clear weaponisation of trade policy), we argue that, while a comprehensive negotiation on economic security may be currently unrealistic, a sectoral agreement within the World Trade Organization would be both feasible and appropriate, and could provide a template for regulating economic security. Such an agreement should include non-discriminatory trade in high-end semiconductors and a negotiated list of segments of the covered product market, in which signatories will be allowed to erect barriers to protect economic/national security without being obliged to compensate affected parties.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, World Trade Organization, Governance, Multilateralism, Trade Policy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: Global Focus

30. The ungoverned sky: Drones and the domestic extremist threat

Author:: James Paterson and Lydia Khalil
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Domestic extremist actors are incorporating drone technology into operational capabilities and attack plots, taking inspiration from the battlefield. The number of violent plots utilising drones has increased sharply over the past five years. Domestic counter-drone frameworks are mismatched to the threat. Effective protection requires layered, multi-system approaches across potential civilian targets and critical infrastructure. Easy-to-access technologies, such as 3D printing, open-source design files, additive hardware, and AI-assisted navigation are lowering the barriers to modifying and weaponising drones.
Topic:: Security, Violent Extremism, Weapons, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, and 3D Printing
Political Geography:: Global Focus

31. Roundtable Blog: Four Years Since Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion Into Ukraine: What Have We Learned?

Author:: Public International Law Policy Group
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:: This blogpost is part of the PILPG Lawyering Peace roundtable series. Rather than a traditional co-authored article, it presents a curated set of expert reflections from members of PILPG’s Peace Fellows and Ambassador Circle networks. Marking four years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, this roundtable examines how the war has reshaped international law, global security architecture, accountability mechanisms, and our understanding of modern aggression. Anniversaries invite commemoration. This roundtable instead invites assessment. Four years on, the international community possesses insights that were unavailable in the early days of the invasion. The war has tested the resilience of collective defense systems, exposed the limitations and adaptability of international institutions, accelerated transformations in military technology and information warfare, and catalyzed new approaches to sanctions, energy security, and legal accountability. It has also revealed both the extraordinary durability of Ukrainian statehood and the profound human costs of prolonged high-intensity conflict. This collection seeks to move beyond retrospective narrative toward forward-looking analysis. What assumptions proved mistaken? What institutional innovations have emerged? How has the legal framework governing aggression and atrocity crimes evolved under pressure? What lessons should policymakers internalize to deter future wars of aggression? By elevating diverse expert perspectives across disciplines, this roundtable aims to distill the most consequential lessons of the past four years — and to consider how they should inform the future of peacebuilding, deterrence, and the international legal order.
Topic:: Security, International Law, Accountability, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

32. From Conflict Actors to Constitutional Guardians? Reassessing Security-Sector Governance Under the 2025 Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of Lesotho

Author:: Bokang Moshoeshoe
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: This article critically examines whether the 2025 Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of Lesotho constitutes a substantive transformation in the governance of national security institutions or merely a reconfiguration of entrenched power relations. Grounded in Lesotho’s history of political instability and recurrent security-sector involvement in governance, the study adopts a qualitative doctrinal and interpretive institutional approach. It analyses the extent to which the Amendment restructures authority, strengthens oversight and promotes the depoliticisation of coercive institutions. The article finds that while the Amendment introduces important procedural reforms – particularly in relation to appointments, oversight mechanisms and professional standards – it does not fundamentally alter the concentration of authority within the executive. Consequently, the reforms align with international and regional norms on democratic security-sector governance yet fall short of achieving meaningful structural transformation. Executive dominance continues to shape the incentives that historically enabled politicisation. The article argues that constitutional reform in this context operates within the limits of constitutional engineering: enhancing formal accountability without fully addressing underlying political dynamics. Nonetheless, the Amendment provides a framework that may, over time, support the gradual consolidation of constitutionalism and institutional neutrality.
Topic:: Security, Reform, Justice, Peacebuilding, and Constitutionalism
Political Geography:: Africa and Lesotho

33. Through Youth Lenses: Reflections on the Impact of the Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security in Africa

Author:: Mpule Kgetsi
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Before the global recognition of the Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agenda through the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250, Africa had already begun laying the groundwork through the African Youth Charter. Article 17 of the Charter, which provides for Peace and Security, when read in conjunction with provisions such as Article 11 on youth participation, establishes a clear normative foundation for integrating young people into peace and decision-making processes. Yet, despite its progressive content, the limited implementation of the Charter by the African Union (AU) and its member states relegated it to the margins of global peace and security practice. This article contends that while YPS frameworks have generated momentum for the adoption of the YPS agenda, progress in implementation remains slow, resulting in limited impact. The adoption of the Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security (CFYPS), along with its ten-year implementation plan, offered an opportunity to address the implementation gaps of the Charter and fulfil Africa’s long-overdue commitments to YPS. Inspired by UNSCR 2250, the framework also incorporates elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture, thereby placing the YPS agenda within key continental policy frameworks. The analysis that follows examines whether the CFYPS has substantially addressed the needs of Africa’s young peacebuilders. This approach allows for a critical evaluation of both the framework’s promises and its practical impact in translating policy into lived realities. The article will assess the extent to which the CFYPS has fulfilled its promises and will evaluate its contributions to peacebuilding and youth empowerment. In doing so, it aims to determine not only the framework’s policy relevance but also its practical impact on the lives of young Africans. Before the implementation of these frameworks, various studies existed that illustrated that the needs of young people did not always align with policy assumptions.
Topic:: Security, Youth, Peace, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Africa

34. The EU-Australia security and defence agreement: not a pact but a partnership

Author:: Bart Hogeveen
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: On 24 March 2026, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and Australian Prime Minister Albanese signed the EU-Australia Security and Defence Partnership. The partnership represents a significant step in EU–Australia relations, elevating cooperation beyond its traditional focus on trade and investment. However, as with previous EU-Australia initiatives, its value will ultimately depend on whether it delivers concrete outcomes rather than remaining a largely declaratory framework. This Explainer describes what the partnership entails and highlights what it needs to become successful and impactful.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Cybersecurity, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Europe, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

35. Selling the Risks: Lessons on Security Modernization from Canada’s Contract Security Program

Author:: Oliver Jones, Karena Kyne, and Alexandre Picard
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Modernization, a watchword in governance and public administration, is an imperative for security organizations that need to adapt their outlooks and processes to an increasingly unsettled world. Yet rigid processes obstruct modernization.
Topic:: Security, Governance, Modernization, and Public Administration
Political Geography:: Canada and North America

36. From wartime solidarity to deeper economic partnership between Denmark and Ukraine

Author:: Maria Repko
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Denmark’s military leadership in support for Ukraine has not yet translated into economic cooperation in the shape of expanded trade or investments. Targeted trade and investment paired with strategic labour market measures could convert wartime solidarity into a deeper economic partnership. Since the outbreak of the war, Denmark has been one of the most vocal supporters of Ukraine in the EU. According to Kiel Institute data,1 globally it is the fourth-largest supplier of military aid, the fifth-largest in terms of total bilateral allocations and relative to GDP it ranks first. Examining developments across the EU’s four freedoms – goods, services, capital and people – this brief shows that despite the strong military support, economic cooperation and trade depth remain limited. According to 2024 data,2 the total trading turnover between Denmark and Ukraine is very low. Denmark is only the 34th supplying market and 44th export market for Ukraine. For Denmark, Ukraine is the 47th largest market both as a supplier and as an export destination. Foreign direct investments boost trade, as can be seen in practice, but it is very selective and focused on a few sectors, not central to the Danish industrial core (except for food and agricultural processing). Moreover, labour market integration of refugees is under-strategised.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and Denmark

37. Hawks remain hawks, and doves remain doves

Author:: Hans Mouritzen
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: This DIIS Working Paper analyses convergences and divergences in Nordic countries’ relations with Russia since the Cold War. It then reflects on the main determinants behind European states’ Russia policies: their location in relation to Russia and their historical experiences with Russia Since these determinants are ultrastable, the hawks remain hawks and the doves remain doves, and some stay in-between.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and History
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

38. Climate change makes Arctic operations ever more complex

Author:: Lin Alexandra Mortensgaard
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: It is a truth widely acknowledged that the Arctic region is warming several times faster than the rest of the globe and, as a consequence, Arctic military operations are already being fundamentally reshaped. But this is not simply a question of the Arctic becoming more accessible. As a Canadian vice-admiral recently noted, ‘it’s harder to operate up there because of climate change. Because the ice is even less predictable than it has been in the past. (...) Everything in the North is much more complex as a result of climate change’.1 Security actors such as military forces, coastguards, intelligence agencies, diplomats and private contractors operating in the Arctic – but also in headquarters far from northern latitudes – increasingly have to acknowledge and plan for these transformations. The dramatic changes to the ice, snow and frost that still characterise the Arctic region have tangible consequences on a daily basis for all those living and operating in this complex geography. It is, however, not only the ice and frost of the Arctic that is changing, but also weather patterns, ocean currents, coastlines and the topography of landmasses. Security actors require an understanding of the changing Arctic climate – an understanding which is at once systematic and comprehensive, but also not so inflexible that it insists on providing exhaustive foresight for all possible trajectories. While climate scientists provide scenarios and theorise tipping points for the global climate, even their projections involve many unknowns. These existing uncertainties are exacerbated by disrupted data flows and knowledge exchange with scientific communities in both Russia and the United States. In light of this, it is very difficult for security actors operating in the Arctic region to project concretely the future challenges presented to their activities by climate change. We can, however, outline different types of change that are relevant at present, and use this typology to consider the implications for Arctic operations. I outline three different types of change here: changes to the size of the operational area and area of interest; changes to the physical state of the area; and changes to the topography of the area. These types overlap but have different degrees of relevance on for example land and sea. I use ‘change’ here because these transformations are not simply a matter of an ‘increasing’ temperature or a ‘decreasing’ amount of ice. To assume that climate change is linear and unidirectional is to misunderstand what it entails as a localised, current and future phenomenon.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:: Arctic

39. Gone with the West: How the transatlantic split helps China and forces Europe to rethink its Indo-Pacific strategy

Author:: Andreas Bøje Forsby
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The erosion of transatlantic unity under a renewed America First strategy has weakened collective Western responses to China and left Europe vulnerable to coercive diplomacy from both Beijing and Washington. Caught between an unreliable America and an assertive China, Europe must strengthen its strategic autonomy by building deeper relationships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Like-mindedness, previously the linchpin of Western unity, no longer appears to play much of a role in building geostrategic coalitions in the Indo-Pacific region.1 Instead, as the Trump administration jettisons the liberal rules-based international order, Europe is fundamentally reconsidering its partnership with America and consequently its approach to the Indo-Pacific. Even the prevailing transatlantic consensus on China – viewed as a “systemic challenger” that should be tackled together – is now unravelling.2 Against the wider backdrop of a return to an era of great power prerogatives and spheres of influence, Europe therefore finds itself in a tight spot in the Indo-Pacific region – unwelcome to both Washington and Beijing. However, given its economic dynamism and critical manufacturing industries, the Indo-Pacific is far too important to be left to Washington and Beijing’s devices. Indeed, many Indo-Pacific countries share not only Europe’s advocacy of free trade, multilateralism, liberal institutions and a rules-based order, but also its unease about relying too much on either China or the US, which together may foster a renewed sense of like-mindedness with Europe. For its part, Europe urgently needs to extend and deepen its own set of strategic relationships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region in the face of growing Chinese and American assertiveness. The proposed new EU security strategy will hopefully address this as a geostrategic priority.3
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Global Economy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

40. The EU in a changing threat landscape at sea

Author:: Jessica Larsen
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The European Union is strengthening its strategic autonomy at a time when geopolitics, hybrid threats and actual war are accelerating insecurity at sea. The situation calls for a review of the EU’s role as a maritime security provider. With 90% of trade moving by sea, the European Union (EU) has economic and security interests in the peaceful and sustainable use of the world’s oceans. Yet the EU’s ability to protect its supply chains, and its energy and food security is compromised by changing threat patterns at sea and the decline of multilateralism with which to address them. This policy brief presents six priority areas that the EU and member states may address to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and consolidate its role as a maritime security provider.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Maritime, Hybrid Threats, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

41. Climate, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council

Author:: Helene Maria Kyed and Justine Chambers
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Climate, peace and security (CPS) is a recurring topic of debate within the UN Security Council (UNSC) that, despite never achieving a formal thematic mandate, has advanced with the support of a majority of council members since 2011 and is now reflected in 11 missions. CPS engagement in the UNSC rests on an understanding that the impacts of climate change deepen vulnerabilities that can aggravate existing threats to international peace and security, placing the issue within the UNSC’s charter-given mandate. CPS-supportive council members also acknowledge that climate impacts challenge UN peacekeeping operations and that addressing climate change is important to both peacebuilding efforts and the conflict prevention mandate of the UNSC. The existential threat that sea-level rise poses to low-lying coastal states is another recurring topic. As an elected member of the UNSC (2025-2026), Denmark has positioned itself as a champion of CPS, aligned with one of its three thematic priorities. In 2025, Denmark co-chaired with Sierra Leone the Joint Pledges on CPS – an initiative launched in 2023 to put a spotlight on CPS in the UNSC’s thematic and geographic meetings, resolutions, mission mandates and analyses. Denmark also stressed climate-related risks in the context of Yemen during its March 2025 presidency and later played a role in retaining CPS-language in the mandate renewal of the UN mission in South Sudan. It has collaborated on events, linking CPS to the protection of civilians, peace operations and the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda. These efforts unfold in a challenging political environment, marked by funding cuts to UN missions and a renewed focus on rearmament and hard-security priorities that risk underprioritizing climate change. While Russia and China have consistently opposed placing climate-related issues under the UNSC’s remit, the US’s recent withdrawal from CPS-supporting groups in the Council and its exit from the Paris Agreement have heightened the risk of eroding progress on CPS.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Geopolitics, Peace, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

42. American ambitions in Greenland pose key dilemmas for the Kingdom of Denmark in NATO

Author:: Lise Wiederholt Christensen
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The conflict between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark concerning the ownership of Greenland has placed the Kingdom under immense pressure. This conflict will have long-lasting consequences for the NATO Alliance and for the Kingdom of Denmark.1 The Greenland–Denmark–US conflict is a strategic shock for the Kingdom of Denmark and its Arctic security policy. The Kingdom of Denmark has been confronted with a potential recalibration of its relationship with its most important Ally, the US, while simultaneously having to establish new relations with the European Allies in the Arctic region. The Kingdom is navigating exceptionally difficult strategic balances that have been accelerated by this crisis, but which will not necessarily disappear in the near future.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, Denmark, Greenland, Arctic, and United States of America

43. Escalating Threats: Africa in the Global Terrorism Index 2026

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Institute for Economics and Peace has released the thirteenth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) for 2026 — the annual report widely regarded as the most comprehensive reference for monitoring and analyzing global terrorism patterns. The Index draws on Dragonfly’s Terrorism Tracker database, which meticulously documents terrorist incidents across approximately 163 countries, offering a detailed picture of the scale and trajectory of the phenomenon worldwide. A defining feature of this edition is its focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, where Sahel countries topped the list of nations most affected by terrorism during 2025. Against that backdrop, the report examines the scale of attacks and casualties while analyzing the most active organizations and the political and social conditions that have fueled the escalation of armed violence across the continent.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violence, and Transnational Threats
Political Geography:: Africa and Sahel

44. Strategic Hedging in Motion: Japan’s Trajectory to Counter Growing Chinese Influence

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Japan has recently intensified diplomatic and security efforts to reinforce regional alliances and mitigate the potential repercussions of Beijing’s rising power amid China’s significant expansion of influence across Southeast and East Asia. Expanded security coordination and military cooperation with the United States, South Korea, and the Philippines now characterize these initiatives, raising important questions about their impact on the regional balance in East Asia.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Hedging, Foreign Influence, and Military Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

45. Emerging Challenges and Opportu-Nities in Humanitarian Assistance in Mozambique: A Case Study from Cabo Delgados

Author:: Fátima Chimarizeni Papelo
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: This paper aims to analyze the emerging challenges and opportuni-ties derived from the humanitarian assistance actions applied in Cabo Del-gado in the context of violent extremism that has been ravaging the province since 2017. This topic is relevant because the traditional concept of huma-nitarian assistance presupposes support for victims of a disaster caused by nature or man-made, and the province of Cabo Delgado presents a growing demand for humanitarian assistance due to the ongoing prolonged violent conflict. In Cabo Delgado, there are victims of a violent, unconventional, low-intensity conflict. More than 1 million people are in need of humanita-rian assistance, of which more than 50% are women and children (OCHA 2021). Along with terrorism, climate disasters, such as Cyclone Keneth in 2019, and the COVID-19 Pandemic, which began affecting Mozambique in 2020, are exacerbating the state of vulnerability of humanitarian victims. Combined, these events force non-state humanitarian actors to operate in an environment characterized by uncertainty, insecurity, and unpredictability. Nevertheless, these humanitarian actors may operate beyond what is defined by traditional humanitarian principles, which concern saving lives and allevia-ting the suffering of humanitarian victims, including developmental actions that may result in the reduction of state power in the humanitarian space and that lead to the implementation of political action by external forces. If prolonged, this scenario may accentuate the weakening of state power. Given this context, one wonders what challenges and opportunities are derived from the humanitarian support process in Cabo Delgado. This paper seeks to reflect on the emerging challenges and oppor-tunities arising from the humanitarian assistance process in Cabo Delgado. Specifically, it sought to a) define what humanitarian assistance is; b) analyze the emerging challenges for humanitarian actors in Cabo Delgado; and c) analyze the emerging opportunities for humanitarian actors within the pro-cess of humanitarian assistance in the region. We started from the hypothesis that the problem of the humanitarian assistance process in the context of violent extremism creates emerging challenges and opportunities for non--state humanitarian actors that are linked to human security, management, and coordination of humanitarian actions.
Topic:: Security, Violent Extremism, Armed Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Political Geography:: Africa, Mozambique, and Cabo Delgados

46. Strengthening Peace and Security in West Africa: A Conversation with Anthony Antem

Author:: Denis Foretia
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: As regional and global challenges related to peace and security continue to evolve, collaboration and knowledge-sharing remain critical to fostering sustainable solutions. The ReCAP Final Regional Conference, taking place in Dakar, Senegal, from February 10-11 2025, brings together experts, practitioners, and researchers from across West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin to reflect on lessons learned in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and the fight against violent extremism. In this insightful conversation, Anthony Antem (AA), Head of the Conflict Prevention Unit at the Nkafu Policy Institute, discusses the peace and security landscape in West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin. He highlights Nkafu’s contributions to the ReCAP project, shares expectations for the conference, and reflects on the importance of regional collaboration in fostering sustainable peace. The discussion is led by Ayukmba Nkonghonyor (AN), Senior Communications Manager at the Denis and Lenora Foretia Foundation.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Security, Peace, Interview, Countering Violent Extremism, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

47. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a changing security order with a mix of diplomacy and deterrence.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

48. Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Criminal gangs have tightened their grip on much of Port-au-Prince, with the multinational security mission making little headway and transitional authorities mired in internal disputes. The UN Security Council should quickly decide how to respond to Haiti’s request for further assistance in restoring public safety.
Topic:: Security, UN Security Council, Organized Crime, Gangs, and Public Safety
Political Geography:: Caribbean and Haiti

49. Practical Guidance for Integrating Climate into WPS National Action Plans

Author:: Christina Vetter and Jessica Smith
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:: In this practical guidance note, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security explores the capacity for National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security (WPS NAPs) to be effective tools for national-level implementation of the WPS Agenda that is responsive to climate-related security risks. WPS NAPs have become the primary tool for national-level efforts to implement the WPS Agenda. To remain relevant and effective, NAPs must be responsive to the ever-changing security landscape and emerging threats to peace and security, like climate change. While the share of NAPs that mention climate change has slowly increased, many include just one cursory reference to climate change in the background section that does not comprehensively address the impacts of climate-related security risks across all four pillars of WPS or include specific actions or commitments related to climate in the NAP’s implementation framework. This report presents actionable policy recommendations for WPS NAPs to more meaningfully address climate change and related security risks throughout their design, drafting, and implementation. The report, authored by Christina Vetter and Dr. Jessica Smith, was made possible with support from the Embassy of Denmark in Washington, D.C.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:: Global Focus

50. Exploring options for advancing Kosovo-NATO relations

Author:: Ramadan Iazi and Jeta Loshaj
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: NATO’s role in Kosovo has been vital since the 1999 intervention and KFOR remains integral for guaranteeing security and stability not only in Republic of Kosovo but also the wider Western Balkans. Public sentiment for full NATO membership is extremely high in Kosovo—over 90% support—reflecting Kosovars’ enduring trust in the NATP alliance. However this overwhelming public support can be affected if Kosovo’s aspirations for closer ties with NATO are not addressed. While, Kosovo’s formal progress toward full membership is politically constrained by the fact that four NATO member states have yet to recognize its independence, there are other options that NATO can pursue to advance relations with Kosovo. In this context, this paper explores options how can Kosovo and NATO advance relations and cooperation. The 1995 study provides core principles for options that are examined in this paper. These principles remain highly relevant for Kosovo. While formal membership is stalled by non-recognizing NATO member states, the paper argues that an inclusive, step-by-step approach can be adapted for a flexible, deeper engagement with Kosovo. A central recommendation is the creation of a “Kosovo Enhanced Cooperation Initiative,” a tailored version of NATO’s partnership mechanisms (e.g., Partnership for Peace, Planning and Review Process, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre). KECI would aim to strengthen Kosovo’s defense institutions, enhance interoperability, support civil emergency preparedness, and develop broader crisis-management capabilities. Crucially, it would not force any change in the political stance on recognition among NATO member states. The EU-facilitated normalization dialogue between Republic of Kosovo and Serbia is one of the essential elements especially for Kosovo to build the confidence of both skeptical NATO member states and international partners when it comes to Euro-Atlantic integration process of the country. Regular coordination with NATO and the EU, particularly concerning sensitive actions in the north, would affirm that Kosovo’s leaders prioritize strategic partnerships and diplomacy over moves that risks and undermine support for Kosovo. Nevertheless, without any concrete carrots such as anything close to a guarantee that Kosovo gains an open perspective for NATO’s PfP, it is rather difficult for Kosovo to be encouraged to deliver on either an agreement with Serbia or any other agreement.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Partnerships, Normalization, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS