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1. Protecting the North American Arctic and Beyond

Author:
Mathieu Boulegue, Rebecca Pincus, and Madison Lipson
Publication Date:
11-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The United States has quickly adapted to the new security environment in a changing Arctic, as the region must deal with geopolitical tension stemming from Russia, the impact of climate change, and NATO’s increased role and presence. Many unknowns remain, however. Turning current and future US strategic documents and concepts about the Arctic into reality does not have any easy solutions. This will require continued endeavor and patience. The US should ensure prevailing in the Arctic in terms of homeland security and forward defense. Forward defense in the Arctic will require forward-thinking, notably what constitutes Arctic-specific integrated deterrence through tailored and calibrated presence as part of the Joint Force. A large part of this endeavor falls on the leadership of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM must be empowered to become the Department of Defense’s Arctic “capability advocate” under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the Total Force concept. USNORTHCOM must be emboldened to take the lead in associated challenges to defend the US homeland, secure the region, cooperate with allies, and bridge potential security gaps. This paper seeks to help USNORTHCOM leverage its influence in shaping the future of Arctic security for the US homeland. It offers plenty of innovative policy recommendations and action points aimed at streamlining the role of NORTHCOM to keep the Arctic safe and secure for the US and its allies. Future policy must address the need to enhance Arctic domain awareness and foster a new approach to Arctic-specific capabilities, technologies, and procurement tailored to the environment. Part of this endeavor is also connected to bridging potential gaps related to logistics, sustainment, maintenance, and transportation adapted to Arctic-specific requirements. This will ensure increased mobility and reach across the region. USNORTHCOM should ensure that regular Arctic drills and exercises under its supervision systematically include logistics and sustainment as essential parts of training. Policy must also clarify the role of the primary Arctic combatant command by identifying structural gaps and bridging them, especially in times of crisis or escalation. Better synchronization of efforts will help the US reach a common operating picture of the Arctic from a whole of government perspective.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and USNORTHCOM
Political Geography:
North America and Arctic

2. Aftermath of Al-Fashir’s Fall to Rapid Support Forces

Author:
Andrew McGregor
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured al-Fashir in late October after an 18-month siege, consolidating RSF control over western Sudan and providing a potential capital for a new state. After entering al-Fashir, the RSF carried out mass looting, ethnic targeting, and killed 460 people at the al-Saudi maternity hospital in an attack that brought international outrage. Parallel RSF sieges in Kordofan indicate a strategy to divide Sudan. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) is struggling to maintain control, but still currently favors a military solution over diplomatic negotiations.
Topic:
Security, Armed Conflict, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and al-Fashir

3. Revitalizing Integrated Tactical Units to Combat West Africa’s Irregular Militant Groups

Author:
Fatai Alli
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Legacy battalion-based formations designed for conventional, linear warfare are poorly matched for the dispersed, fast-moving insurgent threats confronting multiple West African countries. Enhanced operational mobility ensures reach, speed, and tactical unpredictability. Effectiveness in contemporary irregular warfare depends on integrated tactical units, intelligence-enabled maneuver, and sustained operational reach.
Topic:
Security, Counterinsurgency, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa and West Africa

4. Prospects and Problems for Reinvigorating Superpower Nuclear Cooperation

Author:
Ariel Petrovics
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A three-way nuclear arms race between the United States, China, and Russia looms — an escalation that would erode global nonproliferation and usher in an era of unchecked nuclear proliferation. This brief offers a path to preventing this destabilizing outcome through pragmatic nuclear cooperation — an approach that has strong historical precedent and accords with the strategic interests of all three nuclear superpowers. Superpower cooperation historically underpinned the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, but increasing great power competition erodes this entire system of international security. China and Russia have each modernized and expanded their nuclear programs and adopted more aggressive nuclear postures. The United States, in turn, has approved a nearly $2 trillion nuclear modernization program. This burgeoning arms race heightens risks of inadvertent escalation, as each of the superpowers become increasingly reliant on nuclear brinkmanship to hold off the growing capabilities of their adversaries. The deteriorating nuclear security environment places pressure on other states to similarly seek their own nuclear arsenals while weakening the nonproliferation tool kit that previously prevented these states from breaking out. As more armed states join the fray, they in turn multiply the number of potential nuclear flashpoints around the world. Reinvesting in superpower cooperation on nuclear security is not an idealistic bid for goodwill. Rather, halting unchecked competition is a pragmatic strategy that serves the interests of the United States, Russia, and China. It preserves a global nuclear system that has safeguarded the superpowers’ dominance for decades. Weakening it, on the other hand, undermines the international marketplace that has preserved U.S. dominance in private industry and innovation. Russia and China, in turn, risk a multifront nuclear competition, as proximate U.S. allies choose uncontrolled independent arsenals over existing security umbrellas. The superpowers can still step back from the abyss by reviving nuclear cooperation. Toward that objective, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Accept Russia’s offer to extend New START for a year, paired with verification pathways and transparency measures. Reinvigorate existing direct lines of communication (i.e., hotline systems) with both Russia and China. Initiate trilateral nuclear discussions with Russia and China toward the goal of capping arsenals at parity on specific warheads and delivery systems.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

5. The Case for Legal Reform in the IDF

Author:
Gabi Siboni
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The war has exposed a troubling pattern of legal encroachment on the battlefield, with the legal system shifting from a supporting role to a dominant force shaping security outcomes—at times at the expense of victory and at increased risk to soldiers. This paper proposes reforms to restore the balance between legal advice and security needs, remove self-imposed constraints, and return the IDF to a single clear objective: decisive victory
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Reform, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

6. Turkey–Israel Relations: Strategic Context and Policy Considerations

Author:
Gabi Siboni and Erez Winner
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Between Ankara’s regional ambition, ideological and religious zeal, and economic vulnerability—implications for Israel’s security and diplomacy
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

7. As Erdogan Tightens His Grip on Syria, What Can Israel Do?

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Following the agreement between the al-Sharaa regime and the Kurds, the consolidation of Turkish influence in Syria presents strategic dilemmas for Israel
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Kurds, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Ahmad al-Sharaa
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

8. Deconstructing Kosovo's relations with Turkiye - Between Reality and Expectations

Author:
Asllan Zenunaj
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This paper examines the evolution of relations between Kosovo and Türkiye from Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 to 2025, with a specific focus on the security dimension of this partnership. Its central aim is to analyse how Türkiye’s foreign policy tools and priorities toward Kosovo have evolved under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and how these changes are perceived domestically in Kosovo, particularly in light of Kosovo’s stated Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The analysis reveal change and continuities in Türkiye’s engagement, complementing an early emphasis on historical, religious and cultural narratives associated with “Neo-Ottomanism” to a more pragmatic “Erdoganism”, an interest-driven approach, particularly evident after 2022. The initial engagement under the AKP was heavily heavily influenced by Ahmet Davutoğlu's “Strategic Depth” doctrine, which emphasized soft power, shared heritage, and a “zero problems with neighbors” policy. This included religious diplomacy through institutions like the Diyanet (Presidency of Religious Affairs) and TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), which promoted a shared Sunni-Hanafi Islamic identity and renovated Ottoman-era heritage sites. The paper argues this has complimented by a more assertive “Erdoganism”, which combines strategic depth with hard-power tools, particularly economic and defense cooperation, where Türkiye has become a crucial partner in modernizing the Kosovo Security Force through the provision of advanced military hardware and joint industrial projects. Additionally, Türkiye’s command of KFOR in 2023 and 2025 underscores its central position in regional security underlying the strong coordination between the bilateral agreements within the spirit of NATO’s formal structure and coordination with key allies like the United States. The paper also finds out that the Strategic partnership between Türkiye and Kosovo can be seen as exceeding its line between cooperation and interference in Kosovo’s domestic affairs, nevertheless these perceptions often derive from the misconceptions regarding the excessive use of Ankara’s soft-power tools. Henceforth, although Türkiye has sought to shape the country’s cultural narratives and public discourse, leveraging historical memory and kinship ties to project influence within local institutions and communities, there is a notable divergence between public perception and strategic reality. While an overwhelming 91% of Kosovars view Türkiye favorably, strategic allegiance remains firmly with the United States, indicating that popular support is emotive and pragmatic rather than an ideological endorsement of Türkiye’s political model. The paper recommends that Kosovo navigate this complex dynamic by supporting the transition from personalized “brotherhood diplomacy” toward a more structured, transparent, and institutionalized state‑to‑state partnership, one that avoids political interference on either side, remains embedded within NATO‑compatible frameworks, and is clearly communicated as complementary to Kosovo’s Euro‑Atlantic integration. Such an approach would allow Kosovo to maximize the benefits of its partnership with Türkiye while safeguarding its secular, independent, and democratic principles.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Kosovo, and Balkans

9. Monitoring Demilitarised Zones in the Age of Uncrewed and AI Systems: Lessons from the Korean DMZ

Author:
Michael M. Bosack
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:
Demilitarised zones (DMZs) have demonstrated their utility in post-war peace processes. They separate forces, mitigating the risk of deliberate aggression or accidental incidents alike. However, the effective monitoring of DMZs can be challenging, because they tend to cover wide areas, sometimes with dangerous terrain replete with human-made and natural hazards. As such, parties responsible for monitoring DMZs rely on a passive posture where they simply respond to reported incidents, an active posture using personnel or technology wherever resources and the terrain will allow, or a combination of the two. With continued advances in uncrewed systems and artificial intelligence (AI), there are now ever-increasing calls for the employment of these technologies in DMZ monitoring functions. This is true of the Korean DMZ, a 240 km-long, 4 km-wide swathe of land that bifurcates the Korean Peninsula between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (or South Korea). In this area, the South Korean government is seeking to enhance its monitoring capabilities by using uncrewed and AI-based systems. In theory, there are many benefits to this approach, but in practice, policymakers and practitioners must address five inter-related dilemmas to ensure that these technologies actually support peace implementation instead of contributing to unintended conflict and tension. The problems associated with these dilemmas are not insurmountable, but they require deliberate steps and conscious implementation to maximise the opportunities that modern technologies provide while mitigating their risks. The lessons from the Korean DMZ are applicable in any post-war demilitarized zone, including the one envisioned between Russia and Ukraine. This Policy Brief proceeds as follows. It first outlines the function of DMZs in post-war environments and the practical challenges associated with monitoring them. It then examines the potential advantages that uncrewed and AI-enabled systems offer in addressing these challenges. Next, it assesses the implications of five inter-related policy dilemmas – legal, moral, technological, practical, and security – that arise from introducing such systems into DMZ contexts. This analytical framework is then applied to the Korean DMZ as a contemporary case study. Finally, policy recommendations are advanced aimed at ensuring that the use of emerging technologies strengthens, rather than undermines, peace implementation and long-term stability in DMZs.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, Post-Conflict, and Demilitarized Zones (DMZs)
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

10. If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Research on the possibility and likely outcome of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has expanded rapidly in recent years. Studies have focused on a broad range of questions related to deterrence, potential conflict dynamics, and possible conflict outcomes. Tabletop exercises have been used to identify gaps in the capabilities of the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan to assess potential escalation pathways and to better understand war termination strategies.1 Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the potential impact of cross-Strait conflict on the PRC itself and how that impact could shape President Xi Jinping’s risk calculus and decision-making about use of force against Taiwan. Xi’s risk calculus is crucial to understanding if and under what circumstances Beijing might take aggressive actions against Taiwan because any such decision would carry profound political, economic, and strategic consequences for the PRC and for him personally. Xi has tied his legitimacy to putting the PRC on an irreversible path toward the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation by 2049 and unifying Taiwan with the motherland is deemed essential to that goal. Yet a military conflict over Taiwan would risk massive economic disruption, catastrophic military losses, significant social unrest, and devastating sanctions, all of which could turn his dream into a nightmare and undermine his political authority. Xi’s calculus must therefore weigh the perceived benefits of using force to achieve unification against the potential costs. The centrality of Xi’s risk calculus to understanding future PRC decision-making about potential actions against Taiwan demands deeper investigation than has taken place so far. This report seeks to fill this research gap by examining how use of force against Taiwan would impact the PRC in four key areas: its economy, its military capabilities, its social stability, and international costs. Each issue set is evaluated in a separate paper, although all four are interrelated, a factor that the report’s conclusion addresses. Logan Wright and Charlie Vest assess potential implications for the PRC economy. Joel Wuthnow analyzes the possible impact on the Chinese military. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi consider the potential risks for social stability. Zack Cooper examines the likely international responses and costs. There is a broad range of possible scenarios for PRC use of force against Taiwan. Potential actions taken by Beijing may vary in terms of intensity and duration. To make comparisons possible across the four papers, the authors were given two baseline scenarios, a limited conflict and a major war. Both are described in detail below. In outlining these scenarios, specific triggers were not established. They would nevertheless be important in determining international responses and subsequently would have implications for the PRC economy and possibly for social stability. Although the absence of a detailed trigger is a limiting factor, in any crisis multiple actors will draw their own conclusions about what sparked the conflict, so perceptions of who was at fault would differ across countries. The authors were also permitted to assess cases situated between a minor conflict and a major war, given that the economic, military, political, and international costs may vary discontinuously across a range of scenarios. All scenarios were assumed to occur between 2026 and 2030. The first scenario that authors assess is a minor conflict lasting several weeks. In this case, PRC ships and aircraft surround Taiwan after a series of deadly air and maritime confrontations between their forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) then attempts to conduct a “quarantine” of major ports in Taiwan. The United States intervenes and its warships escort commercial vessels through the blockade zone without incident. For the purposes of this scenario, dozens of PRC and Taiwan armed forces members are assumed killed in incidents in the air and at sea. There are no losses of foreign personnel. The conflict terminates when both sides agree to de-escalate the situation. This results in a relatively low intensity and short duration conflict. The second scenario that authors were asked to review was a major conflict of several months that ends in a PLA defeat. This conflict starts with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in which initial PLA missile strikes target Taiwan’s military and US forces in Japan and Guam. PRC forces land on Taiwan but supplies and follow-on forces are hampered by sustained Taiwanese and US strikes on ships and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait. After several months of heavy fighting, PRC forces withdraw to the mainland after losing roughly 100,000 personnel. Taiwan suffers approximately 50,000 military casualties and 50,000 civilian casualties. The United States loses 5,000 military members and 1,000 civilians, while Japan loses 1,000 military members and 500 civilians. Beyond this, no substantial foreign losses occur. The conflict terminates when the PLA withdraws from the main island of Taiwan but retains control of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The purpose of these scenarios is not to assert that this is how a conflict over Taiwan would play out. The intention is instead to help describe in more detail what the costs would be to the PRC of a failed crossstrait operation. An important caveat is that the authors were asked to make their own assessments of the impact on the PRC in each of the four areas examined. They were not asked to put themselves in Xi’s (or his successor’s) shoes. Xi and his colleagues might underestimate (or overestimate) the costs that the PRC would incur in these scenarios. Even if Beijing anticipates that the costs of taking an action against Taiwan are high, they might proceed despite the perceived risks. National leaders often make choices that overlook high costs if the perceived benefits are high or overridden by political considerations. Xi might conclude that not acting is more costly for him personally than taking a risky action that he believes is necessary to demonstrate resolve. For example, if Xi views a step taken by Taipei as intended to permanently separate it from the PRC, and especially if he judges that Washington supports that goal, he is likely to move against Taiwan even if he expects that the PLA would suffer high casualties in attempting to seize it. Overall, the authors of these essays demonstrate that the costs to the PRC of a failed military operation against Taiwan would be substantial. As noted above, this is not to suggest that Beijing would necessarily be deterred from starting a conflict in the first place. But it would be a mistake to simply assume that the PRC would prevail in a conflict over Taiwan. The history of failed amphibious operations is long, and these essays demonstrate that an unsuccessful PRC-initiated conflict would have severe negative consequences for the country’s economy, military, social stability, and international standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia