Topic: Security / Publication Year: within 10 Years

1. Protecting the North American Arctic and Beyond

Author:: Mathieu Boulegue, Rebecca Pincus, and Madison Lipson
Publication Date:: 11-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The United States has quickly adapted to the new security environment in a changing Arctic, as the region must deal with geopolitical tension stemming from Russia, the impact of climate change, and NATO’s increased role and presence. Many unknowns remain, however. Turning current and future US strategic documents and concepts about the Arctic into reality does not have any easy solutions. This will require continued endeavor and patience. The US should ensure prevailing in the Arctic in terms of homeland security and forward defense. Forward defense in the Arctic will require forward-thinking, notably what constitutes Arctic-specific integrated deterrence through tailored and calibrated presence as part of the Joint Force. A large part of this endeavor falls on the leadership of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM must be empowered to become the Department of Defense’s Arctic “capability advocate” under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the Total Force concept. USNORTHCOM must be emboldened to take the lead in associated challenges to defend the US homeland, secure the region, cooperate with allies, and bridge potential security gaps. This paper seeks to help USNORTHCOM leverage its influence in shaping the future of Arctic security for the US homeland. It offers plenty of innovative policy recommendations and action points aimed at streamlining the role of NORTHCOM to keep the Arctic safe and secure for the US and its allies. Future policy must address the need to enhance Arctic domain awareness and foster a new approach to Arctic-specific capabilities, technologies, and procurement tailored to the environment. Part of this endeavor is also connected to bridging potential gaps related to logistics, sustainment, maintenance, and transportation adapted to Arctic-specific requirements. This will ensure increased mobility and reach across the region. USNORTHCOM should ensure that regular Arctic drills and exercises under its supervision systematically include logistics and sustainment as essential parts of training. Policy must also clarify the role of the primary Arctic combatant command by identifying structural gaps and bridging them, especially in times of crisis or escalation. Better synchronization of efforts will help the US reach a common operating picture of the Arctic from a whole of government perspective.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and USNORTHCOM
Political Geography:: North America and Arctic

2. Aftermath of Al-Fashir’s Fall to Rapid Support Forces

Author:: Andrew McGregor
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured al-Fashir in late October after an 18-month siege, consolidating RSF control over western Sudan and providing a potential capital for a new state. After entering al-Fashir, the RSF carried out mass looting, ethnic targeting, and killed 460 people at the al-Saudi maternity hospital in an attack that brought international outrage. Parallel RSF sieges in Kordofan indicate a strategy to divide Sudan. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) is struggling to maintain control, but still currently favors a military solution over diplomatic negotiations.
Topic:: Security, Armed Conflict, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
Political Geography:: Africa, Sudan, and al-Fashir

3. Revitalizing Integrated Tactical Units to Combat West Africa’s Irregular Militant Groups

Author:: Fatai Alli
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Legacy battalion-based formations designed for conventional, linear warfare are poorly matched for the dispersed, fast-moving insurgent threats confronting multiple West African countries. Enhanced operational mobility ensures reach, speed, and tactical unpredictability. Effectiveness in contemporary irregular warfare depends on integrated tactical units, intelligence-enabled maneuver, and sustained operational reach.
Topic:: Security, Counterinsurgency, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Military
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

4. Prospects and Problems for Reinvigorating Superpower Nuclear Cooperation

Author:: Ariel Petrovics
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: A three-way nuclear arms race between the United States, China, and Russia looms — an escalation that would erode global nonproliferation and usher in an era of unchecked nuclear proliferation. This brief offers a path to preventing this destabilizing outcome through pragmatic nuclear cooperation — an approach that has strong historical precedent and accords with the strategic interests of all three nuclear superpowers. Superpower cooperation historically underpinned the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, but increasing great power competition erodes this entire system of international security. China and Russia have each modernized and expanded their nuclear programs and adopted more aggressive nuclear postures. The United States, in turn, has approved a nearly $2 trillion nuclear modernization program. This burgeoning arms race heightens risks of inadvertent escalation, as each of the superpowers become increasingly reliant on nuclear brinkmanship to hold off the growing capabilities of their adversaries. The deteriorating nuclear security environment places pressure on other states to similarly seek their own nuclear arsenals while weakening the nonproliferation tool kit that previously prevented these states from breaking out. As more armed states join the fray, they in turn multiply the number of potential nuclear flashpoints around the world. Reinvesting in superpower cooperation on nuclear security is not an idealistic bid for goodwill. Rather, halting unchecked competition is a pragmatic strategy that serves the interests of the United States, Russia, and China. It preserves a global nuclear system that has safeguarded the superpowers’ dominance for decades. Weakening it, on the other hand, undermines the international marketplace that has preserved U.S. dominance in private industry and innovation. Russia and China, in turn, risk a multifront nuclear competition, as proximate U.S. allies choose uncontrolled independent arsenals over existing security umbrellas. The superpowers can still step back from the abyss by reviving nuclear cooperation. Toward that objective, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Accept Russia’s offer to extend New START for a year, paired with verification pathways and transparency measures. Reinvigorate existing direct lines of communication (i.e., hotline systems) with both Russia and China. Initiate trilateral nuclear discussions with Russia and China toward the goal of capping arsenals at parity on specific warheads and delivery systems.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

5. The Case for Legal Reform in the IDF

Author:: Gabi Siboni
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: The war has exposed a troubling pattern of legal encroachment on the battlefield, with the legal system shifting from a supporting role to a dominant force shaping security outcomes—at times at the expense of victory and at increased risk to soldiers. This paper proposes reforms to restore the balance between legal advice and security needs, remove self-imposed constraints, and return the IDF to a single clear objective: decisive victory
Topic:: Security, Armed Forces, Reform, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

6. Turkey–Israel Relations: Strategic Context and Policy Considerations

Author:: Gabi Siboni and Erez Winner
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Between Ankara’s regional ambition, ideological and religious zeal, and economic vulnerability—implications for Israel’s security and diplomacy
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

7. As Erdogan Tightens His Grip on Syria, What Can Israel Do?

Author:: Eran Lerman
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Following the agreement between the al-Sharaa regime and the Kurds, the consolidation of Turkish influence in Syria presents strategic dilemmas for Israel
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Kurds, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Ahmad al-Sharaa
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

8. Deconstructing Kosovo's relations with Turkiye - Between Reality and Expectations

Author:: Asllan Zenunaj
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: This paper examines the evolution of relations between Kosovo and Türkiye from Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 to 2025, with a specific focus on the security dimension of this partnership. Its central aim is to analyse how Türkiye’s foreign policy tools and priorities toward Kosovo have evolved under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and how these changes are perceived domestically in Kosovo, particularly in light of Kosovo’s stated Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The analysis reveal change and continuities in Türkiye’s engagement, complementing an early emphasis on historical, religious and cultural narratives associated with “Neo-Ottomanism” to a more pragmatic “Erdoganism”, an interest-driven approach, particularly evident after 2022. The initial engagement under the AKP was heavily heavily influenced by Ahmet Davutoğlu's “Strategic Depth” doctrine, which emphasized soft power, shared heritage, and a “zero problems with neighbors” policy. This included religious diplomacy through institutions like the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs) and TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), which promoted a shared Sunni-Hanafi Islamic identity and renovated Ottoman-era heritage sites. The paper argues this has complimented by a more assertive “Erdoganism”, which combines strategic depth with hard-power tools, particularly economic and defense cooperation, where Türkiye has become a crucial partner in modernizing the Kosovo Security Force through the provision of advanced military hardware and joint industrial projects. Additionally, Türkiye’s command of KFOR in 2023 and 2025 underscores its central position in regional security underlying the strong coordination between the bilateral agreements within the spirit of NATO’s formal structure and coordination with key allies like the United States. The paper also finds out that the Strategic partnership between Türkiye and Kosovo can be seen as exceeding its line between cooperation and interference in Kosovo’s domestic affairs, nevertheless these perceptions often derive from the misconceptions regarding the excessive use of Ankara’s soft-power tools. Henceforth, although Türkiye has sought to shape the country’s cultural narratives and public discourse, leveraging historical memory and kinship ties to project influence within local institutions and communities, there is a notable divergence between public perception and strategic reality. While an overwhelming 91% of Kosovars view Türkiye favorably, strategic allegiance remains firmly with the United States, indicating that popular support is emotive and pragmatic rather than an ideological endorsement of Türkiye’s political model. The paper recommends that Kosovo navigate this complex dynamic by supporting the transition from personalized “brotherhood diplomacy” toward a more structured, transparent, and institutionalized state‑to‑state partnership, one that avoids political interference on either side, remains embedded within NATO‑compatible frameworks, and is clearly communicated as complementary to Kosovo’s Euro‑Atlantic integration. Such an approach would allow Kosovo to maximize the benefits of its partnership with Türkiye while safeguarding its secular, independent, and democratic principles.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Kosovo, and Balkans

9. Monitoring Demilitarised Zones in the Age of Uncrewed and AI Systems: Lessons from the Korean DMZ

Author:: Michael M. Bosack
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:: Demilitarised zones (DMZs) have demonstrated their utility in post-war peace processes. They separate forces, mitigating the risk of deliberate aggression or accidental incidents alike. However, the effective monitoring of DMZs can be challenging, because they tend to cover wide areas, sometimes with dangerous terrain replete with human-made and natural hazards. As such, parties responsible for monitoring DMZs rely on a passive posture where they simply respond to reported incidents, an active posture using personnel or technology wherever resources and the terrain will allow, or a combination of the two. With continued advances in uncrewed systems and artificial intelligence (AI), there are now ever-increasing calls for the employment of these technologies in DMZ monitoring functions. This is true of the Korean DMZ, a 240 km-long, 4 km-wide swathe of land that bifurcates the Korean Peninsula between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (or South Korea). In this area, the South Korean government is seeking to enhance its monitoring capabilities by using uncrewed and AI-based systems. In theory, there are many benefits to this approach, but in practice, policymakers and practitioners must address five inter-related dilemmas to ensure that these technologies actually support peace implementation instead of contributing to unintended conflict and tension. The problems associated with these dilemmas are not insurmountable, but they require deliberate steps and conscious implementation to maximise the opportunities that modern technologies provide while mitigating their risks. The lessons from the Korean DMZ are applicable in any post-war demilitarized zone, including the one envisioned between Russia and Ukraine. This Policy Brief proceeds as follows. It first outlines the function of DMZs in post-war environments and the practical challenges associated with monitoring them. It then examines the potential advantages that uncrewed and AI-enabled systems offer in addressing these challenges. Next, it assesses the implications of five inter-related policy dilemmas – legal, moral, technological, practical, and security – that arise from introducing such systems into DMZ contexts. This analytical framework is then applied to the Korean DMZ as a contemporary case study. Finally, policy recommendations are advanced aimed at ensuring that the use of emerging technologies strengthens, rather than undermines, peace implementation and long-term stability in DMZs.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, Post-Conflict, and Demilitarized Zones (DMZs)
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

10. Ecological Statecraft in the Midst of War: Water, Regeneration, and the Future of Gulf Security

Author:: Olivia Lazard and Ali Bin Shahid
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The 2026 U.S.-Iran war is radiating through the Gulf’s energy systems, maritime routes, supply chains, food corridors, financial flows, and regional diplomacy—and its effects will be long-lasting. In energy markets, the war is accelerating demand toward more autonomous sources like renewables. On food, the world is bracing for a compound crisis: a convergence of disrupted fertilizer supply chains, inflationary pressures, and El Niño–induced crop failures. These are cascading trends that will demand sustained attention for years to come. But one long-tail effect has already slipped out of view. The war has crossed a dangerous threshold: Infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including desalination facilities, has been directly targeted. Water infrastructure is emerging as a strategic target in kinetic warfare against a background of structural scarcity. This marks a qualitative shift in the Gulf’s security landscape. In a region defined by extreme aridity, collapsing groundwater reserves, and deep structural dependence on manufactured water, desalination infrastructure is not merely a technical utility; it is part of the region’s survival architecture. Millions depend on a relatively concentrated set of energy-intensive coastal plants for drinking water, industry, and urban continuity. The exposure of this infrastructure reveals that ecological fragility and military escalation are no longer parallel crises: They are becoming fused within a single battle space.
Topic:: Security, Infrastructure, Ecology, Statecraft, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

11. Lebanon and the Regional Conflict

Author:: Arab Barometer
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Before Israel’s recent airstrikes and ground invasion in southern Lebanon as part of the widening regional war centered on Iran and its proxies, Lebanon was already in a condition of profound structural weakness. A recent survey of 1,200 randomly selected Lebanese citizens conducted by Arab Barometer in partnership with the Middle East Consultation Group of the Munich Security Conference provides key insights into conditions shortly before these recent events. The November 2025 survey presents a picture of a country that remained deeply pessimistic about the economy, distrustful of political institutions, and frustrated by corruption and state failure. Yet it also revealed a limited but important shift: for the first time in many years, Lebanese citizens exhibited greater hope. Compared with a survey conducted in spring of 2024, which was conducted before Israel’s major military campaign that severely weakened Hezbollah, the 2025 survey finds Lebanese were willing to place some confidence in state institutions and the future of their country. The Israeli attacks and ground incursions into Lebanon in March 2026 have displaced hundreds of thousands and turned a substantial share of the country into an active evacuation zone come within this framework. Depending on the exact extent of the current conflict, it is possible that these minor gains will face a major setback. Beyond Israel’s incursions, Lebanon has faced a number of other recent crises. In 2019, Lebanon faced one of the worst economic collapses in modern history. Political stagnation and the entrenched sectarian system resulted in a period where Lebanon lacked a president for more than two years from October 2022 to January 2025. At the same time, Lebanon faced significant challenges from the Syrian crisis next door with well over a million refugees being hosted in the country
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Corruption, Education, Health, Governance, Democracy, Refugees, Economy, Institutions, Armed Conflict, Labor Market, and Political System
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

12. Palestine 2025: Views on Domestic Challenges and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Author:: Khalil Shikaki
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: This report is the second in a series covering the results of the ninth Arab Barometer (AB9) survey in Palestine. It presents findings related to three main issues: perceptions of the challenges confronting Palestinians two years after the Gaza war, attitudes toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and perceptions of regional and international actors. AB9 was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 8 and 26 October 2025. The period preceding the survey witnessed several important developments, including the continuation of the war in the Gaza Strip until a ceasefire was reached two days after fieldwork began. In the West Bank, settler violence and attacks continued against vulnerable and unprotected Palestinian communities, often without intervention by either Palestinian or Israeli police. In some cases, these assaults occurred with complicity or even encouragement from the Israeli government, while the Israeli army provided protection primarily to settlers. The army also imposed closures on Palestinian areas and restricted access to main roads throughout the West Bank. The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip was part of what became known as the 20-point Trump Plan, which made no reference to the situation in the West Bank. The period prior to fieldwork also witnessed a sharp decline in government services due to Israeli punitive measures against the Palestinian Authority (PA), including the seizure of clearance revenues. These measures forced the PA to pay only a portion of public sector salaries and curtailed its ability to provide basic services. Israel also imposed stringent conditions, demanding “reforms” that were widely rejected by Palestinian public opinion, such as changes to school curricula and the halting of payments to the families of prisoners and martyrs.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Public Opinion, Economy, Survey, and Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
Political Geography:: Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

13. If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Research on the possibility and likely outcome of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has expanded rapidly in recent years. Studies have focused on a broad range of questions related to deterrence, potential conflict dynamics, and possible conflict outcomes. Tabletop exercises have been used to identify gaps in the capabilities of the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan to assess potential escalation pathways and to better understand war termination strategies.1 Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the potential impact of cross-Strait conflict on the PRC itself and how that impact could shape President Xi Jinping’s risk calculus and decision-making about use of force against Taiwan. Xi’s risk calculus is crucial to understanding if and under what circumstances Beijing might take aggressive actions against Taiwan because any such decision would carry profound political, economic, and strategic consequences for the PRC and for him personally. Xi has tied his legitimacy to putting the PRC on an irreversible path toward the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation by 2049 and unifying Taiwan with the motherland is deemed essential to that goal. Yet a military conflict over Taiwan would risk massive economic disruption, catastrophic military losses, significant social unrest, and devastating sanctions, all of which could turn his dream into a nightmare and undermine his political authority. Xi’s calculus must therefore weigh the perceived benefits of using force to achieve unification against the potential costs. The centrality of Xi’s risk calculus to understanding future PRC decision-making about potential actions against Taiwan demands deeper investigation than has taken place so far. This report seeks to fill this research gap by examining how use of force against Taiwan would impact the PRC in four key areas: its economy, its military capabilities, its social stability, and international costs. Each issue set is evaluated in a separate paper, although all four are interrelated, a factor that the report’s conclusion addresses. Logan Wright and Charlie Vest assess potential implications for the PRC economy. Joel Wuthnow analyzes the possible impact on the Chinese military. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi consider the potential risks for social stability. Zack Cooper examines the likely international responses and costs. There is a broad range of possible scenarios for PRC use of force against Taiwan. Potential actions taken by Beijing may vary in terms of intensity and duration. To make comparisons possible across the four papers, the authors were given two baseline scenarios, a limited conflict and a major war. Both are described in detail below. In outlining these scenarios, specific triggers were not established. They would nevertheless be important in determining international responses and subsequently would have implications for the PRC economy and possibly for social stability. Although the absence of a detailed trigger is a limiting factor, in any crisis multiple actors will draw their own conclusions about what sparked the conflict, so perceptions of who was at fault would differ across countries. The authors were also permitted to assess cases situated between a minor conflict and a major war, given that the economic, military, political, and international costs may vary discontinuously across a range of scenarios. All scenarios were assumed to occur between 2026 and 2030. The first scenario that authors assess is a minor conflict lasting several weeks. In this case, PRC ships and aircraft surround Taiwan after a series of deadly air and maritime confrontations between their forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) then attempts to conduct a “quarantine” of major ports in Taiwan. The United States intervenes and its warships escort commercial vessels through the blockade zone without incident. For the purposes of this scenario, dozens of PRC and Taiwan armed forces members are assumed killed in incidents in the air and at sea. There are no losses of foreign personnel. The conflict terminates when both sides agree to de-escalate the situation. This results in a relatively low intensity and short duration conflict. The second scenario that authors were asked to review was a major conflict of several months that ends in a PLA defeat. This conflict starts with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in which initial PLA missile strikes target Taiwan’s military and US forces in Japan and Guam. PRC forces land on Taiwan but supplies and follow-on forces are hampered by sustained Taiwanese and US strikes on ships and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait. After several months of heavy fighting, PRC forces withdraw to the mainland after losing roughly 100,000 personnel. Taiwan suffers approximately 50,000 military casualties and 50,000 civilian casualties. The United States loses 5,000 military members and 1,000 civilians, while Japan loses 1,000 military members and 500 civilians. Beyond this, no substantial foreign losses occur. The conflict terminates when the PLA withdraws from the main island of Taiwan but retains control of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The purpose of these scenarios is not to assert that this is how a conflict over Taiwan would play out. The intention is instead to help describe in more detail what the costs would be to the PRC of a failed crossstrait operation. An important caveat is that the authors were asked to make their own assessments of the impact on the PRC in each of the four areas examined. They were not asked to put themselves in Xi’s (or his successor’s) shoes. Xi and his colleagues might underestimate (or overestimate) the costs that the PRC would incur in these scenarios. Even if Beijing anticipates that the costs of taking an action against Taiwan are high, they might proceed despite the perceived risks. National leaders often make choices that overlook high costs if the perceived benefits are high or overridden by political considerations. Xi might conclude that not acting is more costly for him personally than taking a risky action that he believes is necessary to demonstrate resolve. For example, if Xi views a step taken by Taipei as intended to permanently separate it from the PRC, and especially if he judges that Washington supports that goal, he is likely to move against Taiwan even if he expects that the PLA would suffer high casualties in attempting to seize it. Overall, the authors of these essays demonstrate that the costs to the PRC of a failed military operation against Taiwan would be substantial. As noted above, this is not to suggest that Beijing would necessarily be deterred from starting a conflict in the first place. But it would be a mistake to simply assume that the PRC would prevail in a conflict over Taiwan. The history of failed amphibious operations is long, and these essays demonstrate that an unsuccessful PRC-initiated conflict would have severe negative consequences for the country’s economy, military, social stability, and international standing.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

14. A Long Time Coming: Europe and India have discovered a strategic partnership

Author:: Garima Mohan
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The relationship between Europe and India is on the cusp of change. Later this month, in a historic first, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will serve as guest of honor, a position reserved for India’s top partners, at the country’s Republic Day ceremony. At the subsequent EU-India summit, the two sides are likely to sign a long-elusive free trade agreement (FTA) and an expansive security and defense partnership. They are also expected to announce initiatives designed to boost skilled migration, and to foster cooperation between European and Indian industry to enhance economic security. There are several other positive developments. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz just undertook his first official visit to India, also his first to a non-NATO ally. Accompanied by a substantial business delegation, he secured many agreements on defense industrial cooperation, semiconductors, and critical minerals. Recent German governments have made a point of sending top leadership to India before official visits to China, and Merz’s visit continues that convention. French President Emmanuel Macron is due to follow in February to cement his own country’s ties with New Delhi on emerging technologies, thereby broadening an already substantial and critical strategic partnership. India’s foreign minister, in a breakthrough for India’s small-group diplomacy in Europe, just joined a Weimar Format meeting for the first time. Lastly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to visit the continent in spring for the next India-Nordic summit. For some observers this momentum is the result of the rocky relationships that Europe and India have with the United States. In a world of fractured alliances and partnerships, Europe and India need each other like never before. But the groundwork for their current ties was laid over the last decade. Structural factors such as competition with China, and India’s policy of diversification that led it to focus on ties with the West, have brought them closer and raised bilateral ambitions. The relationship is, however, not without divergences, particularly on approaches to Russia. Based on interviews with policymakers in New Delhi, Paris, Berlin, The Hague, and Brussels, this piece will trace the evolution of the “India agenda” in European foreign policy and lay out Europe’s position among New Delhi’s foreign policy priorities.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe, South Asia, and India

15. Conflicts and Trends to Watch in 2026

Author:: Jessica Anania, Vicka Heidt, Anna Tuohey, and Jessica M. Smith
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:: Entering 2026, the global security landscape is defined by record-high levels of armed conflict, democratic backsliding, geopolitical fragmentation, and an accelerating climate crisis—dynamics unfolding alongside unprecedented cuts to foreign aid and development assistance. These converging pressures are reshaping conflict environments in ways that disproportionately endanger women and girls while eroding the systems meant to protect them, even as women remain central actors in humanitarian response, peacebuilding, and civic resistance. Women, Peace and Security: Conflicts and Trends to Watch in 2026 integrates gender-responsive analysis into conflict forecasting by drawing on insights from the Women, Peace and Security Conflict Tracker and expert consultations. This report identifies three cross-cutting trends expected to shape conflict dynamics in the year ahead: the increasing weaponization of hunger as a tactic of conquest and control, with devastating gendered consequences; political transitions that intensify repression, violence, and women’s exclusion at critical decision-making moments; and worsening climate shocks that compound displacement, insecurity, and economic loss for women and girls. The report also profiles 10 settings—Colombia, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel & Palestine, Mali, Pakistan, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Venezuela—where these dynamics are likely to be especially acute in 2026. By centering gendered risks as early warning indicators of instability, this report addresses a critical gap in mainstream conflict analysis and offers policymakers, donors, multilateral institutions, and civil society leaders a more inclusive framework for anticipating crises, protecting civilians, and advancing more durable and inclusive peace and security outcomes.
Topic:: Security, Women, Armed Conflict, Inclusion, Democratic Backsliding, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Colombia, Palestine, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Mali, South Sudan, and Global Focus

16. Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine: Massive Losses and Tiny Gains for a Declining Power

Author:: Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Despite claims of battlefield momentum in Ukraine, the data shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains and is in decline as a major power. Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II. At current rates, combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026. After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of between 15 and 70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy is under mounting strain, with manufacturing declining, slowing growth of 0.6 percent in 2025, and no globally competitive technology firms to help drive long-term productivity.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Intelligence, Science and Technology, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. Global Water Bankruptcy: Southeast Asia’s Water Future Is a Peace and Security Issue

Author:: Adam Hansen and Julius Cesar Imperial Trajano
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: As the world enters an era of water bankruptcy, Southeast Asia faces a future with increased competition over shared water resources. With data centres reliant on water-intensive cooling systems, adding to the region’s drivers of water insecurity, stronger multistakeholder cooperation and confidence-building measures are crucial to reduce tensions and enhance sustainable water management.
Topic:: Security, Natural Resources, Water, Peace, Competition, and Data Centers
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

18. Effective Sustainable Development

Author:: Barry Buzan
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: How can we make the concept of sustainable development more effective? Finding a pathway towards effective sustainable development (ESD) becomes more urgent as global warming specifically, and the Anthropocene crisis generally, intensify. It helps to take a long view of development and its role in global society (the anthroposphere) before focusing on what characteristics ESD needs to have.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Anthropocene, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:: Asia

19. The war in Iran: a test of the Gulf states' economic resilience

Author:: Julia Sochacka
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: Forecasts of the long-term economic consequences of the war in Iran for the Gulf states are unequivocally negative. The scale of the losses depends on whether the strategies for building economic resilience implemented by these countries can withstand the shock caused by regional destabilisation. Faced with Iran taking control of the Strait of Hormuz, the EU’s top priority in the short term will be to ensure energy security, and in the long term to diversify its economic partnerships.
Topic:: Security, Economics, European Union, Resilience, Energy, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

20. Hybrid threats: from geopolitics to internal security

Author:: Jean Mafart
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Although the concept of hybrid threats is now widely accepted despite its rather vague nature, there remains a blind spot in European discussions and strategic thinking: the phenomenon is still rarely addressed from the perspective of internal security policy. It has long been recognised that hybrid threats – whether cyberattacks, arson, disinformation, interference in electoral processes or the exploitation of migration flows – can strike within our borders. The European Union acknowledged this: the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) committees regularly address the issue and the Commission gives it considerable attention in its internal security strategy of April 2025. In fact, it is mainly on the basis of hybrid threats that the document justifies the proposal to double the staff of Europol. However, the emergence of these threats in the internal security policies of the EU and its Member States raises important questions, both in terms of principles and operations, most of which remain unanswered. It is instructive to browse through the wealth of analytical and policy papers available on hybrid threats: the geopolitical dimension of the phenomenon still predominates, and while authors sometimes address the resilience of European states and societies, there is almost nothing to be found on how to respond to these threats in the context of internal security policy or on the necessary adaptation of the instruments of this policy. In other words, it is as if the concept of hybrid threats, which originally concerned defence and foreign policy circles, had forcefully found its way into European internal security policy and had not yet been fully assimilated into the internal sphere. If we add to this the fact that European internal security policy itself remains little known despite the considerable proportions it has taken on in recent decades, the current state of strategic thinking is not conducive to the consolidation of a strategy to deal with hybrid threats in their internal dimension. However, a strategy of this kind would be very useful, following the example of what has long existed within NATO and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) for the external dimension: does the issue of hybrid threats, now referred to in every context but without a coherent approach, risk leading European internal security policy astray, diverting it from its primary purpose ? and how can the competences of the Union, its Member States and other actors be harmoniously combined when hybrid threats blur the line between internal and external security, or even between national security – which is in principle the remit of the Member States – and the competences of the Union?
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:: Europe

21. The European strategic approach to technological security: the challenges posed by China

Author:: Earl Wang
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: [1] Not only the US, but the EU and its Member States are also facing Chinese restrictions on foreign critical tech infrastructure. European telecom companies such as Nokia and Ericsson witness a drop by two-thirds in their market shares in China as compared to 2020. On the other way around, Chinese ‘high-risk suppliers’ of telecom networks such as Huawei and ZTE only encountered a 5-10% decline in Europe since EU institution and countries adopted the 5G cybersecurity toolbox in 2020. When it comes to European security in the cyber realm, we can also observe direct Chinese threats. Recent public cases of cyberattacks against France and the Czech Republic reminded us – again – of cybersecurity challenges from China which was also underlined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Among other topics, critical technologies, cyber and digital infrastructure top the EU’s list of tech security preoccupation with regard to China. This paper provides an analysis of the strategic formulation of EU institutions and European countries on tech security vis-à-vis China from 2013 to 2022. Cases of countries covered in the paper include France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom. The paper is structured as follows. The first part studies the gradual awareness of security implications of Chinese investment in European critical technologies following China’s Made In China 2025 policy. In the second part, the paper examines the security threats posed by Chinese companies’ engagement in European digital infrastructure and the coordinated approach of the EU to secure 5G networks. The third part introduces the EU framework for investment screening as a new tool to address security concerns deriving from foreign investment in and acquisition of critical technologies and digital infrastructure. In the fourth part, the paper investigates European cybersecurity agencies and how cybersecurity has become a fast-growing concern of the EU and European countries in its relations with China. This paper showcases that the European Union and its Member States have incorporated the increasing link between security and technology in their strategic formulation of policy on China. More importantly, the effectiveness of the EU’s strategy in tech security highly relies on the coordination and cooperation among Member States and between the EU and national levels.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, European Union, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: China and Europe

22. The 2024 Carlisle Conference on the PLA: Protracted War Against the PRC

Author:: Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The US Army War College’s 2024 Carlisle Conference on the People’s Liberation Army was held on October 16 and 17 at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference featured keynote speakers from the US Department of Defense and the think-tank community, and panels focused on assessing the People’s Republic of China’s understanding of and capability to carry out a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific. The conference brought together over 100 participants from government, military, US Intelligence Community, academic, and think-tank organizations. The conference papers were authored by expert speakers and panelists and were designed to provide insight into key People’s Republic of China and People’s Liberation Army advances that could enable Chinese forces in a future protracted war against a US-led coalition. The papers were also crafted to enable in-depth seminar discussions following each panel, allowing the authors to garner feedback to improve their analyses. The conference volume is organized into four sections based on the conference panels: understanding the People’s Republic of China’s views on historical and modern protracted wars; assessing the People’s Liberation Army’s operational endurance in the land, maritime, and air domains; analyzing China and the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to command and control a protracted war; and determining how Russia and North Korea could support the People’s Republic of China in a protracted war.
Topic:: Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

23. A Human-Centric Framework: Employment Principles for Lethal Autonomous Weapons

Author:: Brennan Deveraux
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: This monograph challenges the Department of War to reframe the conversation about humans’ involvement in lethal autonomous weapons systems by codifying a human-centric framework built on the employment pillars of certification, authority, restriction, and accountability. Although an ample body of literature discusses lethal autonomous weapon systems, this monograph takes a novel approach by proposing a theoretical framework and applying it to historical and hypothetical practical scenarios involving weapons with autonomous characteristics. In terms of methodology, the monograph relies heavily on primary sources, including UN documents and Department of War publications, which are augmented by secondary sources from experts in the field and creative speculation about the characteristics of future warfare. The study’s conclusions will help US military and policy practitioners manage and integrate lethal autonomous weapon systems. This study is designed to spark a necessary and likely uncomfortable conversation about when relying on lethal machines is appropriate. The monograph provides tangible recommendations to help shape future policy decisions about developing and employing lethal autonomous weapon systems.
Topic:: Security, Drones, Emerging Technology, and Autonomous Weapons Systems
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

24. Has Syria turned a corner on the landmine threat?

Author:: Muaz Al Abdullah
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: While Syria's security landscape has shifted since the fall of the Assad regime, the deadliest threat to civilians is no longer concentrated on active frontlines. Instead, it lies hidden beneath the ground. Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) continue to kill and injure civilians across the country.
Topic:: Security, Syrian War, and Landmines
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

25. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: More money, but not more Europe

Author:: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Despite the increasingly direct military threat from Russia and a weakening US commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union’s 27 member states have proven unwilling to harness their union to provide a common defense. Instead, EU members have responded individually, based on their own national interests and circumstances, such as their geographic proximity to Russia and levels of government debt. Failure to act collectively represents a wasted opportunity with potentially far-reaching and negative implications for the prospects of any further meaningful EU institutional integration. This Policy Brief analyzes the drivers of rearmament, especially military aid to Ukraine, and the ways in which such aid is increasingly being provided by different “coalitions of the willing” consisting of subsets of EU members and other countries, working with the Ukrainian military industrial sector. Kirkegaard argues that this approach will likely reduce the European Union to a peripheral role in providing for the continent’s military defense and national security. Instead, the European Union’s principal role will be that of a financier, limited to providing financial support for Ukraine, increasing sanctions pressure on Russia, overseeing Kyiv’s accession to the European Union, and trying to carve out a coordinating role in EU defense-related research and development. Rather than the European Union as a single institution, subsets of EU members together with nonmembers will drive European rearmament and the establishment of a largely independent long-term military deterrent to Russia.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

26. Promote the antidote: Reducing the risk from toxins

Author:: Bipartison Commission on Biodefense at Atlantic Council
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: While toxins occur naturally, contaminating food and feed with sometimes deadly consequences, malevolent actors have weaponized toxins for assassination and mass-casualty terror. Nation-states, terrorists, and lone actors continue to produce and weaponize these agents. The February 2026 confirmation by European governments that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was assassinated using epibatidine (a lethal neurotoxin derived from a South American poison dart frog) underscores the twenty-first century reality of state-sponsored toxin warfare. Yet, national and international defenses remain fractionated. Efforts to address toxin threats span the agriculture, defense, law enforcement, and public health sectors, which often operate in silos. The policymaking community is not fully aware of the expansion of the threat from toxins, instead focusing on contagious biological threats arising from viruses and bacteria. Significant and systemic governmental policy gaps persist despite a clear history of accidental contamination, criminal use, and the continued development of toxins in foreign offensive biological weapons programs. The United States cannot afford to ignore these vulnerabilities. It must identify and bridge these policy gaps immediately, as any biological event involving toxins will have profound implications for national and global security.
Topic:: Security, Biodefense, Defense Technology, and Toxins
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

27. Europe’s Frontier Countries: The EU’s Geopolitical Test

Author:: Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Europe’s European neighbours have become the arena in which the European Union’s geopolitical credibility is being tested in real time. From Ukraine and Moldova to the Western Balkans, Belarus and the wider Black Sea region, developments along the EU’s immediate periphery now shape Europe’s own security environment more directly than at any point since the end of the Cold War. These frontier countries are no longer a buffer or a preparatory space for gradual integration; they are the place where power is contested, deterrence is measured, and Europe’s ability to act under pressure is exposed. This policy brief argues that the EU enters this geopolitical test with a widening gap between ambition and readiness. Over the past two years, Brussels has adopted an increasingly geopolitical vocabulary and launched a series of important initiatives from the White Paper on European Defence and the Readiness 2030 agenda to ReArm Europe, military mobility efforts, a new Black Sea strategy, and the European Political Community (EPC) initiative. Taken together, these steps acknowledge that Europe faces a harsher strategic environment. Yet they have not resolved the core problem: the EU still struggles to convert political declarations, financial resources and regulatory power into timely, coherent geopolitical action. Institutional fragmentation, slow decision-making and unresolved dependencies continue to limit Europe’s ability to shape outcomes in its own neighbourhood. The EU’s European neighbours function in this paper not as case studies, but as stress-tests. They reveal how the EU performs when confronted with fast-moving crises, security risks and external competition. Military mobility offers the most tangible example: despite repeated reports and funding commitments, cross-border movement of forces and equipment remains constrained by legal, infrastructural and political obstacles that are incompatible with Europe’s security rhetoric. Similarly, the Black Sea strategy signals growing awareness of regional importance, yet avoids hard choices about deterrence, escalation management and the division of labour between the EU and NATO. These internal challenges are now compounded by an external shock. The United States’ evolving strategic priorities underline that European assumptions about transatlantic leadership and alignment can no longer be taken for granted. This does not signal a US withdrawal from Europe, but it does expose how dependent the EU remains on external actors for security outcomes in regions it defines as vital to its own stability. The central conclusion of this brief is deliberately uncomfortable: Europe’s frontier countries are not testing the EU’s intentions, but its capacity to act as a geopolitical actor. The question facing the Union is no longer whether it wants to be more strategic, but whether it is willing to address the political, institutional and practical constraints that prevent it from doing so. If the EU cannot adapt its posture in the regions closest to it, its broader ambitions from strategic autonomy to global influence will remain aspirational.
Topic:: Security, Globalization, Governance, European Union, Institutions, Trade, and Single Market
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Western Balkans

28. War is a mind game: countering weaponized information

Author:: Marek Havlík and Jiří Horáček
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Cognitive warfare is the weaponization of information that exploits natural cognitive vulnerabilities to disrupt, manipulate and control individuals’ perceptions of reality. NATO’s current countermeasures, such as pre-bunking, strategic communications, and trust-building efforts, don’t fully address the deeper psychological and cognitive vulnerabilities targeted in cognitive warfare. In addition to common cognitive vulnerabilities like emotions, cognitive biases, and uncertainty, other critical traits are being exploited on the cognitive battlefield to manipulate and control vulnerable individuals.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Information Warfare, and Cognitive Warfare
Political Geography:: Global Focus

29. A plan for a World Trade Organization sectoral agreement on semiconductors

Author:: Petros C. Mavroidis and Mario R. Palacios
Publication Date:: 07-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: To promote their economic security, or simply to inflict damage on other nations, countries are increasingly weaponising trade policy. To do so, trading nations must sidestep the rules-based system established in the aftermath of the Second World War because this system, in letter and spirit, opposes such behaviour. However, neglecting the rules-based system leads to uncertainty, and uncertainty incentivises trading nations to intensify their pursuit of national economic security, thus undermining the multilateral edifice even more. It does not have to be this way, however. Based on an analysis of trade in semiconductors (a product market in which there is clear weaponisation of trade policy), we argue that, while a comprehensive negotiation on economic security may be currently unrealistic, a sectoral agreement within the World Trade Organization would be both feasible and appropriate, and could provide a template for regulating economic security. Such an agreement should include non-discriminatory trade in high-end semiconductors and a negotiated list of segments of the covered product market, in which signatories will be allowed to erect barriers to protect economic/national security without being obliged to compensate affected parties.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, World Trade Organization, Governance, Multilateralism, Trade Policy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: Global Focus

30. The ungoverned sky: Drones and the domestic extremist threat

Author:: James Paterson and Lydia Khalil
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Domestic extremist actors are incorporating drone technology into operational capabilities and attack plots, taking inspiration from the battlefield. The number of violent plots utilising drones has increased sharply over the past five years. Domestic counter-drone frameworks are mismatched to the threat. Effective protection requires layered, multi-system approaches across potential civilian targets and critical infrastructure. Easy-to-access technologies, such as 3D printing, open-source design files, additive hardware, and AI-assisted navigation are lowering the barriers to modifying and weaponising drones.
Topic:: Security, Violent Extremism, Weapons, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, and 3D Printing
Political Geography:: Global Focus

31. Roundtable Blog: Four Years Since Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion Into Ukraine: What Have We Learned?

Author:: Public International Law Policy Group
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Public International Law Policy Group
Abstract:: This blogpost is part of the PILPG Lawyering Peace roundtable series. Rather than a traditional co-authored article, it presents a curated set of expert reflections from members of PILPG’s Peace Fellows and Ambassador Circle networks. Marking four years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, this roundtable examines how the war has reshaped international law, global security architecture, accountability mechanisms, and our understanding of modern aggression. Anniversaries invite commemoration. This roundtable instead invites assessment. Four years on, the international community possesses insights that were unavailable in the early days of the invasion. The war has tested the resilience of collective defense systems, exposed the limitations and adaptability of international institutions, accelerated transformations in military technology and information warfare, and catalyzed new approaches to sanctions, energy security, and legal accountability. It has also revealed both the extraordinary durability of Ukrainian statehood and the profound human costs of prolonged high-intensity conflict. This collection seeks to move beyond retrospective narrative toward forward-looking analysis. What assumptions proved mistaken? What institutional innovations have emerged? How has the legal framework governing aggression and atrocity crimes evolved under pressure? What lessons should policymakers internalize to deter future wars of aggression? By elevating diverse expert perspectives across disciplines, this roundtable aims to distill the most consequential lessons of the past four years — and to consider how they should inform the future of peacebuilding, deterrence, and the international legal order.
Topic:: Security, International Law, Accountability, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

32. From Conflict Actors to Constitutional Guardians? Reassessing Security-Sector Governance Under the 2025 Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of Lesotho

Author:: Bokang Moshoeshoe
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: This article critically examines whether the 2025 Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of Lesotho constitutes a substantive transformation in the governance of national security institutions or merely a reconfiguration of entrenched power relations. Grounded in Lesotho’s history of political instability and recurrent security-sector involvement in governance, the study adopts a qualitative doctrinal and interpretive institutional approach. It analyses the extent to which the Amendment restructures authority, strengthens oversight and promotes the depoliticisation of coercive institutions. The article finds that while the Amendment introduces important procedural reforms – particularly in relation to appointments, oversight mechanisms and professional standards – it does not fundamentally alter the concentration of authority within the executive. Consequently, the reforms align with international and regional norms on democratic security-sector governance yet fall short of achieving meaningful structural transformation. Executive dominance continues to shape the incentives that historically enabled politicisation. The article argues that constitutional reform in this context operates within the limits of constitutional engineering: enhancing formal accountability without fully addressing underlying political dynamics. Nonetheless, the Amendment provides a framework that may, over time, support the gradual consolidation of constitutionalism and institutional neutrality.
Topic:: Security, Reform, Justice, Peacebuilding, and Constitutionalism
Political Geography:: Africa and Lesotho

33. Through Youth Lenses: Reflections on the Impact of the Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security in Africa

Author:: Mpule Kgetsi
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conflict Trends
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Before the global recognition of the Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agenda through the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250, Africa had already begun laying the groundwork through the African Youth Charter. Article 17 of the Charter, which provides for Peace and Security, when read in conjunction with provisions such as Article 11 on youth participation, establishes a clear normative foundation for integrating young people into peace and decision-making processes. Yet, despite its progressive content, the limited implementation of the Charter by the African Union (AU) and its member states relegated it to the margins of global peace and security practice. This article contends that while YPS frameworks have generated momentum for the adoption of the YPS agenda, progress in implementation remains slow, resulting in limited impact. The adoption of the Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security (CFYPS), along with its ten-year implementation plan, offered an opportunity to address the implementation gaps of the Charter and fulfil Africa’s long-overdue commitments to YPS. Inspired by UNSCR 2250, the framework also incorporates elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture, thereby placing the YPS agenda within key continental policy frameworks. The analysis that follows examines whether the CFYPS has substantially addressed the needs of Africa’s young peacebuilders. This approach allows for a critical evaluation of both the framework’s promises and its practical impact in translating policy into lived realities. The article will assess the extent to which the CFYPS has fulfilled its promises and will evaluate its contributions to peacebuilding and youth empowerment. In doing so, it aims to determine not only the framework’s policy relevance but also its practical impact on the lives of young Africans. Before the implementation of these frameworks, various studies existed that illustrated that the needs of young people did not always align with policy assumptions.
Topic:: Security, Youth, Peace, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Africa

34. The EU-Australia security and defence agreement: not a pact but a partnership

Author:: Bart Hogeveen
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: On 24 March 2026, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and Australian Prime Minister Albanese signed the EU-Australia Security and Defence Partnership. The partnership represents a significant step in EU–Australia relations, elevating cooperation beyond its traditional focus on trade and investment. However, as with previous EU-Australia initiatives, its value will ultimately depend on whether it delivers concrete outcomes rather than remaining a largely declaratory framework. This Explainer describes what the partnership entails and highlights what it needs to become successful and impactful.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Cybersecurity, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Europe, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

35. Selling the Risks: Lessons on Security Modernization from Canada’s Contract Security Program

Author:: Oliver Jones, Karena Kyne, and Alexandre Picard
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Modernization, a watchword in governance and public administration, is an imperative for security organizations that need to adapt their outlooks and processes to an increasingly unsettled world. Yet rigid processes obstruct modernization.
Topic:: Security, Governance, Modernization, and Public Administration
Political Geography:: Canada and North America

36. From wartime solidarity to deeper economic partnership between Denmark and Ukraine

Author:: Maria Repko
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Denmark’s military leadership in support for Ukraine has not yet translated into economic cooperation in the shape of expanded trade or investments. Targeted trade and investment paired with strategic labour market measures could convert wartime solidarity into a deeper economic partnership. Since the outbreak of the war, Denmark has been one of the most vocal supporters of Ukraine in the EU. According to Kiel Institute data,1 globally it is the fourth-largest supplier of military aid, the fifth-largest in terms of total bilateral allocations and relative to GDP it ranks first. Examining developments across the EU’s four freedoms – goods, services, capital and people – this brief shows that despite the strong military support, economic cooperation and trade depth remain limited. According to 2024 data,2 the total trading turnover between Denmark and Ukraine is very low. Denmark is only the 34th supplying market and 44th export market for Ukraine. For Denmark, Ukraine is the 47th largest market both as a supplier and as an export destination. Foreign direct investments boost trade, as can be seen in practice, but it is very selective and focused on a few sectors, not central to the Danish industrial core (except for food and agricultural processing). Moreover, labour market integration of refugees is under-strategised.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and Denmark

37. Hawks remain hawks, and doves remain doves

Author:: Hans Mouritzen
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: This DIIS Working Paper analyses convergences and divergences in Nordic countries’ relations with Russia since the Cold War. It then reflects on the main determinants behind European states’ Russia policies: their location in relation to Russia and their historical experiences with Russia Since these determinants are ultrastable, the hawks remain hawks and the doves remain doves, and some stay in-between.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and History
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

38. Climate change makes Arctic operations ever more complex

Author:: Lin Alexandra Mortensgaard
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: It is a truth widely acknowledged that the Arctic region is warming several times faster than the rest of the globe and, as a consequence, Arctic military operations are already being fundamentally reshaped. But this is not simply a question of the Arctic becoming more accessible. As a Canadian vice-admiral recently noted, ‘it’s harder to operate up there because of climate change. Because the ice is even less predictable than it has been in the past. (...) Everything in the North is much more complex as a result of climate change’.1 Security actors such as military forces, coastguards, intelligence agencies, diplomats and private contractors operating in the Arctic – but also in headquarters far from northern latitudes – increasingly have to acknowledge and plan for these transformations. The dramatic changes to the ice, snow and frost that still characterise the Arctic region have tangible consequences on a daily basis for all those living and operating in this complex geography. It is, however, not only the ice and frost of the Arctic that is changing, but also weather patterns, ocean currents, coastlines and the topography of landmasses. Security actors require an understanding of the changing Arctic climate – an understanding which is at once systematic and comprehensive, but also not so inflexible that it insists on providing exhaustive foresight for all possible trajectories. While climate scientists provide scenarios and theorise tipping points for the global climate, even their projections involve many unknowns. These existing uncertainties are exacerbated by disrupted data flows and knowledge exchange with scientific communities in both Russia and the United States. In light of this, it is very difficult for security actors operating in the Arctic region to project concretely the future challenges presented to their activities by climate change. We can, however, outline different types of change that are relevant at present, and use this typology to consider the implications for Arctic operations. I outline three different types of change here: changes to the size of the operational area and area of interest; changes to the physical state of the area; and changes to the topography of the area. These types overlap but have different degrees of relevance on for example land and sea. I use ‘change’ here because these transformations are not simply a matter of an ‘increasing’ temperature or a ‘decreasing’ amount of ice. To assume that climate change is linear and unidirectional is to misunderstand what it entails as a localised, current and future phenomenon.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:: Arctic

39. Gone with the West: How the transatlantic split helps China and forces Europe to rethink its Indo-Pacific strategy

Author:: Andreas Bøje Forsby
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The erosion of transatlantic unity under a renewed America First strategy has weakened collective Western responses to China and left Europe vulnerable to coercive diplomacy from both Beijing and Washington. Caught between an unreliable America and an assertive China, Europe must strengthen its strategic autonomy by building deeper relationships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Like-mindedness, previously the linchpin of Western unity, no longer appears to play much of a role in building geostrategic coalitions in the Indo-Pacific region.1 Instead, as the Trump administration jettisons the liberal rules-based international order, Europe is fundamentally reconsidering its partnership with America and consequently its approach to the Indo-Pacific. Even the prevailing transatlantic consensus on China – viewed as a “systemic challenger” that should be tackled together – is now unravelling.2 Against the wider backdrop of a return to an era of great power prerogatives and spheres of influence, Europe therefore finds itself in a tight spot in the Indo-Pacific region – unwelcome to both Washington and Beijing. However, given its economic dynamism and critical manufacturing industries, the Indo-Pacific is far too important to be left to Washington and Beijing’s devices. Indeed, many Indo-Pacific countries share not only Europe’s advocacy of free trade, multilateralism, liberal institutions and a rules-based order, but also its unease about relying too much on either China or the US, which together may foster a renewed sense of like-mindedness with Europe. For its part, Europe urgently needs to extend and deepen its own set of strategic relationships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region in the face of growing Chinese and American assertiveness. The proposed new EU security strategy will hopefully address this as a geostrategic priority.3
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Global Economy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

40. The EU in a changing threat landscape at sea

Author:: Jessica Larsen
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The European Union is strengthening its strategic autonomy at a time when geopolitics, hybrid threats and actual war are accelerating insecurity at sea. The situation calls for a review of the EU’s role as a maritime security provider. With 90% of trade moving by sea, the European Union (EU) has economic and security interests in the peaceful and sustainable use of the world’s oceans. Yet the EU’s ability to protect its supply chains, and its energy and food security is compromised by changing threat patterns at sea and the decline of multilateralism with which to address them. This policy brief presents six priority areas that the EU and member states may address to strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy and consolidate its role as a maritime security provider.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Maritime, Hybrid Threats, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

41. Climate, Peace and Security in the UN Security Council

Author:: Helene Maria Kyed and Justine Chambers
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Climate, peace and security (CPS) is a recurring topic of debate within the UN Security Council (UNSC) that, despite never achieving a formal thematic mandate, has advanced with the support of a majority of council members since 2011 and is now reflected in 11 missions. CPS engagement in the UNSC rests on an understanding that the impacts of climate change deepen vulnerabilities that can aggravate existing threats to international peace and security, placing the issue within the UNSC’s charter-given mandate. CPS-supportive council members also acknowledge that climate impacts challenge UN peacekeeping operations and that addressing climate change is important to both peacebuilding efforts and the conflict prevention mandate of the UNSC. The existential threat that sea-level rise poses to low-lying coastal states is another recurring topic. As an elected member of the UNSC (2025-2026), Denmark has positioned itself as a champion of CPS, aligned with one of its three thematic priorities. In 2025, Denmark co-chaired with Sierra Leone the Joint Pledges on CPS – an initiative launched in 2023 to put a spotlight on CPS in the UNSC’s thematic and geographic meetings, resolutions, mission mandates and analyses. Denmark also stressed climate-related risks in the context of Yemen during its March 2025 presidency and later played a role in retaining CPS-language in the mandate renewal of the UN mission in South Sudan. It has collaborated on events, linking CPS to the protection of civilians, peace operations and the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda. These efforts unfold in a challenging political environment, marked by funding cuts to UN missions and a renewed focus on rearmament and hard-security priorities that risk underprioritizing climate change. While Russia and China have consistently opposed placing climate-related issues under the UNSC’s remit, the US’s recent withdrawal from CPS-supporting groups in the Council and its exit from the Paris Agreement have heightened the risk of eroding progress on CPS.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Geopolitics, Peace, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

42. American ambitions in Greenland pose key dilemmas for the Kingdom of Denmark in NATO

Author:: Lise Wiederholt Christensen
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The conflict between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark concerning the ownership of Greenland has placed the Kingdom under immense pressure. This conflict will have long-lasting consequences for the NATO Alliance and for the Kingdom of Denmark.1 The Greenland–Denmark–US conflict is a strategic shock for the Kingdom of Denmark and its Arctic security policy. The Kingdom of Denmark has been confronted with a potential recalibration of its relationship with its most important Ally, the US, while simultaneously having to establish new relations with the European Allies in the Arctic region. The Kingdom is navigating exceptionally difficult strategic balances that have been accelerated by this crisis, but which will not necessarily disappear in the near future.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, Denmark, Greenland, Arctic, and United States of America

43. Escalating Threats: Africa in the Global Terrorism Index 2026

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Institute for Economics and Peace has released the thirteenth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) for 2026 — the annual report widely regarded as the most comprehensive reference for monitoring and analyzing global terrorism patterns. The Index draws on Dragonfly’s Terrorism Tracker database, which meticulously documents terrorist incidents across approximately 163 countries, offering a detailed picture of the scale and trajectory of the phenomenon worldwide. A defining feature of this edition is its focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, where Sahel countries topped the list of nations most affected by terrorism during 2025. Against that backdrop, the report examines the scale of attacks and casualties while analyzing the most active organizations and the political and social conditions that have fueled the escalation of armed violence across the continent.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violence, and Transnational Threats
Political Geography:: Africa and Sahel

44. Strategic Hedging in Motion: Japan’s Trajectory to Counter Growing Chinese Influence

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Japan has recently intensified diplomatic and security efforts to reinforce regional alliances and mitigate the potential repercussions of Beijing’s rising power amid China’s significant expansion of influence across Southeast and East Asia. Expanded security coordination and military cooperation with the United States, South Korea, and the Philippines now characterize these initiatives, raising important questions about their impact on the regional balance in East Asia.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Hedging, Foreign Influence, and Military Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

45. Serbia on a Sharpening Geopolitical Edge Between Russia and the European Union

Author:: Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: This policy brief examines the changing nature of Serbia’s relationship with Russia and assesses its implications for the European Union. By analysing four domains – political relations, the economy and energy, security, and societal ties – it argues that the traditionally close Russian-Serbian partnership has seen growing friction and reduced intensity in recent years. While neither side has fundamentally reversed course politically, growing tensions over energy – notably around Serbia’s national oil company NIS – and security have exposed a shift from a narrative of unconditional “Slavic brotherhood” towards a more transactional relationship. These developments place Serbia’s leadership on an increasingly narrow geopolitical edge between Russia, the EU, and other major powers, at a time of sustained domestic pro-democracy protests. The paper assesses that the EU has been partially responsive to both geopolitical and democratic developments in Serbia, but that it can take a more proactive role in the discussed domains based on strict democratic conditionality in support of its enlargement agenda. This recent remark by Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, referred to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s comments suggesting that he is indifferent as to whether Serbian-made weapons are reaching Ukraine. Her statement closely resembles the type of criticism EU diplomats frequently direct at Vučić – accusing him of a lack of commitment to Serbia’s EU accession requirements. Yet coming from Moscow, such a rebuke is remarkable. For decades, Russia and Serbia have cultivated close political cooperation, rooted in a self-proclaimed “brotherly” relationship and a shared Slavic identity. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has reverberated well beyond the conflict itself. As we analyse in this ongoing series of Clingendael policy briefs, “one such consequence is […] a modification in Russia’s bilateral relations, including with countries it traditionally considered as allies”. Increasingly, Serbia may now be one such example. Almost four years into Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Russian-Serbian relationship appears to be increasingly strained. Under pressure from U.S. sanctions, Serbia has sought to find a third-party buyer or even regain control over its national oil company NIS at the expense of the current majority owners Gazprom and Gazprom Neft. Moscow has expressed frustration over evidence of Serbian-produced weapons being used by Ukraine. This takes place against a backdrop of strong pressure on the Serbian government from domestic democratic protests and, increasingly, also from other powers like the US and the EU. This paper examines the evolving relationship between Russia and Serbia and explores its meaning for the European Union. It considers four dimensions of the relationship: political, the economy and energy, security and defence and societal linkages. The paper then discusses implications for EU diplomacy towards Serbia and concludes with recommendations for European and Dutch policy makers. The analysis is based on desk research and a limited number of research interviews with experts and public officials.
Topic:: Security, Sanctions, European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Serbia

46. No Longer Ironclad: America and the Transatlantic alliance

Author:: Max Bergmann
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: This policy brief analyses the implications of the second Trump administration for the transatlantic alliance and European security. It argues that US foreign policy under Trump represents a fundamental departure from the post-war tradition of sustaining a US-led rulesbased order. Instead, the administration embraces a transactional, interest-driven approach that rejects liberal values, questions alliances as assets, and seeks to extract economic and political concessions from partners. While Europe is simultaneously expected to assume greater responsibility for its own security, US security guarantees are no longer perceived as ironclad. The analysis identifies key characteristics of Trump’s foreign policy, including scepticism toward NATO, the decoupling of security and economic cooperation, a deprioritisation of Europe in favour of China and the Western Hemisphere, and reduced US engagement in Ukraine. It concludes that these dynamics increase strategic uncertainty for Europe, weaken deterrence, and heighten the risk of miscalculation. While transatlantic cooperation may persist, the alliance is increasingly strained and may endure more in form than in substance.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

47. China’s ‘World-Class Military’ in the Indo-Pacific: Scenarios for 2049 and their Consequences for European Security

Author:: Kaspar Pucek, Karen van Loon, and Xiaoxue Martin
Publication Date:: 03-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: China’s resurgence has been one of the defining geopolitical developments of our time. By the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2049, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wants to have completed its “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. But what, exactly, does Beijing mean by this statement? And what will this entail for the Netherlands, the European Union, and NATO by 2049. The report is divided into four chapters. The first chapter will analyse the meaning of the 2049 centenary for the geopolitical strategy of the Chinese leadership. The second chapter will zoom in on China’s ambitions to build a “world-class military” by 2049 as part of its national rejuvenation strategy, the extent to which it has succeeded so far, and the areas where it still aims to catch up with the United States in particular. Chapter three will present three scenarios as to how China could possibly attain its military goals in the Indo-Pacific by 2049. Finally, the fourth chapter will reflect on the implications of these scenarios for European security and will present policy recommendations for what Europe could do to prepare for and navigate those scenarios. The scenarios are: 1. Forgone Formose: “Peaceful reunification” through a blockade of Taiwan. 2. Thucydides Trapped: A U.S.-China war of attrition along the First Island Chain. 3. Sino-centric Seas: China’s emerging primacy amid U.S. retrenchment. All three scenarios contain profound implications for European security, exposing it to political, geo-economic, and military pressure from both China and the U.S., maritime vulnerabilities, the potential weakening of the U.S. commitment to European security, as well as Chinese cyber and hybrid threats in retaliation for European support for the United States in case of a conflict with China. Europe should contribute to stability in the Indo-Pacific by raising the costs of conflict and lowering the risks posed by expanding Chinese influence in the region by reducing its own vulnerabilities, through: • Building a credible and usable European geo-economic deterrent. • Strengthening existing and new partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. • Strengthening economic and supply chain resilience. • Prioritising maritime security, chokepoint resilience, and access diversification. • Rebuilding European security to reduce dependence on the United States, enabling Europe to take more responsibility for its own defence, thereby closing any perceived window of opportunity for Russian aggression during periods of U.S. strategic distraction while also making Europe less vulnerable to coercive leverage by the United States.
Topic:: Security, Armed Forces, Geopolitics, and European Union
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

48. Recasting Europe in the Sahel

Author:: Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:: 09-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: European policy on the Sahel is yet again at a crossroads. In late 2025 the EU office of the Special Representative for the Sahel (EUSR) developed a “renewed approach” to the region in recognition of the increasing difficulty for Europe to work in the Sahel and the declining security situation there. The renewed approach seeks to recast Europe’s presence in the Sahel with three priorities: political engagement, support to human security, and a focus on socio-economic resilience. This piece argues that the renewed approach obscures the fact that Europe remains divided on the Sahel. Three very serious issues remain at the heart of EU Sahel policy. First, Europe should overcome internal disagreement around EU interests in the Sahel. The renewed approach ensured some common ground with a narrative of maintaining influence in Europe’s neighbourhood, but there is little precision about what interests are at stake or about Europe’s strategic direction. Second, Europe has not solved the conflict at the heart of EU policy between hardliners who largely oppose engagement with Sahelian states, realpolitik advocates, and the ‘middle ground’ navigating between these camps. This division has put major constraints on how the EU can operate and it will continue to make success in the region unlikely. Third, Europe lacks a convincing narrative about why it is an attractive partner for Sahelian states. That is not an exercise in better explaining, packaging, and selling what Europe does; rather, a new narrative requires concrete policies that materially show what Europe stands for and why partnering with Europe is desirable for the Sahel.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Political Engagement
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Sahel

49. Niger Coup: Survival of the Military Regime and Growing Fragility

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 09-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Niger’s President, General Tiani, survived an attempted coup, but his authority is increasingly fragile as the threat now comes from within the military. He has failed to restore the security that justified his overthrow of Bazoum and relies on Russia’s Africa Corps to suppress the plotters.
Topic:: Security, Domestic Politics, and Coup
Political Geography:: Africa and Niger

50. A Blueprint for US Policy Toward the In-Between States

Author:: Artin DerSimonian and Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:: 09-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Since the end of the Cold War, America’s poorly calibrated approach to former Soviet states like Ukraine has had disastrous consequences, in part precipitating the West’s geopolitical crisis with Russia. While Washington may hope to shift its focus toward competition with Beijing, this pivot is bound to fail so long as America maintains the same misguided approach to other states on Russia’s periphery like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova. Past calls for integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, for example, created dangerous geopolitical gray zones that contributed to Russian aggression while failing to secure Western military commitments to defend these so-called “in-between states.” The best way to advance America’s interests in Europe — avoiding war, promoting stability, and supporting economic development — is to take a different approach to these states, based on four strategic principles: 1.) Rejecting further NATO expansion or other US military guarantees to states along Russia’s border. 2.) Promoting economic connectivity projects across the in-between states. 3.) Encouraging the in-between states to maintain and pursue foreign and trade policy flexibility that permits positive relations with both Western and non–Western partners. 4.) Pairing US regional engagement with targeted confidence-building measures with Russia to prevent dangerous security spirals. Securing a negotiated compromise settlement in Ukraine that guarantees Kyiv a viable economic path into the European Union while establishing formal Ukrainian military neutrality would greatly aid the United States in successfully developing and executing a new blueprint for its approach in Eurasia. Such a deal would offer Washington an opportunity to transform the in-between states into valuable economic partners that directly bolster long-term American industrial competitiveness. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is a positive example that could be expanded on. Continued US support for strategic geoeconomic projects, like TRIPP or the development of Black Sea port infrastructure in Georgia, would not only help the region but also secure Western access to critical minerals and offer alternatives to supply chain choke points. In addition, targeted US diplomatic actions in the region — such as supporting Moldova’s EU integration while helping resolve the Transnistria dispute, advancing dialogue with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and reestablishing a strategic partnership with Georgia — can play a key role in refocusing US engagement on America’s core interests in the region. By discarding Washington’s open-door policy toward NATO enlargement and embracing prudent, interest-driven economic diplomacy, the United States can safeguard European stability, secure vital resource supply chains, and free up critical national security resources that are necessary for managing greater challenges.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, Economic Diplomacy, and Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and United States of America

51. Structural Misalignment and the Limits of Pressure: Trump and Brazil’s 2026 Election

Author:: Andre Pagliarini and Feliciano de Sá Guimarães
Publication Date:: 09-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: A conservative wave is spreading across Latin America. Since 2025, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Honduras have elected right-wing governments that have all largely deferred to President Trump. Now attention turns to the Oct. 4 election in Brazil, a neck-and-neck race in the region’s largest country. On the surface, a victory by right-wing candidate Flávio Bolsonaro would suggest Brazil will align with Trump administration policies. But Brazil’s diverse commercial relations and commitment to regional leadership complicate this narrative. Washington should temper its expectations and recognize potential structural conflicts between US priorities — especially exclusionary policies toward China — and Brazil’s national interests. Throughout the 20th century and into the 21st century, Brazilian governments of all ideological persuasions have consistently resisted perceived subordination to the US. Regardless of who wins the presidency, we should expect Brazil to continue prioritizing national sovereignty. Ignoring this reality threatens to place the US and Brazil on a collision course, potentially harming both nations. Brazil has increasingly attempted to triangulate its foreign policy with the United States and China. As Brazil’s largest trading partner, China is essential to Brazil’s economic standing, making decoupling from China unrealistic. The Trump administration should accept this reality and refrain from economic coercion aimed at forcing Brazil to cut ties with China. Coercive pressure on this or other issues would stoke nationalistic fervor across Brazil’s ideological spectrum — a reaction Washington would also provoke by meddling in the election process. The United States should refocus diplomacy on security. It should lean into collaborative efforts to crack down on cartel violence in Brazil, which are broadly popular among Brazilians. Brazil should, in turn, reassure the United States that it has no intention to expand its relationship with China into a military partnership. Such security collaboration, paired with these reassurances, would let Brazil triangulate between the world’s two superpowers, putting its sovereignty in service of its citizens’ security and its economic vitality. Cooperation between the United States and Brazil is possible if either Bolsonaro or Lula wins. But it would require each country to recognize the structural differences that exist between them and reach understandings accordingly. As a self-described nationalist, Trump should understand Brazil’s sovereigntist instincts and pursue a diplomatic path consistent with both his administration’s security aims in the Western Hemisphere and Brazil’s vital interests.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, Donald Trump, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Brazil, South America, North America, and United States of America

52. Are Qatar and Saudi Arabia Reassessing Their Reliance on the US?

Author:: Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: America’s Arab partners once viewed the United States as their primary security provider. Yet since President Trump returned to the White House in 2025, the Middle East has experienced increasing volatility, much of it driven by Israeli and American aggression. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the two largest purchasers of American defense articles, have been reassessing the value of the US security guarantee, especially as Washington threatens to attack Iran and plunge the region again into war. Based on the author’s interviews with Qatari and Saudi officials, academics, and think tank experts, this brief examines the evolving state of Qatari and Saudi foreign policy and the future impact on US alliance structures and involvement in the Middle East. Israel’s bombing of a civilian building in a residential neighborhood in Doha, Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, was both the first Israeli attack on a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, and the first time a major non–NATO US ally attacked another. In response, Trump enhanced the US–Qatari relationship, pledging to provide Qatar with a NATO Article 5-like security guarantee. While the US may have tacitly allowed the attack, Qatar nonetheless reaffirmed its strong partnership with Washington. Yet Qatar has also turned to regional balancing in recent years, building a stronger military relationship with Turkey and strengthening ties with the United Kingdom and France. Qatar wishes to avoid a public rift with Trump, while quietly expanding its partnerships to prepare for a more regionally oriented security landscape. Although Saudi Arabia would welcome an iron-clad security guarantee from the US, the relationship between Riyadh and Washington is complicated by the two countries’ different, and at times incompatible, goals. The Saudi government has condemned Israel’s war on Gaza as genocide, and remains steadfast on Israel’s recognition of a Palestinian state as a requirement for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Although Riyadh has tried to accommodate Washington’s demands to reduce exposure to Chinese technology in order to secure access to cutting-edge American technology, China remains a critical trade partner; Riyadh is wary of the US pressuring it to take sides between the US and China. Saudi Arabia is no longer as dependent on Washington, having strengthened relations with Pakistan and Egypt and mended ties with Iran and Turkey. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts to transform the Kingdom’s economy and society require the free flow of investment and capital as well as regional stability. But President Trump’s push for global economic protectionism — as well as a US war on Iran — threatens the success of Vision 2030 and the future viability of the Saudi economy. Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s efforts to maintain close ties to the US while also enhancing their capacity to provide for their own security reflect a broader reconsideration among Gulf countries of an excessive reliance on US security patronage and a move toward greater self-sufficiency. Yet ongoing tensions among GCC members have thwarted periodic efforts to empower the GCC as a security institution. Israel and the United States are increasingly seen as the main sources of destabilization in the region, rather than Iran, a perception that would become undeniable if the US follows through on its threats and again embarks on a war of choice in the Middle East.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Partnerships, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United States of America

53. A US Framework for Baltic Security and Russia Policy

Author:: Eldar Mamedov
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Geographically exposed, politically hardline, and highly militarily dependent on the United States and other Western allies, the Baltic states are both a vulnerability and a potential trip wire in the relationship between NATO, America, and Russia. Understandable historical trauma from Soviet occupation — reinforced by Russia’s more recent aggression against Ukraine — fuels a maximalist anti–Russia stance in the Baltics. This posture pushes the countries’ leaders toward confrontational EU/NATO policies, which risk unintended escalation, including inflexible opposition toward efforts to end the war in Ukraine. The risk of confrontation is only increased by the prominent role that figures from the Baltics play in the leadership of the European Union. The risk of a dangerous confrontation in the Baltic region diverts finite resources and strategic attention from higher US priorities: securing the homeland, managing challenges in the Western Hemisphere, and countering China — the United States’ sole peer competitor. This contradicts the central tenets of the new US National Security Strategy, which explicitly prioritizes achieving strategic stability with Russia and ending NATO expansion. As documented in this brief, the conventional threat of a Russian invasion in the Baltic remains limited. However, the risks of escalation stemming from Baltic hardline policies — a resurgent Russian “war party” and continued war in Ukraine — are unacceptably high. To counteract these dynamics, the United States should begin shifting the burden for Baltic and broader European security to European members of NATO, while reaffirming the United States’ commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5 guarantees. Washington should also privately press Baltic leaders to moderate escalatory rhetoric and policies and to work pragmatically toward a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine. As a corollary to these policies, the United States should begin building a genuinely inclusive European security architecture. Such an order would embed both Ukraine and Russia in a framework that removes, or at least substantially mitigates, the risk of another major war on the Continent. An inclusive security order that removes the Ukraine War as an open wound in Europe is, ultimately, the most stable framework to enhance Baltic security and accord with the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy. However, achieving a stable and inclusive European security architecture will require lowering the temperature in the Baltics.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Prussia, United States of America, and Baltic States

54. Community Guidelines for Smart Openness In US Research Collaboration

Author:: Caroline S. Wagner and Denis Simon
Publication Date:: 04-2026
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: China was long perceived as the junior partner in the US–China scientific relationship, but is now at the cutting edge of scientific research in many areas. As China has reached new frontiers, an exclusive focus on security concerns has driven a stark decline in US–China cooperation. This has put the two countries on a path to scientific and research decoupling, which is throttling US visibility into China’s frontier work. It also cuts deeply into the US commitment to scientific openness at a time when US national interests would most benefit from some form of continued engagement. Preventing further damage will require a new paradigm that balances beneficial scientific cooperation among the world’s foremost powers with appropriate attention to both opportunities and security concerns. In other publications, we have outlined the broad conceptual framework and argument for a “smart openness” framework. In this brief, we lay out a path to implementing it. Implementing the smart openness framework, especially in the current atmosphere of mutual suspicion and hostility between Washington and Beijing, will require the participation and buy-in of the research community itself. Government cannot and should not define the frontiers of research. This brief begins the process by proposing an initial classification of field-specific standards for what’s in and what’s out in the major fields of international scientific research. We develop and explain three categories of risk for this classification: a green (low risk) category, a yellow (manageable risk) category, and a red (high security-disqualifying risk) category. Such a categorization allows the research community to make informed, considered decisions about collaboration, rather than relying on vague federal advisories. The framework is intended as a starting point for deliberation among professional societies, research security officers, disciplinary experts, and government liaisons. As we further explain in the brief, agreeing on a smart openness security classification can jump-start a process allowing the scientific community to self-monitor in a unified manner, curtailing the generalized suspicion of all US–China scientific collaboration.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Collaboration, and Research and Development
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

55. Emerging Challenges and Opportu-Nities in Humanitarian Assistance in Mozambique: A Case Study from Cabo Delgados

Author:: Fátima Chimarizeni Papelo
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: This paper aims to analyze the emerging challenges and opportuni-ties derived from the humanitarian assistance actions applied in Cabo Del-gado in the context of violent extremism that has been ravaging the province since 2017. This topic is relevant because the traditional concept of huma-nitarian assistance presupposes support for victims of a disaster caused by nature or man-made, and the province of Cabo Delgado presents a growing demand for humanitarian assistance due to the ongoing prolonged violent conflict. In Cabo Delgado, there are victims of a violent, unconventional, low-intensity conflict. More than 1 million people are in need of humanita-rian assistance, of which more than 50% are women and children (OCHA 2021). Along with terrorism, climate disasters, such as Cyclone Keneth in 2019, and the COVID-19 Pandemic, which began affecting Mozambique in 2020, are exacerbating the state of vulnerability of humanitarian victims. Combined, these events force non-state humanitarian actors to operate in an environment characterized by uncertainty, insecurity, and unpredictability. Nevertheless, these humanitarian actors may operate beyond what is defined by traditional humanitarian principles, which concern saving lives and allevia-ting the suffering of humanitarian victims, including developmental actions that may result in the reduction of state power in the humanitarian space and that lead to the implementation of political action by external forces. If prolonged, this scenario may accentuate the weakening of state power. Given this context, one wonders what challenges and opportunities are derived from the humanitarian support process in Cabo Delgado. This paper seeks to reflect on the emerging challenges and oppor-tunities arising from the humanitarian assistance process in Cabo Delgado. Specifically, it sought to a) define what humanitarian assistance is; b) analyze the emerging challenges for humanitarian actors in Cabo Delgado; and c) analyze the emerging opportunities for humanitarian actors within the pro-cess of humanitarian assistance in the region. We started from the hypothesis that the problem of the humanitarian assistance process in the context of violent extremism creates emerging challenges and opportunities for non--state humanitarian actors that are linked to human security, management, and coordination of humanitarian actions.
Topic:: Security, Violent Extremism, Armed Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Political Geography:: Africa, Mozambique, and Cabo Delgados

56. Strengthening Peace and Security in West Africa: A Conversation with Anthony Antem

Author:: Denis Foretia
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: As regional and global challenges related to peace and security continue to evolve, collaboration and knowledge-sharing remain critical to fostering sustainable solutions. The ReCAP Final Regional Conference, taking place in Dakar, Senegal, from February 10-11 2025, brings together experts, practitioners, and researchers from across West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin to reflect on lessons learned in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and the fight against violent extremism. In this insightful conversation, Anthony Antem (AA), Head of the Conflict Prevention Unit at the Nkafu Policy Institute, discusses the peace and security landscape in West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin. He highlights Nkafu’s contributions to the ReCAP project, shares expectations for the conference, and reflects on the importance of regional collaboration in fostering sustainable peace. The discussion is led by Ayukmba Nkonghonyor (AN), Senior Communications Manager at the Denis and Lenora Foretia Foundation.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Security, Peace, Interview, Countering Violent Extremism, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Africa and West Africa

57. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a changing security order with a mix of diplomacy and deterrence.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

58. Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Criminal gangs have tightened their grip on much of Port-au-Prince, with the multinational security mission making little headway and transitional authorities mired in internal disputes. The UN Security Council should quickly decide how to respond to Haiti’s request for further assistance in restoring public safety.
Topic:: Security, UN Security Council, Organized Crime, Gangs, and Public Safety
Political Geography:: Caribbean and Haiti

59. Practical Guidance for Integrating Climate into WPS National Action Plans

Author:: Christina Vetter and Jessica Smith
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:: In this practical guidance note, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security explores the capacity for National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security (WPS NAPs) to be effective tools for national-level implementation of the WPS Agenda that is responsive to climate-related security risks. WPS NAPs have become the primary tool for national-level efforts to implement the WPS Agenda. To remain relevant and effective, NAPs must be responsive to the ever-changing security landscape and emerging threats to peace and security, like climate change. While the share of NAPs that mention climate change has slowly increased, many include just one cursory reference to climate change in the background section that does not comprehensively address the impacts of climate-related security risks across all four pillars of WPS or include specific actions or commitments related to climate in the NAP’s implementation framework. This report presents actionable policy recommendations for WPS NAPs to more meaningfully address climate change and related security risks throughout their design, drafting, and implementation. The report, authored by Christina Vetter and Dr. Jessica Smith, was made possible with support from the Embassy of Denmark in Washington, D.C.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:: Global Focus

60. Exploring options for advancing Kosovo-NATO relations

Author:: Ramadan Iazi and Jeta Loshaj
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: NATO’s role in Kosovo has been vital since the 1999 intervention and KFOR remains integral for guaranteeing security and stability not only in Republic of Kosovo but also the wider Western Balkans. Public sentiment for full NATO membership is extremely high in Kosovo—over 90% support—reflecting Kosovars’ enduring trust in the NATP alliance. However this overwhelming public support can be affected if Kosovo’s aspirations for closer ties with NATO are not addressed. While, Kosovo’s formal progress toward full membership is politically constrained by the fact that four NATO member states have yet to recognize its independence, there are other options that NATO can pursue to advance relations with Kosovo. In this context, this paper explores options how can Kosovo and NATO advance relations and cooperation. The 1995 study provides core principles for options that are examined in this paper. These principles remain highly relevant for Kosovo. While formal membership is stalled by non-recognizing NATO member states, the paper argues that an inclusive, step-by-step approach can be adapted for a flexible, deeper engagement with Kosovo. A central recommendation is the creation of a “Kosovo Enhanced Cooperation Initiative,” a tailored version of NATO’s partnership mechanisms (e.g., Partnership for Peace, Planning and Review Process, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre). KECI would aim to strengthen Kosovo’s defense institutions, enhance interoperability, support civil emergency preparedness, and develop broader crisis-management capabilities. Crucially, it would not force any change in the political stance on recognition among NATO member states. The EU-facilitated normalization dialogue between Republic of Kosovo and Serbia is one of the essential elements especially for Kosovo to build the confidence of both skeptical NATO member states and international partners when it comes to Euro-Atlantic integration process of the country. Regular coordination with NATO and the EU, particularly concerning sensitive actions in the north, would affirm that Kosovo’s leaders prioritize strategic partnerships and diplomacy over moves that risks and undermine support for Kosovo. Nevertheless, without any concrete carrots such as anything close to a guarantee that Kosovo gains an open perspective for NATO’s PfP, it is rather difficult for Kosovo to be encouraged to deliver on either an agreement with Serbia or any other agreement.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Partnerships, Normalization, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

61. Fueling the Future: Recommendations for Strengthening U.S. Uranium Security

Author:: Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Uranium is a crucial mineral for energy and national security—it fuels the nuclear energy that underpins today’s economy and is key to propelling future growth to meet the surge in energy demand from artificial intelligence. However, supply chain vulnerabilities and dependencies on foreign adversaries challenge U.S. leadership in the sector and create national and energy security risks. Russia and China are rapidly expanding their offtake of mined uranium from international partners, uranium enrichment capabilities, and nuclear infrastructure. To strengthen uranium and nuclear fuel supply chains, the United States must work with allies, implement conducive trade and tariff policies, and invest in both domestic enrichment capacity and uranium ore production abroad.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Economic Security, Uranium, Nuclear Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, North America, and United States of America

62. Russia’s Shadow War Against the West

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Russia is conducting an escalating and violent campaign of sabotage and subversion against European and U.S. targets in Europe led by Russian military intelligence (the GRU), according to a new CSIS database of Russian activity. The number of Russian attacks nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024. Russia’s primary targets have included transportation, government, critical infrastructure, and industry, and its main weapons and tactics have included explosives, blunt or edged instruments (such as anchors), and electronic attack. Despite the increase in Russian attacks, Western countries have not developed an effective strategy to counter these attacks.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Transnational Threats
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

63. The Impact of Stereotyping on International Cyber Norm‑making: Navigating Misperceptions and Building Trust

Author:: Fan Yang
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Over the past three decades, cyberspace – a digital realm shaped by both technological and social dynamics – has evolved into a domain where a wide range of human activities now take place. These activities are marked by their anonymity, which complicates attribution, and their instantaneity, which challenges timely regulation. To address these challenges, states focus on two approaches: applying existing laws and creating new ones. While there is a general consensus that cyberspace should be governed by the rule of law, including international law, the application of existing legal frameworks to cyberspace remains an evolving challenge both in terms of state practice and academic discourse. At the same time, the international community has consistently sought to develop new norms to promote good governance in cyberspace. Against this backdrop, states – especially those with advanced cyber capabilities – are engaging in a competitive game of norm-making, striving to exert influence in shaping international rules to govern cyberspace. As part of this process, states often categorise each other by trying to highlight their counterparts’ most distinct characteristics. While such labelling is common in diplomatic interactions, it is particularly problematic in the context of international cyber norm-making. Labels reflect and reinforce stereotypes, which often oversimplify the complexities of states’ behavioural patterns in cyberspace and their underlying logic. States are thus roughly grouped by opposing indicators, such as those viewing cyberspace as a global commons versus sovereign territory, those advocating for an interconnected free Internet versus a fragmented “splinternet”, or those favouring multistakeholderism versus multilateralism as the dominant approach to the governance of cyberspace. Once established, these stereotypes are difficult to dismantle and can lead to distorted perceptions that obstruct constructive dialogue. This GCSP Policy Brief aims to identify the potential security challenges posed by stereotyping in international cyber norm-making processes. It then illustrates the policy implications of this problem and offers policy recommendations.
Topic:: Security, Cybersecurity, Norms, Cyberspace, and Trust
Political Geography:: Global Focus

64. Managing Global Biological Risks: Towards a Security-Health Coordination Framework

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros, Jeselyn, and Mely Caballero-Anthony
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The task of securing the world against biological risks is complicated by enforcement and information challenges. A security-health coordination framework is crucial for securing cooperation among a diverse set of actors with different but converging mandates.
Topic:: Security, Biosecurity, Crisis Management, Risk, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Global Focus

65. Biosecurity Awareness and Education in Southeast Asia

Author:: Julius Caesar Trajano and Jeselyn
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: ASEAN leaders recognise the critical importance of biosecurity. But there is a need to enhance the security culture and biosecurity awareness among life science, medical, and biotechnology professionals to mitigate the misuse of biological materials.
Topic:: Security, Education, Biosecurity, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

66. The U.S. Pursues Increasingly Aggressive Policy towards Latin America

Author:: Bartłomiej Znojek
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s administration is seeking to rebuild U.S. influence in Latin America. It is trying to convince the countries of the region that cooperation with the United States will bring development and increased security to the Americas. For the time being, however, this approach mainly serves U.S. security interests, in particular combating irregular migration, organised crime and drug trafficking, and reducing China’s influence. The current administration’s threats, inconsistent positions, and expansionist drive will deepen the distrust of the U.S. and antagonise important Latin American partners.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Drug Trafficking
Political Geography:: Latin America and United States of America

67. Hybrid threats: the new horizons for a "Europe of internal security"?

Author:: Jean Mafart
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Even today, most of our fellow citizens are unaware that the European Union is actively involved in the fight against terrorism, money laundering and drug trafficking, in border protection and in the harmonisation of criminal legislation[1]. This is why a European internal security strategy, ProtectEU published by the Commission on April 1st is important : it defines the European Union's work programme for the coming years, within the framework of the guidelines laid down by the European Council. The assessment of the previous internal security strategy (for the period 2020-2025) shows that this kind of programme has real scope: the Commission announced numerous initiatives that were actually completed, even if, as time goes by, the action inevitably deviates from the initial intentions in response to circumstances. Since the successive strategies are work programmes for a given period, none of them really resembles the previous one. On the other hand, the major underlying themes vary relatively little: terrorism, organised crime and external border control were, as it is the case today, key concerns of the ‘founding fathers’ of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ). The doubling of the staff of Europol, the agency responsible which supports Member States in the fight against crime, and the tripling of the staff of the European Border Guard, which are part of the Frontex agency, are also the most spectacular proposals of the new strategy, even if they had already been voiced by the President of the Commission at the beginning of her second term. The arrival of a new theme is therefore bound to attract attention: in this case, it is striking to see the space given over to hybrid threats (a whole chapter, eight pages out of the thirty in the document published on 1 April). A sad sign of the times: it is no longer conceivable to develop an internal security policy without addressing, alongside the more ‘traditional’ themes, the growing threat of destabilisation operations of all kinds coming from Russia or elsewhere. The link between the internal and external dimensions of security is obviously nothing new: in France, the White Paper on defence and national security published in 2008 already considered that ‘the distinction between internal and external security is no longer relevant’. Current geopolitical tensions and the development of hybrid threats are blatantly reinforcing this. How can the ‘internal security of Europe’, initially conceived to respond to internal issues - compensating for the effects of free movement between Member States - adapt to take better account of threats from the outside?
Topic:: Security, European Union, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:: Europe

68. When sleepwalkers awake: German plea for a new European security architecture - a German point of view

Author:: Stéphane Beemelmans
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: For three years, a war has been raging on Europe's borders between two geographically connected states – a conflict that originated in Russia's occupation of Crimea and Donbass almost 11 years ago. Since then, every political and military decision-maker in our part of Europe should have realized that there is a (great) power on our continent that is ready at any time to put ‘war as a continuation of politics by other means’ (Clausewitz) into practice. The deterrent mechanism between the former blocs, which had been effective for almost 50 years and thus prevented war, has evidently given way to a ‘laissez-faire’ on the part of the European states, which has allowed Russia to attack and partially occupy Ukraine with complete impunity, using a crude mix of historical and political justifications that violate international law. What should not have happened could not be seen and therefore could not be addressed appropriately. Our and NATO's ‘laissez-faire’ was based on the for malistic argument that no NATO member country had been attacked and on the lack of strategic foresight disguised as ‘hope’, the expression of which under international law was the ‘Minsk Peace Agreement’ of 2015. The hope, namely, that this attack could be localized and thus geographically restricted or ‘frozen’.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

69. Connecting Opportunities: Greece’s Strategic Role in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)

Author:: Dimitris Gavalas and George Dikaios
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This policy brief discusses the role of Greece in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), focusing mainly on those aspects related to infrastructure and ports and the global supply chain. It suggests a series of different actions and highlights different angles that Greece should take into account if it wants to be a major player in the establishment of the Corridor and its gateway to Europe/European Union. – IMEC will be a game changer in international trade relationships, regional tensions, and political challenges. – The main obstacles to IMEC’s establishment are the conflicts in the Middle East and other major national interests of key actors (such as the Chinese monopoly in the region). – Focus is given to port infrastructure, as ports are pivotal to the global supply chain. India pays significant attention to its ports, while the Port of Piraeus is the largest port in Eastern Europe. – The critical role and position of Greece are highlighted, underlying its role as a hub that connects India and the Middle East to Europe. – Greece needs to invest in infrastructure development, build a skilled workforce, and attract foreign investments. – Suggestions for establishing a successful commercial corridor between India and Greece are given, focusing on mutual interests and growth opportunities.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Trade, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, India, and Greece

70. The Yemeni Civil War: Territorial Partition as the Path to Peace

Author:: Riddhi Likhe
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: The Yemeni Civil War is a conflict that bears crucial regional significance due to its destabilising effect on the Middle East, with the country also being home to one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters. The conflict is characterised by a complex web of regional rivalries, sectarian tensions, and international interventions. This research paper offers a comprehensive assessment of the conflict by outlining its background, key actors and main conflict drivers, and hence proposes a theoretically, historically and contextually informed strategy for resolution- the peaceful territorial partition of Yemen into the historical entities of North Yemen and South Yemen. The paper outlines short-term, medium-term and long-term priorities that the ideal territorial partition plan would focus on, including and accounting for relevant primary, secondary and tertiary actors. The paper aims to showcase that through a nuanced understanding of Yemen’s demographic dynamics and history, a roadmap to ending the conflict focused on territorial partition can be charted out in collaboration with regional actors and the international community, hence leading to stable Yemens that can heal from the humanitarian catastrophe caused by the conflict.
Topic:: Security, Civil War, Peace, Humanitarian Crisis, and Partition
Political Geography:: Middle East and Yemen

71. Pakistan Security Report 2024: An Abridged Version

Author:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: Marking a 70% increase from the previous year, Pakistan experienced a total of 521 terrorist attacks in 2024. This intensified wave of terrorism claimed 852 lives, reflecting a 23% rise compared to the terrorism-related fatalities recorded the year before. Another 1,092 people were injured in these attacks recorded during the year. Although terrorist attacks were recorded in all four provinces and the federal capital in 2024, over 95% of them were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In 2024, a significant increase in militant fatalities was observed during operational strikes conducted by security forces in Pakistan. Compared to 373 militants killed in such operations in 2023, the number rose to 621 in 2024, marking a rise of over 66%. Overall, security forces and law enforcement agencies carried out 158 anti-militant operations in 2024, which was a 22% increase from the previous year. These are some of the key findings from Pakistan Security Report 2024, prepared and released by Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

72. Hate Crimes, Terrorism and the Framing of White Supremacist Violence with Shirin Sinnar (Episode 26)

Author:: Shirin Sinnar and Sahar Aziz
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: In the face of pervasive racial violence in American society, the effort to address and subdue white supremacist extremism has been underserved by the framing of “hate crimes,” and the movement to re-frame these events as domestic terrorism, as these terms do not meet the heavy task of eliminating the perpetuation of institutional oppression.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, White Supremacy, Racism, Hate Crimes, and Domestic Terrorism
Political Geography:: United States of America and North America

73. Public Expectations of Government Responses to Security Contingencies Around Japan

Author:: Satoshi Machidori, Harukata Takenaka, Amy Catalinac, and Kenneth McElwain
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: In this workshop, scholars Satoshi Machidori and Harukata Takenaka speak on Japanese public attitudes toward possible geopolitical contingencies in the light of changing international environment in East Asia. Their new, large-scale survey experiment examines voter assessments of possible government responses to security crises, including a possible Taiwan contingency. The report also analyzes how perceptions of shared ethnicity may affect public reactions to a hypothetical threat from a democratic regime, expanding the research on the relationship between ethnicity and democratic peace. This research is part of a multi-year study project by ROLES (Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies, University of Tokyo). Speakers: Satoshi Machidori, Professor of Political Science, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University, Japan Harukata Takenaka, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies = GRIPS, Japan Discussant: Amy Catalinac, Associate Professor of Politics, NYU Moderator: Kenneth Mori McElwain, Visiting Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Columbia University Hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and co-sponsored by China and the World Program and APEC Study Center.
Topic:: Security, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, and Ethnicity
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

74. Double Dealers: Lebanon and the Risks of Captagon Trafficking

Author:: Mohanad Hage Ali
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Lebanon’s financial collapse and the Syrian conflict have allowed for the growth of an illicit economy, giving rise to a new breed of drug traffickers with ties to Lebanese parties and influence in the security forces. To address this, the country must adopt a comprehensive approach.
Topic:: Security, Syrian War, Drug Trafficking, and Captagon
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

75. Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition

Author:: George Perkovich, Fumihiko Yoshida, and Michiru Nishida
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Preventing nuclear war and other existential military threats requires nations today to focus more on politics than on the qualities or quantities of weapons. Yet, many participants in nuclear policy debates do the opposite.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:: Global Focus

76. Reconsidering Sovereignty Amid the Climate Crisis

Author:: Nitya Labh
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The current international order is based on the presumption that our physical geography is fixed and unchanging. However, climate change—in the form of sea level rise and inundation—is shifting international boundaries. The world’s changing geography will force policymakers and legal experts to adapt the concepts of sovereignty, statehood, and citizenship to address the new global environment. This paper focuses its discussion of climate impacts and response policies on the Pacific islands. The changes befalling low-lying islands, like those in the Pacific, are a harbinger of the future that awaits the residents of coastal cities and shorelines on larger land bodies.1 Islands’ experiences of climate change offer insights into the shortcomings of the existing international system and demonstrate the fundamental tension between sovereignty and climate change. Ultimately, the Pacific region serves as an important case study and a critical blueprint for the future of global adaptation and stability. In view of this challenge, policymakers should consider new legal options to address climate-induced boundary changes. These may include the creation of fictitious boundaries, collective sovereignty, hybrid citizenship, and corridors for climate displacement. This paper does not seek to suggest that these new ideas for sovereignty are the only path to resolving the nexus of legal-climate challenges that exist today. Instead, this paper attempts to raise new questions and ideas about how policymakers should think about the international system at a time when anthropogenic climate and environmental change is rearranging its geophysical foundations.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Sovereignty, and International Order
Political Geography:: Indo-Pacific

77. Ending the New Wars of Attrition: Opportunities for Collective Regional Security in the Middle East

Author:: Amr Hamzawy
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The Middle East’s only viable path toward stability and security lies in fostering dialogue, coordinated initiatives, and joint diplomacy among its influential states.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Dialogue, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: Middle East

78. Q&A: What happened in the coastal region of Syria last week?

Author:: Muaz Al Abdullah
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: On 6 March, a group of armed supporters of former President Bashar al-Assad ambushed a group of security forces in Beit Ana village in the Lattakia countryside, killing and injuring several service members. Following the attack, the gunmen targeted an ambulance that tried to evacuate those who were killed and injured. This triggered a large-scale response by the security forces inside Beit Ana that included artillery shelling and helicopter strikes. Later that same day, Assad loyalists launched coordinated attacks across Lattakia and Tartus governorates to restore control over the main junctions that link the two provinces. This sparked a cycle of violence that included extrajudicial killings of people in the Alawite community by regime forces. At least 57 distinct locations in Lattakia, Hama, Homs, and Tartus governorates were the site of violence over four days (see map below).
Topic:: Security, Extrajudicial Killings, Armed Conflict, and Alawites
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

79. The Global Terrorist Threat Forecast in 2025

Author:: Liu Chunlin and Rohan Gunaratna
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: The global terrorist threat remains persistent and pervasive as the world moves into 2025. Armed conflicts from Ukraine to Gaza and destabilisation by both State and non-State actors are redefining international stability. The influence of groups such as Islamic State, al-Qaeda and Iranian-backed militias underscores the enduring risks. Key challenges include geopolitical rivalries, radicalisation and increasingly sophisticated cyber and physical attacks. With the Middle East at the epicentre of escalating tensions and Africa emerging as a new hotspot, coordinated international efforts are essential to prevent and counter threats. States must strengthen cooperation in intelligence, security and strategic foresight to deal with a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous global landscape.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Collaboration, Threat Assessment, 2023 Gaza War, Transnational Threats, and Salafi-Jihadism
Political Geography:: Middle East and Global Focus

80. Europe’s next watershed – how liberal Europe should react to Trump 2.0

Author:: Fabian Zuleeg
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The return of Donald Trump to the White House and his “America first” doctrine inevitably poses a fundamental challenge for the EU. Trump’s second presidency represents a new watershed moment: the policies of the next US administration are not just likely to put Europe at a global disadvantage, they will threaten its core objectives of prosperity, sustainability, security, and democracy. This is why European countries will have to act decisively to safeguard the bloc’s unity and strengthen its autonomy in a changed world. Assuming that a second Trump administration will resemble the first would be a serious error. Trump has become more extreme in his policy positions, while facing fewer constraints and operating in a more favourable international environment. As a result, preparing for a worst-case scenario may be a wise approach. Trump’s adversarial, zero-sum approach to international trade is likely to undermine the structures and processes of multilateral economic governance. Measures such as tariffs also threaten the EU’s growth and competitiveness and risk deepening divisions within the bloc. Global progress towards greater sustainability is certain to suffer. A disengagement on behalf of the US from its leadership role in environmental and climate governance will be a significant setback in these efforts. Should the US turn away from its climate goals, this would send a strong signal to other countries that these objectives are no longer a priority. On security, any potential benefit that a Trump presidency might produce in terms of strengthening EU unity is strongly undermined by his stance on Ukraine, which is set to increase the threat facing Europe from Russia. A US-imposed ceasefire would be no guarantee of lasting peace or security for Ukraine or for Europe. In response, the EU and its members will have to take a much bolder and more proactive role, sharply increasing Europe’s own military capabilities and spending. Policies that signal a tolerance for the use of open and covert force, in violation of international law, will also have profound consequences for global security. Far-right and anti-democratic forces within Europe are likely to be emboldened by an incoming Trump government. His actions to exploit Europe’s political divides are set to put significant pressure on European integration – a project Trump will have no qualms in undermining. The entrenchment and normalisation of Trump’s style of populistic, divisive politics and ‘us against them’ rhetoric risks eroding democratic debate more broadly. His amplification of falsehoods and disinformation will undermine public trust in the US and beyond, and could also boost political figures adopting similar strategies in Europe. There is strong potential for Trump’s anti-establishment narrative to gain further ground in Europe, and Europe’s illiberal, regressive and new-nativist forces will no doubt seek to harness this to increase their power. Should they be successful, there is a very real risk of the EU becoming hollowed-out and ineffectual. In this context, achieving consensus and acting with unity will be a greater challenge than ever for the EU27. Those within the EU who are prepared to take the necessary steps to rise to the challenge posed by Trump may have to explore unconventional forms of cooperation to act effectively. Moving forward in this way poses its own legal and political risks. But with European democracy at stake, it may be the only path to achieving the necessary level of ambition and unity to mount a strong response to Trump 2.0.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Donald Trump, Sustainability, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Europe

81. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

82. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency: Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Acontingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options. Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid. Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do. U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so: Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency. Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities. Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible. Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States. Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub. Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Coalition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

83. Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding: Analyzing Yemeni Civil Conflict Deadlocks

Author:: Felipe Duran and Marcial A. G. Suarez
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The roots of the ongoing civil conflict in Yemen lie in the inability of Yemeni society to address and resolve the frustration arising from political marginalization, economic deprivation and the effects of an extractive, corrupt and rent-seeking state. By definition, such systems are characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of a restricted elite and impose few restrictions on their exercise of power. This systemic failure has produced a cycle of violence, political upheaval, and institutional collapse since the creation of the modern Yemeni state in the 1960s, of which the current conflict appears to be only the latest eruption. We propose, as a way of accessing potential possible results for resolving the contradiction, a proposal based on the combination of policies based on Peace Studies, understanding that the mechanisms of the Security Sector Reform processes and transitional justice are crucial for the construction and peacebuilding in the Republic of Yemen. This work analyzes how structural violence has perpetuated in recent years in Yemen and how we can direct the conflict towards positive peace.
Topic:: Security, Civil War, Reform, Peacebuilding, and Structural Violence
Political Geography:: Middle East and Yemen

84. Kangaroo Concerns About Swiming Dragon Ambitions

Author:: Saira Aquil and Waheed Ur Rehman
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: China has accelerated its naval modernization in recent years. There are multiple factors behind this modernization drive. The rise of China in many ways is impacting political, economic, and security dynamics around the world but particularly in Asia-Pacific (Indo-Pacific). Australia is one of the country in this region which is not an exception in this regard. This study looks for implications of China’s naval modernization on Australia. The study makes an important contribution to the literature because this part of the world has not been looked into while analyzing Chinese naval modernization. Data is collected through primary and secondary sources. Besides reviewing the existing literature data is collected through key informant interviews and policy documents of China and Australia. Australian threat perception is evaluated by analyzing Australian Defense White Papers, speeches of Australian leaders and analysis of the country’s security analysts. The study finds that challenges posed by other nations in the region is prompting China to modernize its navy. This in turn enhances security concerns in Australia which is always wary of securing its territorial integrity, economic interests, and global liberal world order which has contributed to its development and security. Australia, in response to these developments, has embarked on the path of modernizing its own forces. It has bolstered its alliances with the US and other partners.
Topic:: Security, Navy, Modernization, Strategic Interests, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

85. Starr Forum: The US and the World Under Trump: The First 100 Days

Author:: Juliette N. Kayyem and Kori Schake
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Starr Forum: The US and the World Under Trump: The First 100 Days: Wednesday, April 16th, 2025. Juliette Kayyem and Kori Schake analyzed President Trump’s first 100 days in office and what this means for our nation and the world. Speakers: Juliette Kayyem is the faculty chair of the Homeland Security and Security and Global Health Projects at Harvard University and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. She also serves as a senior national security analyst for CNN where she has been described as CNN’s “go to” for disasters. A contributing writer to The Atlantic, Professor Kayyem has a weekly security segment on NPR’s Boston station WGBH. Her most recent book, "The Devil Never Sleeps: Learning to Live in an Age of Disasters," was described in a New Yorker profile as an “engagingly urgent blueprint for rethinking our approach to disaster preparedness and response.” She served as President Obama’s assistant secretary for intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. Kori Schake leads the foreign and defense policy team at the American Enterprise Institute. She is the author of "Safe Passage: the Transition from British to American Hegemony," and a contributing writer at the Atlantic, War on the Rocks, and Bloomberg. Before joining AEI, Dr. Schake was the deputy director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. She has had a distinguished career in government, working at the US State Department, the US Department of Defense, and the National Security Council at the White House. She has also taught at Stanford, West Point, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, National Defense University, and the University of Maryland. She has written additional books, including "America vs the West: Can the Liberal World Order Be Preserved?" and is coeditor, along with former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, of “Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military.” Moderator: Evan Lieberman is the Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa and the director of the MIT Center for International Studies. He conducts research on the political-economy of development, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. He studies the democratic politics of governing ethnically and racially diverse societies, including the challenges of public health, climate adaptation, and ensuring respect for human dignity. Lieberman is the author, most recently, of "Until We Have Won Our Liberty: South Africa after Apartheid."
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Public Health, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

86. What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba

Author:: Dmytro Kuleba, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, former foreign minister of Ukraine: Tuesday, April 8th, 2025. Speaker: Dmytro Kuleba is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and served as the foreign minister of Ukraine from March 2020-September 2024. Prior to that, he was deputy prime minister on matters of European relations from August 2019 to March 2020. He is internationally recognized as one of the most influential diplomats of his generation and a global champion for democracy, freedom, and resilience. Discussants: Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and US-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is director of the MIT-Ukraine Program at CIS.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

87. Starr Forum: Sudan Under Fire

Author:: Mai Hassan, Cameron Hudson, Kholood Khair, and Ahmed Kodouda
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Starr Forum: Sudan Under Fire: Monday, April 7th, 2025. As we enter year three of civil war, experts discussed the global crisis that has been too often ignored. Moderator: Mai Hassan is an associate professor of political science at MIT and the faculty director of the MIT-Africa Program at the Center for International Studies. Her work examines topics that span across authoritarian regimes, bureaucracy and public administration, and contentious politics. Speakers: Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to multiple other academic posts, Cameron served in the US government, including as an intelligence analyst in the Africa Directorate at the Central Intelligence Agency. Kholood Khair is the founder and director of Confluence Advisory, a 'think and do tank' formerly based in Khartoum that works on three priority policy areas: peace and security, economy, and governance. She is currently at Yale University as a visiting fellow. Ahmed Kodouda is a policy, advocacy, and communication specialist. He has an extensive background in conflict and post conflict settings and experience working with and consulting for governmental and NGOs around the world, including in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kenya.
Topic:: Security, Civil War, International Security, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Africa and Sudan

88. North Korea, Russia, and China: Past Cooperation & Future Prospects

Author:: Sydney Seiler
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Syd Seiler argues that recent developments in the relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia should be examined within the context of past interactions and North Korea’s geopolitical reality over the past several decades. North Korea’s pursuit of a distanced approach toward China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its post-Cold War management of the bilateral relationships while developing nuclear weapons, and contemporary developments within the North Korea-China-Russia triangle highlight limited shared interests and few signs of deliberate trilateralism. Despite skepticism regarding the durability of trilateralism, Seiler warns against neglecting the threat of collaboration and cooperation among the three countries. In particular, the evolving relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia holds the potential to harm the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and embolden North Korea to believe that the use of force might be justified within the New Cold War structure. Seiler outlines three scenarios in which the evolution of trilateralism could lead to North Korea employing military force on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the critical role of China and Russia in either restraining or encouraging North Korean revisionism. To properly respond to the dangerous transformation of the geopolitical environment, Seiler recommends the United States, South Korea, and like-minded states reinforce conventional and extended deterrence by convincing China and Russia that they will incur high costs for enabling North Korea’s coercive and revisionist behavior.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and North Korea

89. Siloed No More: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict

Author:: Clint Work
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This project was motivated by and builds upon earlier research tracing the evolution and apparent alignment of U.S. and South Korean signaling on Taiwan, wherein the South Korean government adopted a more outspoken position regarding “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and framed it in increasingly expansive terms—as a regional and global issue yet also directly linked to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. The previous research indicated the U.S.-ROK alliance faced a gap between its topline diplomatic rhetoric on Taiwan and its preparedness to navigate an actual conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan and the attendant risk of a simultaneous conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This project aimed to go beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Forty-two interviews were conducted from June 2024 to February 2025 in both Washington and Seoul. Most were in-person interviews with some conducted virtually or by written response via email. Through these interviews with U.S. and ROK current and former government officials, think tank experts, and academics—as well as open-source research—this project offers insight on the evolution and state of U.S.-ROK alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict, key challenges obstructing such discussions, and critical variables or dynamics the alliance would have to navigate in the event of a conflict.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

90. US interests can benefit from stronger congressional ties with the Caribbean

Author:: Wazim Mowla and Maite Gonzalez Latorre
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The Caribbean’s geographic proximity to the United States—as well as its use as a transit point for US citizens, goods, and financial services—makes it a crucial hub for US national interests. However, the relationship has suffered from inconsistent and infrequent assistance. Changes in US policy priorities bring ever-changing adjustments to US engagement, leaving the Caribbean, its leadership, and its institutions with insufficient time to benefit from US policy action. For Caribbean countries, policy continuity is critical for implementation and to see tangible and meaningful development. The region’s small populations and markets, vulnerability to natural disasters and changing global commodity prices, and limited institutional capacity slow the pace of receiving and utilizing development assistance and support. Underpinning US-Caribbean ties with stronger US congressional engagement can provide needed longevity to the relationship. Congressional actions—like newly appropriated resources and committee hearings—can bring tangible benefits to US-Caribbean relations.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Politics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Caribbean, North America, and United States of America

91. The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete

Author:: Clementine G. Starling-Daniels and Theresa Luetkefend
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Strategic competition is likely to intensify over the next decade, increasing the demands on the United States to deter and defend against wide-ranging and simultaneous security challenges across multiple domains and regions worldwide. In that time frame, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Force should more effectively leverage the competencies of US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to compete with US strategic adversaries. Three realities facing the DOD over the next decade lend themselves toward leveraging USSOF more in strategic competition. First, the growing need to counter globally active and increasingly cooperative aggressors, while the broader Joint Force remains focused on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, underscores the value of leveraging USSOF to manage competition in other regions. Second, the desire to avoid war and manage competition below the threshold of conflict aligns with USSOF’s expertise in the irregular aspects of competition. Third, unless defense spending and recruitment dramatically increase over the next decade, the Joint Force will likely have to manage more security challenges without a commensurate increase in force size and capabilities, which underscores the need for the DOD to maximize every tool at its disposal, including the use of USSOF to help manage strategic competition. The US government must harness all instruments of national power, alongside its network of allies and partners, to uphold international security, deter attacks, and counter efforts to undermine US security interests. Achieving this requires effectively integrating and leveraging the distinct roles of the DOD, interagency partners, the intelligence community (IC), and the Joint Force, including components like USSOF that have not been traditionally prioritized in strategic competition. For the past two decades, USSOF achieved critical operational successes during the Global War on Terror, primarily through counterterrorism and direct-action missions. However, peer and near-peer competition now demands a broader application of USSOF’s twelve core activities, with emphasis on seven: special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, unconventional warfare, and direct action. Over the next decade, the DOD should emphasize USSOF’s return to its roots—the core competencies USSOF conducted and refined during the Cold War. USSOF’s unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. During that era, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, and that is how USSOF should be applied in the next decade to help manage strategic competition. This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to: Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally. Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation. Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial. Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder. This report seeks to clarify USSOF’s role in strategic competition over the next decade, address gaps in understanding within the DOD and the broader national security community about USSOF’s competencies, and guide future resource and force development decisions. By prioritizing the above five functions, USSOF can bolster the US competitive edge and support the DOD’s management of challenges across diverse theaters and domains.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, National Security, Terrorism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Middle East, Latin America, and United States of America

92. Friends with benefits: Assessing Russian-Chinese military exercises

Author:: Narantsatsral Enkhbat
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: China-Russia joint strategic air patrols and naval manoeuvres near U.S. territory in the Pacifi c have become a growing trend, serving as geopolitical messaging. China is likely to become more involved in maritime security and power projection in the Arctic, as evidenced by its Coast Guard’s manoeuvres with Russia in the Northern Pacifi c. Russia conducts military drills and manoeuvres with China in the South China Sea (and potentially in the Taiwan Strait) to show support to China on territorial issues.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Geopolitics, Navy, Maritime, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

93. Uncharted Rebellion: The Shifting Frontiers of Left-Wing Extremism

Author:: José Pedro Zúquete
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: For readers of Baku Dialogues, a journal dedicated to fostering intellectual exchange across the Silk Road region, the study of left‑wing extremism (LWE) offers a lens into global ideological currents that resonate even in this historically rich and geopolitically and geoeconomically significant area. The Silk Road region, stretching from the South Caucasus to Central Asia, has long been a crossroads of cultures, ideas, and political movements. Today, it faces many of the same challenges of radicalization and extremism that afflict other parts of the world, though often in unique local forms.
Topic:: Security, Geopolitics, Leftist Politics, and Political Extremism
Political Geography:: Central Asia and South Caucasus

94. Infrastructure Grids and Networks. The Challenges Ahead, amid Security and Efficiency

Author:: Carlo Secchi and Alessandro Gili
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: In recent years, accelerating geopolitical tensions, economic disruptions, and climate-related disasters have elevated resilience and economic security to the forefront of both global and European policy agendas. In response, strategies such as de-risking have driven substantial investments in redundancy, new trade corridors, and expanded infrastructure – including railway lines, highways, ports, electricity grids, pipelines, and undersea digital cables. This infrastructure forms the backbone of the global economy. It is not only crucial for maintaining competitiveness and supporting growth but also plays a central role in enabling the energy and digital transitions. As such, protecting these systems from hostile actions or third-party interference has become an urgent priority. At the same time, the long-standing trade-off between efficiency and security has grown more pronounced amid increasingly strained international relations. Both governments and private sector actors are now more willing to absorb higher costs in order to enhance the resilience of supply chains and connectivity networks. Against this backdrop, a new paradigm is emerging - one that raises two critical questions: Where will the balance ultimately settle between economic efficiency and security/resilience? And what investment priorities will shape the future of transport, energy, and digital connectivity infrastructure?
Topic:: Security, Infrastructure, Economy, Energy, and Digital Transition
Political Geography:: Global Focus

95. Friends and Foes in the Indo-Pacific: Multilateralism Out, Minilateralism In?

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Guido Alberto Casanova
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Minilateralism is already among us, and it is here to stay. The well-known shortcomings of the multilateral system of governance are pushing individual states in the Indo-Pacific to come up with new and different solutions to deal with the security and prosperity issues that current institutions are unable to tackle. Amid growing geopolitical rivalries and the uncertainty provoked by the re-election of Donald Trump, this report aims to shed some clarity on an emerging trend that is already affecting the foreign policy of great powers in a region that is central to global affairs.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Multilateralism, Institutions, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, India, Asia, North Korea, Philippines, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

96. Dilemmas for the EU in deficit-financing of defence expenditure and maintenance of fiscal discipline

Author:: Lucio Pench
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union is grappling with the challenge of increasing defence expenditure while maintaining fiscal discipline under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The European Commission has proposed activating the national escape clause available under the SGP to accommodate defence spending without triggering the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). However, the scope and enforcement of this measure remain uncertain. A proposed 1.5 percent of GDP cap on extra fiscal flexibility is legally questionable and unlikely to be enforced. While low-debt countries do not require the clause due to existing flexibility, highly indebted nations may find it insufficient in the face of rising debt costs. The escape clause may also serve as a backdoor for European Central Bank interventions under the Transmission Protection Instrument, which requires compliance with EU fiscal rules. The Commission has also proposed the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) funding mechanism, a €150 billion loan programme to finance national defence investments. SAFE relies on national borrowing and follows the model of the SURE (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) facility, put in place during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, SAFE’s limited scale and dependence on national fiscal capacities mean it falls short of the collective security funding approach advocated by economists. Meanwhile, Germany’s decision to reform its constitutional debt brake marks a major departure from its traditional fiscal policies. The reform establishes a permanent ‘defence golden rule’, exempting military spending from borrowing limits, alongside a €10 trillion infrastructure fund. Although this move does not endanger Germany’s fiscal sustainability, it undermines EU-wide fiscal coordination and conflicts with the SGP. This could weaken the European Central Bank’s position in future market interventions. Given these challenges, discussions on a new EU fiscal framework are necessary to ensure fiscal flexibility while maintaining debt sustainability.
Topic:: Security, Budget, European Union, Fiscal Policy, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe

97. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?

Author:: Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

98. Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform

Author:: Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The economic strategy being defined by the 2024-2029 European Commission seems to follow the prescriptions on innovation and single market reform, and the expansive approach to industrial policy, set out by Mario Draghi in his September 2024 report on European Union competitiveness, with two important differences. First, the Commission stops short of calling for World Trade Organisation-prohibited subsidies – this is welcome. Second, the Commission proposes a new state aid framework for national industrial policy rather than expansion of EU-level public investment funding. This runs the risk of weakening the single market and harming competition, with the unintended consequence of protecting incumbents and inhibiting structural change. In terms of specific policies, on defence, the Commission is right to face up to the challenge of defining an EU procurement mechanism that offers sufficient speed and cost advantages to justify large-scale funding. On economic security and international partnerships, the Commission is right to take a broader approach than a foreign economic policy focused only on supply chains. What is lacking is a much greater commitment to providing support for climate mitigation in developing countries. The second Trump presidency creates risks for the Commission strategy. President Trump has gone further than expected in threatening territorial expansion and with the speed, aggression and disregard for the rule of law with which he has started to implement his policies. These factors will complicate the EU-United States relationship. The best defence against both Trump and the competitive and security threats posed by China is to accelerate policies that address the EU’s structural weaknesses: raising productivity growth, defence capacity and economic security. Economic security, in turn, requires more resilient trade relationships, less financial dependence on the US and an improved standing with emerging market and developing economies. The EU should also seize the opportunity offered by the shift in US policy from subsidies to deregulation. While the EU should not race Trump to the bottom on environmental or financial deregulation, it should rapidly improve its own regulatory framework while building on its core strengths: human capital and the rule of law. Unlike tariff wars or discriminatory subsidies, a competition to provide a good business environment is not a zero-sum game.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Industrial Policy, Budget, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, Sustainability, European Commission, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

99. Ukraine: European democracy’s affordable arsenal

Author:: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: European NATO members must raise defence spending by enough to deter through strength an irredentist Russia. This must be done possibly without the United States and when ageing populations demand higher social spending. Raising defence spending to sufficient levels could result in a doubling of current primary deficits to just over 3 percent of GDP on average. This seems likely to be a fiscally unattainable goal for this group of countries. European NATO members, in addition to their quantitative defence spending challenge, face the qualitative challenge of significantly increasing their outlays on new modern military equipment, especially drones, to credibly deter Russia. This will require all European NATO members to significantly increase investments in their domestic and regional military-industrial capacities. While its armed forces are physically defending their country against Russia’s onslaught, Ukraine is transforming gradually into a very large, advanced and cost-competitive military equipment and weapons producer. Through the so-called ‘Danish Model’, individual European Union and NATO members are already actively funding Ukrainian defence production, helping it to help itself against Russia. Much more focus should be put on Ukraine’s ability, if fully integrated with the military-industrial sector in the rest of Europe, to produce much of the modern military equipment wanted by itself and the rest of Europe. This Policy Brief shows how Ukraine already produces drones and modern howitzers, arguably the two most important weapons in defensive warfare today, at prices well below those achieved by other Western military suppliers. The EU, with a fully integrated and funded Ukrainian military-industrial sector, will have the capacity to produce much of the cost-competitive military equipment it will need in future, while continuing to fund its welfare systems. To facilitate this development, the EU must in all defence and military-related matters begin treating Ukraine immediately as a full EU member.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Industrial Policy, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

100. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:: Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS